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Vatican Council I: Its Political and Religious Setting*

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Almost exactly three hundred years after the last session at the Council of Trent and some fifteen centuries since the faithful had gathered at Nicaea, Pope Pius IX, with all the pageantry and ritual befitting the solemnity of the occasion, opened the first general Vatican council on December 8, 1869. The twentieth such convocation in the history of the church, it was called at a time when the church once again felt threatened. Since 1789 political, social, economic, and intellectual changes had spawned forces and ideologies hostile to the church's position.

New national states, born of war and revolution, claimed the complete allegiance of their people. Liberal concepts of freedom of thought and education, of worship and conscience, of the press and association conflicted with the church's traditional responsibility for the moral, spiritual, and educational welfare of Catholics. The changing character of economic life, accompanied by technological advances, was creating a society whose goals and ideals were wholly secular. The progress of scientific thought and its influence on other fields of scholarship emphasized the conflict between secular learning and the church. By 1869 a serious crisis had arisen. The church's domain, both religious and temporal, was being whittled away, and there was dissent among Catholics as to how the church should meet the challenges of the century.

The first year in the pontificate of Pope Pius IX¹ hardly presaged the bitterness and disillusionment of its last two decades. His election in June 1846 had seemed to open a new era for the church. The year 1847 was a particularly happy one. At its beginning, Ozanam perhaps

* A shorter version of this paper under the title "Vatican Council I and the Crisis of the Times" was presented at the American Historical Association meeting in Philadelphia on December 28, 1963.

¹ R. Ballerini, S.J., *Les premières pages du pontificat de Pie IX* (Rome, 1909). Written in 1867, corrected by Pius IX, but not published until much later, it presents a subjective view of the pope. For general works on Pius IX and his pontificate see P. Aubert, *Le pontificat de Pie IX (1846-1878) (Histoire de l'église, depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours, ed. A. Fliche and V. Martin, Vol. XXI [Paris, 1952])*; E. E. Y. Hales, *Pio Nono* (London, 1954); L. P. Wallace, *The Papacy and European Diplomacy, 1869-1878* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1948); and E. L. Woodward, *Three Studies in European Conservatism: Metternich, Guizot, the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century* ([London], 1963), pp. 276-339.

summarized the feelings of many about the new pope when he wrote to Dom Guéranger on January 29, 1847 that Pius IX “seemed truly to have been sent by God” to bring about “the alliance of religion and liberty.”² Toward its end, Massimo D’Azeglio commented to a French friend: “If Pius IX continues . . . [thus] he [will] become the moral leader of Europe and . . . will re-establish the unity of Christianity.”³

Throughout 1847 the church’s relations with foreign countries entered a new phase. A concordat was signed with Russia, under whose control lived millions of Polish Catholics.⁴ At about the same time the sultan of Turkey, increasingly irked at the interference of England, Russia, and particularly of France on behalf of his Christian subjects, welcomed a suggestion of an Italian priest that the Holy See be entrusted with their protection. The Ottoman government consequently authorized the re-establishment of the Latin patriarchate at Jerusalem to look after all Catholics in the Turkish empire. In 1848 the government of England went so far as to propose to parliament an “act enabling her Majesty to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with the Court at Rome,” but a parliamentary amendment that forbade receiving in England papal envoys who were ecclesiastics nullified the proposal’s intent.⁵ Finally, President Polk recommended to Congress the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican to replace the consular office at Rome.⁶

In Italy cries of *Viva Pio Nono!* were heard as many Italian nationalists began to consider the pope the champion of national independence, especially after he protested Austria’s occupation of Ferrara in August 1847. But the upheavals of 1848–49 radically altered the course of Pius IX’s pontificate. After the Roman revolution the pope returned from exile with none of his former sympathies. In truth, as one student of his pontificate and character has remarked, Pius IX, while manifesting until 1848 a certain indulgence toward liberal “institutions,” had never accepted or supported liberal “principles.”⁷ The course of events only strengthened the convictions already expressed on

² Dom P. Delatte, *Dom Guéranger abbé de Solesme* (Paris, [1909–10]), I, 410.

³ Letter to Eugène Rendu, Sept. 20, 1847, quoted in H. d’Ideville, *Le comte Pellegrino Rossi, sa vie, son œuvre, sa mort. 1787–1848* (Paris, 1887), p. 182.

⁴ S. Olszamowska-Skowrońska, *Le Concordat de 1847 avec la Russie d’après les documents authentiques* (Rome, 1963); A. Boudou, S.J., *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie. Leur relations diplomatiques au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1922), I, 508–64. Relations with Russia were subsequently broken in 1864 over Russian repression of the 1863 Polish insurrection, and the concordat was abrogated in 1867.

⁵ R. A. Graham, *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane* (Princeton, N.J., 1959), pp. 75–76.

⁶ L. F. Stock (ed.), *United States Ministers to the Papal States, 1848–1868* (Washington, D.C., 1933), pp. xxi–xxiii.

⁷ Aubert (see n. 1 above), p. 39.

