

Schleiermacher and the Christologies Behind Chalcedon*

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Although Schleiermacher's Christology is one of the most commented-upon doctrines of his dogmatic system, little scholarship exists on its relation to patristic Christology.¹ To many this gap in scholarship will seem understandable and even appropriate, given Schleiermacher's famous rejection of two-natures language in his major dogmatic work, *Der christliche Glaube*.² In this essay, I shall identify parallels between Schleiermacher's Christology and some of the Christologies "behind" Chalcedon—those conflicting Christologies that Chalcedon attempted to

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¹One exception is an article by Richard Muller ("The Christological Problem as Addressed by Friedrich Schleiermacher," in *Perspectives on Christology* [ed. M. Shuster and R. Muller; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House, 1991] 141–62) that shows how "the doctrinal intention behind Schleiermacher's way of affirming the divinity of Christ evidences common ground with the dogmatic intention" of Chalcedon (p. 142). Muller's main objective is to demonstrate that Schleiermacher's Christology does not violate what he calls "patristic orthodoxy." He does not explore in detail how Schleiermacher's doctrine of Christ may draw (whether intentionally or not) on the Christologies of specific patristic figures or schools. George Hunsinger, in an article outlining Karl Barth's debt to Martin Luther, makes a very brief comparison between Schleiermacher's Christology and that of Theodore of Mopsuestia, labeling both as "spirit-oriented" because they hold that "Jesus points us to the Holy Spirit" and not vice versa. Thus, in Hunsinger's view, these Christologies are focused only formally on Christ, but substantively on the Holy Spirit. See "What Karl Barth Learned from Luther," *Lutheran Quarterly* 13:2 (1999) 129. Given Schleiermacher's view of the church, as well as his conception of the dependence of the believer and the community upon Christ, Hunsinger's interpretation is not convincing.

²Henceforth *Gl*. All references to passages from *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche in Zusammenhange dargestellt* follow the English translation of the second

mediate. By examining the way in which certain emphases of Cyril of Alexandria, on the one hand, and Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, on the other, are present in Schleiermacher's own doctrine of Christ (especially in *Gl.* §§93–99), I shall argue that Schleiermacher does not simply reject Chalcedon, but rather reconfigures its combination of apparently disjunct christological traditions in a new and creative way.

My interpretation is therefore distinct from two common alternatives: first, the judgment that Schleiermacher's Christology dissolves its connection with classical Christology and moves instead toward a historicized picture of Christ that helps found the alleged "low" Christology of the modern period;³ and second, the judgment that Schleiermacher's Christology criticizes but remains in line with the basic spirit of Chalcedon.⁴ In contrast to these, I am arguing that Schleiermacher neither dismisses Chalcedonian Christology altogether nor carries it forward through a mere revision of its language, but rather develops a doctrine of Christ that represents a new synthesis of the mutually corrective christological positions that Chalcedon brought together. Specifically, Schleiermacher's Christology underscores the individual humanity and development of the Redeemer⁵ (a parallel

German edition offered in *The Christian Faith* (ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1928). Occasionally I supply in parentheses the German original, from the standard critical edition edited by Martin Redeker (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960).

³John Macquarrie names Schleiermacher a founder of modern humanistic Christology who "starts off bravely along the road of a Christology 'from below.'" Macquarrie applauds what he calls the "humanistic" elements in Schleiermacher's Christology, but attacks Schleiermacher for abandoning these when he maintains that Christ's perfect God-consciousness is a divine implant. See *Jesus Christ in Modern Thought* (London: SCM Press, 1983) 208. In the conclusion of his work on Athanasius, Khaled Anatolios identifies Schleiermacher's Christology as one that "occupies a pioneering position among modern 'Christologies from below'" because it (with Kant, in Anatolios's view) allows God to be "deduced from the data of human consciousness." See his *Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought* (New York: Routledge, 1998) 207.

⁴This is Muller's argument (pp. 142, 146), and it is the dominant view among Schleiermacher scholars. Similar, too, is Redeker's well-known comment that "Schleiermacher did not fundamentally call the ancient church's doctrine of the two natures into question; he did, however, try to transform it." By "transform," Redeker means that Schleiermacher attempted to carry forward the spirit of the Chalcedonian formula in a way that was both more simple and more appropriate to the thought forms of his own day. See *Schleiermacher: Life and Thought* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973) 136. Gerhard Ebeling argues that Schleiermacher's insistence on the preservation of the doctrines of both the person and the work of Christ (and his refusal to do without—or overemphasize—one or the other) corresponds to "the inner logic of the ancient church doctrine of the two natures" (my translation). See "Interpretatorische Bemerkungen zu Schleiermachers Christologie," in *Schleiermacher und die wissenschaftliche Kultur des Christentums* (ed. Günter Meckenstock; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991) 138. Wolfgang Trillhaas calls Schleiermacher's Christology "a simplification of traditional Christology without comparison in the history of theology that preceded him" (my translation). See "Der Mittelpunkt der Glaubenslehre Schleiermachers," *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie* 10 (1968) 303.

⁵Throughout my presentation of Schleiermacher's Christology, I shall follow his practice of referring to Jesus Christ primarily as "the Redeemer."

to Theodore and Nestorius), while at the same time emphasizing the priority and dominance of the divine in the Redeemer, so that this divine element constitutes the center of who he is and the source of all that he does (a debt to Cyril, and behind him to Athanasius).

Formulated in this way, my argument entails two additional claims that depart from standard readings of Schleiermacher. First, I avoid the assumption that Schleiermacher merely reduces the Redeemer's divinity to his humanity, but suggest instead that Schleiermacher crafts the Redeemer's constitution in a way that not only allows for his divinity and humanity to exist together but even permits the divine element to have greater transformative and directive power than has usually been thought possible within Schleiermacher's Christology. Second, I suggest that Schleiermacher's Christology stands in much stronger continuity with many of the concerns and tensions of patristic Christology than has been generally recognized.⁶

■ “Antiochene” and “Alexandrian” Christologies: Deconstructing the Typology

Textbook typologies, at least since the middle of the nineteenth century, have distinguished between “Antiochene” and “Alexandrian” Christologies⁷—a distinc-

⁶Indeed, Schleiermacher's arguments and footnotes in the christological section of *Gl.* indicate that he articulated his Christology in close conversation with previous models in the history of Christianity, and with patristic authors and themes as well. In footnotes to §§96–99, wherein Schleiermacher assesses classical christological doctrinal statements such as the two-natures doctrine, he refutes or signals his approval of various theological terms and christological positions as put forth in New Testament sources, in classical creeds (particularly the Nicene and the Athanasian), and in the works of John of Damascus and Athanasius, among others. In a footnote to §96.1, Schleiermacher cites approvingly a passage from John of Damascus's *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* where two-natures language is avoided. In a footnote to §96.3, Schleiermacher applauds the Athanasian creed's account of the relation between the human and the divine in Christ. In a footnote to §97.2, Schleiermacher states his preference for the Greek fathers' term “enfleshment” (the *Logos/sarx* model) over “ensomatosis” or “enbodiment” (the *Logos/soma* model) as an adequate description of the act of union. See other footnotes in §§96–99 for more examples of the ways Schleiermacher aligns his christological construction with or distinguishes it from earlier doctrines and proposals.

