



Qeioths: Qeoths, Rom. i. 20; Col. ii. 9

H. S. Nash

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Θειότης — Θεότης, Rom. i. 20; Col. ii. 9.

PROF. H. S. NASH.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

THE distinction between the terms, in one form or another, constitutes part of the common stock of the modern interpretation of the New Testament. For six centuries it has been an exegetical tradition. Those who have disputed its validity have been in number extremely insignificant and in weight hardly worth regard. So firmly seated in the minds of commentators and lexicologists is the distinction that it looks like a waste of time, if not like a wanton search after an excuse for falling out with stable opinion, to attack it. Yet I believe the distinction to be unreal, and while I do not presume to think that I can unseat it, I hope to throw a strong doubt upon its right to its place.

The distinction is variously expressed. Thus Beza: *θειότης* = divinitas, which = attribute; *θεότης* = deitas, which = ipsa natura. Bengel: *θειότης* = divinae virtutes; *θεότης* = ipsa divina natura. Fritzsche: *θεότης* = Gottheit, which = status ejus, qui sit Deus; *θειότης* = Göttlichkeit, which = conditio ejus qui sit *θεός*, *i.e.* divina majestas. Meyer-Weiss: *θειότης* the totality of the divine qualities; *θεότης* the divine being. Sanday: *θειότης* = the divine nature and properties; *θεότης* = the Divine Personality. Grimm-Thayer: *θεότης* differs from *θειότης* as essence differs from quality or attribute. Cremer: *θεότης* = das, was Gott ist; *θειότης* = das, was Gottes ist. Trench: *θειότης* "is not the personal God whom any man may learn to know from nature; as Person He can be known only by the revelation of Himself in His Son: it is only His divine attributes, His majesty, and glory that can be known from nature."

These statements are differently turned. The substance is common, being that distinction between God's essence and His attributes, which is part and parcel of the long-established distinction between natural and revealed religion, — *i.e.* between that knowledge of God which comes into consciousness through general contact with the universe

and that deeper knowledge of Him which cannot enter consciousness except through saving communion with Christ.

In the examination of the grounds for the established interpretation, I shall first take up the contextual bearings of the exegesis, afterwards its lexical and historical supports. In fairness to the traditional view, the two classes of evidence should be separated. It is a plain rule in the study of synonyms, that a given pair of synonyms must needs hold more or less ground in common. The nature of thought entails this result. Hence we must be prepared for exceptions to every rule, and in certain cases, exceptions are so numerous that the teacher has to say to the beginner: First learn the special rule in synonyms, and then be exceedingly careful about applying it. Still, the rule may be a sound one, holding its ground in the face of an objection raised against it by a special context. Fairness to the traditional interpretation requires that we should keep the contextual point of view apart from the lexical and historical point of view.

As we enter the context of Rom. 1²⁰, a general consideration comes to meet us. The base of Paul's thought is thoroughly prophetic. Hellenism colored his mind here and there, but not to any great depth. His mind acts, on the whole, along prophetic lines. Now the bent of prophetic thought does not favor the interpretation. Schelling said that there was no supernatural in Homer. The saying, inverted, might fairly be applied to prophetic thought, whether in the Old Testament or the New. It knows little or nothing of nature, in our sense of the term nature. All is supernatural. Nature is plastic under the divine hand, and is being constantly shaped to His saving purpose touching His people. The hills leap for joy, because they see salvation coming to Israel, and the trees of the forest clap their hands. The heavens are in deep and eager sympathy with the experience of the redeemed; for, as the Judgment Day dawns, the sun and the moon are turned into blood, and the stars fall like fruit from a roughly shaken tree. For prophetic feeling there is no natural and no supernatural in the later sense of the words.

Least of all is there any distinction between God's being and His will. Holy will is the very essence of God. What God is may be seen in what God does. Hence one of the assertions that goes along with the traditional interpretation is plainly out of keeping with the Old Testament to which it appeals. Thus Trench: "It is not to be doubted that St. Paul uses this vague, more abstract, and less personal word (*θειώτης*) just because he would affirm that men may know God's

power and majesty . . . from His works ; but would not imply that they may know Himself from these." To the same point Rogge (quoted by Sanday), who gives to *θεϊότης* the meaning of *δόξα*. The Old Testament does not separate God's being from His splendor. It is true that He is sometimes represented as standing somewhat aloof from the minor manifestations of His glory, they being a sort of surrogate or middleman between the divine purity and an impure world. But taking the doctrine of the divine *δόξα* as a whole, it gives us no hint of any separation between the divine being and the divine splendor. There is indeed a distinction. But in moments of impassioned feeling, as in the nature lyrics of the Psalm Book and the vision of the last days in the Prophets, the divine being is in the divine splendor. Nature and history, regarded as a spiritual total, are the one and sole medium through which God manifests Himself. His being and His will are one.

An objection readily occurs. Paul was several centuries distant from the latest of the prophets. Between him and them lay a broad period of reflection. Granted that Hellenism did not go deep into him. That does not meet the point. Periods of reflection have certain qualities in common. It matters not whether we call the reflection Alexandrian or Palestinian. Prophetism answers to that period in the life of the individual when action is all in all, and when the rich red blood of perception and sensation surcharge the most abstract ideas with color. But Jewish scholasticism answers to that period of the individual's life when memory and reflection fill a larger place than action, and when the man's being far overlaps his will ; so that the central idea of consciousness rises above, even draws aloof from the body of the man's deeds. So with Jewish scholasticism whether Palestinian or Alexandrian. The Supreme Idea, the idea of God, drew more or less apart from the body of divine energy and deeds called Nature and History. Hence, while agreeing that Paul's thought was deeply prophetic, must we not allow for differences of prophetic quality due to differences of conditions? Paul was indeed a prophet. But the rabbi was inside the prophet.

The objection is valid when we are dealing with Paul's system as a whole, but does not touch the point in hand. Jewish reflection caused a gap to open between God and the world, so that the divine being did not seem to enter so completely into the divine will as the prophet had thought. But this fact does not help the traditional interpretation. For, when the idea of God drew apart from the idea of the world, and when the *Logos* doctrine, both in its secondary or

Palestinian and its primary or Alexandrian form, gained ground, it did not move toward a distinction between two kinds of knowledge about God, one within reach of reason and another attainable only through revelation.

It will serve our purpose to examine Philo. Everybody knows that the logic of history made him representative to a rare degree. In his philosophy of religion, in his fusion of Philosophy with Positive Religion, in his principles of interpretation, he embodied or foreboded the world's deepest tendencies. The main lines of his system are so well known that I do not need to do more than call to mind four points.

(1) The relation between the two great terms **NOMOS** and **KOSMOS**. Under the first goes all that we put into "revelation"; under the second, all that we put into "reason." Philo does not dream of the distinction between "natural" and "revealed" religion. The true content of "reason" is identical with the content of "revelation." The self-same Logos speaks through the Cosmos of the Greeks and the Nomos of Israel.

(2) The being of God is unknowable. What men may know about God is given to us in the Logos. The action of the Logos takes in the realm of "reason" no less than the realm of "revelation." What God, as to His essence, is, man cannot know either by "reason" or "revelation." God is above all experience, all thought. He puts Moses—in whom spiritual humanity is embodied—in a cleft of the rock, that he may see God's "backside" as He passes by, for man cannot see God's face. Not as God is in His essence, only as the Logos makes Him known, may man know God. This knowledge, however, is all of one piece. There are not two kinds of knowledge about God, one reached through "reason," the other shut up to "revelation."

(3) Philo's theory of knowledge culminates in out-and-out mysticism. The ripest experience of man is an ecstatic swoon, whereby man passes into complete unity with God. In this swoon the redeemed man transcends positive religion no less than reason. The final question for Philo does not deal with God's two ways of making Himself known to the mass of men in this world; for God cannot make Himself known as He is. It rather concerns the way in which the elect man, transcending at the same time all forms of positive religion and all forms of philosophic thought, swoons out of this world altogether.

(4) The cardinal sin is idolatry. Philo does not think of bound-

ing and limiting the amount of knowledge about God that may enter consciousness through contact with the universe. His one thought, on the practical side of things, is the sin that misreads the meaning of the universe. He does not talk about the limited speech of the cosmos, but about human incapacity to take in the large utterance of the cosmos. The Greek in him utters the master-word Universe. The Jew in him utters the master-word Nomos or Revelation, and then goes on to boast that Revelation alone clearly interprets the Universe, — suggesting by the way that the wisdom of Plato was borrowed from Moses.

Philo, then, has no occasion for the traditional distinction between *θεϊότης* and *θεότης*. I have twice gone through his works in search of the words, and have found only *θεϊότης*, and that but once (*De mundi op.*, c. 61).¹ The absence of the terms does not by itself imply the absence of a thought that, more fully developed after his days, might have needed the terms in order to clearly express itself. But he has no occasion for the distinction. His thought does not run that way. Too often, in the study of New Testament synonyms, has it been forgotten that language is the autobiography of thought. As a result, no small part of our supposed knowledge about synonyms is fragmentary and unsafe. It is not safe to take up any position, either positive or negative, regarding the meaning and relation of great terms, until we have acquired clear ideas concerning the movement of thought that created the terms. And it cannot be too emphatically said that the movement of the reflective thought of Judaism was not in the direction of that distinction between "Natural" and "Revealed" religion which underpins the traditional interpretation.