November 9, 1846 in his first encyclical, *Qui pluribus*, in which he had denounced in the strongest possible terms the “monstrous errors” of the times and those individuals working “to overthrow divine and human laws [and] to sap the bases of Catholic religion and of civil society.”⁸

As liberals and conservatives tried to recover from the conflict of 1848–49, the position of the church seemed to become stronger. Concordats with Spain in 1851 and Austria in 1855 regularized church-state relations to the advantage of Rome. The re-establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchies in England in 1850 and in Holland in 1854 extended papal authority. Relations with France rested on the Napoleonic Concordat of 1804, and Napoleon’s nephew was quick to grasp the importance of Catholic support for his rule.

This peaceful interlude, however, was followed by worsening relations between the church and a secular society coming increasingly under the influence of liberalism, nationalism, positivism, science, and socialism. In addition to these external threats, intra-Catholic differences once again created serious problems. Liberal Catholics in Germany and France were pressing for a rapprochement between the church and the modern world. Their leaders—Montalembert, Dupanloup, Döllinger, and Strossmayer—challenged the Roman curia and the ultramontanes.

In the light of these developments it became imperative for the papacy to reassert its doctrinal leadership and to clarify, both for the outside world and for the factions within the church, its attitude toward the modern world. Subsequent developments in the pontificate of Pius IX can best be understood as the expression of papal determination to counter the opponents of the church and religion and to re-establish internal discipline. Simultaneously, feeling grew in Vatican circles that a firm stand needed to be taken against the ideological errors of the nineteenth century. This feeling was strengthened by the series of events which began in Italy in 1859–60.

After the midcentury debacle had revealed the futility of individual efforts to free Italy from Austrian control, the Kingdom of Sardinia, in the skilful hands of Cavour, slowly assumed the leadership of the national movement. Cavour’s diplomacy succeeded in winning French support for Sardinian efforts against Austria. As a former Carbonaro, Napoleon III had not completely lost his sympathies for the cause of

⁸ *Recueil des allocutions consistoriales, encycliques et autres lettres apostoliques des souverains pontifes . . . citées dans l’encyclique et le syllabus du 8 décembre 1864* (hereafter cited as “*Recueil*”) (Paris, 1865), pp. 172–95. See pp. 174, 176, 180.

Italian unity. The Pact of Plombières translated this lurking sympathy into a commitment. In 1859–60, war against Austria, revolution, and military occupation brought under the control of the House of Savoy most of the Italian peninsula, including Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches, part of the church's temporal domain. Only Rome and a small surrounding area known as the Patrimony of St. Peter's remained under papal sovereignty. Cavour hoped that the pope could be persuaded to surrender Rome in return for important concessions. At first, negotiations⁹ seemed to offer hope for a possible settlement, but on March 18, 1861 Pius IX warned in his allocution, *Jandulum cernimus*,¹⁰ that he would not accept any loss of territory. At the same time, Cardinal Antonelli, the papal secretary of state, broke off discussion.¹¹ In two important speeches to the Italian Parliament meeting at Turin Cavour laid down the lines for future Italian action.¹² He insisted that Rome should and would become the capital of Italy, and he proclaimed the principle of a "free church in a free state."¹³ Continued conflict between the church and the new Italian state appeared inevitable.

The loss of the papal states came as a severe shock to all Catholics. More than ever it appeared imperative for the church to make its position clear. Monseigneur Gerbet, archbishop of Perpignan, presented to the pope a list of eighty-five errors of the modern age which, he suggested, might be condemned by the pope.¹⁴ Considering this list a good starting point, the pope charged a commission of theologians to choose the most important errors and document them theologically. In February 1862 the commission reported back with sixty-one propositions. Despite the secrecy imposed on its work, a news leakage occurred, and in July the French ambassador sent the list to his government. In October a Turin weekly published the complete text with its criticisms, and discussion in the press of all countries followed. Pius IX then de-

⁹ *La questione romana negli anni 1860–61. Carteggio del Conte di Cavour con D. Pantaleoni, C. Passaglia, O. Vimercati* (hereafter cited as "Questione romana") (2 vols.; Bologna, 1929); S. Jacini, *Il tramonto del potere temporale nelle relazioni degli ambasciatori austriaci a Roma. 1860–1870* (Bari, 1931), pp. 42–63; A. C. Jemolo, *Chiesa e stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni* (Turin, 1948), pp. 225–40.

¹⁰ *Recueil* (see n. 8 above), pp. 434–45.

¹¹ *Questione romana* (see n. 9 above), II, 66–73, 89–91, 99, 116–17, 120–23; R. De Cesare, *Roma e lo Stato del Papa dal ritorno di Pio IX al 20 settembre* (Rome, 1907), II, 101–18.