⁷The *Oxford English Dictionary* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), s.v. “Antiochene,” cites John Henry Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1st ed., 1845) as the earliest use of the term “Antiochene School.” Newman mentions the Antiochene School toward the beginning of his treatment of “the Nestorians,” and refers to it as an exegetical school with a literal approach to biblical interpretation. See *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (6th ed.; repr.; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989) part II, ch. VI, §2.2, pp. 285, 294. Vol. 1 of Edward Cox's *History of the Church* (1840), which is a translation of Döllinger's *Geschichte der christlichen Kirchen*, vol. 1 (1833), refers to the “Antiochian fathers.” The German, however, is “Antiochian Synod” (*Antiochenische Synode*). Both Cox and Döllinger refer to the “fathers at Antioch.” See Edward Cox, trans., *History of the Church* (London: Dolman, 1840) vol. 1, ch. 2, sec. 7, p. 176; and J. J. I. Döllinger, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirchen* (Landshut: Manz, 1833) vol. 1, §25, p. 269.

tion that, when hypostasized into two unambiguous “types,” is now considered problematic.⁸ According to this typology, Antiochene Christology is a “Word-Man” Christology that is concerned to protect the full and distinct integrity of Christ’s human nature. It asserts that the Word united itself with a complete, particular human being, who developed, exercised free will, and was the subject of incarnate experiences. In Antiochene Christology, then, there are two natures, two subjects, and two hypostases: the divine and the human.⁹ Alexandrian Christology, on the other hand, is classified according to a “Word-Flesh” model in which the Word takes on human flesh, which—though asserted to be completely human—is not regarded as an independently existing human being but rather as a mass of human characteristics assumed by the Word.¹⁰ Here, then, the Logos is the single

However, Döllinger’s *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, which is the major German text translated in vol. 2 of Cox’s *History of the Church*, does refer to the “Antiochenische Schule,” and this phrase appears in Cox’s second volume as “Antiochian School.” See Cox, *History of the Church* (London: Dolman, 1840) vol. 2, ch. 4, sec. 5, p. 182; and Döllinger, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte* (1836; 2d ed., Regensburg: Manz, 1843) vol. 1, 2d period, ch. 4, §35, p. 145.

⁸Frances Young’s recent work (*Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997]) challenges the adequacy of the categories traditionally used to distinguish “Antiochene” and “Alexandrian” biblical exegesis. Specifically, Young argues that an “allegorical” approach is not exclusive to the Alexandrians, while a “literal,” “historical,” or “typological” approach does not properly describe the “Antiochene” mode of exegesis. Instead, Young shows how the differences between “Alexandrian” and “Antiochene” schools is less about distinct “senses” of scripture, and more about *shared* reading strategies that were employed with diverse emphases and diverse conceptions of the connections among strategies. For a succinct account and critique of the standard view of the distinction between Antiochene and Alexandrian exegesis, see John J. O’Keefe, “‘A Letter that Killeth’: Toward a Reassessment of Antiochene Exegesis, or Diodore, Theodore, and Theodoret on the Psalms,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 8 (2000) 83–104, esp. 86–88. Richard Norris points to the problems with most of the typologies commonly used to distinguish the various Christologies of the fourth and fifth centuries. While in his view the Antiochene/Alexandrian typology is the least problematic, Norris argues that such typologies as monophysite/dyophysite and logos-flesh/logos-man encourage one to overlook the tensions and complexities in the Christologies of the various early church theologians, who do not fit so clearly into one type or the other: “one cannot suppose that two baskets represent adequate equipment for the historian’s task of christological sorting.” See “Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria,” *Studia Patristica* 13 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975) 268.

⁹As Theodore of Mopsuestia states, “the one assumed is distinct from the one who assumes him.” See *On the Incarnation*, book 5, frag. 1, in *The Christological Controversy* (trans. and ed. Richard A. Norris, Jr.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 113.

¹⁰Interestingly, both Frances Young and John McGuckin assert that the modern preoccupation with the human identity of Christ has led to a dismissal of the Alexandrian model of Christology in modern theology, which they say resonates more with Antiochene Christology. See Frances Young, “A Reconsideration of Alexandrian Christology,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 22:2 (1971) 103–14; and John McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994) 134–35, 190, 206.

subject¹¹ of the incarnate experiences, while the flesh is Christ's "impersonal humanity."¹²

It is worth noting that Schleiermacher himself does not categorize Christologies as "Antiochene" or "Alexandrian" in his lectures on church history;¹³ the popularization, if not the invention, of this typology seems to have occurred after Schleiermacher's lifetime.¹⁴ In the following analysis of Schleiermacher's Christology and its parallels to patristic models, I shall nevertheless make use of the Antiochene/Alexandrian typology as a loose shorthand for the christological approaches of Theodore and Nestorius, on the one hand, and Cyril, on the other. By doing so, my purpose is not to overlook the potential problems with these labels. Further, by identifying continuities between Schleiermacher's Christology and those of the early church theologians around the time of Chalcedon, I do not wish to engage in an anachronistic analysis that ignores the real distance that separates the worldviews and concerns of Schleiermacher and his patristic predecessors;¹⁵ nor do I wish to conclude from this investigation that Schleiermacher's Christology is somehow more "orthodox" than generally acknowledged by some of his critics.

