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THE COUNCIL OF FLORENCE (1438-1439) AND THE PROBLEM OF UNION BETWEEN THE GREEK AND LATIN CHURCHES*

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I.

For the medieval world the Council of Florence provided the last great opportunity to close the gap separating Eastern from Western Christendom. Not only was it the most brilliant convocation of Greeks and Latins in the entire Middle Ages, but it marked the first occasion in centuries that East and West assembled in ecumenical council to debate the differences separating their two churches.¹

For almost four hundred years prior to the Council of Florence, from the schism of Michael Cerularios and Leo IX in 1054 to the convening of this Council in 1438, it had been a primary aim of popes and emperors to restore ecclesiastical communion. Negotiations with this object in view had, in fact, been conducted on approximately thirty different occasions.²

Strong forces motivated the desire for union. To the papacy union was the most effective way to extend its ecclesiastical authority over East as well as West, while for the Byzantine emperors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, union with the Latin church seemed the sole means to insure papal aid against the peril of either a Latin crusade or Turkish attack against Constantinople.³ Of lesser importance but worthy of note was the rare idealism of such men as Pope Gregory X and Patriarch John Bekkos, or Humbert of the Romans and John Parastron, to whom Greco-Latin religious accord was the supreme remedy for the problems of Christendom.⁴

As a result of these considerations, union was actually declared at three separate times: first, following the fourth crusade of 1204 with enforced Greek conversion to Catholicism, then at Lyons in 1274 by personal agreement between pope and emperor, and, finally, at Florence itself through the convocation of a general council.⁵ But although union thus seemed to have been achieved, it was in reality each time only ephemeral and without lasting effect. In view of the various forces conducing towards union, how can these repeated failures be explained? Why in particular did the Greek population, for whom the existence of the nation itself was often at stake, always repudiate union?

The answer to these questions lies partly in the nature of the mo-

tivations themselves. For to emperors and popes union was less a matter of merging two spiritual bodies than a means for the satisfaction of political ends. Religious sincerity, indispensable for permanent union, was too often lacking,⁶ and if the objectives of the papacy remained generally constant, the enthusiasm of the emperors for union fluctuated in accordance with the need for Western aid.⁷

From the viewpoint of ecclesiastical government, a more fundamental reason for the failure of union was the conflict between two basic conceptions of the church. To the monarchical claims of the papacy was opposed the Byzantine concept of the pentarchy, according to which the Eastern patriarchs, while acknowledging the honorary primacy of Rome,⁸ rejected papal assertions of universal disciplinary jurisdiction which would have made of the Eastern bishops mere satellites of the Holy See.⁹ While for the West, in accordance with medieval canonistic development, supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction was vested in the pope alone, for the Eastern church highest religious authority resided in the ecumenical councils representing all the patriarchs. It was this emphasis on the authority and canons of the first seven ecumenical councils, transmitted inviolate through the centuries, which constituted for Byzantium the essence of Orthodoxy.¹⁰

Complicating the difference in ecclesiastical polity from the Byzantine side, was the traditional authority of the Emperor over the Greek church—the so-called Caesaropapism—according to which the Emperor, particularly in times of political stress, would seek to accommodate the Greek church to the needs of the state.¹¹

These politico-ecclesiastical considerations, however, were not the only obstacles to union. There was another factor, more difficult to define but of at least equal importance—the deep-rooted antagonism for the Latins felt by the Greek population of Constantinople on whom, in the last analysis, the success of union depended.¹² This popular antipathy for the Latins was more than religious in scope, but it tended, in the spirit of the age, to find expression in the church. For in that institution were reflected not only the basic difference of language, but the development of theories and practices characteristic of the mentality of each people.¹³ It is therefore in the broad context of East-West antagonism that a full solution for the problem of union must ultimately be sought. Only thus can the endless and seemingly useless deliberations over such questions as the *filioque*, the use of unleavened bread in the eucharist, or even the shaving of clerical beards acquire genuine significance. For, apart from dogmatic importance, these questions were symptomatic of the deeper issues separating East from West, and it is this fact which made the problem of union so difficult.

It is not my purpose here to analyze the successive attempts at

union. Rather it is my aim to focus on the disputations at the Council of Florence, which brought to a climax four hundred years of unionist efforts. Through an examination, necessarily brief, of certain aspects of the proceedings of the Council as well as of the circumstances which brought it about, I hope to provide some insight into the complexities of union and especially into the forces which prevented its successful conclusion. While I shall deal with some of the more generally known events of the Council, I shall at the same time touch upon several incidents, relatively unimportant in themselves, but revealing basic attitudes indicative of the tensions between the two peoples and their churches.

II.

As no official acts as such survive for the Council of Florence, our information must in the main be drawn from three accounts of participants: first, the so-called *Acta Graeca*, written in Greek most probably by the pro-unionist Latinophile Bishop, Dorotheos of Mytilene;¹⁴ second, the Latin account in dialogue form by the papal advocate Andrea of Santa Croce;¹⁵ and, finally, the Greek history or memoirs of Silvester Syropoulos, Grand Ecclesiarch of St. Sophia in Constantinople. While the *Acta Graeca* has been considered most authoritative by Western scholars, the work of Syropoulos has long been neglected, indeed generally rejected, by the West. But this neglect is in part attributable to the adverse influence of its only editor, the Anglican Bishop Robert Creighton, who in 1660 published the Greek text together with a highly inaccurate, sharply anti-papal translation into Latin.¹⁶ More important, however, has been the attitude of leading Catholic historians, such as Hefele, Cecconi, and Allatius in particular, who have violently attacked the work of Syropoulos for its anti-unionist views, considering the author a kind of Sarpi of the Council of Florence.¹⁷

For these reasons, not to mention the relative unavailability of Creighton's edition,¹⁸ comparatively few Western scholars are even aware of the remarkable store of information Syropoulos provides. Yet his work is practically the sole record of what went on behind the scenes among the Greek delegation. Beginning with the diplomatic preliminaries to the Council, Syropoulos describes in detail the dangerous journey of the Greeks from beleaguered Constantinople to Venice, their day-by-day activities at the Council, their hopes, frustrations, and petty quarrels, and, above all, their private discussions both among themselves and with the Latins. In short, Syropoulos draws a remarkably complete picture of the Greek mentality, especially of the deep conflict between the unionist Latinophiles and the anti-unionist Orthodox during this critical period of Byzantium's dying days.

Recently Joseph Gill of the Pontifical Institute in Rome (who has just published a valuable edition of the *Acta Graeca*),¹⁹ has demonstrated the accuracy of certain of Syropoulos' statements, hitherto considered false or grossly exaggerated. On the basis of comparison with newly discovered documents, Gill shows, for example, the absolute correctness of Syropoulos' numerous figures regarding the papal withholding of the daily subsistence promised to the Greek delegates at Florence.²⁰ Increasing use of Syropoulos has also recently been made by other notable Catholic scholars, such as G. Hofmann, V. Laurent, and R. Loenertz, while several Greek historians have found corroboration for statements of Syropoulos in passages of contemporary Byzantine writers.²¹ Syropoulos' remarks are, to be sure, often partisan, but is it not necessary for the historian to understand the anti-unionist as well as unionist views at the Council? It is indeed these very attitudes which may best explain the failure of lasting union. Provided Syropoulos' statements can be controlled by other Byzantine writings or, whenever possible, by contemporary Latin accounts, there is no justifiable reason to reject his history as an important source for certain aspects of the Council.²²

Seven years of diplomatic negotiation preceded the assembling of the council at Florence,²³ during which the papacy, after centuries of refusal, finally accepted the conditions of the Greek people and clergy for the establishment of valid union—namely, the convocation of an ecumenical council.²⁴ This stipulation is perhaps nowhere more clearly defined than by the celebrated Barlaam of Calabria, who in 1339, exactly a century before Florence, had been secretly sent by the Emperor Andronikos III to Avignon to plead the cause of union.²⁵ Inasmuch as Barlaam's discourse reflects the sentiment prevailing among the Greek people also during the period of Florence,²⁶ it is worth quoting. Barlaam said to the pope:

. . . That which separates the Greeks from you is not so much a difference in dogma as the hatred of the Greeks for the Latins provoked by the wrongs they have suffered. It will be necessary to confer some great boon on them to change their feeling. . . . There is only one effective means to bring about union: through the convocation of a general council to be held in the East. For to the Greeks anything determined by a general council has the authority of law. You may object and say that a council has already met at Lyons to treat of union. But no Greek recognizes the ecumenicity of the Council of Lyons, since no subsequent council has declared it so. The Greek legates at Lyons were, in fact, sent there neither by the four patriarchs who govern the Eastern church, nor by the Greek people, but by the Emperor alone, who, without trying to gain the support of his people, sought only by force to realize the union.²⁷ To the four patriarchs therefore send legates, and under their presidency a general council will convene which will achieve union. Then all of us present at the council will say to the Greek people:

Here is what the Holy Ecumenical Council has decreed: It is your duty to obey its decisions, and all will submit. . . .²⁸

Barlaam's appeal at the time was ignored, for the Avignonese papacy had no intention of compromising its absolute authority by the assembling of a council to debate differences with the schismatic Greeks.²⁹ But the subsequent decline of papal prestige in the West as a result of the Great Schism and the increasing Western emphasis on conciliar supremacy, eventually induced the Holy See to view the Greek demands in a more favorable light.³⁰ This change of attitude coincided with an even more pressing need of the Greek Emperors for Western aid in order to salvage their last remaining territories of Constantinople and the Morea from the Turks, now practically at the gates of the capital.³¹

The situation became three-sided, however. For besides the Holy See, its bitter rival, the Western Conciliarists sitting at Basle, also looked upon a Greek union as the best means of establishing ecclesiastical superiority in the West. Thus the Byzantine Emperor and Patriarch were courted by both Pope Eugenius IV and the assembly of Basle, each promising military aid for Constantinople together with the payment of all expenses for the journey of a Greek delegation to a general council to be held in the West.³²