¹² *Atti ufficiali del Parlamento italiano. Camera dei Deputati. Legislatura VIII* (hereafter cited as "Atti"), speech of Mar. 25, 1861, pp. 135–37, and speech of Mar. 27, 1861, pp. 154–56.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁴ Aubert (see n. 1 above), p. 248.

cided to refer the whole question to a new commission instructed to study and to extract from his previous allocutions, letters, and encyclicals passages in which he had already condemned the errors listed.¹⁵

In the meanwhile, papal rule in Rome itself was once again being threatened. After Cavour's death in June 1861, the Italian government had desisted from further claims to the Eternal City in the face of Napoleon's veto and the presence of French troops in Rome. However, Garibaldi, now a private citizen, felt no obligation to honor his government's apparent acquiescence to French wishes. In June 1862 he disembarked in Sicily and began to enrol volunteers with the cry, "Rome or death." Crossing over to the mainland, his irregulars were stopped by Italian army groups at Aspromonte. The situation became crucial for the new Italian state, as inflamed public opinion supported Garibaldi. Some conciliatory gesture was needed, but Napoleon could not risk antagonizing conservative French Catholics. After considerable negotiating, France and Italy arrived at the September Convention in 1864. France agreed to withdraw its troops from Rome within two years. In return Italy promised to guarantee the territorial integrity of Rome and the independence of the papacy and to show its good will by transferring the capital to Florence. The convention satisfied no one. In France Napoleon was accused of abandoning the pope to a hostile power. Italians turned against their government for signing away what they felt to be inalienable rights to Rome. To the pope it seemed an act of treachery by Napoleon.

Pius IX had additional reason to be distressed at the course of events. Not only was his remaining territorial independence in serious jeopardy, but liberal Catholics were again threatening to follow a line not at all in agreement with pontifical ideas. In the summer of 1863 the first Congress of Belgian Catholics had met at Malines. One of the featured speakers was Montalembert, the champion of French liberal Catholicism, who addressed the group on August 20 and 21.¹⁶ Choosing his words carefully, he said that he spoke not of theology or theory but of politics and history.¹⁷ To the audience, Montalembert's words brought back the dreams of liberal Catholics in 1848 as he told them that "religion . . . needed liberty . . . no less than liberty needed religion."¹⁸ Quoting Lacordaire, he reminded them that if Catholicism wanted liberty they must want it for all men. He himself supported

¹⁵ All these are to be found in *Recueil* (see n. 8 above).

¹⁶ C. F. de Montalembert, *L'église libre dans l'état libre; discours prononcés à l'assemblée générale des Catholiques à Malines (18-22 août 1863)* (Brussels 1863).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

“freedom of conscience in the interest of Catholicism”¹⁹ and felt that the church could reach agreement with the modern state. Immense progress would result from solidarity between Catholic liberty and public liberty, and the conciliation of the church’s tradition with the aspirations of modern society would be an admirable achievement.²⁰ He concluded that the church, which in the past had done so much for the advancement of civilization, could never be “indifferent or hostile to the new needs of human society.”²¹

Distressed and indignant, first at the loss of the papal states, then at Napoleon’s agreement with Italy, and finally at the resurgence of a liberally oriented Catholic faction, Pius IX was galvanized into making the sweeping condemnation, so long in preparation, of the modern world and its doctrines. On December 8, 1864 Pius IX promulgated the encyclical *Quanta cura*, to which was appended a catalogue or Syllabus of eighty errors anathema to the church.²² Actually, the errors condemned were “old errors revived in modern times.”²³ The propositions had been culled from previous pontifical pronouncements. Listed together they represented a formidable indictment of the modern world. Among the eighty unacceptable errors appeared pantheism, naturalism, rationalism that claimed freedom from ecclesiastical authority for philosophy and theology, indifferentism that considered all religions equally, socialism, communism, Gallicanism, false doctrines on church-state relations, erroneous moral concepts on Christian marriage, denial of the pope’s temporal power, and finally modern liberalism. The eightieth and last proposition gave final emphasis to the document when it declared anathema that the “pope could and should reconcile himself and come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.”²⁴

The reaction to these pronouncements differed with the persuasion of the individual. The ultramontanes rejoiced that the pope had finally made his position unequivocal. In France the document was taken as a condemnation of the liberal Catholics grouped around the newspaper *Correspondant*. The liberals and anticlericals interpreted it as a declaration of war upon modern society and as a definite divorce between Catholicism and the modern world. Among liberal Catholics reactions varied. Some adopted prudence and laid less public stress on their

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 72.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²² *Recueil* (see n. 8 above), pp. 2–35.

²³ J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* (Graz, 1961), Vol. XLIX, col. 10.

²⁴ *Recueil* (see n. 8 above), p. 34.

liberalism. Others drifted away from the church. Still others tried to parry the effect of the Syllabus.²⁵

The Archbishop of Orléans, Monseigneur Dupanloup, had been preparing a protest against the September Convention when news of the papal encyclical reached him. Working day and night he added a second part in which he discussed the condemning propositions of the *Quanta cura* and the Syllabus within their context. He explained that the church thought in terms of ideals and censured modern liberalism as an ideal opposed to Catholicism. This, however, was in no way inconsistent with permission for Catholic citizens to adapt themselves to modern conditions as a practical necessity. His book appeared on January 26, 1865²⁶ and was an immediate success. It went through thirty-four French editions, was published in full or in part by many newspapers, and was translated into many languages.²⁷ That Dupanloup's interpretation did not seem to displease the Vatican appeared from the fact that, on the day of the book's publication, Monsignor Chigi, papal nuncio to Paris, sent Dupanloup a congratulatory note,²⁸ and on February 4 the pope approved its concepts publicly.²⁹ Earlier he had already commented to a friend of Dupanloup that the latter "had explained the encyclical and made clear how it should be understood."³⁰