¹¹As Cyril writes to Nestorius, "Confessing that the Word was united to flesh substantially, we adore one Son and Lord Jesus Christ. We do not set up a division and distinguish the man and God, nor do we say that they are conjoined to one another by dignity and authority, for this is idle chatter and nothing more." See "The Third Letter of Cyril to Nestorius," in John I. McEnerney, trans., *St. Cyril of Alexandria: Letters 1–50 (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 76; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987) 83.*

¹²In delineations of Antiochene and Alexandrian Christology, it is common to assert, as J. N. D. Kelly does (*Early Christian Doctrines* [rev. ed.; New York: Harper, 1960] 281), that in general, the Antiochenes adhered to a more Aristotelian anthropology, in which a human comprises a body and soul, while the Alexandrians held a Platonic view of a body animated by a soul. Yet many scholars point to Platonic elements in Antiochene thinkers (such as those that Richard Norris has identified in Theodore of Mopsuestia) and Aristotelian elements in Alexandrian thinkers (such as those that John McGuckin has found in Cyril of Alexandria); therefore Platonic/Aristotelian affiliations alone do not suffice to distinguish between the Antiochenes and Alexandrians. Further, while the Word-flesh/Word-man dichotomy is also used to distinguish the Alexandrian and Antiochene views, both terms were sometimes used among both schools, and the dichotomy can therefore be constricting when attempting to understand the nuances of varying positions; see Frances M. Young, *From Nicea to Chalcedon* (London: SCM Press, 1983) 180, 260.

¹³Although Schleiermacher refers to the Alexandrian School in his lectures (*Geschichte der christlichen Kirche* [Berlin: Reimer, 1840] 316–28), he does not use an Alexandrian/Antiochene typology in his treatment of the fifth-century christological controversies, but simply gives an account of the conflict between Cyril and Nestorius. See also the text of Schleiermacher's 1821–1822 lectures drawn from the transcript of Karl Rudolf Hagenbach and printed in Joachim Boekels, *Schleiermacher als Kirchengeschichtler* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); Schleiermacher's treatment of the Nestorian controversy appears on pp. 297–300.

¹⁴I have been unable to determine exactly when the Antiochene/Alexandrian terminology became commonplace in textbooks; in general, it appears to have become commonplace by the end of the nineteenth century.

¹⁵Charles Waldrop has undertaken an investigation of the "Antiochene" and "Alexandrian" aspects of Karl Barth's Christology. He has argued that important Antiochene elements of Barth's doctrine of

Rather, I shall use these classifications and parallels simply as heuristic devices to assist in the identification of broad tendencies in Schleiermacher's Christology. These tendencies demonstrate the extent to which Schleiermacher's Christology 1) stands in continuity with several of the christological emphases that Chalcedon attempted to combine, even though Schleiermacher rejected Chalcedon's particular way of combining them; and 2) represents a doctrinal formulation with striking parallels to Christologies associated with both "Antiochene" and "Alexandrian" approaches. In order to support this claim, I turn now to an analysis of Schleiermacher's doctrine of the person of Christ.

■ Schleiermacher's Christology: An Alternative to the Two-Natures Doctrine

Schleiermacher's doctrine of Christ's person is constructed in conversation with, and in strong opposition to, the two-natures doctrine as it has appeared in various Christian confessions and creedal statements since Chalcedon.¹⁶ Schleiermacher agrees with what he sees as the basic aim of the doctrine: to describe properly Christ's humanity and divinity, so that both 1) the connection between him and all humans and 2) the being of God (*Sein Gottes*) in him may be expressed as clearly as possible (*Gl.* §96.1). His contention is that "there is almost nothing in the [Chalcedonian] execution of this aim against which protest must not be raised, whether we regard the scientific character (*wissenschaftliche Beschaffenheit*) of the expression or its suitability for ecclesiastical use (*kirchliche Brauchbarkeit*)" (*Gl.* §96.1).¹⁷

Christ notwithstanding, its basic character is Alexandrian insofar as Barth believes that Jesus Christ is the Logos, in a way that is both "direct and emphatic." That is, "Barth conceives of Jesus Christ as directly identical with God" (Charles Waldrop, *Karl Barth's Christology: Its Basic Alexandrian Character* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984] 3, 87). While some reviewers of Waldrop's book charged it with anachronism, Hans Boersma rejects these charges, stating that "the fact that there is no direct connection between pre-Chalcedonian Christology and Barth does not preclude the possibility of striking similarities." Instead, however, Boersma argues that Barth has so dramatically changed the relation between the doctrines of Christ's person and work that he has simply moved beyond the concerns of the Antiochene/Alexandrian debate ("Alexandrian or Antiochene? A Dilemma in Barth's Christology," *Westminster Theological Journal* 52 [1990] 264–65). Bruce L. McCormack also classifies Barth's Christology as Alexandrian. See B. McCormack, "Revelation and History in Transfoundationalist Perspective: Karl Barth's Theological Epistemology in Conversation with a Schleiermacherian Tradition," *Journal of Religion* 78 (1998) 18–37, esp. 28.

¹⁶For an illuminating analysis of Schleiermacher's christological construction and its impact on his critical reformulation of the two-natures doctrine, see Markus Schröder, *Die kritische Identität des neuzeitlichen Christentums: Schleiermachers Wesensbestimmung der christlichen Religion* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996) 70–77.

¹⁷Schleiermacher judges all doctrinal statements according to their scientific and ecclesiastical value. The scientific value of a doctrine refers to the clarity and consistency of its formulation (both in itself and in relation to the whole dogmatic system). The ecclesiastical value of a doctrine refers to its suitability as a statement of the Christian religious self-consciousness and its reference to Christ as Redeemer (*Gl.* §17).

Schleiermacher's protests (which number four in total) concerning the "scientific character" of the two-natures doctrine can be reduced to two major objections. First, Schleiermacher objects to the terminology of "two natures in one person." The single term "nature," he argues, ought not to be used for both the divine and the human in Christ. For Schleiermacher it is inappropriate to speak of God as having a "nature," since the term "nature" (in Schleiermacher's view) refers to a limited existence, conditioned and divided and corporeal, subject to the flux of activity and passivity, while God is unconditioned, absolute, pure activity, and beyond time (*Gl.* §96.1). Worse, according to Schleiermacher, the relation between the terms "nature" and "person" in the two-natures doctrine is nonsensical. In general, "nature" is a universal term of which many individuals partake; but in the two-natures doctrine one person has two natures. Similarly, "person" is a term referring to a life-unity, while the person of the Redeemer is assigned a duality of natures, and therefore cannot be a unity.