The contest for Byzantine favor grew increasingly severe. Indeed, the account of Syropoulos, corroborated by a report of the legate of Basle John of Ragusa and papal documents, describes the rival Western delegations at Constantinople competing with such intensity as to be restrained from blows only by imperial intervention.³³ Previous to this, an even more violent scene had occurred at Basle itself, where the papal and conciliar adherents created so great a tumult disputing the question of the Greek union that in the revealing phrase of Aeneas Silvius, "You would have found the drunkards of a tavern better behaved."³⁴

Why in the end did the Greeks prefer the offers of the papacy to those of the Basle fathers, when Byzantine tradition itself, at least from the standpoint of the pentarchy, seems conciliar in emphasis? Would it have been more advantageous, as several modern Greek scholars question, to have preferred the Basle assembly?³⁵ This problem has not yet been fully elucidated by historians,³⁶ but we may suggest several reasons for the selection of the papacy. Besides the fact that both the Emperor and Patriarch stipulated the personal presence of Pope Eugenius at the council³⁷—a condition unlikely of attainment at Basle³⁸—the Greeks naturally preferred as a site for the council the papal choice of Ferrara in Italy as opposed to distant Basle, Avignon, or Savoy, places insisted upon by the Basle conciliarists.³⁹ Added to

this probably was the Greek familiarity with the traditional prestige of the papacy in contrast to the relatively recent emergence of Western conciliarism. Not to be overlooked, finally, is the role of the Greek Emperor. In line with Byzantine caesaropapist ideas, he may well have preferred to negotiate with a single absolute authority instead of the factious assembly at Basle.⁴⁰ We must be careful in this connection, however, not to overstress the concept of an all-pervasive Caesaropapism during this period, since the very failures of the unionist attempts initiated by the Emperors themselves, militate against such a theory.⁴¹

On the 24th of November, 1437, in ships provided by the Pope, a huge Byzantine delegation of seven hundred ecclesiastics and laymen, headed by the Emperor John VIII Palaeologos, the Patriarch Joseph of Constantinople, and representatives of the three other patriarchs, finally set out for Italy. After a long, hazardous voyage of three months⁴² the Greeks reached Venice.⁴³ But almost immediately after their arrival, the Council was threatened with disruption over a question of protocol. On the entrance of the Patriarch Joseph into Ferrara, he absolutely refused, despite the demands of the papal representatives and his own pro-unionist convictions,⁴⁴ to salute the Pope in the Western manner by genuflecting and kissing his foot. According to Syropoulos, the Patriarch exclaimed indignantly to the papal legates:

Whence has the Pope this right? Which synod gave it to him? Show me from what source he derives this privilege and where it is written? The Pope claims that he is the successor of St. Peter. But if he is the successor of Peter, then we too are the successors of the rest of the Apostles. Did they kiss the foot of St. Peter? . . .⁴⁵

To these remarks the Latin bishops replied that it was an ancient custom for all to kiss the pope's foot—"bishops, kings, and even the Emperor of the Germans and the cardinals who are holy and superior to the Emperor."⁴⁶ The response of the Patriarch is significant: "This is an innovation and I will not follow it. . . . If the Pope wants a brotherly embrace in accordance with ancient ecclesiastical custom, I will be happy to embrace him, but if he refuses, I will abandon everything and return to Constantinople."⁴⁷

In the end the Patriarch's inflexibility prevailed. Yet the victory was not entirely his, for Pope Eugenius, instead of welcoming the Patriarch and his prelates in public ceremony, received them in his private quarters, where few Western eyes could witness the omission of this mark of subordination.⁴⁸

This initial difficulty, suggested obliquely by the *Acta Graeca*⁴⁹ and of which the form of salutation is prescribed in papal pontificals,⁵⁰ vividly symbolizes Greek insistence on the essential equality of the

bishops of Constantinople and Rome, a fundamental principle of pentarchic theory as opposed to the claims of the pope as vicar of Christ and successor to Peter, first of the Apostles.⁵¹ In the word "innovation," moreover, as used by the patriarch, there is expressed a difference in concept, the significance of which lies at the heart of the conflict between the two churches. To the medieval Latin mind, development in ritual even in dogma—for example, the doctrine of the *filioque*—could be sanctioned by the papacy. But for the Greek mentality, the criterion of ecclesiastical truth, apart from Holy Scripture, was adherence to the doctrines and traditions established by the first seven ecumenical councils.⁵²

This contrast between Greek conservatism and the more flexible Western attitude toward ecclesiastical development first becomes clear in the conflict between Patriarch Photius and Pope Nicholas I, and even more distinct after the pontificates of Leo IX and Gregory VII in the latter part of the eleventh century, when papal claims of jurisdiction underwent their great expansion in canon law.⁵³ Subsequently, therefore, when representatives of the two churches confronted each other to discuss union, the Greeks expected the papacy to conform to conditions before the schism of 1054, while the Holy See, on its part, insisted upon subordination of the Greek church in the manner to which it had become accustomed from the Latin churches of the West.⁵⁴

Of greater significance at the Council of Florence than the conflict over patriarchal salutation of the Pope was the dispute between Emperor and Pope over the problem of seating in the cathedral at Ferrara where the council was first to convene. In his desire to assume the role of arbiter, Pope Eugenius insisted that his throne be placed in the middle of the church with the Greek representatives at his left and the Latins on his right. The Emperor John Palaeologos, however, considered this an infringement of imperial rights, for in accord with Byzantine practice it was the prerogative of the Emperor as vicar of God to preside over ecumenical councils.⁵⁵

After prolonged argument a solution was achieved whereby, as the Greeks insisted, the papal throne was placed on the side of the Latins. But it was, at the same time, elevated above all others including that of the Emperor. Moreover, another throne, corresponding in every respect to that of the Greek Basileus, was set up on the Latin side for the Emperor of the West, despite the vacancy of the throne caused by the recent death of the Western Emperor Sigismund.⁵⁶ The poor Patriarch of Constantinople, his protests overruled, was in the meantime relegated to a place below both Pope and Emperors, a position, according to Andrea of Santa Croce, corresponding to that of the highest

ranking cardinal.⁵⁷ Thus, contrary to traditional Byzantine theories, not to mention of course Greek ethnic pride, the Greeks were forced to recognize the supremacy of papal theocratic theory over both their Emperor and Patriarch. As for the equality indicated between Western and Eastern Emperors, it touched upon an even more sensitive area of the Byzantines, whose rulers had never really become reconciled to the existence of a rival imperial title in the West.⁵⁸

It is worthy of note that in the heated debates which followed, papal champions made no use of the famous Donation of Constantine to support papal claims of supremacy. One wonders in this respect what may have been the role of Nicholas of Cusa, who in 1431, some years before Lorenzo Valla, had attacked the authenticity of the Donation.⁵⁹ Cusanus was one of the legates who escorted the Greek delegation from their capital to Venice,⁶⁰ and while in the East, where we know that he searched for manuscripts,⁶¹ he probably learned that a Greek translation of the Donation was in circulation at Byzantium. Since the Greeks, with the aim of diminishing papal authority, interpreted the document to mean that Constantine had transferred to Constantinople not only the entire Roman government but with it ecclesiastical primacy,⁶² Cusanus may well have seen the danger of trying to support papal claims through an appeal to such a double-edged weapon as the Donation of Constantine.⁶³

When the negotiations at the Council at last got under way, as in the past a great part of the discussions centered on such perennial dogmatic and liturgical questions as the nature of the pains of purgatory, the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the Eucharist, the precise moment at which the Eucharistic miracle occurs, and, most important, the procession of the Holy Spirit, commonly called the *filioque*.

On doctrinal grounds the question of the *filioque* turned on two different concepts of the trinity. The Latins, for whom the three persons in the Godhead were not only of the same substance but of equal attributes, argued that the Holy Spirit emanates from the Son as well as the Father. The Greeks, however, could not accept this, as in their view it would entail for the Holy Spirit the existence of two archical principles instead of one.⁶⁴

Preliminary proposals for the debate of this problem disclosed the differing Greek and Latin attitudes toward the church. The Orthodox, led by Mark, fiery Metropolitan of Ephesus and exarch of the patriarch of Antioch,⁶⁵ insisted that the dogmatic aspect of the *filioque* was irrelevant and that the question for debate should be simply the legality of adding to the creed.⁶⁶ The Latins, or rather their spokesmen the Greek Latinophile Bessarion, Archbishop of Nicaea, and the Greek-born Dominican Andrea of Rhodes,⁶⁷ maintained, on

the other hand, that the argument should focus on the truth or falseness of the dogma itself.⁶⁸

Both sides appealed for support to old manuscript texts of the Greek church fathers—a method of striking modernity. To the embarrassment of the Greeks, an uproar occurred when the Latins, consulting a manuscript of St. Basil recently brought from Constantinople by Cusanus,⁶⁹ suddenly realized that a passage supporting the Latin view of the *filioque* had been expunged from a copy held in the hands of the Orthodox spokesmen.⁷⁰ The debate over the *filioque*, an endless labyrinth of arguments, continued for more than eight fruitless months, until a formula was approved identifying the Latin *filioque* (“from the son”) with the Greek phrase *διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ* (“through the son”).⁷¹ This compromise was finally accepted by most of the Greeks, either as a result of personal conviction, imperial and patriarchal pressure, or even sheer weariness. Mark of Ephesus and the hard core of the Orthodox, however, persisted in their intransigence.⁷²

Why was the *filioque* such a formidable obstacle to union? What did the fanatic Orthodox fear that they would not yield before entreaties from all sides to accept the solution and thereby insure aid for their city, now almost the sole remnant of Byzantine territory unconquered by the Turks? This question is absolutely fundamental for understanding the failure of unionist efforts in the entire period of the later Middle Ages.

