PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND MOVEMENTS

ABOUT THE COLLECTED WORKS

Fr. Florovsky devoted much attention to his *Collected Works*. Until shortly before his death, he had continued to supply a variety of materials. These included suggestions for the structuring of the volumes; changes in certain texts; new materials; updated materials; notes; revisions; suggestions for revisions; updated bibliography; and several outlines for a new structure to his work on the Byzantine Fathers. Substantial time has been expended to implement his suggestions and instructions. Some materials will be included in the final volume, a volume which also contains an Index to the entire *Collected Works*, Appendices, Notes, Errata, Bibliography, and Miscellanea. To publish *The Collected Works* in English has entailed the translation of his works from several languages, including Russian, Bulgarian, Czech, Serbian, German and French.

PHILOSOPHY
Philosophical Problems and Movements

VOLUME TWELVE
in *THE COLLECTED WORKS* of

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Translated from Various Languages by Translators Mentioned at the End of Each Work

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PHILOSOPHY
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THE COLLECTED WORKS OF GEORGES FLOROVSKY

Volume I ..... *Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View*
Volume II ..... *Christianity and Culture*
Volume III ..... *Creation and Redemption*
Volume IV ..... *Aspects of Church History*
Volume V ..... *Ways of Russian Theology: Part One*
Volume VI ..... *Ways of Russian Theology: Part Two*
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Volume X ..... *The Byzantine Ascetic and Spiritual Fathers*
Volume XI ..... *Theology and Literature*
Volume XII ..... *Philosophy: Philosophical Problems and Movements*
Volume XIII ..... *Ecumenism I*
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[Additional forthcoming volumes. The final volume contains an Index to the entire *Collected Works*, Errata, Bibliography, Appendices, and Miscellanea]

SECOND PRINTING

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"The Weariness of the Spirit" is a review of Fr. Paul Florensky's book entitled *Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny* [The Pillar and Confirmation of the Truth]. It originally appeared in Russian in *Put'*, No. 20 (February, 1930). *Translated from the Russian by Roberta Reeder.*

"On Charles Renouvier" is a philosophical analysis of the thought of Renouvier on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Renouvier's death. The analysis originally appeared in Russian in *Put'* 14 (1928), pp. 111-116. *Translated from the Russian by Roberta Reeder.*

"*In Memoriam*: Andrei Karpov" originally appeared in Russian in *Sobornost'* No 12 (London, 1937), p. 2. *Translated from the Russian by Roberta Reeder.*

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APPENDIX

"The Philosophical Foundations of Solzhenitsyn's Vision of Art" originally appeared in *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Critical Essays and Documentary Materials*, ed. by John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh, and Alexis Klimoff (Nordland, 1973 and 1975; Collier Macmillan paperback, 1975).

A NOTE FROM THE PUBLISHER ON THE APPENDIX

The article in the Appendix is included in this volume for two reasons. First, Fr. Florovsky was interested in the research and writing of Dr. Haugh. Fr. Florovsky had read several of Dr. Haugh's writings in theology, literature, history and philosophy and was enthusiastic about them. It was not the first time that Fr. Florovsky had expressed himself publicly on the work of Dr. Haugh. About Dr. Haugh's book entitled *Photius and the Carolingians: The Trinitarian Controversy*, Fr. Florovsky wrote that the book is "*one of the major contemporary contributions to the history of Christian doctrine.*"

Fr. Florovsky wrote that Dr. Haugh's article on "Hawthorne and Dostoevsky" (contained in the Appendix to volume eleven of *The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky — Theology and Literature*) was "the most penetrating and perceptive work on a subject poorly handled previously. Dr. Haugh's range of knowledge in literature and theology and his perceptive analysis of the subject (especially the characters) makes this article necessary reading for a deeper knowledge of Dostoevsky and *Crime and Punishment*. To my knowledge the theological background of the worlds of both Hawthorne and Dostoevsky — and by extension, to a portion of the world of American literature, has never before been handled with such competence. Dr. Haugh's knowledge of the Church Fathers richly adds to his insightful literary analysis of Hawthorne and Dostoevsky."

Fr. Florovsky read an earlier draft of the article on "Dostoevsky's Vision of the Golden Age and Human Freedom" (contained in the Appendix to volume eleven of *The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky — Theology and Literature*) and considered it "one of the most perceptive and necessary works of criticism written."

What interested Fr. Florovsky about Dr. Haugh's "The Philosophical Foundations of Solzhenitsyn's Vision of Art"

was not only the analysis of Solzhenitysn's vision but Dr. Haugh's "ability to compare this vision with Dostoevsky's thought and contrast it with that of Tolstoy's. . . It would be a mistake for the reader to neglect the footnotes, which contain rich comparisons and contrasts."

The reader can judge for himself.

The second reason we are publishing this article in this volume is that we believe it adds a special dimension to the volume, one which we are certain Fr. Florovsky would have endorsed.

The article first appeared in 1973 and was republished in 1975 in the Collier Macmillan paperback edition of *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Critical Essays and Documentary Materials*, edited by John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh, and Alexis Klimoff. It is one of the essays which forms a portion of a book nearing completion by Dr. Haugh on religion and literature. It is printed here with the author's permission.

IN MEMORIAM

FR. GEORGES FLOROVSKY
1893-1979

"Preeminent Orthodox Christian Theologian, Ecumenical Spokesman, And Authority on Russian Letters."

[All quotations are from pages 5 and 11 of the *Harvard Gazette* of October 1, 1982, written by George H. Williams, Hollis Professor of Divinity *Emeritus*, Harvard Divinity School and Edward Louis Keenan, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University and "placed upon the records" at the Harvard Faculty of Divinity Meeting on September 16, 1982.]

"Archpriest Professor Georges Vasilyevich Florovsky (1893-1979), preeminent theologian of Orthodoxy and historian of Christian thought, ecumenical leader and interpreter of Russian literature . . . died in Princeton, New Jersey in his 86th year" on August 11, 1979.

Born in Odessa in 1893, Fr. Florovsky was the beneficiary of that vibrant Russian educational experience which flourished toward the end of the 19th century and produced many gifted scholars. His father was rector of the Theological Academy and dean of the Cathedral of the Transfiguration. His mother, Klaudia Popruzhenko, was the daughter of a professor of Hebrew and Greek. Fr. Florovsky's first scholarly work, "On Reflex Salivary Secretion," written under one of Pavlov's students, was published in English in 1917 in the last issue of *The Bulletin of the Imperial Academy of Sciences.*

In 1920, with his parents and his brother Antonii, Fr. Florovsky left Russia and settled first in Sophia, Bulgaria. He left behind his brother, Vasilii, a surgeon, who died in the 1924 famine, and his sister Klaudia V. Florovsky, who became a professor of history at the University of Odessa. In 1921 the President of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, invited Fr. Florovsky and his brother Antonii to Prague. Fr. Florovsky taught the philosophy of law. Antonii later became a professor of history at the University of Prague.

In 1922 Georges Florovsky married Xenia Ivanovna Simonova and they resettled in Paris where he became cofounder of St. Sergius Theological Institute and taught there as professor

of patristics (1926-1948). In 1932 he was ordained a priest and placed himself canonically under the patriarch of Constantinople.

In 1948 he came to the United States and was professor of theology at St. Vladimir's Theological Seminary from 1948 to 1955, and dean from 1950. From 1954 to 1965 he was professor of Eastern Church History at Harvard Divinity School and, concurrently (1962-1965) an associate of the Slavic Department and (1955-1959) an associate professor of theology at Holy Cross Theological School.

"Although Fr. Florovsky's teaching in the Slavic Department [at Harvard University] was only sporadic, he became a major intellectual influence in the formation of a generation of American specialists in Russian cultural history. His lasting importance in this area derives not from his formal teaching but from the time and thought he gave to informal "circles" that periodically arose around him in Cambridge among those who had read *The Ways of Russian Theology* [then only in Russian], for decades a kind of "underground book" among serious graduate students of Russian intellectual history, and had sought him out upon discovering that he was at the Divinity School . . . During a portion of his incumbency at Harvard . . . patristics and Orthodox thought and institutions from antiquity into 20th century Slavdom flourished. In the Church History Department meetings he spoke up with clarity. In the Faculty meetings he is remembered as having energetically marked book catalogues on his lap for the greater glory of the Andover Harvard Library! In 1964 Fr. Florovsky was elected a director of the Ecumenical Institute founded by Paul VI near Jerusalem." Active in both the National Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches, Fr. Florovsky was Vice President-at-Large of the National Council of Churches from 1954 to 1957.

"After leaving Harvard, Professor *Emeritus* Florovsky taught from 1965 to 1972 in Slavic Studies at Princeton University, having begun lecturing there already in 1964; and he was visiting lecturer in patristics at Princeton Theological Seminary as early as 1962 and then again intermittently after retirement from the University. His last teaching was in the fall semester of 1978/79 at Princeton Theological Seminary."

"Fr. Florovsky in the course of his career was awarded honorary doctorates by St. Andrew's University . . . Boston University, Notre Dame, Princeton University, the University of Thessalonica, St. Vladimir's Theological Seminary, and Yale. He was a member or honorary member of the Academy of Athens, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius."

Fr. Florovsky personified the cultivated, well-educated Russian of the turn of the century. His penetrating mind grasped

both the detail and depth in the unfolding drama of the history of Christianity in both eastern and western forms. He was theologian, church historian, patristic scholar, philosopher, Slavist, and a writer in comparative literature. "Fr. Florovsky sustained his pleasure on reading English novels, the source in part of his extraordinary grasp of the English language, which, polyglot that he was, he came to prefer above any other for theological discourse and general exposition. Thus when he came to serve in Harvard's Slavic Department, there was some disappointment that he did not lecture in Russian, especially in his seminars on Dostoievsky, Soloviev, Tolstoi, and others. It was as if they belonged to a kind of classical age of the Russian tongue and civilization that, having been swept away as in a deluge, he treated as a Latin professor would Terrence or Cicero, not presuming to give lectures in the tonalities of an age that had vanished forever."

Fr. Florovsky's influence on contemporary church historians and Slavists was vast. The best contemporary multi-volume history of Christian thought pays a special tribute to Fr. Florovsky. Jaroslav Pelikan of Yale University, in the bibliographic section to his first volume in *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, writes under the reference to Fr. Florovsky's two works in Russian on the Eastern Fathers: "These two works are basic to our interpretation of trinitarian and christological dogmas" (p. 359 from *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition: 100-600*). George Huntston Williams, Hollis Professor *Emeritus* of Harvard Divinity School, wrote: "Faithful priestly son of the Russian Orthodox Church . . . , Fr. Georges Florovsky — with a career-long involvement in the ecumenical dialogue — is today the most articulate, trenchant and winsome exponent of Orthodox theology and piety in the scholarly world. He is innovative and creative in the sense wholly of being ever prepared to restate the saving truth of Scripture and Tradition in the idiom of our contemporary yearning for the transcendent."

THE SLYNESS OF REASON

"Do not rejoice in this, that the spirits
are subject to you; but rejoice that your
names are written in heaven."
(Luke, X, 20)
πλὴν ἐν τούτῳ μὴ χαίρετε ὅτι τὰ πνεύματα ὑμῖν ὑποτάσσεται, χαίρετε δὲ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα ὑμῶν ἐγγέγραπται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

For a long time much has been said about the "crisis of European culture," thought and life, both in the West and here at home. And even the early Slavophiles, along with the West-European Romantics, penetrated into its mystery and called "Europe's" original sin by its true name in beginning to speak of "rationalism." The deadly-cold "lifelessness" of science, of knowledge — that theme of the tragedy of Faust — has long been a hackneyed topos. "And he who knows more than all others must cry most bitterly of all, having become convinced that the tree of knowledge is not the tree of life," — thus did the lips of Manfred pronounce some time ago a fatal condemnation of "European" civilization, with its complete reliance on the cult of "reason," on the cult of "abstract principles." And we may trace back through the entire nineteenth century, somewhere in the depths, the fiery outbursts of this tragically unhealthy process that was being realized, this "self-destruction of Reason" — *die Selbstzersetzung und Verzweiflung der Vernunft*, as Schelling put it.

The Romantics — Goethe, Carlyle, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hartmann, Renan, Ibsen, Metterlink. At first cautious, then more and more furious, waves of "irrationalism" grew up. Everywhere and in everything, even extending to religious attitudes and to the aesthetic perception of life. Starting from "literary" remarks about the "bankruptcy" of science, all the way to the attraction of the Satanic depths of black magic and to the rebirth of the orgiastic cult of Dionysius and Ceres, from the superficially atheistic denial of the Christian dogma all the way to the inspired justification of the "diversity of religious experience," from the call for a return to nature all the way to Futurism — everywhere there is clear evidence of profound disbelief in rational knowledge, in the "wisdom of systems." "Intuition" triumphantly supplants "logic," and the very ideal of the scientific cognition of "truth" fades away, either in the dim light of biological adaption to the conditions of existence or in the bright flame of mystical feeling and pantheistic ecstasy. The dynamic nature of the cosmos begins to be felt. The haughty dream of Feuerbach comes to

life — that of the "creation" of God, the archaic idea of the "developing Absolute," of the incompleteness of the world, is revived.

A contemporary Russian philosopher and theoretician of law recently drew a graphic picture of the "crisis of the contemporary sense of justice," strictly speaking, of the entire social world view as a whole, a picture of the wreck of "the utopia of earthly paradise." In the process of the test of time, the incapacity of human thought to outline a plan for the organization of life in which the source of discontent would be decisively eliminated, in which there would no longer be social evil, has been revealed. The strength of the fascination wielded by all those words of socio-political wisdom, each claiming to be the ultimate, has been depleted. Doubt has arisen in earlier, hitherto self-evident dogmas of socio-historical faith. Considerable disappointments have extinguished hopes of the coming of "eternal peace," of general prosperity, and faith in the cultural ascension of a united humanity. The conviction is gradually ripening that there is not and cannot be one all-saving plan for definitively "structuring" life, and faith is broken in the omnipotence of the "code" of natural rights and of social justice.

Furthermore, this is not only in theory, but also in life. Does the current history of English democratic statehood not serve as an example of the silent establishing of the "primacy of life" over abstract legislation?! Over there, "reality" has long since parted with "the written law," so that official formulas express most "futuristically" that which is happening "in actuality." But here is what is most important of all — there is not even any attempt being made to correct the archaic "norms" and to secure the transformed contents of social life in a new framework. Trust and interest in "formulas" has psychologically "dried up," and has been succeeded by hope in the creating power of individual creation, which does not assume the form of anything "immutable."

And thus, for all to hear, incompatible and audacious words are pronounced — about the "perishing of the West." A thought which not long ago seemed altogether monstrous moves into the very focus of the spiritual field of vision, a thought concerning the beginning perhaps not of a "new Eon of world history," but in any event of a fracture of the world's historical trajectory that is in no way less significant than the one once experienced by St. Augustine. And no one else after Hegel will repeat that our time is "the last" and "the concluding" stage of the evolutionary process. The historical horizon melted, disappeared: before the eyes everywhere was infinity.

But however impressive these symptoms of the dying of "immortal and absolute" wisdom may be, the roots of which go back far into the soil of history — all the way to Republican Rome and Aristotelian logic — the question still remains to be answered: will the rosy-colored dawn flare up into a bright new day? Will "the West" find in itself enough untouched and fresh strength to realize its dream and to renew itself not only in thought, but in actuality as well? — asked Herzen half a century ago. And it seems that, just like him, we too must now

answer with at least sceptical doubt, if not yet with complete denial. Here "the facts" again speak.

"It is little to refute a beautiful idea, it must be replaced by something that is equally beautiful," said Dostoevsky through the lips of one of his heroes; "or else I, not wishing to part with my feeling, will refute the refutation in my heart, although by force." This is exactly what has happened in the West. Herzen accurately noticed the "pocket idolatry" of the European, which forces him to weave out of any true thought, instead of a "broadening of the circle of action" rather a rope "in order to then bind his legs together and, if possible, to bind others' legs as well, so that the free work of his creation becomes punitive authority over himself."

Having lost confidence in the empty and frozen formulas of Protestant Scholasticism, in the cold legal dogmatics of Roman Catholicism, Europeans are withdrawing in large numbers. But where are they going? To the religion of monism, to theosophy, to Buddhism! No further. But this is all the same "rationalism," the same former striving towards formulas, towards pseudo-scientific "doctrines," — in a word, to belief in logical irrefutability: the God of the Christian faith is being replaced, in a vague way — by Nature, in whose honor new, already "unbelieving" pastors pronounce new *Sonntagspredigten*; or in His place is put a vague concept of an elusive Higher Force, which rules the world in accordance with unshakeable laws and yields to invocations and oaths. Thus, in the uprising against "Scholasticism" European thought does not go further than Gnosis — that is, than the ideal of religious knowledge — not attaining the true freedom of religious life. *Religious "conversions" in the West do not lead their neophytes out of the circle of naturalism.* Such is the case, clearly seen in Huisman's example, of the martyr of "refined Thivaide," in the well-turned phrase of N. Berdiaev. Consumed by the desire for vital completeness, he seeks a remedy to the torturesome banality of Positivism and "Realism" in the decadent overthrowing of conventionalities, in orgiastic individualism, and he passes through the silty depths of Satanism and black magic; reduced to ashes there, he runs to the protection of the cathedral. But not to no purpose have the dark forces, banished from within him, taken shelter as "numbed" monsters on his rooftop, have they gotten stuck in his windows: and even at the heights *de la vie dévote* Huisman remains a typical "decadent"; he accepts religious values only aesthetically, not "religiously." He seeks balsam for his spiritual wounds — balsam, which inevitably heals. In his versions of folk tales the old waves of unhealthy eroticism, of attraction towards the deformities and distortions of life, can be felt. And this is not accidental. In his well-known book on religious experience, which is founded almost exclusively on "Western" material, James strikingly emphasizes that the religious love of "saints" is mostly converted to that which is instinctively repulsive, which seeks an unpleasant situation for its

manifestation. He recalls how St. Francis of Assisi cured leprous sores, how other saints licked them clean; the life of Elizabeth of Hungary, the biography of Madame de Chantal, are filled with such details concerning their selfless devotion in hospitals that it is repulsive to read them. And it is enough to compare this with even a religious sermon of Tolstoy, saturated with ethic purism, to bring back to mind unbelieving intellectuals' conversions to Tolstoyism and then to Orthodoxy, to recall even the *dukhobors* ("spirit-wrestlers") — and the religious limitations of the Western spirit stands out in full force. In this difference, undoubtedly, the contrast between the religious elements nourishing "the East" and "the West" is revealed. And between them now lies the same abyss which in ancient times separated the mysticism of the East from the thought of Montanus, the Athonite Hesychasts from the German Flagellants, St. Simeon the New Theologian from St. Teresa of Spain. *The naturalism of Western mysticism is organically connected with the rationalism of Western thought*, which was perspicaciously felt by Vladimir Soloviev, who combines in the image of the Antichrist the great image of Apollo, the completeness of scientific knowledge and magical omnipotence over the elements of nature.

We encounter such combinations of "Positivism" and intuition in all manifestations of the Western-European reaction against rationality. The "rattling of dry bones" is distinctly heard even in the poetic philosophy of life of perhaps the most vivid expresser of contemporary Intuitivism. The authentic creative pathos of Bergson's "philosophical intuition" is assimilated with "science" in an original way. The French metaphysician substantiates the creative nature of spirit not so much on the unquestionable "self-testimony" of inner experience as on "objective" proof from psycho-physiology, psychiatry and biology. Matter becomes spiritualized, it is only "hardened" spirit; but as a result the opposite end is achieved: the soul becomes materialized, being drawn into the incessantly fluctuating variability of the indivisible vital fervor, at once both material and spiritual — potentially. Within the limits of this kind of naturalistic Monism there is no place for true creation and freedom; what Bergson is calling creation is a visible novelty of phenomena, dependent on the fluctuating character of reality. Bergson does not break through the iron loops of necessity: the causal inevitability remains; only in the place of a mosaic-like composition of influences he has set the latter's organic confluence. But all the purely logical antitheses which come to light in the interspersed evolutionary flow were originally established in the nature of the "*élan vital*." And it is noteworthy that the supra-rational element is realized on an entirely "rational" level — that of the successive kingdoms of nature. Nothing else could possibly happen in Bergson: indeed, in exposing the cinematographic character of "scientific" cognition, he does not deny "science," and is only trying to replace the former false, "rationalistic" science with a new "intuitive" one. And genetically, this outstanding

opponent of *ratio* is indeed the direct successor of the French philosophical tradition which ultimately goes back to the great rationalists — Descartes and Malebranche; in the latter we unexpectedly encounter, it would seem, direct anticipations of Bergson's most "modern" ideas.

The "European" limitedness of Bergson's world view is most noticeable when he is compared with genuine American Pragmatism, which is thickly steeped in the spirit of true religious creative searching. And it is instructive to realize that on "European" soil Pragmatism becomes colorless and impersonal. It may be directly said that Europe does not accept true "Pragmatism," and that what it does accept is only a substitute for the real thing. James' fundamental thought, the idea that the value of cognition consists not in its correspondence to some kind of unchanging canon of reason, but rather in its moral-creative force, has here been transformed into the identification of truthfulness with usefulness, when by "usefulness" we understand — "timely utility." Within the framework of the style of life in which "man is for the Sabbath," in which the highest justice is *fiat justitia, pereat mundus* — the idea of the humanity of truth has not entered into this narrow framework at all, especially when by "man" we understand not the average "Enlightened" European, but rather the "image and semblance of God."

If we closely examine the philosophical development of Europe over the last decades, it is easily noticed that behind the visible shroud of Irrationalism a general mobilization of all rationalist forces, in the literal sense of the word, is taking place. *The most mighty phenomena of German philosophical thought of recent times are nothing other than the revival of rational metaphysics.* This comes across most clearly of all in the so-called "anti-psychoanalysis." The destructive criticism to which Husserl subjected all of modern philosophical thought, exposing its inner "worm-eatenness," is well-remembered by all; he demonstrated nothing more and nothing less than the fact that the contemporary theory of knowledge makes knowledge, like an understanding of Truth, impossible. The shock produced by his arguments was tremendous: after them, many previously formed systems were rebuilt. Husserl insistently restores the rights of Truth — after a series of decades in which this word was written only with a small T. But to what purpose does he do this? For the sake of an absolute system of ideas, of "empirical" essences which rise above life and existence and are unconditionally inaccessible to any kind of real contact from without. This is the archaic rationalist conception of the supra-worldly and pre-eternal prototype of cosmic order, the deistic conception of God as a watchmaker. But in it there is not even a trace of the mystical trepidation which penetrated the entire system of the first "ideologue," the Hellenic prophet, of the religious enthusiasm which made him the pagan precursor of Christ. There is no enthusiasm in it, no rising over the surface of experience. The ideal of cognition remains, as before,

something along the lines of "intellectual contemplation" — true, it is now under the new name of "eidetic intuition."

The same intellectual stamp has impressed even more sharply upon the character of another influential current in the philosophy of modern-day Germany, the so-called "Marburg School" of Neo-Kantianism. In this case, it is true, there is seemingly a definitive break with the ideal of completed, absolute knowledge, which is transformed into the eternally unresolved "problem" of cognition: in place of completed cognition is an infinitely continuing process, the process of "cognition," the process of the "creation" and development of living thought. The place of *factum* is occupied by the creative *fieri*. But this is only how things seem to be. It is enough to recall with what application the representatives of this philosophical movement reduce all thinkers of earlier times to a common denominator, factoring the "common" Kantian coefficient out of their world views. In their hands, the "divine" Plato himself is transformed into a methodologist of science, and his religious terminology and mystical pathos are declared to be nothing more than superfluous "husks," an accident, which caught hold because of the conditions of his milieu. An open and conscious turning "back to Hegel" — explicitly to Hegel, the panlogist, not to any other of the last century's Idealist pleiade, like the moral enthusiast and "adogmatist" Fichte, for example — decisively reveals the ambiguity of the terminology. The "logic of pure cognition" is, indeed, a new system of panlogism, a new attempt to create an absolute science which, although eternally under construction and continually being repaired, is entirely incontestable and immutable in its "fundaments," which develop linearly in a direction that is determined once and for all. Let the "system of knowledge" be replaced by the "history of cognition." History itself is transformed into a system, the principles of which are not subject to any kind of review. In contemporary philosophy in general the tendency to find the ultimate basis of knowledge, the axioms which are higher than all doubt, comes across very clearly. This is only a new form of the "inherent ideas" of the old rationalism. And it must be added that this kind of striving extends into the realm of special science. It is precisely this which is the motivating force behind the present-day research of mathematical science. True, here rationalism is obviously exposing its limits: the attempt to construct arithmetic on "absolute" principles led to the exposure of antinomies and paradoxes in the concept of quantity.

The same intellectual inclination characterizes contemporary moral philosophy. The Marburgian "ethics of pure will" "validates" morality on the basis of law — that is, on the juridical form, on the abstract type of social existence. The Hegelian apotheosis of the state involuntarily comes to mind. The recently begun "renaissance of natural law" represents, again, only the logical reaction of the rationalist spirit against the extremely modest intuitivism that lay at the basis of the "historical school" of the lawyers. "Natural law," the "just law" (*das*

richtige Recht) that Rudolf Stammler preached not long ago, represents a systematic body of "rational" norms which definitively set all reciprocal human contact in its general vital traits. And when it is brought together with moral "law," then morality itself acquires the long-familiar dogmatically-killing touch of judiciousness which is so characteristic of all creations of the ethics of the "categorical imperative." Indeed, insofar as the latter is concerned, even reason is fighting against itself. The rationalism of socialistic teachings is too well known for more than a passing mention of it to be necessary.

In this whole new rationalist renaissance there is one extremely significant characteristic which the "philosopher of culture" is wrong to ignore. The rise of philosophical creation and the revival of philosophical literature over the last decades are inseparably linked in Europe — and particularly in Germany — with the influx of representatives of the Jewish nationality into the ranks of the European intelligentsia. This phenomenon is not unconditionally new. In earlier years one could already name Spinoza, Reimarus, Moses Mendelssohn (all rationalists), Maimonides and, finally, Marx. But at no other time would it have been possible to encounter whole groups of Jewish names. Hermann Cohen, Husserl, Bergson, George Kantor, Minkovsky, Freud, Weininger, Zimmel, Bernstein — and to these we must add more than a few lesser-known names — rare are those who catch the certain identicalness and unity of these uncoordinated names, of the spirit equally inspiring them all.

S. N. Bulgakov once drew a witty parallel between the game of sociological abstractions in *Das Capital* and the apocalyptic animals of post-bondage Judaic apocryphal literature (true, he did not make any rapprochements between the two nations): in both cases, abstract generalities totally hide the "living" variability of actual existence, the individuality of the historical process is totally supplanted by the plan of history which has crystallized. This comparison must be carried even further. It hardly requires many arguments to justify placing a sign of logical equality between "Judaism" and rationalism. Too well known is the "nomism," the conformity to laws, which penetrates all creations of the Jewish national genius, starting with Moses' tablets and going all the way to the "scribes and the Pharisees," and then again from the Talmud through Maimonides to the new Judaism, which no one other than Cohen himself openly placed higher than the obsolete religion of Christ. In the concept of "law" as a general formula, infallible and irremovable, all the threads of the European spirit intersect. Religion becomes a legal code. In the idea of a Deity all traits are effaced except juridical ones; the Judaic God is an administrator and an impartial judge, a strict observer of the order that has been established once and for all, the merciless punisher of all untruth.

At this point there is an unexpected convergence: the religious element of Judaism reveals its affinity with the spirit of Roman Catholicism, regulated by laws to such a great extent, which converted

the Evangelical message into a theological system based on the model of Aristotelian Logic and the Justinian Code. Not to no purpose was it namely the Western Church that inherited the messianic theocratism of ancient Israel, and from a union of believers became a state. In both cases there is the same juridical understanding of good and evil, of sin and retribution, the same understanding of the world as a system of divine law-order, which realizes the pre-eternal thoughts and pre-determinations of the Almighty and Supremely-Wise Creator. And even in Western mysticism — not only in that of the church but also in the sectarian variety, which is far from Roman Orthodoxy — the All-forgiving and Kindhearted Father, the God of the New Testament, is totally hidden in a frightening way by the terrible Judge protecting his eternal will amidst blood and punishments, effacing entire peoples from the "book of life," punishing men for the sins of their ancestors — descendants all the way to seven times the seventh generation — revealing his Truth amidst flashing lightning on fire-breathing Sinai. Catholic thought absorbed all the "cultural" currents of the rationalistic mentality, and last century the official restoration, decreed *ex cathedra*, of the summarizing philosophy of schools is one more clear symptom of the all-permeating rationalism of the Western world. Here, truly, "the West is in the arms of the East," only it is "the East of Xerxes and not of Christ," the ancient pre-Neoasiatic East, which did not recognize any freedom other than that of the arbitrariness of one-man power; it is this very east which was revived in the Roman papacy, just as the traditions of the ancient synagogue were transferred to the Methodists and the Quakers, to their religion of — one could say — "common sense."

It would be completely erroneous to think that "rationalism" excludes all inspiration, all pathos; no, it has its own particular mysticism of "panlogism," the same one of which Hegel speaks in his well-known preface to *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, opposing it to the aesthetic idealism of Schelling. The pivot of this rationalistic enthusiasm is the idea of the general accessibility of cognition, an original gnosiological "democratism." Individual entities become equal before the supra-individual and individuality-less, abstract, self-contained system of Reason. Truth must be nothing other than a system of reason — not a revelation of artistic genius, for only by standing higher than all individuals, by not being organically connected with individual life, can such a system be accessible to all and not be dependent on the spiritual anointment of the individual. Thus, in the name of general accessibility cognition is deprived of its vitality, moral-creative strength is removed from it, and at the same time it is drawn into the necessary game of the elements of the natural world. From a feat of spiritual birth, cognition is transformed into either a psycho-physiological reflex or a mirror-like reflection of "things in themselves." Psychology becomes "the mechanics of emotional life," and logic, a part of this inductive science. The mysticism of rationalism inevitably degenerates into naturalistic "magic," from an actor-creator, free and autocratic, man

becomes the toy of elementally-caused pre-determination, a link in the all-encompassing system of nature. And if spiritual forces are felt in the world, then they are materializing at this very minute — they also obey inevitable laws, in this sense they are entirely analogous to the forces of dead nature, and like the latter they are subject to outer influences. Rationalism logically leads to "spiritism."

The inevitable association of rationalism and naturalism, the necessity for reason to dissolve freedom and the creation of personality in a system of nature, is penetratingly illuminated by the unjustly little-known Russian thinker V. Nesmelov in his brilliant interpretation of the Biblical story of the Fall. Well aware of the irreparability of the contradictions, the irreversibility of the antinomies to which the rationality of the current explanation of the religious meaning of this event leads, he carefully avoids the use of traditional concepts — disobedience, outrage, punishment, retribution and so on. The meaning of evil should not be ascertained in criminological terminology. The content of the "original sin" can be neither in formally heeding the commandment, nor — as Vladimir Soloviev maintained, continuing the gnostic tradition in the line of Schelling and Baader — in departing from total unity and the affirmation of the self. In striving towards the goal of the "cognition of good and evil" there was not and could not be anything bad. The "fall" consisted in the fact that people desired to attain this goal not through a creative act, through free searching, vital God-serving, but rather by a magical route, mechanically: "in essence, they wanted their life and fate to be determined not by themselves, but by outer material causes," and with this "they lowered themselves to the position of simple things of the world," they "subjected their spiritual life to the physical law of mechanical causality, and therefore introduced their spirit into the general chain of worldly things." The essence of the "fall" is not in the violation of a law but in superstition, in the conviction that cognition is passive reception and not a creative act. And redemption consisted of nothing other than breaking through the fatalistic net of causal relations, of newly affirming the personal element over that of "things," in opening the eternal life which lies beyond and above the surface of the elemental forces.

For the very reason that "rationalism" secures the cosmic process in the steadfast formulas of world laws, individuality becomes a thing or an event — it does not merely seem to be this way, it is actually transformed into a thing, for consciousness of the self dies away, so to speak, dissolving into the formless element of reason. The most the rationalist can feel is the existence of borders, the existence of the inevitable limitations of Fate. But the magical circle cannot be opened by the abolishment of barriers alone. To accomplish this it would be necessary "to be born in water and spirit." This kind of rebirth does not happen in the West — and for this reason all of thought's efforts remain captive in the old prisons. It is already a great achievement that the

prisoner has felt and become conscious of himself as such: indeed, earlier he considered himself free.

The "blowing" of the liberated spirit, which "breathes where it pleases" and not to where a causal sequence orders it, is heard in our time only outside the limits of "European" thought. It illuminates the creations of the national geniuses of the Russian people, which is "anarchical" by its very nature; it makes a mark upon the insights of American genius. It is not by chance that the American "rationalist" Royce lifted from among the dropped threads of the "European" philosophical tradition not the thread of the "uniformity of nature," not that of the self-disclosure of reason, but rather that of the ethical pathos which inspired Fichte with the first succinct formulation in the history of Western-European thought of the idea of a "philosophy of freedom," a "philosophy of the individual," as opposed to the dogmatism of a "philosophy of things." It is not by chance that outside of Europe prophetic words were spoken concerning the "plasticity" of the world. It is not by chance, finally, that a Russian writer revealed the deep source of the rationalistic "sense of life" in the suggestions of the "terrible and wise spirit" who spoke with Christ in the desert. There, as earlier in primordial Adam, he spoke of one thing — of the unshakeable strength of the world elements, of world-order, of power over humanity, of social harmony, — and his words, which have an entirely different ring to them, bring genuine renewal: "Now the prince of this world will be banished hence. . . Take heart, I have conquered the world."

Sofia, 1921

Translated from the Russian by
Catherine Boyle

THE CRISIS OF GERMAN IDEALISM (I)
THE "HELLENISM" OF GERMAN IDEALISM

Dedicated to L. I. Shestov

The religious significance of German Idealism was much argued about in its time. This debate was not finished at that time, and at present, the same question is again being asked with great acuteness. Perhaps the real and final crisis of Idealistic metaphysics is beginning only now. The breakdown of the Idealistic system in the middle of the last century was not as conclusive as it was generally considered to be. It was the crisis of public opinion, but not the crisis of the philosophical idea. But after a short period of oblivion the same idea appeared again in Positivism with the same problems and the same notions. However, the revival of Idealism was no philosophical restoration. It was rather the direct continuation of the historical way, the resumption of forgotten, but still not exhausted, traditions. Only now the era of Kant and Goethe comes to an end. Only now the limitation reveals itself, the exclusiveness of the Idealistic conception of the world penetrates the consciousness. But this understanding is equivalent to the end of the era.

The present crisis of Idealism may first be determined by religious motives. Philosophical ways out of the dead ends of Idealism do not exist. Only religious criticism can break the closed circle of Idealistic presuppositions. That is by no means an accident, for Idealism itself is actually a religious system. Idealism is religious in its problems, its aims and its themes. It wants to be a speculative theology. The German Idealists questioned the ultimate, the absolute, and sought final answers. They sought absolute understanding and built systems of absolute knowledge of God and the world. For most of the Idealists, Christianity remained the absolute religion. They sincerely considered themselves Christians, and made use of Christian language. They strove after motivation and "justification" of the Christian faith, whereby Christianity was led to the greatest measure of rational understanding. For that reason, it is not astonishing that Idealism was for a long time the acknowledged philosophy of Protestantism. But doubts soon arose. The roads parted, some of them led far away from Christianity. It was not clear where the line of development continued and who expressed the mystery of Idealism. Feuerbach in his anthropological atheism, Schelling in his "positive philosophy" or Edward von Hartmann? *Or does Idealism not conceal only one mystery?* In former times, the question of German Idealism used to be asked apologetically. One stubbornly spoke of a "reconciliation" between Idealism and Christianity. Over the course of time this became continuously more

difficult, and finally impossible. Based on religious experience, the *incomparability* of these two ideologies, the Idealistic and the Christian one, showed itself. And also the question of religious choice and religious decision. At the same time, it assumes great cultural and philosophical acuteness. For renouncing Idealism means renouncing the past, means a cultural and historical break. The influence of Idealism was so strong in all cultural fields. The "human sciences," in particular, were strongly influenced. To this day, they draw on the inheritance of Idealism. The crisis of Idealism is a cultural crisis. *Not only in Germany does this question take such a turn,* for German Idealism was not only a German affair. It was a world event. It somehow represents a common moment in the historical fate of the European world. That is why the crisis of Idealism means a revolutionary change *in the whole of European history.* One cannot remain simply at the state of rejection. It is not sufficient to reject it. One has to overcome it by realizing it in its creative moments.[1]

In a sense, the present crisis of German Idealism means a new disengagement of the European consciousness from Hellenism. The Biblical ideology is not by chance contrasted now to Idealism. It is hardly correct to regard Idealism as only the expression of the German national element. That would mean that one wants to substitute historical values with natural ones. But we have to explain the historical fate of thought not by natural facts, but by the creative acts of the intellect. In any case, Greek influences acted *determinatively* on the consciousness of German Idealism. Antiquity became an age about which one became enthusiastic, and that applied to Goethe as well as to Hegel. For Hegel, ancient Hellas always remained a kind of ideal paradigm of humanity. The Romantic contrast of two types of life, the harmonic and the broken *one*, also arose originally from the comparison of the present with the ancient world. The question here is not only the enthusiasm for antiquity in general.

One can speak of a creative revival of ancient traditions of thought in German Idealism, of a strong Hellenization of the German philosophical consciousness. Above all, problems are Hellenistic in German Idealism. Ancient thought could understand least of all the empirical, the changeable, the variety. Especially *the event* appeared mysterious and incomprehensible to ancient man. That is why he strove to overcome the event, to overcome time. Ancient thought did not lose itself in the abstract by this. On the contrary, it always remained concrete. And yet it brought the world, so to speak, to a standstill. Thus may the philosophical idea of Plato be characterized. For him, the actual world is the world of the eternal and unchangeable forms. Ideas are not abstractions, not specific notions; they are concrete symbols of things, "plastic-grown thought," as Plotinus later put it. In this Aristotle does not differ from Plato. Ancient thought always tended more towards pluralism than towards generalizations. It is too plastic to become rational. The Greek denies this world, but he denies its tattered

condition and instability, not its variety; he even strives to justify its variety. Ancient philosophy is a universal, metaphysical morphology of existence, a theory of the ideal structure and architecture of the world. The theory of the eternally ideal world, of the world of paradigms and prototypes, was the creative revelation of Greek philosophy, its historical feat. Ancient metaphysics is further completed by the theory of the unique. For the Greek, the unique remains the creative source of everything coming into existence, "where the prototypes undulate *up and down*." Ancient philosophy was a justification of the world, a theory of the persistence of the world. But that was no idyll. The Greek genius is a tragic one. It knows much of the chaos and the contradictions in the universe. The ancient universe is constructed dialectically, but it nevertheless exists, as universe, as harmony. The Greek could anticipate a fall of all things in the fire, but at the same time he also anticipated the eternal return. The most penetrating glimpses into the future could not disturb the mystical balance of the intellect, could not make its conviction of the lasting quality of the universe waver. Lately Hellenism again arises, as with Bruno for example, as the theory of world harmony. German Idealism existed in this ancient universe, too. It again became a morphology of the world. The morphological thought is most sharply expressed in the logic of Hegel. This system of his is a theory of "the forms of the universe." That was the common idea of Idealism. The whole pathos of Idealism was aimed at the search for the unchangeable foundations of the world, at the revelation of its eternally ideal outline or the scheme which holds it together. In other words: Idealism strove for a general explanation. One unjustly reproached Idealism with abstraction. In its aims, it was by all means concrete and realistic. One can accuse it rather of too strong a reality, of too strong a fascination with the world. Idealism exaggerated the proportion and harmony of existence, the organic organization of the world-system. That is the reason for its proud pretention to deduce or reconstruct the world from its origins down to the last grain of sand. Idealism thought that the world is organized so proportionally. Idealistic ideology is polarized. It splits into the pathos of infinity and the pathos of form. Idealism knows Tantalos' pain of insatiable striving forward. But it does not suffer under it. Rather it is very proud of this ability of continuous acting — a motif which is most distinct with young Fichte. Even in existence itself Idealism anticipates an eternal potentiality, the inexhaustible power to create something new. However, the pathos of form was always victorious. That was the case even with Schopenhauer — the blind will incarnates itself in beautiful forms. That is a very characteristic trait. The Idealistic conception of the world is always finite, always limited; it is in any case always a very sharply defined image. Though chaos stirs and bubbles in the depths, though easily excited storms lurk there, chaos cannot overwhelm the universe. For chaos itself is the womb bearing forms, it is impregnated with these forms from ancient times.

Idealism knows this "seamy side" of existence, knows the abysses and whirlpools. But it even believes and sees — they also adapt themselves to the circle, the rhythm of the universe. With Hegel, the pathos of form triumphs definitively. Hegel rejects the progressing infinity as something "bad" and tries to present the world as a complete whole. It is not important here whether he succeeded in doing it. It is only important what he strove for, in what he indulged his imagination. This motif of harmony is very prominent not only in "*panlogism*," but it may also be even more distinct in Romanticism and in Schelling's Voluntarism. Romanticism, wasting away with longing sadness and being inwardly stirred up, always believed in the world as in the universe. In the time of Romanticism the world showed itself as a sublime and perfect epic poem. And with that we meet a new Hellenistic trait. In Idealism, the aesthetic factor prevails over the ethical one. For that reason it is no accident that in the Idealistic age a close connection exists between philosophy and art. It is also no accident that at that time many regarded art as merely a part of philosophy. Schelling directly states that art is the highest of all revelations, and that a real philosophy of the intellect has to be an "aesthetic philosophy." He saw in art above all the power of formation, the capacity to create harmonies. The formalism of Idealistic thought determined its standpoint through this aesthetic tendency, but not through the rationalist one. Plato's world of ideas showed itself in German Idealism above all from its artistic side — take, for example, the original phenomenon of Goethe. In Hegel the aesthetic motifs are very distinct. One certainly cannot reproach him with abstract rationalism. One is amazed at the artistic plasticity and the depiction of his thought in his works. His thought is completely penetrated by imagination; it is a kind of thinking clairvoyance.[2]

This religious attitude also becomes comprehensible through the aesthetics of Idealistic consciousness. The world reveals itself to Idealism in its divine beauty as a work of art, as an organism and system of realized forms. The Idealists tried to comprehend existence through the event, as its basis and energy — the resting in the ever changing. They knew only this ancient way to the absolute. The event as the manifestation of existence, as the appearance of the original, is the highest and only thought of Idealism. It seemed to them that existence would completely reveal itself in the event. In any case, it should be that way for them. For existence is nothing other than the power and the need to reveal itself. There is nothing which is concealed forever, there is only that which has not yet been fulfilled. There are no ultimate unrevealable mysteries of existence. All mysteries are temporally conditioned. The actual mystery for Idealism is the power of revelation. The Idealists thought in the element of the absolute, for only absolute thought is adequate to the perceptible. By this, something absolute always reveals itself to them in accomplished perception. Thus Idealism comes to the identification of God and the world, to the

assertion of the perfection and divinity of every true existence. But by that, *Idealism becomes pantheism.* Despite all its inaccuracy, this name, conceived afterwards, indicates rightly the basic tendency of German Idealism. Of course, identifying God with the world is out of the question, for such an equivalence was only seldom taken for granted by any of the pantheists. The difference is always made between prototype and form. Pantheism is a cosmological theory rather than a theological one, a theory of the world and not of God. The basic idea of pantheism is the absolute, insoluble connection of God with the world, the idea of mutual closest connection. In the recognition of "reciprocity" lies the acuteness of pantheism. For pantheism recognizes not only the foundation of the world in God, but also claims that God absolutely needs the world, that he has to reveal himself in it, that his existence in the world — and thereby the world itself — constitutively belongs to the perfection of the divine existence. This conclusion is drawn in order to explain the world. Otherwise, the existence of the world would be completely senseless, an additional accident could disturb its harmony. Moreover, nothing unnecessary, nothing changeable can be added to something absolute, for then this perfection itself would be disturbed. Considered that way, the world becomes the eternal double of God. The world cannot be non-existent, because then God would not exist either, but then God would not be God. If the world did not have to exist, it would not exist; for nothing can be added to divine perfection from without. Consequently, the world is an eternal self-revelation of God, an eternal changing existence of divine life. Without these eternal and absolute ties, the empirical world would have to decay. The understanding of absolute perfection is the basis for such conclusions. For that is the basic idea of pantheism. At this point all lines intersect. There are many kinds of pantheism, but one must judge them not according to their individual characteristics but according to the tendency common to all of them. Pantheism is not only the denial of the "personality" of God and not only the recognition of the identity of God and the world. These are all individual and hardly unequivocal characteristics. In making a determination, one has to pay attention to the basic thought: either the world does not exist or God does not exist without the world. The German Idealists argued much about pantheism, but pantheism was not overcome with this dispute because even its opponents did not renounce this basic presupposition. Idealism does not cross the boundaries of ancient religious thought: for Idealism God remains only the idea of all ideas, the original ground and the center of the whole cosmic edifice.[3] Idealism restricted itself to the theory of universal unity. And strangely enough, it inevitably assumed an uncosmic coloring. The intention of the absolute motivation of the concrete world, which was carried out with the greatest possible consistency, was expressed in it most clearly. For here everything empirical is immediately translated and arranged into the absolute plan.

From this, a peculiar occasionalism arises. The empirical connections become obscure and superfluous, everything happens through external empirical forces. All true connections, the whole dynamism, lie outside the empirical world. The concrete world becomes strangely phantom-like, changes into some symbolical shadow. Nothing in it changes, it does not disappear. But the shadow becomes too shadowy. So the search for the absolute foundations of existence ends in a peculiar illusionism. The reason for this illusionism, by which the Idealists themselves are often startled, is not the subjectivism but the all-comprehensive perfect conception of the world. That does not mean that the world becomes for the Idealist a mere abstraction. One could rather say, for the Idealist it changes into a dream. "The world becomes a dream and a dream becomes the world," as Novalis says. The world stiffens, shall grow stiff, shall stand still like a beautiful dream. The pathos of form leads to the understanding of finiteness and limitation. The form itself is limitation, an immanent limitation, as the Pythagorians said. The world is from ancient times closed by its form, and equally confined to a circle by the system of forms. It does not matter whether these forms may be divided into logically constructed laws or whether they may only be perceived by the intelligible imaginative power of the ingenious poet, for the world in its beauty is static, is numb. It is from the beginning sufficient in and of itself. The perfection of the real can be realized within the world. One could say that it has already been realized. There is neither the need nor the possibility to cross the boundaries of the absolute world. One can speak of the aesthetic determinism of Idealistic philosophy. It is already determined in advance by the theory of the world as an organic and complete whole. Idealism does not permit any gaps or unevenness in existence. It believes in the adjustment of all faults and imperfections. For that reason it is difficult to include the ethical problems in the circle of the other problems of Idealism. It is characteristic that at that time duty and freedom were being talked about much more than good and evil. In Idealism ethical man was being considered rather formally and aesthetically with the characteristics of perfection, self-determination and social consciousness. The sociological problem almost displaced the question of honesty. We are most strangely concerned by the limited feeling of Idealism for evil. Physical evil shocked more than moral malice, the earthquake of Lisbon more than the act of a criminal. It dissolved in imperfection, an imperfection which means the liberation from ethical categories. It even changes into the one eternally important pole of existence necessary for harmony and perfection. The fall of man has a cosmic meaning rather than an ethical one. Evil was only carried into the concrete world by it. These are again ancient traits. In its basic presuppositions and tendencies of thought Greek Idealism is repeated by German Idealism. This similarity must not be attributed to direct influence but rather to the same basic view.

It is quite interesting to show the great difference between German Idealism and Indian pantheism, although some thoughts of Indian pantheism have been taken over by the German synthesis in reorganized form. The difference consists in the understanding of form. According to their basic attitude, German and Greek Idealism accept and justify the world. That is why the idea of the universe is so distinct. Indian pantheism, on the contrary, not only denies the world, but rigidly rejects it. Buddhism as a philosophical theory rejects not only empirical, immoral multiplicity, but also rejects the ideal world, the world of various forms. It strives to extinguish completely not only the will for the event but also the will for existence; it strives for perfect indefiniteness, "where every name, any form and every consciousness disappears." According to its ideal, it is completely amorphous. This is closely connected with the basic metaphysical ideas of Buddhism. The universe is constructed of atoms, that is, of atoms coming into existence and disappearing immediately. That concerns not only the empirical world but also its basic transcendental ideas. Existence appears in instantaneous and discrete objectivizations. Countless forms incessantly flare up and sink into darkness. They emerge from the transcendental in existence and reveal themselves in the event; but each is done but once. That is a complete denial of continuity, of any connections in the event. And this whole process of transitoriness which is without a beginning shall find its end in Nirvana. Considering this, the desparate longing for what never existed, connected with the absolute oblivion of what existed, has to be interpreted.[4] All this is completely unknown to Hellenistic and German thought. The notion of form remains here always the final and highest value. Metaphysical overcoming is considered here as the highest formation, not as formlessness. If Hellenism reaches a unity beyond ideal multiplicity, then this is done by sublimination, by the combination of different single notions, but not by simple denial. We find the same motif in German Idealism. Here again we find ourselves in the field of the metaphysical morphology of existence. This idea contains the actual temptation of Hellenism, which then appears again in the history of German thought; that is, the union with the universe, the tempting of form.