Schleiermacher's second major objection to the "scientific character" of the doctrine concerns the confusion it creates when brought into relation with the doctrine of the Trinity. First, the term "Jesus Christ" is used as a name for *both* the Redeemer (or, "the subject of the union of the two natures") *and* the second person of the Trinity (or, "the divine nature of the Redeemer from all eternity before its union with the human nature"). Second, the two-natures doctrine speaks of a unity of nature while the doctrine of the Trinity speaks of a unity of essence. Thus, one wonders whether the second person of the Trinity has a divine nature of its own (which is united to the human nature in the Redeemer) in addition to its participation in the divine essence. In Schleiermacher's view, this inconsistency between the language of the doctrines of Christ and the Trinity compromises the clarity of the dogmatic system in general.

The main problem with the two-natures doctrine, however, is its lack of utility for ecclesiastical use. That is, because its formulation is so problematic, "it cannot give any guidance in the proper preaching of Christ" (*Gl.* §96.2). Instead, it has fostered "an involved and artificial mode of procedure" for all further developments of the doctrine (*Gl.* §96.2), and has failed to serve as a guide for understanding properly the relation between the divine and human in Christ. Schleiermacher writes:

Hence all the results of the endeavor to achieve a living presentation of the unity of the divine and human in Christ, ever since it was tied down to this expression, have always vacillated between the opposite errors of mixing the two natures to form a third which would be neither of them, . . . or of keeping the two natures separate, but either neglecting the unity of the person in order to separate the two natures more distinctly, or, in order to keep firm hold of the unity of the person, disturbing the necessary balance, and making one nature less important than the other and limited by it. (*Gl.* §96.1)

A more effective and coherent formulation of the doctrine of Christ would be able to steer the church away from these errors.

To avoid the problems of the two-natures doctrine, Schleiermacher constructs a formula that gives Christ a full human constitution and posits God in him as a “continual living presence” or power in his God-consciousness, and not as an alleged divine property or nature (*Gl.* §96.3). This formula, which Schleiermacher recommends as a modern reformulation of the two-natures doctrine, appears as *Gl.* §94:

The Redeemer, then, is like all [humans] (*Menschen*) in virtue of the identity of his human nature, but is distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him (*ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm*).

Thus, Schleiermacher’s Christ is a human being who shares the same nature with all others and is conditioned by history like all others. What makes him unique is that his God-consciousness is constantly and fully active and powerful, unlike that of all other humans, whose God-consciousnesses are clouded and inhibited. Since God-consciousness itself is part of human nature, one can reasonably say that there is nothing in the constitutional makeup of the Redeemer that cannot be found in all other humans. The Redeemer has what other humans have (a God-consciousness), but in a perfectly ordered and complete way. Since, however, the Redeemer has this perfect God-consciousness, he is a new creation—a “new implanting” (*Einpflanzung*) of the God-consciousness in human nature (*Gl.* §94.3) in a way that is so perfect and steady that it is to be understood as a being of God (*Sein Gottes*) in him. He is, then, the only one “in which there is an existence of God in the proper sense,” so that “he alone mediates all existence of God in the world and all revelation of God through the world” (*Gl.* §94.2). As Schleiermacher develops this christological formulation, several parallels to the “Antiochene” and “Alexandrian” traditions emerge.

■ Schleiermacher’s Christology: “Antiochene” Parallels

Schleiermacher’s Christology resonates with an “Antiochene” orientation in three basic ways. First, like Theodore and Nestorius, Schleiermacher is concerned to protect the full integrity of Jesus’ human identity. Although Schleiermacher asserts and emphasizes clearly that Christ is absolutely ideal—so that no greater form of God-consciousness stands before human nature—he also insists that this ideality be compatible with a genuine historicity, so that Christ’s humanity is neither compromised nor doubted. Schleiermacher argues for this compatibility in the following three ways. First, the very nature of Christ’s ideality has its place within human nature, insofar as human nature has “a self-differentiating quality” that allows for

exceptional individuals to emerge (*Gl.* §94.1).¹⁸ Second, Schleiermacher argues that although according to his ideality Christ was sinless, his full humanness remains, since sinfulness itself is not essential to human nature, but is rather a disturbance (*Störung*) of it (*Gl.* §94.1).

Third, and most importantly, Schleiermacher employs a notion of development to demonstrate the Redeemer's full historicity. Christ's human nature and abilities, he explains, developed like those of all other humans—Christ learned, changed, and was conditioned by history and language. Even his God-consciousness went through a process of development from the germ it was in Christ's infancy to its full expression in adulthood (*Gl.* §93.3). Schleiermacher denies any suggestion that Christ as a child was "conscious of himself as an ego (*als Ich*)" or was "master of language from the first." To grant such a suggestion would be to deny his true human life and adopt "the error of Docetism" (*Gl.* §93.3). Yet Christ's development was sinless (hence guaranteeing his ideality within history) because it was wholly without conflict, the God-consciousness unfolding in a manner that was perfectly parallel and appropriate to the maturity level of his sensuous nature and self-consciousness, so that no confusion or resistance occurred between them (*Gl.* §93.4).

In saying that Christ was essentially sinless, however, Schleiermacher does not wish to imply that Christ feigned experiences of temptation or conflict, as Cyril was accused of arguing.¹⁹ Whatever Christ's sinlessness consists in, it cannot be conceived so as to take away any one part of "all that must belong to Him in virtue of His likeness to us" (*Gl.* §98.1). As a human being, then, Christ must have been susceptible to the possibility of the contrast between pleasure and pain (from which sinfulness emerges in all other humans, according to Schleiermacher). In Christ, however, pleasure and pain were experienced as symptoms of a state that had no "determinative or co-determinative power" over him. That is, Christ actualized no sinful response to temptation; all of his impulses and actions were pure (*Gl.* §98.1). Moreover, the innermost part of Christ never experienced conflict of any kind.

While this is perhaps hardly a "fully human" encounter with temptation,²⁰ I nevertheless think it is fair to say that Schleiermacher is working hard—both on this

¹⁸By this statement Schleiermacher intends to show that the idea of an exemplary and ideal individual does not stand in logical contradiction to the possibilities of human nature. He does not, in other words, wish to imply here that humanity somehow *produced* the Redeemer.