We may therefore return to the general consideration that met us as we entered the context of Rom. 1²⁰, and give it full weight. If the study of reflective Judaism throws any light at all upon the subject, it is surely to the effect that the rabbi in St. Paul was not at all likely to distinguish between the Being or Personality or Nature of God on the one side, and His attributes or majesty or glory on the other. And if the scholar in Paul did not travel that way, certainly the prophet in him, the creative Christian element, did not. The Messianic Idea, with Philo a devout reminiscence, was with Paul a passion. His eager faith in the parousia gave him a consuming interest in eschatology. His theology kept close to his needs as a missionary and debater. His own great power of will, his impetuous

¹ The variant *θεϊότητος* (in one of the best MSS.) is adopted by Cohn, and seems to be suitable in the context.

delight in action, would surely carry him toward the ground taken by the prophets, where the divine being and the divine will are fused. The coloring of the conception of Nature (*ἡ κτίσις*) in Rom. 8¹⁸⁻²³ is deeply prophetic. In view of all we know about his temperament, training, and tendencies, it were exegetically safer, in dealing with the long-vexed phrase *τὸ γνωστόν* (Rom. 1¹⁹), to resign ourselves to ignorance, rather than to run the risk of reading into the text that clear distinction between "Natural" and "Revealed" religion which is peculiar to the thought of the occident in and after the thirteenth century. Whatever Paul's thought may have been, we must not do violence to history and make ourselves guilty of logical anachronism. Better to suppose either that the Apostle's own thought was vague or that we cannot know clearly what he thought.

If the Apostle had any philosophy of religion, in all probability it was substantially one with that entertained by all the serious men of his own and of the succeeding centuries, namely, the theory of a primitive monotheism, from whose heights mankind fell into idolatry. The whole emphasis in the context of Rom. 1²⁰ is practical, being thrown upon idolatry and its consequences. Idolatry is the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, from which all falsehood flows. It is the essence of unreality, the denial of the reality of God as revealed through the universe. The heathen, parading their wisdom, have made fools of themselves,—committing the supreme folly of exchanging the invisible for the visible, the Creator for His creatures. And God had revealed Himself to them through Nature so plainly, in His character of the only God and the good God, that they are utterly without excuse. We must remember that it is a Jew who is speaking, a Jew fresh from the heated debate with polytheism which had now been going on for nearly a thousand years. Christians, standing on the ground won and made good by the Jews, when they put on their theological thinking caps, turn to the Trinity or the Incarnation. But to the Jew in Paul, debating with the heathen, the unity of God was all in all. Clearly recognized and appreciated, it carried the whole case.

To suppose that the Apostle consciously limited the quantity of knowledge which God had put within reach of "reason," and that he marked it off from a knowledge that can come only through "revelation," is, on the one hand, to push back our own point of view and forget his. On the other hand, it is to suppose that he deliberately dulled the edge of his argument. For, if the heathen possess only this smaller quantity of knowledge, then they are less guilty than the

Jews ; and that he does not say. He speaks as a Jew, a man to whom the monotheistic idea of God was the pith and marrow of all knowledge of God, and to whom the fundamental law of right human experience was the sense of dependence and gratitude. He reproaches the heathen because they have let that saving knowledge slip out of consciousness. He is not thinking about those mysteries of the inner being of God toward which the Trinitarian development of doctrine directed attention. He is not even thinking about the mysteries of the Incarnation. He speaks to the Gentiles as Isaiah and as Ezra might have spoken. The traditional interpretation of *θεϊότης* side-tracks the main thought. If the Apostle had any clear and fixed idea when he wrote *τὸ γνωστόν*, in all likelihood it was similar to Philo's conception of God as being in Himself wholly unknowable. But I am disposed to think that to Paul, in the joyous flush of the redeemed and creative life, Philo's thought could not have come home. *Τὸ γνωστόν* should either be left vague or interpreted in the strictest sense of a Jewish debater bent on putting the heathen to shame. Its core is the knowledge that God is one, and that He is good. The tradition is manifestly untrue to the context. In case, then, the lexical and historical evidence for the distinction between *θεϊότης* and *θεότης* be forthcoming, Rom. 1²⁰ must be treated as an exception to the rule. We should find here an illustration of the law that all synonyms have more or less common ground.

If Paul did not write Colossians, the fact that *θεότης* is found in 2⁹ might have less force. But for those who accept the Pauline authorship, it must be admitted that the bare fact that the Apostle uses two terms, not one, starts a presumption of some sort in favor of the traditional interpretation. Besides, the context is more favorable than in Rom. 1²⁰. Still, unless the distinction between *θεϊότης* and *θεότης* be assumed, if the distinction is challenged to approve itself, it is proper to remind ourselves of the law of exegetical parsimony. The ancient system of interpretation glorified God's Word by finding all possible meanings in it. Our system refuses to find in it anything that is not clearly there. Hence, in a doubtful case, we lean away from an opinion unless the context really needs it. Now the context of Col. 2⁹, while it is more favorable to the traditional interpretation than the context of Rom. 1²⁰, cannot be said to make that view necessary. The enemy before the Apostle's mind is an early form of the dualistic gnosticism that bloomed in the second century. On the theoretical side, it injured

the monarchy of Christ. The Apostle opposed it by making Christ out to be the centre of both the visible and the invisible universe. He is the cosmic centre as well as the spiritual centre (1¹⁸⁻²⁰). In Him dwells the fulness of the Godhead — τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος. In view of the exceeding rareness, in the first century, of both terms, the fact that Paul used both deserves attention. It is indeed true that the context of Rom. 1²⁰ is rather against than for the tradition, while the evidence of Colossians is at best shadowy. Still, the bare fact that both words are used has weight. The traditional interpretation is exegetically possible. To determine its probability, we must go outside the context, and take up the lexical and historical aspects of the question.

One of the stock references is to θεϊότης in Wisd. 18⁹. It gives the variant δσιότητος, and the fact that θεϊότης has been undoubtedly substituted for δσιότης in the text of Isocrates (Liddell & Scott, *s.v.* θεϊότης) lends strength to the variant. Ὀσιότης might be taken as an assimilation to ὄσιοι in the line before, θεϊότης being the true reading. The Latin and Syriac renderings (*justitia* and ܐܘܨܝܘܬܐ) point to δσιότης.² The importance of the reference is all the greater because, if θεϊότης be the original reading, it is the only case found in the Wisdom literature. My reading of Philo has so far given me just one case of θεϊότης, already referred to; θεότης I have not found at all in the literature of Alexandrian Judaism. Of course, from the present point of view, it is a matter of indifference that one of the two examples of θεϊότης is in the LXX and the other outside it. Moreover, it is probable that the Book of Wisdom does not antedate Philo by more than fifty or seventy-five years; so that, for our purpose, the study of the history of an abstract term, they are practically contemporary. This, then, is the situation. Alexandrian Judaism gives us, so far as we know, two doubtful cases of θεϊότης, none of θεότης. In view of this state of things, we need to remind ourselves of two plain facts. The first is that the traditional distinction between θεϊότης and θεότης must be proved. The law of exegetical parsimony compels us to prove it before we use it. We are not to act as if the distinction authenticated itself off hand; and as if we were at liberty to pick up examples at random from the page of this or that writer, without regard either to his time or to his relation to the thought of his period. The second point, cognate to this, is that we are studying the history of a pair of abstract terms; and that the beginning of the

² I am indebted for this to Prof. G. F. Moore.

history, so far as we can yet say, is very close to New Testament times.

What, now, has the Book of Wisdom to say? The context (chapters 17 and 18) is a contrast between the Egyptians and the Israelites. Darkness, death the lot of those, light and life the lot of these. God kept safe His sons, δι' ὧν ἤμελλον τὸ ἀφθαρτον νόμον φῶς, etc. (18¹). In secret (v.⁹), on the Passover night, they offered sacrifice, καὶ τὸν τῆς θεϊότητος νόμον ἐν ὁμοιοῖα διέθεντο. It does not need to be argued that θεϊότης here refers not to the inner nature of God, but to the divinely given Law. Upon that all must agree. But those who draw from this fact an argument in favor of the traditional distinction seem to forget that this is but one case of θεϊότης; and that, inasmuch as the author stands near the beginning of the history of our pair of abstract terms, it is possible that the word was wholly new to him; and that, had he employed it more frequently, it might have taken broader uses. Apparently the Book of Wisdom uses θεϊότης just as Philo might have used it. Philo sometimes treats the Law as though it was God's other self. He speaks of the Torah as of the embodied Logos. His single case of θεϊότης is clearly parallel to Wisdom 18⁹. It must be remembered that both authors were using a new term, a word which apparently had but just begun its career. Great caution in drawing inferences from two isolated cases is in order.

The chief fault in the exponents of the distinction between the terms is that they have taken little or almost no account of the long history of the terms. They have made no attempt to correlate them with the history of thought. They have not asked whether the system of the author in question called for the distinction, but, taking the terms as the isolated expressions of an isolated theorem, have picked up an example wherever it came in their way. The only excuse for the hasty study of the larger context of the stock illustrations is the fact that the traditional view, having ruled interpretations for six centuries, has naturally fallen into the habit of taking itself for granted. When once that habit is acquired, the matter of evidence is easily disposed of. But this much at least is certain: the two examples of θεϊότης given us by Alexandrian Judaism, in view of the fact that they stand close to the beginning of the history of a pair of abstract terms, and in view of the farther fact that θεότης does not appear at all, neither prove nor disprove the point in question. Unless we can secure farther evidence, they are neutral.

The other stock examples are taken from Plutarch and Lucian,

non-Christian writers of the second century. At this point an emphatic protest should be raised. Language is an organism. It is created by thought. Its changes obey the laws of thought. Hence, to put an example from Plutarch alongside an example from the Book of Wisdom, without first subjecting the thought of the respective authors to serious comparative study, looks like an exceedingly hasty proceeding. When a new word appears in the field of philosophy and theology, one is not safe in taking any given view of the term at its first appearance, unless he is familiar with the course of thought that preceded it. Least of all, should we pass with light step from Jewish authors to Pagan authors, seeking illustrations of the supposed distinction. The differences between the austere, intolerant monotheism of the Jew and the easy-going monotheism of the Greek are too deep. It is not safe for us to put a case from Lucian in the same class with a case from Philo, till we have examined the bodies of thought that lie back of the respective cases.