Translated from the German by
Claudia Witte

[1]As to critical literature, I give only the essential works: W. Ebert: *Der Kampf um das Christentum. Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen dem Christentum in Deutschland und dem allgemeinen Denken seit Schleiermacher und Hegel* (1921) [The Struggle for Christianity. History of the Relations between Christianity in Germany and the General Thought since Schleiermacher and Hegel]; W. Lütgert: *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende*, 3 Bände und Beilage (Gütersloh, 1922-1925) [The Religion of German Idealism and Its End, 3 volumes and supplement]; E. Hirsch: *Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum*

(Gütersloh, 1926) [Idealistic Philosophy and Christianity]; E. Brunner: *Die Mystik und das Wort* (Tübingen, 1924) [Mysticism and the Word]; Helmut Groos: *Der deutsche Idealismus und das Christentum. Versuch einer vergleichenden Phänomenologie* (München, 1927) [German Idealism and Christianity. An Attempt of Comparative Phenomenology]; F. K. Schumann: *Der Gottesgedanke und der Zerfall der Moderne* (Tübingen, 1929) [Theological Thought and the Decay of Modernism]. Compare the bibliographical information in the work by Groos.

[2]This side of Hegelian philosophy is excellently represented in the book by J. A. Ilin in Russian: *The Philosophy of Hegel as the Theory of the Concreteness of God and Man* (2 volumes; Moscow, 1918).

[3]Compare the essay by H. Schwarz: "Die Entwicklung des Pantheismus in der neueren Zeit" ["The Development of Pantheism in Recent Time[s]"], published in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* [Periodical for Philosophy and Philosophical Criticism] vol. 157, 1915, pp. 20-80. Concerning pantheism, one finds good commentary in the old Catholic theologian Staudenmayer, in his dogmatics, in his book *Die Lehre von der Idee* (Gießen, 1840) [Theory of the Idea] and in his periodical essays.

[4]Compare also a book by Rosenberg: *The Problem of Buddhist Philosophy* (in Russian; St. Petersburg, 1918).

THE CRISIS OF GERMAN IDEALISM (II)
THE CRISIS OF IDEALISM AS THE CRISIS OF REFORMATION

Ancient thought did not know the problem of history. In Greece there were significant historians, but the great metaphysicians never dealt with the philosophy of history. History was not a problem for them; it did not raise any questions. Ancient thought did not go beyond the idea of historical cycles and the eternal cycle. The metaphysical understanding of history awoke only in the Christian age. But strangely enough, even the philosophies of the Christian world did not raise the question of the problem of history for a long time. Apocalyptics took the place of philosophy of history. Thought concentrated only on the question of the end, the rupture of the historical process. Chiliasm also pays attention only to this moment. Only later does historical feeling in philosophy awaken, only in the course of the eighteenth century. History becomes a problem only for German Idealism, perhaps also for Vico (1668-1744).

It is generally assumed that the problem of the philosophy of history has a central position in German Idealism. This is what the Idealists themselves thought and said. In a sense this is correct. The problem of history appeared in philosophical consciousness, but it was not solved in German Idealism — it was only picked up. The German Idealists built up a statics, a morphology and a symbolism of history — a dynamic of history does not exist in their system. The problem of historical dynamics was discovered too late, only in the era of decay, by the Hegelian left. It was not solved any further and could not be solved any more.

The problem of history had the same fate in Idealism as the problem of freedom in Kant — both questions are connected with each other. Kant taught the freedom of the intelligible or reasonable character but an empirical freedom does not exist in his ethics, for the empirical subject is limited by its intelligible or reasonable character. Accordingly, freedom is not the basis and the starting point of action, but only a quality, a static characteristic but not a dynamic one. Thus, in the philosophy of the history of Idealism there is also an ideal or intelligible dynamic outside the empirical realm, whereas there is no empirical dynamic of history. Empirical history turns out to be a necessary projection of the "eternal and ideal history," an indistinct copy of the empirically external prototype. Idealism applies the same occasionalism — by which Idealistic natural metaphysics is determined — to the philosophy of history. Historical reality becomes strangely transparent, it changes into a symbol or a shadow. History was for the Idealist an object of reflection rather than a field of activity. This

historical aestheticism is strange and at the same time, considering the great historical events and catastrophes, it is comprehensible. One could become paralyzed in the searching reflection of the images of life which demand respect and try to clear up the mysteries of the intellect according to forms and signs. And it was strange that during that time of the restless and heroic characters, the will for deeds and contradictions did not become active. Aesthetics is connected with a characteristic trait of the Idealistic philosophy of history: *the future does not exist.* This is most prominent in Hegel. He only sees the past, is totally retrospective. He is absorbed in reflection. He was hardly satisfied with the present, for it destroyed his scheme. History did not stop where it should stop according to his rationally constructed plans. His whole construction was destroyed. But he never turned to the future, either. The category of the future seemed too empirical to him. It was for him too dubious an element. The mysteries of the depth clearly shone through only in immobility and the numb past. Hegel solves and explains these mysteries according to the signs and symbols of the past. For him, history becomes the universe.

Romanticism is more dynamic. The Romantic looks into the future. But he expects the future; he does not create it himself. He hopes and expects. And Hegel rejects this tension in Romanticism. The Romantic lives in longing melancholy; the future reveals itself to him like a wonderful face, like a wonderful dream. The life of the Romantic is the life of a prophet who foresees apocalyptic catastrophes. Romanticism denies personal creativity. Nature creates, but not man. Man is also only a small piece of nature, an eternal fragment, as Schelling puts it. The Romantic was very sensitive to impersonal molecular processes. That is why, for him, everything was animated. He felt everywhere the pulse of life. But Romanticism was blind to personal creativity. The man of Romanticism is not a man of action, but a spectator; not a creator, but an interpreter of the mysteries of creation. In Romanticism the artistic gift is considered the highest form of human existence. But the artist does not create independently; he only pictures the creations which appear to him; he repeats the sounds he hears. He is a reproducer, not a creator. He always reproduces something, always describes, of course not the empirical but the eternal ideal reality, which he penetrates through his intellectual intuition.

There are two sides to the "historical." The historical is original. The historical is changeable. The historian has to be above all clairvoyant and sensitive to the unique and the specific. The German Idealists had this artistic clairvoyance. They could understand the mind of a time, could represent the face of an age. Idealistic historiography is always graphic. For the Idealist, history is divided into a series of completed and sublime images which are always related to an idea, to a plastic scheme. But this is exactly the reason why history changes into morphology. All these prototypes are beyond time. They have become eternal and clear in their perfection, and for that reason they are numb.

That is the immovable face of time. Idealism diverts from time as from the empirical. There is no time in the ideal plan. Time is a predicate of the material world. Hence it follows that the understanding of uniqueness is completely absent in the Idealist. Uniqueness exists only in time. But uniqueness in time is not equivalent to peculiarity or individuality. Concrete time consists of events. But the idea of the event is not the event itself any more. During the transition from the concrete event to the concept, something is lost. Idealism is not alarmed by this loss, for only empirical imperfection and unevenness is lost. Therein lies its blindness. It denies the reality of time. For it, time is only an imperfection, a reduction, a dismembered eternity. Moreover, there is no history as events. History, then, is only a symbol: *everything transitory is only an allegory.* Idealism always studies history as a whole. It always sees the ideal, accomplished history which is complete in itself, history in its idea. From the point of view of history as a whole, time appears only as an architectonic scheme. That is why every moment is like the other. As a whole, every point is different from the others because one differs from the others in its position. But every point is thereby equally important, for there are no especially important and exclusive points in history. Thus, development in history is denied. It appears as a complete circle. Time stands still not only in logic but also in aesthetics. Beauty, like thought, is timeless. In contemplation they are joined together. In time there are only deeds and actions. The Idealistic philosophy of history detaches itself from the events. All actions appear symbolic. They have a meaning, but they are never creative. For the Idealist, the meaning of history does not consist in the fact that something in time is accomplished and takes place or that something new comes into existence. The development lacks the last reality. It is only a symbolic doubling of the actual being. The meaning of history, which lies beyond time, consists in this appearance and emergence of the prototypes in concrete forms. Time itself is not meaningful. Only the emerging from time is meaningful, and that is always possible. Every moment is the symbol of the eternal. That is why the vertical line to the empirical level of history can be reconstructed from any given point in time, and thus time can be left behind. It is in the power of man to free himself from history. Man can always get rid of all his ties by a heroic exertion of will power, he can always realize the variety of his noumenal freedom and assure himself of his eternal meaning. Therein lies the pathos of Fichte — the pole of the Idealistic denial of history. One does not need history in order to realize the ultimate meaning of existence. It only disturbs this process by relating the individual to everything else. But the Idealistic denial of history has still another pole: actual meaning can only reveal itself in the whole. More precisely, it has already been realized in the perfection which is only very incompletely reflected in time. One has to return to this perfection again. In both cases history, conditioned by time, has no meaning. It is

interesting that Idealism in the philosophy of history is closely connected with Leibniz (1646-1716). The world of Leibniz is the world of eternal tranquillity, the world of ideas which have been realized since ancient times. All ties in this world are only symbolic. The world of German Idealism is the world of Leibniz — only applied to the historical. Concerning Idealism, only the language, the terminology, is historical, but time is excluded from all historical terminologies. Idealism received the idea of development from Aristotle, the other great static philosopher, through Leibniz. It strove to be a theory of the development of the world. That is exactly the reason why it was blind to history. For by no means is history a development. For the Idealists, development is a morphological concept, not a dynamic one. Development is a revelation; there is nothing creative about it. Nothing is created anew. Development is revelation of form. A theory of development is always a theory of preformation. That is why development can always be rationally calculated and determined beforehand.[1]

In one of his earlier essays Schelling clearly speaks of the originality of the historical. He thinks in the following manner: the historical differs from nature in its freedom. "History in the only true sense has a place only where one can absolutely — that is, from any level of perception — not determine in advance the direction of free action." For that reason only man has a history, for he alone is absolutely bound neither by his nature nor by his own action. His life alone develops not in continuous circulation, but progressively. This, of course, concerns the whole human race. His fate is created by himself, founded and creatively formed by himself. For that reason it must not and cannot be determined beforehand. It is namely that concerning which theories may be set up *a priori* that is no longer historical. And Schelling draws the conclusion: a philosophy of history is impossible. History is the actual field of the aposteriorical [*das eigentliche Gebiet des Aposteriorischen*] but every theory is an *a priori* theory according to its very nature. Schelling does not fall into crass empiricism; he does not divide history into atoms. He stresses only the last reality, not only of empirical but also of ontological freedom. He writes in his system of transcendental Idealism: "Arbitrariness is the goddess of history." This thought requires explanation, but he rightly put the question as such. One cannot only say that history is the field of the undefinable. One has to add that it is the field of creating and the field of what has to be created anew. This creative power is not directed towards emptiness but aims at an ideal. But Idealism renounced the notion of the ideal. The notion of entelechism, the notion of an immanent aim, takes the place of the ideal.

Hegel denies most strongly and blatantly the notion of ideal. For him, history is equivalent to evolution. He stresses this especially in the development of the intellect. New creations could not appear at all. There would be duplication, repetitions and reproductions of the

intellect. But something completely new, something that never existed before, never comes into existence. This continuity renders possible the look into the future, and not merely a preliminary calculation of the future, not merely a guess. Therein lies the "naturalization" of history in Hegel, for "evolution" is a notion taken over from natural philosophy.

The tendency to unite "nature" and "history" in a whole as two moments of one process always appears not by chance in German Idealism. The incomparability of these two forms of existence, depending on the difference of qualities, appeared only seldom in Idealism. The insensibility of the Idealists to the ontology of the specifically historical reveals itself very clearly in their religious ideas and thoughts. This quality makes Idealistic thought unreceptive to Christianity precisely because Christianity is history, is historical, from the very beginning until the end. Christianity consists of nothing but events. Christianity cannot be accepted and understood other than in the real progress of concrete historical time. One cannot exclude empirical time from Christian consciousness. One could say: only Christianity reveals history; only through Christianity does one obtain the feeling and understanding for history. But one could go even further and say that he who has no feeling for historical dynamics, who does not see empirical time in its ultimate reality, cannot be a Christian. Christianity is not dualism, not only an ontological examination and demarcation of God and the world, of God and man, without their complete separation. It is much more. Christianity also confirms the reality of the world and of man not only in its ideal and eternal prototypes, not only in the idea, but in its empirical fulfillment. Christianity emphasizes the absolute value and the significance of empirical existence, which represents not diminution but enrichment. Only by this are events rendered possible. Furthermore, Christianity claims that not only the event but already the fact of the event as such is valuable. The revelation of God consists of a series of events rather than a chain of symbols. That is why there are peculiar and unique connections and disengagements in time. But the event of all events is the Incarnation of the Logos, of the Word. The Logos as event rather than the word as idea. One has to perceive God in history itself and not merely through history. One must not let the historical environment of the revelations and appearances of God become a kind of illusion, for it is the receiver and mediator of these revelations. The small and insignificant feeling for the historical leads Idealism to a strange Docetism in the reception and interpretation of Christianity. In accordance with its nature, Idealism tends to deny *Revelation* completely. From its point of view, *everything* is revelation. That is why revelation disappears in history, dissolves in historical continuity. The generality of the revelation renders impossible special unique revelations. In Idealism revelation changes from an elementary rupture from another world to a stage of development.[2]

The Idealists regard revelation as the appearance and emergence of divine potencies or of the foundations of the world. With this, revelation takes on a symbolical character. For the Idealists, the meaning of revelation is to name the ideal and to point towards it. This is connected with the tendency for a symbolic reception and interpretation of the Bible. The historicity of the Bible loses its interest and importance. The reversion to allegorical exegesis of the Alexandrian type at the time of German Idealism has to be interpreted not only as a reaction to rationalistic criticism. Allegory is a natural product of Idealistic thought. The Bible cannot be a holy book as a merely historical book. Only symbolical books are holy. The Bible changes into a parable, into a myth. Idealism sees its eternal significance in this alone. It is known what kind of role the obtrusive idea of myth always plays in the consciousness of Idealism. Myth does not mean fairytale. Myth is a real symbol. But a myth lies always beyond concrete time. Strauß, who was faithful to the mind of Idealism, divides it into mythology and New Testament. Of course, in Strauß the notion of myth has a somewhat different meaning than in Schelling and Bachofen. However, the basic tendency is the same: the decomposition of history into symbols, which is the exclusion of time. Hence it follows that the Bible is placed alongside all other mythologies, that it loses its qualitatively unique position, that all revelations are conditioned and get the meaning of road signs in religious life. Revelations are starting points, not ways or paths. Schleiermacher expressed this idea very clearly. From his point of view, it is not he who believes in the Holy Scriptures who is religious, but he who does not need it at all and could write it himself. For everybody is given a special way to salvation in his soul. But the mystery of the individual soul is the most important thing. Schelling's thought of a new mythology which calls for creating art is very characteristic of his age. For art is clairvoyant, it tells of the eternal mysteries of existence. That age thought much about visions and appearances. There was real mysticism, revelation of what was concealed in nature and reverie. However, these visions were not only due to reverie. They often really touched true existence. But it was always a dreamlike vision. Christian dogmatics was also divided into symbols, but it lost determination because of this. Attention was always paid only to the mysteries of the world, the mysteries of chaos and the universe. Theology dissolved into cosmogony and cosmology.

Secondly, the historical image of Christ fades in the Idealistic consciousness. One can say that Idealistic philosophy was the theory of god-humanity, the theory of eternal god-humanity, of the eternal unions of God and man. Thus man was also lifted out of the boundaries of history. The theory of the eternal existence of the world and of man, which was not based on the divine, was developed. The attention of the Idealists concentrated on these eternal visions, these events. Christianity represented only a section of the entire theogonic process. The concrete

facts of evangelical history were of least interest. Idealism could not perceive the variety which revealed itself in a unique, unrepeatable section of history. For Idealism, all of history has been filled with divine forces since ancient times. That is the way Baader and Schelling thought. The theory of the word displaced the theory of the historical God-man. Hegel rejects even more strictly than Schelling and Baader the historical in Christianity. Human consciousness, in its heights, has to get rid of everything tangible, empirical, evident, particular and unique. It is absorbed in the contemplation of the eternal and forgets time, space and events. Hegel's remark concerning the crusades in his *Philosophy of History* is characteristic. The crusaders went in vain to the Holy Sepulchre. They found what they were looking for — an empty grave. Thus, their false longing was revealed: "the fantastic drive to reach the intellectual through a sensible locality." The mystery of Christianity cannot be found in any outer events, but in the eternal ideals which are revealed by them, which shine through them. No finite things and events can be the object of faith, but only eternal ideas. Strauß only brings Hegel to a logical conclusion when he asks: "can some unique and actually unimportant events have a greater value for us than the course of all of universal history?" Schelling urgently stressed the historical character of Christianty: "By its innermost nature, Christianity is historical in the highest sense." "In Christianity the whole world appears as history. The gods of the ancient world are "eternal natural beings." From the Christian point of view, these numb forms do not exist, there everything is in motion, there infinity reveals itself. "The forms" are "not lasting, but appearing." The divine reveals itself only temporarily. These historical forms never come to a standstill. Now, Schelling sees the possibility of "historical constructions." Everything "accidental" disappears. For "history has its beginning in eternal unity and is founded on the absolute." Only the individual appears free, but the whole is closely held together by eternal necessity. It is important that this necessity be put into logical laws. There is only a "pretence of freedom," no real freedom. Schelling does not go beyond historical symbolism. He is completely absorbed in "mythology." Christian dogmatics also dissolves into a series of visionary eternal appearances. He called history "the eternal poem of the divine mind." Schelling spoke of the historical aspect of Christianity, but he did not perceive it. According to his conception of the world, he was too antique to truly hear the basic, fundamental Christian tone in history. One only needs to read the "Philosophical Fragments" of Kierkegaard to understand what Schelling lacks. "God enters the world," Kierkegaard writes concerning the Incarnation of Christ. Something new happens. This new reality is the beginning of eternity! "The novelty of a new day is the beginning of eternity!" "The moment is really the decision of eternity." Therein lies the paradoxical aspect of faith: the historical becomes eternal, the eternal becomes historical.

Philosophy has no place for this because one cannot know this, cannot perceive it with reason. This mystery can only be perceived by faith.[3]

German Idealism could never acknowledge, could never comprehend, that the fate of man could be determined in empirical time. That is why it could neither perceive nor acknowledge the historical God-man. One could say that German Idealism is a theory of God-humanity without the God-man. That is its fatal error. Religious criticism shows the metaphysical poverty and blindness of Idealism. There is too much that Idealism does not see, too much that it leaves aside. It is closed into a numb, petrified, immovable, beautiful but dead world. One does not see God in this world, for his aspect is concealed. The human aspect is distorted in this world. Man lays claim to divinity and submits to the necessity of natural laws. Idealism dissolves into contradictions, it does not reach the accomplishment of its metaphysical attempt.

It is not difficult to prove this. The most difficult thing is to explain how this metaphysical self-deception arises and what it means. German Idealism is filled with philosophical traditions, and in it many historical currents are united. It strives to be an all-embracing and final historical and philosophical synthesis, and in a sense it was. The Idealists did not answer accidental questions, but appropriate questions of a universal kind.

One wonders how it occurred that philosophy and Christianity were separated? How does it happen that philosophical consciousness becomes blind to Christian experience? Contemporary religious criticism of Idealism does not answer these questions; it strives rather to drop these questions.[4] One had to decide clearly: Christianity or Idealism. Another alternative appears behind this one: Christianity or philosophy, Christianity or metaphysics. Contemporary religious thought is also ready to get rid of any philosophy, of the problems themselves, when renouncing German Idealism. It is prepared to destroy the metaphysical impulse for research in order to revive it again. But that proves that this concerns not only Idealism. One perceives the mind of the Reformation in contemporary criticism of Idealism. As a matter of fact, one does not make a choice between Idealism and Christianity, but between Idealism and the Reformation. It is characteristic that criticism contrasts the Idealistic theses to Biblical texts, that it applies the severe measure of the Bible to Idealism. From a certain point of view that is very conclusive. But one must first justify such criticism. One has to prove first the right of Idealism to renounce Christian history, historical Christianity. For history proves that the Church has always existed and that it justified the metaphysical impulse for searching, that it strove from the beginning to show and to explain the truth of apostolic prophecy as a rational truth, as a truth also for the *ratio*. The Church never claimed that no relations existed between Jerusalem and Athens, between the "school" and the Church. There is deep meaning in the fact that only the Greek language became the privileged language of Christianity, that it still is and will always

remain so, because it is the language of the New Testament. In a sense, the Hellenic element, the ways of Hellenic thought, were sanctioned by this. One cannot renounce Hellenism without at the same time touching the Holy Scriptures, the New Testament. Contemporary Protestant rigorists resemble the young Ritschlian liberals remarkably in their attitude towards Christian history. For them, the history of Christianity is a history of decline, of fall. Historical Christianity is a compromise; to them the Hellenization of original Christianity seems like a kind of contamination of the original harsh simplicity. The new rigorism is by no means conservative. It is all protest, internally confused. In it there is the presumption of rebellion. One can say: it embodies the indignation against history, the indignation against the mere fact of history. History appears as a human, much too human affair. Rigorism strives towards the non-existence of history; it wants to extinguish history in Christianity. It cannot understand that there shall be history in Christianity, if the meaning of Christian determination consists in the fact that all flesh becomes silent and trembles considering God's justice, glory and judgment. All problems thus become superfluous and unnecessary, for man is not made for asking but for being silent, for silently listening to the voice from another world. Hence, religious creativity and Christian culture become impossible — there is nothing to be created in religion, only God creates. In this manner one draws a very paradoxical conclusion: the whole field of creativity is regulated by a law which is beyond Christianity, and is delivered to the arbitrariness of the material world.

In secularization Quietist asceticism turns into its opposite. But renunciation of benediction is also renunciation of control. This turns over to culture, it is now exercised by culture. By this, two laws are introduced, the bipartition is justified. Contemporary rigorists repeat the old Reformers. That is the reason for their unavoidable failure. One does not need a special penetrating glance in order to find out how little the German Idealists resemble the Reformers. They are two types; that is, two psychologically opposed types. But the polarization takes place within one intellectual circle. Not without reason did the Idealists trace their family tree back to the Reformation.

Kant later became not by chance the acknowledged "philosopher of Protestantism." It was also no accident that German Idealism influenced determinatively a whole era of Protestant theology. That was not only renunciation of the Reformation. It was also its inevitable consequences. Idealism was only possible after and on the basis of the Reformation. That does not mean that Idealism could be logically derived from the presuppositions of the Reformation, as the earlier polemicists often tried to do. The relations are more complicated. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Reformation was the actual cause for the development of the independence of new European thought. Not so much through direct influence as through its apparent ascetic renunciation of metaphysics, through its philosophical

inactivity. A split formed in the creative consciousness, a division of the historical forces took place.

Luther regarded philosophy as "an arch-enemy of faith." The Catholic polemicists of that time say of the first Lutherans that they rejected philosophy out of malevolence, *ex malitia philosophiam reiiciunt*. But the Protestant world could not do without philosophy. At first scholasticism was taken up again, Aristotle once again emerged. Then, Leibniz has great influence and Wolff is finally victorious in the eighteenth century. The fact that the Reformation had renounced the Christian initiative in philosophy became most significant. This alone rendered possible the revival of de-Christianized Hellenism. It took place in the eighteenth century, and German Idealism was born out of it.[5] There are also direct genetic connecting lines from the Reformation to Idealism, the most important may be that of German mysticism. The rigoristic separation of God and the world also favored the development of the idea of the completeness of the world, of its autonomy. But the extinction of historicism in the old Protestant conception of the world became fatal. Considering this, it becomes comprehensible why Idealism cannot be refuted on the basis of the Reformation. One can condemn and reject it. But then an empty place is left, an unsatisfied thirst. The thought is defenselessly delivered to the temptations resting in it. Contemporary criticism of Idealism proves the incompleteness of the Reformation. With this the question of the possibility and necessity of Christian metaphysics is raised. The Catholic solution cannot be accepted. To include the unchanged Aristotle in religious thought is not a solution but a compromise. There still remains the creative way of the great past — Patristics. Those early, past attempts of patristic thought Christianized Hellenism. But this way is closed to Protestantism. The crisis of Idealism can only be solved by a crisis of the Reformation, only by an intellectual return to the Church. No other way leads into the future than the one from the tradition of the forefathers.

Translated from the German by
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[1]See my essay "Evolution und Epigenesis, zur Problematik der Geschichte" in *Der Russische Gedanke* I, 3 (Bonn, 1930). Concerning the awakening of historicism in Rationalistic Philosophy, see G. G. Spät, *History as a Problem of Logic*, Part I (in Russian; Moscow, 1916).

[2]Concerning the notion of revelation, see the fine commentary in Brunner's book *Der Mittler* [The Mediator], (1928).

[3]Sören Kierkegaard, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 6: Philosophische Brocken (Jena, 1910), pp. 51-65.

[4]See Paul Schütz, "Der politisch-religiöse Synkretismus und seine Entstehung aus dem Geist der Renaissance."

[5]Compare the interesting chapter about Protestantism in the book by E. Spektorsky (in Russian), *The Problem of Social Physics in the 17th Century*, vol.

2 (Kiev, 1917), pp. 188-375 and P. Petersen, *Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland* (Leipzig, Meiner, 1921).

THE DEAD ENDS OF ROMANTICISM
[Die Sackgassen der Romantik][1]

I

The thinking of the famous Russian revolutionary Aleksander Herzen (1812-1870) took its course in fits and starts, in sporadic outbursts. But the content of his thought and discourse was always one and the same subject. His intellectual development knows no leaps or breaks. Instead, he impresses us with his perfect one-sidedness. And when Herzen is shipwrecked by his belief, when he ends up with blind, senseless and boring pessimism — coming himself from rosy, aesthetical pantheism — then this only shows the fatal dialectics of inner contradictions. The way turns out to be a fall of the intellect. This was the crisis of the Romantic dream, the crisis of the Romantic idea.

Two motifs had determined Herzen's development from his early youth: the pathos of individuality and a keenly developed sensitivity for the supreme power of creatively-formed and constantly-changing life. And both of these were joined to an extremely clear vision, to an artistic intuition of the "creative development," the "dynamics of life."

There was something religious in the excitement and delight that were always aroused in Herzen by the reflection of life — its variety, its power and might. This is the Romantic worship of nature. For Herzen, nature is life, *natura naturans*, the fitfully-impetuous breathing of a restless and inexhaustible primordial power which produces a colorful variety of endless worlds. Its abundant, excessive reality and energy are never exhausted in their various manifestations, never languish or are depleted in change or in the series of forms and shapes. For Herzen, the world is a never-ending and inextinguishable process of fermenting powers of unlimited possibilities, an endless series of births. Through endless agitations the world presents a wide selection of shapes, which are always new and which have never been thought of, have never been possible. At first everything is twisted and fettered in a kind of *undifferentiation*. Then the mutual demarcation and impenetrability of the numerous powers reveals itself. The various ways of life branch off, they ramify and delimit each other. The sequences of life "consolidate and differentiate each other" — each sequence represents its own special type and has its own "norm." Some of them dry up and are extinguished over the course of time — their tension and impulsive force diminish, the creative drive expires in the apathetic repetition of a distinct and stereotypical form. They may extinguish and dry up the various floods of life, but the original source itself is eternal. The original power cannot be diffused. The aspect of the world is always rejuvenated. This is how Herzen thought, this is the way he imagined the world of life,

the world of history. This is the Romantic philosophy of identity and variability — the philosophy of the creative supreme will. And it is not difficult to discern a relationship between these conjectures and views of Herzen and the late world of ideas of Bergson and the historiography of Spengler. This similarity, this coincidence of views, is not accidental. It originates in a certain uniformity of conception and perspectives, in an identical intuition of Romantic voluntariness.

In this heroic voluntariness Herzen hoped to find a justification and a reason for his increased individualistic self-confidence. A dream was alive in Herzen, "an image inconceivable to reason" — the vision of a strong and brave man who creates and changes life. He dreamt of heroes and heroism, of a heroic society and a heroic change of life. He thought that the freedom and possibility of human actions and striving present themselves only in original width and breadth. He believed in the original power and truth of man. He therefore always demands freedom for man, and tries to free everybody from his chains and bonds, even from the invisible and imponderable ones. At the same time (and this perhaps with even greater rigidity), he demands of everyone the risk of autonomous activity of will. He becomes excited over every obligation, every restriction, even by the obligation of ideas, even by the narrowing of obligation. But he is even angrier at weak will, impotence and indifference, and the *oneness* of the common herd.

Herzen's instinctive individualism reveals itself primarily in his artistic talent for observation. As an artist and a writer, Herzen is first and foremost a portraitist. Thus, his famous memoirs *My Past and Thoughts* are a gallery of portraits. Herzen is only attracted to and interested in human beings, the living human soul and human individuality. All forces are classified according to an individualistic criterion: pale and expressionless without any meaning; and expressive, intelligent and exceptional faces which stand for wild passions and intellectual daring. This had always been and remained the standard for all of his evaluations of life. This had always been the judgment of the Romantic, the aesthete and the decided individualist. In the name of self-determination and personal freedom, Herzen struggled during the forties with the Moscow Hegelians and with Hegel's very notion of regarding life as "applied logic." Herzen perceived life as a symphony rather than a system. Hegel's *Logismus* confused and alarmed him. Concerning the Hegelian system, he was frightened and repelled by the pathos of heteronomous logical necessity, "the transitory nature of the individual for the sake of the general." "The living individual," he contended, "is the threshold to which philosophy clings." In the Hegelian world everything is too idyllic, one does not feel the beat of a strong pulse in it — "in all the generality, every single noise — even that of the breaking waves of life — has fallen silent." Herzen felt uncomfortable in this cold and colorless world. He was attracted by "the last fragrance of life." He was attracted by life in which everything is new, fresh and light, in which nothing is repeatable and everything always rejuvenates

and arises anew. "One can live only in the bacchanal whirl of the individual," Herzen said. He saw in it, in the "twilight of suspense," the greatest truth, "the great mystery of life." "It is process, stream, abundance, movement." Later, Herzen would say: *creative improvisation*. In the name of life, in the name of personal freedom, Herzen fights against every kind of heteronomy, especially against the heteronomy of reason. And within the world of German Idealism, he returns from the pole of the "logical system" to the "poetic pole" — from Hegelian panlogism to the Romantic philosophy of identity; from "formalism" and anatomy to the organic and the idea of continuously-pulsing, creative and productive life. He turns from Hegel and the "Hegelians" to Schelling, even in the shape of Feuerbach. And even though Herzen bows to the "sublime manes" of Hegel, he cannot abandon the prophetic figure of Schelling.

"In history, everything is improvisation, will and *ex tempore* — there are no limits in front and no direction of march. There are historical conditions, a sacred unrest, the hot flame of life — an eternal appearance of heroes in order to use power, to set out on their travels and to go wherever the way may lead. And when there is no way or passage, genius will clear the way." Such is Herzen's conclusion. History is the moving of shores, vibration, vacillation. Herzen thought that he could find there a justification of the *deed*. And this is his basic contradiction, his basic self-delusion — the radical self-delusion of Romanticism.

The Romantic history of philosophy is a peculiar theory of mutations, impetuous and unexpected ones — "life rushes and dashes through all gates," Herzen said. But this is a philosophy of variability, not one of creation. Romanticism explains and justifies the colorful shape of life, the variety of forms and colors. But it does not justify creative self-determination and does not establish real freedom. For the Romantic, freedom is something else — the power of natural passion, "his energetic and emotionally governed self-confidence." But this is not his own personal voice; it is the voice of impersonal nature speaking loudly to itself under thousands of masks — masks and not appearances. And despite all the constancy of its theses of "self-will" and self-appearance, Romantic ideology is impregnated with the pathos of necessity. In Romanticism, the personality is not the real center of power, but rather the intersection and starting point of influences and currents coming from without. It appears as the medium of elementary influences. "The personal" is by no means exempt from the weighty obligation of the "general," from the bonds of almighty fate. The immanent regularity of the vital instinct remains external and "general" in relation to the individual and the personal. And after all, it is of no importance how the dialectics of historical necessity are determined — by the logical system of existence or the elementary rhythm of subterranean organic power. The logical *a priori* and the elementary *vis a tergo* — both similarly enslave the personality in the "arbitrary

rhythm" of impersonal supreme unity. And the power of the vital instinct, which neither moves for a special purpose nor evokes movement, but acts according to the law which is immanent to its natural essence and which realizes its originally existing possibilities, creates a world that is no less determined by laws and no less necessary than the dialectics of self-destructive reason. In reality, very little real creativity can be found in the "untidy improvisation" of history and life of which Herzen spoke with great enthusiasm and ardor. Any novelty is only appearance — nothing is created and nothing comes into existence, because everything has already been in existence from the beginning in the depths and the bosom of creative nature. And all variety is only "a variation of the basic motif." An elementary vital power, which erupts in temporary appearances, reveals itself in all of this. In this world there is nothing hypostatical, only modalities. And on such a basis it is impossible to build a theory of radical individualism. As a genuine Romantic, Herzen never realized — and could never realize — that the rejection and refutation of logical providentialism and the promulgation of the "plastics" of life, along with the explanation that *la vie déborde la raison*, could never be sufficient as a true justification of individuality and creative freedom. For individuality remains internally oppressed and fettered. Herzen could not realize that creative freedom can ultimately be based only on the reality of the tasks set to it and on the independence of nature. Here, the typical one-sidedness and narrowness of his Romantic horizons is revealed. The fault cannot be ascribed to naturalism — that is, to the combination of nature and history. The fault can be attributed to the idea of predestination. And, fighting with logical fatalism, Herzen reaches another dead end, that of blind alogism, on the basis of which no philosophy of creative activity, no philosophy of heroic human deeds can be built. Herzen set himself such a task, and realized too late and not thoroughly enough that it was unaccomplishable. Therein lies the entanglement of the plot in his life-drama and its explanation — of the inner drama of a deceived Romantic.

Herzen lived during a period of hopes and expectations. There was something apocalyptical in the spirit of Romanticism. It was a time of great disengagements from the past and of great presentiments. The Romantics expected and prophesied revival and a change of life. They dreamt of a heroic and great future — the golden age that had never existed before. They guessed the mysteriousness of what was happening at that time, and overheard the majestic step of time. Man then realized that he was situated on a high mountain pass. And this feeling was expressed by utopian dreams and wild prophecies. Recently someone very appropriately spoke of the "eschatological pathos" of that period. Herzen also indulged his imagination, dreamt and prophesied in tense expectation. And in the name of his hopes and expectations he renounced the present; for the sake of the future he denied the present, expected a new message and "lived in the expectation of a future aeon."

That was Romantic longing and Romantic hope. And with this expectation Herzen remained an aesthete and individualist.

As with many of his Russian contemporaries, Herzen's expectation assumes a messianic and patriotic hue even in his younger days. A historio-psychological reason for this may be adduced, because it was the period when Russian intellectual life awoke. And belief in Russia remained unchangeable in Herzen, belief in the future Russian — for Herzen believed only in the future Russia. From his early childhood he had perceived in himself a "suppressed and whispering voice of predestination." In the forties, the absence of a past, the secular silence of Russia and of the entirety of Slavdom already seemed to him to be a "great prophecy." And this expectation of a Russian future was an aesthetic perception.The future was an aesthetic perception. Above all, the future needed youth, freshness and power. And Herzen perceived this prophetic youth in the Russian original world, in Russian blood — "the blood circulates especially well in the Russian breast."

The Russian messianism of Herzen was an aesthetic messianism. In particular, he loved and esteemed Russia because of the ravishing elemental power which lies in her, because of her indomitable desire for liberty — because of "her young power of formation" and "the daring of her sons." He esteemed not the Russian idea, but Russian power. And as an artist and a portraitist with an excellent talent for observation, with a quick understanding for everything strange and peculiar, Herzen strongly felt the irreplicability of the Russian appearance and anticipated in Russia "the originally-living personality." Later on, considering the intellectual pauperization and the slow fading of decaying Western Europe, Slavonic youth and the youthfulness of the "unhistoric people" became for him an even more impressive prophecy. He formed the opinion that Russia was the only country in the whole world with a flourishing youth, and that the Russian people was the only "people of the future." During the period of the "ethereal revolution," as N. N. Strakhov appropriately called the years of the Russian "period of great reforms," Herzen's hopes seemed to come true — the iceberg began to drift, and bold and brave speeches were being heard. And that was sufficient for Herzen to believe in the beginning of a historical spring. He felt the trembling of the new life and the unrest which had elementally seized Russian existence, and he enjoyed the general awakening. "The beaming flash of events will rend the clouds asunder" — such had long been the passionate desire of this man. And it seemed as if the far-reaching beaming flash from the East would also brightly illuminate Western Europe's dreamy plains. But despite all his historical and patriotic hopes, Herzen could not break through the magic circle of Romantic naturalism. He could not find any other justification for his messianism than the reference to the youthfulness and the original peculiarity of Russian existence.

Herzen never denied Western ideas. He had lost faith in the future of the West. During the forties he had already had misgivings as to

Europe's expectations of a great future. During the years spent in travel his sad presentiments proved to be true. He did not find heroes in Europe. He was repelled and frightened by "the isolated and reserved personality of Western man." He did not find living people on his trip — everywhere there were phantoms of yesterday, expired and already-putrifying creatures. He did not perceive any sweet emotions of creative life in Europe: everything has already been there, everything has been poured into models — "everything develops dwarfishly and fades away on weakened ground." Too much recollection and too little impulsive force of will. Faces are expressionless, vital power expires, "the soul pines away." And Herzen realized that this was historical senility. The spark of life had died away. The god of history had abandoned European mankind. "The light of life expired like the glowing tallow-candles at the windows before the young day dawns."

A deep pain, along with an ultimate lack of remorse, lie in the hymn of death which Herzen takes up: *mortuos plangos* ! He becomes angry and resentful when these dead try to present themselves as alive. Nietzsche anticipates his passionate mass for the dead, which he celebrates in Europe. And like Nietzsche, Herzen wants "to deal the crushing blow" and to accelerate the heavy agony so that the air purifies — for new life. These words — they are the judgment and estrangement of the individualist, the line of demarcation of the Romantic. In these bitter revelations, a fatal ambiguity was concealed. After all, no criticism of the West or of Western principles and ideas can be found in Herzen. But there is more! Herzen appreciates and emphasizes that Western thought rises to the highest prophetic ideals in its climax. In their most perfect form, Western ideas retain power and significance even for the approaching future. That has been prophesied. But it is a prophecy which will never come true in Europe. The significance of the European historical drama consists, according to Herzen, in the fact that Europe lacks the ultimate power to realize the prophetic ideal of socialism and to put it into historical practice. Europe shrinks back from the "biological threshold." This means that one of the currents into which the "dynamic vital power" of all-beaming nature is divided flattens and dries up — that in this stream the energy diffuses. This means that the times and hours have run down, and that the vital power is exhausted — nothing else. Aesthetic denial becomes the prophetic announcement of the hour of death — not the death sentence. For Herzen, the historical crisis changes into a blind, elemental overthrow, into a biological catastrophe. The fall of Europe of which Herzen constantly spoke and which he prophesied, ultimately means only death, the extinction of the Western peoples whose time has run out and who are hopelessly running against their biological thresholds. He accepts the Western ideal as a kind of sacred banner from the hands of the dying. He only does not believe in the future of Europe. And the significance and the nature of the biological threshold upon which European life is dashed remain unclear. Is this the limitation of the type

of development which the life of the Western peoples has produced — not accidentally, of course — so that the fall of the Occident represented the extinction of a certain species of the human race, like the extinction of biological species in general? Or is it only a limitation of the reserves of the vital power which has been exhausted in the long — too long — periods of history? Herzen hesitates to give an answer on this point. He gives a divided answer. On account of their innate character, on account of their inborn dispositions, the Western peoples are unable to realize their own dream, their own ideal — and that is why the power is exhausted. This idea may be phrased the other way around. Here, the ultimate contradiction is revealed. It remains unclear why the biological limitation and onesidedness do not represent an obstacle in order to rise in thought to general ideals, why the West overcomes its original peculiarity in its dreams and why the aspect of the West retains its prophetic power and significance even for other incommensurable, naturally and historically determined types? For to the Romantic, thought is nothing other than the last blossom of organic life. And Herzen cannot answer otherwise, but must acknowledge that, for him, all types of life are only "variations on one and the same theme." But by this admission he depreciates the distinction between types with which he tried to explain and to justify the incommensurability of the national and historical courses of destiny. They differ only biologically, but express the same motif in various ways and realize the same principles. Qualitatively, they are not incommensurable. The cultural disparities are attributed to biological differentiations. Thus, the possibility of a fundamental valuation is removed. Everything is traced back to life — age and change of generations — to the changes of generation of a monistic human race which rejuvenates and constantly regenerates in the change of historical reincarnations. Herzen denied the existence of a universal human way and type, he denied the reality of "mankind," that "spotted demi-god" as he maliciously put it, but nevertheless he could not overcome these notions internally. He argued for the phenomenological plurality of history, but did not feel the tragic discord of its ontological depths, their dualism. He did not perceive the conflict and the struggle of principles in history. As for chronology, the mystery of history exhausted itself in the contrast between the old and the new, between the past and the future, between the past and the present. And that is why, for Herzen, the historical drama finally changed into a "providential charade," but without a providence.

Criticizing the West, Herzen does not go beyond an aesthetic analysis. He rejects Europe because of its old age, whereas he approves of Russia because of its youth. He regards Slavdom as the people of the future. But he emphasizes the fact that Slavdom does not have new ideas and does not bring with it any ideas. Slavdom is only a power, the power and the ability to energetically and passionately realize its innate type in its historical existence, with all the primordial abundance of expression of an untamed, elemental power. The Slavonic and Russian

task restricts itself, according to Herzen, to the realization of the Russian character, to the revelation of the Russian appearance but not of the Russian idea. Hence the acuteness of the predictions. In the *hymn of death* that Herzen was singing "from the other shore" of the decaying European world, the notes of a self-satisfied and nationalistic mood and joyfulness are heard concerning the fact that the Russian was born as a special being, that he was a stranger in a dying world. And that is why he will live — *vivos voco*! And it seems as if the Russian world alone will live — because the European world is dying of decline of life, and one cannot embue a numb corpse with strange vitality and summon it back to life. The future belongs to a few only, to a special biological type only.

This conclusion was inevitable for Herzen. And in this Herzen differs considerably from the older Slavophiles, with whom he shared the same historical and patriotic expectations. He himself characterized this difference as the contrast between prophecy and realization. In reality, the difference did not consist in the fact that the Slavophiles dreamt of the past whereas Herzen was looking into the future. The Slavophiles were also anticipating the future. But for them, it meant the replacement of old ideas by new ones, a substitution involving basic cultural principles, a renewal of the spirit — this can be seen in all naturalistically-colored statements of Slavophile historiosophy. For them, Russia and Europe represent two polarized intellectual worlds. For Herzen, they are two biological species. And Herzen regards the historical replacement of some peoples by others strictly as biological rejuvenescence, as a new disguise for the impersonal historical subject.

Herzen constructed his historiosophical system in order to explain and justify the right of creativity and the realization of ideals. He wanted to create a philosophy of action. He would not and could not renounce the category of the ideal, the right of valuation and the cultivation of ideals. And the breakdown of his socio-political expectations revealed to him only the inner contradiction between naturalistic fatalism and the category of the ideal. Romantic naturalism removes the category of duty and the ideal and changes it into the notions of dispositions — and then there is no will. Only all-devouring and elemental life acts and creates. Man remains but the carrier of life, although it is in him and through him that historical fate is accomplished. He can be drunk with joy because he is swung on the crest of the foamy and roaring waves, though only as a weak splinter. But what empty boredom — to be carried in helpless inactivity by waves which are lost in dreams and have no destination. Such thoughtlessness paralyzes man — neither by fear nor by exterior obligation, but by the boredom he cannot escape. This metaphysical boredom can also be seen in the silent grief which rests on the passionate appearance of the aging heart and tears it up with wrinkles and folds expressing bitter resignation. That is the boredom of death!

II

Konstantin Leontiev repeats what Aleksander Herzen has already advocated, and completes it. This combination may appear surprising and arbitrary. Despite their dissimilarity and differences of opinion, Herzen and Leontiev represent the same intellectual type. Their congeniality and correlation consist in the Romantic aestheticism that is innate to both of them as a kind of passion. They are related to each other by a one-sided aesthetic view of life and a tense reaction to all experience of life. Leontiev felt an affection for the "poor ingenious" heart. Herzen's books, along with the writings of Khomiakov, were lying on his table under some other selected books during the years of his residence at Athos monastery, when his ideology was finally formed and strengthened. In the intellectual fate of Leontiev, the same fatal cliff at which Herzen's life was dashed — that is, the cliff of Romantic aestheticism — reveals itself. Strangely enough, Leontiev remained an unbelieving sceptic and aesthete in his belief, one who languished for belief and remained powerless for renewal — just like Herzen, who remained religious in infidelity and could never extinguish by all his blasphemous doubts the deep and mysterious unrest in his heart. With these paradoxical contradictions, the limited and obscure nature of Romanticism as an ideology is expressed.

The tragic mystery of Leontiev consists in his invincible aesthetical individualism. And in this, the indifference and dislike towards mankind are paradoxically connected with a passionate pleasure in the organic play of colors and forms. It turns out that in its depths, Romantic individualism is the pathos of the unique, unrepeatable form, but not the real acceptance and affirmation of personal creativity and freedom. On the contrary, it is the pathos of the organic metamorphoses in which the confused variety of the natural ground materializes. The mystery of the individual in its ultimate intellectual insolubility remains not only inconceivable, but also unnoticed. In particular, this is revealed by the negation of the categorical necessity of ethical standards of values and ethical valuations which Leontiev managed to maintain with audacious intrepidity until the very end. He acknowledged only one imperative — the aesthetic. And he confessed that he had been tormented his whole life by the desire "to separate the moral problem from the aesthetic." For him, aesthetics alone was a universal sphere that included all kinds of existence, "from ore up to the saint." This, then, is aesthetics of power and not of truth — it is aesthetics of elemental forces, not that of intellectual power. It was sheer uncomfortable short-sightedness that the greatest beauty of truth and of the good remained forever concealed to Leontiev — he submitted it to analysis and critical evaluation as well, in accordance with the criteria of abstract, aesthetic formalism. As for religion, Leontiev also tried to protect this aesthetic criterion in his autocratic invulnerability. He only

limited this principle with a deep sigh about the vanity and transitoriness of all that is worldly.

For Leontiev, beauty is a natural and organic phenomenon — "the blossom of the tree of life, and the highest and most perfect manifestation of life." Formally, he characterizes the beautiful first and foremost as the most elaborate and most accomplished creation, as polyphony, as symphonic variety and "variety in unity." For in this abundant variety are the power and tension of life revealed — "the power of living peculiarity." "We love the inconsistency and the continuous return of all things," Leontiev admits. He loves "the polymorphism in nature," the "living, the complicated and nebulous." "The magic garden, the labyrinth of life," — that is what fascinates him, "the complicated and poetic process of life." And likewise, he understands and values history — as a natural and organic process which represents a continuation of nature and is subject to the same fatal and organic regularity. He could and would regard history only as a natural-aesthetic phenomenon. And the fault in his historiosophical schemes does not lie in the fact that he remorselessly denied the applicability of moral criteria and judgments to history — in history there is no place for sentimental moralism. But at the same time, Leontiev denied in principle what is fundamentally particular to the historical — he could not understand the moral drama of the historical process, and did not even want to feel it. He acknowledged the natural tragedy of life and approved of it, but not of its moral tragedy. He regarded history as a chain of deaths and births, "a fatal play of mechanical forces "which does not have an inherent ontological meaning, which is unconditionally irrational and is suitable to neither the ideals of reason nor those of the heart. Here we have the heavy step of fate: "Ideas do not have a human heart, ideas are inexorable and cruel." As for the historical process, Leontiev is interested not so much in its sense as in its rhythm. Concerning the meaning of history, he hardly speaks of it at all. He builds a historical morphology and not a historical philosophy. It is a naturalistic morphology, an organic sociological theory which is highly reminiscent of Spencer. According to Leontiev, historical life is subject to "the general laws governing the formation, existence and disappearance of all the entities accessible to us." He does not even ask whether the fact that the subjects of history are human beings, reasoning individuals, adds a peculiar element to the historical process. He is not aware of persons in the unbroken historical process. Insofar as the individual is concerned, Leontiev is concerned only with the religious question — that is, exclusively with the fate of the soul beyond the grave. But this "concern," this "anxious unrest" as to the transcendental fate of man, is not at all reflected in his conception of history. Strangely enough, for Leontiev history remains an accomplished natural process. It is a process of development, "a gradual rise from the simplest to the most complex," "a progression from colorlessness and simplicity to originality and variety." This is the path

of organic differentiation, the process of materializing complexity under the formative despotism of the richest ideas. However, this process inevitably has its biological limit, beyond which a fatal simplification sets in. And this is a loosening of the unity and of the understanding for the complex — in short, disintegration and death. Thus the organic curve of history is composed of two lines, the ascending and the descending. For Leontiev, the only meaning of history consists in the ideal of flourishing variety. "Culture is nothing more than particularity," we read. The organic criterion coincides with the aesthetic one.That is by no means an accidental congruity and a violent identification. It is determined by the general spirit of Romanticism, for which beauty is the manifestation of life. Naturalistic aestheticism is characteristic of Romanticism — namely, the interpretation of nature as poetry. And Leontiev's naturalism as an interpreter of history is grounded in his Romantic aestheticism. This allows for the existence of beauty in nature, but leads to the evaluation of all kinds of beauty as a natural phenomenon, as the flashing of an elemental power.