¹⁹McGuckin has disputed this accusation against the Alexandrians, arguing that when Cyril said the Logos only "seemed to" pray, he actually meant that the Logos "did in fact" pray. According to McGuckin (*St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 218) Cyril uses the language of "seeming to" in order to emphasize that these experiences "do not tell the whole story" of the incarnation, but instead focus only "on the limitations of the human economy." While the Word takes on the limits of human life, it does so "as an act of power that did not negate his unlimited condition as God."

²⁰Welch argues that Schleiermacher denied to Jesus the possibility of temptation and error. See Welch, "Schleiermacher's Theological Program," in *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) 84.

specific point and in general—to underscore the Redeemer’s basic and full human identity: Christ was a historical and historicized individual person who developed (even in his God-consciousness), encountered the possibility of temptation (and did not merely feign it), and was subject to the limitations of his historical context in a number of important ways.

These affirmations concerning Christ’s humanity parallel many that were central to “Antiochene” Christology. For both Theodore and Nestorius, the “one assumed” was a complete, perfect human. Theodore’s notion, for example, that God dwells in humans by good pleasure “which he exercises when he is pleased with those who are zealous to be dedicated to him” presumes that the human in Christ was a human being, and not impersonal flesh.²¹ Moreover, Theodore articulates an elaborate vision of Christ’s development, claiming that while, in one sense, the divine was fully united to and perfected in the “assumed man” at every moment of his life (and that therefore his development was without conflict or struggle), nevertheless “as a man, he grew to perfection, fulfilling righteousness at every stage of life in the manner appropriate to that stage.”²² Theodore writes, “He increased in age, to be sure, because time moved on, and in wisdom because he acquired understanding to match his advancing years.”²³

A second parallel between Schleiermacher’s Christology and an “Antiochene” one can be observed in the use of indwelling language for the way the divine is said to be present in the Redeemer.²⁴ This language is, in large part, a by-product of Schleiermacher’s conception of God as pure activity. God’s being, for Schleiermacher, cannot be mixed with passivity, or indeed with any of the limits of the human and natural world (*Gl.* §40). This means that God cannot exist in any human being, insofar as each is composed of activity and passivity. God exists in the Redeemer—a human being—only because “the God-consciousness in His self-consciousness . . . continually and exclusively determine[s] every moment.” It is constantly active and absolutely pure. Schleiermacher therefore refers to this

²¹*On the Incarnation*, book 5, frag. 2, in Norris, *The Christological Controversies*, 115.

²²Richard A. Norris, Jr., *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) 225.

²³*On the Incarnation*, book 7, frag. 7, in Norris, *The Christological Controversy*, 119.

²⁴Such “indwelling” language is sometimes also used by Cyril, but usually in order to make a point against his opponents. In his third letter to Nestorius, for example, Cyril writes, “we do not think that, being made flesh, the Word is said to dwell in him just as in those who are holy, and we do not define the indwelling in him to be the same. But united [naturally], and not changed into flesh, the Word produced an indwelling such as the soul of man might be said to have in its own body.” Later in the same letter, in his eleventh anathema, Cyril argues against the suggestion that the relation between the flesh and the Word of God is “only a divine indwelling.” See “The Third Letter of Cyril to Nestorius,” in McEnerney, *St. Cyril of Alexandria: Letters 1–50*, 84, 92.

as a “perfect indwelling (*Einwohnung*) of the Supreme Being” in Christ “as His peculiar being and His inmost self” (*Gl.* §94.2).²⁵

Finally, a third parallel appears in the way that Schleiermacher, like the “Antiochenes,” takes great pains to protect the immutability and impassibility of the divine in Christ. This is evident, first, in his tendency to exempt the “inner” (or divine) life principle of the Redeemer from the changes, limitations, and determinations experienced by his “outer” (or human) half. When considering, for example, whether “*Volkstümlichkeit*”²⁶ (or cultural identity) ought to be attributed to Christ, Schleiermacher notes that “Christ could hardly be a complete man if His personality were not determined by this factor.” To protect the divine from determination by a finite quality or designation, however, Schleiermacher adds, “but such determination in no way concerns the real principle of His life but only the organism” (*Gl.* §93.4).²⁷

Schleiermacher also demonstrates his strict adherence to divine unchangeability by his rejection of all language and concepts that in any way suggest divine passibility. While the “Alexandrians” clearly subscribed to a doctrine of divine impassibility and immutability, they nevertheless delighted in the paradoxes that the language of incarnation could supply²⁸—such statements as the Word “suffered impassibly,” as Cyril wrote, or “God wept.”²⁹ For Schleiermacher, however, Cyril’s paradoxical language about the Word suffering death was “against the universal (*allgemein*) voice of the church.”³⁰ Along with Theodore and Nestorius,

²⁵Similarly, in §99.1 Schleiermacher attributes Christ’s redemptive efficacy to the fact that “a being of God indwells Him.”

²⁶Mackintosh and Stewart translate *Volkstümlichkeit* as “racial peculiarity.” It seems more appropriate to render it as “cultural identity,” “ethnic identity,” or “people’s identity.”

²⁷Of course, by “cultural identity” Schleiermacher is referring to Jesus’ Jewishness. Given Schleiermacher’s lamentable treatment of Judaism in both the introduction to *Gl.* and in the speeches on religion, one must wonder whether Schleiermacher hints at an unspoken agenda in making this claim.

²⁸As Young says, like the Antiochenes and against Arius, the Alexandrians asserted the unchangeability of the Logos; but since for the Alexandrians the Logos was the subject of incarnate experiences, “it would not do to separate the Logos from the experiences of his humanity” as the Antiochenes did—hence the paradoxical language of the Alexandrians. See Young, “A Reconsideration,” 105.

²⁹Cyril states, “We maintain that because of the intimacy he had with his own flesh, he even suffered its infirmities; though he retained the impassibility of his own nature, in so far as he was not only man but the selfsame was also God by nature. And so far as the body was his very own, so too were the natural and innocent passions of the body, as well as those sufferings inflicted on him by the arrogance of others. He suffered impassibly, because he did not humble himself in such a way as to be merely like us, rather, as I have said before, he reserved to his own nature its superiority over all these things.” See Marius Mercator, trans., *Scholia on the Incarnation of the Only Begotten*, in McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 294–335. This passage is from section 35 (pp. 332–33). See also Cyril’s third letter to Nestorius in McEnerney, *St. Cyril of Alexandria: Letters 1–50*.