At the outset, it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that there is a strong antecedent probability against the supposition that the distinction between the terms grew upon heathen ground. The thought and theology of heathendom made no demand for it. In the first place, the heathen lacked that mental austerity in the treatment of the term *θεός* which was more or less characteristic of Jews and Christians. If the distinction between *θειότης* and *θεότης* existed before Paul wrote, it might have grown up on the soil of Alexandrian Judaism. There were two elements of the soil that favored it. Monotheism was ingrained in the Jewish mind. That dogma of the divine unity was part of the common life. The whole community rested upon it. There went with it a clear distinction, almost a separation between God and the universe. This involved an attempt at precision in the use of terms touching the Deity. Again, the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy of religion had authoritative text-books of the highest quality. The Old Testament exercised a steady pressure upon all Jewish speculation. Plotinus could turn aside for a considerable time from the idea of God to deal with matters purely metaphysical. Philo could not. His Bible called him away from metaphysics. His philosophy was almost wholly theosophy. The idea of God was with him at every turn of thought. And this fact, coöperating with the native austerity of Biblical monotheism, might well have forced on his mind careful distinctions in the terms that dealt with God and with His relation to the universe.

Yet, with all this to favor the growth of some distinction between

θεϊότης and θεότης from the soil of Alexandrian Judaism, we have no evidence whatever that it actually came to light. Far less likely was it to grow up out of the thought of heathendom. In the first place, the word θεός was used freely and lightly. Triflers dragged it in the mud. Men of character used it flippantly. Vespasian, the chill of death creeping over him, said to his friends, "Lo ! I am becoming a god !" When Claudius was murdered, Seneca wrote a satire on his "pumpkinification" or apotheosis.³ Serious men, like Strabo, could talk about "Our God, Cæsar" — Καίσαρ ὁ θεός (6. 4 ; 7. 3). There was nothing in the established religion to encourage any austere use of terms touching the Deity. Neither was there anything in the nature of deep Hellenic thinking to develop a clear distinction between God as He is in Himself and God as He is in the world. Even Plotinus, strongly inclined as he was to asceticism in his personal life, remained, in his view of the Cosmos, a thorough-going Greek. The universe was to him, as it had been to Plato, the only-begotten Son of God. The idea of God did not draw apart from the universe as it sometimes did in Philo. His system had no need for the distinction between θεϊότης and θεότης. No authoritative Book, no authoritative religious community, pressed him toward it from the outside. His own thought exerted no pressure from the inside. There was no demand for the distinction.

Hence it is every way unlikely, in the light of what we know about the nature of heathen theology, that the distinction should have grown up on heathen ground. Language answers to thought, and has no distinctions unless thought calls for them. We pass, then, to the examples of the distinction between θεϊότης and θεότης brought forward from Plutarch and Lucian, with a strong presumption against them. The defenders of the tradition, taking it for granted, went into the heathen writers with a strong bias. If we consider the entire history of Greek philosophy, our bias will be the other way. It must be proved that the examples are real examples.

As regards Plutarch's use of θεϊότης, the remark of Meyer-Weiss, that it is "sehr häufig," is inexact. I have found six cases ; and it is possible, as Liddell and Scott suggest, that one or two of these are misreadings of δοσιότης. Probably very careful reading of Plutarch would give additional cases of θεϊότης. Yet, considering that Plutarch is so voluminous a writer and so religious withal, even a dozen or more cases would not justify the words "sehr häufig." On the contrary, θεϊότης is a very rare word in Plutarch, as we should expect

³ Hausrath, *N. T. Times* iv. 3.

it to be, seeing that Plutarch (born, probably, about 45 A.D.) stands so near the beginnings of the career of the two terms. *Θεότης* is even rarer, only two examples having so far been pointed out. The limits of this paper forbid a detailed examination of every context where either word appears. But I am sure that there is no philosophical distinction between them. It is barely possible that *θεότης* may have had a little more emotional capacity. But even that is only a possibility. If one does not enter the context with a bias toward the tradition, it cannot be proved. And so far as regards philosophical usage, the two words are practically identical in meaning. That fact stands out plainly from the context of *θειότης* in *De defectu oraculorum* (c. 5) : *μεγάλη γὰρ ἡ παλαιὰ δόξα τῆς ἐκεῖ θειότητος*. Plainly *θειότης* here carries all the weight that *θεότης* could carry. And if it be argued that Plutarch's theory of demons as mediating between gods and men is in favor of the tradition, then in the same treatise (c. 10) we meet a use of *θεότης* that looks decisively the other way : *ἐκ δὲ διμύονων ὀλίγαι μὲν ἔτι χρόνῳ πολλῶ δι' ἀρετῆς καθαρθεῖσαι παντάπασιν θεότητος μετέσχον*. In both contexts he is speaking of the same phenomenon, — the inspiration of the oracles ; and he is explaining it by the agency of the demons or intermediate spirits, to whom he ascribes *θειότης* in the one context and *θεότης* in the other. The use of *θεότης* in *De Is. et Os.*, c. 22, is equally convincing. The theory he has in mind would seem to be that of Euhemerus. The rank of the deities in question, at the highest, is not above that of a demi-god, yet *θεότης* is the term used. Finally, another convincing case is found in the treatise, *Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicur.* (c. 21) : *τὰ περὶ θεῶν καὶ θειότης*. His controversy with the Epicureans at this point makes it clear that *θειότης* refers to the deity as an abstract total.

As for Lucian († 180), he was a graceful writer, an easy thinker. Had he lived a century earlier, he would have been a brilliant sceptic. Living in the time of the great religious revival of the second century, he was more or less religious. But his religion was not deep, his philosophy never strenuous. And, keeping in mind the fact that we are following the history of a pair of abstract terms, and the further fact that both of them were still exceedingly rare in the second century, it seems most unlikely that a man of Lucian's weight and temper should have used theological terms with a precision superior to Plutarch. The random and piecemeal nature of the evidence brought forward in defence of the tradition again comes into view. One case of *θεότης* has been found (*Icaromen.* 9). The con-

text shows that it is used in the most sweeping sense. *περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεῶν τί χρῆ καὶ λέγειν ; . . . οἱ μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας θεοὺς ἀπελάσαντες ἐνὶ μόνῳ τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴν ἀπένεμον . . . οἱ δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἐπιδαψιλευόμενοι πολλοὺς τε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφαινον καὶ διελόμενοι τὸν μὲν τινα πρῶτον θεὸν ἐπεκάλουν, τοῖς δὲ τὰ δευτέρα καὶ τρίτα ἔνεμον τῆς θεότητος.* 'The Jews and the Christians drive all Gods but one off the field. But others, giving us gods with a lavish hand, make one of them supreme and allot to other gods a secondary portion of the godhead (θεότης), and to other deities still (demons and demi-gods) a tertiary portion.' What can be plainer than that θεότης here takes the widest sweep? One example of θεϊότης has also been pointed out: *De calum.* 17, ἡ Ἡφαιστιῶνος θεϊότης. The θεϊότης of Hephaestion exactly answers to the θεότης ascribed to demons and demi-gods in the other context.

I have followed the history of the terms into later heathen writers with some care. I have not found either word in Marcus Aurelius or in Pausanias (flourished about 170 A.D.). Possibly that fact means little, the thoughts of the emperor being of a purely devotional turn, and Pausanias being a sort of Baedeker to the temples and shrines of the empire. Still the two, taken together, suggest that these two abstract words had made, up to the last quarter of the second century, very slow headway. The fact that Dio Chrysostom (time of Commodus), so far as I know, did not use either word, gives strong support to this view; for he was a fine type of the Stoic circuit-rider, and likely to know the turns of speech in favor with men of thought. Plotinus († 270) clinches the conclusion. He was altogether the greatest philosophical head after Aristotle, a man of first-rate power, of wide knowledge, and deep piety. I have gone through him twice in search of the words; and, while I cannot say they are not there, I can very positively say that they are extremely rare. We may affirm, then, that the words came very slowly into general use with heathen writers.

I have found θεότης once in a quotation by Cyril from Porphyry (Nauck's ed. of *Porphyry's opuscula*, p. 11), it being uncertain whether the word is Cyril's or Porphyry's. In the opuscula themselves the words do not appear. In the life of Pythagoras by Jamblichus, who headed the Neoplatonic School in the fourth century († 363), I have found θεϊότης twice. It would seem that even as late as the latter part of the fourth century the terms were not common with heathen writers, who in this matter were in striking contrast with the Christian writers of the fourth century. Possibly the very common

Christian usage of the words helped to give them general currency. For in Proclus, the last notable Neoplatonist (died in Athens, 485), *θεότης* is quite common. In his voluminous commentary on the Timæus, I have found *θειότης* but once, and can say dogmatically that he rarely uses it. How it came to pass that *θεότης* pushed *θειότης* nearly out of mind I cannot say. It is possible that the influence of Christianity, both direct and indirect, accounts for it; and that the controversies with Christianity led the heathen controversialists to use, wellnigh exclusively, that one of our pair of words, *θεότης*, which came into almost exclusive use with Christian writers after the middle of the fourth century.