The position of the Latins is, of course, clear. They could not accept as invalid an addition to the creed, used for centuries by the West, without appearing as heretics.⁷³ What the pro-Orthodox, however, seemed most to have feared was not merely alteration of Orthodox dogma, but, by association, loss of national identity, in other words Latinization of the Greek people.⁷⁴ They could not erase from their memories the experiences of fifty-seven years of Latin occupation in Constantinople and the continuing Western domination of their islands and other Byzantine areas. For after the Fourth Crusade of 1204 the Greeks had been dispossessed of their ecclesiastical properties, forcibly converted to the Latin faith, and, in particular, required to recite the creed with the *filioque* and to celebrate the liturgy with unleavened bread.⁷⁵ In addition, certain feudal practices characteristic of the Latin church had been imposed upon the Greek clergy such as the compulsory personal oath recognizing papal authority through the clasping of hands within those of a Latin superior. And, finally, in the manner of the Western churches, a papal legate had been dispatched to Constantinople to dictate ecclesiastical, and influence political, decisions.⁷⁶ Eloquent testimony of the Greek attitude to the Latin conquerors is provided by a canon of the Fourth Lateran Coun-

cil (1215), according to which the Greeks would purify their altars following each use by the Latins, and rebaptize their children after performance of the Latin rite.⁷⁷

These experiences of a dominated people remained vivid in the minds of the Greek laity as well as clergy, and restoration of similar conditions through submission to the Pope was the great fear of the vast majority of Greeks. Not all the people shared this feeling, it is true,^{77a} for some, probably among the upper classes, were ready to accept the Latin union in order to save themselves from what seemed the even greater danger of Islamization.⁷⁸

In the view of the Orthodox, the danger of Latinization threatened not only their religion but their political, social, and economic life as well. For gradually, since even before the First Crusade, Byzantium, far more than is generally realized, had been penetrated by Latin influences. Latin officials participated in the administration, Latin commanders and mercenaries fought in its armies, and everywhere were the Gasmules, children of mixed Greco-Latin marriages. More important even was the strangle-hold of the Venetians and Geonese over almost the entire economic life of the capital.⁷⁹

Some anti-unionists became so extreme in their fear of Latin influence that they openly declared their preference for the turban of the sultan to the tiara of the pope.⁸⁰ This was no idle talk, since it was observed that in Asia Minor, the Turks, in accordance with Mohammedan precepts, had generally permitted to the conquered Byzantines the exercise of their religion and retention of their ecclesiastical hierarchy.⁸¹

The existence of a genuine Byzantine nationalism in this period, though more pronounced than in earlier centuries, may not always be explicit. But it cannot be denied that the Greeks regarded themselves as a people very distinct from the Latins. The crusades and especially the years of subjugation had greatly sharpened this antipathy. It is no wonder, then, that a Greek supporter of the union was looked upon as a traitor. Striking confirmation for this fact exists already from the year 1274, when an imperial envoy, returning to Constantinople after espousing the religious union of Lyons, was taunted by the rabble with the words, "You have become a Frank" (that is, "a Latin.")⁸² Thus to the Orthodox party religious union meant not only ecclesiastical apostasy but a betrayal of the Greek sense of national pride.

In the light of this explanation it would appear that the question of the *filioque*, so bitterly debated at Florence, masked the vital, underlying problem of the hostility between Greeks and Latins. To the anti-unionist Orthodox, union, with submission to papal authority, was, in brief, the prelude to assimilation by the Latins.⁸³ In the words of a leading Orthodox polemist of the fifteenth century, Joseph Bryennios:

“Let noone be deceived by delusive hopes that the Italian allied troops will come to save us. If they pretend to rise to defend us, they will take arms only to destroy our city, our race, and our name.”⁸⁴

We must pass over other liturgical and disciplinary differences, which seem in like manner to disguise the fear of Latinization,⁸⁵ in order to discuss the final act of union at the Council of Florence. Urged on by the Latinophiles, under pressure from the Pope, who, owing to policy, financial difficulties, or both, did not pay the Greek subsistence for five months⁸⁶—pushed by the Emperor, who in the end ordered Mark himself to remain silent,⁸⁷ and goaded even by reports of an imminent Turkish attack on Constantinople,⁸⁸ the last of the Orthodox finally yielded.⁸⁹ With their surrender and Greek concessions on the most important questions at issue,⁹⁰ preparations were begun to draw up the decree of union. But as was perhaps inevitable, a conflict arose even over the signing of the document itself, for both Pope and Emperor claimed the honor of having their name inscribed at the beginning of the text. In true Western theocratic fashion, Eugenius affirmed the superiority of his rank to that of the Emperor, while John Palaeologos, in a last assertion of authority, maintained that, as from the time of Constantine it had been an imperial right to convoke synods, his name should take precedence.⁹¹

Before the desperate need of his capital for aid, however, the Emperor gave way, and the signing of the *horos* began. But one Greek prelate did not sign. While the Patriarch Joseph had died only a short time before⁹² and another bishop had fled from Florence,⁹³ Mark of Ephesus alone resolutely refused to affix his signature.⁹⁴ As Pope Eugenius indicated at the time, this omission would prove fatal for the success of the union.⁹⁵ It was a prophetic remark, as on the return of the Greek delegation to Constantinople, Mark became the soul of Orthodox opposition to union.⁹⁶

The most significant aspect of the unionist decree was its emphasis on the crucial problem of papal supremacy, acceptance of which would, in effect, mean surrender of the independence of the Greek church.^{96a} In the document the authority of the Pope as universal head of the churches of both East and West was clearly affirmed,⁹⁷ although it was stated in the passage immediately following that “all the rights and privileges of the patriarchs of the East are excepted.”⁹⁸ Despite the lack of precise information in the sources, there seems little doubt that the latter phrase was interpolated merely to assuage Orthodox feeling by the appearance of limiting papal absolutism.⁹⁹

On the sixth of July 1439, in the cathedral of Florence under the recently-completed dome of Brunelleschi, the solemn ceremony of

union took place, with Cardinal Cesarini reading the decree in Latin and Bessarion in Greek. Almost immediately afterwards, Pope Eugenius urged the election of a new patriarch for Constantinople while the Greek clergy was still at Florence. This fact, mentioned by the principal sources, is recorded by Syropoulos with the additional statement that Eugenius proposed the enthronement of the titular Latin Patriarch of Constantinople.¹⁰⁰ If Syropoulos' remark is correct¹⁰¹ and the suggestion of Eugenius had actually been carried out, Latinization of the Greek church would thus already have begun at the very top of the Greek hierarchy.

The story of the return of the Emperor and his clergy to Constantinople and the repudiation of the union by the great majority of the people is well told by the Byzantine theologians and historians as well as by Syropoulos.¹⁰² The popular opposition was based not only on the underlying attitudes already described, but, more immediately, on the belief that union had been obtained under duress, that the military aid agreed to by the Holy See would, like previous papal promises, be ineffectual.¹⁰³ and, finally, on the conviction that the Byzantine people themselves would suffer the judgment of God if the purity of the faith were altered.¹⁰⁴

So strong was the Orthodox opposition to the union that it persisted to the very capture of the capital by the Turks in 1453. Indeed, even the Turkish conquest did not destroy the ethnic Greek feeling, for it was the church, significantly enough, which preserved this spirit throughout the long centuries of oppression.¹⁰⁵

III.

One wonders, in retrospect, what the course of Byzantine history might have been had the Greek and Latin churches been able successfully to consummate union.^{105a} Is it possible that the deepening chasm between East and West might have been bridged and the conquest of Byzantium averted?¹⁰⁶

Probably the only way to have achieved union at this time with even remote chance of success would have been to adopt the kind of policy suggested by Barlaam: in essence, recognition of pentarchic equality by the papacy as well as Byzantium,¹⁰⁷ and the holding of a council in Constantinople itself,¹⁰⁸ so that the Greek populace, by following the discussions at first hand, could allay its deep suspicions of the Latins and its own Latinophiles. On the other hand, a convocation in Constantinople might well have provoked immediate retaliation from the Turks.¹⁰⁹ But even more important, the papacy could hardly have accepted terms which would have been contrary to the entire monarchical tradition of the West and at the same time have deprived the Holy

See of a decisive victory over the Greeks, so necessary for its triumph over the conciliarists of Basle.

Even had the Greek people accepted the Florentine union, there seems little likelihood that the Latin princes would effectively have responded to papal appeals for a crusade against the Turks. For the West, always doubtful of the sincerity of Greek conversion, was now engrossed in its own problems and therefore almost indifferent to the fate of the East.¹¹⁰ Thus in 1453 when Constantinople finally succumbed to the Turks, only a few humanists, their passion for Hellenism inflamed by their contacts at Florence, lamented the fall of the capital. Significantly, however, they mourned more the second death of Homer and Plato than the passing of medieval Byzantium.¹¹¹

*This article was read at the 1954 meeting of the American Historical Association.