³⁰*Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, 319.

he consistently rejects a kenotic Christology in which Christ's "descent to earth" is described as a "state of humiliation." He writes: "But to the absolutely highest and eternal—which necessarily remains always self-identical—no humiliation can possibly be attributed" (*Gl.* §105, postscript). Further, Schleiermacher avoids any suggestion that the Redeemer *is* essentially the second person of the Trinity "come down from heaven." This language, he argues, is improper to the nature of both human and trinitarian "persons."³¹ Moreover, such a notion "presupposes a higher being which existed previously," whereas "the Person of Christ began only when He became a man" (*Gl.* §105, postscript). Although "the Word was made flesh" was among Schleiermacher's favorite scriptural passages, then, he did not celebrate or interpret it in quite the same way as Cyril did;³² nor did he wish for it to mean that the Redeemer is the Logos.³³

Theodore, too, was wary of the statement "the Word was made flesh" because it suggests changeability in God's nature. He therefore continually emphasized that God does not "become" or "turn into" a man, as Norris points out.³⁴ As Theodore writes:

It is plain to everyone that what indwells is different from what is indwelt. . . . For "he dwelt among us," assuming and indwelling our nature, and working in it everything pertaining to our salvation. How, then, did God the Word become flesh by indwelling? Obviously not because he was changed or altered; otherwise there would have been no mention of indwelling.³⁵

³¹Schleiermacher makes this same point in his lectures on church history, noting that Cyril's insistence that "the one who does not confess that the logos is at once God and human, is anathema" was "a mere argument over words" (*ein bloßer Wortstreit*). Schleiermacher goes on to make a statement quite similar to that made in *Gl.* §96.1. He writes, "Concerning the term 'Son of God' there was no consensus whether it should refer to the divine nature alone or also to the human nature. But 'Logos' had always been understood to refer only to the second person of the Trinity." See *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, 318 (my translations).

³²Cyril, for example, explains that "it was the Word, therefore, who is in the form of God the Father and equal to him, who humbled himself, and then became flesh, as John says, born through a woman, yet also having a birth from God the Father, who undertook to endure our condition for our sake." See "Cyril's Letter to the Monks of Egypt," 15, in McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 253.

³³Catherine L. Kelsey has suggested that when Schleiermacher references John 1:14 in his sermons, he almost always emphasizes the second half of the verse ("and dwelt among us") and not the first ("The Word was made flesh"). See "Overlapping and Coordinate: The Interpretation of Jesus Christ in Schleiermacher's Preaching, Dogmatics, and Biblical Criticism" (Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 1998) 70–71 and 146–50.

³⁴Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 217.

³⁵*On the Incarnation*, book 9, frag. 9, in Norris, *The Christological Controversy*, 121. Theodore states something similar in his commentary on the Gospel of John, clarifying the meaning of "the Word was made flesh": "he was made flesh in so far as he dwelt in our nature. . . . When [John] meant (*The Word*) *came to be in a man*, he said: *became flesh*. But he does not say *became* as though (the Word) was altered." Quoted in Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 217.

Nestorius shared these sentiments, avoiding and attacking all formulations that pushed the boundaries of what properly could be attributed to the divine (and also to the human) in Christ. In numerous sections of his *Bazaar of Heracleides*, he refutes any notion of either of the natures changing into the other.³⁶ He insisted that “the Son of David is not the divine Logos,”³⁷ and that therefore the birth, sufferings, and death of Christ are not those of God, but rather of the “assumed man.” Thus, they ought not be attributed to God or the Logos, even in the manner of the *communicatio idiomatum*: “To attribute also to him, in the name of this association, the characteristics of the flesh that has been conjoined with him—I mean birth and suffering and death—is, my brother, either the work of a mind which truly errs in the fashion of the Greeks or that of a mind diseased with the insane heresy of Arius and Apollinarus and the others.”³⁸ Schleiermacher shares this rejection of the mutual communication of attributes. In line with his (and the “Antiochene”) interest to protect the proper “natures” of both the divine and human, Schleiermacher argues that such a communication on the part of one “nature” would cancel out the presence and strict particularity of the other (*Gl.* §97.5).

■ Schleiermacher’s Christology: “Alexandrian” Parallels

So far my presentation of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of the person of Christ has emphasized its similarities to an “Antiochene” christological model. The differences, however, are also significant. First, in the “Antiochene” notion of salvation, Christ’s human nature, aided by the Logos, achieves a moral victory because of its free and rigorous fulfillment of God’s law. As Theodore writes:

He had an inclination beyond the ordinary toward nobler things because of his union with God the Logos. . . . On the one hand, he held fast to this way by his own will, while on the other hand this purpose was faithfully guarded in him by the cooperating work of God the Logos. And he progressed with the greatest ease toward a consummate virtue, whether in keeping the Law before his baptism or in following the citizenship in grace after his baptism.³⁹

The possibility of this moral achievement is attributed to the presence of the divine in him, but it is important to Theodore and Nestorius that the human play at least some role in this moral struggle.⁴⁰ Schleiermacher, however, has a rather strong distaste for the “moral exemplar” paradigm of Christology (*Gl.* §93.2).

³⁶See G. R. Driver and Leonard Hodgson, trans., *The Bazaar of Heracleides* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925) 17, 25.

³⁷“Nestorius’s Second Letter to Cyril,” in Norris, *The Christological Controversy*, 138.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 139.

³⁹*On the Incarnation*, book 7, frag. 4, in Norris, *The Christological Controversy*, 118.

⁴⁰Nestorius, in particular, brings out this theme of Christ’s human nature winning a moral struggle against the devil. See “Nestorius’s First Sermon Against the *Theotokos*,” in Norris, *The Christological Controversy*, 123–35.

Second, although Schleiermacher shares Theodore and Nestorius's concern to protect the full integrity of Jesus' human identity, he does not acknowledge a human subject distinct from the divine one in the Redeemer.⁴¹ In fact, the fully active God-consciousness is the central and innermost power in the Redeemer—and this is the *divine* in him. With this observation it becomes clear that Schleiermacher's Christology has strong "Alexandrian" parallels. Here I shall identify three.