It is at this time that plans for an ecumenical council began to be formulated definitely. On December 6, 1864, two days before issuing *Quanta cura*, Pius IX had informed the cardinals of his intention to convoke a council of the church "to counter by such an extraordinary measure the extraordinary needs of the faithful."³¹ He requested the cardinals to study the idea and to inform him individually in writing and in secret of their thoughts on the matter.

The cardinals' replies are most illuminating on how the problems of the times appeared to the leaders of the church.³² While most of the cardinals approved of the council, many expressed grave doubts and pointed out possible obstacles in the way. The majority concurred in

²⁵ A. Quacquarelli, *La crisi della religiosità contemporanea* (Bari, 1946), pp. 18-41; Jacini (see n. 9 above), pp. 130-36.

²⁶ F. A. P. Dupanloup, *La convention du 15 septembre et l'encyclique du 8 décembre* (Paris, 1865).

²⁷ Abbé F. Lagrange, *Vie de Mgr. Dupanloup*, (5th rev. ed.; Paris, 1886), II, 281-82; Aubert (see n. 1 above), p. 257.

²⁸ Lagrange, II, 299.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 302-4.

³⁰ Aubert (see n. 1 above), p. 257.

³¹ Mansi (see n. 23 above), Vol. XLIX, cols. 9-10.

³² *Ibid.*, cols. 9-94, for the complete text of the cardinals' replies. A summary prepared in February 1865 can be found in cols. 93-95.

defining the times as years of “confusion, agitation [and] disorders,” “uncertain and turbulent.”³³ One of the longest answers came from Cardinal Andrea Bizzarri,³⁴ who analyzed the problems faced by the church and the potential effectiveness of a council. He noted that “false politicians” would not respect the council. Rather they might use it as a pretext to promote new disorders and evils against the church. In this context he discussed the opportuneness of calling bishops away from their dioceses to Rome.³⁵ Moreover, he asked, would they be allowed to come? The semidependent status of the church vis-à-vis Napoleon III also troubled him. Would Napoleon approve of the council, or would he try to limit its freedom of action?³⁶ Bizzarri went on to say that, in view of the difficulties and seriousness of the matter, grave responsibilities were involved. Before proceeding, he suggested that it might be opportune to interrogate some prudent, learned, and zealous bishops. Accordingly, in April and May letters³⁷ went out from Rome to thirty-four European bishops querying whether it would be expedient for the good of the church to convoke an ecumenical council in 1867, when, “as common opinion would have it,” it would be the eighteenth centenary of St. Peter’s martyrdom.

In their answers³⁸ the bishops, like the cardinals, touched upon a variety of problems. One of the most trenchant statements came from Joseph Hippolyte Guibert, archbishop of Tours, who thought that the council, besides dealing with matters of dogma and church discipline, could “most happily affect public opinion by showing to all how necessary was the independence of the Head of the Church and bring out the true fact, that Rome does not belong to the Italians but to the Catholic world, that it cannot become the political capital of Italy, because it is already the religious capital of Christianity. The holding of the Council will appear as a new taking possession of Rome, in the name of Catholicism, and the Church, through the Council, will proclaim the moral necessity of temporal power for its Leader.”³⁹

Somewhat later, several hundred bishops in the far-flung dioceses of the church were asked to reply to a series of questions on disciplinary matters to be dealt with by the council. In summarizing their re-

³³ *Ibid.*, cols. 18 and 21.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, cols. 14–22.

³⁵ This point was also raised by Cardinals Nicola Clarelli (*ibid.*, col. 66) and Constantino Patrizi (cols. 30–31).

³⁶ Napoleon’s possible reaction was questioned by Cardinals Fabio Asquini (*ibid.*, col. 75) and Prospero Caterini (col. 56).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, cols. 105–8. Eleven bishops from Italy, nine from France, seven from Spain, five from Austria, and two from Bavaria received the Vatican letter.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 107–78.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 116.

plies, Cardinal Jacobini said that they reported no specific heresy to condemn, as at Trent, but that rather “a universal error . . . [attacks] the fundamental truths of [Catholicism]. . . . Consequently the church faces a general lack of faith, the pernicious outcome of modern rationalism.”⁴⁰

International complications forced the abandonment of the plan to convoke the council in June 1867. Prussia and Italy went to war against Austria in the summer of 1866, after which Italy annexed Venetia. Virtual completion of Italian territorial unity reawakened national dissatisfaction over continued papal control of Rome. Thus, in December 1866, when according to the terms of the September Convention the last French troops left Rome, Garibaldi made a second attempt to capture the city. Napoleon, in trouble at home over the debacle of his Mexican adventure, used the incident to garrison Rome once more with French soldiers. Garibaldi and his band of volunteers were defeated at Mentana by a superior French force equipped with the new, efficient *chassepots*. Mentana ended the September Convention. Again the safety and security of the pope’s temporal domain rested on French arms.⁴¹