However that may be, it is certain that Proclus gives no support to the traditional distinction between the terms. His conception of the cosmos is thoroughly Greek: *ε.γ. ὁ πατήρ . . . ἐψύχωσε μὲν ἤδη τὸν κόσμον καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεὸν ἀπετέλεσεν* (239 B). How was it possible for the Greek reason, glorifying the visible universe as the alter ego of God, to achieve or to need the distinction between what God is in Himself and what He is in the universe? Proclus goes on from the words just quoted to say: *τὸν κόσμον, οὐχ ὅτι . . . τῶν ἐγκοσμίων ἐστὶν ἄγαλμα θεῶν . . . ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν νοητῶν ἐστὶ θεῶν ἄγαλμα. Πληροῦται γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν θεότητος* (239 C). The quality of *θεότης* permeates the universe. Again he says: *ὁ κόσμος μετέχει θεότητος*, and then uses *θεότης* three times in four lines (124 F). The one sure case of *θειότης* which I have found has an identical force: *ὁ κόσμος, ἄγαλμα . . . τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τελεσθεὶς . . . ἔχει ἐμφανῆ τῆς αὐτοῦ θειότητος γνωρίσματα* (83 F). And, lest it be said that the last quotation favors the tradition by applying *θειότης* to the individual phenomena of the universe, while *θεότης* describes its totality, I add one more quotation. Speaking of the Nile, he says: *ἡ τοῦτο συνέχουσα θεότης, i.e. the Deity, θεότης*, controlling and pervading the phenomena of the Nile (36 E). And speaking of Ὠκεανός: *τὴν τάξιν θεῶν τῆς διοριστικῆς ταύτης* (294 E) *θεότητος, i.e. the deity (θεότης)* manifests its defining and boundary-giving power through the great river that girdles the earth. Time forbids further quotation. But I add references to 48 B; 49 D; 51 B; 51 C; 101 D; 117 F; 160 E; 261 B; 278 B; 294 E; 315 C.

Looking back over the history of the words on their non-Jewish, non-Christian side, we find the beginning of it in the criticism of positive Greek religion, set up by Greek philosophy. In place of the cheerful, if somewhat non-moral gods of Homer, came the abstraction of Anaximander, τὸ θεῖον, — dignified but cheerless. Probably

in the first century before our era the word *θεϊότης* was coined in Alexandria, the clearing-house of religious ideas for the Mediterranean world. It was formed on the adjective *θεῖος*, on which *τὸ θεῖον* had been previously formed. *θεῖος*, as Schmidt says, designated "alles durch das walten der Gottheit hervorgerufene."⁴ Men who could not allow themselves to talk sincerely about the gods, could speak sincerely, albeit with little warmth, about *τὸ θεῖον*, even as Matthew Arnold used to speak about 'the power not ourselves, making for righteousness.' Working the same vein of abstraction that Anaximander had worked, some one grafted, upon the same stock, *θεῖος*, not on *τὸ θεῖον*, the word *θεϊότης*. So far Trench is right;⁵ but he is twice in error when he draws his inference from that fact. In the first place, he is wrong in saying that *τὸ θεῖον*, although "nearly," is "not quite" equivalent to *θεός*. He fails to distinguish between the popular and the scholastic use of words. Amongst the people, *θεός* was the superior term, and in the schools *τὸ θεῖον* was its full logical equivalent, even superior to it in intellectual value, although possessing far less emotional capacity. In the second place, Trench is wrong when he proceeds to build upon the fact that *θεϊότης* was formed directly upon *θεῖος*, not *τὸ θεῖον*, the conclusion that, for this reason, it carried less weight and meaning. A living language concerns itself little, in the long run, about etymologies. And the Greeks, with their utter lack of careful linguistic knowledge, made their etymologies serve their dogmatic and emotional needs. The etymologies of Plato and Plutarch are full evidence. The word *θεϊότης* gained very soon, if it did not possess from the first, all the weight and dignity belonging to *τὸ θεῖον*, with which the eye and ear would surely associate it.

Soon afterward, *θεότης* was formed, perhaps by some man who had warmer religious feeling, or was in closer touch with positive religion. Then the two words began a battle for existence. So far as the philosophical and theological outlook could go, they started on even terms; but in the second century came the great revival, and heathen society became religious. The philosophers became devout. The term *θεός* came again into philosophic honor, forced in by popular feeling. From this time on, *θεότης* was sure to get, some day, the upper hand. Concrete terms, deeply rooted in a language, live as long as the language lives.⁶ Abstract terms, the creations of men of

⁴ *Griech. Synon.*, 4, p. 6.

⁵ *N. T. Syn.* (8th ed.), p. 7.

⁶ Schmidt, *ib.* 4, p. 5.

the chair, battle for existence, and their chances for enduring life are the higher in proportion to their nearness to enduring concrete terms. For this reason, not for the reason given by Trench, the word *θειότης* triumphed over *θειότης*, and nearly drove it off the field. Being close to *θεός*, it had a larger emotional capacity. Religious feeling gave it the victory.

Our conclusion, so far, is that the traditional distinction, if it grew up at all in antiquity, grew up on Christian soil. The contexts of Rom. 1²⁰ and Col. 2⁹ are either opposed to, or do not heartily support the tradition. There is, then, a presumption that the distinction, if it grew up at all on Greek soil, grew up amongst the theologians and interpreters of the Greek Church. The fact that the distinction did not grow up, and could not grow up on heathen ground, gives no evidence, not even a presumption, that it could not grow up, and did not grow up on Christian ground. The bias of Christian theology, the doctrine of the Trinity, the clear, dogmatic distinction between God and the world, might make the distinction natural, and even inevitable. And if it did grow up at a fairly early day on Christian soil, then it becomes an exegetical possibility in St. Paul. Even if the distinction did not exist in the mind of Alexandrian Judaism, that would not be at all decisive; for the thought of the Alexandrian Jews lacked the great historic fact, Christ, and was not influenced by the vast capacity to bring about mental precipitation which that fact possessed. If we can find the distinction clearly established amongst Greek-speaking Christians, we shall simply rule out the examples found in Alexandrian Judaism, as having been rashly appealed to by the defenders of the tradition; and then conclude that in Rom. 1²⁰ the Apostle used *θειότης* freely and at large, but afterward came to see that *θειότης* was the one and only term that could describe the being of God in Christ, and so wrote Col. 2⁹.

I shall first consider the Greek interpretation of the two passages down to Theophylact, and afterward take up the general history of the two terms.

The history of the interpretation, roughly divided, falls into two periods: the Patristic period, and what may be called, by a stretch of terms, the Greek renaissance of the ninth to the twelfth centuries. In the first period, I have not found a single exegetical support for the tradition. Clement of Alexandria quotes Rom. 1²¹, but in so vague a way that we cannot draw from him any opinion upon our point (*Contra Graecos*, 8). Origen's commentary on Romans exists

only in Latin : *Quod notum est . . . Ignotum autem Dei intelligendum est ratio substantiae ejus vel naturae : cujus quae sit proprietates, puto quod non solum nos homines, sed et omnem latet creaturam.* At first blush, that looks like the tradition, but he goes on : *Sempiterna ejus virtus ac divinitas.* Virtus ergo Dei quae sempiterna est, et divinitas quae nihilominus sempiterna est, ex conjecturis acnoscitur creaturae. Virtus est qua regit omnia ; divinitas qua replet universa. “Virtus” is the divine power, “divinitas,” the divine presence. And Origen speaks like a Greek. The divine presence pervades the universe. Of the divine essence we are in deep ignorance ; but so are all creatures, even the angels. Origen does not say, or even suggest, that a knowledge of that essence has been revealed in Christ. On the contrary, the suggestion of the passage is a thought that becomes explicit and developed in the *De principiis* ; namely, that the Logos in Christ is the explanation of the universe, and the satisfaction of reason, and that the conjectures of the philosophers are but partial aspects of the truth seen, in its unity, in Him. But that is quite distinct from the idea that one kind of knowledge about God comes through the universe, and another through Christ. It is rather the thought that Christ is the reason of the universe, and that the message of “Nature” to unfallen man is identical with the message of Christ.

Arius is a witness against the tradition. Athanasius quotes him : *ὡςπερ γὰρ τὴν εἰρημένην ἐντάνθα (Rom. 1²⁰) θεϊότητα οὐκ ἂν τις φαίη Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸν πατέρα, οὕτως οἶμαι καὶ ἡ αἰδῖος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης, οὐχ ὁ μονογενῆς Υἱός, ἀλλ’ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ (Orat. contra Arianos, 2. 37).* There is no hint that Arius drew any distinction between θεϊότης and θεότης, but rather it is plainly suggested that Arius applied the word θεϊότης to the Father Himself. Asterius is soon after quoted to the same effect.

Athanasius is clear and convincing. Quoting Rom. 1²⁰, he says : *τίς δὲ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις, αὐτὸς πάλιν διδάσκει λέγων Χριστός (Cont. Ar. I. 11).* That is, Athanasius finds the doctrine of the Incarnation in Rom. 1²⁰ ! and he quotes it again and again in just the same sense (*Cont. Ar. I. 37*) ; *ib. c. 12 (ἡ τε αἰδῖος δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης, ἵνα τὸν Υἱὸν σημαίνῃ)* ; *ib. c. 22*, where, referring the αἰδῖος to the incarnate Logos, he sets it as conclusive scriptural authority against the Arian *ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*. Rom. 1²⁰ was for him a better and handier text on the Incarnation than Col. 2⁹ ; because it more plainly connected the doctrine of the Incarnation with the Greek conception of the universe as full of reason. His interpretation was moulded by his

argument for the Homo-ousia. And he would have had to recast his argument in order to approach the traditional interpretation.