First, Schleiermacher shares with the "Alexandrians" a single-subject Christology—his Redeemer does not have two separable natures, each with its own subjectivity and individuality. Instead, he stands in basic agreement with Cyril, that "the one Lord Jesus Christ must not be divided up, as if there was a distinct man and a distinct deity."⁴² Thus, in *Gl.* §97 Schleiermacher proposes to reject the assertion that "propositions about Christ, to be correct, must be differently constructed according as we are speaking of the whole Person of Christ, or only of one of the two natures" (*Gl.* §97.4). This, too, was Cyril's position: "We do not allocate the statements of our Savior in the Gospels either to two *hupostaseis* or indeed even to two persons."⁴³ Instead, Cyril emphasizes and develops a conception of the unity of Christ according to which all activity is attributed to the economy of the incarnation, so that all activity is done by the one divine Logos-made-flesh.⁴⁴ Schleiermacher, too, crafts a unified picture of Christ, and often describes what seems to be a penetration of the divine and human capacities, so that "no action proceeded solely from the sense-nature and not from the God-consciousness" (*Gl.* §93.4).

For Cyril, however, this single subject in Christ is the Logos. He writes, "One and the same is called Son: before the incarnation while he is without flesh he is the Word, and after the incarnation he is the self-same in the body."⁴⁵ Indeed, the defining feature of "Alexandrian" Christology is its insistence that the Logos is the single subject of incarnate experiences. Although Schleiermacher will make no such claim about the Redeemer being the Logos (and indeed rejects it), he nevertheless shares the basic view that the divine element in Christ is his "personality" (in Schleiermacher's words) and the animating principle and source of all his activity. This, then, is the second parallel to Cyril's christological model: Schleiermacher, like Cyril but in a wholly different way, places the divine at the center of Christ's identity. As Schleiermacher writes in *Gl.* §94.2, the Redeemer is the only one in

⁴¹See *Gl.* §97.2. Although Schleiermacher regrets the traditional description of Christ's human nature remaining "impersonal" before and apart from its union with the divine, he notes that this terminology was constructed (and rightly, he implies) to correct those who "assumed a personality for Christ's human nature apart from the union."

⁴²Cyril of Alexandria, *Scholia on the Incarnation*, 13, in McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 271.

⁴³"Third Letter of Cyril to Nestorius," in McEnerney, *St. Cyril of Alexandria: Letters 1–50*, 87.

⁴⁴See McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 200, 219.

⁴⁵"Explanation of the Twelve Chapters," in *ibid.*, 285.

whom there is a being (*Sein*) of God precisely because the God-consciousness in him “continually and exclusively determin[es] every moment” and because “this perfect indwelling of the Supreme Being” is the Redeemer’s “peculiar being and inmost self.” Consequently—and this is the third parallel to an “Alexandrian” type of Christology—Christ’s human nature is afforded only a passive role in relation to the divine personality and its activity.

These second and third parallels to Cyril’s christological model are well illustrated in Schleiermacher’s discussion of *Gl.* §97, which articulates the theorem concerning the “act” by which the two natures were united and the “state” during which they were in union:

In the uniting of the divine nature with the human, the divine alone was active and self-imparting (*tätig oder sich mitteilend*), and the human alone passive or in the process of being assumed (*leidend oder aufgenommen werdend*); but during the state of union every activity was a common activity of both natures. (*Gl.* §97)

Schleiermacher’s principle for interpreting this theorem is to assign a role to both natures in both the act and the state of union. But the cooperation of the divine and human is to be configured so that the divine is always the exclusive source of activity, efficacy, and originality in Christ, while the human is the source of everything passive and organic in him.

If the act of union, for example, must be considered a common activity of both natures, Schleiermacher adds that “the human nature certainly cannot have been active in being assumed by the divine.” Rather, he continues, “only the possibility was innate in it . . . of being assumed into such a union with the divine, but this possibility is far from being either capacity or activity” (*Gl.* §97.2). Accordingly, the “origin of the specific personality of Christ”—which Schleiermacher paraphrases as “the implanting (*Hineinpflanzung*) of the divine in the human nature”—is an act of the divine, while the human nature plays only a passive and receptive role. This ensures that the divine is the source of everything unique and salvific in Christ. At the same time, however, the human nature is granted an active role (or, at least what Schleiermacher describes as a “not altogether passive” one) in the origin of the human organism, which is also part of the formation of Christ as a human person. This ensures, for Schleiermacher, the full humanness of Christ, as well as some kind of participation of the human nature in the act of union (*Gl.* §97.2).

Similarly, concerning the state of union, Schleiermacher reserves a role for both natures, but again permits “no preponderance on the side of human nature” (*Gl.* §97.3). Instead, “every moment [is] such that the activity proceeds from the being of God in Christ, and the human nature is only taken up into association with it” (*Gl.* §97.3). Even the passive (human) condition which enabled the Redeemer to feel sympathy for others is not “moved for and through itself,” but is

rather activated only when assumed into the activity of divine love. Thus, in this connection between the human and divine during the state of union, “every original activity belongs solely to the divine, and everything passive solely to the human” (*Gl.* §97.3). Further, those passive (human) states that emerged not as a result of a spiritual impulse, but rather from “the natural connection of the human organism with external nature” are not to be included as part of Christ’s “personal nature,” since by definition the personal nature emerges only when what is human is “taken up into union with the divine” (*Gl.* §97.3).

Thus, Schleiermacher’s description of the relation between the divine and human in Christ calls to mind an “Alexandrian” model in which the Word, or the divine, is the primary subject or animating principle of Christ, whose flesh or body is the impersonal mass of human characteristics (which may or may not include a mind and soul) taken up by the divine:

the existence of God in the Redeemer is posited as the innermost fundamental power (*innerste Grundkraft*) within Him, from which every activity proceeds and which holds every element together; everything human (in Him) forms only the organism (*Organismus*) for this fundamental power, and is related to it as the system which both receives and represents it, just as in us all other powers are related to the intelligence (*Intelligenz*). (*Gl.* §96.3)

Although Schleiermacher refers to no Logos who is (ontologically) present as the Redeemer, he nevertheless presents the divine in Christ as the center of his being, while the human nature appears to be less a human individual and more an impersonal body.

