

CREATION
AND
REDEMPTION

VOLUME THREE
in the Collected Works
of

GEORGES FLOROVSKY

Emeritus Professor of Eastern Church History

Harvard University

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About the Author

Born in Odessa in 1893, Father Georges Florovsky was Assistant Professor at the University of Odessa in 1919. Having left Russia, Fr. Florovsky taught philosophy in Prague from 1922 until 1926. He was then invited to the chair of Patrology at St. Sergius' Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris.

In 1948 Fr. Florovsky came to the United States. He was Professor and Dean of St. Vladimir's Theological School until 1955, while also teaching as Adjunct Professor at Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary.

From 1956 until 1964 Fr. Florovsky held the chair of Eastern Church History at Harvard University. Since 1964 he has taught Slavic studies and history at Princeton University.

Fr. Georges Florovsky, *Emeritus Professor of Eastern Church History* at Harvard University and recipient of numerous honorary degrees, is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

About *The Collected Works of Fr. Florovsky*

The *Collected Works* of Fr. Georges Florovsky will be published in English and will contain his articles in Slavic studies as well as in Church History and Theology which have previously appeared in Russian, German, French, Bulgarian, Czech, Serbian, Swedish and English. Each volume will be arranged thematically. Included in the *Collected Works* will be his two major works on the Church Fathers (*The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century* and *The Byzantine Fathers from the Fifth to the Eighth Century*) and *Ways of Russian Theology*. The last volume of *The Collected Works* will contain an *Index* to the entire corpus.

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I
INTRODUCTORY

The Valley of the Shadow of Death

"O YE DRY BONES" ... Ezekiel 37

A GLORIOUS VISION was granted to the Prophet. By the hand of the Lord the prophet Ezekiel was taken to the valley of death, a valley of despair and desolation. There was nothing alive there. There was nothing but dry bones, and very dry they were indeed. This was all that had been left of those who were once living. Life was gone. And a question was put to the Prophet: "Can these dry bones live again? Can life come back once more?" The human answer to this question would have been obviously, no. Life never comes back. What is once dead, is dead for ever. Life cannot come out of dust and ashes. "For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up again" (2 Sam. 14:14). Death is an ultimate ending, a complete frustration of human hopes and prospects. Death comes from sin, from the original Fall. It was not divinely instituted. Human death did not belong to the Divine order of creation. It was not normal or natural for man to die. It was an abnormal estrangement from God, who is man's Maker and Master—even physical death; i.e. the separation

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of soul and body. Man's mortality is the stigma or "the wages" of sin (Rom. 6:23).

Many Christians today have lost this Biblical conception of death and mortality and regard death rather as a release, a release of an immortal soul out of the bondage of the body. As widely spread as this conception of death may actually be, it is utterly alien to the Scriptures. In fact, it is a Greek, a gentile conception. Death is not a release, it is a catastrophe. "Death is a mystery indeed: for the soul is by violence severed from the body, is separated from the natural connection and composition, by the Divine will. O marvel. Why have we been given over unto corruption, and why have we been wedded unto death?" (St. John of Damascus in the "Burial office"). A dead man is no man any more. For man is not a bodiless spirit. Body and soul belong together, and their separation is a decomposition of the human being. A discarnate soul is but a ghost. A soulless body is but a corpse. "For in death there is no remembrance of Thee, in the grave who shall give Thee thanks" (Ps. 6:5). Or again: "Wilt Thou shew wonders to the dead? shall the dead arise and praise Thee? shall Thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave? or Thy faithfulness in destruction? shall Thy wonders be known in the dark? and Thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness" (Ps. 88:10-12). And the Psalmist was perfectly sure: "and they are cut off from Thy hand" (v. 5). Death is hopeless. And thus the only reasonable answer could be given, from the human point of view, to the quest about the dry bones: No, the dry bones will never live again.

But the Divine reply was very different from that. And it was not just an answer in words, but a mighty deed of God. And even the Word of God is creative: "for He spake, and it was done; He commanded, and it stood fast" (Ps. 33:9). And now God speaks again and acts. He sends His Spirit and renews the face of the earth (Ps. 104:30). The Spirit of God is the Giver of Life. And the Prophet could

witness a marvelous restoration. By the power of God the dry bones were brought again together, and linked, and shaped, and covered over again with a living flesh, and the breath of life came back into the bodies. And they stood up again, in full strength, "an exceedingly great congregation." Life came back, death was overcome.

The explanation of this vision goes along with the vision itself. Those bones were the house of Israel, the chosen People of God. She was dead, by her sins and apostasy, and has fallen into the ditch which she made herself, was defeated and rejected, lost her glory, and freedom, and strength. Israel, the People of Divine Love and adoption, the obstinate, rebellious and stiff necked people, and yet still the Chosen People And God brings her out of the valley of the shadow of death back to the green pastures, out of the snare of death, of many waters, of an horrible pit, out of the miry clay.

The prophecy has been accomplished. The promised deliverance came one day. The promised Deliverer, or Redeemer, the Messiah, came in the due time, and His name was Jesus: "for He shall save His people from their sins" (Matt. 1:21). He was "a light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of Thy people Israel/"

And then something incredible and paradoxical happened. He was not recognized or "received" by His people, was rejected and reviled, was condemned and put to death, as a false prophet, even as a liar or "deceiver." For the fleshly conception of the deliverance held by the people was very different from that which was in God's own design. Instead of a mighty earthly Prince expected by the Jews, Jesus of Nazareth came, "meek and lowly in heart." The King of Heaven, the King of Kings Himself, came down, the King of Glory, yet under the form of a Servant. And not to dominate, but to serve all those "that labor and are heavy laden," and to give them rest. Instead of a charter of political freedom and independence, He brought to His people, and

to all men indeed, a charter of Salvation, the Gospel of Eternal Life. Instead of political liberation He brought freedom from sin and death, the forgiveness of sins and Life Everlasting. He came unto His own and was not "received." He was put to death, to shameful death, and "was numbered with the transgressors." Life put to death, Life Divine sentenced to death by men—this is the mystery of the Crucifixion.

Once more God has acted. "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain; Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death: because it was not possible that He should be holden of it" (Acts 2:23-24, the words of St. Peter). Once more Life came out of the grave. Christ is risen, He came forth out of His grave, as a Bridegroom out of his chamber. And with Him the whole human race, all men indeed, was raised. He is the first fruits of them that slept, and all are to follow Him in their own order (I Cor. 15:20, 23). "That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. 5:21).

The prophecy of Ezekiel is read in the Orthodox Church at Matins on Great Saturday, at that glorious office at which believers are invited to keep â watch at the grave of the Lord, at that Sacred and Holy Grave out of which Life sprung abundantly for all Creation. In the beautiful hymns and anthems, appointed for the day, the "*encomidia*"—one of the most precious creations of devotional poetry—this tremendous mystery is depicted and adored: Life laid down in the grave, Life shining forth out of the grave. "For lo, He who dwelleth on high is numbered among the dead and is lodged in the narrow grave" (The Canon, Ode 8, Irmos). The faithful are called to contemplate and to adore this mystery of the Life-bearing and Life-bringing tomb.

And yet, the old prophecy is still a prophecy, or rather

both a prophecy and a witness. Life came forth from the grave, but the fulness of life is still to come. The human race, even the redeemed, even the Church itself, are still in the valley of the shadow of death.

The house of the New Israel of God is again very much like dry bones. There is so little true life in all of us. The historical path of man is still tragic and insecure. All of us have been, in recent years, driven back into the valley of death. Every one, who had to walk on the ruins of once flourishing cities, realizes the terrible power of death and destruction. Man is still spreading death and desolation. One may expect even worse things to come. For the root of death is sin. No wonder that there is, in many and diverse quarters, a growing understanding of the seriousness of sin. The old saying of St. Augustine finds anew echoes in the human soul: *Nondum considerasti quanti ponde fis sit peccatum*, "you never understand of what weight is sin." The power of death is broken indeed. Christ is risen indeed. "The Prince of Life, who died, reigns immortal." The spirit of God, the Comforter, the Giver of Life, has been sent upon the earth to seal the victory of Christ, and abides in the Church, since Pentecost. The gift of life, of the true life, has been given to men, and is being given to them constantly, and abundantly, and increasingly. It is given, but not always readily "received." For in order to be truly quickened one has to overcome one's fleshly desires, "to put aside all worldly cares," pride and prejudice, hatred and selfishness, and self-complacency, and even to renounce one's self. Otherwise one would quench the Spirit. God knocks perpetually at the gate of human hearts, but it is man himself who can unlock them.

God never breaks in by violence. He respects, in the phrase of St. Irenaeus of Lyons, "the ancient law of human freedom," once chartered by Himself. Surely, without Him, without Christ, man can do nothing. Yet, there is one thing that can be done only by man—it is to respond to the Divine

call and to "receive" Christ. And this so many fail to do,

We are living in a grim and nervous age. The sense of historical security has been lost long ago. It seems that our traditional civilization may collapse altogether and fall to pieces. The sense of direction is also confused. There is no way out of this predicament and impasse unless a radical change takes place. *Unless . . .* In the Christian language it reads—unless we repent, unless we ask for a gift of repentance. . . Life is given abundantly to all men, and yet we are still dead. "Repent, and turn yourselves from all your transgressions; so iniquity shall not be your ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby you have transgressed; and make you a new heart and a new spirit: for why will ye die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye" (Ezekiel 18:30-32).

There are two ways. "See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil. . . I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life (Deuter. 30:15, 19).

Let us choose life. . . First, we have to dedicate all our life to God, and to "receive" or accept Him as our only Lord and Master, and this not only in the spirit of formal obedience, but in the spirit of love. For He is more than our Lord, He is our Father. To love Him means also to serve Him, to make His purpose our own, to share His designs and aims. "Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth: but I have called you friends; for all things that I heard of my Father I have made known unto you" (John 15:15).

Our Lord left to us His own work to carry on and to accomplish. We have to enter into the very spirit of His redeeming work. And we are given power to do this. We are given power to be the sons of God. Even the Prodigal son was not allowed to lose his privilege of birth and to be

counted among the hirelings. And even more, we are members of Christ, in the Church, which is His Body. His life is indwelt unto us by the Holy Spirit.

Thus, secondly, we have to draw closer together and search in all our life for that unity which was in the mind of our Blessed Lord on His last day, before the Passion and the Cross: that all may be one—in faith and love, one—in Him.

The world is utterly divided still. There is too much strife and division even among those who claim to be of Christ. The peace among nations and above all the unity among Christians, this is the common bound duty, this is the most urgent task of the day. And surely the ultimate destiny of man is decided not on the battlefields, nor by the deliberations of the clever men. The destiny of man is decided in human hearts. Will they be locked up even at the knocking of the Heavenly Father? Or will man succeed in unlocking them in response to the call of Divine Love?

Even in our gloomy days there are signs of hope. There is not only "darkness at noon," but also lights in the night. There is a growing search for unity. But true unity is only found in the Truth, in the fulness of Truth. "Make schisms to cease in the Church. Quench the ragings of the nations. Speedily destroy, by the might of the Holy Spirit, all uprisings of heresies" (The Liturgy of St. Basil). Life is given abundantly.

We have to watch—not to miss the day of our visitation, as the Israel of old had missed hers. "How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, *and ye would not*" (Matt. 23:37). Let us choose life, in the knowledge of the Father and His only Son, our Lord, in the power of the Holy Spirit. And then the glory of the Cross and Resurrection will be revealed in our own lives. And the glorious prophecy of old will once more come true. "Behold, O my people, I will open your graves, and cause you to come up out of

your graves, and bring you into the land of Israel. . . Then shall you know that I the Lord have spoken it, and performed it, saith the Lord” (Ezekiel, 37:12, 14).

