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The Liturgical Argument in Apollinarius: Help and Hindrance on the Way to Orthodoxy*

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In the essay “Creed or Chaos?” written in the midst of the turmoil of World War II, British mystery novelist Dorothy L. Sayers defended the relevance of the creeds produced during the doctrinal debates of the fourth and fifth centuries to the lives of modern Christians. The theological dogmas contained in such documents as the Nicene Creed (325) or the Chalcedonian Definition (451) are not, she notes wittily, “a set of arbitrary regulations invented *a priori* by a committee of theologians enjoying a bout of all-in dialectical wrestling,” but were “hammered out under pressure of urgent practical necessity” to resolve theological controversies that had real impact on the discipleship of ordinary Christians.¹ To put matters at their simplest, the trinitarian controversies revolved around the question of whether Christ was divine, and so capable of saving humankind from sin and death. The christological controversies, at least in their earliest stage, debated whether Christ was really human, truly the God-made-man capable of healing wounded humanity

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¹ Dorothy L. Sayers, “Creed or Chaos?” in idem, *Creed or Chaos?* (London: Methuen, 1947) 40.

and providing a viable role model for Christians to follow in the living of a redeemed life. At stake in both controversies was a convincing explanation of the central Christian tenet that “Jesus saves” for those who profess to be his followers.

Amidst the philosophical and terminological complexities of these debates is, therefore, a fundamental preoccupation with soteriology. While abstruse discussions of οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and other arcana can obscure this concern, it emerges forcefully when the focus shifts to that aspect of Christian experience that all parties to the doctrinal debates—learned and unlearned, cleric and layperson alike—shared. That experience was liturgy, that participation in prayer and the sacraments of the church by which all Christians appropriate the salvation won for them by the incarnate Word. As the trinitarian and christological controversies progressed, theologians increasingly pointed to the assumptions implicitly embodied in the liturgical practice of the church to defend their positions within the debates. A given theologian would argue that only his understanding of Christ’s relationship to the Father or his analysis of the relationship between divinity and humanity in Christ could adequately explain the de facto liturgical practice of the church and thus guarantee the saving effects thought to come to the faithful through their participation in that practice.

This essay, then, examines one important fourth-century theologian’s use of the argument from liturgy in the doctrinal debates of his time, that of Apollinarius of Laodicea (ca. 310–90).² Handbooks of doctrine commonly identify him as the heretic who instigated the christological controversies at the end of the fourth century by promulgating the view that the second person of the Trinity assumed human flesh without a human soul in the Incarnation. What is perhaps less well-known about Apollinarius is that he was intimately involved in the trinitarian debates that occupied the earlier part of the fourth century. He professed to be a disciple of Athanasius of Alexandria,³ and was known and respected for many years by the great Cappadocian Father, Basil of Caesarea.⁴ With both, Apollinarius shared the conviction first articulated by the Nicene Creed that the second person

² For information on Apollinarius’s biography and ecclesiastical career, see Kelley McCarthy Spoerl, “A Study of the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* by Apollinarius of Laodicea” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1991) 6–66.

³ Apollinarius *Ep. ad Diocæsareenses* 1.255.24–25. References to all Apollinarian works here are to the edition of Hans Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule* (1904; reprinted Hildesheim: Olms, 1970) and denote respectively chapter, page and line number in that edition. For more on Apollinarius’s close and well-attested friendship with Athanasius, see Spoerl, “Study,” 76 n. 19.

⁴ The prehistory of the relationship between Basil and Apollinarius prior to Basil’s break with the latter in the mid-370s is discussed in George Leonard Prestige, *St. Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea* (London: SPCK, 1956).

of the Trinity was fully divine and consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with God the Father.⁵ Apollinarius was thus a notable participant in both the trinitarian and christological debates of his day and used arguments from liturgical practice in his contributions to both. Studying Apollinarius's use of the liturgical argument in both contexts will be useful for two reasons. First, his use of the liturgical argument provides another example of how this argument was deployed in patristic doctrinal debate and supplements current knowledge of its use in theologians like Athanasius and Basil. Second, this study enables one to uncover another element in the complex web of factors that shaped the christology for which Apollinarius became notorious. Scholars thus far have considered philosophical⁶ and polemical factors⁷ in the formulation of that christology. This study, however, demonstrates that a concern for consistency between formulas of worship and formulas of doctrine was also a significant factor in his thought. In Apollinarius's use of the liturgical argument, one can detect the carry-over of concerns from the trinitarian to the christological debates and the manner in which certain concerns from the former debate—specifically, a conception of the nature of salvation shared with Athanasius and an anxiety that no one construe the worship of the incarnate Word as the idolatrous worship of a creature—exert pressure on Apollinarius's thought in a way that will eventually cause him to compromise the full humanity of Christ. In tracking this development, one can observe that the history of Apollinarius's use of the argument from liturgical practice provides a cautionary tale against any facile application of the rule of *lex orandi, lex credendi* in doctrinal debate, a valuable lesson for all Christian theologians, then and now.

■ Christian Worship and the Doctrine of the Trinity

Apollinarius uses the universally shared experience of Christian worship to argue for the single divinity and coeternity of the members of the Trinity. That the members of the Trinity were not equally divine and coeternal were propositions fielded in the course of the controversy generated by the preaching of Arius after

⁵ Apollinarius uses the Nicene watchword ὁμοούσιος in *Katὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 34.180.22. He also sent monks to the Council of Alexandria in 362, which upheld the Nicene creed as the standard of trinitarian orthodoxy (Athanasius *Tomus ad Antiochenos* 9). Both Epiphanius of Salamis (*Pan.* 77) and Basil of Caesarea (*Ep.* 129) expressed dismay and surprise when Apollinarius's views gained notoriety in the late 370s, indicating that his reputation for orthodoxy was unexceptionable prior to that time. Again, Epiphanius emphasizes how close Apollinarius and Athanasius were.

⁶ This is a particular emphasis on Ekkhard Mühlenberg, *Apollinaris von Laodicea* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1969).

⁷ Looking at the evolution of Apollinarius's thought against the background of the trinitarian controversies is the subject of the present author's research, in her Toronto dissertation ("Study") and in the following articles: Kelley McCarthy Spoerl, "Apollinarius and the Response to Early Arian Christology," *StPatr* 36 (1993) 421–27 and idem, "Apollinarian Christology and the Anti-Marcellan Tradition," *JTS* 45 (1994) 545–68.

about 318. The Son's codivinity and coeternity were in question from the beginning of the controversy. The Spirit's codivinity and coeternity became the focus of intense discussion circa 358–62, to which Athanasius's letters to Serapion of Thmuis testify. Apollinarius addresses both aspects of the controversy in his one extant trinitarian treatise, the *Katὰ Μέρος Πίστις* or *Detailed Confession of the Faith*, which appears to be roughly contemporaneous with the letters to Serapion.⁸ References to formulas of Christian worship as implicit proof for Apollinarius's anti-Arian conclusions abound in this text.

The theme of worship appears in the opening chapter of the *Katὰ Μέρος Πίστις*, which lists and anathematizes a number of views that Apollinarius and others attribute to Arius and his sympathizers. "Most hateful and hostile to the apostolic confession," he says at 1.167.14–15, "are those who introduce three disparate and alien forms of worship (τρῆς ἀκοινωήτους καὶ ξένας . . . λατρείας), although there is only one legitimate object of our religion (μίας καὶ μόνης οὔσης τῆς νομίμου θρησκείας)." In articulating this theme here Apollinarius makes a point that he will reiterate in his work: there must be a proper parallelism and coordination between theological formulas and the formulas of Christian worship. There is no explicit evidence that Arius or any of his supporters advocated three distinct and unequal forms of worship directed to Father, Son, and Spirit. They did, however, articulate an understanding of the Trinity as a hierarchy of three ontologically distinct entities, the second and third members of which were created and contingent, and consequently possessed inferior degrees of glory. A line from the *Thalia* clarifies this: "There is a Trinity, whose glories are not alike; their ὑποστάσεις do not intermingle with one another. One is more glorious than the other in their glories unto immensity."⁹ In this opening remark from the *Katὰ Μέρος Πίστις*, Apollinarius extrapolates from this element of early Arian theory the following points: if Arius proposes that the members of the Trinity form a hierarchy of progressively inferior beings, it follows that they must constitute diverse objects of the Christian worship that honors them and the different glories they manifest. Apollinarius's response to this alleged line of argumentation is also implicit in this citation from *Katὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 1: while the Arians think there are three disparate forms of Christian worship corresponding to three disparate divine entities, there is in fact only one legitimate object of the Christian religion (and of Christian worship; θρησκεία contains both meanings).¹⁰ By implication, then, the members of the Trinity must not constitute a hierarchy of three ontologically divided and progressively inferior divine beings but a single godhead radiating a single divine glory, which the church celebrates in a single worship.