With Rome under French protection, preparations for the council proceeded systematically. A papal bull on June 29, 1868 formally convoked the council for December 8, 1869. The intervening eighteen months saw a gathering of forces both within and without the church. Many were the questions and apprehensions voiced about the council and its ultimate goals. In conservative Catholic circles there was support and even enthusiasm for what was hoped would be a strong reassertion of the pope’s authority to regulate society. Liberal Catholics and non-Catholics were disturbed at the significance of such a gathering. Apart from the conjectures that began to fill the European press in July 1868, the first immediate reaction came in the parliaments of France and Italy. Emile Ollivier, a leading French liberal, made a noteworthy speech on July 10, 1868.⁴² Parts of it bear summarizing, as

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 204.

⁴¹ For details on French involvement in the Roman question see E. Bourgeois and E. Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III (1849–1870)* (Paris, 1907). The Roman question haunted Napoleon III throughout his reign. In his attempt to pacify conservative French Catholics, he alienated Italy. His refusal to allow Italy to take Rome may have played an important role in his defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Negotiations for an alliance of France, Austria, and Italy against Prussia in 1869–70 foundered on the Roman problem, and France had to face Prussia alone. See S. W. Halperin, *Diplomat under Stress. Visconti Venosta and the Crisis of July 1870* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 5–8, 19–37.

⁴² For the text of Ollivier’s speech see the verbatim transcript of the Corps Législatif session on Friday, July 10, 1868 in *Le Moniteur Universel, Journal Officiel de l’Empire Français*, July 11, 1868, pp. 1019–20.

Ollivier undoubtedly voiced the sentiments of European liberals of that time. For him the council had a "temporal as well as a spiritual aim." It concerned the state, for it was being convoked not only to assure the integrity of the faith and the purity of church discipline but also to reform the corrupt ways of nations and the principles of civil society. The most important problems arising from the daily functioning of social life—notably civil marriage, secular education, and the very principles upon which modern constitutions rested—were going to be debated and settled. Furthermore he noted, the failure to invite heads of state,⁴³ as had been the custom previously, gave official sanction to the separation of church and state. Both would benefit if this would result in a rapprochement between religious ideas and human reason.

In Italy the Menabrea government appeared reluctant to allow a full-scale parliamentary debate on the problems that the convocation of the council might represent and refused to make any binding statements. While the majority in the Chamber of Deputies showed a lack of interest in the question, a few men, like Giuseppe Ferrari and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, raised the issue of the council's significance on July 15, 1868, and the matter came up sporadically throughout the next year.⁴⁴ On August 4, 1868, Ferrari warned: "the Council [is] not [being] convoked against Luther and Calvin, but against you, sons of the French revolution . . . against the laws, institutions, sciences which you take pride in representing." Some six months later, on February 25, 1869, Morelli brought up the question once more, pointing out that in convoking the council the pope was challenging the modern world. Outside the chamber, on July 6, 1869, Ferrari remarked that Italy was the nation most threatened by the council.⁴⁵ An attempt was made to gather opponents of the church in an anti-council to be held at Naples at the same time as the church council. The anti-council did in fact convene there on December 9, 1869, with the participation of many foreign anti-clericals, but was disbanded by Italian police on the following day, when the cry, "Long live republican France!" echoed through the hall. This action led to parliamentary discussions in which the Italian government was accused of acting illegally.⁴⁶

Reaction among Protestants to whom Pius IX had tendered an in-

⁴³ E. Cecconi, *Storia del concilio ecumenico vaticano scritta sui documenti originali* (Rome, 1873-79), I, 28-30, 121-24; Jacini (see n. 9 above), pp. 247-48.

⁴⁴ *Atti, Legislatura X*, sessions of July 15, 1868, pp. 4303-4; July 16, 1868, pp. 4212-13; Aug. 1, 1868, p. 4535; Aug. 4, 1868, p. 4616; Jan. 21, 1869, p. 5310; Feb. 25, 1869, pp. 5657-58; May 19, 1869, p. 6675; May 29, 1869, p. 6747.

⁴⁵ Cecconi (see n. 43 above), III, 578.

⁴⁶ *L'anticoncilio di Napoli promosso e descritto da Giuseppe Ricciardi* (Naples, 1870); *Atti, Legislatura X*, session of Dec. 13, 1869, pp. 105-6.

vation on September 13, 1868 varied. Considerable discussion and correspondence among the different Protestant churches in Europe and in the United States resulted in a general rejection of the papal invitation and a restatement of Protestant principles.⁴⁷ Greek Orthodox leaders also refused the papal invitation.⁴⁸ Thus hopes of any unity among Christians vanished.

