



The First Campaign of Heraclius against Persia

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Notes and Documents.

The First Campaign of Heraclius against Persia.

THE study of the Armenian historians has of late years done much to increase our knowledge of the campaigns of Heraclius against Persia, but there still remain many difficulties awaiting solution. Among these the operations of the year 622 have hardly received the attention they merit. The reason for the summary treatment which they have experienced from modern students is that virtually our only authority for this campaign is George of Pisidia, and it has been easy for readers of his involved verse to absolve themselves from any detailed study by pronouncing that he was but a poet and no historian. It may, however, be answered that he was something more—an eye-witness—and that this fact is of the greatest moment. In this paper we shall attempt to understand the account given us in the *Expeditio Persica*, assuming that even the words of a poet are usually intended to be susceptible of some meaning.

The object of the first campaign of Heraclius against Persia is in fact, despite oft-repeated misconceptions, quite clear: it was to force the Persian to withdraw from Asia Minor. The plan of campaign was not to engage the enemy, but, passing him on his flank, to threaten his communications and to appear to be striking at the very heart of his native country. The operations were in the result completely successful.

On 4 April 622 Heraclius celebrated a public communion.¹ On the following day he summoned Sergius, the patriarch, Bonus (or Bonosus), the magister, together with the senate, the principal officials, and the entire populace of the capital.² Turning to Sergius he said, 'Into the hands of God and of his mother and into thine I commend this city and my son.' After solemn prayer in the cathedral the emperor took the sacred image of the Saviour and bore it from the church in his arms. The troops then embarked, and in the evening of the same day (5 April) the fleet set sail. They passed Chalcedon, now in all likelihood occupied by

¹ *Exp. Pers.* i. 132 ff.

² Theoph. p. 466 (Bonn ed.); Niceph. p. 17 (Bonn).

the Persians, and coasted round the promontory of the Heraeum.³ Here the pagan name was changed, and Heraclius gave the headland a Christian title, probably dedicating it, as Drapeyron suggests, to the Virgin Mary: the chief goddess of the old pantheon would be displaced by the flower of womanhood in the new faith. A strong wind, however, sprang up from the south and blew in the teeth of the fleet, while a heavy cloud-rack hid all the stars. The emperor's ship ran on a reef, and it was only through his own enthusiasm that she was eventually saved from being dashed to pieces. The sailors, fastening cables to the boat, dragged her free once more,⁴ and the Romans continued their voyage without further mishap. Heraclius, 'the swift courser of a day,'⁵ arrived at the small town of Pylae, in the Bay of Nicomedia, and there cast anchor without delay or opposition.⁶

Dr. A. J. Butler, in his recent work on *The Arab Conquest of Egypt*, has returned to the identification of Quercius, which was adopted by Gibbon and all subsequent historians down to Tafel's time.⁷ He writes: 'The Roman force landed and camped at Issus and seized the pass of Pylae, on the frontier between Cilicia and Syria. . . . The expedition to Cilicia drove a wedge into the very centre of the vast territory between the Nile and the Bosphorus, now controlled by the Persians.'⁸ But the contention of Tafel⁹ that this account is impossible must, I think, be admitted without hesitation. His arguments may be summarised as follows:—

(i.) George of Pisidia gives no geographical position to the place; it must therefore be not only known to the citizens but near the capital.

(ii.) No place is mentioned after the turning of the promontory of the Heraeum.¹⁰

(iii.) Terms like *λεγόμεναι* are not used of famous places, but applied to towns, &c., which are more or less obscure.

(iv.) The words of George of Pisidia, which are in themselves conclusive:

ἕως διελθὼν τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ρευμάτων
αὐταῖς ἐπέστης ταῖς καλουμένας Πύλας
ἐλθὼν ἀπροσδόκητος ἡμεροδρόμος.

(v.) While no one could *sail* to the Cilician Gates¹¹ the sea

³ *Exp. Pers.* i. 156–7.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. *passim*.

⁵ Ἐλθὼν ἀπροσδόκητος ἡμεροδρόμος (*ibid.* ii. 11).

⁶ Ἀπάρας δὲ τῆς βασιλευσύνης πόλεως ἐξῆλθεν κατὰ τὰς λεγομένας Πύλας πλοῖ τῆς πορείαν ποιησάμενος (*Theoph.* p. 466; cf. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 10.)