II

METHODOLOGY

Revelation, Philosophy and Theology

THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS of religious knowledge: *Revelation and Experience*. Revelation is the voice of God speaking to man. And man hears this voice, listens to it, accepts the Word of God and understands it. It is precisely for this purpose that God speaks: that man should hear him. By Revelation in the proper sense, we understand precisely this *word of God as it is heard*. Holy Scripture is the written record of the Revelation *which has been heard*. And however one may interpret the inspired character of Scripture, it must be acknowledged that Scripture preserves for us and presents to us the voice of God in the language of man. It presents to us the word of God just as it resounded in the receptive soul of man. Revelation is theophany. God descends to man and reveals himself to man. And man sees and beholds God. And he describes what he sees and hears; he testifies to what has been revealed to him. The gr̄eatest mystery and miracle of the Bible consists of the fact that it is the Word of God in the language of man. Quite properly the early Christian exegetes saw in the Old Testament scriptures an anticipa-

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tion and prototype of the coming Incarnation of God. Already in the Old Testament the Divine Word becomes human. God speaks to man in the language of man. This constitutes the authentic anthropomorphism of Revelation. This anthropomorphism however is not merely an accommodation. Human language in no way reduces the absolute character of Revelation nor limits the power of God's Word. The Word of God can be expressed precisely and adequately in the language of man. For man is created in the image of God. It is precisely for this reason that man is capable of perceiving God, of receiving God's Word and of preserving *it*. The Word of God is not diminished while it resounds in human language. On the contrary, the human word is transformed and, as it were, transfigured because of the fact that it pleased God to speak in human language. Man is able to hear God, to grasp, receive and preserve the word of God. In any case, Holy Scripture speaks to us not only of God, but also of man. Furthermore, God himself speaks in his Revelation not only about himself but also about man. Thus historical Revelation fulfills itself precisely in the appearance of the God-Man. Not only in the Old but also in the New Testament we see not only God, but also man. We apprehend God approaching and appearing to man; and we see human persons who encounter God and listen attentively to his Word—and, what is more, respond to his words. We hear in Scripture also the voice of man, answering God in words of prayer or of thanksgiving or of praise. It is sufficient to mention the Psalms in this connection. And God desires, expects, and requires this response. God desires that man not only listen to his words but that man also respond to them. God wants to involve man in "conversation." God descends to man—and he descends in order to elevate man to him. In Scripture one is astounded, above all, by this intimate nearness of God to man and of man to God, this sanctification of all human life by the presence of God, this overshadowing of the earth with Divine protection. In Scripture

we are astonished by the very fact of *sacred history* itself. In Scripture it is revealed that history itself becomes *sacred*, that history can be consecrated, that life can be sanctified. And, to be sure, not only in the sense of an external illumination of life—as if from outside—but also in the sense of its transfiguration. For Revelation is indeed completed with the founding of the Church and with the Holy Spirit's descent into the world. Since that time the Spirit of God abides in the world. Suddenly in the world itself the source of eternal life is established. And Revelation will be consummated with the appearance of the new heaven and the new earth, with a cosmic and universal transformation of all created existence. One can suggest that Revelation is the path of God in history—we see how God walks among the ranks of men. We behold God not only in the transcendent majesty of his glory and omnipotence but also in his loving nearness to his creation. God reveals himself to us not only as Lord and *Pantocrator* but, above all, as Father. And the main fact is that written Revelation is history, the history of the world as the creation of God. Scripture begins with the creation of the world and closes with the promise of a new creation. And one senses the dynamic tension between both these moments, between the first divine "*fiat*" and the coming one: "Behold, I make all things new" [ἰδοὺ καινὰ ποιῶ πάντα—Revelation 22:5].

This is not the place to treat in detail the basic questions of Biblical exegesis. Nevertheless one thing must be unconditionally stated. Scripture can be viewed from a double perspective: outside of history *or*—as history. In the first case the Bible is interpreted as a book of eternal and sacred images and symbols. And one must then unravel and interpret it precisely as a symbol, according to the rules of the symbolical or allegorical method. In the ancient Church the adherents of the allegorical method interpreted the Bible in this manner. The mystics of the Middle Ages and of the era of the Reformation understood the Bible also in this

manner. Many contemporary theologians, especially Roman Catholic theologians, also lean toward such an understanding. The Bible appears then as a kind of Law Book, as a codex of divine commandments and ordinances, as a collection of texts or "theological *loci*," as a compilation of pictures and illustrations. The Bible then becomes a self-sufficient and self-contained book—a book, so to speak, written for no one, a book with seven seals. . . . One need not reject such an approach: there is a certain truth in such an interpretation. But the totality of the Spirit of the Bible contradicts such an interpretation; it contradicts the direct meaning of Scripture. And the basic error of such an understanding consists in the abstraction from man. Certainly the Word of God is eternal truth and God speaks in Revelation for all times. But if one admits the possibility of various meanings of Scripture and one recognizes in Scripture a kind of inner meaning which is abstracted and independent from time and history, one is in danger of destroying the realism of Revelation. It is as though God had so spoken that those to whom he first and directly spoke had not understood him—or, at least, had not understood as God had intended. Such an understanding reduces history to mythology. And finally Revelation is not only a system of divine words but also a system of divine acts; and precisely for this reason—it is, above all, history, sacred history or the history of salvation [*Heilsgeschichte*], the history of the covenant of God with man. Only in such an historical perspective does the fulness of Scripture disclose itself to us. The texture of Scripture is an historical texture. The words of God are always, and above all, time-related—they have always, and above all, a direct meaning. God sees before him, as it were, the one to whom he speaks, and he speaks because of this in such a way that he can be heard and understood. For he always speaks for the sake of man, for man. There is a symbolism in Scripture—but it is rather a prophetic than an allegorical symbolism. There are images and allegories in

Scripture, but in its totality Scripture is not image and allegory but history. One must distinguish between symbolism and typology. In symbolism one abstracts from history. Typology, however, is always historical; it is a kind of prophecy—when the events themselves prophesy. One can also say that prophecy is also a symbol—a sign which points to the future—but it is always an historical symbol which directs attention to future events. Scripture has an historical *teleology*: everything strives toward an historical boundary-point, upward toward the historical *telos*. For this reason there is such a tension of time in Holy Scripture. The Old Testament is the time of messianic expectation—this is the basic theme of the Old Testament. And the New Testament is, above all, history—the evangelical history of the Divine Word and the beginning of the history of the Church, which is directed anew to the expectation of Apocalyptic fulfillment. "Fulfillment" is in general the basic category of Revelation.

Revelation is the Word of God and the Word about God. But, at the same time, in addition to this, Revelation is always a Word addressed to man, a summons and an appeal to man. And in Revelation the destiny of man is also revealed. In any case the Word of God is given to us in our human language. We know *it* only as it resounds through our receptiveness, in our consciousness, in our spirit. And the substance and objectivity of Revelation is apprehended not by man's abstracting himself from himself, nor by depersonalizing himself, nor by shrinking to a mathematical point, thereby transforming himself into a "transcendental subject." It is precisely the opposite: a "transcendental subject" can neither perceive nor understand the voice of God. It is not to a "transcendental subject," not to any "consciousness-in-general" that God speaks. The "God of the Living," the God of Revelation speaks to living persons, to empirical subjects. The face of God reveals itself only to living personalities. And the better, the fuller and the clearer that man sees the face of God, so much the more distinct and living is his

own face, so much the fuller and clearer has the "image of God" exhibited and realized itself in him. The highest objectivity in the hearing and understanding of Revelation is achieved through the greatest exertion of the creative personality, through spiritual growth, through the transfiguration of the personality, which overcomes in itself "the wisdom of flesh," ascending to "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" [εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας του πληρώματος του Χριστοῦ—Ephesians 4:13]. From man it is not self-abnegation which is demanded but a victorious forward movement, not self-destruction but a rebirth or transformation, indeed a *theosis* [θέωσις]. Without man Revelation would be impossible—because no one would be there to hear and God would then not speak. And God created man so that man would hear his words, receive them, and grow in them and through them become a participator of "eternal life." The Fall of man did not alter the original intention of God. Man has not lost completely the capacity of hearing God and praising him. And finally—the dominion and power of sin has ceased. "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us . . . and we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth" [John 1:14]. The way of life and light is open. And the human spirit has anew become capable of hearing God completely and of receiving his words.

II

But God spoke to man not only so that he would remember and call to mind his words. One can not just keep the Word of God in his memory. One must preserve the Word of God, above all, in a living and burning heart. The Word of God is preserved in the human spirit as a seed which sprouts and brings forth fruit. This means that the truth of divine Revelation must unfold within human

thought, must develop into an entire system of believing confession, into a system of religious perspective—one may say, into a system of religious philosophy and a philosophy of Revelation. There is no subjectivism in this. Religious knowledge always remains in its essence heteronomous, since it is a vision and a description of divine reality which was and is revealed to man by the entrance of the Divine into the world. God descends into the world—and unveils not only his countenance to man but actually appears to him. Revelation is comprehended by faith and faith is vision and perception. God appears to man and man beholds God. The truths of faith are truths of experience, truths of a fact. It is precisely this which is the foundation of the apodictic certainty of faith. Faith is a descriptive confirmation of certain facts—"thus it is," "thus it was," or "thus it will be." Precisely for this reason faith is also undemonstrable—faith is the evidence of experience. One must distinguish clearly between the epochs of Revelation. And one ought not ascertain the essence of the Christian faith on the basis of Old Testamental precedents. The Old Testament was the time of expectation; the entire pathos of Old Testamental man was directed toward the "future"—the "future" was the basic category of its religious experience and life. The faith of Old Testamental man was expectation—the expectation of that which was not yet, of that which had not yet come to pass, of that which was also "invisible." Indeed the time of expectation came to an end. The prophecies are fulfilled. The Lord has come. And he has come in order to remain with those who believe on him "always, to the close of the age" [Matthew 28:20]. He has given man "the power to become children of God" [John 1:12]. He has sent the Holy Spirit into the world to lead believers "into all truth" [John 16:13], and bring to remembrance all that the Lord has said [John 14:26: ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς διδάξει πάντα καὶ ὑπομνήσει ὑμᾶς πάντα α ἔειπον ὑμῖν ἐγώ]. For this reason the believers have "the anointing by the Holy Spirit, and know

all . . . and have no need that any one should teach them” [I John 2:20, 27]. They have the “unction of truth,” *charisma veritatis*, as St. Irenaeus states. In Christ the possibility and the path of spiritual life opens itself to man. And the height of spiritual life is knowledge and vision, *γνώσις* and *θεωρία*. This alters the meaning of faith. The Christian faith is not directed primarily toward “the future,” but rather toward that which was already fulfilled—more properly expressed, toward that Eternal Present, toward the divine fulness which has been and is being revealed by Christ. In a certain sense one can say that Christ made religious knowledge possible for the first time; that is, the knowledge of God. And this he accomplished not as preacher or as prophet, but as the “Prince of Life” and as the High Priest of the New Covenant. Knowledge of God has become possible through that renewal of human nature which Christ accomplished in his death and resurrection. This renewal was also a renewal of human reason and of the human spirit. That meant again the renewal of man’s vision.

And the knowledge of God has become possible in the Church, in the Body of Christ as the unity of the life of grace. In the Church Revelation becomes an inner Revelation. In a certain sense Revelation becomes the confession of the Church. It is very important to remember that the New Testament writings are younger than the Church. These writings are a book written *in the Church*. They are a written record of the faith of the Church, of the faith which is preserved in the Church. And the Church confirms the truth of Scripture, confirms its authenticity—verifies it by the authority of the Holy Spirit who dwells in the Church. One should not forget this with regard to the Gospel. In the written Gospels the image of the Saviour is held firm, that same image which lived from the very beginning in the living memory of the Church, in the experience of faith—not just in the historical memory but in the very memory of faith. This is an essential distinction. Because we know

Christ not just from memories and accounts. Not only is his image living in the memory of believers—he himself abides among them, standing always before the door of each soul. It is precisely in this experience of the living community with Christ that the Gospel becomes alive as a holy book. Divine Revelation lives in the Church—how else should it be able to preserve itself? It is sketched and strengthened by the words of Scripture. To be sure, it is sketched—but these words do not exhaust the entire fulness of Revelation, do not exhaust the entire fulness of Christian experience. And the possibility of new and other words are not excluded. Scripture, in any case, calls for interpretation.