History is unity, and the concentration of multiplicity. The form is a basic copula of life — "a despotism of the inner idea which does not let the matter burst asunder." In this wide and rich world, we have a great multitude of forms which demarcate each other and are indestructible." Vegetable and animal morphology, Leontiev writes, "is nothing but the science concerning the problem of how the olive tree must not become an oak tree, and the oak tree not a palm tree." The seed determines what kind of leaves they shall have, what kind of blossoms and fruits. Analogically, Leontiev regards history as the science of the immense variety of culturo-historical types. Insofar as this attitude is concerned, Leontiev has been prompted by Danilevsky through the latter's book *Russia and Europe*. This is the idea which may be found in Herzen and even earlier in Prince Odoevsky, one of the first Russian Schellingians from the philosophical circle of the Moscow "lovers of wisdom" [*liubomudry*] of the twenties. After all, what we are dealing with here is the application of the biological theory of the constancy of organic species to the field of history. Two motifs deserve emphasis. First, there is the organic isolation of each type, which remains inaccessible to the other types. Its entire meaning and justification as an enriching moment of a complex system is based on the integrity and accomplishment of each type. Secondly, there is the teleological equivalence of all types in terms of the intensity with which they have emerged — also as moments of the whole. Herein lies the reason for the paradoxical changes. Constructed for the purpose of justifying and understanding the irreducible and the peculiar in the field of history, the theory of culturo-historical types changes into substantial monism, into the theory of mankind as unity. Danilevsky himself recognized and confessed this. For him and for Herzen, the entire range of historical types is "a variation on one and the same theme," and only the totality of all the types expresses the nature of mankind — just as only the

variety of the organic forms manifests the real essence of nature. "For the ultimate collective existence of mankind," Danilevsky writes, "there is no determination or task other than the manifestation of the aspects and directions of the vital power which lies concealed in the idea of mankind and which cannot be exhausted in one individual and one culturo-historical type of development; a manifestation at different times, at different historical places and by different races." These words remind us of Bergson's conception of the fire-bundle-like development of vital power, which realizes in a variety of ever-diverging ways the usually unrealizable pleroma of latent possibilities and power.[2]

Danilevsky and — following him — Leontiev consistently carry the idea of plurality out to the most extreme relativism. The postulate of peculiarity is extended to the entire scope of human life, with the exception of the ideas of God and of the Church — and the latter is done explicitly as a postulate and an imperative. Thus every variation is justified *a priori* provided that it serves the complexity of the whole, and thus the possibility of qualitative selection and valuation is excluded. And at the same time, all the variety of life in its immanent exclusiveness is somehow separated from the idea of God. Actually, the decision rests with the organic-aesthetic criterion. And this is not a syllogism or a theory, but the expression of an invincible inclination of the Romantic consciousness, which somehow instinctively avoids the question of reality and truth. In Leontiev this comes to light very definitely and strongly. Looking romantically at things, he tries to choke the decision of the question of reality. And for the material valuation, which he does not deny but only tries to conceal, he substitutes the aesthetic one, for which he energetically and passionately pleads. And all of this is substantiated by the emphatic hint at the absolute inaccessibility of a "highest teleology."

Leontiev performs a historical selection — he evaluates as a historian, and this he does remorselessly, rigidly, severely, angrily and passionately. But it always was, as with Herzen, the judgment of a Romantic, the verdict of an aesthete. A critical valuation in accordance with the categories of complexity and perfection of the form — that was not only the basic criterion of Leontiev, but also the only historiosophical one. His verdict concerning Europe was again a pathological discussion, a judgment of contemporary Europe and not of the beginnings of European culture. He regarded the fate of the West not as an intellectual tragedy, but rather as a logical calamity or an unavoidable and inevitable end. One has lived too long, and too much in the West is worn out. The vital power is exhausted and "the process of a sweeping new simplification" has set in — in simpler words, the how of physiological death has come. Leontiev does not say anything concerning the question of whether one has lived well and justly in Europe. He does not judge the principles and foundations of life. He is ready to approve of Europe's past. He regards it as a heroic, chivalrous epic poem — "in European life," he maintained, "there was more

peculiarity, more lyricism, more consciousness, more reason and more passion than in the lives of past historical worlds." But he passionately rejects the European present as a *facies hippocratica*, a detestable mask of death. For he sees the decreased standard of living, the fading of aesthetical values. "I have the right to despise such a poor, worthless human race," he exclaims. He is irritated by the slow progress of the European death-struggle. The victory of everyday man means the fall of culture, because it means the disappearance of poetry and of beauty. This remains the conclusive criterion for Leontiev. And Leontiev compares the pathos of the "liberal equalizing" progress which leads to levellings and reductions, which leads to monotony and signifies death, to the pathos of differentiating unequality. But it is only an aesthetic pathos. Leontiev felt the nightmare of the petty-bourgeoisie which was approaching Europe and the whole cultural world. But he never inquired into the intellectual roots of this internal degeneration. He made use of neither religious criticism nor religious philosophy of European history. With him, everything leads to aesthetic protest, to aristocratic indignation. "Is it not terrible and embarrassing to know that Moses climbed Sinai, that the Greeks built their elegant acropolis-buildings, that the Romans waged the Punic Wars, that the ingenious and god-like Alexander, wearing the winged helmet on his head, crossed the Granicus and was victorious at Arbela, that the apostles answered the world's expectations with their message, that martyrs endured torment, that poets sang and spoke, that artists' hands used the paint brush just as knights' hands wielded the sword in glorious jousting games — and all this only so that the French, German or Russian bourgeois in his detestable and ridiculous clothing may comfortably lead an easy life, 'individually' and 'collectively', on the ruins of all this past greatness." In this tirade we have the essence of Leontiev.

Leontiev was animated by a passionate love for the East. He loved the present Near East, above all because of its nature and its folklore, the poetry of rock and sea, the poetry of sharply-marked and wild patriarchal life, the poetry of released passions and of the delight of the South. He loved ancient Byzantium and the Byzantine "idea," but it was always just an aesthetic love. Leontiev only perceived Byzantium aesthetically. To him, Byzantinism as an "idea" meant first "the strongest possible antithesis to the universal humane idea in accordance with general, worldwide equality, freedom, perfection and satisfaction." He regarded Byzantinism as the antidote for the spirit of leveling simplification. He stressed the necessity of this antidote for Russia. Strangely enough, he did not recognize or acknowledge any aspect or idea as being typical of Russia. As for the national principle, Leontiev regarded it as a leveling principle. For him, the Russian and Slavonic "stikhiia"[3] represented something "amorphous" and "unorganized." But in this he saw something positive — a plasticity that renders free formation possible. But he always valued form most of all. As for Russian reality, again, he was always attracted primarily by the form

impressed on it from without, the Byzantine form which entered freely and deeply into the still loose and unformed Russian life-material. At the same time, he was aesthetically attracted to the variety of Russian existence, the Russian force and width. And for him, the opposition of Russia and Europe as such has aesthetic meaning. He demands peculiarity for the sake of variety of forms. He hungers after an "original and inventive culture,"[4] a new plastic art, new colors. Strangely enough, in Leontiev's consciousness the thirst for aesthetic power was connected with the pathos of violence and the violent inequality. He longs for creative explosion, but does not believe in its possibility. Similarly, he fears that the *stikhiia* of life may be too peculiar, and might dissolve without violent intervention from without. Here it is not a question of a "senile" return to simplification, but rather of a primary, amorphous condition. And not by chance did Leontiev speak of the despotism of ideas, of the innate despotism of form. The entity doubled in his eyes: the banishing form and the dissolving matter — as if even in nature itself, unequality and beauty were determined by force. This is why, in human life, beauty also materializes by force, form is impressed violently. This is an aesthetic way of thinking: in this way does the sculptor use his chisel to carve form into the raw, amorphous block. Thus Leontiev's pathos, that of regarding peculiarity as protected, is aesthetically determined. Herein lies an inner contradiction: the organic theory and the pathos of violent formation are incompatible. And this contradiction morbidly erupted in his thoughts on the Russian fate. He did not believe in either the organic power of Russian life or the abstract principles of inequality and order. And these principles did not represent a power in contemporary Russian reality. Herein lay the source of his doubt, of his fear and desperation. Leontiev never felt the intellectual meaning of the Russian fate, neither in his years of cultural and patriotic hopes nor in those of experienced disappointments. Herein lies the basic paradox of his aesthetic theory of history. Herein lies the source of his ultimate pessimism.

Strangely enough, history for Leontiev was never the history of the intellect. His philosophy of history is a theory of peripheral processes. He did not perceive the ultimate metaphysical mystery of history — and moreover, he implicitly rejected metaphysics. He did not want to go beyond "aesthetic comprehension." He did not want to build a religious philosophy of history. Yes, one can say that he did not see religious meaning in history. For him, Christianity as a historical power was not truth but an organizational principle and a variation principle, a principle of contrast.

As truth, Christianity can be the power of personal life but not of history. And moreover, even in personal life Christianity for Leontiev is only power and a postulate of abdication, but not the power of change and sanctification. It is not difficult to judge the drawback of Leontiev's pessimism: by the rough distinction and opposition of the Christian and the natural criteria of life, he actually tries to justify the

individuality of the natural sphere, of its values and principles. He ventures to say: "Christianity does not deny the deceitful and malicious elegance of the evil one; it only teaches us to fight against it and sends the angel of prayer and abdication to our aid." For Leontiev, Christianity is the religion of the end, the prophecy of the end — and of a transcendental end. "The final say can only be one!" Leontiev exclaims. "Everything earthly comes to an end! History and life are extinguishd!" This means that Christianity is only a theory of the end, not one of life.[5] The rigidity is encased in secularization. If there is no Christian doctrine of life, but only one of the end of life, of the abdication of life, then this means that there can be only a natural theory of life. In addition, it means that the natural theory of life is the only and ultimate truth of life, the truth being a nullity, but an elegant nullity which supports and captivates our soul. And the historical philosophy that Leontiev offers is actually a philosophy of the unrest of earthly life, a philosophy of decaying and decayed life, a theory of historical development and historical decay. Christianity leads mankind out of the vain nullity of life, but it does not deny that this nullity is beautiful — such is the opinion which Leontiev did not want to renounce. In other words, Leontiev wants double truth — its heterogeneity permits its juxtaposition. One truth — the ultimate Christian truth is the truth of the catastrophe and the end. But it is a joyless and disconsolate truth. There is yet another supposed truth of transitory life — supposed because life is transitory — but it means joy. One should not deny it, but only separate oneself from it. "I love the power of the mind, but I do not believe in the faultlessness of reason," Leontiev said. "And that is why, with me, the one does not preclude the other." Furthermore, Leontiev does not want to overcome dualism. In his opinion, that would reduce the perfection of Christianity and at the same time would strip the blooming tree of life of its leaves. Leontiev frankly admits that Christianity is hostile to life, that it reduces the level of variety — in other words, that it "kills the aesthetics of life on earth" and it is somehow a heteronomical act to submit to Christianity "out of transcendental egoism, from fear of the judgment beyond the grave."

This statement reveals the ultimate inaccessibility of Romantic ideology: the incapacity to accommodate renewing change. Here we have a closed and fatal magic circle, the circle of immanent naturalism. And a paradoxical antinomy now appears: from the optimistic view of life, pessimism is born. Leontiev is in love with the beauty of life as something immortal. But it turns out that it is a dying beauty: a cycle of being born and fading away. The circulation of nature is eternal death. There cannot be — that is obvious! — a positive philosophy of history. The inherent conclusion of Leontiev's thoughts drove him to pessimism. This pessimism of his was not so much a conclusion drawn from historical experience or a synthesis of impressions received in life, but rather an act of inner self-exposure. As a surging, primordial

force, life must be accompanied by a release of energy. And Leontiev consents to such a naturalistic apocalypse, admitting that his presentiments coincide with those of von Hartmann. Actually, this apocalyptic view lacks all moral sense. This is less a judgment of the evil one than an exhaustion of the nullity, an exhaustion of the force. And with Leontiev this inevitable natural end of all of existence assumes the problem of inner historical valuations. In the last analysis, everything is extinguished. And the aesthetic standard remains as the last standard for life, the principle of synthesis and tension. Each shall value strictly on his own — "out of fear of the Last Judgment." Leontiev's pessimistic conclusion is determined by his obstinate optimism, by his entirely aesthetic conception of reality, by his rejection of the task of changing life creatively. Leontiev's asceticism is the way and the means of preserving life unchanged, not the way of renewal. Asceticism submits to the naturalistic task as a means of increasing inequality and variation and as an antidote against natural death. Leontiev denies the freedom of mankind not because of God but because of the nullity of the world. It is incorrect to blame Leontiev for being defeated by the monophysitic error — his error is exactly the opposite. Monophysitism was religiously animated by the pathos of renewal, by the thirst to change everything natural into the divine. This is exactly what Leontiev does not want: he loves only the unchanged world, he fears all forces of change. As Rozanov appropriately put it, Leontiev answers the angelic chant of Bethlehem: "Glory to God in the highest and peace on earth!" with the simple "We need no peace!" God shall be praised on high, but inequality shall prevail on earth, the struggle for life as an eternal source of fascinating beauty. Leontiev aesthetically demands injustice and untruth. This is the deepest sense of his inner tragedy. And this tragedy is one of consequent Romanticism. As a Romantic, Leontiev cannot believe: he does not believe, but longs for belief — "out of transcendental egoism." His belief is a passionate but ambiguous gesture. And at the same time it is a will for ambiguity. Too weak to renounce his Romantic passions, Leontiev grieves and suffers from their exposures in life. This is the reason for his cultural criticism. But he does not make friends by this either. And so the power of life in him is exhausted. The ultimate tragedy of the Romantic consists in the fact that even faith does not save him from doubts, does not offer him a justification of life and lead him out of the "dead end." And that is why all joy is taken away from him, and his faith colors the world in an ash-pale, death-like hue. Leontiev has completed Herzen's thought and has been faithful to him. But faith did not regenerate him, which is why he has not freed himself from pessimism. For him, unbearable boredom was the final conclusion, a boredom in which irritation, contempt and anger were strangely interwoven into a poisonous tissue. On the basis of Leontiev's premises, tempting conclusions could be drawn to "revolutionarily" break the chains of boredom. In a sense, Rozanov also drew such conclusions, rejecting

Christianity because of his love of life and its natural beauty. This conclusion is a return to Romanticism, a relapse of Romantic heroism. It does not save man from contradictions or from death. The pathos of birth satisfies the longing for immortality. For it bears the faceless, unpersonal *stikhiia*, the personal melts away in the ocean of life — and the birth is a birth for dying. One can get out of this dead end only through renouncing the Romantic premises and through belief in the superior nature of the human personality. Therein lies the real meaning of Christian revelation — which is the antithesis of Romanticism.

Romanticism is natural pathos, whereas Christianity is the revelation of man and thus the revelation of the true meaning of life. "The torment of the ever-doubting mind is nothing in comparison with that of the ever-doubting heart," Grigoriev, one of the keenest Russian Romantics, once said. And such is the torment of every Romantic: the doubting of the heart and the doubting of self-consciousness. Heroism ends up with disillusionment and boredom. For heroic pathos reduces the mystery of the individual and is punished by the fright of the impersonal.

III

One way out of the dead ends of Romanticism leads to the creativity of Dostoevsky. And in a sense, this was a direct answer to the doubts of Herzen — that is, not an outside answer or one from the side, but an inner answer. Dostoevsky completed Herzen's truth just as Leontiev completed Herzen's error. Herzen's truth, like the truth of all kinds of Romanticism, consists in rejecting and exposing historical chiliasm, in overcoming chiliastic optimism. After all, this overcoming remains merely aesthetic. Historical chiliasm is inspired by the longing for tranquillity and balance — and in it is revealed the unreceptiveness towards and indifference for the category of the personal, the intention and the hope of reaching happiness without personal creativity. Romanticism justly protests against this. But this protest does not come from the final depths of personal knowledge of oneself. And that is why Romanticism actually contrasts only the unpersonality of tranquillity to the unpersonality of passion. The real overcoming of chiliasm is possible only through the metaphysical absorption of idealism. And then the insufficiency of one-sided and self-conclusive individualism necessarily becomes obvious. Herein lies the first motive of Dostoevsky's ideology.

The historical problem of the future had been worrying Dostoevsky from his early youth. He felt the approaching future very clearly. In younger days he was a dreamer, and his dreaming assumed an ecstatic intensity. And in these musings was revealed to Dostoevsky the alarming untenability and fragility of the isolated personality, threatened by splitting and decay in total isolation. This is not just a psychological observation. For Dostoevsky, the metaphysical mystery of the individual was concealed in it: personal egocentricity and freedom

and the fatal danger of isolation — such is the basic antinomy which became pressing for Dostoevsky in his younger days. And he tried to overcome it through Christian humanism, through the ethical socialist Utopian scheme. This, for him, was an ethical dead end, and he looked for an ethical solution to it. But the idea of socialistic fraternization was not suggested to him by sentimental sympathy alone, nor by an aesthetical dream, but rather primarily by a peculiar instinct of metaphysical self-assertion. In isolation personal freedom and egocentricity lead to self-destruction. Therein lies the dead end: one cannot escape egocentricity and yet cannot endlessly be in the center. But the question is not to find a quantitative measure of self-assertion. Instead, it concerns the primary quality and meaning of this egocentricity. This conclusion became clear to Dostoevsky later on — after the catharsis on the scaffold, after the experience in exile and prison. But in the new experience only the attitudes he had already entertained in former times became clear. The sense of natural human freedom — this was Dostoevsky's first conclusion from his experiences during imprisonment. One can live only in freedom, and with Dostoevsky the condition of lack of freedom in prison extends to the problem of constraint in general. This is an ambiguous problem. On the one hand, an enforced social life is impossible and intolerable — life cannot be founded upon constraint, regardless of its nature — one simply cannot live under the pressure of constraint. But on the other hand — and this is what shocks Dostoevsky the most — there is a tragic temptation in people's right to control one another, in the right of one man to influence another. Not only the deprivation of freedom is intolerable and unallowable, but unrestricted freedom is also unallowable and destructive because it consumes and decomposes the personality. Dostoevsky tries to reveal this dead end as keenly as possible in *Notes from the Underground*. The "underground man" justly opposes the constraint of the anthill, demanding and striving for freedom. He does not want well-being without freedom. But by asserting only himself, he suffocates with his unnecessary egocentricity, and even the wholeness of personal self-consciousness loosens and staggers. And it is here that Dostoevsky's heart answers. The protest against necessity and constraint does not establish and strengthen freedom. One must find a deeper and more positive basis. This means that the aesthetic problem does not exhaust the mysteries of life. It must be added that the problem of the "proud man" who is exalted by his freedom and intends to live only at the expense of its formal pathos, remains pressing for Dostoevsky for a long time. And Dostoevsky reveals the suicidal dialectics of personal egocentricity not only in the type of the "underground man" but also in the person of Raskolnikov, in Stavrogin as well as in the Grand-Inquisitor. The egocentricity fatally turns into suicide.

In 1863 Dostoevsky was abroad, and there he met Herzen. This meeting left its traces. In his *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*,

written in the autumn of the same year, the reverberation of Herzen's "ends and beginnings" can be clearly heard, along with resonances from this and other publications by Herzen, such as *Letters from France and Italy* and *From the Other Shore*. Of course, it is not a question here of borrowing or imitation. Dostoevsky's narration expresses living and direct experience, intimate contact with Europe. But Dostoevsky saw and experienced the same thing as Herzen. He regarded Europe as a land of colorless faces, and was frightened. But in this fright and this disappointment there were new motives which were strange and inaccessible to Herzen, and that is why Dostoevsky's conclusions were different, though perhaps not immediately. In Europe Dostoevsky heard "something like the ringing of funeral bells" and realized that "the balance had been struck," that something fatal and final had been accomplished and come true. He saw the triumph of everyday man, the victory of the leveling power, the turbidity of the aesthetic idea. But it was not this that worried and was embarrassing to him, and he did not remain with ascetic abdication. His impressions of Europe melted into a horrible, apocalytic image. "It is like a Biblical image, something from Babylon, something like a prophecy from the Apocalypse, something that has happened in front of everybody," he wrote. And he prophesied catastrophe and end: "everything will collapse in an instant and be lost without a trace." This will be a great fall — "Europe finds itself at the eve of tremendous revolutions which no human mind will be able or willing to understand." But this is no naturalistic forecast, and Dostoevsky was not speaking of senile decay. He perceived great religious and moral catastrophe, intellectual explosion and collapse. This, in his eyes, is the religious tragedy of the betrayal of the Christian West. As for European life, Dostoevsky is primarily worried and anxious about moral decay, the discord of moral consciousness. And he traces the intellectual roots and presuppositions of this intellectual crisis. He criticizes European ideas, the principles of their culture. And a whole sublime scheme of the European tragedy gradually becomes visible in Dostoevsky's consciousness: "This is the catastrophe of the Roman idea." Ancient Rome — that was a great human anthill. And for ancient man, the empire as such was a religious ideal. It was the ideal of the man-god. And according to Dostoevsky, this ideal has remained the driving and carrying power even in Christian Rome, for all of European mankind. "A conflict occurred between two ideas of directly opposing natures. The man-god met the God-man, Apollo of Belvedere met Christ." In the West Apollo is not completely defeated — this is the ideal of the man-god. Dostoevsky regarded Western Christianity as compromise, substitute and betrayal. This represents the ultimate meaning and mystery of Catholicism. Here "a new Christ has been proclaimed, one who does not resemble the former one and who let himself be enchanted by the third temptation of the devil in the desert." "Catholicism has proclaimed the opposite Christ," Dostoevsky wrote in his last days. He had in mind the "impure cathedral" of the Vatican, "the

Rome of Julian the Apostate, not only as one who had been vanquished, but also as the victor over Christ in the new and final battle."

Regardless of whether Dostoevsky was right or wrong in his diagnoses and predictions, in any case as far as Europe is concerned, he posed the critical question as one concerned with intellectual truth and power. He never reduced the tragedy of the West to a naturalistic level. For him, it is a crisis of ideas. It appeared to Dostoevsky that all moving principles of European life could be traced back to "the Roman idea." The French Revolution and the principles of 1789 seemed to him only reincarnations of the ancient Roman and Catholic idea. And to his understanding, socialism is "the legacy of Catholicism." It is only a secularized Catholicism. He feels the intellectual unity of Europe, and for him the whole history of the West changes into the history of the Tower of Babel. And this idea reveals itself at present as a chaos of actual contrasts. It produces confusion and terrible horror of life. Intellectual betrayal leads to controversy against God. For Dostoevsky, criticism of Europe changse into the criticism of the Roman idea, of the Roman ideal "of the enforced unity of mankind." And in setting Russia in opposition to Europe he is contrasting one idea with the other, the disfigured Christian ideal with that which is genuine and perfect and accomplished. His nationalistic passions and partialities do not lessen this at all. For him, Russia is first and foremost an intellectual force and power. Orthodoxy is extremely precious to him, as indeed it is to Russia — Orthodoxy, the sanctuary of the intellect, the real image of Christ. In Dostoevsky's creativity the organic motives were always strong, the "*pochvenichestvo*."[6] He never completely overcame the "*narodnichestvo*." But his last hope is not based on this. He did not believe in the Russian *stikhiia* and not even in the Russian idea. He thought that the Russian faith was the true faith, and so he believed in the victorious power of truth.

Dostoevsky anticipated and foresaw a great and horrible struggle, the collision of two principles. In other words, he felt that this struggle takes place in the depths and most secret corners of the human mind. And for him, the whole meaning of history, the sacred history of the human intellect, consists in this struggle. The meaning of this struggle consists in the creative self-determination of man, who must humbly devote himself to duty towards God and his fellow-creatures and therein find himself, and who has to strengthen his freedom and personality. In Dostoevsky's attitudes the perspective splits. One and the same tragedy unfolds on two levels: as the fate of man and as the fate of history. One and the same task is followed up in both spheres — to see God and to find oneself in God — to reach one's fellow-creatures and the world through God. Dostoevsky was convinced that there is no other way. He thought and wanted to think that this tragedy would be resolved.

Therein lies his optimism. But it would be neither right nor "proof of sharp hearing" to accuse Dostoevsky of a kind of "lilac Christianity." It

is true that, for him, historical perspectives were very often shortened and converged, that he too ardently believed in victory, but he believed in the victory of faith, in the victory of truth, and he was guilty neither of overvaluating historical reality nor of mingling what is there with what shall be there. It is true that he prophesied a great, general harmony and that he hoped that the horrible judgment of history would be adjourned, that the secular deceit and appearance would dissipate and fade away, that the Tower of Babel would fall and that from the Orthodox East the word of true peace would resound over the destroyed world. But the precipitation of his prophecies does not weaken the sense of his ideal. He expected the penitence of the great sinner. If he was wrong and the sinner did not convert, would the call of penitence therefore cease to be true? One can say that Dostoevsky's final synthesis did not always definitively succeed, but he rightly posed the problem of the synthesis. For Dostoevsky, belief in God establishes belief in man, and therefore also in the meaning of history. But the way of man and the way of history — they are both equally complicated and painful. In his metaphysical views Dostoevsky presents this intimate tragedy metaphorically and symbolically, and at the same time he presents the mystery of the intellect. Its basic motive is freedom. In Dostoevsky's novels we have a double realism: the realism of history and the realism of metaphysics. Dostoevsky's historical realism does not consist in repetition of the *byt*[7] and of the environment, but in the presentation of the intellect and the sense of a period. All of his images are dramatic, they are the image of the Russian searcher for truth, the truth being considered to be knowledge and justice. All his life, Dostoevsky intended to describe the history of the Russian soul in an epic manner, to describe the way of the Russian European, of the Russian intellectual, of the Russian of his time. This was not possible for him. The synthesis disintegrated. Dostoevsky only narrated single episodes, which even he could not combine into a uniform, epic poem. Perhaps this synthesis could not be anticipated prophetically because even in life it could not be obtained. But this was not the only level on which Dostoevsky's thinking took place. His types are general human types. Types of the human way in general. And here Dostoevsky reaches metaphysical depths and describes the original realities and phenomena of the human mind. And here he internally overcomes Romanticism. The fate of the human intellect is revealed to him as a tragedy of freedom. This is not a process of ongoing evolutionary development, but a struggle. And not the struggle of the individual with impersonal fate, in which the individual is ruined and suffers from the pressure of what has no appearance, in which the individual is choked by the abstract. This is an interior struggle in the innermost depths of the self-destructive individual, who is dying not in the convulsive struggle against overwhelming passion but in the hurricane of its own will, wavering in the choice between good and evil. And the "metaphysical history of the intellect," as Berdiaev appropriately put it, which

Dostoevsky represented so strongly, consists in this final wavering and discord. This is above all moral longing and confusion. And for Dostoevsky, the aesthetic problem shifts to the ethical level. He set himself the task of imagining and presenting a "completely beautiful man," but for him that meant showing the phenomenon of the good. Dostoevsky showed the way to the good out of and through evil. He showed the dialectics of penitence. But, despite all the tension, the dynamic antithesis of good and evil always remained for him. And he deepened the moral antinomies and antitheses to their very ontological roots. He endeavored to reveal the metaphysical depths of evil: to him, moral decay always means metaphysical decay, the decay of the individual. And that is why, in Dostoevsky, the motif of the "double" is marked so distinctly, the motif of antithesis, the tragedy of the person and the mask. The personality can be realized and actualized only in the good. Thus is the difference between the formal principle of individuality and the intellectual principle of personality defined for Dostoevsky. For the Romantic we have the aesthetic boundary, the degree of intensity, of complication, of power, whereas for Dostoevsky we have the moral boundary: only in the good can man find himself; but beyond the good man ceases to be himself, the personality decays in the whirl of masks and faces. The entire meaning of his creative figures consists in this knowledge and view. This is what he tried hardest of all to demonstrate and to prove. And for Dostoevsky, speech does not originate in the abstract principle of the good, but in the personal God and above all in Christ. "Tranquillity for man, the source of life, salvation from desperation for all men and the *conditio sine qua non* for the existence of the whole world can be put into a few words: 'The Word became flesh!'" Dostoevsky wrote this in his *Notebooks*. And this is why the ultimate meaning of history was revealed to him only in Christian metaphysics, only through theology, through the Word of God.

On his intellectual journey, Dostoevsky started from Romantic premises, and Romantic motifs were always very strong in his creativity. These were the motifs of personal particularity and self-arbitrariness, the motifs of passion and delight. Dostoevsky felt with every fiber of his being the subconscious depths and abysses of the mind, the terrible underworld of the soul. And the Romantic contestations were always clear to him. This also applies to his philosophy of history: the notion of the people, the organism of the *pochva* [8] — these are his favorite categories. And yet, through a kind of intellectual clairvoyance, Dostoevsky penetrates into intrinsic nature, crossing this periphery of existence. The final origins of the impersonal, of the *stikhiia*, are revealed to him. For him, it is a kind of emanation of the personality, the precipitation of the personal decision of knowledge so that the personality, if it is ruined by the passions or shrinks under the pressure of abstraction, fails under the pressure of its fantasy, enchants and loses itself. The impersonal in human life is

derived from the personal — that is the basic idea with which Dostoevsky breaks the Romantic circle. And the personal in man is only a power which must be actualized by exertion of the will and by strength of mind. But the dialectics of the personality consist in the fact that it can only be strengthened in the other one by renouncing its inaccessibility and isolation — and not in the homogeneous one but only in God. In other words, the personality materializes only by realizing the height — not only from the depths — but from the heights of another world. Thus may the meaning of history be defined: it is the history of human self-determination, the tragedy and the struggle of ideals. It is reflected in the natural variety of hereditary types. But the source and meaning of human life do not consist of this. Here Dostoevsky again overcomes Romantic naturalism and sublimates the metaphysics of culturo-historical types to the metaphysics of the religious will, of religious ideals and anti-ideals. For him, the unity of history is established not from the end but from the beginning, and not by logical providentialism but by the unity of the call and the calling. And for him the solidarity of fraternity, the harmony, is not an innate power but a creative task which can only be realized by a final effort of love. Thus Dostoevsky contrasts Romanticism with new theses of a Christian philosophy in a number of ways. This is not a system, but experience. In a series of frequently overlapping figures, Dostoevsky describes the metaphysical world which has been revealed to him. This is usually a dramatic dialectical description. Dostoevsky does not present a synthesis. He did not know how to develop his experience notionally, how to combine it into ideas. As a whole, his creativity is only sublime mythology, and thus there is still the task of speculative analysis. There is still metaphysical ore to be smelted and forged here. This is only the beginning — but it is the beginning of a new way, the way of Christian metaphysics, personality and history.

In a sense, Dostoevsky answered Herzen just as he answered Leontiev — he broke through the dead end of Romanticism. This was nothing other than an answer — an answer from inside, that is, since Dostoevsky crossed the zone of Romantic temptations, conquered it and adapted the partial truth of the Romantic view to his own. In Russian intellectual history there was a separate Romantic temptation, a kind of "creative tasting" of European philosophical Romanticism. Therein lies the substance of the Russian philosophical struggle in the nineteenth century, which even today may not have been outlived and overcome. In his metaphysical poetry Dostoevsky offers not only a critical synthesis of this struggle, but a positive one as well. And it seems that with this, the way of Russian philosophy has passed through a new stage.

Translated from the German by
Claudia Witte

[1]The title in German comes from the concluding chapter of the book *Die geistige Entwicklung Herzens*.

[2]Bergson speaks of God as a "center from which worlds spring forth incessantly like the rockets of a tremendous fire-bundle."

[3]This is to be understood as a kind of groundlessness of national existence. The expression should be transferred into our scientific language because it cannot be translated adequately.

[4]The Russian word, "*originalnaia*," encompasses both meanings.

[5]Concerning this attitude, compare the opinion expressed in Overbeck's "Unerledigte Anfragen an die heutige Theologie" in *Die Theologie und Kirche, Ges. Vorträge*, vol. 2, p 5 ff.

[6]Being deeply rooted in the national soil.

[7]National existence as original soil and living space.

[8]The ground supporting national characteristics.

ON THE METAPHYSICS OF JUDGMENT

Das Wahre ist keineswegs von der Art, daß es nur mit unnatürlichen Anstrengungen sich finden oder mit unnatürlichen Worten und Formeln sich aussprechen liesse.
Shelling, *Philosophie der Offenbarung* (1, 18)

In the introduction to his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant establishes two types of judgments, which depend on the nature of the connection between the predicate and the subject — analytical judgments and synthetical judgments. Kant attributed great importance to this division of judgments "by content." As he said in the "Prolegomena," it "deserves to become *classical* in critical examinations of the human intellect. Moreover, although clear and distinct at first glance, under more careful analysis this division turns out to be vague, ambiguous and many-faceted. First and foremost, the topic of discourse remains unclear: is it "judgments" as elements of cognition, which are "becoming," mobile and subjective, or is it "judgments" as elements of knowledge, which are "finished," established and relating to objects? In the case we are examining here, Kant approaches the problem of judgment from the standpoint of a *broadening of knowledge*: he introduces the process of distinguishing between analytical and synthetical judgments as the distinction between "explanatory" and "broadening" judgments. The second unclear issue is connected to this point: what, in the final analysis, must be taken as the subject of "judgment"? In analytical judgments the predicate, as Kant puts it, "belongs" to the subject, "as something contained" in it — "confusingly," "secretly," it is already *conceived* in it. In saying this Kant is referring namely to "that which we *truly* conceive" in the composition of the subject and "not to that which we *must mentally join* to the given concept" (*hinzu denken sollen*). In *all* kinds of judgments the predicate is necessarily connected to the subject, and "this necessity has been laid down in *the concept itself* — *und diese Notwendigkeit haftet schon an den Begriffen.* But in thought this connection remains unrealized until the "act of judging"; and only in analytical judgments is the subject's structure such that there is no need to "go beyond the limits of the concept" in order to either fulfill or justify any of the possible predications. In synthetical judgments, the predicate *connected* to the subject is "located *outside of the concept*" in the sense that no "distinguishing between" or "decomposition of" the *actually*-conceived complex of signs can reveal it. In synthetical judgments the concept-subject, in the thought of Kant himself, plays only a *symbolic* role, the role of an indicator: an obviously incomplete concept, "encompassing *only a part* of the object, *stands for* the entire object through this one part" and moreoever, "in encompassing *at least*

a part of the object" it ensures that a new predicate will be related to the *same* object, to "the object *itself*."

The point of emphasis here, obviously, lies in the question of *the relationship of the "concept"* (as a realized image of the object) *to the object*. Distinctions between types of judgments "by content" are determined by the fact that in some instances an adequate concept comes forward as a subject, one which entirely expresses and *replaces* the object, while in others the concept is still in *statu nascendi*. In the second case, naturally, something other than concepts is required for predication, "some third thing," the presence or *availability of the object itself*, which is given in "graphic representation" — *a priori* or *a posteriori*. And this "x," the "complete experimental knowledge of an object" which has not yet been used by thought, is the source of the predicates. Here the concept is transformed into a variable which assumes various meanings during the formation process and fulfillment of knowledge, and which strives to reach the object as a limit. This formation of the concept may also be interpreted logically (the Marburg interpretation). But in the given case, in the direct and immediate sense of the Kantian formulas, we must understand it as being namely *psychological* and *empirical*. And from this standpoint how entirely truly did Zigvart[1] point out, repeating Schleiermacher's thought, that distinguishing between analytical and synthetical judgments takes on the meaning of a genetic description: it is *two steps* of judgment, not two types of judgment — at the limit or the end of their development *all* judgments *must* become analytical (that is, the concept must cover the object in such a way that going "beyond the limits of the concept" becomes both impossible and unnecessary). In speaking of the subject's content, Kant is referring to the group of co-supposed signs that is actually fulfilled in thought — their practical "co-signification," so to speak; in this case he is extremely close to the viewpoint of customary and indissoluble associations. The "*co-belongingness*" of the object's signs he leaves aside. And for this reason the question of the predication's justification is carried beyond the limits of the study of judgments — into the realm of the categorical synthesis preceding judgment. But by this very transfer we oblige ourselves to focus our attention on the very question that Kant rejected — the question of how we *must* conceive of the object, of that necessity, *die haftet schon an den Begriff*.

Within the limits of the viewpoint of Kant himself, the nature of a judgment is determined by the nature of the *"object"* of judgment. In its formative and attributive wholeness, an object is the *foundation* of judgment, the foundation for acts of the "judging thought process." For us, the structure of an object is the foundation from which we derive the predicates in the form of consequences. As acts of thought, all judgments are fulfilled in the form of "foundation and consequences" — the principle of "sufficient reason" is the formula of *logical transition*. Thus, all judgments contain within themselves a necessary relation

since, as Schopenhauer accurately noted (in a remark that is in no way connected with his debatable metaphysics), the concept of necessity in itself unconditionally contains only the "consequences which proceed from a given foundation," and nothing "outside of this dependence, this 'fixedness' through another, this unavoidable sequence which proceeds from it."[2] *Necessitas in praedicando* can, however, be based on any object relation, and still tells us little about the character of the relation. In particular, types of object relations must be established, by means of phenomenological analysis. "Broadening" knowledge in analytical judgments is impossible (and unnecessary) simply because the entire content of the object is exhausted in the concept-object. Here the blame lies not on any weakness of the "judging thought process," but instead on the poverty of the object itself, which is able to be completely exhausted — to the point that nothing can be found out about it. In contrast, an exhaustible, *rudis indigestaque moles* serves as the object of synthetical judgments. But in this "obscurity," unknown and undefined, lies the foundation for all the possible "broadening" predications. In *a priori* or *a posteriori* contemplation the necessary "co-belongingness" of specific signs (these particular ones, and no others) is already "given" — given *before the act of* judging.[3] In its relation to the object, any judgment is "analytical," is an operation that is only "explanatory," — here "synthesis" would have meant "fantasizing."[4] The categorically synthetical nature of the object does not presume its "identifiedness": even the "arbitrary" constructions of pure mathematics are objects which are seemingly independent and external, and which require "*a posteriori* research" for their identification no less than do the "things" of sensory experience. "The kingdom of the mathematician," Royce aptly said on this score, "is on the one hand his own creation; but on the other hand, it is a world where characteristics are uncovered which he had not intended or anticipated. The mathematician also has his 'news of the day', his unanticipated events, his fate, even though this realm of being *is* only insofar as it is presumed to exist."[5]

Properties are immediately given in and on the object, but they are revealed only in the lengthy process of mediating "proofs." The cognitive force of deduction lies namely in the fact that the facets outlined in the "initial steps" are not broken through in the succession of logical transitions. This is the foundation of the apodicticity of deductive conclusions, for this "connectedness" by the primary content of the initial steps signifies nothing other than the lasting identity of the object being distinguished. All that has been said *a fortiori* preserves its force if the entire categorical apparatus is transferred to reality "in the original." In relation to this point the pertinent considerations of H. Driesch in his "study of order" are particularly interesting. "Order" and "regulatedness" are an initial and primary given, and for this reason "each 'thing' is a hidden concept," in the stability of its very perception, as "such," "set forever by thought"; and that which this "thing" does — "by such and such" — is immediately "co-set" and included in it.

Insofar as this is the case, "decompositional" or "analytical" judgment suddenly appears as the basic form of judgment.[6] This conception of "analyticalness" sharply differs from that of Kant. It was in just this new sense of the preformed structure of an object that Trendelenburg found the analytical side of all judgments." *From the standpoint of their objective meaning*, all judgments are analytical," he affirmed, "for otherwise, whence would the predicate's truthfulness have come, if it had not been set and grounded in the subject?" Moreover, as actual identification processes all judgments are synthetical, and necessitate constructively going beyond the limits of the isolatedly-taken subject.[7] This synthetical aspect, however, characterizes judgment as an element of *cognition*. As an element of *knowledge*, judgment is an *analytical system*, one which only "explains" an object's immediately-given attributes. The predicate always *inest, inhaeret objecto*, and only because of this is judgment possible as an act of cognition. But it still remains undesignated whether all incidences of inference are of the same kind. This question is also connected to the classification of types of judgment "by content."

Predication consists not of connecting signs *among themselves*, nor of "pairing ideas," as Bradley pointedly phrased it — and in any case they cannot be exhausted by attributive synthesis. The connecting of signs is only a preparatory phase of judgment, and the judging act attains its conclusion only when the synthesized complex of designations is timed or related to a certain object, when the "wandering adjective," to use Bradley's appropriate expression, "attaches itself to the real noun."[8] The degree of factual and psychical stability of this attributive complex does not have logical significance, since it is not haphazard and mobile "contents" as such which serve as the terms of judgment, but *ideas* — that is, these contents as signs, symbols or bearers of a perfectly clear and defined "meaning." In judgments, the purely factual complex of signs possesses the function of replaceability, and because of this it loses its integral limitedness.[9] As Vladimir Soloviev demonstrated, a certain character *indelibilis* is inherent in symbols. It is a "fact *signifying* something more than any fact"; it is "an available quantity which outgrows itself," a "psychical fact which has ceased to be merely a psychical fact — which directly intercepts its general meaning through its unified actuality."[10] Precisely because in judgments we are relating an idea, as a symbol of some clear meaning, to an "object," all judgments, given their incompleteness, are — as the well-known Hungarian logician Palagyi effectively expressed it — *ein Ewigkeitserlebnis*.[11] The old English Kantian Mansel aptly defined judgment as the comparison of concepts in their relation to a common object, and this object, "other-wordly" and outside of the judging thought process, is in fact an original subject of judgment about which "something is affirmed or denied."[12] In Russian logical literature, M. I. Karinsky spoke with perspicacity about this issue. "It is always an indeterminately conceptual object," he wrote, "which serves as a true

subject of judgment, an object about which it is always assumed that the content is not entirely exhausted by the property characterizing it in the subject. This indeterminately conceptual object is fixed in judgment by our thought as a certain x, something which within the limits of this judgment remains inexhausted from many directions, and which may be entirely exhausted in its content only in a whole series of judgments. A particular idea that is directly joined to the subject's definition has as its goal only to indicate or suggest the particular object towards which the thought is directed, the one to which the known definition is intended to be attributed."[13]

Two cases are possible here: either the predicate is already implied in the subject, as something which enters into the already-identified and defined part of the object, or it is still subject to the initial derivation and naming process. But this distinction does not have great importance from a logical standpoint. The order in which the "signs" are distinguished belongs to the realm of the chance occurrences of the empirical cognitive process. It is logically important that predications be defined by the "whole" object, by law or by type of structure. An evident subject makes a predication valid *for us* when it presents a compressed image of the whole object. This distinction also relates to judgment as an element of *cognition.*

Phenomenological analysis brings us to a clear juxtaposition of the two fundamental types of object structure and object nature. When I make a predication about a particular mathematical object (for example, about log nat 17), I am distinctly co-supposing all subsequent predicates as being simply "assigned" in the object. The impossibility of negating these predicates without introducing contradictions stems namely from their "preset object stability." The "law of contradiction" is the "highest founding statement of all analytical judgments" because the objects of these judgments are *necessary in themselves,* are closed off and simply designated. The law of contradiction is a law of *object definedness* and, moreover, of concrete "definedness." I cannot state that *pi* = 7.2326 because the object I am calling *pi equals* 3.141592 and this description is *substantiliter* inherent to it.[14] It is this very "definedness" and closed-off state which is taken as the apodicticity of the predications. In proposing an object, I am *fully* co-proposing its "signs," for they are *immediately given* in the object itself and are indissolubly combined. Such an object is a *whole.* It is *wholes* which are given and are *everything all at once*: here there is nothing independent; everything is defined and stipulated to one and all; here each element is a compressed image of the whole — through an analogy with Lotze's *Lokalzeichen* it would have been possible to speak of *Ganzheitzeichen.*[15] For this reason, a whole is a *substance* in the Spinozian sense of the word: its entire content, in its *haecceitas*, in its *hic et nunc*, is immediately fixed by the type of whole; a whole is *causa sui*, and exists namely *per se.*[16] On the other hand, a *whole* as such is absolute *individuality.* Wolff grasped the very essence of the matter in

designating that *individuum est quod omnino determinatum est.*"[17] This definedness is of a logical nature. Furthermore, it is not difficult to point out the internal connection between the "substance" type of metaphysical representation and the analytical ideal of cognition. [18] In this respect the logical system of Trendelenburg is highly significant, for Trendelenburg was far from stagnant rationalism and was polemically disgusted with the cult of pure thought. At the same time, he consciously equates *concept* and *substance*. Concept is the soul of substance, substance the body of concept. Concept expresses the law governing the structure and action of a thing, depicts the necessary disclosure of the general in the particular and thereby pre-establishes what will be possible with the appearance of a particular thing and what may be revealed in it under certain conditions.

All of this is accessible in the principle of "deriving from a concept," even though in actual cognition this ideal is unrealizable.[19] Concept *lives* in judgments — the predicate *grows out of* the subject. A predication depicts the "resulting activity of a thing," and for this reason we may speak of the "organic function of judgment."[20] A judgment is the "disclosure" of its subject — and because of its objective content it is therefore always *analytical*. We will now pass on to the second type of object connection. We will examine an example like: "A cherry tree is growing under my window." We will suppose that the subject here is indicated by the word "cherry tree"; that is — "one of the cherry trees," and that "being located under my window" is predicated about this tree. The logical form will not change if we take the "cherry tree" as the predicate: in that case, "belonging" to a certain botanical species is predicated about "the bush growing under my window." In both cases we are concerned with one of the diverse, *equally possible* (but mutually exclusive) predicates: the cherry tree can grow around gates, at crossroads and wherever else it pleases; there could be dog-rose growing under my window, and so on. Here it is namely the *mobility of the predicate* that is characteristic, the possible multiplicity of the predication's meanings. The latter is not exhausted by the indeterminateness of the subject: "one of many," "some kind of." The mobility of the predication signifies the absence of an essential connection with the object. Spinoza aptly defined *substance*: *ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico, quo dato res necessario ponitur et quo sublato res necessario tollitur, vel id, sine quo res, et vice verso quod sine re nec esse, nec concipi potest* (*Ethica*, p. II, def. 2). Objects of the first kind *are* substances. Objects of the second type *have* substance, but are not exhausted by their essential properties. In them a closed-off essential nucleus, an "essential core," is bordered by a more or less extensive *area of undefinedness*. These objects lack the homogeneity and continuity of structure that are characteristic of the first case. For precisely this reason they are not *wholes*. Therefore, in the final analysis they cannot be entirely characterized "from the concept," since there exists within them an area in which it is no longer

possible to simply define things. Symbolically, objects of the first type may be expressed through enumeration of signs with the help of constants alone. *In addition*, to signify objects of the second type we must introduce variables, as well.

I. A	a, b, c, d,...m, n.
II.B	a1, b1, c1...n1; x, y, z, u, v...

It is this very distinction between object types which is behind the division of judgments into analytical and synthetical. *And we may repeat in a new form the famous Kantian question* of the "possibility of synthetical judgments": *How are "synthetical" objects possible* (or are they possible at all)?

Little remains to be added to what has been said. We spoke earlier about individual judgments: this was an obviously fictitious simplification. There are no isolated judgments in either cognition or knowledge: all judgments and all concepts suggest a certain systematic perspective around and behind themselves. Only for this reason is it possible to have definition *per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*, which suggests the "availability" or existence of a certain "natural system" of things. The possibility of logical movement in general rests on the existence of "middle," mediating and connecting terms. The question of the nature of the predicate's connection to the subject is therefore properly posed only when by "subject" we mean not an isolated (and therefore artificially closed-off) object, but rather an object that is in the completeness of those designations which generate its situation among other objects. In practice, we also act in just this way, not always realizing it. The concept of a parabola or a sinusoid, the concept of H2SO4 or C6H6, the concept of *lynx borealis* and so on — they all include within themselves properties suggesting a mutual relation of objects. The entire question may be reduced to whether or not this all-encompassing system is a *whole*? It is easily noticeable that objects of the second type are "possible" in general only in cases where "*the entire world" is an object of the second type* — where it is not a whole. This observation constitutes one of the most valuable thoughts of the metaphysician H. Driesch.

Spinoza was profoundly right in concluding on the basis of the definition of *substance* that substance may only be *one*, and consequently that if there is substance at all, then everything is an indivisible Individual — *naturum unum esse Individuum* (*Ethica*, p. II, lemma 7; compare with the first definition of the first part). If the world is substance, then *all* connections in it are substantial, and all movement in it is performed *modo aeterno*. If the world is a whole then, by a corresponding determination, objects of the second type turn out to be analytical systems, and their seeming "closedness" may be explained as an artifact of unlawfully "cutting off" a part from the whole. Then knowledge as a whole will be transformed into an

analytical system. Of course, it remains undecided to what extent such an organized body of knowledge is realizable and fulfillable. But as for the significance of the predication, in a case such as this it will be based namely on the preset definedness of the attributive structure. An area of undefinedness may exist in an individual object only in cases where the world is not a whole, is not an Individual — since every such Individual *omnino determinatum est.* The existence of non-essential predicates is possible only on the condition of the *limitedness* of "the world" — *its limitedness by another,* which deprives it of immanent, closed-off self-definition, of "creative solitude." In other words, it requires the possibility of "pure acts" (*actus purus*) in the sense of the capability *causare contingenter.* The important speculative discovery of Duns Scotus consisted of discerning this condition. Furthermore, it would be very instructive to juxtapose the system of this great metaphysician with the heartfelt reflections of Shelling in his *Philosophy of Revelation* about the primacy of existence over essence. Now we are speaking not of *chance* but of *freedom.* For "chance," however we define it, may always be reduced to necessity through taking notice of the primary arrangement of factors or conditions. "Necessity" and "identicalness" would be overcome here only in the event that this primary arrangement were itself "accidental." But if it is truly primary, the distinction between "necessity" and mere presence loses meaning. It is possible to speak meaningfully of the "possibilities" in relation to the entire world only on the condition that at a certain moment in the past there existed *total and real indifference .*

To a known extent this condition existed in the systems of classical rationalism, especially in that of Leibnitz. It is necessary to allow for a free will *outside of the world,* one which can establish some "arrangement" or other. Otherwise we will not go beyond the limits of analytical evolutionism.[21] Of course, *in abstracto,* in the logical imagination, it would have been possible even in this case to hypothetically conceive of other possibilities, as well. But this "possibility" would not have had any cognitive meaning, would have been an obvious phantasm, void of all object-applicability.