1. On this council's ecumenicity see the official decree of union in the so-called *Acta Graeca (Quae Supersunt Actorum Graecorum Concilii Florentini necnon Descriptionis Cuiusdam Eiusdem*, ed. J. Gill [Rome, 1953] hereafter referred to as *Acta*) 461. Cf. ed. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum . . . collectio*, XXXIA, cols. 1027-1028: "Convenientes enim, Latini ac Graeci in . . . synodo yemenica," and *Συνελλόντες γὰρ Λατίνοι τε καὶ Γραικοὶ ἐν... οἰκουμένηῃ συνόδῳ*. On the problem of the ecumenicity of previous councils, in particular the Photian councils of 869 and 879, and Lyons in 1274 (none of which the Byzantine church subsequently considered ecumenical) see esp. F. Dvornik, *The Photian Schism History and Legend* (Cambridge, 1948) 410-427. At Florence, in contrast to the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 and Lyons, debate for the first time took place over ecclesiastical differences.
2. Thus calculates L. Bréhier, "Attempts at Reunion of the Greek and Latin Churches," *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV (1936) 594ff.
3. These underlying motivations are emphasized in the extensive number of works on the problem of union and unionist negotiations in the period from 1054 to Constantinople's fall to the Turks in 1453. Only a few can be cited here: A convenient objective summary in English is the article cited of Bréhier, "Attempts at Reunion of the Greek and Latin Churches;" and, in French, the excellent articles of M. Viller, "La Question de l'Union des Eglises entre Grecs et Latins depuis le concile de Lyon jusqu'à celui de Florence (1274-1438)," *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, XVI (1921) 260-305, 515-532; and XVIII (1922) 20-

60. Other important or representative works dealing with this period in general are W. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin, 1903); M. Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin* (Paris, 1941) esp. 187-270; G. Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate* (London, 1947) 153-203; G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (1952) *passim*; A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, 1952) 469-478, 540-546, 656-676; C. Diehl, R. Guiland, etc., *L'Europe Orientale de 1081 à 1453* (Paris, 1945) *passim*; S. Runciman, *Byzantine Civilization* (London, 1936) 108 - 136; B. Stephanides, *Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Ἱστορία* (Athens, 1948) 315-364; J. Karmires, "The Schism of the Roman Church," (Eng. tr.) *Θεολογία XXI* (1950) 37-67; A. Demetrakopoulos, *Historia schismatis quod intercedit inter ecclesiam occidentalem et orientalem* (in Greek) (Leipzig, 1867); A. Piehler, *Geschichte der Kirchlichen Trennung zwischen dem Orient und Occident* (Munich, 1864-1865); A. Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church* (London, 1916) 201-220; the essay of H. Grégoire on the Byzantine church in *Byzantium, An Introduction to East Roman Civilization*, ed. Baynes and Moss (Oxford, 1948) esp. 119-127; F. Heiler, *Urkirche und Ostkirche* (Munich, 1937) 135-148; Héfélé-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, esp. VI pt. 1, 153-218 and VII pt. 2, 916-1051; A. Fliche and V. Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise*, X, 76-85, 446-460, 487-497; and, finally, S. Neill, "Division and the Search for Unity Prior to the Reformation," *A History of the Ecumenical Movement* (Philadelphia, 1954) 14-19.
4. For recent works on Gregory X and Bekkos (who at first opposed union) see V. Laurent, "La Croisade et la question d'orient sous le pontificat de

- would never agree, and attempts at union would only widen the schism (Sphrantzes [Bonn] 178-179). Cf. Syrop., 258.
13. On identification of the Greek language with Orthodoxy, and on the unfavorable Byzantine attitude to Latin see S. Runciman, "Byzantine Linguists," *Προσφορά εις Σ. Κυριακίδη* (1953) 577. For widespread Western prejudices against Greeks and their language (Greeks in general were considered schismatics, liars, and cowards) see Viller, XVI, 284-305. On reciprocal ignorance of Latin and Greek see Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin*, 39-42.
 14. The best edition is now that of J. Gill (see above, note 1), recently published as part of the vast project of the Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies in Rome to make available all texts relating to the Council of Ferrara-Florence. Previously the standard text of the *Acta* was that in Mansi, XXXIA. On Dorotheos as author of the *Acta* (or rather of the "descriptive" sections as distinct from the "acts") see Gill, *Acta*, pp. LXIII-LXIX, and the same author's "Sources of the 'Acta' of the Council of Florence," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XIV (1948) 43ff. Supporting Dorotheos' authorship are V. Laurent, "Apropos de Dorotheé Métropolitaine de Mytilène," *Revue des Études Byzantines*, IX (1951) 163-169 (a biographical sketch of Dorotheos); G. Hofmann, "Die Konzilsarbeit in Ferrara," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, III (1937) 110; and T. Frommann, *Kritische Beiträge zur Geschichte der florentiner Kircheneinigung* (Halle, 1872) 63-79; A. Vogt's article on the Council of Florence in *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, VI, col. 28 (cf. col. 49); and, recently, D. Balanos, 49; and, D. Balanos, recently, *Οι Βυζαντινοί Ἐκκλησιαστικοὶ Συγγραφεῖς* ever, the older work of H. Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion* (Paris, 1878) 436-449, and Héfelé-Leclercq, *Conciles*, VII pt. 2, 957, who ascribe authorship of the *Acta* to Bessarion.
 15. Published in Mansi, XXXIB, cols. 1431ff. On Andrea himself see T. Ortolan's article in *Dict. d'Hist. et Geog. Ecclés.*, II, col. 1662, and on weaknesses in Andreas' account owing to its dialogue form and dependence on interpreters at Florence see Frommann, *op. cit.*, 45.
 16. The full title assigned by Creighton is S. Sgouropoulos (*sic*), *Vera historia unionis non verae inter Graecos et Latinos, sive Concilii Florentini exactissima narratio, etc.* (Hague, 1660). (A new edition of Syropoulos, vitally needed by scholars, is eagerly awaited from V. Laurent, and is scheduled to appear in 1956 in the same series as Gill's *Acta Graeca*.) For comments on Creighton and his edition see S. G. Mercati's article in *Encyclopedia Italiana*, XXXI, 910, who writes that Syropoulos' anti-unionist tendencies are accentuated by Creighton, whose inexact translation in turn provoked the confutation of L. Allatius, *In Robert Creyghtoni apparatus, versionem, et notas ad Historiam Concilii Florentini scriptam a Silvestro Syropulo . . . exercitationes* (Rome, 1674, earlier ed. 1665). See by Allatius also *De ecclesiae occidentalis atque orientalis perpetua consensione* (Cologne, 1648). See further the recent article of J. Gill, "The 'Acta' and the Memoirs of Syropoulos as History," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XIV (1948) 330-341. For the most detailed analysis of Syropoulos and his work (from a Greek point of view) see A. Diamantopoulos, "Σύλθεστρος Συροπούλος καὶ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐν Φλωρεντία συνόδου," *Νέα Σιών*, XVIII (Jerusalem, 1923) 241ff. and later issues.
 17. On this see Frommann, *op. cit.*, 37-58. Also Ceceoni, who, in his long 224 page introduction generally impugns Syropoulos' accuracy (esp. pp. 14-15, 32, 36, 45, and 50). Cf. Héfelé-Leclercq, *Conciles*, VII pt. 2, 958-959, and, on Allatius, see preceding note. See finally the harsh invective of Ph. Labbé, in Hardouin, *Concilia Generalia*, IX, 1079, who places Syropoulos in the company of such notorious heretics as Arius, Nestorius, and the Albigensians.
 18. The only available copies in America to my knowledge are at Harvard University and the Library of Congress.
 19. See above notes 1 and 14.
 20. On this see Gill, "The 'Acta' and the Memoirs of Syropoulos as History," 330-341, esp. 339: "The *Acta Camerae Apostolicae* reveal that Syropoulos' dates of payments and sums recorded as paid are exact and show that the Greeks had real grounds for complaint at being left without the means of subsistence." Cf. Ceceoni, *op. cit.*, 478-486 and also Syrop., who makes very numerous references to papal subsistence or payments (see 105, 205ff., 225, 302, 318, and esp. 105, where he records that no money or subsistence was ever given to the Greeks without ulterior motives). The *Acta* says almost nothing about the penalty of the Greeks except that the pope's financial embarrassment was the cause of the council's transfer from Ferrara to Florence (220; Mansi, 696). The Greeks (whose delegation numbered 700 people) evidently could ill afford to come to Italy had the Pope not undertaken to pay the expenses of their voyage and subsistence.

- Grégoire X," *Revue Historique du Sud-est Européen* (1945) 105-137; and "Grégoire X (1271-1276) et le projet d'une ligue antiturque," *Échos d'Orient*, XXXVII (1938) 257-273; G. Hofmann, "Patriarch Johann Bekkos und die lateinisch Kultur," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XI (1945) 141ff.; and my article, "Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons," *Harvard Theological Review*, XLVI (1953) 79-89. On the Dominican Humbert who acutely foresaw durable union only through pacific rapprochement and mutual education of both churches, see extracts from his "Opus Tripartitum" in Mansi, *Concilioorum . . . Collectio*, XXIV, pt. 2, cols. 120-130; and cf. K. Michel, *Das Opus tripartitum des Humbertus de Romanis O. P.* (Graz, 1926) (inaccessible to me). On Parastron, a Constantinople-born Greek of Latin faith who declared he would gladly give his life for the success of union, see Viller, *loc. cit.*, XVI, 265, note 4; and my article, "Michael Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons," 84.
5. In addition to the general works cited in note 3, the following deal with specific unions or aspects thereof. Regarding 1204 and after see J. Longnon, *L'Empire Latin de Constantinople* (Paris, 1945) 135-144; and R. L. Wolff, "The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204-1261. Social and Administrative Consequences of the Latin Conquest," *Traditio* (1948) 33ff. On Lyons see the articles of F. Vernet and V. Grumel in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, IX pt. 1, cols. 1374-1409; C. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue Restaurateur de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris, 1926) 99-124; H. Evert-Kapessova, "La Société Byzantine et l'union de Lyon," *Byzantinoslavica*, X (1949) 28ff., and by the same author, "Une page de l'histoire des relations Byzantino-Latines. Le clergé byzantin et l'Union de Lyon (1274-1282)," *Byzantinoslavica*, XIII (1952-1953) 68-92; and also my articles, "Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons;" and "On the Schism of the Greek and Roman Churches: A Confidential Papal Directive for the Implementation of Union (1276)," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* (1954) 16-24. For works concerning the union of Florence see notes below, *passim*.
- The religious ceremony of 1369 in Rome is not to be considered an ecclesiastical union as the Emperor John V Palaeologus there alone made his submission to the pope. See O. Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome* (Warsaw, 1930) 204; and A. Vasiliev, "Il Viaggio dell' Imperatore Bizantino Giovanni V Paleologo in Italia (1369-1371) e l'Union di Roma del 1369," *Studi bizantini e neoellenici*, III (1931) 151-193. Nor can the Council of Bari in 1098 be termed a union of the two churches, since only the Latin church and the Greek clergy of southern Italy were involved. See B. Leib, *Rome, Kiev et Byzanz à la fin du XIe siècle* (Paris, 1924) 287-297.
6. See Viller, *loc. cit.*, XVI, 280: "negotiations were more political than religious (and) between two governments than two heads of churches." Bréhier, *loc. cit.*, 596: "union was regarded merely as a means of political profit, and this lack of sincerity and altruism on both sides is the ultimate cause of the final failure of all these efforts."
 7. For a convenient summary of the shifts in Greek imperial policy in accordance with the degree of external danger to Byzantium, see esp. Bréhier, *loc. cit.*, 695-696.
 8. On recognition of Roman primacy of honor see the treatise of the famous 14th century Greek theologian Nilos Cabasilas, "De causis dissensionum in ecclesia," MPG, vol. 149, col. 685B. Cf. Heiler, *Urkirche und Ostkirche*, 141.
 9. On pentarchic theory see esp. Dvornik, *Photian Schism*, 150 and note 2.; Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin*, 37-38; 222-223, 232; and Karmires, "The Schism of the Roman Church," 30-31, 49, 56, and esp. 65-66.
 10. See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, 420, 423 and cf. Karmires, *loc. cit.*, 29.
 11. The role of Caesaropapism (a not entirely satisfactory term for which there seems no adequate substitute) has been the cause of much controversy. According to an important Catholic historian M. Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin*, 3-9, and esp. 10, Caesaropapism "incontestably should bear the chief responsibility for the preparation of the schism." He unfavorably contrasts imperial interference in affairs of the Greek church with the situation in the Roman where the political authority was excluded from church government. Cf. the typically Greek attitude of Ch. Papadopoulos, *The Primacy of the Bishop of Rome* (in Greek) (Athens, 1930) esp. 207ff., who, in contrast, attributes the basic cause of the schism to papal attempts to impose primacy of jurisdiction over the Greek church. On the Byzantine theory of "oikonomia," the accommodation of the church to the state (except in doctrinal matters), see esp. Dvornik, *Photian Schism*, 8, 24, etc.
 12. The Emperor Manuel II (d. 1425) realized this well when he warned his son John VIII that the pride of the Latins and the obstinacy of the Greeks