And the unalterable truths of experience can be expressed in different ways. Divine reality can be described in images and parables, in the language of devotional poetry and of religious art. Such was the language of the prophets in the Old Testament, in such a manner the Evangelists often speak, in such a way the Apostles preached, and in such a manner the Church preaches even now in her liturgical hymns and in the symbolism of her sacramental acts. That is the language of proclamation and of good tidings, the language of prayer and of mystical experience, the language of "*Kerygmatic*" theology. And there is another language, the language of comprehending thought, the language of dogma. Dogma is a witness of experience. The entire pathos of dogma lies in the fact that it points to Divine reality; in this the witness of dogma is symbolic. Dogma is the testimony of thought about what has been seen and revealed, about what has been contemplated in the experience of faith—and this testimony is expressed in concepts and definitions. Dogma is an "intellectual vision," a truth of perception. One can say: it is the logical image, a "logical icon" of divine reality. And at the same time a dogma is a definition—that is why its logical form is so important for dogma, that "inner word" which acquires force in its external expression. This is why the external aspect of dogma—its wording—is so essential.

Dogma is by no means a new Revelation. Dogma is only a witness. The whole meaning of dogmatic definition consists of testifying to unchanging truth, truth which was revealed and has been preserved from the beginning. Thus it is a total misunderstanding to speak of "*the development of dogma.*" Dogmas do not develop; they are unchanging and inviolable, even in their external aspect—their wording. Least of all is it possible to change dogmatic language or terminology. As strange as it may appear, one can indeed say: dogmas arise, dogmas are established, but they do *not* develop. And once established, a dogma is perennial and already an immutable "rule of faith [*"regula fidei"*]; "ὁ κανὼν τῆς πίστεως"]. Dogma is an intuitive truth, not a discursive axiom which is accessible to logical development. The whole meaning of dogma lies in the fact that it *is expressed* truth. Revelation *discloses itself* and is received in the silence of faith, in silent vision—this is the first and apophatic step of the knowledge of God. The entire fulness of truth is already contained in this apophatic vision, but truth *must be expressed*. Man, however, is called not only to be silent but also to speak, to communicate. The *silentium mysticum* does not exhaust the entire fulness of the religious vocation of man. There is also room for the expression of praise. In her dogmatic confession the Church expresses herself and proclaims the apophatic truth which she preserves. The quest for dogmatic definitions is therefore, above all, a quest for terms. Precisely because of this the doctrinal controversies were a dispute over terms. One had to find accurate and clear words which could describe and express the experience of the Church. One had to express that "spiritual Vision" which presents itself to the believing spirit in experience and contemplation.

This is necessary because *the truth of faith* is also the truth *for* reason and *for* thought—this does not mean, however, that it is the truth of thought, the truth of pure reason. The truth of faith is fact, reality—*that which is.*

In this "quest for words" human thought changes, the essence of thought itself is transformed and sanctified. The Church indirectly testified to this in rejecting the heresy of Apollinarius. Apollinarianism is, in its deepest sense, a false anthropology, it is a false teaching about man and therefore it is also a false teaching about the God-Man Christ. Apollinarianism is the negation of human reason, the fear of thought—"it is impossible that there be no sin in human thoughts" ["ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν λογισμοῖς ἀνθρώπινους ἀμαρτίαν μὴ εἶναι"—Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Apollin.* II, 6, 8; I, 2]. And that means that human reason is incurable—ἀθεράπευτον ἐστί—that is, it must be cut off. The rejection of Apollinarianism meant therefore, at the time, the fundamental justification of reason and thought. Not in the sense, of course, that "natural reason" is sinless and right by itself but in the sense that it is open to transformation, that it *can be healed*, that it *can be renewed*. And not only *can* but also *must* be healed and renewed. Reason is *summoned* to the knowledge of God. The "philosophizing" about God is not just a feature of inquisitiveness or a kind of audacious curiosity. On the contrary, it is the fulfillment of man's religious calling and duty. Not an extra-achievement, not a kind of *opus supererogatorium*—but a necessary and organic moment of religious behavior. And for this reason the Church "philosophized" about God—"formulated dogmas which fishermen had earlier expounded in simple words" [from the service in honor of the Three Hierarchs]. The "dogmas of the Fathers" present again the unchanging content of "apostolic preaching" in intellectual categories. The experience of truth does not change and does not even grow; indeed, thought penetrates into the "understanding of truth" and transforms itself through the process.

One can simply say: in establishing dogmas the Church expressed Revelation in the language of Greek philosophy—or, if preferable: translated Revelation from the Hebraic,

poetic and prophetic language into Greek. That meant, in a certain sense, a "Hellenization" of Revelation. In reality, however, it was a "Churchification" [*"Verkirchlichung"*] of Hellenism. One can speak at length about this theme—indeed, much and often has this theme been taken up and discussed—indeed, it has been discussed and disputed too much and too often. It is essential here to raise only one issue. The Old Covenant has passed. Israel did not accept the Divine Christ, did not recognize Him nor confess Him and "the promise" passed to the Gentiles. The Church is, above all, *ecclesia ex gentibus*. We must acknowledge this basic fact of Christian history in humility before the will of God, which is fulfilled in the destiny of nations. And the "calling of the Gentiles" meant that Hellenism became blessed by God. In this there was no "historical accident"—no such accident could lie thereto. In the religious destiny of man there are no "accidents." In any case the fact remains that the Gospel is given to us all and for all time in the Greek language. It is in this language that we hear the Gospel in all its entirety and fulness. That does *not* and cannot, of course, mean that it is untranslatable—but we always translate it **from the Greek**. And there was precisely as little "chance" or "accident" in this "selection" of the Greek language—as the unchanging proto-language of the Christian Gospel—as there was in God's "selection" of the Jewish people—out of all the people of antiquity—as "His" People—there was as little "accident" in the "selection" of the Greek language as there was in the fact that "salvation comes from the **Jews**" [John 4:22]. We receive the Revelation of God as it occurred. And it would be pointless to ask whether it could have been otherwise. In the selection of the "Hellenes" we must acknowledge the hidden decisions of God's will. In any case, the presentation of Revelation in the language of historical Hellenism in no way restricts Revelation. It rather proves precisely the opposite—that this language possessed certain powers and resources which aided in ex-

pounding and expressing the truth of Revelation.

When divine truth is expressed in human language, the words themselves are transformed. And the fact that the truths of the faith are veiled in logical images and concepts testifies to the transformation of word and thought—words become sanctified through this usage. The words of dogmatic definitions are not "simple words," they are not "accidental" words which one can replace by other words. They are eternal words, incapable of being replaced. This means that certain words—certain concepts—are eternalized by the very fact that they express divine truth. This means that there is a so-called *philosophia perennis*—that there is something eternal and absolute in thought. But this does not at all mean there is an "eternalization" of one specific philosophical "system." To state it more correctly—Christian dogmatics itself is the only true philosophical "system." One recalls that dogmas are expressed in philosophical language—indeed, in a specific philosophical language—but not at all in the language of a specific philosophical school. Rather, one can speak of a philosophical "eclecticism" of Christian dogmatics. And this "eclecticism" has a much deeper meaning than one usually assumes. Its entire meaning consists of the fact that particular themes of Hellenic philosophy are received and, through this reception, they change essentially; they change and are no longer recognizable. Because now, in the terminology of Greek philosophy, a new, a totally new experience is expressed. Although themes and motives of Greek thought are retained, the answers to the problems are quite different; they are given out of a new experience. Hellenism, for this reason, received Christianity as something foreign and alien, and the Christian Gospel was "foolishness" to the Greeks [—*ἔθνεσιν δὲ μωρίων*; I Corinthians I:23].

Hellenism, forged in the fire of a new experience and a new faith, is renewed; Hellenic thought is transformed. Usually we do not sufficiently perceive the entire significance

of this transformation which Christianity introduced into the realm of thought. This is so, partially because we too often remain ancient Greeks philosophically, not yet having experienced the baptism of thought by fire. And in part, on the contrary, because we are too accustomed to the new world-view, retaining it as an "innate truth" when, in actuality, it was given to us only through Revelation. It is sufficient to point out just a few examples: the idea of the creaturehood of the world, not only in its transitory and perishable aspect but also in its primordial principles. For Greek thought the concept of "created ideas" was impossible and offensive. And bound up with this was the Christian intuition of history as a unique—once-occurring—creative fulfillment, the sense of a movement from an actual "beginning" up to a final end, a feeling for history which in no way at all allows itself to be linked with the static pathos of ancient Greek thought. And the understanding of man as *person*, the concept of personality, was entirely inaccessible to Hellenism which considered only the *mask* as *person*. And finally there is the message of Resurrection in glorified but real flesh, a thought which could only frighten the Greeks who lived in the hope of a future dematerialization of the Spirit. These are some of the new vistas disclosed in the new experience, out of Revelation. They are the presuppositions and categories of a new Christian philosophy. This new philosophy is enclosed in Church dogmatics. In the experience of faith the world reveals itself differently than in the experience of "natural man." Revelation is not only Revelation about God but also about the world. For the fulness of Revelation is in the image of the God-Man; that is, in the fact of the ineffable union of God and Man, of the Divine and the human, of the Creator and the creature—in the indivisible and unmerged union forever. It is precisely the Chalcedonian dogma of the unity of the God-Man which is the true, decisive point of Revelation, and of the experience of faith and of Christian vision. Strictly speaking,

a clear knowledge of God is impossible for man, *if* he is committed to vague and false conceptions of the world and of himself. There is nothing surprising about this. For the world is the creation of God and therefore, if one has a false understanding of the world, one attributes to God a work which he did not produce; one therefore casts a distorted judgment on God's activity and will. In this respect a true philosophy is necessary for faith. And, on the other hand, faith is committed to specific metaphysical presuppositions. Dogmatic theology, as the exposition and explanation of divinely revealed truth in the realm of thought, is precisely the basis of a Christian philosophy, of a sacred philosophy, of a philosophy of the Holy Spirit.

Once again it must be stressed: dogma presupposes experience, and only in the experience of vision and faith does dogma reach its fulness and come to life. And again: dogmas do not exhaust this experience, just as Revelation is not exhausted in "words" or in the "letter" of Scripture. The experience and knowledge of the Church are more comprehensive and fuller than her dogmatic pronouncement. The Church witnesses to many things which are not in "dogmatic" statements but rather in images and symbols. In other words, "dogmatic" theology can neither dismiss nor replace "*Kerygmatic*" theology. In the Church the fulness of knowledge and understanding is given, but this fulness is only gradually and partially disclosed and professed—and, in general, the knowledge in this world is always only a "partial" knowledge, and the fulness will be revealed only in the *Parousia*. "Now I know in part"—[*ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους...* I Corinthians 13:12]. This "incompleteness" of knowledge depends upon the fact that the Church is still "in pilgrimage," still in the process of becoming; she witnesses to the mystical essence of time in which the growth of mankind is being accomplished according to the measure of the image of Christ. And furthermore: the Church does not endeavor at all to express and declare

everything. The Church does not endeavor to crystallize her experience in a closed system of words and concepts. Nevertheless, this "incompleteness" of our knowledge here and now does not weaken its authentic and apodictic character. A Russian theologian described this situation in the following way: "The Church gives no fixed plan of the City of God to her members but rather she gives them the key to the City of God. And he who enters, without having a fixed plan, may occasionally lose his way; yet, everything he sees, he will behold as it is, in full reality. He, however, who will study the City according to plan, without possessing the key to the actual city, will never get to the City/" [B. M. Melioranskii, from the *Lectures on the History of the Ancient Christian Church*, "Strannik" (June, 1910), p. 931, in Russian].