Didymus († 395) has a slight extrinsic importance, in addition to his intrinsic importance, by reason of the fact that Sanday, giving the witnesses for the traditional exegesis, refers to him as follows: "Didymus accuses the heretics of reading *θεότης* here, and it is found in one Ms." (Migne, *P. G.* xxxix. 664). Sanday does not imply that Didymus's charge against the heretics plays any part in the defence of the tradition; he rather mentions it as an interesting textual point. Certainly, an examination of the passage shows that Didymus had no knowledge of the tradition, or, if he had, very successfully kept it out of sight; *ἐκεῖνοι ἐποίησαν θεότης· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό*. Note (1) that the heretics changed it to *θεότης*. Note (2) that Didymus, in the context, applies the verse to the Holy Spirit. Note (3) that in another part of the same work he applies *δύναμις καὶ θειότης* to the work of the Son in the universe (Migne, 388), and soon after applies to the text the words *ἡ αἰὲ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχουσα θεότης* (Migne, 389). He thus indirectly reaffirms his *τὸ αὐτό*. *Θειότης* carries all the theological meaning found in *θεότης*. In quoting Rom. 1²⁰ he even says *δύναμις καὶ θεότης* (Migne, 388). Possibly, *θεότης* here is a slip of the text. But it is just as possible that it is Didymus's own word, he unconsciously substituting *θεότης* for the word which he took to be its theological equivalent.

Eusebius quotes Rom. 1²⁰ in a way that makes it wellnigh impossible to suppose that he had the traditional exegesis in mind (*Dem. Ev.* iv. 8. 1 and 2). His whole point seems to be a practical one. He reproaches the heathen for their idolatrous blindness. They have worshipped the sun and moon and stars, whereas those celestial beings, near to God, standing as it were in the forecourt of the palace of eternity, should have taught them to adore God. The emphasis is upon the fulness of the message the stars had to deliver to spiritually minded men. There is no thought of a distinction between a certain quantity of knowledge about God which they could impart, and another field of knowledge where they could impart nothing.

Theodore, in his commentaries on Col. 2⁹, makes no allusion to any distinction between *θειότης* and *θεότης*. This silence, by itself, might have little weight. But taken along with the interpretations of Rom. 1²⁰ given by Origen, Athanasius, Didymus, and Eusebius, it has considerable force. The same thing may be said of Chrysostom's comment on Rom. 1²⁰. He does not speak directly to our question about *τὸ γνωστόν*. He takes a purely practical line of interpretation.

The heathen are like some officer of a great king who has had a treasure entrusted to him by his master and has misapplied the funds. But if Chrysostom knew of any interpretation similar to the tradition, he keeps his knowledge where we cannot reach it.

The evidence so far has been sufficient to show that the exegesis of the Greek Patristic period is either totally silent upon the point in question or is directly counter to the tradition. The evidence of the exegetes in the second period goes the same way. Between the two periods there sets in a new current of theological thought. The Arians had emphasized the knowableness of God, Eunomius even affirming that he knew God as well as he knew the triangle. They applied their clear and supposedly final knowledge to the criticism of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity. The Cappadocians fended off the attack by emphasizing the unknowableness of God. See the quotations by Suicer, *s.v.* θεός, οὐσία, γνῶσις. In Gregory of Nyssa thought took a turn distinctly unlike that of Athanasius. "The complete unity of the theological and philosophical points of view," says Ueberweg, "disappears; Gregory of Nyssa is the representative of the separation, beginning in his time, of these two intellectual forces" (*History of Philosophy* i. 328). Justin Martyr, Clem. Al., Origen, Athanasius, had proclaimed an order of thought wherein philosophy and theology were one. The Logos incarnate in Christ was identical with the Logos brooded over and guessed at by the Greeks. So long as the main work of the Church was to convince the Greek world, this order remained the order of the day. But when the heathen state had disappeared, and the Church became a vast religious establishment and the Greek schools were on the point of closing up, philosophy and theology began to part company.

Hence in the interpreters of the second period there is a deepened emphasis upon the unknowableness of God. It does not stand out prominently in Eumenius (10th cent.), who was largely a compiler and whose own interpretation follows for the most part the practical lines of Chrysostom. He suggests it, however, and even seems to come near the thought underlying the traditional exegesis. Thus — τὸ γινώσκειν Θ. . . ὅπερ δυνατόν ἐστὶν γνωθῆναι, ὅτι ποιητῆς, ὅτι προνοητῆς, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. He does not, however, quite reach it. And he shows plainly, in his commentary on δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης, that, if he had clearly reached the thought, he would not have taken advantage of the supposed distinction between θεϊότης and θεότης to express it. For he says . . . καὶ ἔστι, φησι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κτισμάτων αὐτοῦ κατιδεῖν

αὐτοῦ τὴν θεότητα. He passes, without consciousness of difference or jar, from the Apostle's θεότητα to his own θεότητα.

The thought of the unknowable stands out plainly in Theophylact (eleventh century). Commenting on τὸ γνωστὸν Θ., he says: τοῦ Θ. τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἄγνωστον οἶον ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ γνωστὸν οἶον πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, τουτέστιν ἢ ἀγαθότης, ἢ σοφία, ἢ δύναμις, ἢ θεότης, ἢτοι μεγαλειότης. Those last words seem, at first sight, to strongly support the tradition, and Trench so takes them. But the whole context positively disproves this, for Theophylact says: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τις τῶν πατέρων, ἀίδιον δύναμι, τὸν Υἱόν· θεότητα δέ, τὸ Πνεῦμα. He has no lexical fault to find with the patristic interpretation that takes Rom. 1²⁰ as a proof-text for the doctrine of the Trinity. The opinion that θεότης carries in it the Godhead of the Third Person of the Trinity does not cause him to start or protest, on the ground that the word θεότης is not up to the level of the co-essential Godhead of the Holy Spirit. He does not accept the interpretation, his own interpretation being practical and hitting the centre of Paul's thought: Ἐπεὶ ἄνω ὅτι τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ γνώσιν ἠδίκησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες, κακῶς αὐτῇ χρησάμενοι. But he passes no criticism upon the patristic interpretation. That θεότης stands on a lower theological level than θεότης he does not even remotely suggest. And Trench's inference from μεγαλειότης, "only his divine attributes . . . this Theophylact feels," is, in the light of the context, absolutely without excuse.

The Trinitarian exegesis to which Theophylact refers is an additional witness, if another is needed, against the conclusion that the traditional interpretation was ever held in the Greek Church down to the twelfth century. It was widespread. Athanasius, as we have seen, found in Rom. 1²⁰ a favorite proof-text. Didymus took θεότης to be the Holy Spirit; and since he went through the hot debate over the Macedonian's heresy, he would certainly have been aware of the traditional interpretation, had it existed. Cyril followed Didymus. The Trinitarian interpretation, in one of its two main forms, or, as the words of Theophylact show, in a composite form, was an established Alexandrian interpretation. Adding this indirect evidence to the direct evidence already brought forward, we may say — with decided emphasis, I think — that the Greek interpretation from Origen to Theophylact gives no support to the tradition.

Still, the case is not closed. The exegetical habits of the ancient exegetes left them free to do some things that lie outside our pale. A strong dogmatic purpose, employing an allegorical method, could

ride easily over serious historical and grammatical obstacles. And while it does not seem at all likely that, had the traditional distinction been a real distinction, the Greek interpreters would have maintained for nine centuries an unbroken silence on so important a point, yet it is barely possible. We must therefore carry the case to a final conclusion, by studying the history of the words themselves, from the second century down. The evidence derived from the words is wider than the evidence drawn from the exegetes. Many a man who never interpreted or even quoted Rom. 1²⁰ used the terms. The evidence drawn from this source is also deeper ; for it takes us down to the root-question — Was there anything in the nature and bias of thought in the Greek Church that called for the distinction ? The history may be divided into two periods. The first ends in the fourth century. During this period the terms ran side by side, each of them common, although *θεότης*, on the whole, gained upon *θεϊότης* in point of common use. The second period stretches from the fourth century to the twelfth. The striking fact here is that *θεϊότης* went almost wholly out of use.

I have found *θεϊότης* once in Tatian. The context is too general to permit any inference. In his master, Justin Martyr, I have not found either word, although he uses the compound *πολυθεότης*,⁷ nor in Athenagoras and Theophilus. Irenæus uses the abstract *ἀνθρωπότης* both in a general sense and the specific Christologic sense. One would expect to find its mate, *θεότης*, in its company. But I have not found it as yet in Irenæus's own text, although it might appear, were the entire Greek text in our hands. *θεότης* occurs once in a quotation from the Gnostics : τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἀπὸ πάσης θεότητος καὶ κυριότητος καὶ ἀλήθειας κ.τ.λ.⁸ Apparently *θεότητος* and *κυριότης* and *ἀλήθεια* denote grades in the celestial hierarchy of the Gnostics. And it is to be noted that *θεότης* applies, not to the deepest divine being, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ βυθός, but to the highest æons, the primary manifestations of divine being ; so that, if we may build on a single example from the Gnostics, they did not know and did not use the traditional distinction. I have found two cases of *θεϊότης* in Clem. Al.,⁹ both of them too colorless to be safely used. If we compare Justin Martyr and Clem. Al. with Plutarch, it would seem that in the second century the terms made even slower headway with Christian than with non-Christian writers.

The words began to be common in Origen. He was the founder of Systematic Theology. So he needed abstract terms. How he

⁷ *Adv. Gr.* 25. 36.⁸ 1, 21, 3.⁹ *Strom.* 5. 10 ; 7. 11.

used our words will be evident from a few cases, taken from his commentary on St. John. On 1⁶: αὐτοῦ¹⁰ τὴν θεότητα. On 1⁸: τῆ θειώτητι αὐτοῦ. On 1²⁹: τὴν τοῦ Υἱοῦ θεότητα. On 1³⁷: τῆ θεώτητι αὐτοῦ. On 2²: τὴν θεότητα τοῦ Υἱοῦ, . . . τῆς ἐκεῖνος θεότητος . . . τῆς θεότητος. On 2³: ὁ μὲν Πατὴρ θεότητος, ὁ δὲ Υἱὸς Λόγον. On 2²⁸: τῶν τὴν καινότητα τῆς θεότητος παρατέξασθαι . . . οὐ βουλομένων. On 2²⁹: τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ. On 6²: τὰ τῆς θειώτητος μυστήρια. It seems absolutely certain that the two terms cover the same theological territory, and equally certain that θεότης is his favorite word.