The real discussion on the relevance and import of the council began in earnest after the appearance of an article on February 6, 1869 in the authoritative *Civiltà Cattolica* (pp. 345–52), which brought out into the open the long-bruited question of papal infallibility. This article indicated that papal infallibility and a reassertion of the encyclical *Quanta cura* and the Syllabus were to be among the principal items to be deliberated at the council. At this time diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the major European powers were at a low point, and reaction to this statement was immediate in France and Germany.

In Paris, Veuillot's ultramontane paper, the *Univers*, republished it on February 13, and comment by various newspapers followed. Olivier, writing in the *Public*, the French Government's mouthpiece, on February 24 asked whether the church, through the *Civiltà Cattolica*, had meant to present an ultimatum. But, he went on, whatever the decisions reached at the council, the Concordat of 1804 and the Organic Articles remained basic to French policies, and any divergence from their principles would create "an extremely grave religious and political situation."⁴⁹ While this language was hardly conciliatory toward the ultramontanes, its objections were based on political considerations. At this time Napoleon III was trying to strengthen his precarious regime by a series of liberal reforms to conciliate his opponents.

The much more basic attack on ideological grounds came in Germany, where from March 10 to 15 appeared a series of articles by the Munich theologian Döllinger, under the pseudonym of Janus, in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*.⁵⁰ In them Döllinger attacked the council as a Jesuit plot to bring about an ecclesiastical revolution and denounced papal infallibility. A few months later the articles, rewritten

⁴⁷ Cecconi (see n. 43 above), II, 111–35; III, 108–68; see also G. Schneeman, S.J. (ed.), *Acta et decreta sacrorum conciliorum recentiorum. Collectio Lacensis* (Fribourg, 1890), Vol. VII, cols. 1123–43.

⁴⁸ *Risposte orientale ed occidentale all'invito papale pel futuro concilio vaticano* (Florence, 1869); Mansi (see n. 23 above), Vol. XLIX, cols. 181–202.

⁴⁹ E. Ollivier, "Un manifeste," *Public*, Feb. 24, 1869, reprinted in Schneeman (ed.) (see n. 47 above), Vol. VII, cols. 1164–67; for other negative French press reactions to the *Civiltà Cattolica* article, see Cecconi (see n. 43 above), III, 216–69.

⁵⁰ I. von Döllinger, "Das Consil und die Civiltà"; Cecconi (see n. 43 above), III, 235–38; Schneeman (ed.) (see n. 47 above), Vol. VII, cols. 1167–69.

and amplified, appeared in book form.⁵¹ Widely translated and distributed, Döllinger's attack aroused hostility and uneasiness.

While not all German Catholics seconded Döllinger's arguments, many were disturbed by the contents of the *Civiltà Cattolica* article. On June 17, 1869 a group of prominent laymen sent a memorandum to the German episcopate in which, though stating that they accepted the decisions, whatever they would be, of the council in advance, they thought a definition of papal infallibility inopportune and suggested that the present state of civil society be considered in any discussion of church-state relations.⁵² In September the German bishops met at Fulda to determine their position. After long discussions they released a public pastoral letter, general in tone, but the majority sent a secret letter to the pope pointing out the inopportuneness of a statement on papal infallibility.⁵³

As the date for the council's opening drew nearer, an increased flow of statements appeared. The *Civiltà Cattolica* continued to support the line laid down earlier.⁵⁴ On October 10, 1869 the *Correspondant* of Paris published what Father Cecconi, historian of the council, called the manifesto of French liberal Catholicism.⁵⁵ Very different in tone from Döllinger's virulent attack, the *Correspondant* nonetheless was firm in reiterating the liberal Catholic position. A hasty proclamation of papal infallibility, it pointed out, would raise infinite problems in that it would reawaken governmental suspicions, shock secular susceptibilities, and isolate Catholics everywhere as tools of a theocratic absolutism. How much better it would be, it suggested, if the council together with the pope would work to assure the entire body of the episcopate a role in church administration, now too exclusively in the hands of the Italian clergy. While Rome had every right to be the center of Christianity, this privilege did not extend to Italy as a whole. Let the papacy cease being solely Italian to become once again, through an intimate union with the episcopacy, not only European, but

⁵¹ Janus [pseudonym of I. von Döllinger], *Der Papst und das Concil. Eine weiter ausgeführte und mit dem Quellennachweis versehene Neubearbeitung der in der Augsburger Allgemeinen Zeitung erschienen Artikel: Das Concil und die Civiltà* (Leipzig, 1869). It was refuted by J. A. G. Hergenröther, *Anti-Janus. Eine historisch-theologische Kritik der Schrift "Der Papst und das Concil" von Janus* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1870).

⁵² Cecconi (see n. 43 above), III, 329–31.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, III, 336–44; for a brief general account of German reactions see T. Granderath, S.J., *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils von seiner ersten Ankündigung bis seiner Vertagung. Nach den authentischen Dokumenten* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1903–6), I, 232–46.

⁵⁴ In 1869 each issue of the *Civiltà Cattolica* began publishing special notes on the council. These continued until March 1871.