Cyril’s emphasis on the Logos as the single subject of incarnate experiences includes within it the claim that all the incarnate acts are those of the Logos, and not (also) of some independent human subject. McGuckin describes Cyril’s view in the following way:

The human nature is . . . not conceived as an independently acting dynamic (a distinct human person who self-activates) but as the manner of action of an independent and omnipotent power—that of the Logos; and to the Logos alone can be attributed the authorship of, and responsibility for, all its actions.⁴⁶

Although the humanness of Christ is present and involved in all of his actions, it is always nevertheless the Logos—the subject—at work in everything, with the human nature playing, according to Frances Young, “a purely passive role.”⁴⁷ Thus, while Schleiermacher’s distance from an “Alexandrian” Christology of the fifth

⁴⁶Ibid., 186.

⁴⁷Young, “A Reconsideration,” 113.

century is clear, there remains nevertheless a significant parallel in emphasis between the two.

■ The Identity of Christ

So far this analysis has shown that Schleiermacher's attack on Chalcedon does not signal his rejection of many of the christological emphases that were central to either the "Antiochene" or "Alexandrian" schools. Rather, Schleiermacher's Christology continues the "Antiochene" tradition of protecting the absolute integrity of Jesus' human identity while at the same time maintaining a more "Alexandrian" emphasis on a single (divine) subject that is the source of all Christ's redemptive activities. Thus, Schleiermacher's christological model brings together what he might have regarded as the strengths of the various Christologies that informed the Chalcedonian construction, while at the same time avoiding their excesses. That is, Schleiermacher affirms a single-subject Christology that gives a prominent and primary role to the divine without thereby compromising the full integrity of the Redeemer's human nature and human identity.⁴⁸

At the same time, this combination makes for some confusion about the identity of Christ. On the one hand, as I have shown, for Schleiermacher the Redeemer has a divine personality—the divine in him is his innermost self and serves as the life principle of his humanity. Therefore, this innermost part of the Redeemer is excluded from any involvement with conflict, historical particularity or peculiarity, or passivity. Moreover, in relation to this divine personality, the humanity of Christ is often described as "impersonal" apart from its relation to the divine. Here Schleiermacher implies that the "identity" of the Redeemer is first and foremost divine.

On the other hand, Schleiermacher fears that this presentation of a divine personality in Christ will threaten Christ's full humanity. He therefore makes several attempts to show that the Redeemer can still be human even though his personality is divine. First, he attributes to the Redeemer a process of development. Second, he places the Redeemer in the context of the language and traditions of his own day. Third, he emphasizes the indispensability of the passive human functions in Christ that contribute to both the act and state of union. Finally, Schleiermacher tries as much as possible to locate the Redeemer's origin and development in the context of a natural life process:

⁴⁸I would like to thank the reviewer of this article for making the important observation that a close study of Schleiermacher's view of human nature may shed light on how Schleiermacher's Christology can sustain this unusual combination of the divine and human in the person of the Redeemer. As my reviewer noted, engagement with Schleiermacher's philosophical works such as the *Dialektik* and the *Psychologie* could supplement my work here by exploring exactly how Schleiermacher construes his philosophical anthropology, especially with respect to the ways human beings understand and relate to the divine.

It is not a special nature which comes into being in this way, one which could and must be distinguished from other human existence; what comes into existence through the being of God in Christ is all perfectly human, and in its totality constitutes a unity, the unity of a natural life-story, in which everything that emerges is purely human, and one thing can be deduced from another, since every moment presupposes those which have gone before, yet in which everything can be completely understood only upon the presupposition of that union through which alone this person could come into being, so that every moment also reveals the divine in Christ as that which conditions it. (*Gl.* §97.3)

Here Schleiermacher argues that the divine element in the Redeemer does not compromise his basic identity as a human being, but rather is integrated into it as a natural component.⁴⁹

This tension concerning the relative status of the divine and human in Christ (and therefore concerning the final point of the Redeemer's identity as either divine or as a concurrence of the human and divine) tends to threaten the coherence of Schleiermacher's doctrine of the person of Christ. In some passages, the divine personality of Christ is the center of who he is, and the human nature, described as an organism, is only taken up in relation to this divine principle. In other parts of the text, the Redeemer's human nature is shown to be much more intimately at the center of his identity; although it is still always passive in relation to the divine personality, it is nonetheless "vitally passive," as Schleiermacher would say.

Ironically, a similar tension was left unresolved in the Chalcedonian definition, that is, whether the final point of identity in Christ is to be assigned to the Logos alone or to the hypostasis that is the concurrence of the two natures.⁵⁰ Although Schleiermacher would object to this language, his Christology leaves a very similar basic question unanswered: whether Christ's distinctive identity and work are to be located either in his divine personality alone, or in the concurrence of this personality and the human nature to which it is related.

⁴⁹Richard R. Niebuhr's observation that Schleiermacher construes Christ as "the heavenly, or life-giving, spiritual man" provides a helpful way of thinking about his christological model. See *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) 157.

⁵⁰Anthony Baxter offers an analysis of the ambiguities that are written into the Chalcedonian definition, including the issue of whether the subject in Christ is the preexistent Logos or that which emerges out of the actual concurrence of the divine and human. Baxter argues that the ambiguity left in place at Chalcedon leaves open a number of interesting christological options. See "Chalcedon and the Subject in Christ," *Downside Review* 107 (1989) 1–21. Thus, by combining "Antiochene" and "Alexandrian" emphases in his own reformulation of the doctrine of Christ, Schleiermacher is exploiting an ambiguity in Chalcedonian Christology that was later denied by the Second Council of Constantinople, which made the Alexandrian position the authoritative one. Special thanks to Professor Sarah Coakley for this observation.

■ Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has shown that Schleiermacher, while criticizing Chalcedon for its supposed inconsistencies, nevertheless forges a Christology that has strong “Antiochene” and “Alexandrian” elements within it. Theodore and Nestorius’s emphasis on the full integrity of the Redeemer’s human identity is combined with a Cyriline view of Christ’s “life principle” and salvific activity as centered in the Logos. Thus, I conclude with two observations about Schleiermacher’s Christology. First, one might say that Schleiermacher is working with a “high” soteriological orientation and relating it in a new way to a strongly historicized and naturalized view of Christ’s human nature. It is possible to say something similar about Schleiermacher’s whole theological program in *Der christliche Glaube*. Second, this analysis underscores the extent to which Schleiermacher’s Christology is in conversation with the Christologies of the early church—much more so than his critique of Chalcedon would suggest. Such an insight neither neglects nor bemoans the thoroughly modern aspects of Schleiermacher’s Christology, but rather shows once again that Schleiermacher turned creatively to the resources of Christianity’s present and past as he went about the task of dogmatics.