⁸ On the dating of the *Katὰ Μέρος Πίστις*, see Spoerl, "Study," 363–67.

⁹ As quoted in Athanasius, *De synodis* 15.3.

¹⁰ *PGL* s.v. θρησκεία.

Apollinarius reiterates this argument with greater liturgical specificity in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 9:

For one must either conceive of the whole Trinity in accordance with a natural and true opinion, or we shall be compelled to . . . reckon created things with the Creator and creatures with the Master of the universe and things sanctified with the Sanctifier, even though nothing created can be reckoned with the Trinity. But baptism, the invocation (ἐπίκλησις), and worship (λατρεία) are performed in the name of the holy Trinity. But if the glories are three, let the forms of worship (αἱ λατρεῖαι) among those who impiously revere creatures [also] be three. If the members of the nature that is worshipped are divided, let the elements of the worship (τὰ τῆς προσκυνήσεως) also be divided by these people. But things of recent origin will not be worshipped with the eternal.¹¹

This passage betrays in abundance the elliptical quality that marks all of this work.¹² The basic point Apollinarius argues is nevertheless clear. To begin with, he establishes that Christians do not reckon created things with the Creator. To do otherwise is “impious,” as he makes clear at 9.170.18. He then points to the liturgical fact that various important sacramental actions, the formula of baptism, invocation (ἐπίκλησις), and other forms of worship (for example, the doxology) that comprise Christian λατρεία are performed in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit together. The implied logic of the first two sentences of the passage, then, suggests that if Christians do not reckon creatures with the Creator, but do perform significant acts of worship in the name of the Trinity, then the members of the Trinity, including the Son and Spirit, must not be creatures. Then at *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 9.170.17–19, Apollinarius returns to those propositions to which he has alluded in chapter 1. If there are three unequal glories celebrated in Christian worship, there must be three unequal objects of worship. As he had countered in chapter 1, however, if all the formulas of Christian worship acknowledge and honor the members of the Trinity together, the latter must not possess three separate and unequal glories but a single one. If they project a single glory, moreover, they must not constitute three divided, progressively inferior divine entities but a single divinity. The statement at *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 9.170.19–20 makes this explicit. Dividing the members of the nature (φύσις) that is worshiped also implies the possibility of dividing the elements of the worship of them. Yet, as the second sentence of the passage makes clear, the elements of the worship of

¹¹ *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 9.170.11–21.

¹² This is further complicated by textual difficulties. On these, see Spoerl, “Study,” 208 n. 64.

the triune Christian godhead are *not* divided. Christian liturgical formulas honor all three as a unit. The witness of Christian liturgy thus insists that the objects of that liturgy, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are not divided, but share a single divine nature. The ultimate conclusion of chapter 9, then, establishes that there is one divine nature, one divine glory, and, as the last sentence in the passage just cited indicates and as is further clarified in chapter 10, one eternity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.¹³

From these considerations it is evident that the liturgical experience of Christians functions axiomatically for Apollinarius in the anti-Arian polemic of the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*. Theological formulations are deduced from the data of liturgical practice and so must be consonant with that practice. The logic of Apollinarius's argument presumes that the opposite does not hold true—that is, that liturgical formulations do not derive from theology. In this respect, liturgical practice can function for Apollinarius much as scriptural proof texts do for him as well as for other theologians of his day. This parallelism between scripture and liturgy, moreover, is one Apollinarius himself consciously identifies and endorses. The *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* concludes with the statement that “the holy Trinity is believed to be one God and is worshiped (προσκυνεῖται) in accordance with the testimony of the divine scripture,”¹⁴ a remark that echoes what he says after his initial reference to Christian worship in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 1 cited above: “There is only one legitimate object of our religion, which we possess, having obtained it from on high through the Law and the prophets, and which was confirmed by the Lord and proclaimed by the apostles.”¹⁵ In making this latter remark, Apollinarius indicates that the parallelism that exists between liturgical and scriptural proof-texts is rooted in the organic relationship of continuity that scripture and liturgy bear to one another in Christian experience.¹⁶

In fact, as is evident from Apollinarius and other theologians of his age, references to the liturgical practice of the church became an important, indeed, indis-

¹³ *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 10.170.23–28. “Therefore the man who supposes that the life of the Son and of the Holy Spirit has a beginning in time by the same token separates the Son and the Spirit from their reckoning with the Father. For it is necessary that, just as we confess one glory, so also we confess one substance or godhead and one eternity of the Trinity.” Apollinarius specifically refers to the inclusion of the Holy Spirit in the baptismal formula as proof of his codivinity with the Father and the Son in two other passages in the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*: 8.170.4–10 and 24.175.15–19.

¹⁴ *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 43.184.23–25, my emphasis.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 1.167.15–17, my emphasis.

¹⁶ See Thomas M. Finn, ed., *Early Christian Baptism and the Catechumenate: Italy, North Africa, and Egypt* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992) 25: “The early Christian catechists saw the liturgy . . . as the ongoing biblical history of salvation narrated—more accurately, enacted—in myth, symbol, and ritual drama. Although the events of the old dispensation were linked indissolubly to those of the new, both were linked to the sacraments, which rendered accessible the God who saves.”

pensable feature of anti-Arian argumentation in the third quarter of the fourth century as a necessary supplement to the use of scriptural proof-texts. This is because the progress of the trinitarian controversy had made it clear that varying methods of scriptural exegesis could lead to divergent theological conclusions. Hence scripture had become less helpful as a standard by which to solve doctrinal disputes. The use of arguments from liturgy, as R. P. C. Hanson has noted, bespeaks the realization among theologians of the time that “the witness of scripture must be supplemented by, or interpreted in the context of, the religious experience of the church and of the Christian individual.”¹⁷ Interestingly, the turn to the use of arguments drawn from liturgy seems to presume that liturgical formulations in the mid-fourth century were fixed and stable in a way that the “correct” interpretation of scripture was not. This is not at all likely to have been the case, especially in light of evidence for the liturgical and devotional innovation going on in the same period, and of the lack of “a single, substantial, and widely diffused corpus of liturgical texts.”¹⁸ It is nevertheless clear that certain key liturgical formulas (such as the baptismal formula and the doxology) were trinitarian in some standard way, if not in their exact formulations.¹⁹ This feature, in turn, seems to have been

¹⁷ R. P. C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988) 783. One should note, however, that while liturgical arguments became particularly important in the trinitarian controversy for the reasons discussed above, this is not to suggest that this was the first time such arguments were used to resolve doctrinal questions, nor would it be the last. The principle of *lex orandi, lex credendi* had already been invoked on numerous occasions prior to the fourth-century trinitarian debates and to establish other doctrines. For more examples of the use of liturgical practice as evidence in arguments concerning doctrine, see Geoffrey Wainwright, *Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine, and Life* (London: Epworth, 1980) 224–35; and Maurice Wiles, *The Making of Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 62–93.

¹⁸ Rowan Williams, “Baptism and the Arian Controversy,” in Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams, eds., *Arianism after Arius: Essays on the Development of the Fourth-Century Trinitarian Conflicts* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1993) 155.

¹⁹ Certainly by the mid- to late-fourth century, all baptisms regarded as canonically valid were trinitarian in form. See E. C. Whitaker in “The History of the Baptismal Formula,” *JEH* 16 (1965) 1–12; and idem, *The Baptismal Liturgy* (2d ed.; London: SPCK, 1981) 1–28. See also the use of trinitarian formulas in baptismal rites described by a representative collection of Church Fathers from the mid-fourth to the early-fifth centuries in Hugh M. Riley, *Christian Initiation* (Catholic University of America Studies in Christian Antiquity 17; Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1974) 144–50.