⁷ See Professor Bury's edition of Gibbon, v. 79, n. 97.—ED. E. H. R.

⁸ P. 124.

⁹ *Theophanis Chronographia; Probe einer neuen kritisch-exegetischen Ausgabe* (1852), p. 146 sqq.

¹⁰ Drapeyron clearly felt this difficulty (*L'Empereur Héraclius*, p. 154).

¹¹ 'Pylas autem Ciliias intus situs navibus nemo mortalium adit ut hinc in Armeniam superiorem . . . perveniat' (Tafel, p. 149).

passage through the Nicomedian Bay avoided a circuitous coast road.

Gerland¹² has seen an additional argument for Tafel's view in the fact that a south wind blew in the teeth of the fleet: *Νότου πνέυσαντος εἰς τὸὺναντίον*.¹³ This would clearly, however, apply equally well if the troops were on their voyage either to the Bithynian or Cilician Pylae. It could be quoted as rendering an identification with the Caspian Pylae impossible, but I am not aware that the latter have ever been seriously suggested in this connexion. There is, however, one other point of importance to be noticed. Pylae was precisely the spot at which the emperors were accustomed to land when going to the east.¹⁴ In the *De Cerimoniis* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus the proper formalities to be observed on such a disembarkation are detailed.¹⁵ Dr. Butler supports the old view by a passage of Sepeos, according to whom 'there was a drawn battle close to Antioch city, with great slaughter on both sides. But the Romans retreated to Pylae, where they defeated the Persians, who, however, recovered and took Tarsus and all Cilicia.'¹⁶ But Sepeos has no chronological framework,¹⁷ and in his account the whole Persian war is apparently fought out in a single campaign. I would suggest that he is here describing events which should be referred to the spring of 626, when Heraclius had undoubtedly marched into Cilicia.

From Pylae the emperor proceeded, Theophanes tells us,¹⁸ 'into the region of the themes,' by which he must mean the heart of Asia Minor, probably Galatia and perhaps Cappadocia. Remembering the march of Philippicus and the route pursued in Heraclius's own second campaign,¹⁹ we might conclude that he now halted at Caesarea, in Cappadocia. To this spot the army was to be collected, and veterans and recruits welded into one force. Speed was necessary and the greatest vigilance, or else the enemy might cut off small sections of the scattered troops and sever them from the main body. But the concentration was carried out successfully,²⁰ and the several mountain streams helped to form

¹² 'Die persische Feldzüge des Kaisers Herakleios,' in the *Byz. Zeitschr.* iii. 341.

¹³ *Exp. Pers.* i. 170.

¹⁴ Cf. Ramsay, *Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, p. 187.

¹⁵ *De Cerim.* i. 474, 493; Ramsay, *op. cit.* p. 201.

¹⁶ Butler, *op. cit.* p. 124.

¹⁷ Gerland, *ubi supra*, p. 335.

¹⁸ 'Ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν θεμάτων χώρας ἀφικόμενος (Theoph. p. 466).

¹⁹ Sepéos, cap. 26.

²⁰ "Ὁμως συνῆλθον, Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 66; cf. *Heraclias*, ii. 153:

ἡβουλόμεν δὲ καίπερ ὦν βραδύγραφος
τὴν συλλογὴν σου τῶν στρατευμάτων γράφειν.
τὴν εἰς ἅπαν γῆς ἐσκεδασμένον μέρος
βόυλαις δὲ ταῖς σαῖς ἐν βραχεὶ συνηγμένην
οἱ σοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἤγον ἐκτικοὶ λόγοι
ὡς εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐκ μίας ὑδραργύρου
σύρει τὰ χρυσᾶ συλλέγων σπαράγματα.

that river which was to overflow the Persian land.²¹ As Theophanes says, 'he collected the garrisons, and added to their number his young army.'²² George does not cease to wonder at the way in which the emperor kept all his plans clear and distinct from each other, despite their multiplicity,²³ or at the resource and adaptability he showed in devising others when one failed, or in strengthening a scheme insufficiently developed.²⁴ After the troops had been thoroughly drilled and exercised in mimic combats,²⁵ Heraclius continued his march. The first aggressive operation was to send out skirmishing parties of picked horsemen. These captured many small bands of the enemy who were ravaging the country-side. The leaders were set at liberty, and the emperor's motto, 'Pardon rather than the sword,' brought, we are told, many even of 'the faithless barbarians' to his side.²⁶