III

Revelation is preserved in the Church. It was given by God to the Church, not to separate individuals, just as in the Old Testament "the words of God" ["τὰ λόγια του Θεοῦ"—Romans 3:2] were entrusted not to individuals but to the People of God. Revelation is given, and is accessible, only in the Church; that is, only through life in the Church, through a living and actual belonging to the mystical organism of the Body of Christ. This means that genuine knowledge is only possible in the element of *Tradition*. Tradition is a very important concept, one which is usually understood too narrowly: as oral Tradition in contrast to Scripture. This understanding not only narrows but also distorts the meaning of Tradition. Sacred Tradition as the "tradition of truth,"—*traditio veritatis*, as St. Irenaeus stated—is not only historical memory, not simply an appeal to antiquity and to empirical unchangingness. Tradition is the inner, mystical *memory of the Church*. It is, above all, the

"unity of the Spirit," the unity and continuity of the spiritual experience and the life of grace. It is the living connection with the day of Pentecost, the day when the Holy Spirit descended into the world as the "Spirit of Truth." The faithfulness to Tradition is not a loyalty to antiquity but rather the living relationship with the fulness of the Christian life. The appeal to Tradition is not so much the appeal to earlier patterns as it is an appeal to the "*catholic*" experience of the Church, to the fulness of her knowledge. As the well-known formula of St. Vincent of Lérins states: *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est*—in this formula, to which one so often appeals, there is an essential ambiguity. "*Semper*" and "*ubique*" must not be understood literally and empirically. And "*omnes*" does not include all who claim to be Christian but only the "true" Christians who preserve the right doctrine and interpret it correctly. Those, however, who are "heretics," who are misled, and those who are weak in faith are not included in the concept of "*all*." The formula of St. Vincent is based on a tautology. The scope of Tradition cannot be established simply by historical research. That would be a very dangerous path. That would mean a complete disregard for the spiritual nature of the Church. Tradition is known and understood only by belonging to the Church, through participation in her common or "*catholic*" life. The term "*catholic*" is often understood wrongly and imprecisely. The καθολικός of καθ' ὅλου does not at all mean an external universality—it is not a quantitative but rather a qualitative criterion. "*Catholic*" does not mean "universal"; καθολικός is not identical with οἰκουμενικός. The "Catholic Church" can also historically turn out to be the "small flock." There are probably more "heretics" than "Orthodox believers" in the actual world and it can turn out that "heretics" are "everywhere"—*ubique*—and the true Church is pushed into the background of history, into the "desert." This was often the case and it may happen again. But this empirical limitation and situation does not

in any way destroy the "*catholic*" nature of the Church. The Church is *catholic* because she is the Body of Christ, and in the unity of this Body the reciprocal co-growth of individual members takes place; mutual seclusion and isolation is overcome, and the true "community" or the "common life"—κοινωνία or κοινωβία—is realized. And that concerns thought also. In the unity of the Church the catholicity of consciousness is realized. In this the true mystery of the Church is contained: "that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us... so that they may become perfectly one..."—"ἵνα πάντες ἐν ᾧσιν—ἵνα ᾧσιν τετελειωμένοι εἰς ἓν... -John 17:21, 23.

This "fulness of unity" in the image of the Trinity is precisely the *catholicity* of the Church. In explaining the High Priestly prayer of our Lord, the late Metropolitan Antonii of Kiev stated: "This prayer concerns nothing else other than the establishment of a new, united existence of the Church on earth. This reality has its image not on earth, where there is no unity but only division, but rather its image is in heaven where the unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit unites Three Persons in one Being. Thus there are not three Gods but One God who lives One life. The Church is the completely new, particular, unique existence on earth, a unique existence which one cannot define clearly by certain concepts taken from profane life. The Church is an image of Trinitarian existence, an image in which many persons become one being. Why is such an existence, as also the existence of the Holy Trinity, new and, for ancient man, inaccessible? For this reason: because in the natural self-consciousness a person is enclosed within himself and is radically opposed to every other person." [Archbishop Antonii Khrapovitskii, *Collected Works*, II, 2 (St. Petersburg, 1911) —"The Moral Idea of the Dogma of the Church" (pp. 17 and 18) ; in Russian]. Elsewhere Metropolitan Antonii states: "The Christian therefore must free himself, in the measure of

his spiritual perfection, from the direct opposition of "I" and "non-I"—to transform from its very foundation the structure of human self-consciousness" [*Ibid.*, p. 65].

Such a transformation of "human self-consciousness" also takes place in the Church, in the "*catholic*" or "*communal*" consciousness of the Church. "Catholic" consciousness is not a collective-consciousness, not a universal or profane community-consciousness—neither is it a conglomerate of single conscious individuals; it is not an impersonal "consciousness-in-general." "Catholicity" is the concrete "unity of thoughts" and "community of persons." "Catholicity" is structure and style, "the determination of personal consciousness," which overcomes its limitation and isolation and matures to a "catholic" height—"catholicity" is the ideal standard or boundary-point, the "τέλος," of personal consciousness which is realized in the affirmation, not in the abolition, of personality. And the measure of "catholicity" can only be fulfilled through life in Christ. And not because we realize in our consciousness an abstract "consciousness-in-general" or an impersonal nature of logical thought, but rather "catholicity" is realized by concrete experience or by the Vision of the Truth. Unity is realized through participation in the one truth; it realized itself in the truth, in Christ. And therefore consciousness transforms itself. As the clearest expression of this transformation one must recognize that mysterious overcoming of time which takes place in the Church. In Christ the believers of all eras and generations unify and unite themselves—meeting each other, as it were, as mystically united contemporaries. In this consists precisely the religious and metaphysical meaning of "the communion of the saints"—*communio sanctorum*. And therefore the memory of the Church is oriented not to the past which has passed away but rather to what has been achieved or "completed"—the memory of the Church is turned toward those of the past as contemporaries in the fulness of the Church of the Body of Christ, which embraces all times. Tradition is the symbol

of this "all-time-ness." To know or perceive through Tradition means to know or perceive from the fulness of this experience of "all-time-ness." And this can be known within the Church by each person in his personal experience, according to the measure of his spiritual maturity. To turn oneself toward Tradition means to turn oneself toward this fulness. The "Catholic transformation" of consciousness makes it possible for each person to know—not in fact for himself only but for all; it makes the fulness of experience possible. And this knowledge is free from every restriction. In the catholic nature of the Church there is the possibility of theological *knowledge* and not just something founded upon theological "*opinions.*" I maintain that each person *can* realize the catholic standard in himself. I do not say that each person *does* realize it. That depends upon the measure of one's spiritual maturity. Each person is, however, called. And those who realize it we call Fathers and Teachers of the Church, for we hear from them not simply their personal opinions but the very *witness* of the Church—because they speak out of the Catholic fulness. This fulness is unexhausted and inexhaustible. And we are summoned to testify about this and in this the vocation of man is fulfilled. God revealed and reveals himself to man. And we are called to testify to that which we have seen and see.

Translated from the German
by RICHARD HAUGH

III

CREATION

Creation and Creaturehood

Behold, I have graven thee upon the palms of my hands,
and thy walls are continually before me . . . ISAIAH 49:16

THE WORLD IS CREATED. That means: the world came out of nothing. That means there was no world before it sprang up and came into being. It sprang up and came into being together with time. Because when there was no world, there was no time. Because "time is reckoned from the creation of the heavens and the earth," as St. Maximus the Confessor said.¹ Only the world exists in time—in change, succession, duration. Without the world there is no time. And the genesis of the world is the beginning of time.² This beginning, as St. Basil the Great explains, is not yet time, nor even a fraction of time, just as the beginning of a road is not yet the road itself. It is simple and uncomposite.³ There was no time; and suddenly, all at once, it began. Creation springs, *comes into* being, passes from out of non-being into being. It *begins* to be. As St. Gregory of Nyssa says, "The very subsistence of creation owed its beginning to change/"⁴ "the very transition from non-entity to existence is a change, non-existence being changed by the Divine power into being."⁵ This primordial genesis and beginning of change and duration, this "transi-

tion" from void to existence, is inaccessible to human thought. But it becomes comprehensible and imaginable from its opposite. We always calculate time in an inverse order, back from the present, retreating into the depths of time, going backwards in the temporal sequence; and only secondarily do we think in terms of consecutive reckoning. And going backwards into the past, we stop at some determinate link, one which is calculated and calculable from within the series, with a clear consciousness that we have to stop. The very notion of the beginning of time is this necessity of stopping, is the very impossibility of an infinite regression into the past. It makes no difference whether we can or cannot compute this limit of retreat in terms of centuries or of days. The prohibition itself remains in full force. A first unit is absolutely postulated in the temporal series, before which there are no other links, no other moments of time, because there was no change, and no sequence whatever. It is not time that precedes time, but "the height of ever-present eternity" transcending duration—*celsitudo semper praesentis aeternitatis*, as St. Augustine used to say. Time began. But there will be a time "when time shall be no more" — "ὅτι χρόνος οὐκέτι ἔσται" (Rev. 10:6). Change will cease. And according to St. John Damascene, "Time, after the resurrection, will no longer be numbered by days and nights; rather, there will be one day without evening."⁶ The temporal sequence will be broken; there will be a *last* unit in it. But this end and cessation of change does not indicate the abolition of what began with time, of what was and existed in time; it does not suggest a return or relapse into nothingness. There will be no time, but creation will be preserved. The created world can exist even not in time. Creation began, but it will not cease.⁷ Time is a kind of line *segment*, with a beginning and an end. And therefore it is incommensurate with eternity, because time has a beginning. And in eternity there is no change, neither a beginning. The whole of temporality does not coincide

with eternity. "The fulness of the times" [*omne tempus*] does not necessarily mean "always" [*semper*], as Augustine has pointed out.⁸ Infinity or endlessness does not necessarily imply beginninglessness. And creation may be compared to a mathematical "bundle of rays," halves of straight lines extending from their point of origin to infinity. Once brought out of nothingness and non-being, the world has in the creative *fiat* an immutable and final foundation and support for its existence. "The creative word is like an adamantine bridge upon which creatures are placed, and they stand under the abyss of the Divine Infinitude, over the abyss of their own nothingness," said Metropolitan Philaret. "Because the word of God must not be imagined as like the spoken word of man, which, when it has been pronounced, straightway desists and vanishes in air. In God there is nothing of cessation, nothing of vanishing: His word proceeds but does not recede: *the word of the Lord endureth for ever* (I Peter I:25)."⁹ God "created all things, that they might have their being" (Wis. Solomon i.14). And not for the time being, but for ever did He create: He brought creation *into being* by His creative word. "For He hath established the world, so that it shall not be moved" (Ps. 93:1).