By the late fourth-century doxologies had a basic trinitarian format that still allowed variations in prepositional use and other respects. This is evident from Basil’s discussion in the opening chapters of *De Spiritu Sancto*. See also the trinitarian doxologies in the *Apostolic Tradition* of the Roman presbyter Hippolytus in Lucien Deiss, *Early Sources of the Liturgy* (New York: Alba House, 1967) 41 and 61; in the *Didaskalia Apostolorum* (ibid., 96); in the Euchology of Serapion of Thmuis (ibid., 101); and the *Testamentum*

sufficient for the construction of anti-Arian trinitarian arguments. Within explicitly anti-Arian treatises, arguments from liturgical practice appear as early as the 350s in Athanasius's *Orationes contra Arianos*.²⁰ They appear in the letters to Serapion²¹ and the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* from the late 350s or early 360s, and are resumed in Basil's early *Contra Eunomium* (circa 365),²² perhaps achieving their most elaborate form in his *De Spiritu Sancto* from 375.²³ Apollinarius's use of this type of argument, then, is continuous with a clearly identifiable theological trend.

One should particularly note the parallels between Apollinarius's use of the liturgical argument and Athanasius's use of it. Again, Apollinarius saw himself as a disciple of the Alexandrian bishop, and the influence of the latter's anti-Arian rhetoric is evident throughout the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*. Athanasius's use of the liturgical argument has recently been studied by Rowan Williams. In the course of his study, Williams identifies two important assumptions in Athanasius's deployment of the liturgical argument: (1) that one divine agency alone is involved in the work of salvation, and (2) that salvation is union with the divine life, direct and without intermediary.²⁴ That is, Athanasius assumes that only God can act to save; hence if the Son and Spirit are associated with the Father in liturgical actions such as baptism that are presumed to mediate God's saving action, they must possess divinity themselves. Likewise, salvation, for it to be authentic, must be mediated by divinity and not by a created intermediary. Hence, again, insofar as the resurrected life can be mediated to Christians through baptism in the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit, Son and Spirit must be divine and not created, as the Arians alleged.

Given his close affiliation with the Alexandrian bishop, it is not surprising that Apollinarius's use of the liturgical argument incorporates the same assumptions. They are implicit in the passage from *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 9 that I cited earlier in this section. The point of that passage was to argue that no member of the Trinity is created or contingent because Father, Son, and Spirit effect salvation through the Church's sacramental invocations as a unit, as a single divine entity. Hence, Apollinarius, like Athanasius, believes that salvation is mediated by a single divine agency without created intermediary. It is important to note here the assumptions these two share, as I will show in the next section of this essay. They will

Domini (John H. McKenna, *Eucharist and Holy Spirit* [Alcuin Club Collections 57; Great Waking, England: Mayhew-McCrimmon, 1975] 22).

²⁰ Athanasius *Orationes contra Arianos* 2.41.

²¹ 1.28–30

²² 2.22 and 3.5

²³ Basil *De Spiritu Sancto* 1–8, on the doxology and 12 on baptism.

²⁴ Williams, "Baptism and the Arian Controversy," 152.

receive more explicit expression, with important ramifications, in Apollinarius's christological writings.

■ Christian Worship and the Doctrine of the Person of Christ

Given the central importance that the experience of Christian worship had in Apollinarius's arguments for his conclusions in the trinitarian sphere, it is predictable that this experience also figures significantly in his discussions in the christological sphere. These references to worship in christological contexts, moreover, reveal his keen awareness of the inextricable and dynamic relationship between trinitarian and christological doctrine, as a result of which deviations in the former will inevitably affect the latter and vice-versa.

This awareness is particularly evident in Apollinarius's response to dualist christologies. Such christologies can take two forms. They can sharply distinguish human and divine in the Savior to the point of discerning within him two distinct and independently existing personal entities, πρόσωπα or ὑποστάσεις, in which the christology is called *dyoprosopic*. Alternatively, they can distinguish within the Savior two natures, two principles of life and activity, in which case the christology is called *dyophysite*. Some christologies can in fact be both dyoprosopic and dyophysite. It is important to recall that while the church at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 rejected the claims of dyoprosopic christology, at the same council the church upheld the thesis of dyophysite christology.

My research has attempted to show that Apollinarius first encountered the dualist type of christological model in Marcellus of Ancyra and his disciple Photinus of Sirmium, whose trinitarian views he can be amply shown to attack in the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*.²⁵ This opposition to dualist christology then underwent further development in the debates Apollinarius conducted with Diodore, once layperson of the diocese of Antioch and after 378 bishop of Tarsus in Cilicia.²⁶ That dualist christology has harmful ramifications for one's doctrine of the Trinity becomes clear in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 31, which, although it mentions dyophysitism, argues more pointedly against dyoprosopic christology:

The one without flesh, who was manifested in flesh, is true God, perfect by virtue of the true and divine perfection, and *is neither two πρόσωπα nor two natures. For we do not say we worship four πρόσωπα, God and Son of God and man and Holy Spirit.* Consequently we also anathematize those who are so impious that they place a man in the divine

²⁵ Spoerl, "Study," 212–318.

²⁶ Although the chronology of Apollinarius's career is not well documented, one major scholar has placed his debates with Diodore after his condemnation by Damasus in the late 370s. See Marcel Richard, "L'introduction du mot 'hypostase' dans la théologie de l'incarnation" *MScRel* 2 (1945) 12.

doxology. For we say that the Word of God has become man for our salvation, so that we might receive the likeness of the heavenly man and be divinized in the semblance of the true Son of God according to nature, and of the Son of Man our Lord Jesus Christ according to the flesh.²⁷

If Jesus is a man with a separate existence from that of God the Word, Apollinarius argues here, the trinitarian formulas of Christian worship will be compromised, as the faithful worship four πρόσωπα instead of three, or a Tetrad instead of a Trinity, as he asserts elsewhere in Fragment 82.²⁸ Once again, then, in an argument that both recapitulates and builds on the use he has made of it in anti-Arian trinitarian debate, Apollinarius here invokes liturgical practice as an implicit proof refuting the claims of dyoprosopic christology. He argues that if Jesus and the Word are separate πρόσωπα, Christians will worship (προσκυνεῖν is the verb in question again) a Tetrad instead of a Trinity. Since, however, Apollinarius argues, Christians do not worship a Tetrad, but a Trinity, Christ must not embrace two natures and two persons, but one nature and one person, who is the second person of the Trinity.

In addition to the charge of adding a man to the divine doxology, Apollinarius accuses his dualist christological opponents of dividing the worship of the divine Word from that of the man Jesus and thereby advocating two separate types of worship of the God-man. Apollinarius levels this accusation specifically in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 28.177.9–12, when he anathematizes “those who contrive diverse forms of worship (τοῦς διαφόρους προσκυνήσεις), one divine and one human, and who revere the man born from Mary as if he were different from the God born from God.”

It is intriguing to consider whether there is any historical evidence for the type of liturgical practice Apollinarius condemns here. Could he be criticizing the practice of antiphonal chanting introduced in the East by his future christological opponents Diodore and Flavian, which might have lent itself well to the expression of a dualist christology?²⁹ This is unlikely in view of other evidence,³⁰ and the

²⁷ *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 31.178.17–179.10.

²⁸ Fragment 82.224.25–26.

²⁹ This is reported in Theodoret *Hist. eccl.* 2.19. I have always been struck by the “antiphonal” character of the following passage from Diodore (preserved in Severus of Antioch, *Contra impium grammaticum* 3.25): “We worship the purple because of the one who wears it, the Temple because of the one who indwells it, the form of a servant because of the form of God, the lamb because of the High Priest, the one who was assumed because of the one who assumed, the one who was fashioned in the Virgin’s womb because of the Creator of all.” Translation from Rowan A. Greer, “The Antiochene Christology of Diodore of Tarsus,” *JTS* 17 (1966) 338.