21. G. Hofmann, "Die Konzilsarbeit in Ferrara," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, III (1937) 110ff. and later issues; V. Laurent, "A propos de Dorothee, Métropolitte de Mitylène," 163-166; and R. Loenertz, "Les Dominicains Byzantins Théodore et André Chrysobergès et les Négociations pour l'union des églises de 1415 à 1430," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, IX (1939) 5-61, esp. 32, 46. Cf. also M. Jugie, "Note sur l'histoire du concile de Florence de Sylvestre Syropoulos," *Echos d'Orient*, 38 (1939) 70ff. Among modern Greek historians see esp. Diamantopoulos, "Silvestros Syropoulos, etc.," 265ff.; P. Kalligas, *Μελέται καὶ Λόγοι* (Athens, 1882) 1-186; and Demetrakopoulos, *Historia schismatis*, 99-174.
22. F. Dölger, review in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 47 (1954) 154 and Frommann, *op. cit.*, 6, note 1, consider Syropoulos the second important source for the Florentine council, after the *Acta Graeca*.
23. Unionist pourparlers had been going on intermittently, of course, since long before this, but the Turkish conquest of Salonika in 1430 and the accession of Pope Eugenius IV in 1431 marked a new stage in the negotiations. See Loenertz, "Les Dominicains Byzantines," 5, and Diehl-Guilland, *L'Europe Orientale* (Paris, 1945) 359.
24. This Greek attitude was expressed only a short time after 1054, the date usually considered as marking the definitive schism between the churches (on which date, see my article with bibliography, "On the Schism of the Greek and Roman Churches," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* [1954] 17-18), when the Emperor wrote to the Pope that union could be realized only through the convocation of a general council (see Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 48). It should be noted that the popes of the fourteenth century themselves also seemed to favor a council, but never gave their full support until the Western Conciliar movement forced their hand (Viller, XVIII, 20-35 and see below, text and note 30).
25. Barlaam's discourse is printed in MPG, vol. 151, col. 1332. For a discussion of Barlaam's mission see C. Gianelli, "Un progetto di Barlaam Calabro per l'unione delle chiese," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, III (Vatican, 1946) 171 and note 22; and Viller, XVIII, 21-24. See further on Barlaam, Jugie's article in *Dict. Hist. et Géog. Éclés.*, VI, cols. 817-834.
26. The idea of an ecumenical council to end the schism was expressed by many leading Greeks between the period of Barlaam and the Council of Florence: Nicephorus Gregoras, X, 8; John Cantacuzenos, IV, 9; Nilos Cabasilas, MPG, vol. 149, cols. 684ff. (for a recent article touching on Cabasilas see M. Paulová, "L'Empire Byzantin et le Tchèque avant a chute de Constantinople," *Byzantinoslavica*, XIV [1953] 164); and Joseph Bryennios (who died just before the convocation at Florence), *Περὶ τῆς ἐνώσεως τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν*, ed. Bulgaris, I (Leipzig, 1768). Noteworthy, on the Western side, is the attitude of the Dominican Humbert of Romans, who just before 1274 had favored the convocation of a council but in the East (Mansi, XXIV, col. 128). Cf. Viller, XVIII, 23, note 1, and 20-35, for mention of representatives of the University of Paris like Jean Gerson in the early 15th century who demanded a council to treat of the Greek union. Finally see Loenertz, *loc. cit.*, 42-43.
27. As Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin*, 259, justifiably emphasizes, there were only two Greek bishops at the council, and the union was concluded "without psychological preparation and theological discussion on the disputed points." In fact, the concessions mentioned in letters borne by the imperial envoys had been forcibly extorted from the Greek clergy. See Chapman, *op. cit.*, 109, and Jugie, *op. cit.*, 259.
28. This passage follows the quotations conveniently cited in Viller, XVIII, 22-23. For the entire text see MPG, vol. 151, cols. 1332ff.
29. For Pope Benedict XII's refusal of Barlaam's proposal see MPG, vol. 151, cols. 1255ff. The chief point at issue was the question of the *filioque* (on which see below, text and note 64). The Pope and Curia did not want to question an article of the faith already defined (see Viller, XVII, 23 and Jugie, *op. cit.*, 251).
30. On this see Paulová, "L'Empire byzantin . . .," 164-167; Loenertz, "Les Dominicains Byzantins," 42-43; Viller, XVIII, 20-35; and Jugie, *op. cit.*, 251. On the Great Schism see also O. Halecki, "Rome et Byzanz au temps du grand schisme d'occident," *Collectanea Theologica*, XVIII (1937) 476-532.
31. Bréhier, *loc. cit.*, 617ff.; Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, 640, 672; etc.
32. See Syrop., 32ff. E. Cecconi, *Studi Storici sul Concilio di Firenze* (Florence, 1869) 478-486. For the papal-Basle rivalry over Byzantine favor see Frommann, *op. cit.*, 7ff.; Paulová, "L'Empire Byzantin et les Tchèques," 164-167; W. Waugh, "Councils of Constance and Basle," *Cambridge Medieval History*, VIII (1936) 35ff., and the work of J. Haller, *Concilium Basiliense*, I-V (Basel, 1896-1905) *passim*. Of interest here also is a little-