⁵⁵ Cecconi (see n. 43 above), III, 353–89.

universal. If pope and bishops worked together, relations between church and civil society would be affected for the better. Despite the separation between the two, the demarcation line remained unclear and retained sources of conflict. These differences could be solved by increased reciprocal understanding. In the struggle against the encroachments by the state on areas properly belonging to the church, the latter should make use of the liberal framework, for it stood to gain more from constitutions than from the volatile favors of an absolute monarch.

A little later the Archbishop of Orléans, Dupanloup, published in quick succession two letters, on November 11 and 21, shortly before the council's convocation date. In the first letter,⁵⁶ addressed to the priests in his diocese, Dupanloup said that he would have kept quiet, but the supporters of papal infallibility had been vociferous in their propaganda, and the *Civiltà Cattolica* and the *Univers* not only had discussed it but had asserted that it would be proclaimed by acclamation. In the press the question had been made to appear very simple, yet the effects of such a proclamation would be grave and perilous, particularly politically.

Veillot attacked Dupanloup on November 18 in the columns of the *Univers*. On the twenty-first,⁵⁷ Dupanloup replied in no uncertain terms, accusing Veillot of meddling in affairs not within his competence and of disrupting the work of the council.

As the issue of papal infallibility emerged to be the crucial one in the discussions on the council, European governments,⁵⁸ especially the Catholic powers, became more concerned about its possible political repercussions. Bavaria took the diplomatic initiative. On April 1, 1869, prompted by Döllinger, Prince Hohenlohe, prime minister of Bavaria and brother of Cardinal Hohenlohe, circularized the other governments on the dangers that the council represented. In view of the threat it posed to existing church-state relations, Hohenlohe suggested that governments publicly call to the attention of their bishops the disastrous results such a development might have. Furthermore, governments should agree to protest, through their representatives at Rome or in some other way, against all unilateral decisions by the council on questions having both political and religious character. Hohenlohe's proposal met with little success. Most governments replied that they pre-

⁵⁶ F. A. P. Dupanloup, *Lettre* [Nov. 11] *de Mgr. l'évêque d'Orléans au clergé de son diocèse. Observations sur la controverse soulevée relativement à la définition de l'infaillibilité au prochain concile* (Paris, 1869).

⁵⁷ F. A. P. Dupanloup, *Lettre* [Nov. 21] *de Mgr. l'évêque d'Orléans aux prêtres de son diocèse pour leur donner communication de son avertissement à M. L. Veillot, rédacteur en chef du Journal l'Univers* (3d ed.; Paris, 1869).

⁵⁸ Quacquarelli (see n. 25 above), pp. 133–49.

ferred to wait and see what would happen before taking any steps and that they had laws to prevent clerical encroachments. Hohenlohe was disturbed, but Bavaria could do little alone.⁵⁹

In the fall of 1869, France, the country most closely linked to the church, since its troops in Rome protected the temporal domain of the papacy, announced that it would send no special envoy to Rome to observe the council.⁶⁰ Other governments followed the French example.⁶¹ Thus the council was able to begin its deliberations free from open interference on the part of any of the European powers, but the preceding struggle had left a legacy of suspicion and distrust.⁶² The council debates were not uneventful, as a reading of the discussions quickly shows. Rome itself was a hotbed of rumor and intrigue.⁶³ Despite the secrecy imposed on council participants, half-truths and reports leaked out, often distorting the real meaning of the daily deliberations.

At the beginning of 1870 there was a renewed flurry of diplomatic activity on the part of France and Austria, while in Italy Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta allowed discussion in the Chamber of Deputies.

⁵⁹ C. zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, *Denkwürdigkeiten* (Stuttgart, 1907), I, 351–66, 375–76, 384–86, 392–95, 398–99, 401–4, 428–30; E. Ollivier, *L'église et l'état au concile du Vatican* (Paris, 1879), I, 511–19; Jacini (see n. 9 above), pp. 264–65.

⁶⁰ For the text of the French note on October 19, 1869 see Ollivier, *L'église et l'état au concile du Vatican*, I, 519–28.

⁶¹ For the diplomatic correspondence see Cecconi (see n. 43 above), III, 501–13, 561–65, 579–81, 593, 597–600, and Schneeman (ed.) (see n. 47 above), Vol. VII, cols. 1211–16, 1231–36, 1238–39, 1247–48.

⁶² Edmond de Pressensé, "Le concile du Vatican. Ses préliminaires et sa constitution," *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Mar. 1, 1870), pp. 147–77; see p. 148.