³⁰ It is possible that canon 15 of the Council of Laodicea, held sometime between 343 and 381, contains some criticism of the practice of antiphonal chanting, but Grosdidier de Matons, who discusses this, admits that the evidence could well admit of other interpretations. See José

fact that Apollinarius most likely first encountered dualist christology in Marcellus of Ancyra, rather than Diodore and Flavian. On the contrary, I believe that the charge of advocating separate worship of the divine and human in Christ is a charge that Apollinarius *extrapolates* on the basis of his opponents' dualist christology, much as he probably extrapolates the Arian devotion to three separate λατρείαι (“worships”) on the basis of their subordinationist trinitarian theology. The parallelism between the arguments advanced in the two contexts is marked. In the anti-Arian section of the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*, Apollinarius alleged that the Arians endorsed three λατρείαι to honor three unequal divinities. He then argued that the standard trinitarian form of Christian worship implied that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit constituted one divinity, not three. In the anti-Marcellan section of the treatise, he further suggests that certain persons endorse a separate worship of the divine Word and of the human Jesus because they are two distinct πρόσωπα. In opposition to this, Apollinarius asserts that the fact that the trinitarian form of Christian worship glorifies one Son of God, not two, compels one to conclude that Christ possesses an irreducible unity of person. In the former argument, one worship, understood in a trinitarian sense, points to one godhead. In the latter argument, one worship (understood in a specifically christological sense) points to one person in Christ. The correspondence between the worship of the one incarnate Son and of his single πρόσωπον is articulated pointedly in the same section of *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 28 cited above:

We further confess that the Son of God has become the Son of Man, not in name but in truth, having taken flesh from the Virgin Mary. And we confess that *the same* is perfect Son of God and *the same* Son of Man, *that his πρόσωπον is one and that the worship of the Word and of the flesh that he assumed is one.* And we anathematize those who

Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode et les origines de la poésie religieuse à Byzance* (Paris: Editions Beauchesnes, 1977) 10. Grosdidier de Matons goes on in the same work to recount resistance to the use of newly developed hymn forms in the fourth century and later (pp.10–14), especially within monastic circles. Nonetheless, he concludes (p.14) that the very environment in which Apollinarius was active, i.e., Syria-Palestine, was the area in which the most hymnographical innovation took place in the early Christian world. In addition, he cites (p.15) Basil of Caesarea's *Ep. 207* as evidence that antiphonal chanting had become standard practice in Palestine, Phoenicia, and Syria by the third quarter of the fourth century. Given this and Apollinarius's literary creativity in the service of the church attested elsewhere (see Sozomen *Hist. eccl.* 5. 18 and Socrates *Hist. eccl.* 3.16, regarding Apollinarius's composition of Christianized classics based on the Bible to be used in rhetorical education when Christians were barred from the profession under Julian the Apostate), it is unlikely that the practice of antiphonal chanting per se was a practice to which he objected and which he attacked in the *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*.

contrive diverse forms of worship (τοὺς διαφόρους προσκυνήσεις), one divine and one human, and who revere the man born from Mary as if he were different from the God born from God. For we know that “in the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God,” and we worship him who became man for our salvation, not as one who became truly equal to the body, but as a master who took on the form of a slave.³¹

The essential link in Apollinarius’s theology between christological and trinitarian thought is evident again in a passage in the treatise *De fide et incarnatione*, in which he asserts that a dualist christological model effectively divides the incarnation from the Trinity by severing the fleshly humanity of Jesus from the person of the second member of the Trinity. This jeopardizes the salvation of the faithful, for, Apollinarius contends, there is no salvation outside of the Trinity (οὔτε γὰρ σωτηρία ἐκ τῆς σαρκώσεως ἐπηκολούθει τοῖς πιστοῖς, ἐκτὸς τῆς θείας τριάδος ὑπαρχούσης).³² He further reiterates this point: nothing is salvific or worthy of being worshiped outside of the divine Trinity (οὐδὲν γὰρ προσκυνητὸν οὐδὲ σωτήριον ἐκτὸς τῆς θείας τριάδος).³³ He then goes on to argue that to separate the incarnation from the Trinity by severing the divine Word from His human body (either by attributing the latter to a distinct πρόσωπον or nature) will call into question the validity of two key sources of the apostolic faith for Christians: scripture and liturgy, specifically the sacrament of baptism. (Note again the linking of these categories, as in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 1 and 43.) If one is to accept a dualist christology, the witness of scripture will be shown to be a lie (ψεῦδος), because it attributes these differing statements to the same Savior: “The Word became flesh” (John 1:14); “a Savior, Christ the Lord, has been born to you this day in the city of David” (Luke 2:11); “a powerful God,” and “the child” (Isa 9:6).³⁴ Then, as if to bolster this argument from scripture with something immediately persuasive to his audience, Apollinarius turns to a discussion of baptism and its experienced soteriological effects.

Before he does so, however, and perhaps prompted by the citation from Luke, an important Gospel for his own christology, Apollinarius interjects that should one accept the claims of dualist christologies “the Virgin will no longer be believed to be the *Theotokos* [“God-bearer”].”³⁵ At first glance, this remark might seem out of place in an argument based on liturgical practice. Evidence for any type of formal ritualized invocation of the Virgin, whether liturgical or devotional,

³¹ Apollinarius *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 28.177.4–178.3, my emphasis.

³² *De fide et incarnatione* 4.195.22–24.

³³ *Ibid.* 5.195.24–25.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 5.196.18–22.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 5.196.22.

is scarce in the mid- to late fourth century, although it becomes more plentiful shortly afterward.³⁶ Yet the title Theotokos does occur in a number of fourth-century Greek writers, particularly in those under the influence of Alexandria, as Apollinarius was.³⁷ Still, I would argue that even these fourth-century uses of the title originate out of traditional popular devotion to the mother of Christ (devotion that will shortly flower into liturgical practice), and not, strictly speaking, out of abstract theological speculation on the unity of Christ's person. Apollinarius may well be the first to make the title Theotokos a focus for this type of speculation, thus preparing the way for the controversies between Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius of Constantinople nearly fifty years later.³⁸ Although he does not spell it out, the reason why Apollinarius thinks a dualist christology renders the title Theotokos inapplicable to the Virgin is clear: if the human body of the Word and the Word itself are separate entities, it follows that the Virgin gives birth to the former but not the latter. She would therefore be only *Anthropotokos*. Apollinarius's ferocious return to this contention illustrates the extent to which the latter title has become a traditional feature of the piety of the age: not to call the Virgin Theotokos, he says, is "lawless and impious and alien to every pious soul" (ὄπερ ἀθέμιτον καὶ ἀσεβὲς τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀλλότριον πάσης θεοσεβούς ψυχῆς).³⁹ Again, he seems to accept the traditional, devotional title for the Virgin as a kind of literal, axiomatic truth and uses it as irrefutable proof for the christological point he wants to make against his opponents, namely, that the divine Word and his fleshly humanity con-

³⁶ On the cult of the Virgin in the early church, see Hilda Graef, *Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion* (2 vols.; New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963) 1. 32–100. Vasiliki Limberis describes a variety of evidence for formal devotion to the Virgin, including sermons, memorials, the building of churches and vigils, initiated under the auspices of the Theodosian Augusta Pulcheria (399–453) in the early- to mid-fifth century in *Divine Heiress: The Virgin Mary and the Creation of Christian Constantinople* (London: Routledge, 1994) 47–61.

³⁷ Aside from Apollinarius's close friendship with Athanasius, Socrates reports that the former's father was originally from Alexandria. See Socrates *Hist. eccl.* 2.26. Origen is alleged to have been the first to use the title. (See Graef, *Mary*, 46, discussing Greek Fragments 41 and 80 of Origen's commentary on Luke.) See also Alexander of Alexandria in *PG* 18.568C. The title is invoked in this instance with clear anti-docetic import, to prove the reality of the Word's bodily incarnation. The occurrences in Athanasius *Contra Arianos* 3.14 (*PG* 26.349C) and *Vita Antonii* 36 (*PG* 26.897A) both appear without further comment within discussions of the Lucan account of the Annunciation and the Visitation. Interestingly, Cyril of Alexandria reports that by the mid-fourth century the title Theotokos was commonplace; he reports that Julian the Apostate mocked the Christians for always calling Mary by this title (*Contra Julianum* 8 [*PG* 76.901C]).