Heraclius had, apparently, down to this time been pursuing a line of march running due east from Caesarea—that is to say, through the north of Cappadocia. Thus the capture of a Saracen leader is said by Theophanes to have taken place when the emperor was drawing near to the districts on the frontier of Armenia.²⁷ He does not say—as some have translated him—that the emperor was *in* Armenia, where he certainly was not.²⁸ Heraclius now struck in a north-easterly direction into the province of Pontus. The summer was over; before the Romans lay the mountains and the forces of the enemy. The passes had been seized by the Persians; the road to the east was blocked. Sarbar intended to keep Heraclius where he now was during the winter, and to besiege his quarters in Pontus.²⁹

²¹ *Exp. Pers.* ii. 66-9.

²² Theoph. *loc. cit.*

²³ *Exp. Pers.* ii. 70 ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 60 ff.

²⁵ The poet assures us that he was anxious to see the pleasant prelude of the war, but that this mock battle was a most terrible sight.

²⁶ *Geo. Pisid. Exp. Pers.* ii. 235-238.

²⁷ *Γενόμενος δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη Ἀρμενίας* (Theoph. p. 468). Gerland appears (p. 347) to think this barely possible.

²⁸ Theophanes, p. 469, makes this quite clear when he says of Sarbar, *φοβηθεὶς μὴ διὰ τῆς Ἀρμενίας εἰς τὴν Περσίδα ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰσβαλὼν ταύτην παράξῃ*. From the narrative itself we see that the words *εἰς τὴν Περσίδα εἰσβάλλει* must be regarded as an expression of direction; as such they are correct. To the Persians who had been out-maneuvred he seemed to be striking at their country (*contra* Tafel, p. 55, note on l. 13).

²⁹ Cedrenus, i. 720: *ἀποκλίνας ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Ποντίου κλίμα*. *Geo. Pisid. Exp. Pers.* ii. 256:

ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς χειμῶνα πρὸς τὸ πόντιον
κλίμα διατρίψας συντόμως ὁ βάρβαρος
τὰς εἰσβολὰς κατέσχε τῆς ὁδοῦ φθάσας.

Read with Tafel *πόντιον* and *διέτριψας*. Manuscripts of Theophanes, p. 468, have *ἀποκλείσας*, 'absque sensu,' says Tafel. We should read *ἀποκλίνας*, i.e. he strikes north-east. I adopt (following De Boor) the interpretation of the *Hist. Misc.*: 'visum est barbaris obsidere illum in hoc hiemantem.' A manuscript of Theophanes has *ἔδοξε τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν παραχειμαίνειν*, for which Tafel reads, *ἔδοξε τοῖς βαρβάροις πολιορκεῖν*

Heraclius was thus forced to adopt a stratagem in order to turn the enemy's position. For this manœuvre our only authority is George of Pisidia.³⁰ The obscurity of his description has, however, deterred historians from any detailed consideration of the passage.³¹ The fighting was evidently very slight. In fact the poet is most anxious that we should understand that the operation was a successful feint: *ἐπαινετὴ πλαστοουργία, σοφὴ πλαστοουργία, σοφὴ ὑπόκρισις, τοῦτο τὸ ποικίλον, εὐμηχάνως* (not *ἀνδρείως*, or the like), &c. The enemy were entrenched in a strong position, and were determined not to abandon it. At the same time they would be keeping a keen watch over the movements of the Roman army. To divert their attention Heraclius in person made a sudden frontal attack,³² as though about to storm the passes to the east. Meanwhile the army, under cover of this diversion, probably marched to the north, and soon struck east, where they got possession of the hills, either meeting no force of the enemy or preventing any from escaping. The Persians, thinking that the body led by the emperor was the main force, came out from their entrenchments.³³ Immediately Heraclius, as though finding a more serious opposition than he had expected, gave the signal for retreat. The Persians, knowing the love for feints which was proverbial in Byzantine military tactics, were afraid to pursue to any distance, fearing that they might lose their position by a secret flanking attack, and accordingly retired to their fortified encampment (*ἐκ σου σκελισθεὶς δυστυχῶς ὑποστρέφει*). As, however, the Roman army did not return to the attack, the Persians, concluding that it was as demoralised as its predecessors, relaxed all vigilance, and Heraclius was able to follow in the track of his main force.³⁴

ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν παραχειμάζοντα. If we accept the reading of the manuscript we must take it as an excuse for the ease with which Heraclius turned the Persian position.