In the final analysis, the question of the objective structure of judgment may be reduced to the fundamental metaphysical *a priori* of necessity and freedom. The brief preceding remarks were not intended to solve or even to explain this *enigmam philosophorum.* They are but one metaphysician's "glosses" on theories of judgment, and their modest goal is to demonstrate that logicians must ask themselves these fundamental questions.

Translated from the Russian by
Catherine Boyle

[1]Zigvart, *Logika*, I, Davydov's translation, p. 119 ff. Edward Hartman justly pointed out that "in discursive conscious thought there are no longer any synthetical judgments, since the latter only appear while the representation of the subject is still incomplete. See Hartman, *Kategorienlehre* (1896), pp. 239-240.

[2]Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Bd., I, p. 261.

[3]Compare Beneke's remarks, *Lehrbuch der Logik als Kunstlehre des Denkens* (1832), sections 55, 58, 115, 119 and 153.

[4]Compare with Fr. A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II Bd., p. 294 f. (second edition).

5Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual*, second edition, vol. I, pp. 225-226.

[6]Hans Driesch, *Ordnungslehre*, "new" (second) edition, vol. I, pp. 225-226.

[7]Trendelenburg, II, pp. 241-244.

[8]F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic* (1883), pp. 10, 21, 55.

[9]See Bradley, p. 1 ff.

[10]Vladimir Soloviev, Teoreticheskaia filosofiia [Theoretical Philosophy], in *Sobranie sochinenii* (pervoe), vol. VIII, pp. 190, 192, 204.

[11]M. Palagyi, *Die Logik auf dem Scheidewege* (1903), p. 164.

[12]Mansel, *Metaphysics* (1870), p. 220.

[13]M. I. Karinsky, *Klassifikatsia vyvodov* [*The Classification of Conclusions*, SPB (1880), pp. 88-89. This viewpoint was accepted and developed in the metaphysical interpretation of S. L. Frank, *Predmet znaniia* [*The Object of Knowledge*], SPB. (1915). Compare with Benno Erdmann, *Logik* , p. 83 — the subject is not a graphic object, but *das Transzendente, das, als die Seinsgrundlage dieses Vorgestellen vorausgesetzt wird, in dem Vorgestellen sich darstellt.*

[14]Compare with Trendelenburg's ideas on negation, Bd. II, p. 147 ff., and with Bradley's, p. 109 ff.

[15]Compare with H. Driesch, *Ordnungslehre*, and especially *Wirklichkeitlehre*. Also see Alois Müller's interesting pamphlet, *Der Gegenstand der* Mathematik (1922).

[16]For a successful formulation of substance see I. A. Ilin, *Filos. Gegelia, kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka* [*The Philosophy of Hegel as a Study of the Concreteness of God and Man* (Moscow, 1918), v. II, p.2.

[17]See Eisler's Dictionary: *Individuum.*

[18]This was skillfully demonstrated at one time by Shelling, who emphasized the fact that recognition is characteristic of "rationalism," that everything follows *modo aeterno* in eternal logical necessity, that there are only *Wesentliche Verhaltnisse.*

[19]Trendelenburg, II, pp. 209 f.; 362 ff.

[20]*Ibid.*, pp. 237, 245, 254, 375.

[21]Compare with Driesch's remarks concerning the possibility of freedom only on the condition of unconditional epigenesis: Hans Driesch, *Logische Studien über die Entwickeung*, 1 Reihe (Heidelberg, 1922).

THE METAPHYSICAL PREMISES OF UTOPIANISM

In memory of the unforgettable
P. I. Novgorodtsev

It is the pure of heart
who shall behold God.

I

The thoughts and evaluations of each and every one of us are interconnected by a kind of mutual responsibility, and thus the components of human world views are not simply placed next to one another "from without" in a mosaic, "accidental," disjointed manner. Man's "creedal world view" is always integral. Everything in it stems from a single source, everything gravitates toward a single focal point. Everything is organically connected and "interconditional" — each element is defined by the whole of which it is a part and, inversely, somehow reflectively coexists everywhere and in all other elements. It is for this reason that the method of ideally reconstructing a whole by its parts is entirely applicable to world views. Every individual element contains a compressed reflection of the organic whole which contains it, and the character of each element is determined by the particular qualities and structure of the unified system which envelops and forms it, and within which it occupies its own innerly substantiated place. The entire man is revealed in each individual judgment and opinion, — his general world view, his own particular vision of the world. "And just as in a scarcely noticeable dewdrop you can see the entire face of the sun, in the hidden depths you will find a whole cohesive world view." Inversely, it is namely because of the inner cohesiveness and organization of world views that the image of the whole must be anticipated, the unifying principle divined and grasped, in order for each individual judgment to be mastered, each individual thought in its undamaged completeness, in its concrete uniqueness.

Behind every construction of the mind may be felt its creator and bearer — a living and searching human entity. In a sense, every world view is an autobiographical narrative, an account of what has been seen and heard, a description of experience undergone. It would not be erroneous to understand this experience psychologically and subjectively. Experience is actual object contact, "leaving oneself," — the encountering of, communicating and cohabitating with, an "other," with a "not-I." Cognition, as a kind of experience, is a subject-object relationship — it is fundamentally dual, and therefore heterogenous. Man does not "build," "create," or "suppose" his world — he finds it.

The world offers or reveals itself to objects seeking to know. But it does not present itself with straightforward, compulsory, intimidating necessity. We must somehow respond to stimuli from objects, and then accordingly find our way through the creatively opening world around us; we must make a selection. In this willful initial choice we are not inescapably restricted by either innate character, inherited predispositions or everyday circumstances. This primary self-definition is the metaphysical root of an individual, the living focus of its existence. For man does not live in solitude, in monadic seclusion, and not from his own self does he extract the *life force*. He asserts himself through "others" and, as Vladimir Soloviev aptly put it, "every living entity is that which it loves." There is in the structure and layout of a particular object-world the ultimate foundation of the inner structure of the corresponding "creedal world view." It is not so much a self-portrait or a narrative about oneself as a description of the treasures that man loves, that he has perceived, transformed and "appropriated." Moreover, in spite of Fichte's famous aphorism, one may say that it is not the man who determines the philosophy, but rather the philosophy which determines the man: who a man is depends on the world that he has chosen to inhabit, on what he loves most of all, on his interests, on what nourishes and moves his soul.

Here we encounter the fundamental theoretical cognitive aporia. For all experience is object related, even when we sink into hallucinations and surrender ourselves to the will of the undisciplined play of our own dreams and fantasies. In a context of cause and effect, of causing and "affecting," all judgments are "substantiated." And if the significance and value of cognitive acts depended only on their "objectivity," then cognition as such would not even be possible at all. In such a case there would be no hard and fast boundary between "true" and "false." In the same way, cognition as a "search for truth" would be inconceivable if the object-world itself were homogeneous, solid, "of one essence," equal in all of its parts. In that case, cognition would have turned out to be "beyond good and evil." There could have been gradations in its scope, its completeness, its "clarity and distinctness," but not in its value or worth. An alluring nihilistic poison is concealed in "equalizing" objectivism — the poison of naturalistic fact worship. As Joberti aptly put it, philosophy that started with pure facts would never arrive at the truth. There is little true "objectivity." It is not enough to simply exclude "subjective" mixtures from a world view, not enough to create a representative correspondence between it and some kind of object. For not object experience in general, but only definitively described object experience, experience of Truth, discloses and substantiates cognitive truthfulness. A wide spectrum of phenomena may appear and be revealed to man. Individual judgments may differ among themselves not only in breadth of scope, not only in depth of penetration. At the basis of the distinction between empirical objects subject to "cognitive attention" there is also qualitative heterogeneity, a variety of possible

inherent natures, inequality of metaphysical objects and of levels of existence. We may encounter Truth, but we may also not encounter it — and moreover, we may encounter something other than Truth. These are the "conditions of the possibility of cognition" as a vital metaphysical event, charged with meaning. And only under these conditions do cognitive "yes" and "no"s acquire a character of inalienable oppositeness.

To use the words of the *Teachings of the Twelve Apostles*, "there are two paths, one the path of life and the other — that of death. And the distinction between them is great." There is an ontological heterogeneity of kinds of experience — experience has different object referents and different world views therefore have different values. The real distinction between what is true and what is false is the basic metaphysical premise of the possibility of true cognition. There are good objects and bad objects. There is the experience of Truth, and there is the transparent and empty experience of falsehood. The transition from error to truthfulness is not only one from "subjectivity" to "objectivity," but is primarily one from bad objects to good ones — and consequently, from bad "subjectivity" to good "subjectivity." There is experience of "this world," that of flesh and blood — and there is heavenly experience, experience "in the Spirit." And the transformation from the first to the second can only be realized in a heroic act, in a new birth "by water and the Spirit," in a fiery christening, in a metaphysical, noumenal transformation of the individual. The object of contemplation changes. During this change and because of it, the very entity which seeks to know changes ontologically. For in one respect, truly, "an object becomes known to us through what is similar to it." And in the contemplation of Truth the subject seeking to know must itself become and exist as "true." The "Mysteries of the Kingdom" come to take the place of insignificant visual things, but in order for this to occur, the "seeking object" must also become the "son of the great nuptial hall." The "philosophizing of the flesh" must die. It will then be seen how the order of "nature" is suggested in the order of "paradise." A metaphysical leap takes place, a rupture. And the greatest man born of woman is less than the least significant being in the Heavenly Kingdom.

There are two kinds of world views. And because of the inner interrelatedness of construction in the world of thought, there can be no indifferent views or opinions, there cannot be any kind of adiaphora. In every cognitive act we are either bringing together or dispersing, and whatever does not do the former will necessarily do the latter. We must distinguish between the "natural," organic "formedness" to which everything is equally subject — both the ugly and the beautiful, the true and the false — and the "formedness" that is of true value. The natural coexistence and equilibrium of parts in any world view still does not guarantee that the contents will be significant. Only too often does one encounter gaping logical abysses in creations which had seemed to

be "set in concrete." The cause of these cognitive failures is to be sought not only in the inability to be "logical." It has deeper roots, and leads in the final analysis to the objective impossibility of being "true to oneself" — in other words, to a hidden duality and "splinteredness" of initial vision. The contradictions of a world view are determined by object disharmony. The world chosen for description turns out to be "a kingdom divided in and of itself," and so its description must inevitably disintegrate into contradictions. The "dead ends" of a world view are determined by the inescapability of experience, by the inescapability of the object itself. There is "another world," more remote, a world of the precious and the sacred, at once both near and far. The heavens descend to earth in answer to the celestial flights of the human soul. In these encounters with the celestial world there is the fulfilment of cognition. And the withdrawal of "nature" into itself, into its own "this-worldliness," is the root of downfall and error. He who does not rise in cognition, does not remain immobile — he falls. "For to those who have, still more will be given, while from those who have not, what little they have will be taken away."

Cognition, as a historical phenomenon created by the systematic and interrelated efforts of successive generations, is a heroic act. It is a tragic struggle for experience, for true experience, for "the experience of the Truth." World views do not extend in one single evolutionary line. They are of a polyphyletic nature. Two experiences — having different objects and different values — clash in history. And until Judgment Day, wheat and weeds will grow intermingled. The history of thought is a heroic search, the feat of willfully and passionately overcoming sin, the penitential feat of humanity's ascension "to the reason of the Inaccessible Glory" of God, to "the reason of Truth." In the final analysis, all errors, transgressions and mistakes may be reduced to a particular initial, fundamental temptation, to a kind of original sin — *at the heart of all transgressions always lies some kind of false experience, a false faith, a false path.* History, in its ontological essence, is the history of Christianity — the history of Redemption. The destinies of the peoples who lived before Christ are, as a whole, a kind of *praeparatio evangelica.* The destinies of peoples *post Christum natum* are those of the Church, the historical cause of Christianity. The historical process is irreversible and metaphysically unified. "Something is being accomplished" in history. And on the whole, history strives forward to and gravitates toward a kind of limit and fulfillment. There are periods in which the empyrean seemingly reaches its point of greatest wear, when nearly everyone becomes able to clearly perceive this latent and profound metaphysical struggle. At such times the fundamental lie of religion reveals itself with extreme sharpness. However close at hand and empirical the means and causes of modern day upheavals may be, it is all too clear that this very same initial lie is to be found and disclosed in them. This lie must be sensed, identified and refuted. One must not prematurely and faintheartedly fall from the

din of universal turbulence into an apocalyptic trance. These are not yet the last days. The metaphysical storm has been raging since ancient times, and a keen ear hears it at all times, even through the veil of well-being. Chronological limits are not of interest to the spirit that is profound and intense. Whether the *Parousia* is close at hand or whether many generations must still succeed one another before the harvest — at both the first and the eleventh hours the eternal testament of the "ordeal of spirits" remains with equal strength, along with eternal, inescapable melancholy.

II

Not long ago, the unforgettable P. I. Novgorodtsev strikingly depicted the crisis of the entire contemporary social world view, the ruin of the "utopia of heaven on earth." The process of the test of time revealed the inconceivability and unrealizability of a "life structure" in which the source of decay and imperfection would be permanently and definitively eliminated. Yet people believed in this construction with all the passion and ardor of a tortured and seeking soul. And thus the entire system of life, the entire spiritual way of being, was ruined — as if the most intense Utopian spirit could be broken down and surmounted. In this penetrating description and diagnosis we must disagree with one point in particular — namely, with the hope that the present day ruin of social Utopianism is final and definitive. Social Utopianism is only the symptom, the "upper layer," of an whole integral world view, the lawful conclusion to be drawn from premises of certain world views, a conclusion that could not be made without a certain lack of logical successiveness. And it should be noted with particular attentiveness that not only the unbridled fantasy of reckless individual fanatics leads to unrestrained Utopian hopes, but also a certain fateful logic of sober thought — once it has accepted certain fundamental views, once it rests upon specific, defined experience. Utopian conclusions are inevitably demanded by some kind of fundamental initial axiom. Indeed, it is not accidental that Catholic thought of the Middle Ages was grounded in Utopianism, as well as the commonplace philosophy of the New Age, the Age of the Enlightenment, and that of "historical reaction," and contemporary theomachist socialism. All of these reveal a certain latent idea. And in this idea alone is the enigma of Utopianism. It has not only not been overcome, but has not even yet been identified. For the time being, we are observing only the "casualties" of Utopian attitudes, a kind of disillusioned tide following the unbridled optimistic excess. Poison remains in the blood. And as long as the fundamental premises of Utopianism have not been surmounted, there is no foundation for the dangerous hope that new paroxysms will not occur. To the contrary, in the very experiencing of crisis and failure too many of the old Utopian features and habits remain. And not to no purpose did Vladimir Soloviev, in an insightful presentiment, represent the Antichrist as the

greatest and boldest of the Utopians. Utopianism is a continual and inescapable temptation of human thought, its negative pole, charged with great, although poisonous, energy.

Utopianism is a complex, many-storied spiritual "edifice." Its essence cannot be compressed into a brief, succinct definition. Instead, its axiom supply, which is not always clearly and distinctly "knowable," must be uncovered in layers. One must begin with the uppermost layer — with social Utopianism. By this name we are referring to faith in the possibility of final words, in the possibility of imminent historical success, maximized and definitive, although perhaps only partial, a success which would not call for or even admit further changes for the better. What is typical here is the faith in the possibility of definitive realization within the framework of history. The period of time in which the actual realization of this viceless social structure is to take place is irrelevant — whether in the irretrievable past, in the distant or imminent future, or whether it is recognized as already attained in the present. It also makes no difference how the actual features of the ideal structure are conceived, and to what historical factors their realization is connected. Decisive significance belongs to formal faith in the realizability of an earthly city, in the empirical attainability of "perfection," in social structure; that is, a condition that would exclude not only the necessity, but also the very possibility, of improvement. This faith includes the assumption that within the framework of time it is possible for the opposition of "the necessary" and "the actual" to completely disappear, and at the same time that "categories of assignment" may be overcome and abolished. In other words, it is the affirmation of the possibility of an "ideal" as a part of empirical reality, as an objectively given means, as a condition and phenomenon of the natural, historical world. This may be called aesthetic naturalism; it is the fundamental equating of values and facts. An ideal is a "future fact," only divined and anticipated for the time being, juxtaposed not with bare givens, with "indifferent nature," but only with the current "existing order of things," and situated along with the latter in one and the same plane of the historical empyrean. And to a certain extent, chronological order becomes in one sense the criterion for evaluation: what is moving forward is better. Naturalism is not even surmounted when the "ideal" is transported beyond the boundaries of history — even then it preserves its role of model, never entirely realized and therefore always continually and imminently realizable. Under these circumstances the identification of chronological succession with an evaluating hierarchy remains intact — simply because of this chronological consideration, each subsequent historical step is accepted as a "higher" one. The headlong rush into the "bad" infiniteness of natural time continues.

One may even call this an "expanded version of the thousand year kingdom," for here not only one particular "sacred" period is absolutized, but the entire historical process. And moreover, not only

on account of its harmonious teleological organization, not only as a means, but also because of the relative irreproachability of each stage in its particular place. Thus, everything that happens is "justified" and accepted — unaccountably and without evaluation. The very category of "value," as a principle significant in itself, is excluded altogether.

However, this "naturalization" of values has its own inherent truth. Behind the transformation of the categorical imperative into historical prediction there lies concealed the vague but righteous instinct of a willful, effective ethos. There is a glimmer of a true idea of the ultimate efficiency of good as a force. Ethical naturalism would like to be the ethics of the will, and not merely the "recording" ethics of evaluation. It dreams of the incarnation of perfection, and would thus surmount the abstract moralism of the ethics of formal duty. But this is not wherein its falsity lies. The lie of ethical naturalism consists of the fact that "ideal reality" (or "the reality of an ideal") is equated with and collaterally subordinated to "natural" reality within the limits of a particular plane of empirical existence. There is no sense of the fact that a realized ideal would scorch this reality, reduce it to ashes, generically "eliminate" it. To the contrary, in Utopian fantasies the ideal life is depicted strictly objectively, involving "things" and "objects" — like a kind of new and particular order or structure that will come to encompass the man of the future just as much "from without," necessarily and inescapably as the imperfect order does now. The "ideal structure" may be understood as one of the many different appearances of the possible empirical structure. This is the source of the peculiar belief in institutions — what one may call "institutionalism." All attention is focused on an organized type, and it is to this very type that self-sufficient meaning is ascribed, abstractly and irrespective of questions concerning the kind of people who will be living within this framework and the sources of inspiration they will have for their creative activity. Due to the very composition of a particular constructed institution, both unconditional value and faultlessness of action are ascribed to it, as such, in a specific way. An ideal structure or tradition of this kind therefore rises above the ethical sphere, in a sense, removes itself from the realm of ethical discussion and is transformed into a supra-ethical force to which "everything must be permitted." It appropriates the right to make moral legislation, a kind of morally metaphysical sovereignty.

This inescapable cult of a "deified" organization flows with a certain inevitable logic from the ideology of social Utopianism, and we encounter it even when the anarchical tendencies of some thinker or other would seemingly have to interfere with it. It is not accidental, for example, that Proudhon concludes his ideological evolution, in Herzen's well-turned phrase, with a "prison family" and a "Mandarin hierarchy." If it is possible for a way of life to exist that is good in and of itself, then by this very fact it is the primary good and, it comes to pass, is subject to realization in all domains. It may even "supplant" people —

hence the dictatorial and despotic pathos, the pathos of violently bestowing "happiness." This paradoxical idea is closely connected to the "realization" of an ideal.

The postulate of the complete "rationalizability" of social life operates with Utopian will, and may be applied in two ways: *de lege lata* and *de lege ferenda*. On the one hand, any existing order, any complete system of social relations, is recognized *a priori* as open to a kind of exhaustive "codification," to total envelopment by generalizing formulas. An equal sign is unreservedly placed between the code and life. On the other hand, it is therefore also permissible to permit this rationalization as a kind of goal setting: the anticipation of the apparent "constitution" of the future ideal society seems to be within the realm of possibility — and, moreover, with all of its special cases and its details. The penchant for and striving towards petty reglamentation are unusually significant for the most diverse strains of Utopian thought. It should be stressed that the "constitution" is constructed as a defining description of the "ideal structure." Thought anticipates the "ideal object" with all the creative flair of the constructive imagination, and everything is foreseen and precalculated. Moreover, everything foreseen here as the features and details of a "perfect" object is beautiful. Hence the pathos of the authoritarian gestures, the pathos of decreeing normative forms. A new, correct constitution can and must be declared by absolute law, and by this very act the transformation of society will already have been completed. All of "the rest" will appear in and of itself, like a derivative. Thus abstract schemas conceal concrete reality and appear to the Utopian as more "real" than the actual world.

Utopian ideals are always of an abstract nature. However, they may be related to historical or everyday impressions, the reflection of which may almost always be easily identified in them, they are constructed through abstraction. Utopians seek logical justification for these ideals not in concrete, living experience, but in uniform norms of "reason" or "nature," in "natural" law. Here, of course, true consciousness of the unconditionally categorical nature of norms for evaluation manifests itself, distorted, however, by their hypostatization, their separation from the living, moral consciousness that they require in order to assume meaning. Their "equalizing" social structure is related namely to this. The ideal condition, as one of completed wholeness of perfection, as "that which cannot be surpassed," must by its very definition be a single, isolated "object." The concretization of the categorical imperative leads to the idea of a unique and complete social structure, equally and unmistakably "normal (appropriate) for any society and any people, equally good at all periods in history." It is a kind of "normative charter" for human societies, simply deduced from the unchanged — and unchangeable, even in light of the diversity of historical conditions — "essence" or "nature" of man as such, as a "being of nature." *This is why a certain antihistorical tendency is always an inherent part of the Utopian world view* — a tendency which

may be disguised but not overcome through recognition of the diversity of the ages of different societies. It may still be suggested that they all pass through the same stages or phases of growth, that they all belong to the same embryological type. Ultimately it turns out that all societies become equal in their development, and at that point a homogeneous structure is established, particular to the mature human being as such. Deviation from the one and only normative type of development leads a people out beyond the boundaries of history, condemns them to a "non-historical" fate. In the final analysis, the idea rests upon nothing but the fantasy of a complex system of smaller heterogeneous units, a system of "associations," or on a single world "empire."

The establishment of a certain uniform, "rational" and "natural" structure allows for the search for a social "ideal." An ideal society will be realized. The necessary and the actual will be equalized and identified with one another forever. Thus a particular Utopian philosophy of history, which is behind social Utopianism to substantiate and support it, reveals itself. The hope that at some point, perhaps even soon, "the dawn of enthralling happiness will break" once and for all, and, moreover, on an "all human" or "planetary" scale — this hope is suggested and reinforced by a particular understanding and interpretation of the meaning and character of the historical process.

And it is to this next phase of the Utopian world view that we now turn.

III

Social Utopianism is the expression of belief in "complete ability," in an end to progress. It should be emphasized: the end of progress, not that of the historical process in general. The essential here is the fact that the flow of historical time, in contrast, is viewed as endless, continuing indefinitely and without boundaries. "History" does not end, only progress ends — that is, the increasing enrichment, improvement and perfectioning of life and custom. On the infinite line of time there is assumed to be a certain critical point at which "pre-history" is succeeded by "history." But the succession of generations continues even after the notorious "jump from the realm of the necessary to that of freedom." And indeed, it must continue, for otherwise progress itself would lose all meaning. All of "prehistory" is a lengthy process of production and accumulation which counts on the existence of future consumers, on the fact that under the blissful conditions of the ideal system and way of life, it will actually be possible for people to live. If the historical process were to actually end with the attainment of perfection, time itself would be extinguished, at which point, from the Utopian perspective, life would lose all meaning. History would assume the character of a fruitless, mindless "gathering" of "valuables" that are of no use to anyone and are therefore imaginary. At the very

least, Utopians must state that "history" is of longer duration than "progress." In addition, they must recognize the heterogeneity of two segments of historical time — the curve rises, and this ascent is followed by a seemingly infinite, or at least incredibly vast, plateau. Recognizing the homogeneity of time, in the given case, would be suicide. Upon the replacement of a self-sufficient standard for evaluation by a chronological one, the theory of finite progress within the infiniteness of time imposes itself with inevitable necessity. Otherwise it would be necessary to refuse even the very idea of progress itself, the idea of a social ideal — and to either declare all of history to be meaningless or "reconcile oneself" with all the various epochs. The socio-historical process may be justified only in the presence of chronological support. No action should be observed in relation to a point in time that is infinitely far away. Movement towards an infinitely distant goal is in no way different from a state of rest, for along the line of time there always remains "just as much" ground to be covered before the goal is attained as there was today or yesterday.

An ideal is a fact of the attainable future, but nonetheless it is the immanent goal of the entire flow of time. It is because of ideals that history is actually accomplished. The Utopian is obliged to conceive of and interpret history in teleological categories — as the development or "unfolding" of innate, predetermined inclinations, as the germination and maturation of a seed, like the self-realization of a kind of "plan" or "entelechy." In history an entire circle of successive transformations is preformulated and pre-determined in route to a completed, seemingly "mature" state. For purposes of expediency, history must conform to a certain plan. The idea of efficient development inevitably leads to a particular kind of logical "providentialism." In the historical process a certain pre-established goal is attained and realized, and its realization proceeds with a particular expedient rhythm through innerly substantiated stages. Whatever the factors and forces realizing this potential plan may be, their action is interrelated with all-encompassing necessity. And it is this very historical necessity which justifies the evil and the suffering in life. From the point of view of development, a "perfect," "mature" and "normative" condition cannot be fundamental and cannot appear suddenly. It must be "prepared." From this perspective the world as a whole is justified, with its entire structure, and in light of its teleological "interrelatedness" it turns out to be "the best of all worlds." This justification of the world is brought before *the judge of logical reason* and often leaves people in a state of emotional dissatisfaction , remaining deaf and dumb to direct, integral, moral feeling. It is the world itself that is being justified, not man; history as a whole, not private or individual lives. To the contrary, the individual is transformed into an organ or element of the "world essence," and is presented as a sacrifice to "the whole." Thus historical teleology provides a foundation and support for the anti-individualistic tendencies of the Utopian world view. Man — that is, man the "native being" —

becomes a part of nature, and the social ideal assumes cosmic proportions. This "naturalization" of man is closely connected with an understanding of the world as a teleological unified system, as an organic whole, as a kind of "individual of a higher order." History is the history of the world, of its expedient and law-governed formation in the image of man — hence its symmetry and harmony. This organic world view is the primary basis for the Utopian concretization of ideals. The goal of history is material, and cannot be otherwise, it cannot consist of anything other than "structure," if this is in fact the ultimate state of the naturally developing and forming, systematic world.

And once again, in this realistic approach to history, in the "objectivization" of its idealistic goals, in its expansion to include "all of creation" — in all of this, there is genuine and profound truth. The "building of history" actually consists of really overcoming incompleteness, real ontological redemption, a transformation, and not of the empty abolishment of all that is earthly, or of a subjective and individual withdrawal from it into an acosmic and ascetic pessimism. The falsity of organic historicalism lies not in this kind of "realism," but rather in the removal of the boundaries between nature and history, between nature and man. If history is the continuation and completion of "nature," a natural process of development, then it proceeds automatically — in which case it is inescapably necessary, with all of its parts and stages. On the other hand, in such a case the expression "history of humanity" takes on a literal meaning. Just as in nature the ultimate subject of development is the race living in a plurality of species which individualize it and in a number of "transient individuals," thus in history does the human race abolish and absorb into itself a plurality of human individuals. This point usually receives emotional emphasis — for "historical automatism," the "iron necessity" of existence, the feeling of the "indissoluble interwovenness" of individual destinies in fateful predetermination — all of these immediately serve as the best possible guarantee of the necessary realizability of ideals. Understanding an ideal to be the imminent goal of an inevitable natural process confers upon that ideal solidity and durability, separates it from dream-like fantasies, and guarantees that it will have "historical victory." Hence the testament of submissiveness — there is no reason to be "in disharmony with reality," and it is mad to struggle against it. One must ascertain the "natural tendencies of development" and adapt oneself to them. Historical "automatism" eliminates the risk of failure. At the same time, it also destroys the possibility of creation. In the well-turned phrase of S. Bulgakov, from this perspective all of life presents itself "in the passive voice" — and one may add: in impersonal sentences, as well. For "the individual" loses its independence, dissolving into "the racial." Hence that strange indifference that is so striking in its blind cruelty, the indifference with which the theoreticians of "fateful and incessant progress" treat living, empirical sorrow and suffering. Hence that gloomy determination which

so terrified Dostoevsky, with which they undertook to establish "future harmony" on the basis of torrents of innocent blood and tears.

Renouvier aptly demonstrated that the theory of progress is essentially one of the many different forms of the dogma of insuperable grace. The theory of progress, he said, "relies on the providential strength of facts which follow one after the other, which produce good from evil." There would seem to be more here than merely a clever analogy. He who professes the creed of progress senses within himself a universal, superhuman, infallible strength. Historically, we may observe the unchanging combination of the teachings of the "violence of divine grace" with the tenseness of Utopian expectations. This was the case with St. Augustine, and also in early Calvinism. The essential here is not so much the motive of the determinism as the experience of divine grace as an entirely "outer," seemingly inherent law. In the accurate words of Prince E. N. Trubetskoy, throughout the works of St. Augustine there continues a "search for the universe" which would rise above the contrasts in time reality, its unfortunate duality — in a unified system of worldwide peace and tranquility. What is essential here is namely the ideal, universal, objective harmony of universal, cosmic existence. Grace is transformed into a natural force of this "original," objective sphere. Determinism is only one of the components of this universally organic world view. Necessity is only one aspect of objectivity. What is fundamental is the very concretization of the world of moral values, making it fatefully inevitable. The "social ideal" is complete and "completed" objectivity, a balanced state of the world — not a "building" but rather a condition, a fact, a kind of order. In other words — the world in organized form. For this reason, individual suffering and the torments of others are forgotten in dreams of a "Messianic feast" — attention is focused on the exterior, on the world. Thought works in categories that are either cosmological or naturalistic. Individuals and generations are perceived as details or fine points of the whole which encompasses them.

In this one-sided objectivism, in the concretization or naturalization of moral values, in a kind of "spellbound attachment" to the "finite goal of the world," man's state of mind is expressed. History reveals itself to the observer in proportion to his perspicacity — he sees in it that which he himself is able to bring to it. The freeborn man will see in it great causes, will hear in it a heroic and creative poem. The slave will see only a "system of highly subtle acts of compulsion," a "stone wall," and to him heroes will seem to be "deceived day laborers who have just been had," warming up before a "providential charade." Man's willed sense of self is the root of his world view. And from behind the anti-individualism of the Utopian world view there clearly shines through the torn condition of the individual's consciousness of himself, the weakness of his willful self-definition. Such are the fundamental beginnings of Utopianism — in the intuitive correlation of oneself with "another," of oneself and the world.

IV

Cosmic possessedness — thus may we define the essence of Utopianism. A sense of unconditional dependence, of total "definedness" from without, of being completely drawn into and included within the structure of the universe — all of these inform both the Utopians' self-evaluation and their evaluation of the world. Man feels that he is an "organ pivot," one link in a kind of all-encompassing chain. He senses his simple and unchanging "bondedness" with the cosmic whole. He declares that he is within the scope of the world orbit in which the life of this integral, supra-individual organism is disclosed and realized — and also that he has disappeared into the "all-engulfing, world-creating abyss" from which worlds are incessantly emerging one after the other and into which they fall once again at the designated hour, back into the primordial abyss of chaos. In this process there is no action of the will. Confronted with the image of the world element with its compelling inescapability, the Utopian man becomes conscious of the transparency and the "nothingness" of his "private life," and even hesitates to actually attribute his life and his will to himself. He is too sharply aware of foreign, inherent, fateful, faceless forces, flowing within his very essence. He is drawn to cast himself into the "self-empowering ocean" of divine nature. He recognizes that he is the creation of another, the tool of another, the organ of an "exterior" will, the product of the "environment," the slave of destiny or of fate. He lives in the snares of world necessity. This is the pure, unadulterated pathos of the material world.

Subjectively, this material pathos may also not be expressed by a feeling of suppressedness and captivity. The "sense of the universe" may enflame the soul with ecstasy, inspire reverent trembling before and worship of the inexhaustible richness and immeasurability of the "many-colored" world. One sentiment alone cannot be awakened by elemental might in the possessed, deafened soul: the will to will, the daring of freedom, the consciousness of creative duty and responsibility. The world presents itself as "completed," and — however much movement it may contain — nothing new appears in it, nor can it appear, just as in a syllological chain the conclusion cannot ever contain anything superfluous in relation to the premises, which it only expresses in "unfolded" form. In the process of development only pre-established potentialities are uncovered. Man cannot introduce anything new. He can act in the world, faintheartedly participating in the general swirling confusion, but he cannot influence the world of his own free will. And indeed, there is no need for him to decide or to will anything — everything is pre-decided, everything is accomplished in its proper order. This does not mean that individual existence is superfluous or unnecessary. There is nothing superfluous in the world, everything in it has its place and its appointed function. But this function is of a servile

nature. Individuals serve the progress of the "coral reef." The life of the whole is composed of individual "blossomings" and "witherings," of incessant individual deaths. Individuals do not have stability of substance — their existence is only a possibility — it happens accidentally. Of course, everything that is experienced, everything that takes place, somehow accumulates and is preserved in the world memory; not one little sound that has been made will ever be irrevocably lost. Instead it will be woven into the constantly flowing cosmic melody as an overtone, enriching it in the process. Every sound — even those that are so soft as to have nearly faded away — still continues to resound, in some hidden form, at every new stage of development. In and of itself an individual sound is nothing, and may be distinguished only through abstraction. Truly and distinctly, everything is strictly "of the world." The universal organism is a united "essence," a single, original individual being. Only such a world unity exists in and of itself. There is only the world — the world as a unified system.

And this means, therefore, that the world is God. All other existences are in the world, and are only for it. The world as a whole lives, develops, "becomes" — the unified system is enriched, formed, revealed and individualized because of the perishing of all particular existences. Leaves are continually turning yellow, drying up and falling from the immortal tree of faceless life — but it stands eternally young and indifferent. Indeed, in the words of one poet, "nature can have no idea of the past," and from its point of view every new spring is "fresh as the first spring."

In this closed-off world unity there is no room for self-definition or for freedom. Here any kind of self-definition is transparent, and therefore unnecessary and evil. Freedom and creation are inherent elements of the unified system — its very formation is creative evolution. But no novel aspect of these unforseeably arising transformations can confer upon them self-sufficient meaningfulness — the systematic whole alone has meaning. In this "universalism" one finds the roots of the ultimate foundation of the Utopian propensity for "material" ideals. Behind the antithesis of the individual and society hides the opposition of the individual and the world, of the individual and the cosmos. The pathos of collectivism is nourished by the primordial naturalistic point of view, by its perception of the world as an interrelated, unified system tending towards the completed organization of all of its natural and material forces.

There was a kind of profound truth in the differentiation between the independent spheres of "pure" and "practical" reason, with which Kant attempted to free moral "self-regulation" from the bonds of naturalistic oppression. But Kant, not having surmounted monism, was unable to make use of his clear intuition, and vacillated helplessly between a "double accounting system," between two conflicting kinds of reason, inevitably degenerating into nihilism — and the very same naturalistic

monism. Either "good" turns out to be impotent and the moral conscience is transformed into a kind of ineffective epiphenomenon of natural reality, or the world has dissolved into a dream and only the "world of significances" has been preserved, a world which cannot be said to "exist." Or, finally, values have solidified as the hidden "essences" of empirical things, and are drawn into the natural orbit. "What exists on the other side" turns out to be "intelligible character," the root and even the substance of "what exists on this side." The "world of values" turns out to be the "essence" of the world of "phenomena," in which it is reflected and realized. The two worlds are equated to and continually reinforce one another. Prototype and reflection, cause and effect, original and copy, possibility and actuality, essence and phenomenon — all of these are co-related pairs, separable only in abstraction. We are entering the realm of the pantheistic deification of the world. Nature is introduced into the "entrails of Divine nature" as one phase or part of Divine life, as an outpouring of Divine might that is revealed and realized in the world as a "thing" in "phenomena." God dissolves into the world, flows into it. Various nuances are possible here. The "unified system" may be conceived of logically, as a unity of justification (God is the *ultima ratio* of things) — or naturalistically, as the innate and unique essence of existence (God is the *potentia actuosa* of world reality). In both cases everything that exists, including even God, is interwoven in one and the same "tissue." Everything turns out to be "unconditional" and "divine" in its absolute substantiation, like different links of one and the same chain. "And beneath the impassive mask of matter, the divine flame everywhere burns." For this reason, once again, there are no rigorous, clear-cut boundaries to facilitate evaluation. The law of "sufficient grounds" is expressed as the highest world-governing principle. In the world as a natural "theophany" there can be neither deception nor evil. Everything in the world is illuminated by being retraced to the First Cause, which creates and "gives off" existence from its completeness and abundance, through will — *aneu proaireseoi*, as Plotinus put it.

"Particular individual dissonances" are not only not equalized in world interaction, but even turn out to be necessary, for aesthetic reasons, for the completeness of the harmony of the universe, which would otherwise have suffered in terms of its fullness of sound and "multicolcredness." The design of the ontological unified system has its own particular kind of truth. In the attempt to retrace everything to its fundamental elements, to understand all of existence as merit and good and all values as productive and effective forces, the true religious instinct is conveyed. But the attempt to interpret everything in terms of material, object-related categories, to subject everything to the principles of fate and necessity, is false and deceiving. There is no room for action in the unified organic system — movement alone is possible. As Schelling perspicaciously noted in his *Philosophy of Revelation*, all acts are excluded here and only "substantial relations" (*wesentliche*

Verhältnisse) are recognized; the thought process here is exclusively "substantial," and everything follows modo aeterno, purely logically, through imminent movement. There is no place for acts or heroic "feats." Everything suggests "sly quietism," a clever timid submission to exterior forces. "Adam said: The wife whom you gave me, she gave me of the fruit of the tree, and I ate." The outstanding Russian philosopher V. I. Nesmelov penetratingly interpreted our ancestors' fall as the temptation of the impotent will. The original sin consisted in refusing creation and boldness, in refusing active self-definition. Our primogenitors wanted "their life and their fate to be determined not by themselves, but by outer material causes," and with this intention and "their superstitious act" people willingly subjected themselves to "exterior nature," and willingly destroyed the world meaning that they could and should have had, given the spiritual nature of their identity. They lowered themselves "to the level of simple things of the world," "joined their spirit to the general chain of world phenomena," "made themseves subject to exterior nature," to the "physical law of mechanical causality." "Instead of being the free realizers of the general goal of world existence, they instead appealed to the world for help so that it would realize their eternal task for them — with its mechanical forces. With this act they renounced creative freedom, dissolved into the world, lost themselves among the insignificant things of this world. They excluded from the economy of nature the fact that there is no guarantee of responsible action. It is namely "faintheartedness" that makes up the sinfulness of the will, which seeks "objective" crutches.

On account of guaranteed success man, just like the clever slave of the Evangelical parable, renounces self-significance and self-definition, he renounces "the terrifying burden of the freedom of choice," in the words of the Grand Inquisitor. In his quest for a "solid foundation" he seeks to "bow down before what is already unquestionable — so unquestionable that all people immediately agree upon general worship of it." And what is more "unquestionable" than nature? From nature a new way of feeling will be born, that of a slave of the elements, shackled by an invisible "system of subtle compulsory acts." The renunciation of heroic acts and of freedom's audacity includes man within the fiery cycle of births and deaths, dooms him to the drudgery and "bustling" of endless flight. Development then replaces heroic acts. Such is the ultimate foundation of this unfortunate "digression" into the irreversible flow of time, "into the emptiness of infinity and distance" which is at the heart of the Utopian world view.

The primary base here is cosmic possessedness, in the natural way of feeling, in the fact that man — according to the prophet Jeremiah — "says to the tree, 'you are my father' and to the stone, 'you gave birth to me'." This "obscuration of the reasonless heart," suggesting the "Grace of Eternal God" in the image of "perishable man," in the image of creation, was disclosed with great clarity in the philosophy of antiquity which for its entire duration, from Falesovian pandemonism to the

speculative heights of the Neoplatonic gnosis, never managed to get out of the naturalistic "dead end." Given all the ascetic harmoniousness of the Hellenistic spirit, exhausted by everyday commotion, given the great attentiveness to "secrets from beyond the heavens," Neoplatonism accepts the Great Pan, for everything is — "from One." Furthermore, in the Plotinian system of dynamic unity all evaluating characteristics are transformed into material designations. The One is good because it is the metaphysical focal point and beginning of everything, and because it provides the conditions for everything since it is itself unconditional. The inescapable naturalism and cosmologism of Hellenistic thought was expressed with particular sharpness during the period of dogmatic quarrels concerning the Trinity, when the distinction between the mysteries of Divine Life and those of the Architecture, between the mysteries of the Pre-Eternal Creation of the God-Word and those of the creation of the world, was so emphatically enforced. Ancient thought could not escape the limits of this world, it could not get beyond the naturalistic representation of Divinity as an immanent cosmic force and of Providence as the "distinct law-governed interrelatedness" of the world. But if, before the Gospels, there was a kind of holy melancholy in these transgressions of the tired and lonely spirit, naturalism of thought in the Christian world becomes merciless "falsely named knowledge."

Moreover, there remained too many naturalistic temptations in subsequent philosophy, too much of an undefined heritage from pagan times. The "Roman idea," the idea of forcibly uniting humanity, has not yet perished — even in our time it is conquering the world with great writhings and convulsions. But it is grounded in the "Hellenistic idea," in pagan cosmotheism, in the practices of a "naturalistically determined" spirit. It would have been criminal carelessness to diminish the actuality and effectiveness of pagan temptations which at many times and in many ways concealed from the human conscience the God-revealed tidings of Christian freedom. And it would not be an exaggeration to say that the human spirit breaks down in the struggle with temptation. The history of philosophical teachings is a crystallized chronicle of the mind's incessant unsuccessful attempts to attain Divine Revelation, which exceeds the reason of creation. Here again, the main obstacle is the usual cosmological position of the conscience, which is limited to this century and therefore powerless to intervene in the mystery of creation-out-of-nothing, out of "that which is non-existent." This relates in particular to Western European philosophy, which is nourished on impoverished and obfuscated religious experience.

No, it is not "meonism" that affects "European" philosophy, but the opposite vice — exclusive and equalizing objectivism. The fact that man is "possessed" by the world obliges him to seek out and concretize the image of unconditional perfection that is inherent to his soul. This is the enigma of the paradoxical combination of the slave conscience and arrogant self-assurance. Precisely because man is conscious of his

own metaphysical insignificance, he feels that he is but a "dream of nature," "the medium of external objectivity," he is inclined to ascribe objective significance to his own dreams. Hence the Luciferian confidence in the complete cognizability of the mysteries of the world and in the realizability of the "strivings" vainly exerted by nature. This concept was most clearly expressed in the "subjectogony" developed by the German Idealists at the beginning of the last century: the subject will be created from the very same root as the object — and the object is therefore entirely knowable. In fact, cognition is essentially the self-cognition of an object, a phase of death formation. Furthermore, it is a step of Divine self-disclosure. This is why cognition is adequate for existence, unconditional by its very nature. Hence the highflown summons to "trust above all science and oneself," to "believe in the strength of the spirit" — phrases used by Hegel to arouse his students. It seemed to him that man "cannot think highly enough of the greatness and might of his spirit." And even the closed-off and precious essence of the Universe is powerless to stand against the courageousness of the cognition process: before the latter it must reveal itself, must disclose its treasures and its depths and allow pleasure to be derived from them. For man is the meaning and the focus of everything, he is a microcosmos. In addition, in man God is conscious of or identifies himself. Human cognition is divine and, it has come to pass, infallible. The soul becomes inspired by self-affirming cognitive optimism, based on the real and inevitable correspondence of object order and mind order, on the "correlatedness, agreement and coincidence" of existence and cognition through their categories and logical laws, as Ed. Hartman demonstrated. The sense of mystery, the sense of "amazement" — that original philosophical eros, is excluded altogether by this kind of optimism, and it is replaced by naively proud assurance of the facility of acquiring total knowledge. It would seem to be enough to merely open one's "cognitive eyes" in order to immediately and instantaneously see "everything that is, that was, that is to come during the centuries."

And one would see with strict observation of objective proportions. It is left for knowledge to overcome only qualitative and graduated obstacles, to spread itself far and wide, to fill out, to develop. In our time the conception of knowledge as contemplation, as unmediated and passive perception and calculation, is again beginning to be affirmed, with new force. Nonetheless, whether the "contemplating window" is directed inward or outward, the creative moment is not included in cognitive activity. This quietistic tendency is clearly expressed in the renaissance of "naive realism," in the attempt to completely objectify cognitive categories, to transfer the entire category apparatus into the infallible "given" of the contemplative object. The conception of cognition as "contemplation of the world in the original," carries the sense of "looking through a microscope" to such a point that a state of dream-like contentment is reached. And the assumption that cognition is necessarily sufficient already contains the Utopian dream of outwardly

attainable completion. The "correspondence" between nature order and mind order must be revealed and led to its logical conclusions — then will nature be filled with reason and reason fully incarnated. The world will attain completedness and complete "formedness," the "ideal universe" will be realized and the earth will become "just." The circle of hesitations, searchings and worries will be exhausted, right down to the very end, and the all-satisfying repose of universal bliss — the "Messianic feast" — will finally come to pass. All the ardor of Utopian intention is directed towards this ultimate goal — the contemplative tendency of the spirit is related to its involvement in the flow of time.

On the foundation of naturalistic monism the "Utopian world view" develops in steadfast logical succession. In it "Utopian experience" is revealed — a vision of the world as a closed-off, "completed" organic unity, as a "whole" that has been assembled and equilibrated from within. As such a unity, the world stands "on the other side of good and evil," beyond all evaluation. Values, both positive and negative, are possible only within the world. In and of itself, the world as a whole must simply be accepted — without evaluation. The ultimate wisdom of this world may be reduced to recognition — this is how things are, this is how they were, this is how they will be. And the same change of essence may occur within the unity. For the naturalistic conscience there can be no reconciling optimism and pessimism, and both poles demand to be brought to an extreme. It is necessary to either accept the entire world or refute it. These are the two types of nihilism. In both cases the world is essentially empty, for purposes of appraisal. Any and all monism begins as nihilism, for existence is dual.

This duality is almost always felt in a vague way. From this feeling will the opposition to external objectivism be born. But within a naturalistic framework this opposition can only assume the form of acosmic negation. The way out of the "naturalistic dead end" can only be discovered through the transformation of experience. Only in the experience of faith, in religious experience, does the metaphysical schismatism of existence reveal itself, a harrowing abyss. And only in the experience of faith, in the experience of freedom, is the noble path of true speculation revealed.

Translated from the Russian by
Catherine Boyle

FEDOROV AND THE PROJECT OF THE IMAGINARY CAUSE
ON N. F. FEDOROV AND HIS SUCCESSORS

Determining the place of N. F. Fedorov in the history of Russian thought is not an easy task. He was not a writer, and he did not construct a philosophical system. Nor was he a preacher, even though he did feel summoned to testify. If he wrote, then it was for himself and perhaps a few other people, always very confidentially, and not for outsiders. He was never able to make a general outline of his views. There is something "Socratic" in his way of writing and of setting forth his thoughts — it is always like a kind of conversation. It is always discourse that is urging someone on or persuading someone to do something, a conversation. Fedorov's manuscripts were first published only after his death, by his admirers, but again "not for sale." Moreover, not everything that remained was published. A few individual articles and letters were published only in recent years, in émigré publications.

Fedorov has only recently begun to be read. It is doubtful whether many people have read or are reading him even now. But it is becoming customary to speak of or mention him, to allude and make references to him. The builders of the new "post-revolutionary" ideology, both in Russia itself and in émigré communities, show particular attentiveness to and partiality for the name of Fedorov.[1] In Fedorov's writings they find justification for or confirmation of their designs and intentions — in any event, they claim to find it. In constructions such as these, Fedorov's world view is contrasted with Soviet reality. Furthermore, in his writings they intend to find ideological support and the foundation for a new and systematic social activism. There is something very contemporary, and even "burning," in the thoughts and arguments of this "mysterious thinker" who almost still belonged to the generation of "the forties" (he was born in 1828 and died in 1903). Strangely enough, people with an extremely wide range of tastes and outlooks come together in their affinity for Fedorov's teachings, from the adherents of moral orthodoxy to the builders of the Communist way of life (traditionally Valerii Briusov and M. N. Pokrovsky). There is also a small circle of immediate admirers of Fedorov himself, the "standard-bearers" and continuers of his ideological cause. They "hold out" in isolation, on their own. They speak of the "*the common cause*," but their spirit of isolation is strong. And in any event, the "common" cause of which they speak is a cause that is entirely *particular*, endorsed by no one but themselves. They prefer to avoid any and all participation

in the affairs of others. What we have here is a kind of *system of continual evasion.*

This is also how it was with Fedorov himself. He lived a closed-off and solitary life, about which little is known. We know almost nothing of his youth, when the foundations of his world view were established and organically fused together, when his individual personality was formed. He spent his young years in a remote province, and then became a permanent resident of Moscow. He lived humbly and in poverty, and occupied insignificant positions. But he could sooner be called an "abstinent" than an "ascetic," and his poverty is more suggestive of the ancient Cynics than of even St. Francis and his disciples. Fedorov is not so much *acting* as *abstaining* — he avoids and evades, he does not want to take part in the building of a false life. And his modesty or "poverty" are only one particular — and very original — variety of "not-doing." In any event, he does in fact step out of existing culture. He leaves all of created history, withdrawing and setting in opposition to it his own "*project.*" He shuts himself up in this project, barricades himself into it or away from the world. He lives in his own little world. *The solitary dream of a common cause* — this is the fundamental paralogism of Fedorov's entire world view.