³⁸ The use of arguments from mariology and eucharistic piety in the debates between Cyril and Nestorius are analyzed by Henry Chadwick in "Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy," *JTS* 2 (1951) 145–64. The analysis in the present paper further confirms the affinity Chadwick posits (156) between the thought of Apollinarius and Cyril.

³⁹ Apollinarius *De fide et incarnatione* 5.196.23–24.

stitute one and the same person, so that in giving birth to the human Jesus, the Virgin gives birth to God the Word. Taken in context, therefore, this reference may not be as much of a non sequitur as it seems at first glance.⁴⁰

In any case, if the liturgical reference is somewhat faint in these remarks about the Theotokos, it is patent in Apollinarius's next statements about baptism. I have already noted how important (in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 9) baptism was in Apollinarius's anti-Arian trinitarian discussion; here its importance for his christology is also evident. His remarks follow closely upon previous ones regarding the negative effects that a dualist christology would have on the reliability of scripture and Marian devotion. If the incarnation is divided from the Trinity (by dividing the divine Word from his human body), he says, "neither will the great and honorable gift of Christians, the bath (λουτρόν), which is performed into the death of Christ (Rom. 6:3), be reckoned as something divine, but as something human."⁴¹ This is because the death of Christ pertains to his body, which Apollinarius's opponents attribute to a different πρόσωπον or ὑπόστασις from that of the divine Word. To counter this claim, Apollinarius tacitly appeals to his audience's deeply-held convictions about the soteriological effects of baptism, and to the two assumptions about how salvation can be mediated that his earlier trinitarian arguments presumed. To begin with, he assumes that baptism has saving effects (that is, new spiritual and physical life), and that these effects must be attributable to a divine, not human, agent. *De fide et incarnatione* 7.199.18–23 makes this explicit. "For it is said that baptism is given for the forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the flesh in the enumeration of the Trinity, *which indeed is the work of divinity and not created nature* (ὅπερ ἐστὶ θεότητος ἔργον καὶ οὐ κτιστῆς φύσεως)." On the other hand, he also assumes that only one agency (divine) can mediate salvation and that this mediation must be direct. It cannot be accomplished through a created or human intermediary. The latter would be the case if Jesus' human body were a constituent of a distinct human πρόσωπον or ὑπόστασις. Given, then, the assumption that baptism is performed into the death of Jesus but results in graces that only divinity can grant, one must conclude that Jesus is one person, one independent existence who is the second person of the divine Trinity. By being

⁴⁰ A parallel appears in a passage in Gregory of Nazianzus, a contemporary of Apollinarius, who, like him, makes the acceptance of Mary as Theotokos a test of orthodox belief. Ironically, he does so in a letter condemning the Apollinarians. He writes: "If anyone does not accept Mary as Theotokos, he is separated from divinity." (*Ep.* 101.16 in Paul Galley and Maurice Jourjon, eds., *Grégoire de Naziane: Lettres théologiques* [SC 208; Paris: Cerf, 1974] 42.

⁴¹ Apollinarius *De fide et incarnatione* 5.196.26–197.15. The idea that baptism is "into the Lord's death" was a common feature of the "West Syrian" liturgical tradition in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean seaboard at this time; see Williams, "Baptism and the Arian Controversy," 173–74.

baptized into Jesus' human body, the proper subject that experienced death and belongs directly to the person of the divine Word, Christians can access the divine life that resurrected that body after three days and animates it eternally.

If one steps back for a moment and considers this argument more closely, one can conclude that from the perspective of later Chalcedonian orthodoxy, Apollinarius uses the evidence of liturgy and sacrament to argue correctly for Christ's unity of person against the claims of those dualist christologies that would see in Christ two distinct and independent personal entities. Apollinarius is clearly right here: if one separates Christ from the Trinity by distinguishing within him two distinct persons, one divine and one human, it is much more difficult to understand how sacramental incorporation into his humanity can enable the faithful to access his divine and saving power. Apollinarius's anticipation of Chalcedon's assertion of the unity of Christ's person is evident in his reiteration at *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 28, namely, that the same is perfect Son of God and the same Son of Man. This language will reappear in the Chalcedonian Definition.⁴²

What happens, however, when Apollinarius uses a structurally similar argument, with one important change of terminology, that is, the substitution of the term "nature" (φύσις) for the word "person" (πρόσωπον or ὑπόστασις)? The parallelism in Apollinarius's writings between categories of nature and person has already been evident in the passage cited above from *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 31. This phenomenon operates still more clearly in this passage from *Ad Dionysium* 6.258.15–259.2:

For it is necessary for those who speak of two natures to worship the one and not worship the other, and to be baptized into the divine nature, but not to be baptized into the human nature. And if we are baptized into the death of the Lord, we confess that there is one nature of the impassible divinity and of the passible flesh, so that in this way our baptism is into God and is performed into the death of the Lord.

The structure of this argument is a familiar one. If Christ has two natures along with his two persons, it is necessary that Christians divide their worship of him by worshipping the divine nature (because only divinity is worthy of such worship, for

⁴² See *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 28.177.4–9: "We confess . . . that *the same* is perfect Son of God" (τέλειον αὐτὸν υἱὸν θεοῦ) "and *the same* Son of Man" (αὐτὸν υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου). Compare with the Chalcedonian Definition: "We confess *one and the same* Son" (ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱόν), "who is our Lord Jesus Christ, and we all agree in teaching that this *very same* Son is complete in his divinity and complete—*the very same*—in his humanity" (τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι, καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι). Translation from Richard A. Norris, Jr., ed., *The Christological Controversy* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 159. The Greek text is readily available in Henry Denzinger and Adolf Schönmetzer, eds., *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1973) 108.

reasons that I will make explicit below), and not the human one. To the contrary, Apollinarius counters, Christians believe that the sacrament of baptism takes place into the death of the Lord, a death that only the passible human flesh can experience. As a universally recognized sacrament of Christian worship, baptism thus does not in fact separate the divine nature of Christ from his mortal human flesh, alleged to be an element of a distinct human nature. These elements, therefore must not be separate but must comprise one nature.

Now, while the basic insight of this argument is valid, the particular terms in which Apollinarius frames it are erroneous by the standards of later orthodoxy. To be sure, the incarnate divinity of the Word must not be separated from his flesh, but it does not follow that this flesh comprises one nature with divinity. Apollinarius uses the evidence of the church's liturgical activities to support his monophysitism. This is a disturbing revelation, but it is one that is further confirmed if one turns to Apollinarius's reference to the other central Christian sacrament, which, like baptism, possesses lifegiving power: namely, the eucharist.⁴³

At least three references to the eucharist survive in the Apollinarian fragments. In general, these references rebut the same christological errors for which Apollinarius had earlier invoked baptism, namely, dyoprosopic and diophysite christology. At the same time, these remarks and the polemical contexts in which they occur reflect a concern traceable back to anti-Arian argumentation, the original context in which Apollinarius began to cite liturgical practice for theological purposes. This concern, in turn, while reasonable and appropriate in itself, had a distorting effect on his christology.

The first of these eucharistic references, Fragment 7, comes from a text identified as *Concerning the Incarnation*, and follows immediately upon a discussion in Fragment 6 of the appropriateness of worshiping the Savior as incarnate.⁴⁴ There he exhorts his readers not to consider the worship (προσκύνησις) of the Son of God even with his human likeness, to be base or low, lest they themselves be brought low. In the passage, he goes on to liken Christ's flesh to a humble garment (εὐτελῆς στολή) but insists that it must be glorified as befits the body of God, the Savior of the universe, the seed of eternal life, and so forth. Once again, Apollinarius alludes here to the errors of those who embrace dualist christology, who, as he has suggested in *Ad Dionysium* 6, divide the worship of the Savior by permitting the worship of his divinity but not of his humanity. Of course, Apollinarius wants to deny the central thesis of such a christology and so must deny the divisibility of Christ's

⁴³ Apollinarius's doctrine of the Eucharist is discussed elsewhere in W. H. Bates, "The Background of Apollinarius' Eucharistic Teaching," *JEH* 12 (1961) 139–54, and Henri de Riedmatten, "Some Neglected Aspects of Apollinarian Christology," *Dominican Studies* 1 (1948) 248–50.