We may draw from Justin Martyr, Clem. Al., and Origen a safe inference regarding the bearing of the Logos doctrine upon our question. That doctrine was an attempt to make the Greek Reason feel at home within the Christian view of the world. The emphasis fell upon the intelligibility of God. God cannot be God without a Logos, without a full and clear expression of Himself. The name for this self-expression is the Incarnation. Christ is the embodied knowableness of God. The divine principles, embedded in the structure of the universe, seen in the constitution of man as interpreted by the philosophers and the prophets, have in him their perfect fulfilment. Just as the school of North Africa fused the Græco-Roman conception of Natural Law with the Biblical conception of the Will of God, so the school of Alexandria fused the Greek conception of the Logos with the New Testament conception of Christ. And, so long as the emphasis fell here, there could be no demand for the distinction between θειώτης and θεότης. That distinction presupposes a problem in epistemology. How do we know God? and how far does our knowledge of Him go? When the conflict with Arianism, ensuing upon the establishment of the Church and the disappearance of Greek philosophy as a dangerous opponent, had led the theologians to emphasize the doctrine of the Unknowable, that problem might naturally arise. But not before. Greek philosophy, a splendid body of knowledge about things human and divine, existing apart from sacred Scripture, is the final explanation of the distinction between a truth within reach of reason and a truth that can enter experience through revelation alone. That philosophy exerted a profound influence upon the mind of the Greek Church. It might appear, then, to be likely beforehand that, inasmuch as the main cause of the distinction existed, the distinction itself would easily come into consciousness. But the cause, although existent, had not begun to really operate. The Greek Fathers did indeed make one decisive step

¹⁰ The αὐτοῦ in every case refers to the incarnate Logos.

toward the distinction, when, taking over from the Greeks the division of knowledge into "encyclic" or common knowledge and special or philosophical knowledge, they lumped all knowledge outside the Bible under the head of "encyclic," putting the special knowledge wholly into the charge of Christian theology.¹¹ This step, however, did not bring about the expected consequence. And for the reason that in the strenuous period of the Greek Church, Greek philosophy, while it was in fact a body of knowledge existing apart from and independent of the Christian Scriptures, did not succeed in getting itself recognized in that capacity. From Philo down, there went along with the allegorical method that made Moses Platonize, a theory which made out the philosophers to be either the pupils or plagiarists of Moses. Clement of Alexandria's exegesis of κλέπτται (John 10⁸), as meaning the fallen angels who stole the divine truth from the Scriptures and imported it into Greece, is an illustration. All the Fathers used the theory, even those who did not allegorize. It was the established explanation of Greek wisdom. Plainly, so long as this explanation gave satisfaction, the epistemological problem involved in the connection and contrast between Greek wisdom and the wisdom of the Bible could not actually enter consciousness. In effect, it was side-tracked.

Lacking the problem, the distinction between θεϊότης and θεότης could not develop. There was, after all, just one indivisible body of real knowledge about God. The philosophical knowledge of the Greeks, being thought of as an echo of Scripture, could not press upon theology the epistemological problem. The times created no demand for the distinction between two kinds of truth about God. There are many things in the Greek Fathers that suggest the distinction, and sometimes almost reach it. But they do not actually achieve it.

This is fully borne out by the history of Greek thought after Origen. In proportion as theology became more and more important in the Church, the words became more common. In the first half of the fourth century they are found everywhere. And at the same time the evidence against the tradition becomes overwhelming. Trench affirms (p. 10) that the Greek Fathers "never used θεϊότης, but always θεότης, as alone adequately expressing the essential Godhead of the Second Person in the Holy Trinity." The usage of two men, Eusebius and Athanasius, added to the usage of Origen, will conclusively prove that he is in error.

¹¹ See Kuyper, *Encyc. of Sac. Theol.*, § 3.

Eusebius uses *θειότης* far more frequently than *θειότης*. But four examples are enough to show that the two words occupy and hold the same theological territory. *Praef. Evang.* 3. 6: τὴν τῆς θεότητος διαρκῆ μεγαλοργίαν ἐπιδεικνυμένην. He is working the argument from Nature and uses *θειότης* in precisely the sense that Paul gives to *θειότης* in Rom. 1²⁰. *Ib.* 7. 17: . . . ὅπως διὰ παντῶν αὐτῷ οὐρανίαν τε καὶ αἰθερίαν τῶν τε ἐπὶ γῆς λογικῶν καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ θειότητος ἀντιληπτικῶν ὁ προσήκων ὕμνος ἀναπέμποιτο. It is exceedingly difficult to see how *θειότης* in this text differs from *θειότης* in the one above. *Ib.* 7. 20: καὶ εἰ αὐτός, μὴ οὔσης ἄλλης, ἐβούλετο κατεσκευάσαι αὐτήν, τί ἂν πλέον ἢ σοφία καὶ ἡ θειότης αὐτοῦ πεποιήκει κ.τ.λ. This case might seem to favor the rule, were it not that *θειότης* does not refer to a quality manifested in the universe, but to God's own power to create something out of nothing, a power embodied in the Logos. *Dem. Ev.* 4. 13: *θειότης* and *θειότης* are used, almost in the same breath, and to the same point, God's creative action in and through the Logos. *H. E.* 1. 13: Ἡ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ θειότης. *Θειότης* thus exchanges offices with *θειότης* both in the description of God's creative work through the Logos, and in the dogmatic exposition of the historic Incarnation.

In the treatise *Cont. gent.*, written before the Arian controversy, Athanasius does not use *θειότης* at all, so far as I know. In the treatise *De incar.*, written about 318, just before the Arian controversy, *θειότης* is common, although *θειότης* is more so. . . . Περὶ τῆς θειότητος τοῦ Λόγου and τὴν περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ μαρτυρίαν (Migne, 97 A). Here, almost in one breath, the terms are applied in turn to the Logos. Τοὺς δὲ χλευάζοντας καὶ ἀπιστοῦντας μεταπέιθων (the Logos is the subject) ἀφανῶς, ὥστε τὴν θειότητα αὐτοῦ καὶ δυνάμιν ἐπιγινώσκειν (97 B). He here has Rom. 1²⁰ in mind. With the same text again in mind he says: . . . οὐ κατενόησαν τὴν διὰ τῆς κτίσεως αὐτοῦ θεότητα κ.τ.λ. *Θεότης* slips into the place of *θειότης* in his paraphrase. Τῆς αὐτοῦ θεότητος (173 C): τῆς ἑαυτοῦ θειότητος (176 C). Τῆς μὲν θειότητος τοῦ Σωτῆρος (189 A): . . . τῆς θειότητος τοῦ Σωτῆρος (189 B). Εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εἰς τὰ ὅλα αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως ἐγίνωσκον αὐτοῦ τὴν θεότητα κ.τ.λ. Once more, in the argument from Nature, *θειότης*, without effort, exchanges places with *θειότης*. Other examples could be given, but space is lacking. I venture, however, upon one more. It is found in the treatise against Apollinaris, written about 372; καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὴν σάρκα τῆς θειότητος λέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖτε (1108 B). To suppose that *θειότητος* does not reach the deepest depth in the person of Christ were to make Athanasius an Apollinarian out of hand.

It is, then, plain that in the usage of the Greek Church, as illustrated by two representative men, Eusebius and Athanasius, both of whom took very important parts in the most critical theological work of Greek Christianity, the traditional distinction between *θεός* and *θεότης* was unknown. If additional testimony were necessary, it might be found in the theological usage of the Arian party. In Arius's interpretation of Rom. 1²⁰ already quoted, *θεότης* is used to express the full being of God. Ezra Abbot in his essay on the reading "Church of God" says that the Arians did not hesitate to apply the term Θεός to Christ, but lowered its meaning. They were fond, as we learn from Athanasius, of "calling τὴν θεότητα τοῦ λόγου παθητήν" (*Critical Essays*, 314). That is, they brought the term *θεότης* down to all those lower uses, supposed by the tradition to belong exclusively to *θεότης*. Of course, we know the Arians only through fragmentary quotations found in their enemies' books. But if Arius and the Arians had ever hinted at any distinction between *θεότης* and *θεότης*, their enemies would have informed us of it.

We come now to the second period in the history of the words. Its main feature is the practical disappearance of *θεότης*. Athanasius, in his later treatises, uses *θεότης* scores of times. I have found *θεότης* once (quotation from *Cont. Apoll.*, made above). That it occurs in other places, I have little doubt, but I have read enough to know that it is very rare. So, likewise, in the Greek writers at large, after Athanasius. Didymus has *θεότης* in quoting Rom. 1²⁰. Otherwise, *θεότης* is incessantly used. I have not found *θεότης* in Greg. Nys.; nor in Greg. Naz., not even in those parts of his theological poems which deal with the argument for Nature, and where *θεότης* would be likely to meet us if the tradition were correct: *θεότης* occurs everywhere. In Basil I have found *θεότης* once (*Cont. Eunom.* 5. 1). In Cyril I have found it only when he quotes Rom. 1²⁰, while *θεότης* occurs hundreds of times. *θεότης* does not occur in the Pseudo-Dionysius, who uses *θεότης* about as freely as Cyril. It is not in Chrysostom, nor in John of Damascus, through whose writings I have gone with some care because of his position as the first out-and-out Greek scholastic. Photius uses *θεότης* twice in commenting on Rom. 1²⁰. I have not found it in Œcumenius or Theophylact. The fact that Suidas does not notice it is without force, since he takes no notice of *θεότης*.