The world exists. But *it began* to exist. And that means: *the world could have not existed*. There is no necessity whatsoever for the existence of the world. Creaturely existence is not self-sufficient and is not independent. In the created world itself there is no foundation, no basis for genesis and being. Creation by its very existence witnesses to and proclaims its creaturehood, it proclaims that it has been produced. Speaking in the words of Augustine, "[It] cries out that it has been created—it cries out that it did not create itself: [I] exist because I am created; and I was not before I came to be, and I could not issue from myself. . . ."—*clamant quod facta sunt. Clamant etiam quod seipsa non fecerint: ideo sumus, quia facta sumus; non eramus ante quam essemus, ut fieri possemus a nobis...*¹⁰

By its very existence creation points beyond its own limits. The cause and foundation of the world is outside the world. The world's being is possible only through the supra-mundane will of the merciful and Almighty God, "Who calls the things that be not, to be" (Rom. 4:17). But, unexpectedly it is precisely in its creaturehood and createdness that the stability and substantiality of the world is rooted. Because the origin from out of nothing determines the otherness, the "non-consubstantiality" of the world and of God. It is insufficient and inexact to say that things are created and placed *outside of God*. The "*outside*" itself is posited only in creation, and creation "from out of nothing" [*ex nihilo*] is precisely such a positing of the "outside," the positing of an "other" side by side with God. Certainly not in the sense of any kind of limitation to the Divine fulness, but in the sense that side by side with God there springs up an *other*, a heterogeneous substance or nature, one different from Him, and in a certain sense an independent and autonomous subject. That which did not exist springs now up and comes forth. In creation something *absolutely new*, an extra-divine *reality* is posited and built up. It is precisely in this that the supremely great and incomprehensible miracle of creation consists—that an "other" springs up, that heterogeneous drops of creation exist side by side with "the illimitable and infinite Ocean of being," as St. Gregory of Nazianzus says of God.¹¹ There is an infinite distance between God and creation, and this is a *distance of natures*. All is distant from God, and is *remote* from Him not by place but *by nature*—οὐ τόπω, ἀλλὰ φύσει—as St. John Damascene explains.¹² And this distance is never removed, but is only, as it were, overlapped by immeasurable Divine love. As St. Augustine said, in creation "there is nothing related to the Trinity, except the fact that the Trinity has created it"—*nihilique in ea esse quod ad Trinitatem pertineat, nisi quod Trinitas condidit. . .*¹³ Even on the most exalted heights of prayerful ascent and

intimacy there is always an impassable limit, there can always be perceived and revealed the *living duality of God and creation*. "He is God, and she is non-God," said Macarius "the Great" of the soul. "He is the Lord, and she the handmaid; He the Creator, and she the creation; He the Architect, and she the fabric; and there is nothing in common between Him and her nature."¹⁴ Any transubstantiation of creaturely nature into the Divine is as impossible as the changing of God into creation, and any "coalescence" and "fusion" of natures is excluded. In the one and only hypostasis and person of Christ—the God-Man—in spite of the completeness of the mutual interpenetration [περιχώρησις εις ἀλλήλας] of the two natures, the two natures remain with their unchanged, immutable difference: "without the distinction of natures being taken away by such union, but rather the specific property of each nature being preserved." Οὐδαμοῦ της των φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένες διὰ την ενωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον της ιδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως (the δρος of Chalcedon). The vague "out of two natures" the Fathers of Chalcedon replaced by the strong and clear "in two natures," and by the confession of the double and bilateral consubstantiality of the God-Man they established an unshakeable and indisputable criterion and rule of faith. The real existence of a created human nature, that is, of an other and second nature outside of God and side by side with Him, is an indispensable prerequisite for the accomplishment of the Incarnation without any change in or transmutation of the Divine nature.

What is created is outside of God, but is united with Him. The Fathers of the fourth century, moved by the Arian controversy to define the concept of creation in a clear and precise manner, stressed above all else the heterogeneity of the created and Creator in counterdistinction to the "consubstantiality" of generation; and they corrected this heterogeneity with the dependence of creation upon the will and volition. Everything created, wrote St. Athanasius

the Great, "is not in the least like its Creator in substance, but is *outside* of Him/" and therefore also could have *not* existed.¹⁵ Creation "comes into being, made up from outside."¹⁶ And there is no similarity between that which bursts forth from nothing and the Creator Who verily *is*, Who brings creatures out of nothing.¹⁷ Will and volition precede creating. Creating is *an act of will* [ἐκ βουλήματος], and therefore is sharply distinguished from the Divine generation, which is an *act of nature* [γεννᾶ κατὰ φύσιν].¹⁸ A similar interpretation was given by St. Cyril of Alexandria. The generation is out of the substance, κατὰ φύσιν. Creating is an act, and is not done out of the creator's own substance; and therefore a creation is heterogeneous to its creator.¹⁹ Summarizing the patristic interpretation, St. John of Damascus gives a following definition: "Begetting means producing from the substance of the begetter an offspring similar in substance to the begetter. Creation, or making, on the other hand, is the bringing into being, from outside and not from the substance of the creator, an actor of something, entirely unlike [by nature]." Generation is accomplished "by a natural power of begetting" [της γονιμότητος φυσικῆς], and creating is an act of volition and will—θελήσεως ἔργον.²⁰ Creaturehood determines the complete dissimilarity of the creation and God, its otherness, and hence its independence and substantiality. The whole section of St. John is actually an elaborate rejoinder to arguments of Origin.

Creation is not a phenomenon but a "substance." The reality and substantiality of created nature is manifested first of all in *creaturely freedom*. Freedom is not exhausted by the possibility of choice, but presupposes it and starts with it. And creaturely freedom is disclosed first of all in the equal possibility of two ways: to God and away from God. This duality of ways is not a mere formal or logical possibility, but a real possibility, dependent on the effectual presence of powers and capacities not only for a choice

between, but also for the following of, the two ways. Freedom consists not only in the possibility, but also in the *necessity* of autonomous choice, the resolution and resoluteness of choice. Without this autonomy, nothing happens in creation. As St. Gregory the Theologian says, "God legislates human self-determination."²¹ "He honored man with freedom that good might belong no less to him who chose it than to Him Who planted its seed/²² Creation must ascend to and unite with God by its own efforts and achievements. And if the way of union requires and presupposes a responsive prevenient movement of Divine Mercy, "the ancient law of human freedom," as St. Irenaeus once put it, is not undermined by this. The way of dis-union is not closed to creatures, the way of destruction and death. There is no irresistible grace, creatures can and may lose themselves, are capable, as it were, of "metaphysical suicide." In her primordial and ultimate vocation, creation is destined for union with God, for communion and participation in His life. But this is not a binding necessity of creaturely nature. Of course, outside of God there is no life for creation. But as Augustine happily phrased it, *being and life do not coincide* in creation.²³ And therefore *existence in death* is possible. Of course, creation can realize and establish herself fully only by overcoming her self-isolation, only in God. But even without realizing her true vocation, and even opposing it, thus undoing and losing herself, creation does not cease to exist. The possibility of metaphysical suicide is open to her. But the power of self-annihilation is not given. Creation is indestructible—and not only that creation which is rooted in God as in the source of true being and eternal life, but also that creation which has set herself against God. "For the fashion of this world passeth away" (I Cor. vii. 31), and shall pass. But the world itself shall not pass. Because it was created "that it might have being." Its qualities and properties are changeable and mutable, and do change; but its "elements" are immutable. And

immutable above all is the microcosm man, and immutable are men's *hypostases*, sealed as they are and brought out of nothing by the creative will of God. Indeed, the way of rebellion and apostasy is the way of destruction and perdition. But it leads not towards non-being, but to death; and death is not the end of existence, but a *separation*—the separation of soul and body, the separation of creation from God. In fact, evil "is not an entity."²⁴ Evil has no "substance"—it is ἀνούσιον according to St. John Damascene.²⁵ Evil has a negative and privative character, it is the absence and privation of true being. And at the same time, as St. Gregory of Nyssa says, "in its very non-being it has its being"—ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει.²⁶ The root and character of evil is delusion and error. Evil, in the incisive phrase of one German theologian, is "a mythopoeic lie" ("eine dichtende Lüge"—F. Staudenmeier]. It is a kind of fiction, but a fiction loaded with enigmatic energy and power. Evil is active in the world, and in this actuality is real. Evil introduces new qualities into the world, as it were, adding something to the reality created by God, a something not willed and not created by God, although tolerated by Him. And this innovation, in a certain sense "non-being," is in an enigmatic fashion real and powerful. "For God made not death" (Wis. Sol. I:13), and nevertheless the whole creation is become subject to futility, and to the bondage of corruption (Rom. 8:20, 21). By sin death spread to all men (Rom. 5:12), and sin, being itself a fictitious innovation in the world, the spawn of the treated will and of human devices, creates death and as it were sets up a new law of existence for creation, a kind of anti-law. And in a certain sense, evil is ineradicable. Yet, because the final perdition *in eternal torment* provoked by evil in "the resurrection unto judgment" does not mean total annihilation nor the total suppression of evil beings, it is impossible to ascribe to evil such anti-creative power which would overcome the creative power of God. By its devastation of

being, evil does not wipe out being. And, such a devastated, distorted, deceitful, and false reality is mysteriously received into eternity, even though in the torments of unquenchable fire. The eternity of torments that will come upon the sons of perdition points out with a special urgency and sharpness the reality of creation as a second and extra-divine reality. It is provoked by a persistent though free rebellion, by a self-assertion in evil. Thus, as in becoming, so in dissolution—as in holiness, so in perdition—as in obedience, so in disobedience—creation manifests and witnesses to her own reality as the free object of the divine decrees.

The idea of creation is alien to the "natural" consciousness. Classical, Hellenistic thought did not know it. Modern philosophy has forgotten it. Given in the Bible, it is disclosed and manifested in the living experience of the Church. In the idea of creation are juxtaposed the motif of the immutable, intransitory reality of the world as a free and active subject (more precisely, as a totality of interacting subjects) and the motif of its total non-self-sufficiency, of its ultimate dependence upon Another higher principle. And therefore any supposition of the world's beginninglessness, the necessity of its existence, and any admission of its elimination are excluded. Creation is neither self-existent *being*, nor transitory *becoming*; neither eternal "*substance*," nor illusory "*appearance*." In creaturehood a great wonder is revealed. *The world also might not have existed at all.* And that which might not have existed, for which there are no inevitable causes or bases, does *exist*. This is a riddle, a "foolishness" for "natural" thought. And hence comes the temptation to attenuate and blunt the idea of creation, to replace it by other notions. Only by the contrary approach can the mystery of creation be clarified, by the exclusion and suspension of all evasive speculation and conjecture.

II

God creates in perfect freedom. This proposition is framed with remarkable precision by the "Subtle Doctor" of the Western middle ages, Duns Scotus: *Procedit autem rerum creatio a Deo, non aliqua necessitate, vel essentiae, vel scientiae, vel voluntatis, sed ex mera libertate, quae non movetur et multo minus necessatur ab aliquo extra se ad causandum.* "The creation of things is executed by God not out of any necessity, whether of essence or of knowledge or of will, but out of a sheer freedom which is not moved—much less constrained—by anything external that it should have to be a cause!"²⁷ Even so, in defining God's freedom in creation it is not enough to do away with crude conceptions of compulsion, of external necessity. It is obvious that we cannot even speak of any kind of external compulsion, because the very "outside" itself is first posited only in creation. In creation God is determined only by Himself. But it is not so easy to demonstrate the absence of any *internal* "necessity" in this self-determination, in the revelation of God *ad extra*. Here, the thought is beset by alluring temptations. The question may be put in this manner: Is the attribute of Creator and Sustainer to be considered as belonging to the essential and formative properties of the Divine Being? The thought of the Divine immutability may prevent us from giving a negative answer. Precisely so did Origen reason in his time. "It is alike impious and absurd to say that God's nature is to be at ease and never to move, or to suppose that there was a time when Goodness did not do good and Omnipotence did not exercise its power."²⁸ From the perfect extra-temporality and immutability of the Divine Being, Origen, in the words of Bolotov, draws the conclusion "that all His properties and predicates always belong to God *in a strict sense—in actu, in statu quo.*"²⁹ Here, "always" for Origen has the meaning of "extra-temporal eternity," and not only "the whole of tempo-

lity.”—“Just as nobody can be a father without having a son, nor a lord without holding a possession or a slave,” reasons Origen, “so too we cannot even call God Almighty—Pantocrator if there are no creatures over whom he can exercise His power. For if anyone would have it that certain ages, or periods of time, or of Divine Omnipotence—whatever he cares to call them—elapsed during which the present creation did not exist, he would undoubtedly prove that in those ages or periods God was not Almighty but that He became Pantocrator afterward, that He became Almighty from the time when he began to have creatures over whom he could exercise power. Thus God will apparently have experienced a kind of progress, for there can be no doubt that it is better for Him to be Almighty than not to be so. Now how is it anything but absurd that God should at first not possess something that is appropriate to Him and then should come to possess *it*? But if there was no time when God was not Almighty, there must always have existed the things in virtue of which He is Almighty; and there must always have existed things under his rule, over which He is their Ruler.”³⁰ In view of the perfect Divine immutability, “it is necessary that the creatures of God should have been created from the beginning, and that there should be no time when they were not.” Because it is inadmissible to think that, in time, God “would pass from inaction to action.” Hence it is necessary to recognize “that with God all things are without beginning and are co-eternal.”³¹

It is not simple or easy to escape from Origen’s dialectical nets. In this very problematic there lies an incontestable difficulty. “When I think what God was Lord of from eternity, if creation be not from always,” exclaimed Augustine, “I fear to affirm anything.” *Cum c o git o cuu s rei dominus semper fuit, si semper creatura non fuit, affirmare aliquid pertimesco. . .*³² Origen complicated his question by his inability to extricate himself completely from time as change.