⁴⁴ Apollinarius Fragment 6.205.18–27.

worship. The eucharist for him is a perfect example of the indivisibility of such worship, because in it Christians worship the divinity of Christ by communing with his human flesh. Hence Fragment 7: “Whence we worship the body as the Word, since we partake of the body as we do of the spirit” (ὅθεν ἡμεῖς τὸ σῶμα προσκυνούμεν ὡς τὸν λόγον, τοῦ σώματος μετέχομεν ὡς τοῦ πνεύματος).⁴⁵

Again, in constructing this argument Apollinarius implicitly appeals to the recognition of the sacrament as a universally accepted act of Christian worship and interprets it as literal proof against the christological claims of his opponents. That is, when one receives Christ’s human body in the eucharist, one worships the Word incarnate in it. The eucharist as Christian worship does not separate divine Word and human body; therefore Word and body are not separate, and to posit a dualistic christology is erroneous.

The next two fragments that contain eucharistic references occur in texts that consider whether the flesh of Christ is ὁμοούσιος with his divinity. In these fragments, however, Apollinarius does not so much argue on the basis of sacramental practice to prove some christological point, as he does describe the sacrament and its effects so as to illuminate in significant—and unsettling—ways the christological ideas he brings to his perception of that sacrament.

Fragment 116, from a text identified as *The Syllogisms*,⁴⁶ renders explicit Apollinarius’s conviction, already implicit in *De fide et incarnatione* 7, that divinity alone can bestow life.

His [Christ’s] flesh bestows life upon us because of the divinity that is substantially united to it (διὰ τὴν συνουσιωμένην αὐτῇ θεότητα). For that which gives life is divine. Consequently the flesh is divine, because it is conjoined (συνήφθη) to God. And the flesh itself saves, and we are saved when we partake of it (μετέχοντες) as of food.⁴⁷

Apollinarius affirms here that Christ’s flesh (given in the eucharist) bestows life because of the divinity that is substantially united with it. This passage confirms his conviction expressed in *De fide et incarnatione* 7 that divinity alone can bestow new life, there characterized by the categories of the forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the flesh. It is also consonant with the characterization in Fragment 6 of Christ’s body as the “seed of eternal life.” Yet if one reflects on this statement more closely, it is clear that in saying that Christ’s flesh can give life because of the divinity united to it, Apollinarius is suggesting that without that divinity the flesh itself could not give life and in fact that the flesh itself would not be alive, but dead. His phrasing here points strongly in the direction of stating that

⁴⁵ Apollinarius Fragment 7.205.29–30.

⁴⁶ Fragments 112–16.

⁴⁷ Apollinarius Fragment 116.235.8–11.

the flesh of Christ does not have a principle of vitality within itself, but only has one by virtue of its relationship to the indwelling divinity. This statement appears, therefore, to assume the characteristic Apollinarian denial of a created, human soul in Christ. The principle of life within Christ, and therefore by extension in the eucharist, is the divine Word. Accordingly, by consuming the eucharist, Christians consume a flesh that is enlivened by divinity, and this is why the eucharist can restore a saving vitality to the communicant, otherwise subject to the punishment of death that afflicts all sinful humanity.

These Apollinarian implications within the discussion of the eucharist emerge with even greater explicitness in Fragment 155, from a treatise entitled *Λόγοι*.⁴⁸ Again, as with Fragment 116, this fragment occurs within a discussion of the consubstantiality of Christ's human body with the divine Word. Fragment 155⁴⁹ returns to the theme of partaking in the body and spirit (σῶμα/πνεῦμα) of Christ that appeared in Fragment 7, except here Apollinarius uses the term σάρξ for the body:

The living Christ is a divinely inspired (θεόπνοον) body and divine spirit in flesh, a heavenly mind (νοῦς οὐράνιος), in which we pray to partake according to Paul's statement "We have the mind of Christ" [1 Cor 2:16], and a holy flesh that is connatural with divinity (θεότητι συμφυής) and that places divinity in those who partake of it. He is the foundation of eternal life, the originator of immortality for humankind, the creator of the eternal creation, the father of the age to come.

Apollinarian christological ideas are clearly in play here, most obviously with the reference to Christ's νοῦς οὐράνιος, his "heavenly mind," which is free of the sinful thoughts to which all human minds are subject.⁵⁰ Fragment 155 thus exhibits the Apollinarian belief that denies Christ's possession of a real human intelligence and assigns the functions of the latter to the indwelling Word.

Nevertheless, the phrase θεότητι συμφυής, with its allusion to the dynamic category of φύσις and thus the idea of the flesh as growing with and from the indwelling divinity, reinforces the impression that already appeared in both Fragments 7 and 116, namely, that the divinity of the Word, and not a human soul, is the principle of biological as well as intellectual life in Christ. Again, as in Fragments 7 and 116, this is why the eucharist can give the divine gift of life to those who partake of it. The terminology Apollinarius uses here, in conjunction with the ideas

⁴⁸ Apollinarius Fragments 153–6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 155.249.3–8

⁵⁰ See Apollinarius *Ep. ad Diocaesarenses* 2.256.5–7: "The Word did not become flesh by taking on a human mind, a mind that is changeable and subject to filthy thoughts, but by being a divine unchangeable heavenly mind.

he expresses, reconfirms the profession of monophysitism in *Ad Dionysium* 6,⁵¹ which Apollinarius confirms elsewhere with the emphatic assertion that Christ possesses only one nature.⁵²

Thus, even though Fragments 116 and 155 are primarily descriptive rather than polemical, they nevertheless reveal the heterodox theoretical framework informing Apollinarius's references to sacramental practice extant elsewhere in his writings. With his discussion of the eucharist, as with baptism, his soteriological preoccupation with the restoration of life through incorporation with divinity is paramount. Then with *Ad Dionysium* 6, and Fragments 116 and 155, one sees how Apollinarius views his own idiosyncratic christological ideas as the necessary presupposition for the communication of life in these sacraments. Only if the flesh of the eucharist itself receives life via a divine agent and is, in this respect, one nature with it can the faithful gain access to the divine life of the divine Word indwelling this flesh.

Here one can observe a pernicious continuity between those concerns that Apollinarius brings to the trinitarian and the christological spheres. I noted earlier that one of the assumptions he brings to trinitarian argument is that one divine agency alone is operative in salvation. Consequently, he used liturgical evidence to argue that Father, Son, and Spirit constitute this single divine agency. This concern carries over, then, into the christological sphere, when he argues that dualist christology separates the human Christ from the divine Word and thus from the single saving agency of the Trinity. Hence, here Apollinarius must use the liturgical evidence to argue that in fact Christ's humanity is not distinct in person *and nature* from the divine Word, and thus not separate from the saving agency of the divine Trinity.

The other assumption that Apollinarius brought to the trinitarian discussion was that "salvation is union with the divine life directly and without intermediary." This notion drove him to cite liturgical evidence to deny Christ's created status against Arian theory. Yet in the christological sphere, I would argue, the same kind of assumption compels him to construct a unique christological model

⁵¹ My intuition about the monophysite import of the term *συμφυής* receives support from Enzo Bellini's Italian translation of the phrase: "carne santa che costituisce un'unica natura con la divinità" ("holy flesh, which constitutes a single nature with the divinity"). In Enzo Bellini, ed., *Su Cristo: Il grande dibattito nel quarto secolo* (De Fronte e Attraverso 35; Milan: Jaca Book, 1977) 93.