I cannot presume to say that, taking the whole body of Greek writings after 350, *θεότης* does not occur in them all a considerable

number of times. I have not been able to read the entire Greek *Patrologia* with the care that would give me the right to speak positively; but complete statistical accuracy, while it is beyond my reach, is also outside the needs of the case. Taking things in the large, it is quite certain that *θειότης* went very nearly out of use. Now it hardly needs to be said that if *θειότης* had ever had a portion of the theological field all its own, this could not have happened. Greek theology, from Origen to John of Damascus, held tenaciously to its lines of thought. The turn taken in Gregory of Nyssa did not lead to anything like a change of fundamental lines. And soon after his time the Greek Church lost her creative energy, her theology becoming scholastic. If the two terms had ever divided the field of theological statement and definition between them, it would not have been possible for one of them to practically drive the other out of use. The fact that this happened plainly suggests the conclusion that the two terms covered a common field, that they fought for existence, and that *θειότης* triumphed.

At the very beginning of the battle, *θειότης* had an advantage. As we have seen, Trench's contention that *θειότης*, being derived from *θεῖος*, not from *τὸ θεῖον*, could not derive dignity from the latter, is scholastic and untrue to the conditions of a great living language spoken by men who utterly lacked scientific etymology. The similarity between *τὸ θεῖον* and *θειότης* appealed both to eye and ear. *θειότης* soon acquired all the prestige that *τὸ θεῖον* could give it; and, so long as it was wholly a question for men of the chair to settle, *θειότης* would at least stand on even terms with its rival. For, in the Greek schools, where doubt was fashionable and the unknowableness of God seemed often the only certain thing, *τὸ θεῖον* was a nobler word than *θεός*. But when religion revived all over the empire, when the sceptics began to go to the temple, when the men of the chair began to go into the pulpit, *θειότης* lost its advantage. The word *θεός* was as deeply rooted in the Greek language as 'God' is in ours. It was the concrete word, and had both antiquity and experience, the common people and the poets, no less, on its side. *θειότης* now won a marked advantage of position. The battle could go but one way. In the time of Proclus *θειότης* had won a decisive victory. He used *θειότης* only now and then when he desired a verbal change for the sake of variety.

In Christian usage *θειότης* had a pronounced advantage at the outset. *τὸ θεῖον* was in use down to the last days of Greek theology. It lacked, however, that power of appeal to the feelings which *θεός*

possessed. To Greek philosophy the conception of the personality of God came home with slight force. To Christian theology it was all in all. Το θεῖον lacked color and warmth : ὁ θεός, used as Christians used it, its powers insured against the dissipation of polytheism, was every way superior to τὸ θεῖον ; θεότης shared its kinsman's fortunes. Hence, even in Origen, the first systematic theologian, it had a clear advantage, being used about three times where θεϊότης was used once. When theology, in the heat of the third and fourth centuries, was changed almost wholly into Christology, θεότης won a still greater advantage. The supreme question for the Church became the relation between the two natures in Christ. The necessary correlatives were θεότης — ἀνθρωπότης. Nowhere, not even in the earlier writings of Athanasius, where θεϊότης is so common and so efficient, is θεϊότης used as the correlative of ἀνθρωπότης. Now, it is within bounds to say that nine-tenths of the usage of both θεότης and θεϊότης is monopolized by Christology. Consequently, θεότης had a decisive advantage ; θεϊότης, unable to make a stand against it, like many another unsuccessful word, lost its hold on the mind.

After the fourth century there was a bare possibility that theology might take a turn that should make both terms necessary, assigning to each a distinct function. The tendency of the Logos doctrine was to fuse theology and philosophy. The debate with Arianism led to the suggestion that they should be separated in some measure. Had the Greek Church followed this suggestion home, our traditional interpretation of θεϊότης and θεότης might have appeared. Two causes prevented this. One was the comparative mental stagnation of the Greek Church. After the patristic period, she had nothing that could approach the splendid energy and purpose that went into the university movement of the Western Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The other cause was the unbroken connection kept up between Greek theology and the ancient Greek learning. The Myriobiblion of Photius is a melancholy reminder that in the ninth century great stores of ancient learning lay within reach of the Greek Church. In the Occident there was almost a sheer break between the wisdom stored up in the Bible, called "Revelation," and the wisdom stored up in classic literature, called "Reason." In the Greek Church nothing like this was possible. The continuity of connection with Greek learning worked with the mental stagnation of Greek theology to keep the traditional interpretation of θεϊότης and θεότης from coming into consciousness.

The traditional interpretation is an error. An objection to this

conclusion, apparently a strong objection, is started by the fact that *θειότης* submitted itself to certain usages to which *θεότης* never condescended. Thus Origen: *ἡ τῆς Γραφῆς θειότης* (*De principiis*: Migne, 353 C); *θεότης* never occurs in such a connection. While it is a partial answer to this objection to say that *θειότης*, applied to the Holy Scripture, is the inevitable result of a steady use of the adjective *θεῖος* with the same Scriptures, the objection gains fresh force from the language of the court. Thus in Athanasius: *ἡ θειότης αὐτῶν* (Migne i. 401 B., referring to Constantine and his sons). Eusebius: *ἡ θειότης τῶν δεσπότων ἡμῶν* (Migne ii. 800 B.). How came it to pass that Christians could, without offence to themselves, apply *θειότης* to a Christian emperor, but did not think of using *θεότης* in the same way? In part the use of *θειότης* may be explained here as above, in connection with Holy Scripture.¹² *Θειότης* would naturally follow upon *θεῖος*. Still, this is only a partial answer, and merely shifts the burden to the other shoulder. Does not the fact that *θεῖος* could lend itself to such miscellaneous uses weaken the strength and capacity of its derivative *θειότης*? The answer must be affirmative. But the concession does not operate as the objector supposes. It simply serves to bring out the truth already conceded to the tradition. *Θεότης* possessed an inherent capacity for the expression of religious emotion, as well as logical precision, superior to the emotional and logical qualities of *θειότης*. On the ear of the impassioned Christian feeling for the Personality of God τὸ θεῖον struck cold and hard, and *θειότης* shared its emotional limitations. The standing Biblical antithesis between God and man which could be expressed only by *θεός-ἄνθρωπος*, the doctrine of the two natures in Christ which could be expressed only by *θεότης-ἀνθρωπότης*, emphasized the superior logical precision of *θεότης*. In the struggle for theological existence it conquered its rival, because it was a word with a deeper root than *θειότης* could possibly have. The latter, driven off the theological field, found asylum in the language of the Byzantine court. The element of truth found in the traditional interpretation does not weaken the conclusion that the interpretation itself is an error.

The knowledge that the tradition is an error is not enough. We must know how this error came to be. Especially in a case so striking, an interpretation that has gripped the text for many centuries with a hold that could not be withstood, we must know how it came

¹² *Θεῖος* was freely used with the names of rulers, bishops, etc.

to be made, and what is the secret of its popularity and strength. The explanation is found in the history of Latin Christianity.

The Vulgate gives *divinitas* as the equivalent of Θεόςτης in Col. 2⁹; and from Tertullian down to Aquinas it is always so quoted. If that fact stood alone, it might not have much weight. It could then be fairly urged that the earlier text of the Vulgate was the work of translators, who, knowing Greek only in the rough, slurred over a fine distinction, like that between Θεόςτης and Θεόςτης; and, furthermore, when once the Vulgate had entrenched itself in liturgical use and popular reverence, it was next to an impossibility to change it. The fact, however, that the Greeks themselves did not know the tradition, knocks the bottom out of the argument. We are now dealing with the history of an error. Therefore, the fact that *divinitas* stood in the text of Col. 2⁹ from the earliest to the latest days, is a fact that has weight in the history of the terms *divinitas* and *deitas*.

The inference it suggests is that, in the early centuries of Latin Christianity, the Latins had one word, *divinitas*, in a field where the Greeks had Θεόςτης and Θεόςτης. This is confirmed by the history of the term *deitas*. The Latin Christianity of the first six centuries stood toward Greek Christianity as the Romans had stood toward the Greeks. They were disciples and imitators. Naturally the disciples sought for new terms in the mother-tongue that should answer to the theological terms in Greek. Theology could not be naturalized in Latin without considerable criticism of words nor without steady reference to the native language of thought and theology. Thus Tertullian: God created the universe in ornamentum majestatis suae; unde et Graeci nomen mundo κόσμον accommodaverunt (Migne i. 432 A.). Again: apud vestros quoque sapientes ΛΟΓΟΝ, id est sermonem atque Rationem; and . . . ostendem (Christ) se esse ΛΟΓΟΝ Dei, id est verbum, etc. In a similar way, Lactantius. The standard Greek terms were variously translated, and the fittest translation survived. Thus *omnipotens* is the successful translation of παντοκράτωρ, "its defunct rivals being 'omnitens,' 'omnipolens'" (Lightfoot, *Clem. Rom.* 2. 7).

It was work of this kind — work like that of students in the theological school, breaking their teeth on Hebrew and aiming at an almost slavishly literal translation — that introduced *deitas* into the Latin, as the equivalent of Θεόςτης. Augustine has been long referred to as a support of the tradition. His words are: Hanc divinitatem, vel, ut sic dixerim, deitatem; nam et hoc verbo uti jam nostros non piget, ut de Graeco expressum transferunt id quod illi Θεόσητα appel-

lant (*Civ. Dei* 7. 1). Augustine's *ut sic dixerim* proves that he was dealing with translator's work of the kind just described. His "nostri" refers to the Latins who had come fresh from the theological school. In all probability his main reference is to Hilary († 368), whose work on the Trinity was the first attempt at systematic divinity in Latin. Augustine nowhere suggests that he himself would make any dogmatic distinction between the two words.