³⁰ I am not aware that any writer has attempted to explain this passage of George. Le Beau does not mention it; Drapeyron's account (p. 170) is even more mysterious than the Greek original; Gerland (p. 347) simply gives the result of the manœuvre and does not hazard a suggestion as to method; Tafel has no note on the subject, and the general historians are silent. Professor Bury's remarks (*Later Roman Empire*, ii. 228, note 3) are useful, but he was at that time (1889) apparently unaware of Tafel's work. It is noticeable that the movement cannot be explained even by such a formation as an *oblique echelon*, for the flanking movement was not only *unsuspected* by the enemy but absolutely unknown to them, which implies a wider *détour* than a mere formation in *echelon*.

³¹ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 256 sqq.

³² This is apparently the meaning of *ἐκδρομή* in l. 264.

³³ Cf. *ἐξωρμηκός, προεκτρέχειν*.

³⁴ I retain the manuscript text in ll. 276, 277, *καὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον τοῦ σκοποῦ τὸ ποικίλον τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνήκεν εἰς ῥαθυμίαν*. Tafel says it reads 'inepte,' and emends *ἄθυμιαν*. But the poet clearly implies that the Persians considered themselves victorious; why *ἄθυμια*? Theophanes has preserved the true word (*λαθὼν δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας καὶ ἐπιστραφεὶς εἰς τὴν Περσίδα εἰσβάλλει. Τοῦτο μαθόντες οἱ βάρβαροι εἰς ῥαθυμίαν ἦλθον τῷ ἀπροσδοκῆτῳ τῆς τούτου εἰσοδοῦ*), but in his abbreviated form has missed the

Thus at the time of the feint his army was marching *διπροσώπῳ σχήματι* (*i.e.* east and north), and on his retreat the emperor, from being leader of the van, at once took the second place in the line of march (*καὶ πρῶτος εὐθὺς ἠγρέθησ ὁ δεύτερος*). Formerly he had been going almost at right angles to the direction taken by the army (*τὰς ἡγίας λόξας προδείκνυσ*), but turning³⁵ he went straight after his force (*ὀξέωσ παρέρχεται*); and, taking up a position exactly opposite to that previously held (*ἐξ ἀντιστρόφου, εἰσ ἀντιστάδην*),³⁶ had thus passed the enemy on their right flank³⁷ (*παρέρχεται, παρήλθε*). George sums up the operation thus:—

*καὶ τὸν παραβάτην βαλὼν πλασμῶ ξένῳ
πρὸ τῆσ μάχησ ἀφήκασ εἰσ ἀντιστάδην.*

These lines have been hopelessly misunderstood. The note in the Bonn edition opens thus:—

Παραβάτην duplici sensu vocat Persam tum quia locum aptiorem ad pugnam praeoccupaverat, tum etiam quia a religione Christiana defecerat. Παραβάτης enim est tam is qui currum moderans alios praevertit quam qui legem violavit.

In the first place it is, I think, clear that the word *παραβάτης* means ‘transgressor,’ and that alone. Elsewhere George applies the same term to Chosroes: *ὡσ καθεἶλεσ (τὸν) παραβάτην Χοσρόην*.³⁸ Indeed, the *παραβάτης* is he who stands beside the warrior in the battle chariot, and has no connexion with skill in *chariot-racing*. In the second place we are not to read *πλαστῶ ξένῳ* (with Kusterus), and certainly neither to translate *et transgressorem coniectum in planitiem ignotam ante pugnam in adversam partem compulisti* nor *Parabaten cum ficto hospite committens ante pugnam in adversarium* (*ἀντιστάτην*, Suidas) *immisisti*. We must deny that *πλασμὸσ idem est ac πλατυσμὸσ, planities*. *πλασμὸσ* (*πλάζω*) is, in fact, only another word for *πλαστουργία*.³⁹ *πλασμὸσ ξένωσ* is the newly invented stratagem of the emperor. As for the reading⁴⁰ to be adopted, the manuscript of George of Pisidia has *καὶ τὸν παραβάτην βαλὼν πλασμῶ ξένῳ κ.τ.λ.* Those of Suidas have *τὸν πᾶρᾶβᾶτην παραβαλὼν*, or *συμβαλὼν*, or *τὴν πᾶράβᾶσιν συμβαλὼν*. I believe that we have here one of those verbal conceits which are of such frequent

precise meaning of the poet. The *Historia Miscella* reads ‘in rancorem . . . devenerunt.’ Tafel proposes ‘angorem;’ I would suggest ‘languorem’ (= *δαθυμίαν*)