⁵² The connection in Apollinarius's mind between the one divine principle of vitality and the unity of person and nature in Christ is elsewhere illustrated in Fragment 85.225.19–20: "For (he says) the flesh of the Lord is worshiped, because it is one person and one living thing (ἐν ζωόν) with him;" and also *De fide et incarnatione* 6 (199.16–17), which asserts the one life of the Word and his flesh (6.198.16) and concludes with the assertion that Christ is *μία φύσις, μία υπόστασις, . . . ἐν πρόσωπον*."

that will guarantee that through the sacraments (and especially through the eucharist) the type of direct, unmediated access to the divine that he believes is necessary to salvation will be provided. This christological model seriously compromises the created humanity of the Savior, seeing in the latter an organism in which biological and intellectual life derive from the indwelling divine Word.

Given that the terminology with which Apollinarius describes the lifegiving effect of the eucharist in Fragments 116 and 155 suggests his fundamental blurring of the divine and human in Christ (with the divine given clear precedence), it is all the more ironic that this blurring appears in discussions that seek to clarify the distinction between these categories—specifically by considering whether the flesh is ὁμοούσιος with the divinity or not.⁵³ In discussions leading up to Fragment 116, he makes it clear that, in and of itself, the flesh as flesh is not ὁμοούσιος with the divinity of the assuming Word.⁵⁴ Yet in the discussion leading to Fragment 155, he also asserts that because of the flesh's unity with the Word and the *communicatio idiomatum* this entails, one can say that the flesh, as the flesh of the divine Word who is consubstantial with God, is ὁμοούσιος with God.⁵⁵

One cannot, moreover, detach this discussion of the distinction between divine and human in Christ from the larger issue of worship directed toward him, which is the specific topic of concern in the material leading up to Fragment 7. There, Apollinarius explores the proper way to understand Christ's body as a legitimate object of Christian worship. He wants to endorse the worship of Christ's human body and not make a division between what Christians worship and what they do not, a distinction that he suggests in *Ad Dionysium* 6 and *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* 28 some Christians make. A certain tension, however, exists between Apollinarius's resolution of the questions raised by these issues (that is, the desire to maintain some kind of meaningful distinction between human and divine in Christ while, at the same time, upholding the necessity of worshiping Christ's body). This tension is created by the threat of idolatry, the fear that in worshiping the body of Christ, Apollinarius inadvertently advocates the worship of a creature instead of the Creator. He sees this as another potential problem with dualist christology, as is evident in *Ad Dionysium* 1.256.21–257.7.

Those who are slaves to Paul of Samosata say that one is he who came from Heaven, confessing that he is God, while another is the man from the earth, saying that the one is uncreated and the other created, that one is eternal, while the other is of recent birth, that one is the master,

⁵³ This question is also discussed in the treatise *De fide et incarnatione* cited above (3.194.15–23).

⁵⁴ See especially Fragment 112.133.32–134.10.

⁵⁵ See especially Fragment 153.248.18–27.

the other a slave, being so impious that they would worship the one they say is a slave and a creature (δοῦλον καὶ κτιστόν) and not worship the one who redeemed us with his own blood.

This preoccupation with idolatry can be traced back to the trinitarian controversies following Arius, where the question of the distinction between the divine and the created orders was a topic of heated debate. Arius and his sympathizers identified the line of demarcation between the two realms as falling between the first and second members of the Trinity, while Arius's opponents saw this line as lying between the Trinity as a unit and the rest of the created order. Apollinarius emphatically sides with the opponents of Arianism on this question.⁵⁶ Significantly, one of the subthemes he sounds in articulating this position is that of idolatry. If the Arians continue to worship Christ but define him as a creature, they convict themselves of worshipping a creature instead of the divine Creator.⁵⁷ As part of the Arian opposition, then, Apollinarius must insist that Jesus Christ is not a creature but the divine Creator, along with the Father and the Holy Spirit. This sharply drawn creature/Creator dichotomy appears frequently throughout the anti-Arian tract *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις*, sometimes in conjunction with the equivalent master/slave dichotomy suggested by the "form of a slave" language in Philippians 2. More importantly, it appears implicated not simply in trinitarian, but also in christological discussion. These dichotomies appear, for example, in *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις 7*:

But if someone says that Christ was commanded by the Word to work all things, he both renders the Word of God idle and changes the rank of the master into one of slavery. For everything that is commanded is servile (δοῦλον) and what is created is not capable of creating. For what is created will not in any way be made equal to the Creator, so that it could create other things just as it had been created by him.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ For example, *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις 27*: "We anathematize those who say that either the Son or the Holy Spirit is a creature, and we confess that all other things were made as created and servile (ποίηματα καὶ δοῦλα) beings by God through the Son <and> were sanctified in the Holy Spirit" (27.177.1–4). The same idea is expressed in the citation from *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις 9* cited earlier in this paper.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 6.169.16–21: "But if someone says in this way that the Son is God because he too has received the fullness of divinity and not because he was begotten from divinity, he has denied the Word, he has denied Wisdom, he has destroyed the knowledge of God, he has fallen to worshipping the creation, he has embraced the impiety of the Greeks."

⁵⁸ *Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις 7*.169.26–170.4; cf. 1.167.5–8, 9.170.11–16, and 26.176.10–13, as well as Fragment 120.236.33–35. "How can the matter not be impious, to hold that the created substance, which is different and servile (δουλικήν) has one and the same worship as He who is the Creator and Master?"

As I have shown elsewhere, this passage posits a dualist christology traceable back to perceptions of Marcellus of Ancyra's christology from the mid-fourth century.⁵⁹ This model divides the Savior into the divine Word who is the commanding master, and the human Jesus who is the submissive slave. Apollinarius then integrates this model into the anti-Arian creature/Creator dichotomy, the articulation of which again raises important soteriological concerns. To be specific, if Christ is simply a creaturely human slave, he is incapable of creating (or recreating) anything (again, one sees here the Athanasian/Apollinarian assumption that salvation can be mediated only through the single agency of divinity and not through any created intermediary). Apollinarius assumes, however, that Christians understand Christ as a creative agent. Therefore, he reasons, dualist christology must be wrong. Christ is not divided but is one person who is the Creator and Redeemer and not a creature.

While Apollinarius's desire to distance himself from idolatry is understandable from a confessional and polemical standpoint,⁶⁰ the rigid dichotomy it entails in his mind creates certain christological difficulties for him, which then cooperate, with unfortunate results, with the monophysitism he professes for soteriological reasons. If, as the logic of anti-Arian polemic requires one to state, Christ is a Creator and not a creature, it becomes considerably more difficult to affirm any kind of created reality about him, including the created reality of his flesh. Again, examination of Apollinarius's remarks concerning the sacraments indicate that soteriological concerns drive his monophysitism. Christ is the Savior, the giver of divine life to mortal humanity. Hence, his flesh, which gives life to the faithful through baptism and the eucharist, must be enlivened by a divine principle of life and activity if it is to be truly saving. This conclusion, as I have already indicated, compromises the creaturely integrity of Christ's humanity by allowing Apollinarius to deny a human principle of biological or intellectual life in Christ. I now contend that this anti-idolatry rhetoric is what pushes Apollinarius into radical either/or statements (Christ is not a creature, but the Creator) that only make it more difficult to maintain some kind of nuance in christological discussion, and possibly even to prohibit the admission that Christ's flesh retains its real creatureliness.

Soteriological concerns and fear of idolatry, therefore, drive Apollinarius in the direction of a truly hard-core monophysitism, which undermines even the creaturely nature of Christ's human flesh. Recall the passage from *De fide et incarnatione*

⁵⁹ Spoerl, "Study," 173–80.

⁶⁰ This is so, not only in polemics with the Arians. One must remember that Apollinarius himself suffered persecution during the reign of the pagan emperor Julian (360–63) (Sozomen *Hist. eccl.* 5.18; Socrates *Hist. eccl.* 3.16), which may have further piqued his sensitivities concerning the practice of idolatry. I owe this suggestion to Dr. Nicholas Conostas of Hellenic College/Holy Cross Seminary.

7 cited above, where Apollinarius says that forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the flesh (which are mediated through the Savior's human body) is the work of divine, not created nature. In context, this text further reinforces the impression given by the Apollinarian fragments that by virtue of its union with the Word, Christ's flesh completely transcends its creaturely nature and becomes a constituent of a nature that is wholly divine. Apollinarius intuits that this is going too far—hence his efforts at the end of *De fide et incarnatione* 7 to deny that the flesh of Christ has lost its created corporeality as a result of its union with the Word.