Together with the sempiternal and immobile eternity of the Divine Being, he imagined an endless flow of ages which had to be filled. Furthermore, any sequence in the Divine predicates appeared to him under the form of real temporal change; and therefore, having excluded change, he was inclined to deny any sequence at all to, or interdependence among, those predicates taken as a whole; he asserted more than the mere 'co-eternity' of the world with God; he asserted the necessity of the Divine self-disclosure *ad extra*, the necessity of the revelation and out-pouring of Divine goodness upon the "other" from all eternity, the necessity of the eternal realization of the fulness and of all the potentialities of Divine power. In other words, in order to comply with the notion of the Divine immutability, Origen had to admit the necessity of a conjointly ever-existent and beginningless "not-I" as a corresponding prerequisite to and correlative of the Divine completeness and life. And here is the ultimate sting of the question. *It was also possible that the world might not have existed at all—possible in the full sense of the word only granted that God can also not create.* If, on the other hand, God creates out of necessity, for sake of the completeness of His Being, then the world must exist; then it is not possible that the world might not have existed. Even if one rejects the Origenistic notion of the infinitude of real past time and recognizes the beginning of time, the question remains: Does not *at least the thought of the world* belong to the absolute necessity of the Divine Being?

We may assume that the real world came into being together with time, and that "there was when it was not," when there was no temporal change. But the image of the world, does not *this* remain eternal and everlasting in the Divine knowledge and will, participating immutably and ineluctably in the fulness of the Divine self-knowledge and self-determination? On this point St. Methodius of Olympus had already put his finger, against Origen, stressing that

the Divine **All-Perfectness** cannot depend on anything except **God Himself**, except on His own nature.³³ Indeed, God creates solely out of His goodness, and in this Divine goodness lies the only basis of His revelation to the "other," the only basis of the very being of that "other" as recipient and object of this goodness. But should we not think of this revelation as eternal? And if we should—since God lives in eternity and in unchangeable completeness—would not this mean that in the final analysis "the image of the world" was present, and conjointly present, with God unchangingly in eternity, and moreover in the unalterable completeness of all its particular predicates? . . . Is there not a "necessity of knowledge or will"? Does not this mean that God in His eternal self-contemplation also necessarily contemplates even *what He is not*, that which is not He, but other? Is God not bound in His sempiternal self-awareness by the image of His "Non-I" at least as a kind of possibility? And in His self-awareness is He not forced to think of and to contemplate Himself as a creative principle and as the source of the world, and of the world as an object of and participant in His good pleasure? And on the other hand, over the whole world there lies imprinted the Divine seal, a seal of permanence, a reflection of the Divine glory. The Divine economy of the world, the unchanging and immutable Providence of God, conveys—to our vision—perfect stability and wise harmony—and also a kind of necessity. This vision hinders our understanding and apprehension of the claim that the world also might not have existed. It seems we cannot conceive the world as non-existing without introducing a kind of impious *fortuitousness* or *arbitrariness* in its existence and **genesis**, either of which is contradictory and derogatory to the Divine Wisdom. Is it not obvious that there must be some kind of sufficient cause for the world, *cur sit potius quam non sit*? And that this cause must consist of the unchangeable and sempiternal will and command of God? Does it not follow that once the world is impossible

without God, God also is impossible without the world? Thus the difficulty is only shelved, but not solved, if we limit ourselves to the chronological beginnings of the actual existence of the world, since, in this case, the *possibility* of the world, the *idea* of the world, God's design and will concerning it, still remains eternal and as though conjointly everlasting with God.

And it must be said at once that any such admission means introducing the world into the intra-Trinitarian life of the Godhead as a co-determinant principle. And we must firmly and uncompromisingly reject any such notion. The idea of the world, God's design and will concerning the world, is obviously *eternal*, but in some sense *not co-eternal*, and *not conjointly everlasting* with Him, because "distinct and separated," as it were, from His "essence" by His *volition*. One should say rather that the Divine idea of the World is eternal by *another kind* of eternity than the Divine essence. Although paradoxical, this distinction of types and kinds of eternity is necessary for the expression of the incontestable distinction between the *essence (nature)* of God and the *will* of God. This distinction would not introduce any kind of separation or split into the Divine Being, but by analogy expresses the distinction between *will* and *nature*, the fundamental distinction made so strikingly explicit by the Fathers of the fourth century. The idea of the world has its basis *not in the essence, but in the will* of God. God does not so much have as "think up" the idea of creation.⁸⁴ And He "thinks it up" in perfect freedom; and it is only by virtue of this wholly free "thinking up" and good pleasure of His that He as it were "becomes" Creator, even though from everlasting. But nevertheless He could also not have created. And any such "refraining" from creation would in no way alter or impoverish the Divine nature, would mean no diminution, just as the very creation of the world does not enrich the Divine Being. Thus by way of opposites we can come close to an under-

standing of God's creative freedom. In a sense, it would be "indifferent" to God whether the world exists or not—herein consists the absolute "all-sufficiency" of God, the Divine autarchy. The absence of the world would mean a kind of subtraction of what is finite from the Infinite, which would not affect Divine fulness. And conversely, the creation of the world would mean the addition of what is finite to the Infinite, which in no way affects Divine plenitude. The might of God and the freedom of God must be defined not only as the power to create and to produce but also as the absolute freedom *not to create*.

All these words and presuppositions, obviously, are insufficient and inexact. They all have the character of negations and prohibitions, and not of direct and positive definitions; but they are necessary for the testimony to that experience of faith in which the mystery of Divine freedom is revealed. With a tolerable inexactitude, one could say that God is able to permit and tolerate the absence of anything outside of Himself. By such a presumption the whole immeasurability of the Divine love is not diminished, but on the contrary is thrown into relief. God creates out of the absolute superabundance of His mercies and goodness, and herein His good pleasure and freedom are manifest. And in this sense, one could say that the world is a kind of a surplus. And further, it is a surplus which in no way enriches the Divine fulness; it is, as it were, something "supererogatory" and superadded, something which also could not have existed, and which exists only through the sovereign and all-perfect freedom and unspeakable good pleasure and love of God. This means that the world is created and is "the work of" God's will, *θελήσεως έργον*. No outward revelation whatever belongs to the "necessity" of the Divine nature, to the necessary structure of the intra-Divine life. And creative revelation is not something imposed upon God by His goodness. It is executed in perfect freedom, though in eternity also. Therefore it cannot be said that God *began*

to create, or "became" Creator, even though "to be Creator" does not belong to those definitions of Divine nature which includes the Trinity of Hypostases. In the everlasting immutability of God's Being there is no origination whatsoever, nor any becoming, nor any sequence. And nevertheless there is a kind of all-perfect harmonic order which is partially knowable and expressible on the level of the Divine names. In this sense St. Athanasius the Great used to say that "to create, for God, is *secondary*; and to beget, *primary*" that "what is of nature [essence]" is antecedent to "what is of volition."⁸⁵ One has to admit distinctions within the very co-eternity and immutability of the Divine Being. In the wholly simple Divine life there is an absolute rational or logical order [τάξις] of Hypostases, which is irreversible and inexchangeable for the simple reason that there is a "first principle" or "source" of Godhead, and that there is the enumeration of *First*, *Second*, and *Third* Persons.⁸⁶ And likewise it is possible to say that the Trinitarian structure is antecedent to the will and thought of God, because the Divine will is the common and undivided will of the All-Holy Trinity, as it is also antecedent to all the Divine acts and "energies." But even more than this, the Trinity is the internal, self-revelation of the Divine nature. The properties of God are also revelations of the same sort, but in their particular disclosure God is free. The unchanging will of God freely postulates creation, and even the very idea of creation. It would be a tempting mistake to regard the "thinking up" of the world by God as an "ideal creation," because the idea of the world and the world of ideas are totally *in God*, ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, and in God there is not, and there cannot be, anything of the created. But this ambiguous notion of an "ideal creation" defines with great clarity the complete distinction between the necessity of the Trinitarian Being on the one hand and the freedom of God's design—His good pleasure concerning creation—on the other. There remains an absolute and irremovable distinction, the denial

of which leads to picturing the whole created economy as made up of *essential acts* and conditions which disclose the Divine nature as though of *necessity*, and this leads to raising the world, at least the "intelligible world" [κόσμος νοητός] to an improper height. One might, with permissible boldness, say that in the Divine idea of creation there is a kind of contingency, and that if it is eternal, it is *not an eternity of essence*, but a *free eternity*. We could clarify the freedom of God's design—His good pleasure—for ourselves by the hypothesis that this idea need not have been postulated at all. Certainly, it is a *casus irrealis*, but there is no inherent contradiction in it. Certainly, once God "thought up" or postulated such an idea, He had sufficient reason for doing so. However, one thinks that Augustine was right in prohibiting any search for "the cause of God's will."³⁷ But it is bound by nothing and preordained by nothing. The Divine will is not constrained by anything to "think up" the world. From eternity, the Divine Mind, rhapsodized St. Gregory the Theologian, "contemplated the desirable light of His own beauty, the equal and equally-perfect splendor of the triple-rayed Divinity. . . The world-creating Mind in His vast thoughts also mused upon the patterns of the world which He made up, upon the cosmos which was produced only afterwards, but which for God even then was present. All, with God, lies before His eyes, both what shall be, and what was, and what is now. . . For God, all flows into one, *and all is held by the arms of the great Divinity!*"**

"The desirable light" of the Divine beauty would not be enhanced by these "patterns of the world," and the Mind "makes them up" only out of the superabundance of love. They do not belong to the splendor of the Trinity; they are postulated by His will and good pleasure. And these very "patterns of the world" are themselves a surplus and super-added gift or "bonus" of Him Who is All-Blessed Love.

In this very good pleasure of His will to create the world the infinite freedom of God is manifest.