In the works of his imitators this paralogism comes across even more sharply. This is the essence of their Utopianism. Psychologically, Utopianism is just this kind of *flight into a dream,* a dream-like *seclusion from history.* This kind of "dreaminess" is entirely compatible and often combined with the most terrible "will to power." The dreamer and the Utopian can seize power, can burst into history, just like the active man. In the history of any revolution there are many examples of this — examples of the clearest kind. And he nonetheless remains a dreamer, isolated and secluded, the sectarian of his idea. Indeed, the fundamental theme of Dostoevsky's work is concerned with this "dreamy violence," or the violent acts of dreamers. N. F. Fedorov himself was in fact a dreamer. He was not a perspicacious person, and viewed "contemplation" with contempt and hostility. In his arguments there are far more dreams than there are actual visions or insights. Psychologically, Fedorov belongs to the same historical formation as the old French Utopians — Saint-Simon, Fourier, Leroux, Auguste Comte. All of them were dreamers. Each of them believed in his own personal dream more than he did in actual history. These names do not come to mind here simply by chance or to no purpose. It is not merely a formal similarity, not merely a historical contiguity. Fedorov was organically connected with this old French Humanism and Utopianism. He was not the only one in Russia to be attracted to Fourierism and Comte's Positivism in the forties and sixties. It was a genuine "craze" in the Russian environment, and was in many cases colored in religious tones. In this respect, Fedorov was entirely a man of his generation.

However, Fedorov's world view remained mysterious, seemed unexpected even to his contemporaries, who had lived through an

experience analogous to his own. I am referring first and foremost to Dostoevsky. This impression of mysteriousness and of a certain unexpectedness remains even to this day. Even more may be said. Fedorov's entire world view is constructed on a manifest contradiction. He claims to construct a philosophy of Christianity, and starts from the premises of a "*religion of humanity*." The strangest aspect of his system is the fact that it is easy to subtract from it the "hypothesis of God," and nothing in it would change. Many of Fedorov's successors are now doing just this, and are even turning his system into an ideology of godless or theomachist construction. This is by no means an act of violence against the design of the creator. It is rather a return to the initial elements of the system. The system turns out to be more integral and coherent in this kind of "man-and-God" interpretation than it does in the context of any and all attempts to understand it in the framework of historical Christianity. The system's Christian "attire" must not lead the reader into error. It is not that important where the words and images were taken from — it is far more important to consider with what spirit the entire system is animated and what the source of its premises is.

Strictly speaking, in Fedorov's work there was one all-absorbing theme, one fixed plan. It is the theme of *death*. And the plan is that of the *resurrection of the dead*. Fedorov begins with criticism of life and relations as they exist. He considers the world to be in decay and disorder, in a shattered and dissipated state. He is disturbed by the weakening and even breaking off of brotherly and kindred feelings, and bitterly gives evidence of the "non-kindredly" condition of the world. In this respect he is highly reminiscent of the Romantics in general, especially the French Utopians. Comte speaks of "anarchy," Saint-Simon of the scarcity of "brotherhood," Fourier of the "breaking up" of life. To the self-affirmation of the self-isolated man they all opposed the principle of "association" and of "brotherhood," the principle of agreement and joint labor. In this respect Fedorov is close to them — and it is important to stress that the moment of community is introduced here in the form of the *cause*, in that of *labor*. This, in particular, is characteristic of Fedorov. The pathos of his racial integrity and completeness makes him similar to the French Socialists. It is always a question of *humanity*.

But Fedorov's pain is still sharper and deeper. He is wounded *by time*, above all else. Indeed, the unity of humanity is destroyed most of all by time and by death. The restoration of "kindred" and "brotherly" feelings alone is still in no way sufficient. For the completeness of humanity in any case will not be attained and realized. *As long as* the alternation of generations continues, *until* all generations are *simultaneously joined together*. For this reason Fedorov makes it a duty not only to love those who are close, but also *to resurrect one's ancestors*. This is the very essence of the notorious "common cause" — *the resurrection of our fathers*. Instead of stretching out into horrible infinity with the birth

of descendants and being drawn into the alternation of births and deaths, we must direct all our instincts and passions and focus them on the *labor-resurrection of ancestors.*

Fedorov uses Christian terminology, and it is possible to think that he is speaking of the same thing. In reality, he is speaking of something entirely different. [Fedorov appears to be part of the reality of the Church and of Orthodoxy in terms of what he says, but it is only conventional historical language. He utterly lacked any "intuition" of the "new creation" in Christ; he did not sense that Christ is a "shock" for the natural order and rhythms. About Christ he speaks very rarely and vaguely, in terms which are quite dull and unconvincing. Strictly speaking, he completely lacked any Christology, and his "projects" contain absolutely no sense of anything beyond the grave. There is an explicit insensitivity to the transfiguration.][2] His is not a religion of salvation, it is a religion of *struggle.* And it is not even a religion. It is the very concept of "salvation" that was most foreign to him. From what we were to be saved, he could never understand. He did not see evil in the world, only *chaos and the elements.* He did not recognize sin, only weakness and misunderstanding. He saw *enemies* in the world. And enemies must be fought with. Actually, man has only one true enemy. And even this enemy is only *temporal.* This enemy is *nature or death.* Here it is this very "or" that is typical. Nature is blind, and in its blindness it is destructive and even fatal. But the elements are strong, *until* they are checked. They are strong, *until* man is strong, *until* he becomes enlightened. Man is stronger than nature, and he is summoned to control nature, to curb sense and reason and turn them into a submissive tool. Then even death will cease. "In us nature begins not only to be conscious of itself, but also to govern itself. In us it attains perfection, or a condition in which it will no longer destroy anything and will restore, resurrect, all that was destroyed during the period of blindness." Thus Nature becomes and attains fulfillment in the labor and doings of man. Man is not pre-created by Nature, and must pre-create himself and Nature itself. He must introduce reason into Nature.

The most unclear aspect of all in Fedorov's world view turns out to be his teachings on man. It is really only the *fate of the human body* that interests Fedorov. Indeed, it is namely through the body that man is organically joined with nature. But it remains unclear as to what the fate of the *soul* is. It also remains unclear *what death is.* It remains unclear *who* dies and *who* is resurrected — *the body or man.* Fedorov barely mentions the afterlife existence of the dead. He speaks more of their tombs, of their entombed remains. As a matter of fact, the entire phenomenon of death in Fedorov's system may be reduced to the fact that generations supplant one another, that the term of life is too short, and the entire systematic body of human generations cannot exist all at once. His conception of death is that it is but a natural defect, the underdevelopment of nature and of the world. For this reason, the treatment that suggests itself is also natural, within the limits of

nature, through the forces of man and nature, without any interference from the transcendental world, without paradise. "It must also be added that the resurrection spoken of here is not mystical, *is not a miracle, but rather a natural consequence of the successful cognition of the blind, death-bearing force of nature* by the systematically-unified forces of all people." Fedorov insistently stresses the *equivalence* of this natural restoration. In his depiction of the "disharmony of human nature" Fedorov unexpectedly brings to mind Mechnikov. Both are attempting to resolve the same question. Mechnikov has even more anguish and pays even more attention to individual fate. Fedorov is not very interested in the fate of a particular individual or organism in and of itself. And in the resurrected world he is interested less in the completeness of *persons* than in that of *generations* — the realized or restored *wholeness of the race*. Fedorov's teachings on human individuality are not at all developed. The individual remains and must be only *an organ of the race*. For this reason, among human emotions Fedorov values attachments and blood ties, "kindred" relations, highest of all. Fedorov seeks a solution to death on the path of a kind of human biotechnics. It is typical that to *organic* processes he juxtaposes namely *technical* ones, and to natural strength — human *labor and calculation*.

In nature Fedorov does not see and does not recognize any kind of meaning or goals or beauty. The world is chaos and the elements, and therefore there is really no world in it at all. Meaning is introduced into the world alone through labor. *To vital passion* Fedorov opposes *a labor project* — a kind of *cosmic many-year plan*. For Fedorov, man is above all the technician, almost the mechanic, of nature, the orderer and distributor. In his eyes, the highest form of action is *regulation*. Reason must reconcile and combine the chaotic movements and processes of the world, must introduce into them rational conformity to laws. Meteorological regulation at first, and in the future — government by the movements of the earth itself. We must become heavenly mechanics in the direct sense of the word, must make the universe submit to our conscience. "When this question will have been solved, then for the first time a star or planet governed by conscience and by will shall appear in the heaven-space." Fedorov sees the "ulcer" of the Fall as being the fact that man lost his cosmic power and might. And in man nature itself becomes blind. The main thing is to restore or re-establish his power over his own body. Man must once again control his body from within — "must know himself and the world so well that he then has the possibility of *producing himself from the most fundamental elements* into which human existence may be broken down." And this ability to "reproduce oneself" suggests a corresponding power over all human bodies as well, over matter in general — for the entire world is the dust of our ancestors. Particles of dead bodies must be extracted from sideritic distances, from telluric depths. For Fedorov, the question here concerns namely the gathering and combination of particles, the composing of that which has been decomposed.

Soloviev feared with good reason that this would be a "reanimation of corpses." In Fedorov there is a definite touch of necromancy. The most mysterious thing of all in his theory of "resurrection" is related to this surprising lack of feeling for human individuality. Fedorov proposes experimenting with and on ancestral remains *as if they did not exist at all.* Many of the contemporary successors of Fedorov also think in these terms, to all appearances — at least, they frankly admit that they are not interested in the "immortality of the soul" and its "fate beyond the grave." It is then to be asked *who is being resurrected*? At that point, Sergei Bulgakov's reply becomes incontestable: "the appearance on earth of robots with the physical appearance of people who have previously died is not the resurrection of the dead." Fedorov himself calls for the resurrection of other bodies, as if it were not "his own" soul that was primary and the direct "vital force" of his body. The entire task may be reduced to a new composition of bodies, and it somehow remains unclear exactly what unites this aggregate of particles and how it is transformed into a living organism. It also remains unclear just what death is in man's fate, this "dis-incarnation," this withdrawal into a kind of colorless kingdom. In Fedorov's system a question like this becomes altogether incontestable. Otherwise the "project" itself would remain unmotivated and unfounded. But Fedorov has no answer to this question, and he somehow does not even notice the question at all.

Strangely enough, he has no "anthropology." The reader gets the impression that he is getting ready to prepare new *homonuculi in vitro.* Indeed, Fedorov would like to rebuild the entire cosmic *organism* or turn it into a *mechanism.* Furthermore, he expects that through this kind of change and rationalization, the world will revive and be resurrected, will become immortal. "By changing the influence of the earth's mass into conscious labor, the united human race will give terrestrial force, governed by reason and feeling — and consequently life-bearing force — prevalence over the blind forces of the other heavenly bodies, and will unite them in one life-bearing cause of resurrection." Then will *labor heaven* be revealed. Strength — from knowledge and from consciousness. Strength — from reason. Resurrection is a matter of science and art. And the dead will be resurrected by natural forces, by the very same forces of nature, which have merely been applied to new goals.

Fedorov had in mind above all the changing of the natural and elemental forces of birth, the "transformation of birth into resurrection," the use of the creating sex's erotic energy for the restoration of the completeness of the race. "In Christianity, to natural reproduction there corresponds chastity, in the negative sense — that is, the denial of birth — and in the positive sense, general resurrection — that is, reproduction *from the surplus that is wasted during race-creation,* and from the ashes produced by the destructive struggle of previous generations." In this strange techno-religious project economy, technics, magic, sensuality and art are combined in one fascinating and

uncanny synthesis. It must be stressed yet again: Fedorov always *prefers what has been made to what has been born, and the artificial to the natural.* Past generations, restored by knowledge of matter and its powers, still capable of recreating their bodies from the basic elements, populate worlds and annihilate the discord between them. The earth will become the first star in the heavens to be moved not by the blind force of "falling" but by reason, which renews and forewarns of downfall and death. The time is not far away when in the systematic body of worlds we will see the systematic body of all the past generations. All will be of the same race, nothing foreign. This day will be wondrous, fantastic, *but not miraculous,* for resurrection will be a matter *not of miracles, but rather of knowledge and common labor.*" In Fedorov this humanistic activism is connected with a *conditional* understanding of the Bible's eschatological prophecies as only warnings that are pedagogically addressed to the imagination and will of people. They speak only of what *would happen under the condition* of man's "doing nothing." For Fedorov, though, this is only a kind of *casus irrealis.* It is interesting to note that for Fedorov, "transcendental" resurrection by the power of God is equated with "resurrection of judgment," with resurrection of anger. Man can only bring about resurrection by his own strength or by that of nature. Fedorov rushes headlong into the discrimination of the most extreme optimistic Pelagianism.

The originality of Fedorov's religious construction is not in the fact that to contemplative or *ascetic* Christianity he is opposing "*active*" Christianity. He goes much further. To *divine* action he is opposing *human* action. To *paradise* he is opposing *labor.* One *in place of* the other. The doctrine of God-Humanity is not at all explicated in Fedorov's system. The "religion" of N. F. Fedorov is a *religion of humanity.* It is an original *cult of ancestors* — thus insists N. F. Fedorov himself. "*Religion of common undertaking,*" again, is his own designated term. Fedorov's teachings are an original form of religious positivism, a refined form of "positivist religion." They say that Fedorov was a churchgoer. But his world view, "in most of its propositions," was not at all Christian, and sharply disagrees with both Christian revelation and Christian experience. It is an ideology rather than an actual faith. "Christ is the resurrector and Christianity the resurrection; *the resurrection of Lazarus was the completion of Christ's judgment.*" This is not an accidental slip of the tongue. Indeed, in Fedorov's eyes Christ was only a great *miracleworker* whom spirits and the elements obeyed. The sacrament of the Cross remained inaccessible to him — "both the very crucifixion and the death of Christ were only the feeble *revenge of the enemies of the resurrection* and the enemies of the Resurrector." Bethany, where Lazarus was resurrected, is for Fedorov higher than Nazareth and Bethlehem and Jerusalem itself. Fedorov retains only applied Christianity, without the foundation. By no means does his "project" lead beyond the limits of the "human, too human."

It is very characteristic that in Fedorov's writings there is an unexpected number of points of resemblance and contiguity with the "Positive Politics" of Auguste Comte. We may conclude that it was not by chance that Vladimir Soloviev again took up reading Comte in the nineties, when Fedorov's influence on him was so obvious. In Soloviev's well-known article about Comte, explicit suggestions of Fedorov may be identified. Soloviev singles out the motif of *resurrection* in Comte. "Comte does not directly express this thought, but he who reads with conscientious attention all four volumes of his *Politique positive* must recognize that none of the world's famous philosophers has come as close to the task of the *resurrection of the dead* as did Auguste Comte." It is important to note: it is hardly by chance that Soloviev here calls resurrection a "*task*." This immediately brings Fedorov to mind.

Comte's thought is always directed *towards ancestors*. The "positive cult" is namely a cult of ancestors, first and foremost. Comte discusses burial and graves with the same attention and insistence as does Fedorov. The social cult in the "religion of humanity" is also attached to the sacred necropoli. Directly, Comte speaks only of "ideal resurrection" — in memory and in eternal remembering, in the cult of the dead, in the monopsychism and unity of thought of successive generations with those of the past. But by this he is implying nothing more than simple recollection. He is always thinking of the animating force of love. In general, this motif is very characteristic of Positivism.

In this respect, it is not so far away from the "positive politics" of even Guillot (compare with the last chapter of his *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*, where he discusses personal immortality and the resurrecting force of love, which even triumphs over death). Here it is always a question of the integration of the Catholic "complete body of individuals" into the unity of the "Great Essence," so that no one would be forgotten or lost. According to Comte, the "Great Essence" consists first and foremost of the deceased, of ancestors. It is through them that the *essence* acts in the history of humanity's formation. The deceased wield power over the living by the triple strength of example, antiquity and tradition. The guarantee of progress is in strengthening the deceased's power, in preserving the continuity of traditions and of succession.

This continuity in time, according to Comte, is even more important than the support of his contemporaries. This continuity connects the generations, drawing them into the unity of the race, into the unity of Humanity. The "Great Essence" of the Positivists is, of course, a secular or secularized *entity similar to the Church*, catholic and ecumenical. In this unity of body, the living and the dead are inseparably joined and death is defeated. Similarity and substitution — one *instead of* the other. The emotional experiences of the church are very strong in Positivism, particularly in Comte — I do not mean that there is an intended imitation or repetition of Christian motifs, but

namely that there are "experiences," an inner psychological homogeneity. In the Positivist cult of ancestors, in this "idealization" and "adoration" of the departed, speaks the sharpest necessity of meeting and *being with the dead, as with the living*. In other words — the need to overcome this painful break between successive generations, the need to "stop a moment," to halt time itself. The last "sacrament" of the Positivist cult is the rite of "inclusion" or "incorporation" — that is, the triumphant inclusion of the deceased into the noble image or assembly of ancestors, a kind of canonization, their inclusion into the composition of "Humanity."

Not all human children are members of Humanity, but only those noble "chosen ones" who live for others. Parasites, who live an anarchical and egotistical existence, remain outside of the group, there is no room for their remains in the sacred groves of repose. "Humanity," as defined by Comte, is "a continuous systematic body of similar essences." And in his eyes, this "convergence" is the most important thing of all.

The common theme in Fedorov and Comte is above all that of the unity of Humanity, of all the generations of human beings who have lived. There is also the same spirit of claimed "scientificness," the same naturalism or physicism, the same colorless and inarticulate anthropology. Fedorov withdraws even further than does Comte, but along the same route and — even more importantly — on the basis of the same initial ideas. The "type" of world view they have is one and the same. The personal religiosity of Fedorov does not make his system religious at all. The system remains locked into that which is human. God does not act in the world, according to Fedorov; only man acts.

There are other points of similarity between Fedorov and Comte, as well. Comte's theory of marriage very definitely brings to mind Fedorov's plan to "convert" erotic energy — and Soloviev is even more reminiscent of Comte (I am refering to his "Meaning of Love"). A very curious similarity to Fedorov's ideas may be noted in the dreams of the circle of young "thinking people" to which Pisarev belonged. This group, which met "for honest conversations and mutual moral support," set themselves the task of extinguishing passion between the sexes in all of humanity and of stopping births. They nursed the hope of a miracle: would mankind not become immortal as a reward for such a feat, or would people not start being born without the sin of sex. Behind these dreams, most probably, were impressions of this very same Comte.

Fedorov's idea of organizing a permanent "ecumenical council" from representatives of the clergy, the arts and ourselves has much in common with Comte's project, and even more with Saint-Simon. Fedorov also has much in common with Fourier and his "mystical positivism," in which motifs of Diderot and Retif are so fantastically interwoven. They are related to one another by the dream of the rebirth of nature and the resurrection of the dead, which will occur namely

through the conscious regulation of nature. And, just like Fourier, Fedorov poses and hypothetically resolves the question of the "heavenly migration" — "the ascension of resurrected generations to heavenly worlds or earths, which will be recreated and governed by these generations of the resurrected that have ascended to them." In Fourier and Fourierism the connections with ancient magical traditions were strong. These magical traditions come back to life in Fedorov, as well. Right until the very end, Fedorov remains in this endless circle of magical and technical naturalism, of a kind of technical miracle-working of the conscience. In his world view no room remains for free inspiration, there is no place for intelligent actions or for the ascension of prayers.

Fedorov's whole world view is defeated by its incurable practicality. In the guise of "labor conscience" he is preaching, in essence, the most vulgar and forced kind of Utilitarianism. He himself speaks out about the *obligation* imposed by his coercive religio-magic "project." By "freedom," about which he loves to talk, he means only *labor* — by his own hands. The question arises as to whether those strange and terrible years will return once again, when Russian intellectuals abolished aesthetics and art itself, when they did away with altruistic creation "for the sake of the cause," in the pathos of benefit and philanthropy. Whether the sixties will not return, with all the "nihilism" of that time. It is even more dangerous when *questions are rescinded.* In Fedorov's writings this pathos of abolition is very strong, and it is even stronger in those of his imitators.

There is much truth in Fedorov's critical analysis of abstract thought, of capricious feelings, of inactive hopes. There is truth in this *will to the cause and to action.* But there is also danger in this hypertrophy of "practical reason" and "active conscience." This "practical reason" is very intolerant, and does not admit or allow for any kind of freedom. This "business-like manner" becomes a devouring temptation, stealing man away from himself. And is this temptation not intensifying now for many people, this urge to take refuge and to withdraw from the so-called "eternal questions" while at the same time retreating from oneself — into matter-of-fact prose of the present day or the shining morrow. This is a kind of renunciation of the heavens, it is the genuine self-belittlement of man.

Paradoxically, it is combined with nothing other than self-affirmation — it is self-belittlement out of pride. Man lays claim to metaphysical self-lawfulness, denies the Absolute, and declares himself the ultimate being in order to be the highest judge of himself. This is a very typical conversion or "heterogony" of intentions. Moreover, it is noticeable that this "business-like" spirit is usually combined with a thirst for "secret knowledge," with a search for covert forces. This business-like prose is thoroughly steeped in dreaming and fantasizing. It is stuffy in Fedorov's system, regardless of how much he speaks of heavenly spaces and of wanderings among the stars. For the inner heavens lie coiled and

fading in man's soul. In Fedorov's system we feel the "spellboundness of death," it has no paschal spirit whatsoever, no paschal joy and light. *Nor can there be any such spirit.*

Indeed, according to Fedorov, *death has not yet been defeated.* Fedorov only gives evidence to show that it *can and will be conquered, if and when* the "sons of the human race" unite to combat it. In Fedorov's writings this state of continually addressing and turning *inward* is striking. He even resolves to say that it is not as important to change relations between people as it is to change those existing between man and nature. Uniting people amongst themselves Fedorov sees as a general burden or labor, one that is against nature. It is namely Fedorov's "business-like" or "labor" pathos, this transition from the "word" to the "deed," which attracts many people. But this transition is in fact imaginary — the "matter" of which Fedorov speaks is a dream, and the "labor" he calls for is something imaginary and empty. In Fedorov's world view, all the genuine inner values of human creation and inspiration fall away entirely. He is deaf to and even hostile towards them. In his "business-like" attitude there is a definite touch of nihilism. "The world was not given to us for looking" sounds almost the same as Bazarov's words: "The world is not a temple, but a workshop." For Fedorov the world is also a workshop, a terrifying workshop for the reanimation of corpses.

Rationality and dreaming are combined in Fedorov's system. It is a very common combination. Such was the case with many of the Enlightenment thinkers and Utopians. It is enough to again recall Auguste Comte. He banishes metaphysics in the name of experimental knowledge, and opens up space for entirely-unverified fantasies. In Fedorov's system, many and various things attract modern man. Above all — the limitedness of human horizons, *the closeness of its boundaries*. The world, according to Fedorov, is entirely finite and entirely visible. All of Fedorov is "on this side." Any and all strivings towards "the other side" seem to him to be a purposeless inconvenience, an idle matter. The entire domain of moral searchings, strivings and concerns is actually negated — along with all creative dynamics of the human spirit in general. The whole culture is tightly laced into a kind of ideological and Utilitarian obligation. Fedorov is highly reminiscent of the ancient philanthropists and dreamers of the eighteenth century, with their projects to make humanity happy. The very word "project" is in the style of the Enlightenment. And this recurrence of the Enlightenment is entirely unexpected after all the mental and spiritual discoveries and experiments of the last hundred years.

A contemporary successor of Fedorov, N. A. Setnitsky, wrote a book entitled *On the Finite Ideal.* [*O konechnom ideale*]. In it he broaches the subject of the Apocalypse. In his interpretation, the Apocalypse turns out to be a book on human actions, a plan of the "earthly paradise" that is to come, which "may be called the state of John," in opposition to the Platonist State. This misinterpretation is typical. The interpretor did

not know how to read what is written in the book, for he does not want to read it — the most characteristic aspect of the book of *Revelation* is namely that final *divine revelation* is pre-described. But in this book Setnitsky reads only of man. And from the very beginning, this *thirst for ends*, this *will to end*, comes across sharply. Setnitsky begins with a critical analysis of P. I. Novgorodtsev's well-known book. In it he refutes the latter's most important point — he refutes the pathos of *infinite growth, the dynamics of spiritual ascent*. Infinity, as chaotic indeterminateness, scares Setnitsky — for him, the infinite yawns with emptiness. He wants to stop himself. It is true that the "ideal," which is entirely unattainable and only regulatory, is an imaginary ideal and a deceptively-alluring dream. But in the teachings of "infinite perfectioning," the ideal can be and is actually realized. For the very striving towards that which is highest, the very creative love of it, is already a kind of positive value — and an eternal, inalienable value. This Setnitsky does not understand, nor do other successors of Fedorov understand it. For in this system there is no place for the realization of individual personality. In the works of Fedorov and especially in those of his imitators there is a very shallow and unpretentious anthropology. For them, man is a finite being. He has no need whatsoever for infinity. He is created for the finite and completed world, so that in it he may govern and rule over the elements. It seems that the secret of human existence will be revealed when man takes control over the expanse of starry heavens and becomes the pilot of the heavenly bodies. Here we no longer have man, not by any means — he has been lost in cosmic rhythms and distances. This is the main failing of the system as a whole. In it *man does not exist*, there is only the human *race*. Auguste Comte comes to mind once again, with his aphorism that "man exists only in the abstraction of metaphysicians." Humanity alone exists.

The current success of Fedorov's idea is connected namely with the profound *anthropological crisis* of our times. In the period that is now upon us, *man is losing himself*. We may make many objections to Fedorov and his followers. But we must understand them. We must understand what the system's appeal was for Fedorov himself, and what it is for our contemporaries. It is easier to answer the second question than the first. Fedorov's own personal secret remains private. His mentality remains mysterious. It is easier for us to understand our contemporaries. Above all, what attracts them to Fedorov's "project" is the *power over nature*. In this state of domination or "creative possession," "magical" and "technical" motifs are interwoven. Modern man feels himself to be a figure even in nature itself, considers himself namely a technician, wants to be one. It is this general condition or self-definition to which Fedorov's "project" answers, and upon which it makes an impression. It is attractive namely as an "ideology" of the technical era, of the technical way or type of life. Fedorov foresaw the modern preoccupation with things technical — from the spirit of

magic. This is not merely an accidental connection. As a world view, contemporary "technicism" developed from the premises of the so-called "scientific philosophy" of the last century, in the soil of Positivism and Scientism. And in it is revealed the *magical subconscious* of this "scientific" philosophy. The naturalist of modern times began as an observer, as a collector, as a "tester of nature." But he never stopped thinking about power. Even Bacon himself stressed that "knowledge is power." In the genesis of the new natural sciences we must not separate Bacon and Paracelsus. In the last century the naturalist became essentially an experimentor. His first desire was to investigate, to know and to discover. But the desire to rule and to command, to remake nature soon awakened. In essence, this was a breakthrough in science. A new factor was introduced into the game — *the power of man.* And its magic and mysticism of power are everywhere. Man can even violate nature itself. Reskin painfully felt and foresaw this aspect of the "technicism" that had developed, and angrily spoke out against this violence. But man ever more deeply "carved his terrible path" into the flesh of nature. This became possible only through Materialism, when nature was rendered soulless and spiritually "bled," and turned into a kind of fusible material that is pliant to the imperious right hand of Man.

This process was also furthered by the lowering of cognitive ideals. It was customary to speak of the conditionality, the relativity, the subjectivity, even the fictitiousness, of scientific concepts and constructions. In this way consciousness of the objectivity or the reality of world-laws has been forfeited. Even through gnosiology man went or let himself out into the vast distances. Of course, nature threatens, crushes, "squeezes" man. But it applies pressure onto him as a cumbersome, inert mass, as chaos and the elements. In Fedorov's writings this simplification of all of natural philosophy to the problem of regulation is surprising. In nature there are forces, secret and great forces, but no reason. Fedorov's successors emphasized the emptiness and blindness of nature even more strongly. Setnitsky finds no harmony and no limits whatsoever, no "cosmicness." Only chaos, no order, no stability. "God is entirely separate from the elements." In other words, there is no God in the world. This, at the very least, is deism. Practically speaking, this statement is in no way different from atheism, since we come to act in the world just as if there were no God. Hence this unexpected collaboration of the "believing" and the "theomachist" successors in the imaginary "common" cause. "Technicism" is simultaneously a crisis of the study of nature and the study of man. Man becomes smaller, and nature poorer. But man seems stronger to himself. And indeed, it is in technics that the *metaphysical value of man* is discovered and disclosed. "Positivism" explodes outward from within. Man is not only an "organ-jointpin," but a ruler as well. Strangely enough, he is both at once. A certain secret about man is revealed even in his very self. A new myth of man is created, the myth

of the Titan. We have already entered into the problematics of Soviet ideology, into the problematics of the systematic general condition. This is namely the self-discovery of the technical ideal. It remains unclear and not pre-defined *for what sake* man will take control of nature, just *what* he will command of it. Whence does man have knowledge of goals — if the surrounding world were plastic, even, where would "tasks" come from? Here is the second flaw of Positivism.

Most characteristic of all, however, is the fact that in the present age life in society itself is becoming "technicized" — and in two ways, for that matter. It is not only a matter of social or political power using or applying technics. Something else is far more important, contemporary power is compelled to lead its "subjects" towards some kind of supra-social and "metaphysical" goals. It is a strange demand to put on government ideology, on a world view that is dictated from above. Truly, it is not only at the present time that this is the case. Here again, what we have before us is not a recurrence of the Enlightenment or of state "policification," when power also worried about the world view of its subjects or citizens. The reformers of the beginning of the last century consciously wanted the same thing — Saint-Simon, Comte, Fourier. Right now there is a new wave of "ideocracy." Here there is still another fault in Positivism, one more rent in its metaphysics. The state lays claim to supra-empirical might. It is namely in the form of "ideocracy" that systematic construction develops in the Soviet government. It has its own particular quasi-religious pathos — the magic and mysticism of the economy. Here we have yet another point of similarity between the contemporary spirit and Fedorov's "project." The theomachist order can hold its ground only through supra-empirical decrees. Hence this pathos of construction, this "fuss of activity" in nature. Fedorov's system realizes all the possible wishes of this kind of "ideocracy," right down to the very last one. And it resembles effective pathos more than does economic materialism.

There is one additional trait that is characteristic of our era. *False spirituality* is developing. By now it is connected in part with the devastation of nature. Man is suddenly left in solitude: in the middle of an icy wasteland. He has been left to his own devices. Only reason and will are left to him. This is related to the modern era's development of various attempts to *exert influence* over other people and over nature itself *through consciousness*. There is the will to hypnotize and the demand for hypnosis, which account for the psychological nature of the success of all the secret studies of recent times — anthroposophy, occultism, Christian Science. Fedorov's "project" belongs to the same category. Is this not an attempt, fantastic in its grandiosity, namely to hypnotize the world with reason and to make the world's forces serve consciousness? This is the essence of the system's pathos. And also the essence of its new appeal for the modern spirit. Here the dualism and tension between *consciousness* and *existence* are felt very sharply.

Given such a sharp break between these two terms, when "existence" and nature are equated with chaos and man is thereby transformed into a lawmaker, there remains no other means of influencing besides power and hypnosis. By this very fact, man is elevated to the level of a kind of creature-demiurge. All the charm of the "construction" process is in this certain self-consciousness. Fedorov's system makes a very strong impression on this "demiurgical" or "Luciferian" instinct of man. Man alone acts in the world. Fedorov's world view is an intricate mosaic, not merely "fabric" or "net." In it the most unexpected little stones are strangely joined to one another. Hence the possibility of different evaluations and different impressions. There are also Christian elements in it. But we must judge the very design or plan of the system. And as a whole, Fedorov's system turns out to be nothing but *sublimated humanism*. The most mysterious thing about it is the absence of spiritual life. There is no enthusiasm, no anxiety, no animation. All "religious ardor" is led off into side channels, and becomes satiated with the substitute of dreams. Man stands not before God, but before nature. There is no talk of life in God. There is no will to have Divine Paradise overflow into the world. Setnitsky even feels that prayers can only do harm. Man must be able to conquer even without God, by his own strength. "The salvation of humanity and of the cosmos is the affair of humanity itself in all of its stages, from first to last." We must not impute to Fedorov all the opinions of his successors. But it must be recognized: they loyally argue on behalf of Fedorov's mystery. It is the mystery of human-godliness, the mystery of the godless man. Christian phraseology is totally unnecessary here. It gets in the way. And the brilliance of dreaming is not the flames of paradise. In Fedorov's system, one of the deadends of the contemporary world view is revealed. And its appeal is a dangerous symptom. A symptom of spiritual dessication.

Translated from the Russian by
Catherine Boyle

[1]At this point we will introduce an incomplete and "accidental" list of publications which appeared abroad and were dedicated to N. Fedorov — consisting only of those which were received in recent years by the editorial office of *Sovr. Zapisok* for reference.

N. F. Fedorov. *Philosophia obshchego dela*. T. I. ed. 1 and 2. (Kharbin, 1928-1929).

A. K. Gornostaev. *Pered litsem smerti. L. Tolstoy i N. Fedorov*. (Kharbin, 1928).

A. K. Gornostaev. *Rai na zemle. F. Dostoevsky i N. Fedorov*. (Kharbin, 1929).

Vcelenskoye delo. 2. Sbornik. (Riga, 1932).

N. A. Setnitsky. *O konechnom ideale*. (Kharbin, 1932).

A. Ostrovmov. *N. Fedorov i sovremennost*. Ed. 1, 2, 3 and 4. (Kharbin, 1932-3).

See also the recent study in English by George Young, *Nikolai Fedorov: An Introduction* (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt).

[2]Selection taken from Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology*, Part Two [vol. 6 in *The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky* (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt), pp. 92-93]. Translation by Robert L. Nichols.

HUMAN WISDOM AND THE GREAT WISDOM OF GOD

Whoever is not with me, is against me; and whoever does gather with me scatters.

Luke 11. 23

ὁ μὴ ὢν μετ' ἐμοῦ κατ' ἐμοῦ ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ μὴ συνάγων μετ' ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.

I

In the grand sweep of positivistic enthusiasm of Russian society, when all questions seemed solvable and resolved by science and faith was represented as a past, outmoded and antiquated stage of the historical development of humanity, in Petersburg the twenty-six year old Vladimir Soloviev presented a public "Lecture on God-manhood." This was a spiritual apology for the Christian faith. On the one hand, Soloviev showed that only in the religious world view is the real justification of life achieved, is the meaning and value of it revealed and confirmed. On the other hand he justified, so to speak, the God-revealed truth before the face of human reason, revealing the profound similarity of the content of Christian dogma with the highest achievements of philosophical speculation.

Soloviev himself called his world view the *philosophy of integral knowledge* and namely in this aspect of an all-embracing synthetic conception he opposed it to the historically developed systems of "abstract principles." Without risking making a crude mistake, one may say that Soloviev did not recognize the existence of errors. The falsehood of any judgment, confirmation or evaluation was not in its positive content but in its nature (*physis*), and in its *nonobligatory* position (*thesis*) in the system of knowledge, i.e. in incompleteness or one-sidedness. Not a single thinker, according to Soloviev's estimation, completely erred, did not essentially tell lies; it was only the transformation of partial truth into exclusive truth that was mistaken. One and the same position can be true and false depending on what it is combined with. Therefore, in his system Soloviev accepts almost all historically developed teachings, beginning with the Bible and ending with socialism and the theory of Darwin. In his understanding it is namely because of this that God is Truth, Goodness and Beauty, that He is absolute, unconditional, infinite, that He "fills everything with Himself, embraces, moves, creates," that outside of Him there is nothing. In other words, he is the *All-unifying principle*, focus and aim of *every type* of being. Correspondingly, religion is also the highest truth namely because it embraces everything and in this way in *proper* perspective — perhaps that which would have been taken in and of

itself separately would have been false, in religious context becomes true.

To the absence of absolute falsehood corresponds the lack of absolute evil. Again, there is nothing evil by nature, and one or another movement of human will does not seem bad in and of itself. "I do not recognize existing evil as eternal," he wrote. "I do not believe in the devil." Evil is also in the incorrect *regulation of values*, in the distortion of perspective. Soloviev looks at the essence of evil in the establishment of the limited in place of the *unconditional*, in the affirmation of self, i.e. in falling away from the All-unity. Evil therefore does not have any true reality, is not even something independent but is only a distorted form of Good. And overcoming evil is reduced not to its eradication but to the destruction of its one-sidedness, to the restoration of destroyed harmonic interrelationships.

But this is nothing. Attempting to explain the existence of evil in the world created and controlled by the Wise and All-blessed Creator, Soloviev arrived at the confirmation of the *necessity of evil or sin*. The world view of Soloviev is completely saturated with the spirit of historicism, borrowed partly from German Idealistic philosophy, partly from the gnostic mysticism of the ancient Christian period and the pre-Reformation period (especially from Jacob Böhme). The basic idea of this historiosophy is the concept that all of history is reasonable and that, moreover, in it is realized a certain plan *accessible to human achievement*. In brief, here the rational meaning of the temporal existence of the world was seen in the *free All-Unity* being realized. Due to creation, the world would realize the divine plan by necessity, so to speak, by force, the wholeness and unity would be blind and mechanical. *And it was necessary* that this *primordial* harmony disintegrate; that all free beings come to the limit of their self-will, experience the entire burden of *unregulated* chaos and *free* choice, the free act of self-renunciation of will returned to the lost All-unity. In other words, without the Fall and retreat from God the world *could not* become what God destined it to become. It literally *could not*, for everything actually occurring was reasonable, logically necessary, not only for determinate reason but also for Reason in general — also in the quality of that which had been foreseen by God.

The historical process was, consequently, imagined by Soloviev in the form of a *curved* line: first the disintegration, the disassociation of being had to expand to the extreme limits of chaos so that a second unification of existence would then gradually occur. In the end the same thing occurs as in the beginning: unity, but in the beginning was bare unity, and in the end synthetic unity, unity of the many, *pan kai-en*. History, according to Soloviev's depiction, is a "God-human process," a gradual process of *Godmanhood*, the *profound* and free unity of the Divine and the human. Pre-established in advance in *Sophia* as the ideal essence of the created world, it was restored for the second time in the God-human image of Christ. But later it had to spread over the entire

world, and in this lies the essence of Christian history; here again the *triple* rhythm is repeated; humanity must again fall away from unity, must again pass through the abyss of self-willed self-affirmation so that for the remainder of his days he will achieve the most perfect free Godmanhood, when God will be everything in everyone and the perfect Kingdom of God will be confirmed on earth, i.e., "*the fullness of natural human life, united through Christ with the fullness of God.*"

It is in this idea of the Kingdom of God that all of Soloviev's basic ideas receive their extensive development. This must be the "*fullness*" of human life, i.e., *all* human life, no matter how curtailed, must enter into a culminating world synthesis. *Nothing* can be excluded as unworthy; everything will be sanctified. Therefore, for Soloviev the future is drawn in bright earthly colors. And the Kingdom made ready for centuries turned out in his depiction to be an earthly state headed by an earthly Tsar, an earthly High Priest and an earthly Prophet. Soloviev put a period at this point, and it turned out that it is namely to this kingdom that there had been promised that there will be no end. Here Soloviev fully agreed with the theoreticians of the atheist social ideal, also expecting the overcoming of all life disharmony here and not there, beyond the historical horizon, among the lights of the Father. And also, like them he believed finally in the "natural flow of things," in the stable laws of the immanent development of the world, "the best of all possible ones."

II

Soloviev has often been accused of pantheism. But it is not in this that the *proton psendos* of his religious and philosophical system lies. The boundary between the eternal, the anarchistic and created, between the absolute and final was never erased in his consciousness; and he frequently, even with exaggeration, emphasized the opposition of these principles. The basic flaw of his world view is in something else, in the complete *lack of tragedy* in his religious perception of life. He perceived sin too narrowly, only within his mind, and it did not seem necessary to break the continuity of the natural order of nature in order to overcome it. The world was imagined by him in the form of an ideally constructed mechanism, steadily and precisely obeying irreproachable laws given by the Almighty and Wise Creator. This is why he was so attracted by the evolutionary hypothesis, and he applied it to prove the Resurrection of Christ, *his necessity, and consequently his reality.* Indeed, "nature awaits and languishes for him."

The moral dualism of Good and Evil was perceived by him too abstractly; he did not feel the reality of the "ideal of Sodom." Temptations and seductions seemed to him only necessary moments of the realization of freedom, the irresistibility of which for him was provided by reason of the existing, eternal will of God. And living,

concrete human personalities disappeared in the face of the inevitable triumph of the general transformation, and all attention was drawn away to the side of abstract forms of social and cosmic being. For Soloviev what was more valuable was the combination of churches, i.e. the formal union of all of them under a single theocratic authority, rather than salvation of the individual soul, restless and embittered. *The idea was more precious than the person.*

It is necessary to make a reservation — what has been said about Soloviev refers only to the first period of his life. In his last years he passed through a difficult religious crisis, in the purging fire of which all his gnostic and theocratic utopias burned. He felt not only the sharpness of the sinful sting in the individual soul but also the reality, the independence of evil as a cosmic principle. He felt the catastrophic pulse of history, and instead of the here-and-now Kingdom he saw "the end of history" — the Last Judgment and the second coming of Christ.

"All great *earthly* matter will dissipate like smoke" — in this discovery his earthly life exploded.

III

Soloviev, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky were forerunners and prophets of the period of the new religious ascent in which, after several decades of atheistic and theomachistic wandering, Russian thought entered at the beginning of the present age. "The new religious consciousness" arose in the "dust of the liberation movement" when, it seemed, cherished, inherited hopes were now ready to be realized — the situation was favorable for the rise of utopias. And actually in the excited expectation of the consciousness, "the Russian Revolution" — a movement of political and socio-economic origin and immediate content — grew to dimensions of apocalyptic dislocation. But this was a millenarian sensual apocalypse not perceiving any limits, a hiatus between the "here" and the "there," an ardently "recovering city," but a city of the *here and now*. The ideal of free unification was repeated here again in other forms, but with all its charms and seductions. *Everything* had to become *religious*, to perceive the *fullness* of human life, *corporeal and carnal* — for "Godseekers" this postulate was turned into a task — to combine pagan Christianity with the "historical" Christianity of the Church, dying Pan with the Resurrected Christ. And it seemed that the epoch of the Third Testament, of the mystical Kingdom of the Spirit, was already at the door. In it must be combined the truth of Hellenic sensual naturalism with the truth of ascetic spiritualism, freedom and sanctity of the flesh with the freedom and sanctity of the spirit. — Soloviev waited for the ideal religious *state*, Merezhkovsky, Gippius, Minsky, Viacheslav Ivanov, Sventsitsky, a "God-drunk" (*Gottgetrunken*) anarchistic society. And this and the other are identical — *heaven on earth*. "There are still a few, still one effort of good —

shouted one of the great representatives of this current, Sventsistky — and the heavenly vaults will move apart, the world will shudder like a dying sick person, *and immediately there will shine a new sky over the new, beautiful, incorruptible, eternal earth.*

Religious thought moves here completely within the confines of the idea of the Divine Kingdom of God on earth: "The Christian community occupies the place of the socialist society or ideal democracy of former extra-religious socio-historical systems. The subject of desire as before is here a *system*, an ideal order as such. And this in spite of the fact that the problem of personality is strongly posed, in spite of the enthusiasm of individualistic religious extra-church mystical sects. Moreover, in spite of the growing feeling of world tragedy "Life," says Sventsitsky, "is not a harmonic chord but a stormy dissonance tearing one's soul." And in addition the refusal to "*religiously conceptualize history*" according to him would be "the most absolute rejection of God," for God cannot create a senselessly, kaleidoscopically motley, incoherently episodic, unintegrated world. Either history "is the organic growth of the Cosmos" or there is no God.

Thus the restoration of the destroyed universal harmony overshadows the problem of the enlightenment and salvation of individual souls.

The reason for this is clear: an equal sign has been put between the *meaning* of the world and its *rationality*, and rationality is measured by a finite, human scale. The rationality of history is identical to its regularity, its logicality within the limits of human "Aristotelian" logic. "The religious comprehension of life is transformed into one of the variables of the theory of progress, just as the difference betwen human reason and divine Reason is only qualitative, as between the final and the eternal, and within the fragile framework of human knowledge the entire Mystery of God's Wisdom is inserted and captured.

The overcoming of the rational limitation of religious consciousness was possible only through a systematic philosophical analysis of the historical problem, and as a result it led to an intensification in posing the question of the mutual relationships of knowledge and faith, in other words, Divine Wisdom, hidden for centuries, and human wisdom. The main philosophical value of Russian "God-seeking" also involves the distinct and clear posing of the question of the essence of a religious understanding of history, in the revelation of the antinomies which are inevitably present in it.

IV

"To know the reason for everything existing, to understand equally every blade of grass in the field and every star in the sky is accessible only to the omniscience of God," S. N. Bulgakov wrote in 1902 (then professor of political economy, now also archpriest). For us, individual

events, both those of our own lives and those of history, will forever remain irrational. For moral action the "confidence that progress will be realized with mechanical necessity" is unnecessary and superfluous; "no crutches are necessary for moral law!" For it is not guaranteeing *knowledge*, but daring *faith* that must lie at the basis of life. In other words, a significance that defines and directs must belong not to an ideal system lying somewhere *ahead*, within the limits of the historical perspective, but to an extra-temporal and eternal norm, to absolute moral postulates.

It is possible to examine history in two ways: to either look at it as a "process leading to the achievement of something limited, however, a history still immanent and its aim achieved by force;" or "to look above oneself and beyond the limits of this world with its supra-natural aim of history": then "in the face of eternity all historical values will pale and vanish or be radically reevaluated " "The world matures for its transformation by the creative force of the Divine"; history "is entirely an affair of the will and omnipotence of the Heavenly Father" and its aim for man is completely unachievable and unattainable. Bulgakov designates these points of view correspondingly as *millennialism* and *eschatology*. Millennialism is the passive, deterministic, strict determination of everything occurring in history, the "fate of regularity"— this is the highest reality for it. "History is taken here in a foreshortened form of ideals and discoveries; no place remains in it for the free human personality." Such is the ideology of Marxism, such is Moslem fatalism, such were the apocalyptic noncanonical Judaic prophets. And with this is connected the abstractness of millennialism of ideals and revelations: it is always a question of not concrete facts, not specific epochs, but rather one of types or schemas, of the future in general — for everything resembles everything else and is repeated. Eschatology is essentially transcendent; it lives by the thought about another world and about the forthcoming departure from it. And it therefore lies in a completely distinct religious and metaphysical plane — the path of Providence is incommensurable to man's paths; what is there does not resemble what is here. Evil is felt here, like a real self-affirming force, and world and historical processes — like a metaphysical real tragedy. But it is played out beyond the limits of empirical history. "For Christians," says V. F. Ern, coming quite close to Bulgakov, "the future is not a world cultural process of a gradual outgrowth of any values, *but a catastrophic picture of increasing explosions*; finally, the last explosion, the last effort — and then the end *to this* world, the beginning of the *New, Eternal*, absolute Kingdom of God." And "there will be a day and the old world will perish in the thunder and lightning of the great Last Judgment; Angels will blow their trumpets, the skies will unfurl like a scroll, Time will disappear, *Death* will be vanquished, and from a flame of transformation will arise a *new* earth under *new* heavens. *Then this world will be no more.*

In this perspective it is quite clear that it is necessary "to gather treasure" not on earth where everything is corruptible, but in heaven. And translating this into everyday language, one must say that value is not in this or that form of empirical existence, but in the human soul. The method of evaluation changes: the former, chronological time, when the merit of historical achievement was defined simply by its distance in time from the crowning ideal aim, is replaced by extra-temporal time — and the verdict is pronounced, depending on the content embodied in the given forms. By this the personality is finally extracted from underneath the dominion of time and fate. For all time and among all peoples, righteous men are possible. Each epoch is evaluated in and of itself, is measured by one and the same measure unchanging in historical perspective — by an absolute, religious and moral norm.

Nevertheless, time exists. We live in history. And although history does not give way to harmless rationalization, cannot be "comprehended" logically without making sense ethically — it still does have a certain "meaning" only if God rules the world. But this meaning cannot be achieved, cannot fully be exhausted by any human definition. This, in truth, is the mystery.

Thus the question of the meaning of history leads to the question about faith. *History has meaning and history is inaccessible, puzzling.* This antinomy is resolved when *knowable meaning is distinguished from believed meaning.*

V

At the basis of the opposition of knowledge and faith lies the profound psychological, ethical and metaphysical opposition of freedom and necessity. Knowledge and faith are born from different world views, are on different planes: as N. A. Berdiaev so successfully expressed it, if faith is a "thing disclosing the *invisible*," then knowledge must be called the "disclosure of *visible* things." "*Knowledge is compulsory, faith is free.*" "Knowledge has the character of the forced and the safe," writes Berdiaev, "in faith, in the disclosure of unseen things, in free choice of other worlds there is risk and danger. In the daringness of faith man seems to hurl himself into an abyss, risk or smash his head or take on everything. Demands on faith, guarantees given by knowledge, are represented as similar to the desire to go to the bank to gamble, having seen the cards in advance." The psychological nature of faith has been characterized by the famous expression of Tertullian: "*credo quia absurdum.*" *The need to take risks, agree to the absurd, renounce one's reason, put everything on a card and hurl oneself into the abyss*" only this *feat* of self-denial and self-sacrifice goes beyond the "too human" limits. And what is revealed is the rationality of the world, not the human but the Highest, Eternal, Divine rationality. "*I believe in my*

God," Berdiaev formulates the religious direction of consciousness. "*Not because his existence has been proven to me, am I forced to accept Him, am I guaranteed by guarantees from heaven, but because I love Him.*"

Thus, knowledge and faith are correspondingly reduced to obedience and daring. And along with this only in faith is the understanding of the meaning connected *vividly* with the knowing personality, only faith is an *event*, profoundly and broadly cutting into its life. But knowledge slips along the surface. And, moreover, the one-sided intellectual ideal of knowledge raises this surface to a norm: it insists on an extra-reality, on the "ideal nature" of knowledge, on the fact that knowledge is not an event, that in it does not occur essential contact with reality, with "other worlds." In the depths is felt the spirit of alienation, coldness, indifference — when true faith is always ardent, always love.