⁶³ For descriptions of Rome during the council see H. J. Browne, "Letters of Bishop McQuail from the Vatican Council," *Catholic Historical Review* (Jan. 1956), pp. 408–41; Cuthbert Butler, *The Vatican Council. The Story Told from the Inside in Bishop Ullathorne's Letters* (2 vols.; London, 1930); J. Friedrich, *Tagebuch während des vaticanischen Concils* (Nördlingen, 1873); F. A. Gregorovius, *Römische Tagebücher* (Stuttgart, 1893), entries for Oct. 24, Dec. 4, 9, 13, 19, 26, 1869; Jan. 7, 30, Feb. 6, 14, 18, Mar. 10, 12 (in which he records a Roman pasquinade on infallibility, "Quando Eva mosse, e morder fece il pomo / Gesù per salvar l'uomo, si fece uomo / Ma il Vicario di Cristo, il Nono Pio / Per render schiavo l'uom, si vuol far Dio"), Apr. 14, May 1, 15, 29, June 7, 19, July 3, 1870; Pomponio Leto [pseudonym of F. Nobili-Uitelleschi], *Otto mesi a Roma durante il concilio vaticano* (Florence, 1873); T. Mozley, *Letters from Rome on the Occasion of the Ecumenical Council, 1869–1870* (2 vols.; London, 1891); Quirinus [pseudonym of I. von Döllinger], *Letters from Rome on the Council* (London, 1870), first published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* while the council was meeting; A. Tamborra, *Imbro I. Tkalic e l'Italia* (Rome, 1966), pp. 125–43, 227–338; and L. Veuillot, *Rome pendant le concile* (2 vols.; Paris, 1872). For a general account of council developments see Lord Acton, "The Vatican Council," *North British Review*, Vol. LIII (Oct. 1870). See also I. von Döllinger and Lord Acton, *Briefwechsel*, Vol. II: 1869–70, ed. Victor Conzemius (Munich, 1965).

In his statement he made clear to the Italian Parliament and to the country at large that the government's position vis-à-vis the council remained one of watchful waiting. No action would be taken, no effort made to influence or interfere with the council's work. At the same time, however, there would be no acceptance of council decisions that would attempt to interfere in areas considered wholly secular and within the sphere of governmental authority and responsibility.⁶⁴ What he did not reveal was that he had sent to Rome the Croatian political exile Tkalac, from whom he received minute and detailed reports of all that transpired both at the council sessions and among the different factions that filled the city with their intrigues.⁶⁵

Disturbed at the future of church-state relations, France and Austria attempted to influence the council's deliberations. Austrian Chancellor von Beust protested, through his ambassador in Rome, the possible invasion of state's rights implied in the council's schema. The papal secretary of state, Cardinal Antonelli, listened to the Austrian protest but stood firm on the right of the council to decide as it pleased.⁶⁶ The Austrian protest was followed shortly by that of the liberal Catholic French Foreign Minister Daru, who dispatched a memorandum to the curia.⁶⁷ If the council discussed questions having political significance, Daru pointed out, the French government would insist on being informed of them and on presenting its views before any decisions were reached. This was a matter of concern for all countries, Daru concluded, though he was only speaking for France. However, before the matter could be pressed, a domestic crisis led to the resignation of Daru from the French cabinet. The liberal Prime Minister Ollivier took over his portfolio. A firm believer in the absolute separation of church and state, Ollivier notified the French ambassador at Rome that, since the Holy See did not accept French advice, France would return to its policy of "abstention and expectation."⁶⁸

Thus ended the last attempt at outside intervention, and the council was able to continue its debates. There was little unanimity, as the anti-infallibilist minority, composed of those few who opposed infallibility outright and the greater number who accepted it but thought its proclamation inopportune at that time, fought against the majority. At last defeated and with the voting imminent, some eighty bishops of the

⁶⁴ *Atti, Legislatura X*, session of Mar. 28, 1870, pp. 411-15.

⁶⁵ Tkalac's letters to Visconti Venosta are to be found in Tamborra (see n. 63 above), pp. 227-338.

⁶⁶ Schneeman (ed.) (see n. 47 above), Vol. VII, cols. 1569-78.

⁶⁷ For the text of the memorandum see Ollivier, *L'église et l'état au concile du Vatican* (see n. 59 above), II, 551-66.

⁶⁸ Ollivier, note of May 12, 1870, in *ibid.*, p. 232.

minority decided to leave Rome. Most of them informed the pope by letter.⁶⁹

On Monday, July 18, the voting on papal infallibility took place in public session at St. Peter's. Bishop Ullathorne of Birmingham described the voting as a summer storm broke in the Roman skies: "The lightning flashed into the aula, the thunder rolled over the roof . . . glass was broken by the tempest in a window nearly over the pontifical throne and came rattling down."⁷⁰

The next day, on July 19, war erupted between France and Prussia. The council adjourned until November 11. However, ensuing events interfered. On August 19, France, pressed by war, withdrew its troops from Rome. A month later, on September 20, Italian soldiers entered the city. On October 2, Rome was proclaimed the capital of Italy.

Embittered and disillusioned at the loss of the Patrimony of St. Peter's, Pope Pius IX withdrew into the Vatican. On October 20, a papal bull officially suspended Vatican Council I. So ended both the ecumenical council and the temporal power of the papacy.

⁶⁹ Fifty-five bishops signed it; six wrote individual letters; and the others left without making any statement (Mansi [see n. 23 above], Vol. LII, cols. 1325-27). See also P. Vallin, S.J., "Pour l'histoire du concile du Vatican I. Le démande de la minorité auprès de Pie IX le 15 juillet 1870," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* (1965), Nos. 3-4, pp. 844-48.

⁷⁰ Butler (see n. 63 above), II, 166.