So St. Athanasius says, "The Father creates all, by the Word, in the Spirit,"³⁹—Creation is a common and indivisible act of the All-Holy Trinity. And God creates by *thought*, and the thought becomes deed—κτίζει δὲ ἐννοῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐννόημα ἐργου υφίσταται, says St. John Damascene.⁴⁰ "He contemplated everything from before its being, from eternity pondering it in His mind; hence each thing receives its being at a determinate time according to His timeless and decisive thought, which is predestination, and image, and pattern"—κατὰ τὴν θελητικὴν αὐτοῦ ἀχρονὸν ἐννοίαν, ἣτις ἐστὶ προορισμὸς καὶ εἰκῶν καὶ παράδειγμα.⁴¹ These patterns and prototypes of things that are to be constitute the "*pre-temporal and unchangeable counsel*" of God, in which everything is given its distinctive character [ἐχαρακτερίζετο] before its being, everything which is preordained by God in advance and then brought to existence—ἢ βουλή αὐτοῦ ἢ προαιώνιος καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα.⁴² This "counsel" of God is eternal and unchanging, pre-temporal and without beginning—[ἄναρχος]—since everything Divine is immutable. And this is the *image of God*, the second form of the image, the image turned towards the creation.⁴³ St. John Damascene is referring to Pseudo-Dionysius. These creative patterns, says the Areopagite, "are creative foundations pre-existent together in God, and together compose the powers that make being into entities, powers which theology calls 'predestinations,' Divine and 'beneficent,' decisions which are determinative and creative of all things extant, according to which He Who is above being has preordained and produced all that exists."—Παραδείγματα δὲ φάμεν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν Θεῷ τῶν ὄντων οὐσιοποιούς καὶ ἐνιαίως προὔφεστῶτας λόγους, οὗς ἢ Θεολογία προορισμοῦς καλεῖ, καὶ Θεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα, τῶν ὄντων ἀφοριστικᾶ καὶ ποιητικᾶ, καθ' οὗς ὁ Ὑπερούσιος τὰ ὄντα πάντα

καὶ προωρίσε καὶ παρήγαγεν.⁴⁴ According to St. Maximus the Confessor these types and ideas are the Divine *all-perfect* and *everlasting* thoughts of the everlasting God,—νοήσεις αυτοτελείς ἀίδιοι τοῦ ἀίδιου Θεοῦ.⁴⁵ This eternal counsel is God's design and decision concerning the world. It must be rigorously distinguished from the world itself. The Divine idea of creation is not creation itself; it is not the substance of creation; it is not the bearer of the cosmic-process; and the "transition" from "design" [ἐννόημα] to "deed" [ἔργον] is not a process within the Divine idea, but the appearance, formation, and the realization of another substratum, of a multiplicity of created subjects. The Divine idea remains unchangeable and unchanged, it is not involved in the process of formation. It remains always outside the created world, transcending it. The world is created *according to the idea*, in accordance with the pattern—it is the realization of the pattern—but this pattern is not the subject of becoming. The pattern is a norm and a goal established *in God*. This distinction and distance is never abolished, and therefore the *eternity of the pattern*, which is fixed and is never involved in temporal change, is compatible with temporal beginning, with the entering-into-being of the bearers of the external decrees. "Things before their becoming are as though non-existent," said Augustine, *utiquae non er ant*. And he explains himself: they both were and were not before they originated; "they were in God's knowledge: but were not in their own nature"—*er ant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua natura*.⁴⁶ According to St. Maximus, created beings "*are images and similes of the Divine ideas, **"⁷ in which they are "participants."⁴⁸ In creation, the Creator realizes, "makes substantial" and "discloses" His knowledge, pre-existent everlastingly in Himself.⁴⁹ In creation there is projected from out of nothing a new reality which becomes the bearer of the Divine idea, and must realize this idea in its own becoming. In this context the pantheistic tendency of Platonic ideology and of the Stoic theory of "seminal

reasons" [σπερματικοὶ λόγοι] is altogether overcome and avoided. For Platonism the identification of the "essence" of each thing with its Divine idea is characteristic, the endowment of substances with absolute and eternal (beginningless) properties and predicates, as well as the introduction of the "idea" into real things. On the contrary, the *created nucleus* of things must be rigorously distinguished from the *Divine idea* about things. Only in this way is even the most sequacious logical realism freed from a pantheistic flavor; the reality of the whole will nevertheless be but a created reality. Together with this, pan-logism is also overcome: The thought of a thing and the Divine thought-design concerning a thing are not its "essence" or nucleus, even though the essence itself is characterized by λόγος [λογικός]. The Divine pattern in things is not their "substance" or "hypostasis" ; it is not the vehicle of their qualities and conditions. Rather, it might be called the *truth of a thing*, its *transcendental entelechy*. But the truth of a thing and the substance of a thing are not identical.⁵⁰

III

The acceptance of the absolute creatureliness and non-self-sufficiency of the world leads to the distinguishing of two kinds of predicates and acts in God. Indeed, at this point we reach the limit of our understanding, all words become, as it were, mute and inexact, receiving an apophatic, prohibitive, not a cataphatic, indicative sense. Nevertheless, the example of the holy Fathers encourages a speculative confession of faith. As Metropolitan Philaret once said, "We must by no means consider wisdom, even that hidden in a mystery, as alien and beyond us, but with humility should edify our mind towards the contemplation of divine things."⁵¹ Only, in our speculation we must not overstep the boundaries of positive revelation, and must limit ourselves to the inter-

pretation of the experience of faith and of the rule of faith, presuming to do no more than discern and clarify those inherent presuppositions through which the confession of dogmas as intelligible truths becomes possible. And it must be said that the whole structure of the doctrine of faith encourages these distinctions. In essence, they are already given in the ancient and primary distinction between "theology" and "economy." From the very beginning of Christian history, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church endeavored to distinguish clearly and sharply those definitions and names which referred to God on the "theological" plane and those used on the "economical." Behind this stands the distinction between "nature" and "will." And bound up with it is the distinction in God between "essence" [οὐσία] and "that which surrounds the essence," "that which is related to the nature." A distinction, but not a separation.

"What we say about God affirmatively shows us," as St. John Damascene explains, "*not His nature, but only what is related to His nature*" οὐ την φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τερ! την φύσιν,⁵² "something which accompanies His nature" [τ! των παρεπομένων τη φύσει].⁵³ And "what He is by essence and nature, this is unattainable and unknowable."⁵⁴ St. John expresses here the basic and constant assumption of all Eastern theology: God's essence is unattainable; only the powers and operations of God are accessible to knowledge.⁵⁵ And as matters stand, there is some distinction between them. This distinction is connected with God's relation to the world. God is knowable and attainable only in so far as He turns Himself to the world, only by His revelation to the world, only through His economy or dispensation. The internal Divine life is hedged by "light unapproachable," and is known only on the level of "apophatic" theology, with the exclusion of ambiguous and inadequate definitions and names. In the literature of the ante-Nicene period, this distinction not seldom had an

ambiguous and blurred character. Cosmological motives were often used in the definition of intra-Trinitarian relations, and the Second Hypostasis was often defined from the perspective of God's manifestation or revelation to the world, as the God of revelation, as the Creative Word. And therefore the unknowability and inaccessibility were assigned primarily to the Hypostasis of the Father as being unrevealable and ineffable. God reveals Himself only in the Logos, in "the spoken Word" [λόγος προφορικός], as "in the idea and active power" issuing forth to build creation.⁵⁶ Connected with that was the tendency to subordinationism in the ante-Nicene theological interpretation of the Trinitarian dogma. Only the Fathers of the fourth century obtained in their Trinitarian theology the basis for an adequate formulation of God's relation to the world: the whole entire and undivided "operation" [ἐνέργειαι] of the consubstantial Trinity is revealed in God's acts and deeds. But the single "essence" [οὐσία] of the undivided Trinity remains beyond the reach of knowledge and understanding. His works, as St. Basil the Great explains, reveal the *power and wisdom* of God, *but not His essence itself*.⁵⁷ "We affirm," he wrote to Amphilochius of Iconium, "that we know our God by His energies, but we do not presume that it is possible to approach the essence itself. Because although His energies descend to us, His essence remains inaccessible." And these energies are multiform, yet the essence is simple.⁵⁸ The essence of God is unfathomable for men, and is known solely to the Only-begotten Son and to the Holy Spirit.⁵⁹ In the words of St. Gregory the Theologian, the essence of God is "the Holy of Holies, closed even to the Seraphim, and glorified by the three 'Holies' that come together in one 'Lordship' and 'Godhead.'" And the created mind is able, very imperfectly, to "sketch" some small "diagram of the truth" in the infinite ocean of the Divine entity, but based not upon what God is, but *upon what is around Him* [ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτόν].⁶⁰ "The Divine essence, totally

inaccessible and comparable to nothing," says St. Gregory of Nyssa, "is knowable only through His energies."⁶¹ And all our words concerning God denote not His essence but His energies.⁶² The Divine essence is inaccessible, unnameable, and ineffable. The manifold and relative names referring to God do not name His nature or essence but the *attributes of God*. Yet the attributes of God are not just intelligible or knowledgeable signs or marks which constitute our human notion of God; they are not abstractions or conceptual formulae. They are *energies, powers, actions*. They are real, essential, life-giving manifestations of the Divine Life—real images of God's relation to creation, connected with the image of creation in God's eternal knowledge and counsel. And this is "that which may be known of God"—τὸ γνωστόν τοῦ Θεοῦ—(Rom. I:19). This is, as it were, the particular domain of the undivided but yet "many-named" Divine Being, "of the Divine radiance and activity,"—ἡ Θεία ἔλλαμψις καὶ ἐνέργεια, as St. John Damascene says, following the *Areopagitica*.⁶³ According to the Apostolic word, "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His everlasting power and Godhead" (Rom. I:20). [—ἡ τε ἀίδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ Θειότης]. And this is the revelation or manifestation of God: "God hath shewed it unto them" (Rom. I:19), [ἐφανέρωσεν]. Bishop Silvester rightly explains in commenting on these Apostolic words: "The invisible things of God, being actually existent and not merely imaginary, become visible not in a kind of illusory way, but certainly, veritably; not as a mere phantom, but in His own eternal power; not merely in the thoughts of men, but in very fact—the reality of His Divinity."⁶⁴ They are visible because manifested and revealed. Because God is present everywhere, not phantasmally, not in remoteness; but really present everywhere—"which art in all places, and fillest all things, the Treasury of good things, and Giver of life." This providential ubiquity (dif-

ferent from the "particular" or charismatic presence of God, which is *not everywhere*) is a particular "form of existence" for God, distinct from the "form of His existence according to His own nature/⁶⁵ And furthermore this form is existentially real or subsistent—it is an actual presence, not merely an *omnipraesentia operativa, sicut agens adest ei in quod agit*. And if we "do not particularly understand" (in the phrase of St. Chrysostom⁶⁶) this mysterious omnipresence, and this form of the Divine Being *ad extra, nevertheless* it is indisputable that God "is everywhere, whole and entirely," "all in all," as St. John Damascene said—ὄλον ὀλικῶς πανταχοῦ ὄν,—ὄλον ἐν πᾶσι.⁶⁷ The life-giving acts of God in the world *are God Himself*—an assertion which precludes separation but does not abolish distinction.⁶⁸ In the doctrine of the Cappadocian fathers concerning "essence" and "energies" we find in an elaborate and systematic form the mysterious author of the *Areopagitica* that was to determine the whole subsequent development of Byzantine theology. Dionysius bases himself on the strict distinction between those "Divine Names" which refer to the intra-Divine and Trinitarian life and those which express the relation of God *ad extra*.⁶⁹ But both series of names tell of the immutable Divine reality. The intra-Divine life is hidden from our understanding, is known only through negations and prohibitions,⁷⁰ and in the phrase of St. Gregory the Theologian "one who by seeing God has understood what he has seen, has not Seen Him."⁷¹ And nevertheless God really reveals Himself and acts and is present in creation through His powers and ideas—in "providences and graces which issue from the incommunicable God, which pour out in a flooding stream, and in which all existing things participate,"⁷² "in an essence-producing procession," [οὐσιοποιὸν πρόοδον], in "a providence that works good things," [ἀγαθοποιὸν πρόνοιαν], which are distinguishable but not separable from the Divine entity "which surpasses entity," from God Himself, as St. Maximus the

Confessor says in his scholia.⁷³ The basis of these "processions" and of the, as it were, procession of God in His providences out of Himself—[ἔξω εαυτου γίνεται]—is His goodness and love.⁷⁴ These energies do not mix with created things, and are not themselves these things, but are only their basic and life-giving principles; they are the prototypes, the predeterminations, the reasons, the λόγοι and Divine decisions respecting them, of which they are participants and ought to be "communicants."⁷⁵ They are not only the "principle" and the "cause," but also the "challenge" and beckoning goal which is beyond and above all limits. It would be difficult to express more forcefully both the distinction between and the indivisibility of the Divine Essence and the Divine energies than is done in the *Areopagitica*—τὸ ταυτον καὶ το ἕτερον.⁷⁶ The divine energies are that aspect of God which is turned towards creation. It is not an aspect imagined by us; it is not what we see and as we see it, but it is the real and living gaze of God Himself, by which He wills and vivifies and preserves all things—the gaze of Almighty Power and Superabundant Love.