With the greatest clarity and fullness this cycle of thoughts is revealed in the religio-philosophical conception of the priest P. A. Florensky, whose book is *The Pillar and Confirmation of Truth.*

The experience of the Orthodox Theodosius "is without doubt the most significant fact in the Russian religious movement of recent times. Here the unusual combination of philosphical and theological erudition and strength and the flexibility of the dialectic is intermixed with a great exertion of intuitive insights and a depth of direct religious feeling. "Living religious experience, as the only legal method of the knowledge of dogma — this is how I would like to express the general aim of my book," Father Florensky begins his introductory address to the reader; his entire book has been written on the basis of this very "living religious experience" and is grounded in "data based on experience," as well as in data of Church experience.

The basic idea of Florensky is this opposition of rational knowledge and spiritual knowledge which he reveals above all turning to the words of Christ: "*thou hast hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes*"; *ἔκρυψας ταῦτα ἀπὸ σοφῶν καὶ συνετῶν καὶ ἀπεκάλυψας αὐτὰ νηπίοις·* (Matthew 11:25). "True human wisdom, true human rationality is insufficient in itself, since it is human. And at the same time, intellectual 'infancy', lack of intellectual richness, preventing entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven, may turn out to be the condition for attaining spiritual knowledge. But the fullness of everything is in Jesus Christ, because knowledge can be received only through Him and from Him." That is why "among those that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist; yet he who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he"; *οὐκ ἐγήγερται ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν μείζων Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ· ὁ δὲ μικρότερος ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν μείζων αὐτοῦ ἐστιν.* (Matthew 11:.11).

For human reason the knowledge of truth, like a discovery of indisputable trustworthiness, is definitely inaccessible, and the only result achieved by it is sceptical *epoche*, denial of any confirmation;

psychologically this is not at all *ataraxia*, not the "deep calm refusing of anything expressed by the spirit" but an intolerable spiritual struggle among unknowns, a "kind of inarticulate philosophical *howl*," a "truly fiery torment." The way out lies only in faith; for this it is necessary to deny *dogmatic* prerequisites, since "the authentic cannot result from the inauthentic." "Whoever does not want to destroy his soul, let him dwell in Ghenna, in the unextinuishable fire of *epoche*, "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched"; *ὅπου ὁ σκώληξ αὐτῶν οὐ τελευτᾷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται.* (Mark 9: 44, 46, 48). Thus did the Arians act, tempting with rational incomprehensibility the Nicene Creed, applying logical senselessness to the *omoousios*. The words of reproach hurled by Eunomius at the Cappadocians, St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa: "You dare to teach and think the impossible." This is a typical expression of rational temptation before the revealed Truth, an expression of the *worst* of the forms of atheism, of the so-called "rational" faith. Here the nonrecognition of "unknowable things" is hypocritically masked — the existence of God is recognized, but His very essence — "unknowability" — is rejected. It is necessary to *believe* "in spite of the moans of reason," *namely because* reason is hostile to the given affirmation of faith. "Overflowing with blood, I will say in tension: *Credo quia absurdum est.* Nothing, nothing do I want of my own — I do not even want reason. You alone—only You. *Dic animae meae: Salus et Ego sum!* However, not mine but Your will be done." "It is necessary to stand on a completely new earth, of which there is no trace among us. We do *not even know* whether this new earth really exists. We do not know, for the spiritual blessings which we seek are found *outside* the realm of corporeal knowledge: for it is said: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man"; *Ἃ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἶδεν καὶ οὖς οὐκ ἤκουσεν καὶ ἐπὶ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἀνέβη* (I Corinthians 2:9; see Isaiah. 64:4)."In order to come to Truth, one must reject oneself, one must go out of oneself; and this is totally impossible for us," but "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and not the God of philosophers and scholars," as Pascal wrote, comes down to us, comes to us at night, takes us by the hand and leads us so that we would not think about it. "With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible"; *Παρὰ ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ δὲ θεῷ πάντα δυνατά.* (Matthew 19: 26 see Mark 10: 27). "Not intuition and not discourse provide knowledge of the Truth. It arises in the soul from the free *revelation* of the actual Trihypostases of the Truth, from the visit in grace to the soul by the Holy Spirit." And the path to attainment of the Spirit is the path of intelligent activity, inner spiritual life. *Christian philosophy* is the "philosophy of *personal and creative* activity."

Based on the content of the illumination of the Spirit, religious revelations have definitely not been set into a logical framework; they are *antinomic*, inwardly incomprehensible for thought. And in this fact

of being incomprehensible, permeating the entire area of religious dogma, is revealed not its but *our weakness, our sin.* And only because dogma is incomprehensible is it possible, actually possible, to *believe.* If they are comprehensible, "*believe* here (as if there were) nothing, purify oneself and do a good deed — not for anything in particular: "everything would be easily and simply *generally accessible.* And Florensky shows the real presence of "dogmatic antinomies" in the Apostle Paul. These "contradictions," apparent to the unenlightened view, are transformed into wholeness for the spirit-bearing gaze. The clearest example is eschatological dogma: if one proceeds from the concept of God as Love, then "the *impossibility of general* salvation is *possible.*" If one proceeds from the idea of creation as a free creation of God, then it is impossible "to admit that salvation without reciprocal love for God is possible," as well as free love not compelled by God; that is, "*the impossibility of general salvation is possible.*" Ideas of *forgiveness and retribution* inevitably suggest each other and at the same time exclude each other. It is equally beyond doubt that there will be eternal torment — for knowledge of the Truth and contact *with it can* only be free. And that which will be generally restored — apokatastasis — for God is love. And only in faith is *ta eschata* revealed.

But faith is not a transient, fleeting state of the human soul, but a constant, defined state, a defined *tonos, integralness* or *chastity* of the soul. This degree of spiritual order is subject to formal or logical definition. "*There is no understanding* of churchness, but *it does exist* , and for every human member of the Church church life is the most definite and tangible thing he knows." "This very vagueness of churchness, its elusiveness for logical terms, its inexpressibility does it not prove that churchness *is life,* a particularly new life given to people." And is it possible to put the Body of Christ, "the *fullness* of him everyone in everything"; *ἥτις ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου.* (Ephesians 1: 23) "into the narrow coffin of logical definition?" In this sense knowledge of the truth is also *true* life.

To know the truth in the genuine and deepest sense means not copying or passively reflecting in one's consciousness something standing outside of the knower and alien and indifferent to his being. *To know the truth means* to *become true,* i.e., to realize one's ideal, to realize the Divine purpose or, as V. F. Ern said, to find and clarify one's "image of Sophia," to find one's genuine "place in the universe and to find God." "Truth," as he says, "can be achieved by man only because in man is the place of Truth, i.e. he is the image of God, and to him is accessible endless and continual growth in the realization of the eternal idea of his being. The only path of real knowledge is the path of Christian selfless devotion. Only he who will reveal in himself the "inner person," who will become what was predestined for him by the mysterious will of God and what he would have been if there had been no Fall, only such a one can know the truth.

VI

Such are the maximum achievements of Russian religio-philosophical thought.

Having begun with the project of an all-embracing religious synthesis, the reception and sanctification of all of life in its present, empirically given form, it ends with a complete rejection of the world and everything "still in it," even more full in that it is accomplished not in the name of the rejected moral significance of the "world" but in the name of its full pricelessness. The struggle with evil is transferred onto a new plane: religiously perceived evil is distinguished from what is recognized as evil within the limits of "natural" life: we saw that knowledge, wisdom is evil before the judgment of faith. And in the depths of religious consciousness a spiritual moral feat is accomplished: the renunciation *of its* reason, its"*understanding*" —its first step; *revelation* — its content.

At the starting point is the feeling of the divine element in human reason; in the concluding insight is the confession of the vanity of human wisdom. "But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, *even* the hidden *wisdom*, which God foreordained before the ages unto our glory. . . But God hath revealed *them* unto us through the Spirit, for the Spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God"; *ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ, τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην, ἣν προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν· . . . ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπεκάλυψεν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος· τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα ἐραυνᾷ, καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ*.(I Corinthians 2:.7 and 10).

We are extremely far from ascribing the significance of absolute, canonical trustworthiness to the results and achievements of the Russian religious quest. But it is necessary to recognize that the newly chosen path is mainly correct. Its strength is not in the self-affirmation of logical knowledge, but in the humility of self-renunciation before the mystery of God and in the thirst for spiritual activity. And without risking making a mistake, it is possible to say that doubtlessly orthodox theological thought has drawn at least one lesson from this process of seeking and struggle: as a model and source of inspiration Christian speculation must take not those God-inspired beginning words of the Blessed Evangelist and Theologian, by whom the blessed patristic thought of the first Christian epoch was inspired, but the more elementary words, so to speak, which come closer to the organic forces of fallen creation and were written by the Apostle to the Corinthian Church. At the heights of Divine Knowledge is the Logos felt and perceived, and is Divine Wisdom revealed. But to begin immediately from such heights is beyond one's strength and not without danger. At the beginning there must be repentant consciousness of the weakness of his understanding, the trembling of the mystery.

For it is written: "And the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the discernment of their discerning men shall be hid"; *καὶ ἀπολῶ τὴν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν συνετῶν κρύψω.* (Isaiah 29:.l4), "for it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent" "because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men"; *γέγραπται γάρ,* 'Απολῶ *τὴν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν συνετῶν ἀθετήσω; ὅτι τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ θεοῦ σοφώτερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν καὶ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ θεοῦ ἰσχυρότερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων.* (I Corinthians l: l9 and 25).

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

THE WEARINESS OF THE SPIRIT
On Fr. Paul. Florensky's *The Pillar and Confirmation of Truth*

It is difficult to speak about the book of Fr. Paul. Florensky [*Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny*; *The Pillar and Confirmation of Truth*] — this means speaking about the author and his personal religious path. The book of Fr. Florensky is purposely and consciously subjective. It is not accidental that he chose the semi-biographical form of the friendly epistle for it. This is not only a literary device. This is the tonality of his spiritual type — it suits Florensky to theologize in this way in letters to a friend. The pathos of intimacy, the pathos of psychological egotism is too strong in him — too strong is the need for personal relationships and ties. He speaks much about "churchness" and about "community" [*sobornost*], but there is little of this very community in his book. In his reflections one always feels solitude, isolation. He seeks a way out of this tedious solitude in friendship and for him the fullness of community is resolved in a multitude of intimate friendly bonds, and the indissoluble bond of personal friendship psychologically replaces community. He lives in a kind of humble corner and wants to live thus, in a kind of aesthetic prison. He leaves the tragic crossroads of life and hides in a cramped but comfortable cell. And he picks life's fragrant and spicy flowers. Florensky at times lives in a kind of world torn apart, in an invincible, "asyndeton."

And time for him is longing, but not action — time extending and extending, stretching and wearing out the soul. Florensky understands dynamism, but not history. He does not understand concrete and creative historical time, in which something is not only experienced but also accomplished. And in this is the solution to his subjectivism. He does not feel the rhythm of church history. Florensky was reproached for having a predilection for *theologumena*, for particular theological opinions. And in actuality, he has more of a taste for *theologumena* than for dogma. Dogma itself is too bombastic for him, and he prefers the vague whispering of personal opinion. In his book, Fr. Florensky speaks above all about experiences — not only about personal experience, but namely about the personal in experience. True, he resigns himself and renounces his own opinion; he would like to say nothing about himself, nothing of his own, but only to convey and paraphrase what is general and pertains to the church as a whole. However, in reality he continually speaks from and about himself. He is subjective even when he wants to be objective.

This is expressed with complete force in his attitude toward Church tradition. He himself recognizes that he is selecting or picking out his own allusions and examples. He approaches the Church's past not as a

historian but as an archaeologist. And it breaks down for him into numerous monuments of antiquity and the past, among which he wanders as if he were in a museum. The scroll of Church tradition somehow rolls up for him; he does not distinguish epochs. Historical perspective for him is unreal. The entire tradition for him is one single tablet — a parable, a symbol of the static. The historical allusions of Florensky are always haphazard and arbitrary. With a certain careless aestheticism he weaves his theological wreath. For him all questions of historical criticism are not important; he easily alludes to deliberately unauthentic testimony, considers the pseudo-Dionysius as the holy Areopagite. He never searches, but only makes selections. And he remains silent — this is especially typical of him. And that is why his book seems so special. This is a book of personal selections. And it is first and foremost the author who is apparent in it.

Fr. Florensky begins his book with a letter on the subject of doubt. The path to truth begins with despair, begins in a Pyrrhic fire. This is a tormenting and endless labyrinth and suddenly somewhere unexpectedly flashes the lightning of revelation. It remains unclear about which path Fr. Florensky is speaking. Is he speaking about the tragedy of a non-believer's thought? Or is he portraying the dialectic of Christian consciousness? In any case, he poses the question in such a way that the most important thing is to convince and to be saved from doubt. It is inevitable for man to come to God through doubt and disillusionment and here on earth to pass through purgatory and hellish torment. All religious gnoseology is reduced for Fr. Florensky to the problem of return. There is no positive gnoseology in him; he is limited to the negative. He does not go further than a prolegomena: how is knowledge possible? And now a contradiction appears in Fr. Florensky's discussions: *his psychology does not correspond to his ontology*. In actual fact, how can antinomism and ontology coincide? How can Pyrrhonism be combined with Platonism — especially with the interpretation which Florensky himself gives to the theory of ideas in his study: "*Smysl idealizma*" [The Meaning of Idealism] (1915). It remains unclear and incomprehensible why the path of knoweldge is so antinomic and torn if the world is Sophian at its bases, and Sophia, according to the definition of Fr. Florensky, is "the hypostatic *system* of the peacemaking thoughts of God" How is it possible that antinomism express the ultimate mystery of thought, if the world is created in Wisdom, in Sophia, and is the wise revelation of God. The teachings about sin do not resolve this *a priori*. For not only sinful consciousness is dual for Fr. Florensky — thoughts in general particularly waver in antonyms and contradictions. The Christian consciousness is also antinomic, dogma is antinomic, truth itself is antinomic — "truth is antimony." And for Fr. Florensky this means not only the incommeasurability of religious experience and rational schemas but also the impossiblity for reason to make a selection between: "yes" and "no." The impression arises that only in thought are

there no Sophian roots, that Christian consciousness remains in captivity and poisoned by ignorance. In a strange way, in the chapter about Sophia, Fr. Florensky totally forgets about antinomies. Moreover, the world is revealed to him as a system of reason. As if in the final culmination antinomies are resolved, or at least remain in eternal balance. However, this balance has still not been achieved in the consciousness of the Church. Thus the struggle with rationalism brings Fr. Florensky to symbolism in dogmatics. And now everything is shaky. And this is why it is necessary to be saved. This refers not only to one's personal path but also to the path of the Church.

Reason is saved from doubt in the knowledge of the Trinity. And with great force Fr. Florensky reveals the speculative thought of Trinitarian dogma, as the truth of reason. But in a strange way he somehow passes over the Incarnation, and from the chapters about the Trinity he immediately moves to teachings about the Comforting Spirit. This lack of Christological chapters is particularly striking and expressive in the book of Fr. Florensky. The image of Christ, the image of the Godman like some kind of vague shadow, is lost in the background. And that is why there is so little genuine joy in the book of Fr. Paul. The Lord has actually left the world. And that is why Fr. Florensky does not so much rejoice about the coming of the Lord as languish in expectation of the Comforter, in waiting for the Spirit. And again, he does not rejoice in the coming of the Comforter, but craves more. Mostly he somehow does not feel the persistent dwelling of the Spirit in the world — the Church authority of the Spirit seems confused and dim to him. The revelation of the Spirit he feels only in some selections, but not in "the everyday life of the Church." Salvation has not yet been accomplished: "the wonderful moment flashed blindingly and . . . *as if* it did not exist. And the world remained dark, untransformed — only above its pre-dawn rays, not yet warming the world, illuminate it. The heart languishes over the fantastic. And that is why it is so sad for Fr. Florensky in history — a certain languor of grief possessed him, and his entire soul stretched toward the moment that had not yet arrived. In the Christian world it was somehow congested and stifling for Fr. Florensky. The simple knowledge of the Second Hypostasis does not liberate the world — on the contrary it chains it to normality. For the Logos is namely the "general 'Law' of the world." The revelation of the Logos for Fr. Florensky substantiates scientificness, and the freedom and beauty of the world are therefore not revealed in Christian consciousness. The Christian world is a world severe and harsh, a world of law and continuity — the legal canopy of coming grace has not passed. As in the Old Testament we awaited only the Word, so in the New we await only the Spirit — and perhaps in the New the Spirit will appear only as the Logos appeared in the Old. And it is unclear what Pentacost meant for Fr. Florensky. It is a question not only of fulfillment but namely of a new revelation, of a third

testament. And at the end of time he awaits not the Second Coming of Christ but the Revelation of the Spirit.

It remains indisputable: Fr. Florensky does not feel the absoluteness of the New Testament appearance of God, the Incarnation of the Logos does not satiate his hopes. In a strange way he somehow does not see Jesus the Sweetest, he does not see the Comforter who has come, and he keeps waiting for another. And again here the strong contradiction in his views becomes apparent. The world still has not been transformed, but already in its eternal roots it is divine. And from pining Fr. Florensky passes to glorification. His languor is resolved in contemplation of Sophia: "There is objectivity, this is God-made creation." The hope of Fr. Florensky is not that the Lord came and God became man, but that from creation itself and by nature "the creature will leave for inner-trinitarian life." In his primary reality the world, like some "great being," is already a kind of "fourth person," a kind of fourth Hypostasis. In the teachings about Sophia, Fr. Florensky does not strive for a reconciliation of contradictions — the image of Sophia divides and appears in many aspects.

But in this the teachings about Sophia are most weakly connected with the image of Christ. And if Fr. Florensky calls Sophia the Body of Christ, meaning by this "a created essence, perceived as the divine Word," then first of all: Sophia precedes in its fullness and reality any concrete historical time, and secondly: the higher revelation of Sophia is seen by Fr. Florensky not in Christ, but in the Madonna. There is the impression that in Christ Fr. Florensky sees only the Divinity of the Word, and the fullness of naked humanity is revealed to him in the Virgin. Moreover, in the Madonna Fr. Florensky sees the advance appearance of the Spirit on earth, a type of *pneumatophania*. For him this is a genuine foretelling of a future age, the beginning of the last testament. And in the Virgin he sees and honors above all the appearance of Sophia — more than the Mother of God. About Godmotherhood and about the ineffable birth he speaks only in passing, in epithets and subordinate sentences. In any case, for him the Madonna is somehow distinguished from Christ. And he speaks vaguely about the union of two essences in the Godman. Fr. Florensky says many things about the spiritual type of Church mysticism from the formal aspect, the gathering of the spirit, the virginity of the soul. But in its content, his mysticism is by no means the mysticism of Christ. It is rather the mysticism of original creation, the mysticism of the Sophia virginity. And for him even the Church is the realization of pre-existing Wisdom rather than the revelation of Godmanhood. That is why he leaves Christian history on a kind of dreamy level.

It is possible to say that in the consciousness of Fr. Florensky *Augustinianism and Pelagianism are somehow remarkably intertwined*: the psychological pathos of distance; faith in the nature of creation. One other characteristic motif is connected with this: in essence humanity is

primordially smashed and shattered into numerous incommensurable types.

Fr. Florensky developed this idea very decisively in his remarkable study: "On Types of Growth" [in *Bogoslovskii Vestnik*, July-August; 1906]. And everyone has his own primordial specific path. Fr. Florensky puts namely this innate chastity higher than the sanctity of deed. And the highest of the "types" is the spiritual type of the Madonna. Florensky strongly feels the problematics of return, and senses little the pathos of rebirth. He hopes for the manifestation of Sophian supports, but does not speak of resurrection. In reality, it is not in resurrection that the ultimate fate of creation is revealed to him. He is somehow enclosed in a circle of Sophian immanentism.

In Russian religio-philosophical literature the book of Fr. Florensky occupies a special place. This is a very vivid, but rather weak book. On the contrary, in it there is something complaining and whining. In it weariness and disillusionment are felt most strongly. This is a kind of autumnal book, and the beauty of fading is in it: "I love the luxurious fading of nature." And spring motifs are interwoven here in a kind of wingless dream. The book of Fr. Pavel, above all, is a religous and psychological document. And the document of a specific Russian epoch. This explains its psychological success. Somehow all the pining of the nineteenth century converges in it. In its spiritual meaning this is a very Western book, a book of a Westernizer being aesthetically saved in the East. The romantic tragic quality of Western culture is closer and more comprehensible to Fr. Florensky than the problematics of the Orthodox tradition. Least of all is it possible to see in Florensky Orthodox restoration, "stylized Orthodoxy." By no means does Fr. Florensky proceed from the Orthodox depths. He remains a stranger in the Orthodox world; only to be Orthodox, he tries to absorb even that aesthetically, i.e. as a stranger.

Rather it is possible to see in Fr. Florensky a delayed Alexandrian. In any case, a man of the pre-Nicene epoch. In this is the narrowness and non-communalism of his religious consciousness. Florensky does not accept and does not contain the historical fullness of the Church. He selects archaic motifs from it. Moreover, not the joy of the apostolic early Christianity, but the ashy grief of dying Hellenism. In Florensky the fate of Origen repeats itself: for both, Christianity is the religion of the Logos and not that of Christ. All the architectonics of the religious and philosophical system is defined by this. In Church synthesis the exclusivity of Alexandrianism has been removed, and in addition its true recovery of sight is transformed. Florensky would have wanted to again decompose this synthesis and return to the ambiguity of the third century. And this attempt at restoration is doomed to failure. The path of Fr. Florensky leads to a cul-de-sac. This is the cause of his grief. And thought is torn apart into dreaminess and reverie. His book is a book about the past, about the tragic past of the Russian spirit returning to the Church. The image of the God-man has still not been

revealed to him. And the creative path has therefore still not been revealed.

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES RENOUVIER

This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the day of Renouvier's death. He is little known beyond the borders of France; it seems only in America have his ideas been given credit as one of the factors in the composition and development of pluralism in that country. In France Renouvier has been an influence. But until now his intimate philosophical image has not been deciphered, his philosophical heritage has not been assimilated and valued in all its complexity and fullness. A Kantian, "neo-critic," as he defined himself, in reality, in the inner pathos of his quest, Renouvier was a religious thinker. Metaphysical aprioris disturbed and excited his thought, from the first philosophical awakening until the years of old age; and he constructed and reconstructed his own system in order to resolve them. And it is not accidental that in the year before his death Renouvier concluded his creative path with an attempt at a unique, theosophic, religio-metaphysical synthesis.

Renouvier was not a school philosopher. He never was a lecturer. And it was not in school, not under a school's influences and impressions that he found himself and comprehended his philosophical calling. He was awakened to philosophy by St. Simonism; and the first works of Renouvier appeared in the *New Encyclopedia*, which, in counterbalance to the destructive effect of the first enlightenment Encyclopedia, was published in the thirties and forties by the former St. Simonists Pierre Lereaux and J. Reineau. In his younger years Renouvier was passionately involved in political struggle. With the beginning of the Second Empire he was buried in his inner work, and emerged out of his philosophical confinement only as a writer, for the printed propagation of a new world view. Renouvier recognized in himself the calling of a preacher; he philosophized for life; for him, philosophy was a living, practical affair. And in this respect he always remained the son of that dreamy age when St. Simon, Comte, Fourier and many others daydreamed about the total renewal of human nature on the basis of an all-embracing world view synthesis. About such a transformation of human society Renouvier dreamed his whole life — about the present epoch of universal discord and struggle being replaced by an epoch of peace and harmony. But never did he believe that social organization could solve the problem of human life. And he repeated the apostolic words: we do not have here the abiding city, but we rather seek the future one. Never could earthly, historical perspectives satisfy his curiosity or satiate his moral thirst. Renouvier considered and called himself a humanist — but in this "humanism" there was religio-philosphical depth. The horrible mystery of death always engaged and

disturbed the attention of Renouvier. From his very youth he had an unconquerable fear of death, of its cutting into personal life and striking the human personality. He was never able to believe in the destruction of the personality; to this he could never be reconciled. And he strove to overstep the threshhold of death and affirm life after it. Only in personal immortality did he see the real justification of personal life. And he therefore firmly believed in the ultimate resurrection, the restoration of all personal fullness, all personal life — he believed in a unique apokatastasis. He hoped for another world, renewed and transformed even in its physical construction, he hoped for a new heaven and a new earth. He had a presentiment of the end of this world, the end of history, and beyond it another higher and final existence. In this new world every truth would be fulfilled. All kinds of earthly utopianism were rejected outright by Renouvier, and if he constructed his own utopia, then it was a supra-Christian and supra-earthly one.

Renouvier defined the sphere of scholarly evidence very narrowly, enclosed rational knowlege within the limits of "consciousness" and limited it to the world of "phenomena" — he was a logical "phenomenalist." Moreover, he strongly insisted on not only the right but also the necessity of passing beyond these tight boundaries. For to live by evidence alone is not only impossible on a practical level, but even unjustified. For evidence weakens and cuts into the creative freedom and independent activity of man, it enslaves and captures the human personality. Higher than evidence (and more human than it) — is belief, *la croyance*; and in it is revealed and justified the genuine recognition of man, his moral freedom, his unephemeral value. Renouvier *confirms the unconditional primacy of morality in metaphysics*, and in this way he repeats Kant. Not only does he repeat, he also corrects. For Renouvier, belief is not only a moral postulate but its own kind of insight, intuition and supra-intellectual understanding. For him, the world of belief is perhaps much more real than the world of evidence. In this respect he is repeating not so much Kant as the early French Utopian socialists, who contrasted creative, synthetic faith to destructive, analytic reason. And in turn, for Renouvier ethics itself is above all an ethics of will and action and not only of evaluation, as in Kant. He does not directly follow Kant, carrying freedom beyond the limits of empirical activity into the realm of a "mind-comprehending character," but rather confirms it namely in empirical life as an immediate principle of all activity and work. According to Renouvier, man is free namely in his "empirical character"; for him, it is namely the empirical freedom of personal action that is the primary and indissoluble fact of self-consciousness and the highest value in life. And he attempts to explain and substantiate this fact of freedom, to construct a philosophy of freedom, and in so doing — a philosophy of the personality, "personalism."

One must recognize as the most remarkable among Renouvier's books not his *Attempts at a General Critique*, but his *Attempts at*

Classifications of Philosphical Systems. Renouvier rejects linear development in the history of philosophy, just as he rejects it in history in general — and the very concept of development he considers unsuitable for and inapplicable to history. History for him is not development but the realm of creativity, free and insurmountable, in which what has never existed before is actually created and it is not merely embryonic possibilities and tasks which unfold. This is the point of view from which he also observes the history of philosophy. For him this is the realm of personal insights and discoveries. And in the history of thought he observes the struggle and conflict of polar aspirations. It is impossible to construct philosophical systems into a single staircase; they must be classified — they are distributed not around a single center, but around two poles. These two typical "scheme-views" of Renouvier define the six pairs of antitheses; the thing *(substance)* and the idea; infinite and finite; development and creation *(creativity)*; necessity and freedom; happiness and duty; evidence and confidence *(belief)*. In the final analysis, this is a single six-rank, six-form antithesis. In the historical past and in the present the first type of system triumphed and is triumphing, and in it Renouvier sees a "conspiracy against our freedom," a conspiracy against the personal principle. The strongest and most vivid representaion of this victorious and false philosophical spirit Renouvier sees in Hegel, and it is primarily with Hegel that he carries on his battle. He sees in it "philosophical hypnotism." In the intuitive, almost instinctive "personalism" of Renouvier lie the solution and cause of this strained and embittered struggle which he passionately carries on with all forms of monism and pantheism. In impersonal pantheistic thought, the ultimate oneness drowns and dissolves any personality that is being transformed into a transcient image or personality. And in this way the personality loses freedom, attracted by a fatal and insuperable rhythm of development. The categorical opposition of good and evil loses real meaning under the dual pressure of necessity and evidence. The world loses freedom and meaning. To this false and deceptive world view Renouvier opposes the metaphysics of personalism — he opposes pantheism to theism, monism to a "new monadologia," the pathos of necessity to the pathos of freedom, the idea of development to the idea of creation.

What is most characteristic of the religio-philosophical consciousness of Renouvier is the fact that in the concept of God it is the attribute of creativity which is advanced to first place — the thought of Him as Creator, not only Demiurge or Providence but namely as Creator, as the creative and free First Cause. Renouvier vacillated on the question of the unity of God, paradoxically inclining sometimes to the side of polytheism, but he never doubted in the personality of God. Renouvier refused to think of the world as without beginning. The world exists as the final number of moments; it has a beginning — it did not exist and it arose. And there is no necessity in this origin, in the actual existence

of the world — the world also might not have existed. There is no irresistible fatality even in its fate. The world has been created by God, and all of its existence is a continuing creation, and every personality in it is a creator.

Man does not develop, but is created; and in this free act of creation, he develops — he becomes what he can be, but also what he might not be, what is befitting to him but what he is in no way forced to become. There is no fatal predestination, but there is predestined perfection, for the world was created Perfect. The world could have been different, and in actuality it is not the world that was befitting which was realized. In what happened and occurred Renouvier saw the matter of human freedom and will, and not the revelation of irresistible fate. In the realized past he saw the result of sin and the Fall, and he judged it very severely. And he constructed an imagined, utopian picture of the historical past — what could be and what had not been. Our world, the world in which we live and the history of which we can trace back to the "original vagueness," Renouvier considered to be the fallen world. This is not the first, not the primordial world, but the second, which arose on the ruins and from the fragments of the first creation, ruined by free, conceited man. And Renouvier foresees its end. Only the created world which had begun can be a world of creativity and freedom, in it alone is the justification of good possible. Only on the condition of the creativity of the world is a real theodicy possible — not reconciliation with evil as an inevitable and passing imperfection, but the overcoming of evil, the revelation of its possibility and its final disappearance. The cause of evil Renouvier sees in the freedom of man, conceited and making what might not have been into reality; and thus the presence of evil in the world in no way contradicts the blessedness and perfection of the Creator. The moral Fall of man brought about degeneration and disintegration. And after the Fall suffering became necessary and useful as a kind of purification, a tempering and collection of the personality — but only after the Fall. The entire present-day world is the result of sin, but is a kind of expiatory retribution for it and the transitional stage to the last, third world. In it is realized the apokatastasis of the entire personal being. Every personality passes through these sequential worlds, through numerous existences, without being destroyed in its metaphysical power kernel. And in the last world the entire fullness of experienced fate is restored and gathered together. In this way every personality is realized and confirmed to the maximum.

This metaphysical picture did not develop in Renouvier's consciousness immediately. The impressions of the utopian epoch did not pass for him without a trace, when "positivism" so frequently merged with "theosophy." He experienced Kant most strongly of all, and especially in thinking about his cosmological antinomies many things were imprinted into Renouvier's thoughts. Later he passed through Leibnizism. But strongest and sharpest of all seems to have been the influence of Renouvier's friend during youth, J. Lacaire, the

ardent and passionate seeker, stricken with madness at the very beginning of his creative path. It was namely him that Renouvier always, to the very last years, called his teacher. And in actuality, as we can now judge by excerpts of this unhappy failure that have been preserved, it was namely from him that Renouvier perceived all the basic ideas of his metaphysical freedom — he himself admitted this. J. Lecaire was an ardent Catholic who set himself the task of a new apologetics of the Christian faith. And in reality the metaphysics of Renouvier was a weakened repetition of the Christian philosophical synthesis which his faithful friend had conceived. The non-Christian theism of Renouvier is a pale and impoverished reflection of Christian metaphysics from which the living soul and inner truth has been lost. Moreover, this system testifies to the profound religious movement of the soul striving for eternal truth, the vague and dim features of which it identifies with love. Renouvier was not only not a Christian, but was directly hostile to Christianity and saw in it historical misfortune and error. *Nonetheless, he almost involuntarily testifed to its speculative truth; against his will he proved it.* In this was his fatal destiny. He did not find himself, did not himself completely understand his own affairs.

Renouvier occupies one of the first places among the thinkers of the past age. And his philosophical system is very typical of the tragic fate of the new European philosophy. Two cul-de-sacs, two temptations threatened it: the cul-de-sac of pantheism and the cul-de-sac of theism. In the final analysis, German Idealism rests on the first. Leibnitzian monadologia lead to the second. The first danger Renouvier vigilantly recognized, unmasked and condemned. The second, he too was unable to avoid. Both temptations are born from abstract thought torn from the roots of concrete Christian experience, having forgotten about the single God-manhood image. Pantheism forgets about man wishing to become a god, and does not find God either. Theism forgets about God in a passionate concern for the self-defence of the human principle, and loses man as well. Neither in infinitism nor in finitism is there complete truth. For truth is in the fact that God became man. But the various and slanting rays of the Sun of Truth also lie outside the sovereign path of the Church. One of them also burns with a dying light in the work of Renouvier.

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

IN MEMORIAM: ANDREI KARPOV (1902 — 1937)

A. F. Karpov died on the third of October, a few days after returning from Mount Athos. Karpov joined the Fellowship in 1929, and had attended the annual conferences almost every year since. It was partly through his initiative that the book of the Fellowship, *The Church of God*, was produced. For this symposium Karpov contributed a valuable article, "The Individual and the Church." This issue was always of major concern for him: what does "being in the Church" mean for one's personal life and existence? Karpov was rather reserved and reticent, almost enigmatic. He would speak and think slowly, cautiously, as if with some kind of inhibition. One could learn more about him from an intimate, friendly talk than from open and public discussion. And those who were fortunate enough to know him well could appreciate in full the power of his analysis, the depth of his insight and, above all, the earnest seriousness of his thought.

He demonstrated all of these qualities in his book on Plato, which came from the printer almost on the eve of his unexpected death. The book is written in the Platonic manner, as a dialogue, and the aim of the author was to present all of Platonism as a "living body," as a feature of philosophical life. The knowledge and penetration displayed in this book are tremendous. Again, the main issue here is *the individual and the collective*. Plato's solution was inadequate. The solution has, however, been provided by the Church. Karpov was contemplating another book, an attempt at a philosophical introduction to the reality of the Church. He went to see Greece, classical and Christian, the land of his dream, of his desire. He expected to get some new inspiration, some new insight. And he surely did succeed. It was his last earthly journey, the new world was revealed to him at Mount Athos. He died quietly, reconciled and firm. "And I will give him a white stone, and upon the stone a new name written" — *καὶ δώσω αὐτῷ ψῆφον λευκὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ψῆφον ὄνομα καινὸν γεγραμμένον*. [*Revelations* 2:17].

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

ON KOYRÉ'S *La Philosophie et le problème nationale en Russie au début du XIX-e siècle*

There is little that is new in the book of Koyré. The entire significance of the book lies in the fact that material known for a long time but scattered has been gathered and put together in it very completely. The weakest aspect of the book is historic synthesis. Its publicistic tendentiousness disturbs the author very much. Too often he cannot distinguish between superficial contradictions, obscurantism and progress. Annoying gaps in his erudition are connected with this. In vain he left Alexandrine mysticism aside — he mentions the publication of mystical books but does not speak about reading them; and Prince Golitsyn for him is only some kind of "opponent to philosophy." Moreover, the history of Russian Romanticism is comprehensible only if one takes into account that sentimental-pietistic and mystical preparation which was accomplished namely in the Alexandrine period. The "Masonic" stream in Romanticism was very strong. The recent interest in themes of Romantic psychology, the influence of Western theosophic systems, in particular Baader — all this is incomprehensible if the experience of Alexandrine mysticism is not mentioned. Koyré too submisssively follows former historians of the Russian intelligentsia, for whom "mysticism" was equal to obscurantism, and the early history of Russian philosophy was reduced to a struggle with the censor for freedom of thought.

Yet another omission of Koyré is related to this. He says nothing of the study of philosophy in the Russian spiritual school. However, it was namely here that for the first time the study and assimilation of German Idealism began; and it is not accidental that one of the first figures of Russian "Romanticism," N. I. Nadezhdin, was a pupil of the spiritual school. Around the same time that it enjoyed popularity among the "*liubomudry*" of the twenties, German philosophy also had appeal in the Moscow Spiritual Academy, where at this time Professor A. Golubinsky, a great scholar and admirer of German philosophy, German mysticism and German poetry, was already lecturing on philosophy. It is necessary to mention Golubinsky in order to clarify the latest influence of Baader and Jakob on Russian thought. In any case, academic philosophy turned out to have a strong influence on the Slavophilism of the forties. It is hardly expedient to keep silent about it in a history of the formation of Russian Idealism.

It is also possible to note another series of gaps in the material collected by Koyré. In particular, one should consider the history of the spread of Catholic ideas in Russian society, especially those of de Maistre. The image of Chaadaev would have become clearer, and would

generally have illuminated several motifs of Russian thought concerning historical fate. In addition, Chaadaev was a typical dreamer — a "mystic" of the Alexandrine epoch. The chapter about Chaadaev in general was successful in Koyré's book (compare his article: "Chaadaev and the Slavophiles" in *Slavonic Review* [1927]). But even here he omitted too much from view. It would have been useful to speak about other dreamers of the Alexandrine period — for example, Batnekov, who was close to Kireevsky, Prince A. I. Odoevsky, Küchelbecker.

The most important elements in Koyré's book are his faithful, but nonetheless too brief, remarks concerning the connections between and interdependence of Russian and Western thought, his indications of parallels and borrowings. His observations on the complexity of the first schemas of Russian historiography are interesting. Here he mentions and explains forgotten facts and texts. Unfortunately the book ends quite haphazardly. The process does not stop and even is not interrupted where the author stops his analysis. The reader therefore leaves the book dissatisfied. He does not see where the strong lines, which appear before him, actually lead. In any case, for a long time Koyré's book will remain a useful textbook for the historian of Russian thought.

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

PRINCE S. N. TRUBETSKOY AS A PHILOSOPHER (1862-1905)

Prince S. N. Trubetskoy entered the history of Russian thought above all as an inspired historian of philosophy. His first book in particular, *Metaphysics in Ancient Greece*, will always remain an example of truly philosophical research on the history of philosophy. Trubetskoy became an historian because he was a philosopher. Philosophy for him was a revelation, like history. He strongly felt the universal and collective nature of philosophical thought, and believed that human thought only enters into composite experience and the deeds of all times and generations, and only thus can enter into the reason of truth. Above all he rejected individualism in knowledge. He considered the greatest sin of the new European philosophy its "Protestant principle," the absolutism of the human principle, the principle of isolated knowledge. From here only sceptical, only pessimistic conclusions are inevitable. Trubetskoy called for philosophizing in the element of history. And he showed that it was namely in this way that man always philosophizes. This does not mean that he is connected to tradition. This is a feeling of universal solidarity or mutual responsibility in philosophical aspirations and problems; and it is defined by a consciousness of responsibility, a consciousness of the sanctity and greatness of philosophical activity. Everyone philosophizes on behalf of everyone and for everyone, seeking and achieving one single truth that is the same for all.

Trubetskoy treated the philosophical past critically and freely, but always with sympathetic attention, attempting to understand each set of teachings and even errors from its problematics, from real although unresolved questions of the spirit. He was unable to live in a world of errors; he would not have been able to live if it turned out that everything past was in hopeless darkness. He would not have considered himself truly philosophizing if the history of philosophy were without meaning. Thus, the problem of a *justification of the philosophy of history* was in the foreground of his thought. He dared to show that in any philosophy there is a particular truth, frequently not recognized by its bearer, frequently distorted by him, often a disfigured fragment of truth — but always or almost always there is the truth of the quest. Trubetskoy believed in the nobility of the human mind, the divine image in man; and he was therefore never able to admit that the human idea consciously or intentionally seeks and desires falsehood, self-deception. In this respect he was almost naively optimistic. This optimism frequently blinded him, prevented him from feeling the severe

tragic nature of the history of philosophy. Here the limit of the historical view is revealed.

Trubetskoy did not construct a philosophical system. His philosophical activity was cut off too early. But all his life he was a teacher, almost a preacher, of philosophy. In his philosophical development Trubetskoy was the product of German Idealism, of German mysticism. In this respect he is especially reminiscent of Vladimir Soloviev, with whom he was so intimately close. From German Idealism he returned to the ancient world. This was his second and great love. For him this was a bright world of joyful and solemn thought, sufficiently young and strong to vanquish doubt and fear. But what is most important to him was the historical path to Christ. He saw in ancient philosophy that "evangelical preparation" which the early Church writers who considered Plato and even Heraclitus "their own" had already seen and recognized in it. In Hellenistic philosophy Trubetskoy saw a movement of natural human thought meeting Revelation, a kind of natural prophecy, a presentiment and omen. However, Christianity is the teaching about the God-man. And thus for a Christian the possibility of loathing the human as such is excluded. The Incarnation of the Logos testifies to the purity of the human being, to his capacity for purity. The highest faculty in man is his mind. Trubetskoy found confirmation of this in the Fathers of the Church. This highest faculty in his natural aspirations is also illuminated in the Incarnation of the Logos. It is not fortuitous that Christian truth was hostile to pagan Hellenic wisdom. Hellenism was not strong enough to manifest the truth, for the Truth is divine. But it was able to accept the truth and recognize it, for it was striving towards it. Wisdom could only be revealed — and the Logos became flesh. But it was revealed to philosphers, for they languished for love of wisdom and of philosophy. It was namely in Christianity, as the religion of the Logos, that Trubetskoy saw the ultimate justification and illumination of philosophy.

It can be said that he was and strove to be a philosopher because he was a Christian. Perhaps he was mistaken in many things and did not sufficiently feel in Hellenism its poisonous temptation, let alone its limitations. It is very typical that Trubetskoy apparently was least attracted to the greatest thinkers of the ancient world. It is not accidental that he did not write about either Plato or Aristotle. And in his course on the history of philosophy, the chapters about them are not among the best. He is interested in beginnings and ends: the birth of thought from religiosity or myth and the outcome of Hellenic philosophy. This is very indicative. Antiquity for Trubetskoy was only a prelude, a beginning, the first act. He tried to become liberated from Hegelian historical constructivism; he avoided reducing philosophical movements to simple formulas. But nevertheless, for him antiquity turned into a particular moment in the universal development of thought. There was great truth in this.

In the Russian consciousness Trubetskoy for the first time forcefully posed the question of Hellenism as a Christian problem. But the question was not posed by him very clearly, not strongly enough. It is also typical that Trubetskoy did not feel the nature of ancient tragedy — those problematics which Nietzsche had exposed so sickly even in his early articles about Greek philosophy was somehow not noted by Trubetskoy. Both this Hellenic tragic nature, and the unique, inimitable and very persistent rationalism of the ancient past remained alien to him. That is why he somehow simplified the question of the encounter of the Gospel and philosophy. In this respect, he was not able to overcome if not the influence, then in any case the mood, of German liberal Protestantism. All this does not diminish the merit of Trubestkoy as a historian of thought. At the time he posed the important question and was able to show all its vivid and religious strength. And what is most important, he studied the history of philosophy with the consciousness that he was fulfilling a religious task, he was performing a Church service. Perhaps Trubetskoy was also too much of a Hellene. But he was a Hellene recognizing and accepting Christ. He remained a philospher. He was a sage of this age, and in this very wisdom he composed and tried to compose a hymn of praise to the Incarnate Wisdom of God.

Prince Trubetskoy belongs to a disappearing generation of Russian thinkers, too peaceful and good-natured. By his spiritual temperament he was an old Russian liberal, perceiving, it is true, many motifs of Slavophilism, but he remained a Westernizer. This prevented Trubetskoy from completely understanding the entire acuteness of that Russian crisis which always upset him. He did not pose the question of the crisis of culture. He seemed to not understand the entire depth of those contradictions of Russian life which in his time were only just coming to light. His books and especially his publicistic articles now seem out of date. But what will not become outdated in them is a philosophical love, philosophical eros — a love and attraction for the truth. His firm will to churchify thought and life will also not become outdated in them. And one must not erase from one's memory of Prince S. N. Trubetskoy someone seeking and finding and summoning others to seek and find the truth of reason in Christ, the Incarnate Wisdom and the Logos.

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

ON CHIZHEVSKY'S *PHILOSOPHY IN THE UKRAINE*

The book of Chizhevsky is of a preliminary nature. It is only a bibliographical list and survey. The author provides a synthesis of the collected material in another book which is being printed, but has not yet come out: *Narisi z istorii filosofii na Ukraini*. However, even now it is possible to draw some conclusions. The author does not find a single "great philosopher" in the Ukraine, and therefore refrains from characterizing a national uniqueness of Ukrainian thought. He correctly suggests that the "national spirit" is recognized not by the "average man" but by "great people." But there is no need to dispute the existence of Ukrainian nationality. The historic uniqueness of the cultural formation which is connected with Kiev and Volyna is indisputable. And this is a kind of historical individuality, in any case — in the 17th-18th centuries. The historian must guess and explain the meaning and significance of this individual historic formation. The historian of Russian culture should also be interested in this. For the "Kievan spirit" was one of the formative and decisive factors in the Russian spiritual environment. This is especially felt in the history of Russian theology and philosophy. From this point of view the history of the early Kievan Academy in the 17th-18th centuries is particularly important. Here for the first time the reception of Western learning and philosophy occurred, and a unique type of Russian Westerner and "Russian European" developed. It is not accidental that it was namely in the Kievans or, as they were called then with irritation in the north, in the Cherkas that Peter the Great found ideological adherents to his reforms, and a new order of churches in terms of social relations in the first half of the 18th century was realized by the forces namely of the Cherkas. In the realm of spiritual culture it is possible to speak of a "Kievan pseudomorphosis." It was particularly felt in theology. Since the Kievan period, for the majority of Russian school theologians, "examples of the Western school and late philosophy" became closer and more similar to the half-forgotten patristic traditions. The meaning of this Kievan pseudomorphosis has not been revealed until now and is not fully known. A lack of published materials prevents a historical synthesis. Until now a genuine history of the Kievan Academy has not been written, and existing works on this theme have no merit. Too much original material has not yet been published. Chizhevsky, understandably, does not fill this gap, but provides a successful explanatory summary. He correctly emphasizes that it is impossible to approach all of Kievan learning under the general and vague concept of "scholasticism"; he convincingly shows that in Kiev of the 17th

century they knew about the Renaissance and about new philosophy, and he selects interesting data about philosophical reading in the Ukraine in the17th and 18th centuries. He promises in particular to return to the question of "routines" in the Western schools in the 16th and 17th centuries.

This is not the place to correct and supplement the enormous bibliographical list of the author. But in any case, it is necessary to add the book of Verhovskoy about the Spiritual Regulations (1916) to the literature. Chizhevsky is mistaken: the book of Zernikov, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* had also been published in the Latin original by the Kievan metropolitan Samuil Mislavsky (by the publisher Prokopovich) in Königsberg (1774-1775). The chapter about the Kievan Academy is the best in Chizhevsky's book. In the chapter about "The Middle Ages" one must note the connection of Kiev with Novgorod. If the "literature of the Judaizers" is connected with Kiev, then the religious movement of heresy was uncovered in the north. The chapter on Skovoroda is called outdated by the author himself in later notes ("actually now outdated"), and he refers to his own future works. A great deal has been written recently about Skovoroda, and the image of him is gradually becoming clear as the image of a Platonizing pre-romantic typical of the Western 18th century. A large amount of interesting data has also been collected by Chizhevsky in chapters devoted to the 19th century — to the history of German Idealism in Russia, to D. D. Iurkevich. The information of the author would have been much clearer on a broader historical background. As a whole, the book of Chizhevsky is a programme for an attractive book.

Translated from the Russian by
Roberta Reeder

ON CHIZHEVSKY'S *HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN PHILOSOPHY*

The new book of D. I. Chizhevsky on the history of Ukrainian philosophy is of a popular nature. This is a series of essays or sketches. The author himself notes the unevenness of his writing. At the beginning of the book the author speaks about the Ukrainian national character and world view. He poses the question historically and tries to define the sequential historic layers from which the national spirit was formed: the psychological stage, echoes of Hellenism, Baroque, Romanticism. For Chizhevsky the national spirit arises, develops in history, and does not only mainfest itself. One thinks the author is exaggerating the significance of Hellenistic motifs in the Ukrainian world view. In any case, "Ukrainian Hellenism" is of Western origin, and not Byzantine. And the Hellenism of Skovoroda is especially the typical Hellenism of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. Skorovoda is much closer to the Western Platonizing mysticism and theosophy of this time. The author shows this himself with great conviction. Ukrainian emotionalism quite rightly comes close to the pietistic mood of the post-Reformation West. And this explains the great receptivity to the influence of Romanticism. The most interesting chapters in Chizhevsky's book are about the nineteenth century. Very valuable are indications of the history of the influence and assimilation of German Idealism.