³⁵ In l. 283 I read *ὀποστρέφωσ* with all the editions.

³⁶ This latter phrase must here mean ‘opposite’ and not ‘in hand-to-hand fight,’ as Liddell and Scott.

³⁷ If, as is probable, he marched to the north of the enemy’s position.

³⁸ *Heracle.* i. 206.

³⁹ Cf. *ἐπαινετὴ πλαστουργία, σοφὴ πλαστουργία*, above, p. 698.

⁴⁰ See Hilberg, *Wiener Studien*, ix. 211.

occurrence in the poems of George. I suggest that we should read—

τῷ παραβατῇ γὰρ συμβαλὼν, πλασμῷ ξένῳ
πρὸ τῆς μάχης ἀφήκας εἰς ἀντιστάδην,

i.e. 'for though you had engaged with the transgressor, yet before the fight, by a novel stratagem, you reversed the relative position of the two armies.'

The enemy, having retired to their entrenchments, made no further movement, but waited quietly for six days. It was only then⁴¹ that the unexpected report was brought them that the emperor had outflanked them and was now in their rear. As George says,⁴² it was a matter of the greatest import to the Persians that the Roman army should have gained this advantage. The country lying between the hostile forces was mountainous and difficult; the Persians themselves were invaders, who could only look for opposition from the native population; they were threatened by famine, as the Romans could carry off all provisions in the line of march; they would be forced to be continually on their guard against ambushes in the rough districts of Pontus towards the east, while all the most favourable positions would be seized in advance by the imperial army. While Heraclius apparently marched east at a leisurely pace, Sarbar was at a loss to know what policy to adopt. At first he determined to follow hard on the tracks of the emperor, to overtake him and fight a battle forthwith. But should he suffer a reverse in such country his retreat would be beset with dangers and difficulties. Rather would he turn southwards; by so doing he would draw off the emperor from Pontus; by rendering him anxious for his southern provinces he would turn the Roman into the pursuer and would frustrate his well-planned strategy. Sarbar set out accordingly for Cilicia. The Persian tactics, however, met with signal failure. Heraclius refused to abandon the position he had won, while the Roman fleets were undisputed masters of the Euxine and the Archipelago. Once more Sarbar hesitated. He suddenly realised that since his southern march the passes into Armenia were left unguarded. What if the enemy should thus strike at the very heart of Persia? 'And so he leapt from one plan to another like a rolling stone, which, falling down a precipice, crashes on to a projecting point and rebounds, only to be tossed back from the opposing crag.'⁴³

But the prospect of the emperor entering Armenia unopposed was insupportable, and so at last the Persian general determined

⁴¹ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 286.

⁴² *Ibid.* l. 293 ff. Drapeyron (p. 170) is clearly in error in his explanation of these lines, which show a keen perception of the real strategic importance of the emperor's manoeuvre.

⁴³ *Ibid.* ll. 338-56.