- known Greek work on the Greek-born, pro-unionist pope of the early 15th century Alexander V, by M. Renieris, 'Ο Έλληνα Πάπας Άλέξανδρος Ε', τὸ Βυζάντιον καὶ ἡ ἐν Βασιλείᾳ σύνοδος (Athens, 1881).
33. See Syrop., 54ff. For the report of the Basle envoy John of Ragusa see Cececoni, *Studi Storici*, 487ff. and esp., pp. DXI, DXII: "Imperator mandavit ne aliquis inciperet facere aliquam novitatem . . . ne se invaderent mutuo. . ." For an analysis of John of Ragusa's account from the Greek viewpoint see Diamantopoulos, *loc. cit.*, 274-275. On John also see F. Dölger, "Ein byzantinisches Staatsdokument in der Universitätsbibliothek Basel: ein Fragment des Tomos des Jahres 1351," *Historisches Jahrbuch* (1953) 218-220. As for the papal embassy's account, see Cececoni, *op. cit.*, esp. p. DLXXVII: "ad vitandum quondam motionem galiotarum nostrorum (!) contra gentes illarum galearum. Imperator fecit dictas galeas transire ad portum ante palatium suum. . ."
 34. See *Der Briefwechsel des Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini*, ed. R. Wolkan, pt. I, vol. I, *Briefe aus der Laienzeit* (Vienna, 1909) letter 24, p. 58ff., dated May 21, 1437. (I follow the English transl. of W. Boulting, *Aeneas Silvius* [London, 1908] 82.) Note also another passage in Wolkan's edition, 62, evidently referring to the same general event: "quasi videres duos exercitus invicem pugnatos arma induere. . ." Cf. Mansi, XXXI, cols. 223ff.
 35. See esp. Diamantopoulos, "Silvester Syropoulos," 265ff.; and Kalligas, *Μελέται καὶ Λόγοι* (Athens, 1918) 11-32.
 36. See Paulová, *loc. cit.*, 167ff.
 37. See, for example, documents recently published by G. Hofmann, in *Orientalium Documenta Minora*, III, fasc. III (Rome, 1953) nos. 9-10, pp. 13-15, dated Nov. 11 and 26, 1435, letters of Patriarch John II and Emperor John VIII to Pope Eugenius IV: "cognoscimus, quod presentia vestre beatitudinis multum necessaria est in futura synodo" (ed. Cececoni, *op. cit.*, 154-155 and 166-167). Cf. Paulová, *loc. cit.*, 167.
 38. Feeling between the Basle fathers and papalists had grown so acute that just before the convocation of the Council at Ferrara-Florence, the Basle fathers suspended the pope from his functions. See also Hofmann, *Orientalium Documenta Minora*, III, fasc. III p. 29, letter of John Palaeologos to the Basle synod declaring himself free of obligation because Basle had not carried out its promises.
 39. On these sites see the reports of the papal embassy in Cececoni, *op. cit.*, no. 188, esp. pp. DLXXVII-DLXXX; and of the Basle envoy John of Ragusa, *ibid.*, pp. DXVIIff. Cf. Syrop., 19. Acceptance of the cities specified by Basle would no doubt have permitted exercise of greatest influence by the Western conciliarists.
 40. Syrop., 79 and 85 ff., reports that as late as his arrival in Venice, the Emperor was still undecided whether to go to Basle or Ferrara, the latter being the site fixed by the Pope for the Council. According to Syrop., he was advised by the Doge to select that most advantageous to him. But the news of the death of the Western Emperor Sigismund, a strong supporter of Basle and one from whom the Greek Emperor expected aid, probably helped to induce the Greeks to go directly to Ferrara. On the accuracy of this report see Frommann, *op. cit.*, 9; and most recently B. Stephanides, "Ο Άρχαιος σταθμός τῆς ἐξελέξεως τῶν σχέσεων ἐκκλησίας καὶ πολιτείας τοῦ Βυζαντίου... (1416-1439)," *Ἐπετηρίς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* (1953) 27-40, both of whom seem to accept its authenticity. Cf. Hélefé-Leclereq, VII pt. 2, 961, which denies its correctness.
 41. Indeed the popes tended to overemphasize the power of the Emperor over the Greek church, and therefore often wrongly attributed Greek popular hostility toward union to imperial perfidy. See Viller, XVI, 264, note 4 and XVIII, 20-21. Also A. Fliche, "Le problème oriental au second concile oecumenique de Lyon," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XIII (1947) 4.
 42. On the preparations for departure and the voyage itself see Syrop., 60-80. Little important information is added by other Greek historians. But cf. the report of the Bishop of Digne (who participated in the papal embassy escorting the Greeks to Venice) in Cececoni, *op. cit.*, no. 188, esp. p. DLXXXI.
 43. For the arrival at Venice see Syrop., 80ff. Note his moving account (87) of Greek emotion at seeing the former treasures of Hagia Sophia exhibited at San Marco. On the reception at Venice see *Acta*, 1-5 (Mansi, 466-467); and Ducas (Bonn) 212.
 44. On his unionism see even Syrop., 92, who reports that the Patriarch confided to intimates his hope that papal coöperation would permit him to cast aside the Greek church's servitude to the Emperor and "to recover the authority proper to me." On this curious passage see B. Stephanides, "Ο Άρχαιος σταθμός..." 38ff.; and Diamantopoulos, "Silvester Syropoulos," 275-276. But the Patriarch

- was disillusioned, says Syrop., 93, when he heard of Eugenius' demand that he kiss the pope's foot.
45. Syrop., 92-95.
 46. Syrop., 95.
 47. *Ibid.*
 48. Syrop., 96. Also see Andrea da Santa Croce, col. 1435: "in secreto camera," and *Acta*, 9 (Mansi, 474): "in palatium papae."
 49. The *Acta Graeca*, 9-10, pointedly omits mention of the footkiss, but for evidence that similar practice was current at this time see elsewhere in the *Acta*, 467 (Mansi, 1040), where immediately after the reading of the decree of union at Florence, Greeks as well as Latins kissed the knee and hand of the pope: "ἡσπασάμεθα τοῦ πάπα τὸ γόνυ καὶ τῆν χεῖρα" (cf. Andrea da Santa Croce, col. 1702). Andrea, col. 1435, does not explicitly mention the footkiss on the patriarch's arrival in Ferrara. But see G. Hofmann, "Die Konzilsarbeit in Ferrara," pt. 2, *Orient. Chris. Per.*, III (1937) 410, who seems to accept Syropoulos' statement that the footkiss was demanded, as does Héféle-Leclercq, VII, 962. See also Stephanides, *Ecclesiastical History* (in Greek), 359.
 50. See M. Andrieu, *Le Pontifical Romain au Moyen Age, II, Le Pontifical de la Curie Romaine au XIII^e Siècle* (Vatican, 1940), 386, stating that during certain ceremonies king, archbishop, and bishop "osculetur pedem ipsius." Also cf. 357, par. 16. It is of interest that, while the Dictatus Papae of Gregory VII required the Emperor to kiss the foot of the pope and that, according to Western custom, the Emperor should hold the bridle and lead the mule of the seated pope, none of the sources of the Council of Florence allude to such a performance on the part of the Greek Emperor, recording rather that he rode into the papal palace. See *Acta*, 7 (Mansi, 470-471). Such a practice was in fact the object of acute criticism in the East, being considered highly degrading to the imperial dignity. See esp. G. Ostrogorsky, "Zum Stratordienst der Herrschers in der Byzantinischen-slavischen Welt," *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, VII (1935) 189-192; and cf. my article, "The Nicene Revolution of 1258 and the Usurpation of Michael VIII Palaeologos," *Traditio* (1953) 428.
 51. According to F. Dölger, "Rom in der Gedankenwelt der Byzantiner," *Byzanz und die Europäische Staatenwelt* (1953) 105, there was little trace of Petrine supremacy in the Greek church, over which Christ Himself, not the Pope, was considered head.
 52. Note the typical statement of the Patriarch Joseph at Florence (*Acta*, 438; Mansi, col. 1001) that he would never change the dogmas handed down from the fathers (τὸ πατροπαράδοτον δόγμα). On the matter of Greek retention of traditional practices and Latin innovations see also Barlaam's second Greek discourse, ed. by C. Gianelli, "Un progetto di Barlaam per l'unione delle chiese," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, III (1946) 165 and text 202. On the ecumenicity of the first seven councils see above note 10 and cf. Stephanides, *Ecclesiastical History* (in Greek) 361.
 53. See a hitherto unknown Greek discourse of Barlaam, also dated 1339, in which he maintained that to achieve union the pope should return to the traditional form of the creed as it existed before the schism, that is without the *filioque*. In Gianelli, *loc. cit.*, 167 and 187. On Photius and Nicholas see Dvornik, *Photian Schism, passim*. Also Heiler, *Urkirche und Ostkirche*, esp. 141.
 54. See my article, "On the Schism of the Greek and Roman Churches," 23. Not to be overlooked here also are the imperfect contacts between Rome and Constantinople which kept each side at least partially ignorant of the precise course of events in the other. It is probably true, nevertheless, that more frequent contacts existed than is generally believed.
 55. On the seating see *Acta*, 11 (Mansi, 474E); Syrop., 101-103; and Andrea da Santa Croce, col. 1435ff. On the imperial presidency over ecumenical councils see Dvornik, "Emperors, Popes, and General Councils," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers no. 6* (1951) 1-23.
 56. *Acta*, 11 (Mansi, 474E); Syrop., 103; and Andrea, XXXIB, col. 1436.
 57. Andrea, col. 1436: "In oppositum primis cardinalis sedes patriarchae fuerat constituta." The *Acta* does not specify the exact position.
 58. Cf. Humbert de Romanis (Mansi, XXIV, pt. 2, col. 124) who says that the chief cause of the schism was rivalry over the claims to the Empire. On the beginnings of this problem see W. Ohnsorge, *Das Zweikaiserproblem im früheren Mittelalter* (Hildesheim, 1947). A very curious passage is contained in Syropoulos, indicating that the Emperor John VIII had hopes of coöperating to achieve union with the Western Emperor Sigismund in the aim eventually of succeeding him on the Western throne. It is certain at any rate that the two Emperors were on cordial terms and that John had at one time even visited Sigismund's court. See Syrop., 8, 57; *Regesta Im-*