In the bibliography another new book should be pointed out, A. Koyré, *La philosophie et le problème nationale en Russie au début du XIX-e siècle* (Paris, 1929). Here much is spoken about Shadier, about Vellans, and others. The chapter on "Cyril and Methodius" in Chizhevsky's book is very interesting — a vivid essay of romantic religio-social radicalism. The author used previously published materials and new research.

What is most disputable in the book is the chapter about Gogol, written, moreover, not by Chizhevsky but by L. Mikolaenko. The tragic contradictoriness of Gogol remains in shadow. The problem of the demonic in Gogol is not touched upon at all. Optimistic motifs in his aesthetic world view are emphasized too sharply — as if Gogol had not written *The Portrait*. Absolutely nothing is said about Gogol's religious utopianism. The influences under which Gogol developed are not revealed at all. In general, nothing is said about his spiritual drama. This, of course, does not diminish the significance of the observations and the comparison which we find in Chizhevsky's book in the chapter about Gogol. But it demands serious reworking. It is necesssary to note in particular another essay about P. Iurkevich, again too short. In any

case, one will read Chizhevsky's book with great interest and edification.

ON THE SUBSTANTIATION OF LOGICAL RELATIVISM

Philosophy begins with experience, and is always the description and interpretation of experience. This is the fundamental and determinative description of philosophy, one that is equally applicable to all philosophical disciplines. In particular, theories of cognition are the description and interpretation of cognitive experience. In this case it is completely logical to base philosophy on scientific fact, since a theory of cognition must interpret actual knowledge that is both realizable and realized. Demanding that philosophy be "premiseless" to the point of denying the actual existence of science and of the concrete forms which scientific knowledge has traditionally assumed amounts in essence to annihilating the object of gnosiology. This kind of immoderate "anti-analysis," like all excesses, inevitably turns out to be self-destructive. As we shall see in due course, it leads to the paradoxical assertion that knowledge as a subject-object relation is impossible. A theory of cognition must reveal the meaning of humanly realizable knowledge, and that is why gnosiology as a theory must be preceded by a certain pre-theoretical examination of the fundamental types of cognitive creation, a preliminary phenomenology of scientific experience. This alone can lead to the correct and efficient posing and resolution of questions concerning the logical nature, structure and significance of knowledge. Of course, here we are not speaking of the manner in which scientific work proceeds or of the historical circumstances under which it arose, but of what it actually is.

These brief preliminary remarks, we think, sufficiently justify the proposed attempt to approach the fundamental issues of a theory of cognition through descriptive analysis of the principal forms of cognitive experience as it is given in scientific fact.

I

1. When a geometer ascribes "truthfulness" to any theorem — that is, "to a proposition which is not immediately obvious" — in essence he is asserting only that the given proposition flows with logical necessity from the series of preceding ones, from axioms and theorems. "Truthfulness" in this instance signifies the necessity of the conclusion, the apodictic nature of the logical sequence. This may be seen particularly clearly in cases using the method of the "rule of contraries": when accepting a proposition would lead to rejecting the initial

assumptions or — which amounts to the same thing — to changing these assumptions into their opposites, the proposition cannot be taken as "true" in the given system of geometrical science; and this inability is determined namely by the necessity of the logical transitions constituting the systematic tissue of science. The same must be said of another branch of mathematics — of analysis or "arithmetic." However "self-evident" many of its propositions may be for the *homo lacium*, only through deduction may their authenticity be thoroughly substantiated. The analysts of the last century focused all their energy on endowing analysis with the perfect, deductively-logical form which geometry had long since attained in the ingenious "Principles" of Euclid.

2. Thus the point of emphasis is transferred to the question of the meaning and significance of "axioms," propositions that are initially and directly true — it would be more exact and more cautious to say, propositions that are taken as such. If they actually did possess unconditional necessity and could not be replaced by other propositions, if adopting a certain system of primary statements was unavoidable in order for the thought process to take place, then the entire systematic body of theorems developing and "following" from that point would assume "absolute" value, and would be the only possible such body. For theorems are either directly included *implicite* in axioms, "suggested" by the very combination of initial assertions or proposed by these assertions in relation to specific constructions and shapes; that is, they respect concepts which are more or less arbitrarily created by thought. If, on the other hand, the axiom supply in geometry (or analysis) does not possess absolute value — in other words, if it does not possess the property of "truthfulness" in and of itself before becoming the axiom supply of a particular system (that is, before becoming a foundation for deductive development), then no mathematical theorem can lay claim to "absolute" truth; then their truth will be only relative — having the condition of accepting the given set of axioms. The entire question, it turns out, may be reduced to whether the fundamental axioms of mathematics are necessary forms of thought, whether they are irremovable assumptions (*conditiones sine quibus non*) for all mathematical thought processes or even for all thought processes in general, since all thought processes propose categories of quantity and space.

3. The idea that geometric axioms do not possess primary truth in themselves — this proposition, after the intensive work of the last decades, is now the almost indisputable property of mathematical science. A lengthy dispute with the defendants of the intuitive (visual) element in geometry, provoked by efforts to give geometry strict systematic form, led to the discovery that on the one hand, the traditional geometry of Euclid differs from that which could be called "natural" geometry, and that on the other hand, it is only one of the

(logically) equally possible deductive theories of "space." This was revealed particularly distinctly in experiments concerning the purely analytical construction of geometry (those of Helmholtz, Riman, Kell and many others all the way down to Gilbert). With this work it was ascertained that not only the Euclidian system of axioms, postulates and definitions may be used as an initial axiom supply, but others as well. Moreover, these other systems may be used without introducing contradictions into the thought process and without its becoming sterile; they are equally capable of explaining the systematic substance of the theorems. The content of these systems, of course, will ultimately differ. Logically, however — that is, deductively — they are equally possible and of equal value: not one of them can be refuted by another. In other words, both Euclidian and "non-Euclidian" geometries, each within itself, possess "truthfulness" — that is, a logical unity which either allots any given theorem a place in relation to the necessary consequences of corresponding axioms, or does not provide the theorem with such a place. It is this search for a place in a systematic relation which constitutes the formal essence of the process of "proving." It is possible to "prove" (or to refute) any proposition only in relation to a specific system of axioms. Taken by themselves, these systems are equally possible as long as the compatibility of the axioms among themselves has been demonstrated. Each of them is arbitrary, in a sense; in essence, this is nothing other than a system of combined postulates or a complex definition of a certain logical, conceivable object ("thing"). Euclid's axioms designate or "assign" a certain object with specific properties that they can explain; subsequent theorems reveal the details of the object's structure. The axioms of Lobachevsky "assign" a different object, those of Riman — a third object, and so on.

All objects assigned by postulates or axioms are like specimens of one species, which is understood to be an "ideal thing" — they are different "types" of space or, in other words, various types of spatial order. This is why the question "true or false" must not be asked here: there are no boundaries to or limitations for the constructive work of logical thought, of "logical fantasy." Here we may repeat the words of R. Dedekind, who called numbers "free creations of the human spirit," *die freie Schöpfungen des menschlichen Geistes.* Indeed, every mathematical object is just such a "free creation" — limits are generated only by the demand that axioms be in a state of compatibility ("uncontradictoriness").

4. Every systematic whole that is inwardly-focused and clearly delimited from all other such bodies has its own particular sequence of deductive transitions, the continuity and validity of which constitute the only standard for and justification of the "truthfulness" ("truth") of each individual theorem within the "system." The understanding of the axioms, as postulational definitions or as constructive tasks, distinctly resolves the question of the significance of the mathematical

propositions. Each of them reveals the implied properties of a single object and, obviously, applies only to this object — that is, to its characteristic system of axioms. Thus, in its application to theorems with mediated and arbitrary meaning, the property of "truthfulness" signifies only the available amount of lawful (continuous) logical movement. To the "axioms" themselves this description of "truthfulness" is in no way applicable: any system of axioms, like a postulate, is acceptable if it is free from inner contradictions; "uncontradictoriness" is the only "truthfulness" of an axiomatic system, enabling it to be the definition of a single object.

The issue takes a different turn when we leave the realm of "pure" mathematics and ask ourselves about the relationship between "deductive" geometry and the sensorily-perceptible world, of the relationship between our "ideal space" and the "natural length" of given experience. All geometric shapes are different in nature from the "things" of the sensory world, and are essentially incommensurable with them — they do not belong to the realm of empirical reality. At the same time, they enable us to "direct ourselves" in the heterogeneous space that is "natural" for them. In fact, this apparent paradoxality was the motivating cause for the development of philosophical speculation about space. The result of this speculation is well-known: removing geometry from the sensory empyrean turned out to be impossible, and the antinomy we have thus formulated is resolved through taking the "ideal shapes" of deductive geometry as particular symbols for sensory objects and relations, ones which are more or less adequate for the world they represent; adequacy in this case does not refer to sensory identity — this is impossible, since one of the items being compared is not a sensory thing — but the ability to replace sensory things. Ideal space is a model of the sensory continuum, a conceived substitute for visual diversity. Since this is a problem involving symbolic representation and schematic substitution, we may rightly speak of the correspondence between geometrical propositions and the "outer" world, of their "reality" or "real" truth. In other words, our traditional (Euclidian) geometry may be called "true" and real insofar as it serves as an appropriate symbol for our actually present, visually spatial world. In this sense — that is, in relation to the sensorily given world — traditional geometry is true, unlike certain of the other equally possible deductive systems. In this instance the truth of Euclidian geometry is relative, for it would in no way be contradictory to propose another structure of givens, in the presence of which the Euclidian system would be deprived of its working force and would lose all reason to be called true.

5. Both the axiom supply as an isolated entity and the entire system as a whole, examined in and of themselves, are neither true nor false from a developed standpoint. "Theorems" are "true" when they "flow" naturally — either directly or with mediation — from axioms; they are false when there is no place for them in the deductive explanation of a

given axiom supply. The system as a whole may also be "true," but only in an "applied" sense, taking into consideration its appropriateness for the schematic symbolization of empirical givens. If, beginning with uncoordinated sensory facts relating to length and attempting to determine the "nature" of this length, we raise the question of the properties of space, we may then answer that "real" space "is" in fact Euclidian, meaning that the "ideal object" constructively assigned by the Euclidian axioms is in our eyes a satisfactory "substitute" for the vague and unclear visual image of "natural length." It is self-evident that this "reality" of Euclidian geometry in no way makes the system unconditional. "Truth" in the given instance signifies only appropriateness for schematizing perception which is actually real and which therefore admits the (logical) possibility of change. "Reality" signifies the success of the symbol.

6. Analogous considerations are involved in relation to analysis. First and foremost, it must be noted that in contemporary mathematical consciousness there no longer exists any kind of sharp dividing line between the "science of space" and the "science of number": both come together in the general and unified "study of order," and are almost nothing more than two parallel readings of one and the same code. The genius of the great seventeenth and eighteenth century mathematicians brought under examination many new concepts and methods, and brought forth an almost countless number of propositions which were proven or seemingly-proven — or sometimes only designated as needing to be proven. All of this was suitable for resolving particular questions of both a pure and an applied nature; but it was not a mathematical "system." Mathematical work of the nineteenth century was concerned namely with creating systems. And in the search for rigorous proof of both individual propositions and of whole bodies of such propositions, it became clear that the images (concepts) of analysis are free (arbitrary) constructions of thought determined only by conventional agreement concerning the rules of operation which govern them. From this standpoint a theory of irrational numbers was successfully constructed — that is, a body of further-irreducible propositions was found which generates the logically well-grounded ("necessary and sufficient") basis for the deductive development of theorems, facilitating the attainment of rigorous solutions to those problems which cannot be solved in rational numbers.

It is highly significant that not one but three such theories have been constructed, ones which are hardly entirely in agreement (or compatible) with one another — we are referring to the famous constructions of Wairstrass, G. Kantor and Dedekind. Even more noteworthy is Kroneker's attempt to eliminate irrational numbers altogether in the given case, instead using several concepts of number theory to prove the same particular propositions. Analogous efforts led to the creation of analytical theory of complex numbers. Here, in the interest of rigorous deduction, it turned out to be necessary to start openly with

arbitrary definitions and postulates. With this work the horizons of the field have continually expanded, and the initial object of "arithmetic" — the natural sequence and even the system of "magnitudes" in general — has perished in the boundless ocean of new "generalizations" and problems; it suffices to point to Wairstrass' discoveries in the areas of signs of differentialibility, set theory, functional calculus. The limits of "pure" mathematical facts have turned out to be mobile, and this creates the necessity of not adding to and developing old theories, but of reviewing and again verifying statements which have long seemed extremely obvious or hackneyed.

An excellent example is the exceptional difficulty of succinctly spelling out the first pages of arithmetic, especially its first lines: it is somewhat dismal, not to mention downright frightening, for the beginner to realize that the sharpest and most capable minds inevitably fall to contradicting themselves on this topic. In any case, a constructed system of analysis should never under any circumstances be considered the only possible system and therefore the "real" one.

7. It should again be noted, moreover, that these deductive systems, constructed arbitrarily and on the basis of a "conditional" axiom supply, turn out to "work" practically. A theory of complex numbers turns out to be at the same time a theory of vectors — it also directly provides solutions for the problems of mechanical engineers, even though not only the latter were in mind at the time of the theory's construction — but by nature "imaginary" numbers are a "fiction," they are extra-real and ideal ("abstract"). This is evidenced even more sharply in the role played by R. Hamilton's "quaternions" in vector analysis, "shapes" which are entirely arbitrary and which do not submit to the fundamental laws of arithmetical processes but may still be taken for "numbers." The significance of this fact is clear: the "solution" of specific problems requires a point of support — a unified body of primary "self-evident" concepts beyond which we will not try to go — nor will we even wish to do so, remaining content with the fact that they have simply been defined, all in the same way; we "create" ("construct") them — and because of this, types of questions that interest us become solvable (that is, reducible to that which is conditionally known), and a certain "ideal unity" of truths comes into being. In a system of analysis, we speak of "truthfulness" only in the following senses: we either mean rigorous deductive movement from the starting point of a single-meaning axiom supply, or the appropriateness of a certain correspondingly concise body of propositions for substantiating a known theory — that is, for imparting systematic unity to a designated ideal realm. To speak of the truthfulness of analysis as a whole within the boundaries of pure mathematics would be meaningless — this issue assumes meaning only through transition to applied mathematics — that is, to the actual calculations and measurement of real (sensorily given) objects.

8. Our conclusions receive control confirmation by the "rule of contraries" in cases of the complete and definitive failure of all attempts to "deduce" the fundamental concepts of "mathematics" from "logic," attempts to transform the laws of mathematics into fixed laws for the process of thinking, laws independent from relative and "haphazard" objects — in other words, from the specific bodies of problems that mathematical theory is intended to solve. Heading in this direction, thought runs aground on the same reefs where German dialectical idealism once met its ruin. Removing even the most general and basic categories of mathematical theory from the concept of "thinking" turns out to be impossible simply because these "categories" are only postulates necessary for the sake of solving specific problems — ones raised either by a suggestion from "outer experience" or by the creative inspiration for thought — and are only definitions for the systematic whole in which these problems become unified.

Building an "absolute" system of mathematical concepts is impossible because the very task is in itself contradictory, and the logical development of the ingenious intuitions of George Kantor led only to dead ends, "antinomies" and paradoxes. Motives that were more of a "speculative," theological nature and origin rather than of mathematical ones moved him to construct an "absolute" theory of diversity, to base mathematics on the most simple and necessary axioms of thought — in essence, on the axioms and laws of logic. The longer his discourse continued, the greater the number of insurmountable "antinomies" that were uncovered, which gave Henri Poincaret the grounds for sharply condemning this entire school of thought. But Poincaret did not clearly indicate the meaning of the primary error which led Kantor's thought astray, did not emphasize the definitive relativity (meaning, of course, logical relativity) of mathematical concepts, which does indeed render meaningless any design for "absolute" mathematics. Logistics also breaks with Kantorism at this point, as do the Marburg School's attempt to logically substantiate mathematics in a secretly Hegelian spirit and Rois's Fichtean attempt to interpret the fundamental categories of mathematical thought as typical forms of the action of an absolute will.

9. We may summarize the conclusions reached above. The relativity of mathematical truth is not connected with any particular or distinct traits of particularly mathematical objects, if only because there are no such objects. Mathematical knowledge is relative in the sense indicated above because it is "pure theory," and in all theories that are examined in and of themselves we encounter only two forms of conditional and hypothetical truth: either the deductive process of "leading outward" from accepted axioms ("provability"), or the ability to regulate and "substantiate" a unified body of individual propositions ("self-evidence" by condition!). We either designate or construct the theoretical realm — this is realized through establishing axioms or definitions.

For the present discussion, one example will suffice. Government is an ideal object, the "existence" of which is legally defined by its "fundamental laws." Only within the boundaries of the circle of relations outlined by these axiomatic postulates are legal actions possible; only within this circle may we speak of lawful and criminal actions (in the juridical sense). "Criminality," juridically speaking, is a relative evaluation which suggests a specific and conditional set of characteristics — this is particularly evident in the area of civil interrelations, where moral and educational associations tending to obfuscate the nature of law fall away. That which is a violation of the law establishes itself as law. Only on the basis of these correspondingly formed assertions is the court able to carry out its "checking" activities in the resolution of cases. Legal cases are not only analogous to mathematical problems, but are also formally and logically identical to them. They have their own axioms forming an ideal unity, within which juridical thought will advance. Here we are digressing from the metaphysical aspect of rights and of legal intercourse, and are speaking only of juridical theory. In this area, as in mathematics, we are locked in by the relativity of the initial axioms that were accepted.

II

1. By "experimental knowledge," as the term is customarily used, we understand first and foremost the natural sciences. However we may feel about this limitation of the term's scope, as a preliminary investigative measure it is entirely acceptable, for it is namely in natural science cognition that the logical essence of the cognitive relation to experience reveals itself most distinctly. The natural sciences are primarily experimental sciences, and at the same time it is they which pull particularly strongly towards the discovery of "laws," towards nomotheticism. At first glance empiricism and nomotheticism are contradictory tasks — subsequently we will maintain rather that at bottom they are one and the same task. We will henceforth leave aside the traditional conception of the natural science method as inductive, in the sense of the empirical theories of St. Millia, and as reducing all judgments in the natural sciences to sensory perception or to the automatic "summarization" of perceived impressions, with "similar" elements being removed from parentheses — given these conditions, logical coefficients that remain in parentheses and individualize separate items are discarded. This theory of natural science cognition has its *a priori* — it rests upon a corresponding understanding of general concepts and on a corresponding theory of abstraction; this aspect of the question was treated with perspicacity by A. Mainong (in *Hume-Studien*) and by Husserl (in the corresponding chapters of the second volume of *Logische Untersuchungen*), and so in the context of our discussion we are right to omit it. There is decisive significance for us in the fact that the classical theory of induction which received its typical expression in Mill's "System of Logic" did not grow out of the

phenomenology of scientific experience, and moreover immediately turned out to be in disagreement with and poorly reconciliable to it. This was revealed at one point by Whewell in his outstanding but — unfortunately for us — forgotten systematic historical works.[1] This was noted by Libik in his well-known speeches on Bacon and on "induction and deduction." Henceforth we will be speaking about namely this phenomenological view of natural-science cognition, and not about some kind of hurriedly simplifying theory.[2]

2. "Experience" in the natural sciences assumes two typical forms: observation and experiment. These forms are usually clearly demarcated and are designated as "active" and "passive" observation; but however customary this description may be, it must by no means be taken as satisfactory. In the first place, "experience" is identified with observation in an extremely dogmatic way, as though understanding (interpretation) were something secondary and additional. Secondly, on the basis of this distinction a vague and confusing sign is set forth: an astronomer who uses spectrophotographic devices to study the basic chemical composition of nebular bodies or who, on the basis of the Doppler-Fizo principle, determines the existence of satellites around distant stars, is without a doubt "experimenting," not "observing," even though he does not interfere with the "natural" course of natural phenomena — and indeed, he cannot interfere with it; as it turns out, the difference between experimenting and observing is not that the former process involves subjecting natural phenomena to some kind of influence. "Activeness" may be limited by the conditions under which the phenomena are being observed. In light of this fact it is essential that changes not be the work of the experimentor's own hands. An expression that is already commonplace: "an experiment provided by nature itself" leads to the idea that "activeness on the part of experimentors" does not exist. Indeed, from a logical point of view, the investigation of compass needles' behavior during magnetic storms or times of maximum sun spot activity, for instance, or research on the metabolism of people who are starving or ill in some clinical form or other — such work is undoubtedly of an experimental nature, even though on the surface it may appear that the experimentor is acting like a "mere observer." He may indeed turn out to be only an observer — we will find out later under what circumstances this is so. In any case, "activeness" alone, resp. "passivity," does not enable us to classify cases of scientific research by logical structure with sufficient clarity. For this reason it is incorrect to omit the role of the instruments used, both material and ideal — to remove both "observation" and "experiment" from the actual course of scientific work. We are not speaking here about the technical aspect of the matter, nor about whether or not the researcher makes use of "devices," but rather about the instruments' participation in the very content of the experimentally established propositions. This issue was raised at one point by Clifford,

and then with particularly striking clarity by Dugem in his *Theory of Physics*.

3. The question must be put directly and sharply: is it possible to reduce all natural-science judgments to (sensory) perception, even if only to "the possible" sensory perception, and does not such an attempt lead to an irresponsible misuse of the concept of experience, to a game of fictions, and moreover to an understanding of the meaning of judgments that does not correspond to their actual role in the scientific system. It would certainly be difficult to accept, in speaking about the heliocentric structure of the planetary system, about the mutual attraction of its members and the disturbing influence each of them exerts on the others' movement, that in actuality we are appealing for proof to the sensory perception of an imaginary being endowed with perceptory abilities (which for us are inaccessible and vague) and situated in world-space in such a way that it is in a position to see or to perceive in some way the designated outwardly visual picture. If it were even possible to make such an admission, it is clear that this would be an experience totally incommensurable with our own. But it is easy to be persuaded that in astronomy the heliocentric system by no means rests on this "possible" experience, one that is blatantly impossible. Nor is the geologist appealing *ad oculos* when he speaks of the Ice Age or of physics, or when he develops a theory of ether. This does not at all mean that these judgments are entirely without grounding in "experience." It must be understood, however, that not every judgment concerning "reality" directly rests on experience or directly relates to and reflects sensory perception. Judgments may be based on experience in different ways — and here we arrive at the genuine basis of the distinction between "observation" and "experiment."

4. We will compare two judgments: "an aqueous solution of potassium permanganate has a crimson-violet hue" on the one hand, and "benzene has a cyclical structure with double links alternating two by two and a molecular composition made up of six atoms of carbon and six atoms of hydrogen." We will raise the question as to whether these opinions "rest on experience" or "are confirmed by experience" in the same way. It is self-evident that only in the first case are we really working with perceived images, actual or potential, and in any case actually realizable — we note, however, that this is only for the "average" or "normal" individual, namely, he who is able to perceive a certain spectrum of colors. In the second instance we are not speaking of the sensory and visual properties of a perceivable ("given") object. Visually speaking, benzene "is" an oily liquid that is flammable, has a specific odor and so on, and within sensory experience there is no transition whatsoever from these properties to its molecular composition and structure. That which is expressed by the known structural formula for benzene (and by all kinds of chemical formulas — simple, structural or stereochemical — without distinction) is in no

way attributable to direct perception and is not a sensorily-real property. In this particular instance we have two heterogeneous types of judgment concerning reality. The formula of benzene does not express the direct content of our sensory perception, and inversely, by its own direct content it does not express any sensory facts. When taken alone, in and of itself, the formula is simply obscure and lacking in meaning. But indirectly, through a certain mediation and thus conditionally, in the long run it expresses and systematizes nothing other than the data of sensory perception. It expresses first and foremost the results of molecular analysis — the fact that with unlimited frequency and without exceptions, any benzene sample that has been purified by distillation will, within the margins of error for weighing, contain 6 weight units of hydrogen for every 72 weight units of carbon; the formula also expresses the results of observing the formation of derivatives of benzene during the process of the latter's reaction with various other chemical bodies, the composition and structure of which are known and determined beforehand — for example, the fact that only one nitrobenzene is produced, and so on.

The formula not only summarizes these facts, however, but also interprets them in accordance with the fundamental principles of atomic theory and structural hypothesis, going on the assumption that carbon has a valency of four and hydrogen a valency of one, and so on. Without these assumptions no kind of experimental judgment can exist. This interpretation of a series of facts (which may be either primary or already interpreted and replaced by symbols) provides them with a systematic unity, regulates them. The formula of benzene enables us to understand — that is, to designate one single meaning for — the results of an elementary analysis of benzene derivatives and their character. If a benzene "nucleus" of this particular composition and structure does exist or, in other words, if benzene is constructed in precisely this way, then in "experience" we must necessarily meet up with the same facts that we encounter in laboratory practice. It is this particular relationship to experience which constitutes the "empirical" basis for experimental judgments. Attention is focused not on the search for a more "similar" (in a visual or graphic sense) image of the "outer thing," but on the construction of a hypothetical symbol which unites sensory facts despite all the dissimilarity and incommensurability between them. In the case of benzene, the conclusion turns out to be particularly sound because the unification spreads to a vast body of compounds — the theory of the "benzene nucleus" transforms "chemistry of aromatic carbons" into a system. The same is suggested even more distinctly by the classical formula for methane, a truly ingenious intuition supporting all of organic chemistry. But we should never lose sight of the conditionality and the relativity of these formulas, which are significant and meaningful only as long as our "experience" maintains the structure that it currently has and that it could lose at any time — not because some kind of devastating catastrophe will occur in "nature,"

but because new traits and new facts will perhaps be revealed to us, or even some that have simply been forgotten and gone unnoticed.

5. As Claude Bernard said, an experiment "is nothing other than an open-ended discussion." Experimental judgment differs from observational judgment in that its authenticity stems not from graphic perception but from a logical conclusion; for this reason it is limited in its "truth" by the premises of the conclusion — and moreover, only on the condition of these premises does it have meaning. This is why only theoretical science allows experiments and, inversely, why all experimental science is theoretical: the authenticity of conclusions stems from the theoretical foundation, and only within the framework of this foundation and the realm designated by it are they of significance. An experiment is a "conclusion," and is carried out in thought and by thought — not by the work of hands; for precisely this reason it is of an essentially different nature from sensory observation. The experimentor builds an "ideal" model designed on the basis of set "laws" and planned in such a way that specific facts enter into and are united by it. He constructs a certain "imaginary world," in which facts must exist and events must take place in a certain order — and in no other. In other words, the experimentor proposes a possible mechanism for phenomena, through which they may be fit into a scientific system and comprehended by a "unity of interpretation." This proposition is the *ratio cognoscendi* of phenomena but not their *ratio essendi* in the sense of their transsubjective cause (here it is understood that we are speaking of a transcendental subject). In actuality, experiments do not go past this point. Facts demanded by or inadmissible for the constructed "hypothesis" may again be established by the author himself, propositions in the form of a premeditated, organized structure of observations; they may also be found in different forms; they may be uncovered in the well-known store of "raw material," lying in a useless leap, hidden away since ancient times.

This last case is typical of astronomical experiments: for many years the Greenwich Observatory was operational, from Flemsteed to Eri, but it was only independently of this accumulation of observations that the newly developing Newtonian "hypothesis" drew this same body of facts into a systematic scientific system and used them as its justification; it was not necessary to look for new facts. In addition, the Newtonian theory of the moon, for example, is a typical experimental theory. The same must be said of Darwin.

6. The initial element of experimental discourse may be both a "single" observation or series of such observations and the play of the "scientific" or, as Libik phrased it, the "inductive" imagination. During the next stage the imagination plays a fundamental role: the "hypothesis" must be developed. The investigator must fully anticipate all the facts necessarily postulated by the "picture of the world" he has constructed. In other words, he is trying to find the "axiom supply" and

the unified body of primary "ideal" images from which he can deductively arrive at "existential judgments" concerning the facts given in experience, and on the basis of these judgments then develop all the conclusions potentially contained in this axiom supply. The result achieved is a "model" of a specific realm of phenomena, within which there can be only two kinds of relative "truthfulness": the truth of the substantiating axiom supply and the truth of the substantiated conclusion. The "reality" of any such model signifies only its suitability for regulating facts, and the degree of "truth" in it is determined on the one hand by the breadth of its systematic scope, and also by the simplicity and clarity of logical movement within the system. "In and of itself" no such model is true, whether it concerns "the entire world" or a particular realm of phenomena. The restrictive link to the given factual material is always maintained and cannot be surmounted, even if it turns out that a particular model has been somehow pre-adjusted to accommodate an increase in facts and does in fact comprehend them in its systematic synthesis. It must be remembered that if a model ceases to be "true" in relation to an increasing or changing supply of facts, it does not lose this property in relation to the former supply of facts which had entirely fit into it. For "truthfulness" is the character of the relationship between symbol and experience, not that which exists between copies and "transsubjective" or "super-experimental" "reality."

7. Observation and experiment are not two co-subordinated types of scientific experience, but two phases of scientific investigation. They lie in different cognitive planes: observation belongs to the domain of sensory perception and appeals to its graphic obviousness; experiment relates to the domain of thought and deals with the continuity of logical relations. Observation provides the material and experimental judgment interprets it. Here one qualification must be made: "observation" provides not raw material, but a version of "sensory perception" that has already been logically "worked through." Judgments in general do not merely "summarize" or "represent" a series of perceptions (whether they be mine or anyone else's), but already provide an interpretation of these perceptions. Firstly, judgments go beyond the limits of any final number of individual perceptions (and even beyond the potential infinity of their indefinitely-continuing sequence), thereby affirming the necessary synthesis of the concept — that is, the necessity of the ideal construction. Secondly, it is not sensory images which serve as terms in every judgment, but — as Bradley aptly put it — rather "idea-symbols" which more or less conventionally "signify" the facts of perception. It has come to pass that even natural science "observational judgments" (like — "mammals have four-chambered hearts") are already the product of interpretation, and the material handled by scientific theory is not "bare facts" but "abstract" models of facts. But this interpretation differs from the experimental kind in that it is not dependent on the special theoretical premises of a given area of

scientific thought, since it proposes only a general "theoretical" basis for everything (and for all kinds of sensory perception). We will return to this question later on.

8. The "laws of nature" established by the natural sciences are neither "real" laws by which "things themselves" are governed, nor merely regular processes in nature regulating the combination and alternation of phenomena. Naturalists make a sharp distinction between "empirical laws," which only approximately and preliminarily summarize sensory "data," and "theoretical" authentic laws, which are substantiated by axioms and are at the very basis of experimental deduction. The latter in and of themselves represent neither a constituent part of the "outer" world as it "exists" (better to say, "as it would exist") without cognition, the cognitional process and cognizability, nor a constituent part of sensory world-representation. Beginning with "experimental" data, during the process of logical interpretation or "explanation" experimental thought constructs hypothetical models for a body of phenomena that is ever-growing in scope, striving to attain the highest and "ultimate conclusions," the "picture of the universe." This model — which ideally is all-encompassing — must represent the way in which the "world" ("existence") could be organized, the factors (figures) from which it could be formed, and so on — in order for us to understand the system that is the sensory empyrean, so that the latter would become for us a necessary (logically transparent, regulated) unity. The "factors of world creation" and the "laws of nature" are signs and traits of a certain "ideal object" — the existence of which would be revealed, our reason tells us, by precisely those manifestations which form our "perception." This "object" is only a "conceivable" object. Its "reality" signifies only the fulfillment to a significant degree of the task of systematically unifying "experience." If the world were indeed of such a nature, then these "phenomena" would have to occur and this "conformity to natural laws" would have to determine their interrelationship in experience. Furthermore, if our experience justifies these "predictions," we take our models to be "true." We will focus our attention on this double "if." The "laws of nature" are hypotheses, *conditiones sine quibus non* for the systematic cognition of the world, conditions — but only possible ones, not necessary ones. The singleness of these conditions' occurence and their indispensability are neither self-evident nor provable by mediation. Their "necessity and sufficiency" are only addressed to the consequences which they "stipulate," and signify only necessity ("well-foundedness") of movement. In and of themselves these hypotheses do not possess necessity, and may not be deduced from principles of logic. They are the result of a creative imagination applied to facts — once again, the "free creations of the human soul."

Showing that "experience" may not be explained any other way — or in other words, that we cannot conceive of any other "world," is a task that is unfulfillable and entirely in vain. We must remember that in the

given circumstances, the conclusion crosses from the consequence to the foundation — which can formally provide a basis for nothing more than the probability (possibility) of the conclusion. This was not taken into consideration by Kant, whose "transcendental method" proceeds by just such a modus of conditionally categorical syllogism — nor by the Neo-Kantians, who applied the method of a priori "founding" or "genesis." By its formally logical substance, this "reconstructive method" can demonstrate the necessity of conclusions given the condition of the established premises, but can never justify the inevitability of these premises.

At this point we arrive at an important question: at the heart of the absolutization of reconstructive models of "reality" lies the dogmatic premise of the "uniformity of nature," which enables us to accept any quantity of given facts as "typical" and sufficient for the formation of a definitive, single-meaning judgment concerning the "entire" body of "possible" facts — and once agian, concerning any body of empirical material which could appear in the future following a broadening of experience; this is the premiss substantiating the certainty that once-established principles of explanation will (in general) turn out to actually be capable of embracing any and all new observations. This premise is entirely unprovable, and furthermore is totally superfluous for cognitive purposes. The limited nature of attempts to systematically explain all of experience by a specific form of this experience in no way violates the constancy of such efforts in relation to the given experience — the connection here is of a logical nature and is therefore inviolate. If in the future our present-day experience turns out to be only a part of experience in general — and moreover, a part which is inappropriate for serving as a description of the whole of experience, our hypothetical models will fully maintain their cognitive significance in relation to this part of experience even if they are no longer applicable to the whole.

9. The same factual material may perhaps be "explained" simulatneously by different models, all equivalent insofar as the "truth" is concerned. A situation in which there are no givens on which to base a choice or a definitive evaluation of competing theories may be characterized as a state of insufficient knowledge about the object; for example, the present state of physiological color-sensation, in which every proposed theory encompassing a certain part of the entire body of factual data is without strength in relation to the remaining part of the body of data. Such was the state of optics up until the time of Frenel. There were no "esthetic" or "economic" distinctions between theories from the standpoint of the "elegance" and "simplicity" of their gnosiological meaning.

10. The "relativity" of scientific constructions has a uniquely logical significance (that of dependence on a specific axiom supply) and therefore does not at all suggest that these constructions must actually

change at some point. All conceptions or models explain and unite a certain body of facts, and if this body of facts has been observed through the course of history to increase in quantity without changing qualitatively, then no means of changing the principles of interpretation appears. However, at the same time we must not exaggerate the degree of stability possessed by these scientific models, nor take the preservation of the significance of any one of them over a long period of time as a sign of genuine (that is, not allowing for substitution even when no contradictions are introduced) "unconditional" significance (eternity).

An examination of the history of science soon reveals that all judgments concerning this point, from the initial ones to those that are more recent and individual, are in a state of incessant movement. In different areas we will find this movement at different levels in relation to the "generally accepted" outlook, but nowhere will we encounter complete rest: this would only be possible in the event of a total cessation of even the quantitative growth of the factual material. Here we arrive at the issue of the "nomothetic" (and not "idiographic") nature of the natural sciences. It should be stressed with special emphasis that not only does "nomotheticism" not exclude "interest" in the particular, but that the "laws of nature" are only laws because and insofar as they explain individual facts — especially the individual pecularities of these facts. It would by no means suffice to formulate general laws and to then explain their imminently implied content. It must be shown that each and every individual fact, each and every individual observation, may truly be explained by these laws and is included by them in a systematic relation. If several facts that are "suitable" for a predictable, theoretically "ideal case" of a law differ slightly among themselves (but no more than would follow from the theory of probabilities, or than would be allowable given the degree of accuracy of the method of inquiry being used, which is subject to strict calculation) , the naturalist "ignores" these differences — by no means on the grounds that they are individual, but entirely to the contrary, namely because they are *not* individual and relate not to the "facts themselves" but to the imperfect nature of the means of inquiry. If these "digressions" from the theoretical type go beyond the limits theoretically predetermined expectation, it becomes unavoidable to review either the theoretical premisses ("laws") or the right to assemble these facts into just such an "ideal case" and no other. In any event, it is individual cases which always serve as the best check of "laws," and the more complex and individual they are, the better.

The appropriateness of any generalization is measured namely by its ability to unite and regulate the most heterogenous of materials. It is this ability which comprises the significance of so-called "unsuccessful experiments," resp. anomalies. No reasonable naturalist would allow himself to "ignore" "individual" digressions and particularities of this kind, and it is just such "exceptional" cases which always serve as the motivating stimulus for theoretical work (we recall Michaelson's

experiment and the whole "mistake" in the predicted time of the passing of any comet!). The experimentor's ideal is to be able to explain all the peculiarities of each and every isolated fact, and for this reason scientific theories are in constant movement, "adjusting" to and controling the changing phenomenon of experience. The natural sciences strive to build a model of the world in which there would be a substantiated and rigorously defined place for the entire wealth of differing individual facts. They strive to take into consideration all natural factors, to foresee all the possible combinations of conditions and laws so that no fact — no matter how small — ends up being outisde of the "system." Of course, this is only a formal ideal. But the practically infinite quantity of facts does not abolish this ideal — it only makes the path towards it infinite. It should be noted that by their content, scientific theories do not form a united series in such a way that each subsequent theory is reached on the basis of the previous one through additions alone. More often than not, the broadening of experience invokes not additions and corrections, but simply substitution of one thing for another. Constructions which successively replace one another do not become "better," do not develop: they simply change and become "broader." Only their formally-systematizing effectiveness continually grows — and even this does not always occur.

11. The "science of nature" does not describe but instead explains "reality" — that is, experience. For this reason, the determining role here belongs not to the "empirical" phase but to the deductive one. we will illustrate this statement with an example. The "catastrophistic" school of geology and the biological theory of "fixed species" did not leave the scientific scene because "in reality" things were not as they depicted them. "Uniformitarianism" triumphed because Lyell and other succeeded in demonstrating that it was possible to "understand" the mechanism for the appearance and distribution of life forms, for the origin of fossils that had been unearthed and so on, going on the assumption that only "hitherto and presently acting" agents were at work — in other words, they showed that all the factual data of geological science could be assembled ino a system on the basis of an "axiom supply" consisting of propositions originally constructed in order to systematize "currently occuring" geological transformations. It was not "facts" from sometime in the past that were being discussed, but data from contemporary experience and its cognitive unification. And in exactly the same way, Darwin's work consisted of setting forth "axioms" ("laws") which enabled him to include in a *unified* relation the available material which, in the "axiomatics" of Buffon and Cuvier, disintegrated into a series of disconnected groups. Only subsequently did the "evolutionary" point of view turn out to be an appropriate "axiom" for comparative embriology as well.

The significance of an isolated (not to mention exceptional) case is well illustrated by the role of A. O. Kovalevsky's research concerning the history of the development of Amphyoxus lanceolatus. The concept

of evolution allowed him to clearly and concisely encompass diverse biological and paleontological materials in a unified body, as though all of living nature had a single ancestor from which all species — both fossilized and living — fanned outward, as though a struggle for existence, natural selection and so on actually existed. These are principles for explanation and unification, not "real" events. Some of these principles turned out to be well "adapted" to experience, others not, and within evoluationary theory rage an incessant battle and a constant regrouping of the "principles of explanation" — some groups of facts are "unified" from the standpoint of natural selection while others simply cannot be explained by it; the theory of "mutation" fulfills the task of systematization within its own particular range; other bodies of facts are systematized by the Neo-Lamarackists' hypothesis... But biology as a whole has not attained genuine systematic unity because corresponding "axioms" were never "found" (or the corresponding partial "theorems" could not be reduced to known axioms). In biology there neither can nor will be talk of "correspondence" to outer reality: we are operating in the realm of principles of explanation, not in that of "real existence." The aforesaid relates to all bodies concerning the science of nature. All of its affirmations are hypotheses which systematically unite through deductive interpretation the available experimental material, which changes constantly and non-directionally as a "consequence" of the "ideal object" designated by corresponding postulats — the world. No scientific system or theory can entirely conquer double relativity — dependence on the given construction of "experience" and on definitions based on one specific axiom supply and no other. This conclusion is clearly suggested by an unbiased phenomenological examination of scientific knowledge as it comes to exist in actuality.[3]

III

1. A scientific system consists of a series of consecutive layers of ideal constructions which are stratified in such a way that each upper one "explains," makes logically possible and necessary, the one which directly follows — and through this one the entire body of remaining layers as well, all the way to the foundation, to the heart of the matter. The latter is "experience" in the true and strict sense of the word — that is, something which is "experienced," passively perceived, "given from without," and is of a completely irrefutable character, a kind of "other" or "limit." Only within the framework of secondary strata is there place and meaning for the question of cognitive proof, the issue of cognitive evaluation, of "truthfulness." For "experience" is not knowledge, and because of its compulsorily defined nature — "in this way and no other" — it does not permit "evaluations" as an alternative relation. But the whole cognitive issue is possible only because something is "given." *Givens necessitate interpretation* — this is a primary fact and requirement of cognition. Givens themselves explain and systematize

nothing, because they are truly "primary" and do not propose anything to follow them. Thanks to givens, the whole complex structure of a scientific system is erected — they are a "negative condition" of cognition, in a sense: if they didn't exist at all, there would be nothing to discuss; if they were of a different nature, the entire construction would have to be replanned. But givens alone are not sufficient for cognition, and they do not enter into the body of knowledge itself. Within a system of knowledge we will not be able to reach "perceptions": science already knows them in the form of judgments. In this context the question of "truthfulness" may be introduced, but it would be senseless to bring it up in relation to "that which is given."

2. "Experience" encompasses everything that is simply and directly "given" to us. The way in which the "first" relation of "givenness" came into experience cannot be determined. "Experience" predates all questions and answers, and is the first to make them possible. "Experience" is taken in the same way that it is "given" — here we are involved with a state of "conditionlessness," but with the conditionlessness of bare facts and not the absoluteness of conceptual necessity. Precisely on account of its conditionlessness of experience, there is something outside of local thought, something that is mysterious to it, something resulting in "wonder" — it is the beginning of philosophical meditation. But "givenness" is not "existence." The moment of "ontological inevitability" is lacking, that moment which is always present in all conceptions of existence. This particular sign, in a sense, is not "given." The act of initial experiencing does not necessarily imply that "things cannot be otherwise." This sign is dogmatically introduced from the side, when the phenomnology of cognition is begun with the affirmation that *existence* is "given," something that exists in and of itself as well as *by itself, causa sui*. At this point it is appropriate to speak of "existence." Knowledge *comes* to existence, but does not stem from it.

3. "Experience" is broader than "sensory perception." "Direct perception" (better to say — "directly given perception") even precedes the distinction between "subjective" and "objective," between "sensory" and "ideal," which assumes meaning only in an "explanatory" system of knowledge. Not only "spatial and temporal things" are given but also shapes of ideal geometric space, not only "things" but also "relations." "Experience" is regulated from the very beginning. But this "intuitive" stability does not coincide with the logical stability provided by inclusion in a system and by the classical formula *per genus proximum et differentiam specificam.* [4] A phase of vague "images" always precedes a logically defined "concept" — but these images are already conceptual, not visual. Moreover, this vagueness is only in relation to thought, and is not an "absolute" vagueness. These primary images possess a certain stability simply because they are realized in their present forms and not any others. They are not raw, chaotic material awaiting initial

formulation from somewhere without, similar to Kant's products of passion or Plato's "non-real" matter. If "givens" were entirely without form and the "given order" were of secondary origin, then the "problem of experience" would indeed be an entirely unsolvable mystery. Such is in fact the proposition in systems of gnosiological dualism which oppose "form" and "matter," "relation" and "facts," as two entirely heterogenous domains which may be combined and placed in correspondence only because of a kind of mysterious harmony.

But not all gnosiological dualism is of this nature. A theoretically cognitive concept that we develop is dualistic, but this is not dualism of "form" and "substance"; it is the duality of "knowledge" and "object" which lies at the very heart of the cognitive relation. Givens have no layers, and stability is not something "introduced," but is rather a primary fact. When we contemplate an isolated object — regardless of whether it is a sensorily created object or an image of the creative imagination — we grasp its individual peculiarities and are in a position to "recognize" it, singling it out from among a group of other objects, generally not only not being aware of our grounds for doing so but also not being in a position to be aware of them. This "direct" "intuitive" stability, obviously, is by no means identical to that which an object receives during the process of comparison, analysis and so on following its inclusion into a series of objects analogous and "homogenous" to it as "individuals" of a certain class, distinguishable from the other co-belonging elements of the group by the presence, resp. the absence, of certain *signs*. To distinguish between objects there is no need to go beyond the limits of "experience." But in order to pinpoint and "explain" this distinguishing process, to replace this "vague" intuitive state of consciousness with one that is logically clear, it is necessary to rise up above the "given" and enter into another sphere, the realm of knowledge. This is a transition, the symbolic substitution of a new object, not the transformation of an old one by mysteriously adapted supplementary elements. Without the "vague" intuition of length, all geometrical reflection would be impossible. But intuition alone is not sufficient. Intuitive shapes are replaced by logical symbols which, as may easily be shown, do not in themselves represent a reworking of visual designations, and do not in any way make an appeal *ad oculos*. They are deaf to our sensibility. Graphic images of circumference — ellipses, prisms and so on — and the corresponding equations in analytical geometry, obviously, relate to different and incommensurable planes, and the objects defined by them are not identical, only allowing mutual "substitution" because of a conditionally defined correspondence. The same may be said of the realm of "numbers."

4. Experience is given not in an atomically chaotic state of perceptionlessness but as "regulated variety": relations are initially given. But these are "intuitive" relations — they are not established by thought. Length is given to us, but not homogenous space of three

dimensions. We are given a series of visual images, but not one of "objects." The universe and the "things" in it are already a logical "construction" appearing on the other side of "pure experience." It is not, of course, an arbitrary construction, but one which in a certain sense is determined by experience. Logical symbols somehow "represent" experience. But in the first place, this is not a relation of visual resemblance or "identicalness"; secondly, it is not a relation that has only one meaning. In the first place, the logical images substituted for the given ones should not in any way visually reproduce ("suggest") them — indeed, this is impossible in light of the heterogenous natures of the planes involved. A melody, as "given" to a composer, contains an inexhaustible wealth of inner connections and interrelations; but this unstructured acoustical order does not at all resemble the order which is logically founded on the principles of harmony and counterpoint and which makes possible the "musical notation" of this melody in the terminology of a conventional system of signs. Here there is no primary, "natural" connection — this connection is formed, it is "artificial," arbitrary. Secondly, this symbolic transposition of one order into another is subject neither to actual "compulsoriness" nor to logical necessity: the same system of symbols may represent different spheres of data. And vice versa, different signs may symbolically "correspond" to the same set of data, depending on the principles of schematization that have been accepted.

5. Knowledge begins with "judgments of perception" — this is the most profound stratum of the constructive profile, one which is directly at the heart of "experience." With judgments of perception begins the interpretive cultivation of data. This process consists of symbolically replacing intuitive images with concepts. We will examine a simple example, like "this is a pencil." In pronouncing this judgment we are referring to a specific visual "given" and are trying to characterize and "define" it. But this is not all. In calling the optically perceived image in front of me a "pencil," I am first of all attributing to this object a certain "constancy" and am intuitively considering a designated body of visual impressions as a demarcated "unity." Secondly, I am referring not only to "this," the object of visual contemplation, but also to "this," the body of precisely these qualities and relations, and all such bodies; in other words, I imply that everything which looks like this I will call a pencil, and that I designate this particular object by this "name" precisely because it looks this way. Thirdly, I accordingly imply that everyone who considers this object will make the same judgment. Fourthly — and this is what comprises the significance of the judgment — I am attributing to the logically fixed shape (that is, one designated by signs) the significance of a symbol — of a sign predicting subsequent "experience" and *implicite* anticipating subsequent judgments of perception, which must be validated under strictly defined "conditions." The judgment "this is a pencil" is a shorthand way of expressing the following: if I take "it" in my hands and draw it along a

sheet of paper, then "it" will leave a colored mark, and so on. The scope and character of such predictions may differ, but something is always predicted: otherwise judgments would be meaningless. The "meaning of a judgment" and the "meanings of the terms" of a judgment are not one and the same. The "meaning of a judgment" is created by "prediction" — that is, by the synthesis of two shapes that are ideally defined (in the logical sense). In all judgments a certain universal, unconditional synthesis of logically defined shapes is established. Obviously, the "existence" of these "logically defined" shapes is assumed — that is, the existence of a certain logically regulated system of them, what the English logic symbolists called the "universe of discourse." Judgments of perception are possible, it turns out, as long as symbols have already been established to which we may relate the given shapes: we "name" them , we interpret them, designating specific symbols. We are now coming to the question of "definitions."

6. "Definitions" are in essence authentic judgments of naming. In them, a name — that is, a sensory sign — is given to a particular logical shape, the content of symbols becomes fixed, and the body of judgments which must be applicable to all objects brought under a particular symbol is indicated (co-signified). In general, all definitions are arbitrary; there are different degrees of this arbitrariness, depending on whether the symbols relate to "experience" directly or with mediation. An extremely simple judgment of the type: "this is such and such" assumes that the meaning of the said shape is determined. I may only call "this" a pencil, a cat and so on when it is "known" (established, fixed) "what" a pencil is or what a cat is (*quidtitas*). Definitions are not judgments in the strict sense of the word, since they do not involve synthesis, prediction, interpretation. They precede all kinds of prediction. Definitions do not have meaning, only content. They form a certain ideal tissue of logical shapes, which in real judgments takes on meaning — namely, the meaning of a symbol in relation to "experience" — and becomes its "interpretation." At this point the question of "truthfulness" and "falseness" arises. These concepts are not applicable to definitions — symbols, as nothing more than fixed shapes, are outside of this distinction, which only has the right to exist once "interpretation" begins.