to march north-east, through Cappadocia, into the region of the upper streams of the Halys. He was thus dragged after the emperor against his will, like a dog on a chain, as George vividly puts it.⁴⁴ But while Heraclius had improved his position, and had inspired the new Roman army with his own enthusiasm, the Persian troops were disheartened by their arduous and fruitless manœuvres. Clinging to the hills, they feared to venture on an open assault upon the imperial camp, pitched in the plain below. Sarbar had planned a secret attack under cover of darkness, but the moon was nearly at the full, and the clear wintry nights were cloudless. An eclipse of the moon when the attempt was on the point of being made further discouraged the enemy (23 Jan. 629). Thus passed fifteen days. The Persians were rapidly becoming demoralised; constant skirmishes invariably resulted in a victory for the Romans, the emperor himself 'doing all things instead of all before the whole host,' while deserters brought news of the desperate state of affairs in the Persian camp. Sarbar was forced to take the decisive step. Just before dawn he drew up his forces in three divisions facing the imperial position. A picked body of men, however, he had set in ambush on the wing between the two armies. They were fully concealed by the hollows of the broken country in which the battle was fought; during the engagement they were to charge upon the Roman flank and throw it into confusion. Sarbar's hope was that as it had been in the past so would it be now. But 'the times of cowardice were past;' before the night was half over Heraclius was aware of the danger and took his measures to guard against it. He also drew up his army in three divisions to meet the disposition of the enemy, and himself took the initiative by sending out a body of men 'armed rather with good counsels than with weapons.' As soon as they were on a line with the ambuscade they made a feigned retreat, as though terror-stricken by the strength of their opponents. The Persians in hiding, thinking this to be the very moment to strike, poured out upon the supposed fugitives. Relying rather on the surprise and suddenness of their onset than on order or combination, they found drawn up against them the three divisions of the Roman force. Heraclius immediately led out a body of his most trusted soldiers, and the Persians, themselves ensnared, broke and fled. When Sarbar ordered a general advance it was too late: the army was seized with sudden panic. In the utter rout which ensued but few escaped.⁴⁵ The Romans fearlessly entered the Persian camp, and did not even strike the enemy's tents, but wherever a man found a shelter still standing he left the canvas as it was and appropriated

⁴⁴ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* l. 357-8.

⁴⁵ Σφάζουσι δὲ ἅπαν τὸ Περσικὸν πλῆθος ὀλίγων τιμῶν διαδράντων (Cedr.)

the spoil.⁴⁶ Thus ended the first campaign of Heraclius against Persia. The army went into winter quarters; the emperor set out for Byzantium, and with him went the poet to whom we owe the *Expeditio Persica*.
 NORMAN H. BAYNES.

London and the Commune.

THE word 'commune,' as is well known, was used in the middle ages, like many words in the feudal vocabulary, both in a vague, popular sense and in one strictly defined and technical. In the former sense it might be applied to any union of citizens for the purpose of securing freer conditions of local government; in the latter it was applied only to a town that was formally constituted in its corporate capacity a feudal person, a vassal of its lord, a lord perhaps of other vassals, with the rights, obligations, and freedom of that station in the feudal society, a *seigneurie collective populaire*, as it has been termed by Luchaire.¹ That London was called a commune in the former sense has long been known.² The most interesting of the early instances of the fact is the passage in William of Malmesbury where, in recording the events of 1141, he mentions *omnes barones qui in eorum communionem iamdudum recepti fuerant*.³ The question whether London was ever a commune in the stricter sense has been raised by Mr. J. H. Round in connexion with the events that occurred there in 1191 and the light thrown on them by two documents of a little later date which he has printed for the first time.⁴ The language of the chroniclers in describing the occurrences of 1191 clearly indicate that with reference to a commune of London something unusual was done,

⁴⁶ The lines of George are as follows (*Exp. Pers.* iii. 281, 899):—

πάντες γὰρ οἱ πρὶν μῆδε Περσικὴν κόνιν
 ἰδεῖν στέγοντες, οὐδὲ τὰς σκηνας τότε
 καθεῖλον ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ἦν εἶχε σκέπη
 οὕτως ἀφῆκεν ὥσπερ ἦν πεπηγμένη.

I believe that the poet is here speaking of the occupation by the Romans of the Persian camp; and he was thus understood by Theophanes. Quercius refers *σκηνας* to the Romans' own tents, which, usually struck before a battle, were, he thinks, on this occasion left standing. The interpretation is improbable; it is the sense of security *after* the victory of which George is speaking, not of that *before* the battle. Further we must not translate *σκέπη* with Quercius by 'scutum' or 'armatura.' It means simply 'shade.' The Romans after an arduous pursuit come back spent and weary; nearer than their own camp, on the flank of the hill is that of the Persians. So great was the assurance of their complete safety that the soldiers, not troubling to dismantle the enemy's camp, occupied it, and any shelter from the midday sun which each man discovered he left standing as it was and turned to his own use.

¹ *Communes Françaises*, p. 97.

² Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* i. 407, first ed.

³ *Hist. Nov.* c. 495.

⁴ *The Commune of London, and other Studies* (1899), pp. 219 ff.