- perii *Die Urkunden Kaiser Sigismunds*, ed. W. Altmann (Innsbruck, 1896) II, nos. 12226 and 11367; and cf. Kalligas, *op. cit.*, 8.
59. See E. Vansteenbergh, *Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues* (Paris, 1920) 27-28. It should be noted that at the time of Cusanus' attack on the Donation he was a supporter of the Western Conciliar movement.
 60. On this embassy see the reports of the Basle and papal ambassadors in Cecconi, *Studi Storici*, pp. DIXff. and pp. DLXXVff. Cf. Syrop., 54.
 61. See M. Honecker, "Nikolaus von Cues und die griechische Sprache," *Sitzungsb. Heidelberger Akad. Wissen. Phil.-hist. Kl.*, XXVIII (1938) 13.
 62. On this significant Greek attitude see esp. F. Dölger, "Rom in der Gedankenwelt der Byzantiner," *Byzanz und Die Europäische Staatenwelt* (1953) 109-110, who shows that the twelfth century Byzantine canonist Joseph Balsamon and the historians Cinnamos and Anna Comnena (among others) reveal a good knowledge of the Donation, but that they turn this against the papacy. Surprisingly, as Dölger notes, Pope Nicholas I did not use the Donation against the Greeks, although Cardinal Humbert subsequently employed it against Cerularios in the events of 1054.
 63. It may be true, on the other hand, as Professor Stephen Kuttner points out to this writer, that by the early fifteenth century the Donation had lost much of its potency even in the West. See the recent work of W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955) 416-420; and S. Williams, "The Pseudo-Isidorean Problem Today," *Speculum*, XXIX (1954) 703. Cusanus himself was not at the Council of Florence, having at the time been sent on a papal mission.
 64. See *Acta*, 413 (Mansi, 973), where the Latins remark of the Greeks: ὑποπτεύουσι... ἡμᾶς λέγοντος δύο ἀρχάς, καὶ δύο αἰτίας τῆς... Τριάδος... ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς μίαν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν. On the *filioque* in general see esp. A. Palmieri's article in *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, V, col. 2309ff.; Gennadios Scholarios, "Κατὰ τῆς προσθήκης ἣν ἐν τῷ συμβόλῳ..." in Dositheos, *Τόμος Ἀγάτης* (Jassy, 1698) 291-307; and on the Greek and Latin positions at the end of the eleventh century, B. Leib, *Rome, Kiev, et Byzance* (Paris, 1924) 331-344.
 65. According to the *Acta*, 12 (cf. Syrop, 66 and 110) both Mark and Isidore of Russia represented the patriarch of Antioch. Cf. Andrea da Santa Croce, col. 1436. On Mark's significant role see the full length work of A. Diapantopoulos, *Mark of Ephesus and the Council of Florence* (in Greek) (Athens, 1899) and L. Petit's article in *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, IX², cols. 1968ff.
 66. See Syrop., 166ff.; *Acta*, 56 (Mansi, 517), where Mark says that the cause of the schism is the illegal addition of the *filioque*. Elsewhere in the *Acta*, 67 (Mansi, 529), Mark emphasizes the decree of the Council of Ephesus in 431 which forbade any change whatever to the symbol.
 67. On Bessarion, later to become the celebrated Cardinal of the Roman church, see esp. H. Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion* (Paris, 1878); and L. Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist, und Staatsman* (Paderborn, 1923). Also on his role at Florence see recent studies by E. Candal, "Bessarion Nicaenus in Concilio Florentino," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, VI (1940) 416ff.; and E. Udalcova, "The Struggle of Parties in 15th Century Byzantium and the Role of Bessarion of Nicaea" (in Russian), *Vizantijsky Vremennik*, II (1949) 294-307 and III (1950) 106-*Géogr.*, II, col. 1696ff., and cf. R. Coulon's article in *Dict. Hist. et Géogr.*, II, col. 1696ff., and cf. R. Loenertz, "Les Dominicains Byzantins," 5-61.
 68. See *Acta*, 92 (Mansi, 556), where the *filioque* is termed an explanation not an addition: ἐξήγησις... οὐκ... προσθήκη. Also Andrea da Santa Croce, cols. 1459 and esp. 1463ff. and 1475ff.
 69. *Acta.*, 297 (Mansi, 769) and Andrea da Santa Croce, esp. cols. 1585ff.
 70. On the long involved conflict over MSS and their interpretations in which texts of St. Basil played an important part, see *Acta*, 250-390 (Mansi, 720-876). On the problem of corruption of texts in particular see esp. *Acta*, 296-298, 308, 326ff., 354, and 401 (Mansi, 769-772, 783, 804ff., 836, and 888). Also letter of Bessarion in MPG, vol. 161, cols. 325ff. Cf. Vast, *op. cit.*, 81-82; Vogt., *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, VI, col. 36; and M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, II (London, 1892) 184.
 71. See decree of union in *Acta*, 461 (Mansi, 1029); Andrea da Santa Croce, col. 1696; Mark of Ephesus, MPG, vol. 159, col. 1076. Cf. Stephanides, *op. cit.*, 362. This identification of terms was largely the work of Bessarion.
 72. Particularly useful here is Syropoulos' knowledge of behind-the-scenes activities. See Syrop., *passim*, and *Acta*, 393, 402, 416, 450 (Mansi, 879, 888, 976, 1016). Cf. J. Gill, "The 'Acta' and the Memoirs of Syropoulos," 303-355.

73. For a good example of Latin inability to accept invalidity of the *filioque*, see Giannelli, "Un progetto di Barlaam, etc.," 172 and esp. 176.
74. See in *Acta*, 400 (Mansi, 885) the revealing remark of a Greek bishop at Florence: "I will not give up our dogma and become Latinized." It is to be noted that certain Western theorists, esp. of the fourteenth century, had proposed elaborate schemes for forcibly Latinizing the Greeks. See, for example the plan set forth in the *Directorium*, written by Brocardus or very possibly by the Dominican Guillaume d'Adam, to convert the Greek churches into Latin, suppress the privileges of the fanatically Orthodox Greek monks, burn heretical Greeks, and, perhaps most important, to force all male Greek children except first-born to learn Latin letters. The plan would even have abolished the Greek language had it not been used at Christ's crucifixion! See ed. de Reiffenberg, *Monuments pour servir à l'histoire des provinces*, IV (Brussels, 1846) 288ff. Cf. Viller, XVI, 274.
75. On Greek experiences under Latin domination in Constantinople see Jugie, *op. cit.*, 253-254 and esp. article cited of R. L. Wolff, "Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople," 33-34. At the start of the conquest, however, Innocent III had directed that the Greeks be permitted to retain their rites (MPL, vol. 215, cols. 959ff.) but this was not observed. Regarding the islands, in Cyprus for example the Greeks were not permitted during the 14th century to retain their liturgical usages (Raynaldi, 1338, no. 72; 1368, no. 20; 1370, no. 4). As for the Greeks of southern Italy, in 1284 their priests were enjoined by Pope Martin IV to chant the creed with the *filioque* under pain of excommunication (Viller, XVI, 265 and note 2).
76. On the practice of an ecclesiastical feudal oath see Bréhier, "Attempts at Reunion," 606. On the significance to the Greeks of a Latin legate in Constantinople, see my article, "On the Schism of the Greek and Roman Churches," 19-23.
77. Héfélé-Leclercq, *Conciles*, V pt. 2, 1333. Cf. the remark of Petrarch (in 1366): "These tricksters call the Roman church their mother, but they treat our Latin rites as foolishness, and purify their basilicas after one of our people has entered them" ("Rerum sinilium," in *Opera Omnia* [Basel, 1554] Bk. VII, ep. 1. Cf. ed. G. Fracassetti, *Lettere Senili di F. Petrarca*, I [Florence, 1869] 422-424.
- 77a. Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin*, 263, believes that the increasing number of Greek translations of Latin theological works (of Thomas Aquinas, etc.) explains the development of pro-unionism among certain of the Greek clergy.
78. On the fear of Latinization and particularly that union would restore Latin domination, see esp. the monograph of N. Kalogeras, *Μάρκος ὁ Εὐγενικός καὶ Βησσαρίων ὁ Καρδινάλιος* (Athens, 1893) 57-102; the oration of Barlaam in MPG, vol. 151, col. 133; and the *Directorium* of Guillaume d'Adam (or Brocard), ed. de Reiffenberg, 288ff. Cf. Viller, XVI, 274; and my article, "Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons," 86-87. On the preference of some Greeks for the Turks see Kalogeras, *op. cit.*, *passim.*; the recent article of H. Evert-Kappesova, "Le Tiare ou le Turbain," *Byzantinoslavica* (1953) 245-255; and, finally, the article cited of Udaleova, "The Struggle of Parties in 15th century Byzantium . . ." *Viz. Vrem.*, III (1950) 106-132, who attempts to analyze the views toward union of the various classes in Byzantium. Regarding Latin military aid for Byzantium see the treatise of Demetrius Cydones (late fourteenth century), *De admittendo latinorum subsidio*, in MPG, vol. 154, cols. 1028D, urging the acceptance of Latin aid against the Turks. For discussion of this see D. Zakythinos, *La Grèce et les Balkans* (Athens, 1947) 46-56.
79. On Latin penetration in general see Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, 680 and 684, and my forthcoming book, "The Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologos and the West: A Study in Greco-Latin Relations (1259-1282)." On the Gasmules' importance see the Byzantine historians Gregoras (Bonn) 98 and Pachymeres, I (Bonn) 188, 309. For Italian economic domination in Constantinople see the recent article of R. Guiland, "Les appels de Constantin XI Paléologue à Rome et à Venise pour sauver Constantinople (1452-1453)," *Byzantinoslavica* (1953) 226-227; and W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge* (Leipzig, 1885-6) I, 427-527 and II, 257-313.
80. Statement attributed to the Grand Duke Lukas Notaras not long before Constantinople's fall (in Ducas [Bonn] 264). For a recent article analyzing this famous remark, see Evert-Kappesova, "La Tiare ou Le Turbain," 245-257, who shows that this sentiment, usually cited as the expression of a blind hatred, constituted in reality a political program. Kappesova, 250, correctly stresses that people though conquered do not cease to exist if they