7. Thus the description of "truthfulness" (resp. falseness) is connected to the concept of "symbols." Replacing a sensory image with a logical scheme (concept) forms the subject of judgment; in the judgment, symbolic meaning is imparted to this subject — namely , the meaning of a specific prediction. The success of any interpretation, the present fulfillment or potential fulfillability of any prediction, is the criterion for determining its "truth." If the predictions are not fulfilled and are not fulfillable, the judgment is categorically false. Any name foretells a series of consequences which must follow if the naming has been correctly performed. In other words, any name systematizes a designated

segment of experience. If "this is a cat," it is going to scratch and mieow when I grab it, and so on. If this doesn't happen, it is obviously not a cat — I have used an "unsuccessful" symbol, an inappropriate sign which does not correspond to experience. It is in just this way that hallucinations are refuted. In saying that "my grandfather is standing there in the corner," I am anticipating that it will be possible to touch him, begin a conversation with him and so on — and possible not only for me but for any individual. The fact that this prediction cannot be realized demonstrates that I have made an error, that "this" is only a figment of my imagination. The fulfillment, resp. the fulfillability, of predictions forms is the "truth" of judgments — this means that judgments, replacing "experience" with such and such a model, allow us to be guided by thought within the framework of this model. Not only "scientific world views" but also "naive" ones are examples of this kind of given-substituting schema, the appropriateness of which is affirmed and reinforced by the repeated realization of "predictions." Under these conditions, we totally lose sight of the fact that a "substitution" has taken place, and practically speaking it is an entirely unrealizable task to free "pure experience" from all traces of symbolic interpretation. The quarrel between "empiricists" and "nativists" had a gnosiological sense: "given" or "constructed." The quarrel is not solvable if we ask the question maximalistically: is everything given or constructed. In reality, the question is concerned with what is definitely "constructed" in an ordinary "world view" and what is conceptually associated with the initial "given."

8. The "naive" outlook is not unique. Its "truthfulness" consists in the fact that it enables us to logically direct ourselves in the world of experience — logically, since we are speaking here not of "facts" but of judgments. We are not concerned with whether this outlook is biologically or psychologically useful, nor with the psycho-physical adaptation of an individual or species to the surrounding living milieu, but with conceptually assembling "given" material into a logically connecting and deductively practicable system. Therefore, the "relativity" of truth in our use of the word signifies neither the dependence of perception on the structure of our sensory organs or on the haphazard character of that which we see, nor the "definedness" of knowledge by the content of the environment or by historical tradition, nor the general limitedness of knowledge by empirical conditions. By "relativity" we mean only that any cognitive evaluation of a judgment proposes other judgments, in relation to which the evaluation is produced and has force (significance) — in other words, we are saying that all judgments are only a descending part of a certain conditional period, one which inevitably suggests a corresponding ascending one. The question of "truthfulness" is applicable only to a body of interrelating judgments. We therefore have occasion to go the axiom supply, where the question of truth loses meaning, if we do not start off in a retrospective way. We still remain in the sphere of thought. We

therefore call our point of view logical relativism and make a sharp distinction between it and that naturalistic relativism which historically was personified in ancient times by the studies of Athenian sophists and sceptics, in modern times by English empiricism, "positivism," contemporary empiriocriticism and pragmatism, and so on. Here we see realized a "transformation into another kind" [Greek] which does not conform to natural laws, a complication of the logical problem by alien elements: cognition is seen as a natural "event" or an inherent process that is included in cause-and-effect series and explained on the basis of them. Insofar as a repeated *petitio principii* is taking place, there is no place for primary (and in this case, "premiseless") autonomous gnosiological inquiry. The above analysis of knowledge is fundamentally different from such a "psychological analysis." We are phenomenologically analyzing knowledge as a particular ideal domain, not as a fact and not as a phenomenon of nature. Furthermore, we are revealing the relativity not of facts but of the logical principle. Our "Als Ob" is devoid of all naturalistic traces — it signifies only the logical interrelations of concepts and judgments.

9. The first and fundamental cause of the "relativity" of knowledge lies in the incompleteness of experience. There are no reliable grounds to maintain that "our" experience is unconditional and unchanging, and indeed such grounds will never exist — they would not have existed even in the event that experience historically had not changed, since the possibility of change is not logically excluded. But changing experience was given to us — this is the primary property of that which is "given"; and it changes without moving in any particular direction — by mutations, in a sense. For this reason there is no justification for conferring absolute value onto any ideal model, no matter how stable and historically functional it may be: no quantity of confirming justifications, no matter how large, has the power to transform probability into certainty; absolutes are inaccessible to all series of accumulated relative theories, even if they are potentially infinite and progressive. Unconditionally significant knowledge is *transfinitum* in relation to logically deductive knowledge — a kind of Kantorian "Alef."

In this sense the recent attempts at strict "justification in and of itself" made by gnosiological absolutism are unusually significant — I am referring first and foremost to the brilliant criticism of "psychoanalysis" that was particularly developed by Husserl in the first volume of *Logical Inquiries*. Husserl focuses his attention on establishing the existence of an absolute object, one that is indivisible, eternal and unchanging — within the limits set by intentionally addressing this object, knowledge itself becomes absolute. This conclusion is entirely true: absoluteness of the object of knowledge is the "condition" for absoluteness of knowledge. From our point of view, knowledge is relative insofar as it is directed towards the "given." It is not a matter of the "given" being fluid, of Heraclitean pandynamism, but instead of another given, one formed differently, not being logically

inconceivable. Experience is "unconditional" in the sense that we may speak of the total stability of that which is "given" — it is "in precisely this way, and no other." Even if we were to find a single and unique axiom supply for our experience, we nonetheless would not have attained "conditionlessness." In order for that to occur, the "necessity" of a particular world-order would have had to be proven.

In this fact lies the foundation for the ontological deductions used by the German Idealists to justify their cognitive absolutism: the apodicticity of knowledge may only be shown through simple deduction of all of concrete existence from an Absolute as the only option. Thought heading in this direction is based on a "dead end," and gets itself caught in a no-exit antinomy. If the "object" of knowledge is entirely unconditional and self-sufficient, is not given or assigned to anyone — just as Husserl insisted — then cognition as a subject-object relation is altogether impossible, and the true cognition process realized by individuals throughout history loses all value. It is then completely unclear how the subject reaches such a tightly closed-off object. In essence, "anti-psychoanalysis" is analogous to Deism, which unites the Absolute with itself and thus resolves itself into scepticism. The "anti-psycholanalyst" may be saved from the danger of scepticism only if he modifies his thesis and limits it with the requirement of changing the sphere of "experience" — this is precisely what Husserl did in fact do, making the transition to "pure phenomenology." In this case, however, the question of the unconditional necessity of the contemplated object repeats itself. The given of the eidetic world in and of itself is as little unconditional as is the given of the empirical world — especially if the "world of ideas" is not removed from phenomena as a world that is altogether "other," but instead supposes itself to be their base, their intellectually understood root. In that case, it is in essence the same world, and its inevitability can only be postulated without proof. This does not mean that there "is" ("outside") another world; this means that the "truth" of the given world is by nature *une vérité du fait*, and not *une vérité éternelle*, the antithesis of which is (logically) inadmissible.

At the opposite pole we also find ourselves at a dead end. The acosmic doketism stemming from isolated absolutism may be avoided by interpreting "the concrete" as an inevitably necessary outcome of the absolute base. Shelling and Hegel did just this. Under these conditions cognition is reintegrated into "existence" as one — albeit a high one — of the phases of object formation, of the self-disclosure and self-realization of existence. Then it does indeed become an absolute, but ceases to be cognition, the relation of the subject to the object, and turns out to be the self-cognition of the object, the self-knowledge of the world's Absolute base. Thus, the unconditional necessity of cognition is internally contradictory: it is either because cognition is impossible and the subject does not therefore reach the object, or because the subject dissolves into the object. In both cases gnosiology is absorbed by dogmatic ontology. The root of all of these antinomies is in taking the "given" for "existence."

10. The second cause of the "relativity" of knowledge consists of the formal nature of thought. The "axiom supply" at the basis of all knowledge may be singled out as the "condition of the possibility of knowledge." But this supply is restricted by the "logical laws of thought" and by a few formal situations which together represent nothing other than a definition of the object of thought and of logical systems in general. The subsequent extension of the boundaries of this axiom supply is entirely arbitrary, since all material (substantial) concepts and categories propose a specific experimental given (of some kind) and can be neither deduced a priori from the concept of "thought in general," resp. "existence in general," nor transformed into an "inherent idea" that is unrelated to experience. Furthermore, all formally logical statements possess apodictical value in the realm of thought, not because of their qualitative conditionlessness but because they are "formative principles" of thought — its definition, so to speak. It is possible to reject them in actuality, even though negating (and even simply not recognizing) them is inconceivable. It is precisely this quality which is peculiar to them: any "empirical" judgment may be (logically) replaced by another, one different in content, and its negation leaves space for other judgments; the negation of formally logical postulates breaks off all thought. If we "wish" to think, if we try to construct some kind of system of knowledge, by this very act we take postulates as an unalterable base. But thought as such is not an unconditional phenomenon — it is only a fact or a problem which we are free to raise or to not raise, as we so desire. Before us lies the world as an eternal enigma. We may "unbiasedly" contemplate it in all of its beauty; we may subject it to an intuitive aesthetic evaluation — all of this lies outside the realm of logical thought, outside the category of the cognitive Logos, outside of "yes" and "no." A "coinciding of contraditions" is therefore possible. Only in making the "given" the object of "explanation," only in approaching it with the issue of cognition in order to make experience clear for the intellect, are we acting in the realm of "thought" and subjecting ourselves to formal logical obligations. Only in a system of knowledge, since it is designated and realized, do the "laws of logic" have absolute significance. But then again, knowledge could also not exist.

11. Gnosiological analysis is based on these general conditions. Here we are dwelling on ontological problems. It becomes obvious that the focus of philosophical thought is at this very point. The cognitive ideal brings to light man's primary, pre-cognitive sense of self. It may waver between the poles of "necessity" and "freedom." Either natural experience with its "givens" and thought with its direct availability to man are elevated to a state of unconditional value — which, however, "in and of themselves" they do not have; or they are "taken" as they are given — as bare facts. This is a profound and religious act of the intellectually understood will. In the first case, the world is revealed in

pre-established harmony, in the second case in freedom. And in the second instance, the limits of experience are extended to all which is outside the world and which came before it, to the original conditionlessness of Divine Existence, *ex mera voluntate* — as a miracle, not a compulsory act of self-exposure or an emanation presupposing a finite existence — a creature, a "creation" [Greek]. Analysis of these metaphysical problems does not enter into our task. We attempted to approach them through a purely phenomenological analysis of knowledge and to demonstrate what it is, in terms of structure, and what it is not.

Translated from the Russian by
Catherine Boyle

[1]Very shortly I intend to return to a description of Whewell's "scientific teachings," of which to date there has unfortunately not been a single monographic examination in any language.

[2]The subsequent explanation is based on the author's independent excogitation of impressions received over the course of several years of laboratory work — or should I say, "laboratory life." Only relatively recently did I become familiar with the literature related to this topic which has given form to previously-proposed hypotheses. In addition to the work cited in the text above, Claude Bernard's ingenious *Introduction a l'étude de la medicine experimentale* and Jevons' *Principles of Science* should also be noted.

[3]In the interest of brevity I have chosen to omit the question of the methodological construction of a "science of the soul," with the idea of examining it on its own. The considerations developed in this text may also be applied without difficulty to historical interpretation, and it will then become clear that in studying history we are not finding out "what was," but instead are hypothetically "guessing" what can and must have "been" — that is, how we must "think" of the past.

[4]The concept set forth here was formulated before the author became familiar with the later, truly philosophical works of G. Drisha, to whose views it comes very close in many ways even though it is far from coinciding with them entirely. In the given instance I am referring to Drisha's distinction between "direct" and "indirect" objects and his fundamental thesis concerning the "primary givenness" of "order." In the near future I intend to speak in detail about this subtle philosophical system.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOLZHENITSYN'S VISION OF ART

by Richard S. Haugh

Solzhenitsyn's writings prior to 1972 reveal a generally consistent pattern in his views on art. Nevertheless, it would have been difficult to speak with assurance of Solzhenitsyn's "philosophy of art," if only because a large proportion of these views was embedded in the pronouncements of fictional characters. With the publication of his Nobel Lecture in 1972 Solzhenitsyn's vision of art became unambiguous and explicit.

The essential purpose of this article is to examine these views and to point to their philosophical roots and their theoretical implications. This article briefly looks at Solzhenitsyn's attitude toward socialist realism and his vision of the social role of the artist. Finally — but most importantly — it analyzes the philosophical foundations of Solzhenitsyn's vision of art and value.

I

In Solzhenitsyn's writings there is an almost total condemnation of both the theory and the practice of socialist realism, that officially prescribed dogma which demands of an artist "a truthful, historically concrete portrayal of reality in its revolutionary development."[1] An artist, according to this doctrine, must not only portray that "reality" which does not contradict "ideological orthodoxy" but must also portray "reality" as it will be.[2]

What Solzhenitsyn objects to in socialist realism is quite clear. He is opposed to the censorious literary criterion of "ideological orthodoxy"[3] and rejects the theoretical principle that an artist must portray "the seedlings of the plants of the future,"[4] of that assumed "wonderful tomorrow."[5] The doctrines of socialist realism are shown to have had a baneful effect on the understanding of the Russian literary tradition; Dostoevsky, for example, is relegated to the level of an insignificant and unknown writer.[6] In Solzhenitsyn's novels the officially held literary views are portrayed as vapid, lifeless, and inane, as a distortion of reality and truth, and as a force opposed to conscience.[7]

In opposition to the theory and practice of socialist realism another vision of literature emerges from the pages of Solzhenitsyn's novels. Literature must "raise the right feelings,"[8] a phrase reminiscent of Tolstoy's theory of art.[9] Literature must not only "appeal to the heart"[10] but must also deal with those ultimate questions of existence which "tear and shake the human heart."[11] Before the Secretariat of the Union

of Soviet Writers Solzhenitsyn declared"

> The task of a writer is to select more universal and eternal questions, [such as] the secrets of the human heart and conscience, the confrontation between life and death, the triumph over spiritual sorrows, the laws in the history of mankind that were born in the depths of time immemorial and that will cease to exist only when the sun ceases to shine.[12]

Literature must be rooted in the "conscience" and should assume the role of the "teacher of the people"[13] and the "teacher of life,"[14] confronting the people with the totality of truth and life.

Although he does not accept the principles of socialist realism, Solzhenitsyn has solemnly committed himself to "Russian Realism." When the writer Riurikov, at the meeting of the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers on September 22, 1967, demanded that Sozhenitsyn renounce the title of "continuer of Russian Realism,"[15] Solzhenitsyn replied: "Placing my hand on my heart, I swear that I shall never do it."[16]

"Realism," a most elusive term,[17] is here fortunately modified by the word "Russian". This helps in the sense that there is at least some agreement about the general characteristics of this literary tradition.[18] Solzhenitsyn's concern with the ultimate questions of human existence, with a professed commitment to truth and social justice, and with empathy for the suffering, the "insulted," and the "injured" are all recognizable elements of this tradition. The literature of the Russian nineteenth century, furthermore, inclined toward moral exhortation, considered itself a teacher of and servant to society, and assumed the inseparability of art and life. Solzhenitsyn clearly leans in the same direction.

Solzhenitsyn's "realism" is by no means restricted to a presentation of mere external reality. There is in his writing an idealistic, moral, and prophetic dimension. In a discussion on the nature of art with the artist Kondrashev-Ivanov in *The First Circle*, Rubin asks: "In other words, the painter doesn't simply copy?" Kondrashev-Ivanov's reply, quite probably echoing Solzhenitsyn's own view, is noteworthy:

> Of course not!. . . Externally there must be some resemblance . . . But isn't it rash to believe that one can see and know reality precisely as it is? Particularly *spiritual* reality?. . . And if, in looking at the model, I see something nobler than what he has up to now displayed in his life, then why shouldn't I portray it? Why shouldn't one help a man find himself and try to be better . . . Why must I undervalue his soul? . . . I will tell you something else: it is a major responsibility not only of portraiture but of all human communication for each of us to help everyone else discover the best that is in him.[19]

By accepting the view that it is a "major responsibility" of the artist to ennoble this "external reality" and to "discover the best" in man, art takes on an ethically inspired task, the ultimate purpose of which is to call mankind to see moral perfection.

II

In his Nobel Lecture Solzhenitsyn asks: "What then, in this cruel, dynamic, explosive world which totters on the brink of destruction — what *is* the place and role of the writer?"[20] For Solzhenitsyn the answer is "obvious," and he acknowledges his agreement with Albert Camus' "brilliant statements on this theme."[21] Solzhenitsyn declares that he is "not ashamed to continue this tradition" of Russian literature which upholds the "concept that a writer can do much among his people — and that he must." For Solzhenitsyn there is no way an artist can escape from the real world precisely because an artist is first of all an organic member of society. Art and life are inseparable in Solzhenitsyn's view.[22] The artist who merely laments the human condition is essentially hypocritical, for — in words which seem to echo *The Brothers Karamazov* Solzhenitsyn sees the writer as "an accomplice to all the evil committed in his country or by his people." The "stench" of all the evils of his society and nation mingles "with the breath of the writer."

Although Solzhenitsyn is clearly opposed to *l'art pour l'art*, he respects the freedom of an artist to reject the notion that art must serve society. With ironic seriousness Solzhenitsyn writes: "We shall not trample on the *right* of an artist to express nothing but his personal experiences and his self-observations while disregarding all that occurs in the rest of the world."[23] Insisting, however, that he too has the freedom and the right to attempt to shake such artists from a self-centered subjectivism to an encounter with total reality, Solzhenitsyn writes: "We shall not make *demands* on him,[24] but surely we can be permitted to reproach him, beg him, call him, or beckon to him."

For Solzhenitsyn the "great and blessed property" of true art [*istinno-khudozhestvennoe*] has a mission which is both *educational* and *prophetic*.[25] The educational mission of art allows both the individual and the nation the possibility of acquiring experience otherwise inaccessible.[26]

But for Solzhenitsyn art can do more than simply inform society. Its prophetic mission is to warn humanity, unify mankind, and work for the possible redemption of man. In his interview with the Slovak journalist Pavel Licko Solzhenitysn asserted that everything which the artist's intuition perceives as "injurious or disquieting" must be revealed to society.[27] In his Letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers Solzhenitsyn wrote that literature which "does not warn in time against threatening moral and social dangers — such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a facade."[28] Solzhenitsyn envisions art

as revealing the truth about the past and the present and as warning society of impending problems. In this prophetic function, art can unify and redeem mankind. This dimension of Solzhenitsyn's thought is inextricably bound up with the philosophical foundations of his vision of art and value.

III

If the mission of art is educational and prophetic, the source of art for Solzhenitsyn is spiritual and mystical, indeed of divine origin. Art, he states in his Nobel Lecture, is a "gift" which is "breathed into" the artist "ready-made at birth." Always bearing the "stamp of its origin," art has the capacity to reveal a "portion of its mysterious inner light" and to "warm even a chilled and sunless soul to an exalted spiritual experience." Through the "irrationality of art," through art's mystical encounter with reality, the artist conveys "revelations the likes of which cannot be achieved by rational thought," allowing man to glimpse the "Inaccessible" [*Nedostupnoe*]. Solzhenitsyn thinks that this revelatory aspect of art with its "unforeseeable discoveries" is too mystical to be "wholly accounted for by the artist's view of the world, by his intention, or by the work of his unworthy fingers."

Solzhenitsyn's vision of the source of art and value is ultimately rooted in his belief in the Absolute. In an unambiguous text from his Nobel Lecture Solzhenitsyn states that the artist has not "created this world, nor does he control it; *there can be no doubts about its foundations.*"[29] For Solzhenitsyn the world is a *created* world. It is a world which might not have existed at all and hence it points beyond itself to its spiritual source. The world, for Solzhenitsyn, is necessarily dependent and participatory, deriving its value and meaning from the uncreated and eternal. Implicit in his use of the word "eternal" is the vertical aspect of the transcendent Absolute. He believes it is the obligation of the artist to maintain a balance between the "eternal" and the "present." In his interview with Pavel Licko he stated:

> The writer must maintain the balance equally between these two categories. If his work is so taken up with the present that the author loses the perspective of the point of view *'sub specie aeternitatis'*, his work will not delay in perishing. Also, if he accords too much attention to eternity and neglects the present, his work will lack color, force, and expression. . .[30]

Solzhenitsyn is not a relativist. He is sharply critical of that attitude of the twentieth century which "drones into our souls that there exist no lasting concepts of good and justice valid for all mankind, that all such concepts are fluid and ever-changing. . ." Solzhenitsyn opposes and challenges such relativism with a belief in the "unshakeable nature of goodness, in the indivisible nature of truth. . ." Solzhenitsyn suggests

that at the core of ultimate reality there exists a "tri-unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty [*eto staroe triedinstvo Istiny, Dobra i Krasoty*]."

> So perhaps the old tri-unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty is not simply the decorous and antiquated formula it seemed to us at the time of our self-confident materialistic youth.

It is significant that with this one sentence Solzhenitsyn challenges one of the fundamental principles upon which Tolstoy built his theory of art. Solzhenitsyn's disagreement with Tolstoy on this issue is total. In evaluating the history of aesthetic theory in *What Is Art?*, Tolstoy devoted several pages to refuting the "trinity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty."

According to Tolstoy, the 18th-century aesthetician Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) envisioned the "Perfect (the Absolute)" as existing in the "three forms of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty."[31] Dismissing as foolish those who try "to prove that this union of beauty and goodness is inherent in the very essence of things," Tolstoy explicitly states that "to this class belongs the astonishing theory of the Baumgartenian Trinity: Goodness, Beauty, Truth."[32] Tolstoy opposes this "mystical" view of beauty which merges beauty "into that of the highest perfection, God," asserting that this "mystical" view is a "fantastic definition . . . founded on nothing."[33]

> Learned people write long, cloudy treatises on beauty as a member of the aesthetic trinity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness: *das Schöne, das Wahre, das Gute; le Beau, le Vrai, le Bon* are repeated with capital letters by philosophers, aestheticians, and artists, by private individuals, by novelists, and by *feuilletonistes*; and they all think when pronouncing these sacrosanct words that they speak of something quite definite and solid. . . In reality these words not only have no definite meaning, but hinder us in attaching any definite meaning to existing art.
>
> We only need escape for a moment from the habit of considering this trinity of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth presented to us by Baumgarten . . . to be convinced of the utterly fantastic nature of the union into one, of three absolutely different words and conceptions.[34]

"The notion of beauty," wrote Tolstoy, "not only does not coincide with goodness, but rather is contrary to it; for the good most often coincides with victory over the passions while beauty is at the root of our passions."[35] "But what," asks Tolstoy, "is there in common between the conceptions of beauty and truth on the one hand, and of goodness on the other?"

> Not only are beauty and truth not conceptions equivalent to

> goodness, and not only do they not form one entity with goodness, but they do not even coincide with it. . . And lo and behold! the arbitrary conjunction into one, of these three conceptions which are . . . foreign to one another, has served as the basis for that amazing theory [*udivitel'noi teorii*].[36]

Solzhenitsyn affirms the existence in tri-unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty precisely because he accepts the existence of the "Absolute" or the "Perfect." Where there is perfection, truth and goodness necessarily co-exist, the "radiance" of which is Beauty. Truth, Goodness, and Beauty exist in tri-unity because perfection logically implies unity, a unity which is not merely restricted to numerical oneness but which is rather a unity of plurality — which the very idea of unity presupposes and implies.

For Solzhenitsyn the existence of the Absolute is intuitively obvious.[37] In his Letter to Three Students Solzhenitsyn approached the question of the Absolute from an interesting perspective. He wrote that justice is "obviously . . . a concept which is inherent in man, since it cannot be traced to any other source."

> There is nothing relative about justice, just as there is nothing relative about conscience. . . And please do not tell me that 'everybody understands justice in his own way.' No![38]

The meaning behind the statement that justice is "inherent in man" because it "cannot be traced to any other source" is quite significant for Solzhenitsyn's vision of value and art's prophetic mission. Solzhenitsyn has arrived at the conclusion that since the world of our experience contains only imperfection, the only possible basis for mankind's concept of and deeply rooted intuition of perfection (i.e. justice, truth, goodness, beauty) is precisely the existence — at some higher level — of perfection which grounds, sustains, and penetrates our world of imperfection and our inner consciousness.[39] Man, as it were, bears the image of perfection within himself because the reality of perfection exists in the Absolute. In *The First Circle* Kondrashev-Ivanov states:

> A human being possesses from his birth a certain essence, the nucleus, as it were, of this human being. His "I." . . . he has in him an *image of perfection*.[40]

In *Cancer Ward* Solzhenitsyn writes that "the meaning of existence" is "to preserve unspoiled, undisturbed and undistorted the *image of eternity* with which each person is born [*izobrazhenie vechnosti, zaronennoe kazhdomu*]."[41]

This "image of perfection" or "image of eternity," the internal link between man and the Absolute is the basis of the intuition of the

Absolute. It is the foundation of Solzhenitsyn's epistemology and teleology. Referring to an official tenet in Marxist epistemology, Kondrashev-Ivanov states in *The First Circle* that "truth is supposed to be the final result of long investigation." Disagreeing, he asserts: "But don't we perceive a sort of twilight truth before any investigation has begun?"[42] Kondrashev-Ivanov believes that man can intuitively grasp the truth.[43]

This revelatory aspect of epistemology is interconnected with Solzhenitsyn's teleology.[44] In this respect Solzhenitsyn's portrayal of Stalin as he attempts "to make his indelible contribution" to linguistics is significant. "Inspired, he wrote down several phrases: 'The superstructure was created *for the purpose of* . . .'" Apparently Marxist teleology has missed the real purpose of human existence, for Solzhenitsyn writes: "and he did not see the *angel of medieval teleology* smiling over his shoulder."[45]

One of the aims of human existence for Solzhenitsyn is a genuine unity of mankind in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. In his Nobel Lecture Solzhenitsyn writes that in the past few decades "humanity has imperceptibly and suddenly become united . . . humanity has become one." This unity, however, was achieved "not by means of gradually acquired experience, not from the eye. . ." Rather, it is a unity brought about by "international radio and the press" and it is therefore superficial, external, and fragile; it is not a spiritual, organic, and free unity of mankind. In fact, Solzhenitsyn claims that this superficial unity has brought about a divisive rather than a unitive vision of man, contributing to the spread of various "scales of values" which are now vying with each other for the heart of man. And yet, according to Solzhenitsyn, there was a time when "it was possible for the individual human eye to see and accept a certain common scale of values." At one time the "individual human eye" knew "what was cruel. . . what constituted honesty, and what deceit." But, writes Solzhenitsyn, "this twentieth century of ours," devoid of a single scale of values, "has proved to be crueler than its predecessors. . ."; it is a world which "upon seeing a slimy bog" exclaims: "What a charming meadow!"

"Who will reconcile these scales of values and how?" asks Solzhenitsyn. "Who is going to give mankind a single system of evaluation for evil deeds and for good ones. . .?" For Solzhenitsyn it is the prophetic mission of art to help "a troubled humanity to recognize its true self. . ." When Solzhenitsyn affirms the reality of the tri-unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, he commits himself and art to absolute, universal values which are not "fluid and ever-changing" and which are "valid for all mankind" precisely because these values are rooted in that divine unity which is the source of all existence. It is only because of his belief in the Absolute that Solzhenitsyn is able to call mankind to embrace one scale of universal values.

> Given six, four or even two scales of values there cannot be a

> unified world, a united humanity . . . We could not manage to survive on one Earth, just as a man with two hearts is not long for this world.

If the tri-unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty is of divine origin, and if the created world participates mystically in the uncreated spiritual world of this triad, then — in a world in which Solzhenitsyn sees truth and goodness mocked, trampled upon, and simply ignored — the only chance for humanity as a whole to regain the lost values of truth and goodness is through the mystery of beauty which still attracts mankind.[46] Art, as a reflection of beauty, has the capacity to reveal truth and goodness in a vivid way and thereby to arouse mankind to the cause of ethical concern:

> if the all too obvious and the overly straight sprouts of Truth and Goodness have been crushed, cut down, or not permitted to grow, then perhaps the whimsical, unpredictable and ever surprising shoots of Beauty will force their way through and soar up to *that very spot*, thereby fulfilling the task of all three?

Because of its organic relationship with Beauty, "true art" has the possibility of restoring universal sight and value to humanity. An artist must not necessarily share Solzhenitsyn's belief in the Absolute to produce "true art." An artist, if he is honest and true to his intuition, inevitably reveals that aspect of reality he depicts; this revelation is hence a reflection of the Absolute. But Solzhenitsyn believes that the prophetic task of true art can best be accomplished by the artist who "recognizes above himself a higher power and joyfully works as a humble apprentice under God's heaven." Solzhenitsyn thinks that it is difficult for a relativist or solipsist to "structure a balanced spiritual system" and hence their art does not consistently reflect either the "eternal" or the "present"; it fails because it does not reveal the foundations of existence.

> One artist imagines himself the creator of an *autonomous spiritual world*; he hoists upon his shoulders the act of creating this world and of populating it, together with the total responsibility for it. But he collapses under the load, for no mortal genius can bear up under it, just as, in general, *the man who declares himself the center of existence is unable to create a balanced spiritual system.*[47]

The prophetic mission of art is to restore universal values and to arouse an ethical atmosphere in the world, the goal of which is convincingly expressed by Shulubin in *Cancer Ward.*

> We have to show the world a society in which all relationships,

> fundamental principles and laws flow directly from ethics, and from them *alone*. Ethical demands must determine all considerations: how to bring up children, what to train them for, to what end the work of grownups should be directed, and how their leisure should be occupied. As for scientific research, it should only be conducted where it doesn't damage morality, in the first instance where it doesn't damage the researchers themselves. The same should apply to foreign policy. Whenever the question of frontiers arises, we should think not of how much richer or stronger this or that course of action will make us, or how it will raise our prestige. We should consider one criterion only: how far is it ethical?[48]

"True art" has therefore an enormous task. Its educational mission is to teach individuals and nations. Its prophetic mission is to warn humanity of its precarious path and to call it to return to universal and absolute values. But when Solzhenitsyn quotes Dostoevsky's "enigmatic remark" that "Beauty will save the world [*mir spaset krasota*]," [49] the task of art seems to take on another dimension, almost messianic in scope. Is Solzhenitsyn's vision of the mission of art ultimately utopian? Does he seriously believe that art can and will ultimately save the world? Admitting that Dostoevsky's remark once seemed to him "simply a phrase," Solzhenitsyn writes that as time passed he came to realize that Dostoevsky's remark was "no slip of the tongue" but a "prophecy," one of Dostoevsky's "astonishing flashes of insight."

Several statements in the Nobel Lecture tend to support the interpretation that Solzhenitsyn seriously thinks that art can not only *help* humanity in its ethical warfare but that it can ultimately *win* the battle against evil. Writing that art and literature "hold the key to a miracle," Solzhenitsyn states: "We shall be told: what can literature do in the face of a remorseless assault of open violence?" He replies that "violence does not and cannot exist by itself: it is invariably intertwined with the *lie*. They are linked in the most intimate, most organic and profound fashion." "Lies," he writes, "can prevail against much in this world, but never against art." This is brought to a climax when Solzhenitsyn declares in a purely utopian spirit:

> And no sooner will the lies be dispersed than the repulsive nakedness of violence will be exposed — and age-old violence *will topple in defeat*.[50]

In the confrontation with evil Solzhenitsyn sees an enormous difference between the effective activity of the "ordinary brave man" and the Prophet-Artist. The only possible moral response for the "ordinary brave man" is not to participate in lies. "His rule: let *that* come into the world, let it even reign supreme — only not through me." But the effectiveness of the Prophet-Artist is seemingly unlimited.

> It is within the power of writers and artists to do much more: *to defeat the lie!* For in the struggle with lies art . . . shall always triumph!

The last sentence of the Nobel Lecture seems unambiguously utopian. Quoting the Russian proverb that "one word of truth shall outweigh the whole world," Solzhenitsyn declares that it is "on such a seemingly fantastic violation of the law of conservation of mass and energy that my own activity is based, and my appeal to the writers of the world."

If Solzhenitsyn ultimately envisions art as capable of redeeming the world, then his view is not only a "fantastic violation" of physical laws but also a "fantastic violation" of the very spiritual principles upon which his vision of art and value is based, a violation of the deepest aspect of human ontology — freedom. His view would then be more consistent with Tolstoy's sanguine utopian hopes than with Dostoevsky's thought.[51]

It would be unfair, however, to interpret Solzhenitsyn's statements on this subject too literally. Other statements in the Nobel Lecture support the interpretation that Solzhenitsyn sees in art only a powerful weapon with which to wage a vigorous battle against evil. "Could not then art and literature," he asks, "in a very real way offer succor to the modern world?" Believing that "world literature is fully capable of helping a troubled humanity," Solzhenitsyn calls on artists to "come out and join the battle."

The safest interpretation, and the one most consistent with his own personal life and his literary works, is that Solzhenitsyn views art as a most powerful weapon which can *help* but not save mankind. Solzhenitsyn has clearly exaggerated some of his expressions in order to emphasize his point: *the prophetic potential of art.*

Solzhenitsyn's view of evil is not naive. He is quite aware of the deepest dimensions of the problem of spiritual freedom. If man is spiritually free, then he is capable of "creating" evil simply by a perversion of the will. As long as man is spiritually free, there can be no earthly utopia. One well-known example of Solzhenitsyn's recognition of the depths of human evil is both striking and Dostoevskian.[52] At the end of *Cancer Ward* Oleg Kostoglotov visits a zoo and is astonished by "an announcement fixed to one of the . . . cages."

> The little monkey that used to live here was blinded because of the senseless cruelty of one of the visitors. An evil man threw tobacco into the Macaque Rhesus's eyes.[53]

Kostoglotov is "struck dumb," unable to comprehend it. This man "was not described as 'anti-humanist,' or 'an agent of American

imperialism'; all it said was that he was evil. This was what was so striking: how could this man be simply 'evil'?" Kostoglotov, "obsessed with picturing the face of that blinded macaque monkey," repeats again and again that an evil man caused it — "just like that [*prosto — tak*]."[54] Evil, for Solzhenitsyn, is not the inevitable result of the economic and social order, but emerges from the depths of human freedom, rendering any utopia on earth impossible.[55]

Nevertheless Solzhenitsyn will not retreat into defeatism and pessimism. He believes a positive effort must be made to improve the moral climate of the modern world and he firmly maintains that art is inherently suited to engage in this effort. Artists, if they are genuinely interested in truth and goodness, can contribute enormously to the restoration of these lost values. Solzhenitsyn's ultimate vision of the mission of art is therefore neither naive nor utopian. It is profoundly idealistic, courageous, and noble.

[1]This is the definition of the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. Quoted from W. N. Vickery, *The Cult of Optimism* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1963), p. 70.

[2]The distinction between present "reality" [*byt*] and the assumed certainty of the in-breaking socialist "reality" of the future [*bytie*] has remained a theoretical principle in Soviet literary theory since the 1920's. See Robert A. Maguire, *Red Virgin Soil: Soviet Literature in the 1920's* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 188-259.

[3]See *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, tr. R. Hingley and M. Hayward (New York: Bantam edition, 1969), p. 93f. See also the specious defense of socialist realism by Avieta Rusanov in *Cancer Ward*, Ch. 21 (tr. N. Bethell and D. Burg [New York: Bantam edition, 1969], p. 281). At the meeting of the prose section of the Moscow writers' organization on November 17, 1966 Solzhenitsyn commented on Avieta Rusanov's defense of socialist realism: "I adopted here an impermissible device — there is not in the section about Avieta a single word of my own — she uses words spoken in the last fifteen years by our most important writers and literary critics. . . Yes, it is undisguisedly a farce, but it's not mine." (Quoted from Leopold Labedz, ed., *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record* [New York: Harper & Row, 1971], p. 78f).

[4]See Demka's response to Avieta in *Cancer Ward*, Ch. 21; p. 284.

[5]Avieta Rusanov condescendingly explains this tenet of socialist realism to Demka in *Cancer Ward*, Ch. 21; p. 286. In *The First Circle* Gleb Nerzhin rejects a view of art which demands that art be concerned with the "becoming" reality. (See *The First Circle*, Ch. 53; tr. T. P. Whitney [New York: Bantam edition, 1969], p. 377. In his interview with the Slovak journalist Pavel Licko Solzhenitsyn stated: "We sometimes hear that literature should beautify the future. This is a falsification, and justifies lying." (Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 15).

[6]See Klara Makarygin's evaluation of the views of literature promulgated in the lectures at school where Dostoevsky is regarded as "totally unknown." (*The First Circle*, Ch. 40; p. 273). In his letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers Solzhenitsyn wrote: "Even Dostoevsky, the pride of world literature, was at one time not published in our country (still today his works are not published in full); he was excluded from the school curriculum, made unacceptable for reading, and reviled." (Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 83).

[7]See, for example, *Cancer Ward*, Ch. 10; p. 119 and *The First Circle*, Ch. 57; p. 414 and p. 418.

[8]See *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, p. 94.

[9]See *What Is Art?* (tr. A. Maude [London: Oxford University Press, 1962], p. 198f). Tolstoy's view that "true art" must evoke the "right feelings" in man is inextricably connected with his rather puritanical and restricted view of religion and "religious perception," a view not shared by Solzhenitsyn. "Art," wrote Tolstoy, "transmitting feelings flowing from the religious perception of our time . . . should be acknowledged, highly valued, and encouraged. . ." (p. 234). Tolstoy, who was so indignant about censorship in Russia ("I consider [it] to be an immoral and irrational institution" [p. 65]; "The Spiritual Censorship is one of the most ignorant, venal, stupid, and despotic institutions in Russia" [p. 67]), ultimately arrived at a view which was also censorious. All art which did not conform to Tolstoy's criteria of "right feelings" and "religious perception" "should be acknowledged to be bad art, deserving not to be encouraged but to be driven out, denied, and despised. . ." (p. 247). Tolstoy, explicitly consenting with Plato, wrote that "every reasonable and moral man" would rather see no art in the world than a world in which "some" good art must co-exist with bad art. (p. 261). Solzhenitsyn's vision of art does not push him at all in the direction of censorship. In his Letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers Solzhenitsyn wrote that "literature cannot develop between the categories of 'permitted' and 'not permitted', 'about this you may write' and 'about this you may not'." (Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 84).

[10]See Cancer *Ward*, Ch. 21; p. 283.

[11]See The *First Circle*, Ch. 28; p. 194.

[12]Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[13]See The *First Circle*, Ch. 57; p. 415.

[14]See *Cancer Ward*, Ch. 21; p. 285.

[15]Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[16]Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

[17]Literary theorists and critics have discovered a mimetic realism, a naturalistic realism, a symbolic realism, a romantic realism, an idealistic realism, an intuitive realism, a mythic realism, an anecdotal realism, a grotesque realism, etc. The German literary historian Bruno Markwardt has discovered so many additional types of realism that, as René Wellek remarks, "one's head spins with the dance of bloodless categories." (René Wellek, *Concepts of Criticism* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963], p. 253).

[18]See Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis*, tr. W. R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 522-524. Dostoevsky distinguished his "realism" from that of his contemporaries. In a well-known passage he claimed he was a "realist in a higher sense" precisely because he described the "depths of the human soul." (See N. Strakhov and O. Miller, *Biografiia, pis'ma i zametki iz zapisnoi knizhki Dostoevskogo* [St. Petersburg, 1883], p. 373). Dostoevsky explicitly stated that he had a totally different view of "reality and realism" than his contemporaries, claiming his "idealism" was "more real" than their alleged realism, for his was "fundamental, true realism." (See A. S. Dolinin, ed., *Pis'ma*, II [Moscow, 1930], p. 150 and 169).

[19]*The First Circle*, Ch. 53; p. 375f.

[20]All quotations from Solzhenitsyn's Nobel Lecture are from the Alexis Klimoff translation which appeared in *Solzhenitsyn: Critical Essays and Documentary Materials* ed. by John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh, Alexis Klimoff (Nordland; 1973 and 1975; Macmillan (Collier Macmillan paperback); 1975).

[21]In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 1957 Albert Camus asserted that a writer

writer must accept the "two tasks that constitute the greatness of his craft: the service of truth and the service of liberty. Because his task is to unite the greatest possible number of his people, his art must not compromise with lies and servitude. . . The nobility of our craft will always be rooted in two commitments, difficult to maintain: the refusal to lie about what one knows and the resistance to oppression." See Nobel *Lectures: Literature 1901-1967*, ed. H. Frenz (Amsterdam-London-New York: Elsevier, Nobel Foundation, 1969), p. 525.

[22]Dostoevsky held the same view. See his remark about the inseparability of art and man in "Mr. -bov and the Question of Art" in *Dostoevsky's Occasional Writings*, tr. D. Magarshack (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 135.

[23]In his Nobel Lecture Solzhenitsyn expresses astonishment that an artist can withdraw "into self-created worlds," into the "realms of subjective whim." He is dismayed that artists can "surrender the real world to others" and laments the fact that some artists only complain about "how hopelessly warped mankind is, how shallow people have become, and how burdensome it is for a lone refined and beautiful soul to dwell among them."

[24]Dostoevsky wrote similarly in "Mr. -bov and the Question of Art," (*Occasional Writings*, p.96): "We repeat: . . . one cannot demand it, if only because one demands mostly when one wishes to compel by force, and the first law of art is freedom of inspiration and creation."

[25]Solzhenitsyn assumes that an artist must raise himself to the level of "true art." For Solzhenitsyn "true art" is not guided by considerations of the "market" nor by the principle of "relevance."

[26]For Solzhenitsyn only art can overcome the individual's "ruinous habit of learning only from his own experience, so that the experience of others passes him by without profit." Only art can bridge the gap between the transitory individual life and "timeless human nature," for art transmits between men "the entire accumulated load of another being's life-experience"; it "re-creates — lifelike — the experience of other men, so that we can assimilate it as our own." In *What Is Art?* Tolstoy voiced a similar view, reducing experience to his own peculiar vision of "right feelings." ". . .It is on this capacity of man to receive another man's expressions of feeling and to experience those feelings himself, that the activity of art is based." (p. 121).

[27]Cited from a French version of the interview. See Georges Nivat and Michel Aucouturier, eds., *Soljénitsyne* (Paris: L'Herne, 1971), p. 117.

[28]Dostoevsky, maintaining a balance between "pure art" and art which is socially involved, gave an interesting example of unresponsive art in "Mr. -bov and the Question of Art." "Let us imagine that we are in the eighteenth century in Lisbon on the day of the great earthquake. Half of Lisbon's inhabitants are perishing; the houses are collapsing and crashing down. . . At that particular time a famous Portuguese poet was living in Lisbon. The next morning the Lisbon *Mercury* . . . appears. A paper published at such a moment naturally arouses a certain feeling of curiosity among the unhappy citizens of Lisbon. . . And suddenly on the most prominent place on the page they find a poem describing 'whispers, timid breathing and warbling of the nightingale', the 'silvery gleam and rippling of the sleepy brook', 'nocturnal shadows' . . . I don't know for certain how the Lisbon inhabitants would have reacted to this poem, but it seems to me that they would have lynched their famous poet there and then in the city square, and not because he had written a poem without a verb, but because instead of the warbling of the nightingale they had heard quite a different kind of warbling under the ground . . . even if the Lisbon citizens had lynched their favorite poet, the poem that had made them so angry . . . might have been excellent so far as its artistic perfection went. . . It was not art that was to blame, but the poet who abused art at a moment when the people were not in the mood for it. He sang and danced at the coffin of a

man." (*Occasional Writings*, p. 94f; the poem in question is a famous lyric by Afanasii Fet, a defender of "pure art.")

[29]"Zato: ne im etot mir sozdan, ne im upravliaetsia, *net somnen'ia v ego osnovakh*. . ." (My italics).

[30]See Georges Nivat and Michel Aucouturier, *Soljénitsyne*, p. 117. At the meeting of the prose section of the Moscow writers' organization on November 17, 1966 Solzhenitsyn stated that "in a work of art there must be a correlation between the present time and eternity." (Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 78).

[31]*What Is Art?*, p. 93. The idea is, of course, as old as Plato.

[32]*What Is Art?*, p. 140.

[33]*What Is Art?*, p. 112.

[34]*What Is Art?*, p. 141.

[35]*What Is Art?*, p. 141. It is remarkable that Tolstoy can present goodness as positive and present only the negative aspect, not of beauty in itself, but of man's perverted attitude to beauty. Truth can after all be distorted into the lie and goodness can be deformed into evil just as beauty can be subverted.

[36]*What Is Art?*, p. 142.

[37]See, for example, Solzhenitsyn's 1962 prayer, published in English in Michael Bourdeaux, ed., *Patriarch and Prophets* (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1970), p. 344. In *The First Circle* even Stalin is portrayed as unable to escape the question of the Absolute. "Suddenly he stopped. 'And up there? Higher? He had no equals, of course, but if there, up there. . .' And he paced back and forth, but slowly. Now and again that one unresolved question crept into Stalin's mind." (*The First Circle*, Ch. 21; p. 131).

[38]Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 125f.

[39]Solzhenitsyn would apparently agree with the view, both Platonic and Christian, that it is impossible to arrive at the concept of and intuition of perfection merely from the fact of imperfection. Truth, for example, can exist without the existence of the lie, but the lie can exist only in relationship with the positive reality of truth which the lie distorts and perverts.

[40]*The First Circle*, Ch. 42; p. 297. (My italics).

[41]*Cancer Ward*, Ch. 30; p. 428. (My italics).

[42]*The First Circle*, Ch. 53; p. 376.

[43]Even on a practical level intuition guides many of Solzhenitsyn's characters, especially in *August 1914*.

[44]The repeated use of certain words — "sight," "gaze," "vision," the "eye," the "heart" — links Solzhenitsyn, perhaps quite unconsciously and unintentionally, with that revelatory epistemology so common in the pre-scholastic Latin West and in the continuous epistemological tradition of Eastern Christianity. According to this view, man's inner being is interiorly illumined by the light of the Divine, allowing man to see and judge the temporal from the perspective of the eternal.

[45]*The First Circle*, Ch. 19; p. 114. (My italics). The Middle Ages is favorably portrayed elsewhere in Solzhenitsyn's works. In *August 1914* Professor Ol'da Andozerskaia explains that "if you reject the Middle Ages, the history of the West collapses, and the rest of modern history becomes incomprehensible. . . the spiritual life of the Middle Ages is more important. Mankind has never known a time, before or since, when there was such an intense spiritual life predominant over material existence." See *August 1914*, tr. M. Glenny (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1972), p. 548f. See also *The First Circle*, Ch. 60; p. 442 and Ch. 42; p. 297f.

[46]In "Mr. -bov and the Question of Art" Dostoevsky wrote: "Art is as much a necessity for man as eating and drinking. The need for beauty and creation

embodying it is inseparable from man and without it man would perhaps have refused to live in the world. Man craves it, finds and accepts beauty *without any conditions* just because it is beauty. . . Beauty is therefore inherent in everything that is healthy, that is to say, everything that is most of all alive and is a necessity of the human organism. It is harmony; it holds the promise of tranquility; it is the embodiment of man's and mankind's ideals." (*Occasional Writings*, p. 124f).

[47]My italics. In "Mr. -bov and the Question of Art" Dostoevsky wrote that "art deviates from reality because there really are mad poets and prose writers who sever all relations with reality." (*Occasional Writings*, p. 130); ". . .man can deviate from normal reality, from the laws of nature, during his life; art too will deviate with him" (p. 135).

[48]*Cancer Ward*, Ch. 31; p. 442. At Solzhenitsyn's meeting with the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers on September 22, 1967 this moral vision expressed in *Cancer Ward* was attacked and denounced. One critic complained: "The philosophy of moral socialism does not belong merely to the hero. One senses that it is being defended by the author. This cannot be permitted." (Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 115). Another was more explicit: "The ideological and political sense of moral socialism is the negation of Marxism-Leninism. All these things are completely unacceptable to us, to our society, and to our people." (Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 119).

[49]Ippolit attributes these words to Prince Myshkin in *The Idiot*, III, 5.

[50](My italics). In *What Is Art?* Tolstoy wrote similarly: "The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of real art . . . that peaceful co-operation of man which is now maintained by *external means* — by our law-courts, police, charitable institutions, factory inspection, and so forth — should be obtained by man's free and joyous activity. *Art should cause violence to be set aside.*" (p. 287; my italics).

[51]For an analysis of Dostoevsky's view of utopianism see my article "Dostoevsky's Vision of the Golden Age" in *Transactions of the Association of Russian-American Scholars*, VII (1973) and in a different form in the Appendix to volume eleven of *The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky*.

[52]For analysis of Dostoevksy's view of evil see my article "Dostoevksy and Hawthorne?" in *Transactions of the Association of Russian-American Scholars*, V (1972) and in a different form under the title "A Critique of the Dostoevsky and Hawthorne Comparison" in the Appendix to volume eleven of *The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky*.

[53]*Cancer Ward*, Ch. 35; p.506.

[54]The last words of *Cancer Ward* are: "An evil man threw tobacco in the Macaque Rhesus's eyes. Just like that. . ." (*Cancer Ward* , Ch. 36; p.532). For inexplicable reasons the Posev edition of *Cancer Ward* has omitted these last two lines.

[55]At the meeting of the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers on September 22, 1967 the writer Abdumomunov was quite aware of the implications of the scene in *Cancer Ward*. See Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 117.