“For the body and God, whose body it is, are one and the same; neither has the flesh been changed into what is incorporeal, but it retains both its unique character that it has from us as a result of its birth from the Virgin, and the character that transcends ours because of its unity [or mixture] with God the Word.”⁶¹

This same momentum generated by the creature/Creator dichotomy gives rise to the question that Fragments 116 and 155 pose, which, of course, presumes the whole debate on the consubstantiality of the Son that began to absorb theologians in the early 360s, with their renewed interest in the Nicene Creed. If Christ is ὁμοούσιος with the Father, and the flesh is emphatically one with Christ, it makes sense that one would wonder whether it is proper to conclude that the flesh itself is ὁμοούσιος with the Word and, by extension, with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Apollinarius denies the latter, thereby upholding the distinction between created humanity (however truncated it may be) and creative divinity in Christ, as he will in numerous other passages in his writings.⁶² Yet the task remains difficult, because the weight of the creature/Creator dichotomy and the threat of idolatry he invokes to combat Arian theology pushes him in the direction of denying or minimizing this distinction. I would argue that this whole complex of ideas that develops in the course of Apollinarius's anti-Arian argumentation constitutes another factor undermining his ability to envision consistently a fully human Christ.

■ Conclusion

The study of liturgical themes in Apollinarius's work is valuable for many reasons. First, it reveals him not as the coldhearted technologist, who can only construct dry syllogisms to express the deepest mysteries of the faith, that Gregory of Nazianzus suggests he is,⁶³ but as a man of the church who is personally invested

⁶¹ Apollinarius *De fide et incarnatione* 7.199.23–27.

⁶² See, for example, Fragments 112.233.31–234.10; 127–128.238.14–30; 145–146.242.14–22; 148.246.30–249.10.

⁶³ Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.* 101.53, with his reference to Apollinarius's “geometrical” arguments. The background to the sort of accusation leveled by Gregory against Apollinarius

in the worshiping life of that community. Indeed, his passionate invocations of baptism, eucharist, and even the incipient cult of the Virgin to persuade his readers of the truth of his theological formulations reveal the experience of Christian worship to be a potent nexus at which his intellectual theories and existential religious concerns intersect. In particular, Apollinarius's comments concerning the sacraments enable one to see more clearly that his christology is strongly motivated by soteriological concerns and convictions. It is no accident that he says in *De fide et incarnatione* 7 that baptism renders to its recipients forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the flesh. Sin and death are the two wounds of fallen human nature to which he repeatedly refers.⁶⁴ He is convinced, moreover, that these wounds are healed through Christ's incarnation and that this healing is made available through the individual's participation in the sacramental life of Christ's body, the church. When this is brought to the fore, it becomes clearer why his christology takes the shape it does. In his view it is only if Christ's body is enlivened by a divine spirit that provides both intelligence and biological life to the flesh that divine guidance and life can be made available to a sinful and dying human nature. Only in this way can sacramental participation make any sense and the worshiping life of the church be a truthful witness to the saving event of God's incarnation.⁶⁵

Second, the study of liturgical themes in Apollinarius provides more insight into the development of his trinitarian and christological ideas and their interaction in the polemical context of his day. Specifically, his use of the liturgical argument in christological contexts is directly continuous with his use of it in trinitarian contexts and, moreover, consciously integrated with the arguments as they are articulated in the former context. In both cases, Apollinarius points to the liturgical fact to argue against his opponents' views. Baptism into the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit proves that they constitute one divine nature; invocation of Jesus the Son of God (and not of Jesus of Nazareth alongside that of the Son of God)

is explored in an illuminating way in Richard Lim, *Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).

⁶⁴ I would argue that Apollinarius shares this assessment of the problem that the incarnation must solve with Athanasius, especially in the latter's *De incarnatione*.

⁶⁵ Indeed, in Norris's reading, Apollinarius sees the sacramental participation in the church, through which Christians partake of the sanctified body of Christ, as preliminary to any meaningful moral reform for the Christian, and thus partaking of Christ's mind: "To be sure, this self-assimilation of the human soul to the Logos does not and cannot take place apart from the sanctification of the flesh through participation in the divinized flesh of the Logos. The importance of the latter theme in Apollinarius's teaching cannot be overemphasized. For him, Christ became man 'in order that we might receive the likeness of the heavenly One, and be divinized after the likeness of the true Son of God by nature' [Fragment 116]. But this process in turn has its essential condition in man's participation in the body of Christ, which has been brought within the sphere of the divine life." Richard A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) 120.

proves that the Savior is one person and one nature. Apollinarius is keenly aware, moreover, that an incorrect christological model can jeopardize trinitarian orthodoxy. If Christians worship two distinct persons in Christ, they will end up distorting the confession of the Trinity by adding a man to the divine doxology. Most significantly, the soteriological assumptions he brings to the liturgical argument in both spheres are the same. In the trinitarian sphere, the conviction that only one divine agent can effect salvation and that salvation must be mediated directly to the believer without a created intermediary enabled him to argue effectively for the unity and equal divinity of the Trinity's members. In the christological sphere, however, these convictions drove him to truncate Christ's human nature, convinced as he was that to affirm such a complete human nature would set up an uncrossable barrier to the divine life of the Trinity that Christians assumed the sacraments to make available to the faithful.

Added to the pressure created by these soteriological concerns, then, is the influence of the sharp creature/Creator dichotomy and the anti-idolatry polemic coming in from anti-Arian argumentation, which has a distorting effect when it becomes implicated in christological discourse. However limited he may judge the humanity of Christ to be, Apollinarius knows that Christ's creaturely status must be affirmed and clearly distinguished from the indwelling divinity of the Word. However, the pressure of preexisting anti-Arian polemic, which requires him to assert that Christ is not a creature and not worshiped as such, often renders this an uphill battle. As I said earlier, this strain of polemic creates a certain momentum toward minimizing the distinction between the human and the divine, between the created and the uncreated nature in Christ. Combined with other pressures added by anti-Arian and the anti-Marcellan debates,⁶⁶ Apollinarius's concerns about soteriology and idolatry thus join forces to disallow a complete humanity in Christ. Ironically, then, while he sees Christian worship as upholding the integrity of christological orthodoxy, the rigid dichotomies and unnuanced assumptions it entails for him contribute to his own unwitting compromise of that orthodoxy.

This article has noted the limitations of liturgical arguments in Apollinarius, and perhaps in all theological writers. That is, while it is true that theologians derive *lex credendi* from *lex orandi*, the evidence from Apollinarius also suggests that the way in which certain thinkers derive theological conclusions from the worship of the church may be conditioned—rightly or wrongly—by preexisting theological assumptions. Liturgical fundamentalism can be as problematic as biblical fundamentalism, suggesting that true wisdom lies somewhere in the interaction among scripture, worship, and the guidance of church tradition informed by reason and the Holy Spirit. While understanding that the experience of worship

⁶⁶ See above, n. 7.

can be essential to theological formation, that experience itself is not, nor perhaps ever can be, devoid of presuppositions that are capable of distorting the process of theological formation. In considering the complex effect his experience as a worshipping Christian had on Apollinarius's own theological formation, one may do well to keep in mind Wiles's caveat: "Undoubtedly the practice of prayer has had its effect on doctrine; undoubtedly the practice of prayer should have its effect on doctrine. But that is not to say that the effect which prayer has actually had is at every point precisely the effect which it should have had."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Wiles, *Making of Christian Doctrine*, 93. Rowan Williams draws a similar conclusion in his paper on baptism and the Arian controversy, remarking insightfully that arguments from liturgy suffered the same problems as arguments from scripture in the fourth century. Contrary to what Apollinarius and his colleagues assumed, "liturgy does not simply determine the shape of doctrine: it is far more the contested material upon which doctrinal reflection must work, the subject of rival 'bids' for definition. Or, to put it rather more bluntly, liturgy does not settle arguments . . . but it does provide the *language* for argument." See "Baptism and the Arian Controversy," 154.