- preserve their language and civilization. On Greek preference for the Turks see also S. Runciman, "Byzantine and Hellene in the Fourteenth Century," *Tomos Harmenopoulos* (1951) 30-31. Cf. a statement somewhat similar to that of Notaras ascribed to Petrarch: "The Turks are enemies, but the Greeks are schismatics and worse than enemies" (in "Rerum senilium," *Opera Omnia*, Bk. VII, 912). Also cf. the statement of Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, in his discourse to the king of France after the Council of Pisa (1409), that the Greeks prefer the Turks to the Latins (see A. Galitzin, *Sermon inédit de Jean Gerson sur le retour des Grecs à l'unité* [Paris, 1859] 29 and cf. Manuel Calecas, MPG, vol. 152, col. 239).
81. The Koran prescribed toleration to Christianity. See L. Bréhier, *Vie et Mort de Byzance* (Paris, 1947) 498.
 82. Quoted in my article, "Michael VIII Palaeologus and . . . Lyons," 87.
 83. On the Greek fear of Latinization see further *Acta*, 400 (Mansi, 885), where a Greek bishop, objecting to acceptance of the *filioque*, says pointedly: "I prefer to die than ever to become Latinized" (ἐγὼ... θούλωμαι ἀποθανεῖν ἢ λατίνισαι ποτέ.) George Scholarios, subsequently an arch-foe of union, refers to the union as τὸν Λατινισμόν ("Latinism"), and warns the Greeks that by accepting the union "all of you and this assembly will become Latins . . ." (cited in Demetrapoulos, *op. cit.*, 168). Note finally a curious letter of Bessarion, written after the Turkish conquest to the tutor of the children of the last representative of the Byzantine imperial family. He instructs that they live in all respects as Latins, wearing Latin clothing, attending Latin churches, even praying in the Latin manner (Sphrantzes, [Bonn] 418ff.).
 84. Quoted in Kalogeras, *op. cit.*, 70. On Bryennios, who died just prior to the Council of Florence and who was in attendance at the Council of Constance, see Bréhier's article in *Dict. Hist. et Géog. Ecclés.*, X, cols. 993-996; and Ph. Meyer, "Des Joseph Bryennios Schriften, Leben und Bildung," *Byz. Zeit.*, V (1896) 74-111.
 85. It is significant that when Pope Eugenius asked the Greeks at Florence to abandon the use of leavened bread ("enzymes"), the Greeks, according to the *Acta*, 446 (Mansi, 1012), responded that the practice was handed down from their ancestors (πατροπαράδοτον), as was the use of azymes for the Latins.
 86. On this see Syrop., 142, 207, 292, and see above, note 20. In justice to the Pope it should be noted that his financial difficulties were doubtless aggravated by attacks in the area by the condottieri Nicolò Piccinino (Syr., 142), and also because the Council of Basle had deprived him of many ecclesiastical revenues (W. Boulting, *Aeneas Silvius* [London, 1908] 69).
 87. *Acta*, 393ff. (Mansi, 880ff.). Cf. Vast, 85 and 87-90.
 88. Syrop., 125-129.
 89. Syrop., 290ff. But cf. a letter of Bessarion in MPG, vol. 161, 424CD., stating that at Florence union was agreed to "absque quocumque violentia sponte et voluntarie."
 90. On the final definition of the *filioque* and other disputed points see the discussion and official decree of union in both Greek and Latin versions as printed in the *Acta*, 440-472, esp. 459ff. (Mansi, 1004-1045). It may be noted that each church retained its own rites and usages, esp. the azymes and enzymes (unleavened and leavened bread), while the Latin teaching of purgatory prevailed. On the settlement of the specific points at issue cf. the various opinions of Jugie, *op. cit.*, 267; Frommann, *op. cit.*, 18; and Stephanides, *op. cit.*, 326-363. For the crucial problem of papal supremacy see below notes 97-99. Significant is a passage in the *Acta* quoting the pope as saying after signing of the union: "I do not know what more to ask of the Greeks, for what we asked for and sought, we have." But cf. Syrop., 307-308.
 91. Syrop., 280ff.
 92. *Acta*, 444-445 (Mansi, 1008-1009).
 93. The *Acta* does not mention the flight of Isaias, Bishop of Stavropol, but his signature is missing from the tomos and Syropoulos, 292, explicitly mentions his secret departure before the signing of union.
 94. Syrop., 284; *Acta*, 469-471 (Mansi, 1041-1045).
 95. Syrop., 291-294. Cf. Frommann, *op. cit.*, 26ff.
 96. See Syrop., 330ff. At Mark's death George Scholarios (later as monk named Gennadios) became the leading anti-unionist (Ducas, 254-264).
 - 96a. See *Acta*, 451ff. (Mansi, 1016ff.) and Syrop., 278ff. The key point was the right of appeal to the Pope against the Patriarchs.
 97. The decree reads that the Pope possesses the "primacy over the whole world," and is "successor to the blessed Peter first of the Apostles, true vicar of Christ, head of the entire church, and father and teacher of all Christians, with complete power received from our Lord Jesus Christ via Peter to teach, rule, and govern the universal church . . ." See *Acta*,

- 464 (Mansi, 1032); Syrop., 293ff., and Andrea da Santa Croce, cols. 1697-1698. For various opinions regarding papal jurisdiction as expressed in the decree see Frommann, *op. cit.*, 18; Héfélé-Leclercq, *Conciles*, 1049-1051; Stephanides, *op. cit.*, 361-364; and G. Hofmann, *Papato, conciliarismo, patriarchato (1438-1439), Teologi e deliberazioni del concilio di Firenze* (Rome, 1940) 28-92.
98. The Latin text of the *Acta*, 464 (Mansi, 1032) reads: "salvis videlicet privilegiis omnibus et iuribus eorum (patriarcharum)." The Greek: *σωζομένων δηλαδή καὶ τῶν προνομίων πάντων καὶ τῶν δικαιῶν αὐτῶν.*
99. The fact that the same clause also appears in a canon of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (at which time the Greek church was forcibly united to Rome) would seem to indicate that no great importance should be attached to the phrase. Indeed at Florence the same words doubtless conveyed different meanings to each side (cf. Frommann, *op. cit.*, 18; and Stephanides, *op. cit.*, 363). A severe argument, of course, developed over the addition of this clause. See *Acta*, 457 (Mansi, 1025). Cf. the attitude of Hofmann, *Papato, conciliarismo, etc.*, 69-73. Also on the decree of union itself note esp. the opinion of Frommann, *op. cit.*, 19: "There took place no union, in fact not even a compromise, but a silencing of the differences by means of a brilliantly indefinite and ambiguous definition." See further Frommann, *Zur Kritik des Florentiner Unionsdecrets* (Leipzig, 1870) (inaccessible to me).
100. Syrop., 299 and *Acta*, 468-471 (Mansi, 1041-1044). The titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople was then Pope Eugenius' nephew, Francesco Condolmaro (on which see L. de Mas Latrie, "Patriarches Latins de Constantinople," *Revue de l'Orient Latin*," III [1895] 444. Cf. Frommann, *op. cit.*, 187).
101. Possible corroboration for Syropoulos' remark may be a statement of the Pope, cited in *Acta*, 471 (Mansi, 1044), that he wanted selection of the best man, *neither relative nor friend*, as the new patriarch. A nephew of Eugenius, named Condolmaro, is mentioned in Syrop., 54, as having commanded the papal fleet in Constantinople just before the convocation of the Council.
102. Syrop., 346ff., lists seven factors for the failure of union in Constantinople. See also Ducas, 215 and 252ff.; Mark of Ephesus, MPG, vols. 160-161, *passim*. and his works in L. Petit (ed.), *Patrologia Orientalis*, XV, 1-170 and XVI, 307-524.
103. This is an argument of Joseph Bryennios in his "Concerning the union of the churches" (in Greek), ed. Bulgari, I, 469 (cited in Viller, XVI, 283). See esp. the speech of George Scholarios quoted in Demetrakopoulos, *op. cit.*, 161ff. On Scholarios, who became the first Greek patriarch after the Turkish conquest, see his *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Petit-Siderides-Jugie (Paris, 1928ff.). For a recent sketch of Scholarios' life see Paulová, *loc. cit.*, 192-203.
104. On the judgment of God see Ducas, 254ff., and for similar disturbances over the Union of Lyons in 1274, see my article, "Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons," 85-86.
105. Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, 675-676; K. Paparrigopoulos, *History of the Greek People*, V (Athens, 1903) (in Greek) 497ff.
- 105a. It should be pointed out that although the Greek church as a whole repudiated union, it is on the basis of the act of union at Florence that certain Eastern Christians termed Uniates are today in communion with Rome.
106. On the inevitability of Byzantium's fall cf. S. Runciman, "Byzantine and Hellene in the Fourteenth Century," *Tomas K. Harmenopoulos* (in Greek) (1951) 29-30, and *Byzantinoslavica*, (1953) p. V.
107. See Giannelli, "Un progetto di Barlaam," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, III, 175-176. On his return from Avignon Barlaam wrote a treatise against papal primacy of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he subsequently became closely identified with the Roman church. On Barlaam see above, text and notes 25-29.
108. The suggestion of a Constantinopolitan council is mentioned several times by Syropoulos. He notes, 13, that the Patriarch Joseph favored this proposal because in the West the Greeks would be at the mercy of the Latins for their subsistence. Syrop., 155, also records that in 1426 the famous philosopher Gemistos Plethon had advised the Emperor to insist on Constantinople as the site for a council. Cf. on this Demetrakopoulos, *op. cit.*, 103. Though the Latins were in general unwilling to go to Constantinople, it is noteworthy that Humbert of Romans (13th century), who understood the Greek mentality well, had already suggested that "papa in Graeciam deberet descendere, si spes esset probabilis, quod propter hoc reuniretur ovile" (Mansi, XXIV, col. 128).
109. Ducas (Bonn) 215, says that the Emperor had stressed to the Sultan the religious aims of the Council of Florence, but the Sultan no doubt

- realized the political considerations involved. According to Sphrantzes, 178-180, the first and greatest cause of the Turkish attack and slavery of the Greeks was the Council of Florence. Cf. Syrop., 14.
110. How, cried some of the Greeks, could the Latin princes help them in view of their inability to aid even the Latin states in the East. The fact is that the great Western states were not yet seriously menaced by the Turks and therefore felt no great compulsion to help. Most threatened were Hungary, Albania, Venice and Genoa with territory in the East. France and England, still involved in the Hundred Years' War, did not respond effectively to papal appeals, not participating in the unfortunate crusade of Varna (1444), which seemed to seal the fate of the Greek Empire. No secular prince, in fact, except the Duke of Burgundy had sent representatives to the Council at Florence. (For the insulting attitude of the Burgundian envoys to the Greek Emperor, see Syrop., 175-177; cf. *Acta*, 212-213). The absence of Western princes at Florence was a profound disillusionment for the Greek Emperor.
111. See in particular the eloquent letter of Aeneas Silvius (the later Pope Pius II), in *Opera Omnia* (Basle, 1571) 712 (cf. E. Vansteenberghe, *Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues* [Paris, 1920] 228): "Secunda mors ista Homero est, secundus Platonis obitus!" On Western disinterest in Constantinople's fall and rhetorical laments of the humanists see R. Cessi, "La Caduta di Costantinopoli nel 1453," *Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti* (1937-1938) 565, and M. Gilmore, *The World of Humanism 1453-1517* (New York, 1952) 15-21.