Hilary, Augustine's predecessor in theology († 368) gives us decisive evidence as to the nature of the causes that brought *deitas* into existence. I have not been able to find the word earlier than Hilary. It is asserted by Grimm-Thayer (*s.v. θεότης*) that Tertullian uses the term. No reference is given, and I have not found it. Swete asserts that Arnobius uses it (*Theodore of Mops.* 1. 286). He, too, gives no reference; and I have not been able, in two hasty readings, to find it. Nor have I found it in Lactantius. So far as my own knowledge goes, Hilary is the first to use *deitas*. And, while my knowledge on this point is not to be deeply trusted, yet happily the main conclusion is not thereby altered. For it is certain from Hilary's own words that the cause which brought *deitas* into existence was not the preëxistence of the traditional view regarding *θειότης* and *θεότης*. He quotes Col. 2⁹ in the established form, *plenitudo divinitatis*, e.g. *De Trin.* 2. 11; 3. 3. 4. He steadily uses *divinitas* to cover the highest meanings. But in the Com. on Mt. we find *aeitas* put forward as the literal translation of *θεότης*. On Mt. 16⁴: *theotetam quam deitatem Latini nuncupant*. On 26⁵: *theotetam quam deitatem nuncupamus*. Watson, to whom I owe the references, well says that Hilary had not yet decided upon the terms he would use (*Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 9, p. viii.). Hilary's "Latini nuncupant" suggests that he found *deitas* already in existence. But if so, he regarded it as an attempt at an exact translation of *θεότης*. He did not consider it a necessary term. He was a profoundly speculative man. He acts sometimes like a pioneer in speculation. He is awkward and cumbrous. He feels around for terms, and he is conscious all the time that the Greeks are his masters. But *divinitas* goes as deep into his mind and into God's being as any word can go.

After Hilary the new term made headway, although it was slow headway. Down to the twelfth century, although *deitas* seems to have been steadily gaining in favor, the two words lived together in peace. In Isidore and Bede and Erigena *divinitas* goes as deep and as high as a word can go. In Peter Lombard we apparently find

the signs of a change ; *Sent.* I. 29. 1, unde Augustinus in lib. 4, de Trin., ait : Pater est principium totius divinitatis, vel, si melius dicitur, deitatis. He seems to prefer the word *deitas*, although he passes readily from one word to the other, e.g. I. 23. 9. But down to his time the traditional interpretation was not known in the Occident. Jerome took the same line as Chrysostom on Rom. 1²⁰. The Latin translation of Theodore's commentaries, made in Gaul in the fifth or sixth century, does not prove, as Swete thinks it proves (*Comm. of Theod.* i. 286 n.) that the traditional distinction between *θεότης* and *θεότης* was in the author's mind. Swete propagates the old error. The translator changes from the *divinitas* of the Vulgate text to the *deitas* of the commentary, merely in order to translate Theodore's *θεότης* literally. Haymo († 853) follows the line of Jerome and Chrysostom. Hugo (1096–1141) follows the line of Athanasius and Didymus, taking Rom. 1²⁰ as a Trinitarian text : Cur Spiritus sanctus per divinitatem significatur? . . . per invisibilia intelligitur Sp. Sanctus. . . Per virtutem Pater . . . Per divinitatem seu deitatem intelligitur Filius. (Migne, *P. L.* clxxv. 440 B.) He is aware that the Trinitarian interpretation of Rom. 1²⁰ varies in form. That it is in substance right, he does not seem to doubt. And his "divinitatem seu deitatem," taken in connection with his interpretation, proves that the distinction between *divinitas* and *deitas* had not achieved dogmatic significance. Lombard († 1164), in his notes on Romans, prefers the interpretation of Jerome. But he refers to the Trinitarian interpretation as a fair alternative : vel sicut quidam volunt, potest hic intelligi Trinitas. Hence, it is plain that the inference, drawn from the use of the terms *deitas* and *divinitas* in the *sententiae*, is at best uncertain. We may say, then, that down to his time the tradition was not known in the Latin Church ; or, if known, it had not won its way into any place of note.

But Lombard's master, Abelard, had brought the thought of the Church to a point where the dogmatic need of the tradition was in sight. With his splendid trust in reason and his almost extravagant admiration of the Greek philosophers, he seemed to threaten the very citadel of the faith. Bernard's alarm was deep and loud-voiced, and Bernard represented the piety of the Church even more thoroughly than Abelard represented its reason. His outcry gave expression to the deepest feeling of the Church.

And, in truth, there was good ground for alarm. Abelard's interpretation of Rom. 1²⁰ seemed to be nowise different from that of Athanasius and Didymus. There is, however, a profound difference

in the mental background. Abelard knows nothing about an underground railroad between Jerusalem and Athens. The theory of demons has disappeared along with the bitter warfare between Christianity and polytheism which gave it birth. Polytheism had become a dead issue. The intellectual majesty of the Greeks, the noble philosophical monotheism of their highest minds, shone clear in its own inherent strength. The patristic theory that Moses and the prophets taught the Greeks having passed away, to give Abelard's tribute to the philosophers threatened ruin to the Church's conception of inspiration.

This was the turning-point in the history of the interpretation of Rom. 1²⁰, even as it was the turning-point in the intellectual history of the Middle Ages. Latin theology, on the edge of the thirteenth century, was nearly ready to take a revolutionary step regarding the relation between Reason and Revelation. In the Greek Church the distinction between them had never been clearly drawn. Greek philosophy, a splendid body of knowledge about things divine and human, stood apart from Scripture while it profoundly affected the Christian mind. But for causes already given, Reason, as embodied in the Greeks, did not draw clearly away from Revelation as embodied in Holy Scripture. When, however, Abelard made the leveling tendency of the renaissance so plain, the Latin Church was seriously alarmed. She had a great problem to face, a problem that the Greek Church had either covered over or postponed.

In the East there had never been a break in the knowledge of Greek culture. In the West there was almost a sheer break. Hence, in the thirteenth century, the full text of Aristotle, coming from the Arabians and backed by the superior scientific knowledge which it had encouraged, invaded the mind of the West with great power. At the same time the mental life of the Middle Ages began to run with a strong current. The crusades had pushed the horizons of the world far out. Modern travelling, as distinct from the pious pilgrimage of men incapable of seeing anything but a miracle or the bones of a saint, began. Roger Bacon started modern science on its career. The marvellous university movement of the Middle Ages was in full swing. Reason, supported by the prestige of the Greeks, loomed up dangerously before Revelation. This was one cause for the new turn of thought taken in the West.

The other cause was the corporate existence of an imperial Church. The ecclesiastical traditions of the East, compared with those of the West, were cumbrous and unmanageable. The Papacy gave to tra-

dition the rallying-point and the tactics that should make it coherent and effective. The Church of the West could act as a Church, untrammelled by the State. She was threatened, in the thirteenth century, by the Albigensian heresy on the one side and the rapidly growing mental life of Europe on the other. She drowned the heresy in blood. She headed off the possibility of a breach with the strengthening reason of the Occident by a concordat. Reason was allowed to have its field, but was to confine itself rigidly to that field. To theology, *i.e.* to the teaching powers of the Church, was given the sole key to the being of God. "It is impossible," said Thomas Aquinas, "for the natural reason to arrive at the knowledge of the divine persons. By natural reason we may know those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, but not those which pertain to the distinction of the divine persons" (Ueberweg i. 443). Greek theology had practically identified itself with philosophy. Gregory of Nyssa took steps toward separating them, yet his lead was not followed. In the West, also, theology and philosophy were at first identical. Down to Abelard's time, there was no clear thought upon the necessity of separating them.

In the thirteenth century the necessity was seen and followed. The division of the field of knowledge concerning divine things between natural theology and revealed theology had been anticipated by the Arabian and Jewish commentators on Aristotle (Ueberweg i. 444), who found themselves forced to take the step by the collision between their Aristotelianism and the positive religion of the Koran and the Old Testament. The Western Church, adopting the distinction, put into it a force far beyond what was possible to the Mohammedans and to the Jews. Being a vast, thoroughly centralized institution, possessing authority separate from, and superior to, that of the State, having the habit of imperial action and sway, she gave to the distinction a clear and authoritative form. Revelation strikes a treaty with Reason. There is to be no mental confusion as in the Greek Logos-doctrine ; and no such *deus* or *diabolus ex machina* as the theory that Plato stole the clothes of Moses. Thought shall be frank and clear. Reason and Revelation shall have plain boundaries, separate fields of activity. From the days of Origen Rom. 1²⁰, the text with its context, had been the locus classicus for comments upon the connection between Nature and God. Whenever the Christian student had anything to say upon that subject, his New Testament opened of itself at that text. When, therefore, the Western Church had taken a turn of thought so momentous, of necessity a new line

of interpretation had to be marked out. A resistless dogmatic need entailed it.

Thomas Aquinas gives the traditional exegesis of Rom. 1²⁰ with perfect precision: . . . *potius dixit divinitatem, quae participationem significat, quam deitatem, quae significat essentiam Dei*. Whether he was the first to interpret the verse in this fashion I cannot say. But that the interpretation came to the light after the middle of the twelfth century, I take to be nearly certain. And that it was the product, not of exegetical study, but of a pressing and even tyrannical dogmatic need, is, to my mind, absolutely certain. Its immediate vogue and permanent success were due to the wide spread of a very serious mental difficulty, which it seemed to happily and permanently solve. At the Reformation, the Protestant exegetes took it up with all heartiness. For a very good reason! While they threw overboard the idea of an infallible Church, they retained and even developed the idea of an infallible Bible. So their problem was identical in essence with the problem of the thirteenth century. They took the same road to a solution, and consequently interpreted Rom. 1²⁰ in the same way. The tradition has reigned for six centuries. No wonder, if it came at last to be taken so much as a matter of course, that there seemed to be little need of a thorough overhauling of the evidence.