The doctrine of the energies of God received its final formulation in the Byzantine theology of the fourteenth century, and above all in St. Gregory Palamas. He bases himself on the distinction between Grace and Essence, "the divine and deifying radiance and grace is not the essence, but the energy of God"—ἡ Θεία καὶ Θεοποιὸς ἔλλαμψις καὶ χάρις οὐκ οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ Θεοῦ." The notion of the Divine energy received explicit definition in the series of Synods held in the fourteenth century in Constantinople. There is a real distinction, but no separation, between the *essence* or *entity* of God and His *energies*. This distinction is manifest above all in the fact that the Entity is absolutely incommunicable and inaccessible to creatures. The creatures have access to and communicate with the Divine Energies only. But with this participation

they enter into a genuine and perfect communion and union with God; they receive "deification."⁷⁸ Because this is "the natural and indivisible energy and power of God,"—*φυσικὴ και ἀχώριστος ἐνέργεια και δύναμις του Θεοῦ*,⁷⁹ "it is the common and Divine energy and power of the Tri-Hypostatic God."⁸⁰ The active Divine power does not separate itself from the Essence. This "procession" [*προϊέναι*] expresses an "ineffable distinction," which in no way disturbs the unity "that surpasses essence."⁸¹ The active Power of God is not the very "substance" of God, but neither is it an "accident" [*συμβεβηκός*]; because it is immutable and coeternal with God, it exists before creation and it reveals the creative will of God. In God there is not only essence, but also that which is not the essence, although it is not accident—the Divine will and power—His real, existential, essence-producing providence and authority.⁸² St. Gregory Palamas emphasizes that any refusal to make a real distinction between the "essence" and "energy" erases and blurs the boundary between generation and creation—both the former and the latter then appear to be acts of essence. And as St. Mark of Ephesus explained, "Being and energy, completely and wholly coincide in equivalent necessity. Distinction between essence and will [*θέλησις*] is abolished; then God only begets and does not create, and does not exercise His will. Then the difference between foreknowledge and actual making becomes indefinite, and creation seems to be coeternally created."⁸³ The essence is God's inherent *self-existence* ; and the energy is His relations towards the other [*προς ἕτερον*]. God *is* Life, and *has* life; *is* Wisdom, and *has* wisdom; and so forth. The first series of expressions refers to the incommunicable essence, the second to the inseparably distinct energies of the one essence, which descend upon creation.⁸⁴ None of these energies is hypostatic, nor hypostasis in itself, and their incalculable multiplicity introduces no composition into the Divine Being.⁸⁵ The totality of the Divine "energies" constitutes His pre-temporal will,

His design—His good pleasure—concerning the "other," His eternal counsel. This is God Himself, not His Essence, but *His will*.⁸⁶ The distinction between "essence" and "energies"—or, it could be said, between "nature" and "grace" [φύσις and χάρις]—corresponds to the mysterious distinction in God between "necessity" and "freedom," understood in a proper sense. In His mysterious essence God is, as it were, "necessitated"—not, indeed, by any necessity of constraint, but by a kind of necessity of nature, which is, in the words of St. Athanasius the Great, "above and antecedent to free choice."⁸⁷ And with permissible boldness one may say: God cannot but be the Trinity of persons. The Triad of Hypostases is above the Divine Will, is, as it were, "a necessity" or "law" of the Divine nature. This internal "necessity" is expressed as much in the notion of the "consubstantiality" as in that of the perfect indivisibility of the Three Persons as They co-exist in and intercompennetrate one another. In the judgment of St. Maximus the Confessor, it would be unfitting and fruitless to introduce the notion of will into the internal life of the Godhead for the sake of defining the relations between the Hypostases, because the Persons of the All-Holy Trinity exist together above any kind of relation and action, and by Their Being determine the relations between Themselves.⁸⁸ The common and undivided "natural" will of God is free. God is free in His operations and acts. And therefore for a dogmatic confession of the reciprocal relations between the Divine Hypostases, expressions must be found such as will exclude any cosmological motives, any relation to created being and its destinies, any relation to creation or re-creation. The ground of Trinitarian being is not in the economy or revelation of God *ad extra*. The mystery of the intra-Divine life should be conceived in total abstraction from the dispensation; and the hypostatic properties of the Persons must be defined apart from all relationship to the existence of creation, and only according to the relationship that subsists between Them-

selves. The living relationship of God—precisely as a Triad—to the creation is in no way thus obscured; the distinction in the relations of the different Hypostases towards the creation is in no wise obscured. Rather, a fitting perspective is thus established. The entire meaning of the dogmatic definition of Christ's Divinity as it was interpreted by the Church actually lay in the exclusion of all predicates relative to the Divine condescension which characterize Him as Creator and Redeemer, as Demiurge and Saviour, in order to understand His Divinity in the light of the internal Divine Life and Nature and Essence. The creative relationship of the Word to the world is explicitly confessed in the Nicene Creed—*by Whom all things were made*. And "things" were made not only because the Word is God, but also because the Word is the Word of God, the Divine Word. No one was as emphatic in separating the demiurgical moment in Christ's action from the dogma of the eternal generation of the Word as St. Athanasius the Great. The generation of the Word does not presuppose the being—and not even the design—of the world. Even had the world not been created, the Word would exist in the completeness of His Godhead, because the Word is *Son by nature* [οὐδὸς κατὰ φύσιν]. "If it had pleased God not to create any creatures, the Word would nevertheless be with God, and the Father would be in Him," as St. Athanasius said; and this because creatures cannot receive their being otherwise than through the Word.⁸⁹ The creatures are created by the Word and through the Word, "in the image" of the Word, "in the image of the image" of the Father, as St. Methodius of Olympus once expressed it.⁹⁰ The creation presupposes the Trinity, and the seal of the Trinity lies over the whole creation; yet one must not therefore introduce cosmological motifs into the definition of the intra-Trinitarian Being. And yet one may say that the natural fulness of the Divine essence is contained within the Trinity, and therefore that the design—His good pleasure—concerning the world is a cre-

ative act, an operation of the will—an abundance of Divine love, a gift and a grace. The distinction between the names of "God in Himself," in His eternal being, and those names which describe God in revelation, "economy," action, is not only a subjective distinction of our analytical thinking; it has an objective and ontological meaning, and expresses the absolute freedom of Divine creativity and operation. This includes the "economy" of salvation. The Divine Counsel concerning salvation and redemption is an eternal and pre-temporal decree, an "eternal purpose" (Eph. 3:11), "the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God" (Eph. 3:9). The Son of God is from everlasting destined to the Incarnation and the Cross, and therefore He is the Lamb "Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world" (I Pet. 1:19-20), "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. 13:8). But this "purpose" [πρόθεσις] does not belong to the "essential" necessity of the Divine nature; it is not a "work of nature, but the image of economical condescension," as St. John Damascene says.⁹¹ This is an act of Divine love—*for God so loved the world...* And therefore the predicates referring to the economy of salvation do not coincide with those predicates by which the Hypostatic Being of the Second Person is defined. In Divine revelation there is no constraint, and this is expressed in the notion of the perfect Divine Beatitude. Revelation is an act of love and freedom, and therefore introduces no change into the Divine nature.⁹² It introduces no change simply because there are no "natural" foundations for revelation at all. The sole foundation of the world consists in God's freedom, in the freedom of Love.

IV

From eternity God "thinks up" the image of the world, and this free good pleasure of His is an *immutable*, un-

changeable counsel. But this immutability of the accomplished will does not in the least imply its necessity. The immutability of God's will is rooted in His supreme freedom. And therefore it does not bind His freedom in creation, either. It would be very appropriate here to recall the scholastic distinction between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*.

And in conformity with the design—the good pleasure of God—creation, together with time, is ‘built up’ from out of nothing. Through temporal becoming, creation must advance by its own free ascent according to the standard of the Divine economy respecting it, according to the standard of the pre-temporal image of and predestination for it. The Divine image of the world always remains above and beyond creation *by nature*. Creation is bound by it unchangeably and inseparably, is bound even in its very resistance to it. Because this “image” or “idea” of creation is simultaneously the will of God [Ἑλληνική ἔννοια] and the power of God by which creation is made and sustained; and the beneficent counsel of the Creator is not made void by the resistance of creation, but through this resistance turns out to be, for rebels, a judgment, the force of wrath, a consuming fire. In the Divine image and counsel, each creature—i.e., every created hypostasis in its imperishable and irreproducible form—is contained. Out of eternity God sees and wills, by His good pleasure, each and every being in the completeness of its particular destiny and features, even regarding its future and sin. And if, according to the mystical insight of St. Symeon the New Theologian, in the age to come “Christ will behold all the numberless myriads of Saints, turning His glance away from none, so that to each one of them it will seem that He is looking at him, talking with him, and greeting him,” and yet “while remaining unchanged, He will seem different to one and different to another”⁹³—so likewise out of eternity, God in the counsel of His good pleasure, beholds all the

innumerable myriads of created hypostases, wills them, and to each one of them manifests Himself in a different way. And herein consists the "inseparable distribution" of His grace or energy, "myriadfold hypostatic" in the bold phrase of St. Gregory Palamas,⁹⁴ because this grace or energy is beneficently imparted to thousands upon myriads of thousands of hypostases. Each hypostasis, in its own being and existence, is sealed by a particular ray of the good pleasure of God's love and will. And in this sense, all things are in God—in "image" [ἐν ἰδέα καὶ παραδείγματι] *but not by nature*, the created "all" being infinitely remote from Uncreated Nature. This remoteness is bridged by Divine love, its impenetrability done away by the Incarnation of the Divine Word. Yet this remoteness remains. *The image of creation* in God transcends created nature and does not coincide with "the image of God" in creation. Whatever description may be given to the "image of God" in man, it is a characteristic moment of his created nature—// *is created*. It is a "likeness," a mirroring.⁹⁵ But above the image the Proto-Image always shines, sometimes with a gladdenning, sometimes with a threatening, light. It shines as a call and a norm. There is in creation a supra-natural challenging goal set above its own nature—the challenging goal, founded on freedom, of a free participation in and union with God. This challenge transcends created nature, but only by responding to it is this nature itself revealed in its completeness. This challenging goal is an aim, an aim that can be realized only through the *self-determination* and efforts of the creature. Therefore the process of created becoming is real in its freedom, and free in its reality, and it is by this becoming that what-was-not reaches fulfilment and is achieved. Because it is guided by the *challenging goal*. In it is room for creation, construction, for re-construction—not only in the sense of recovering, but also in the sense of generating what is new. The scope of the constructiveness is defined by the contradiction between the *nature* and the

goal. In a certain sense, this goal itself is "natural" and proper to the one who does the constructive acts, so that the attainment of this goal is somehow also the subject's realization of *himself*. And nevertheless this "I" which is realized and realizable through constructiveness is not the "natural" and empiric "I", inasmuch as any such realization of one's self" is a rupture— a leap from the plane of nature onto the plane of grace, because this realization is the acquisition of the Spirit, is participation in God. Only in this "communion" with God does a man become "himself"; in separation from God and in self-isolation, on the contrary, he falls to a plane lower than himself. But at the same time, he does not realize himself merely *out of himself*. Because the goal lies beyond nature, it is an invitation to a living and free encounter and union with God. The world is substantially different from God. And therefore God's plan for the world can be realized only by created becoming—because this plan is not a substratum or *substantia* that comes into being and completes itself, but is the standard and crown of the "other's" becoming. On the other hand, the created process is not therefore a development, or not only a development; its meaning does not consist in the mere unfolding and manifestation of innate "natural" ends, or not only in this. Rather, the ultimate and supreme self-determination of created nature emerges in its zealous impulse to outstrip itself in a κίνησις ὑπὲρ φύσιν, as St. Maximus says.⁹⁶ And an anointing shower of grace responds to this inclination, crowning the efforts of the creatures.

The limit and goal of creaturely striving and becoming is *divinization* [θέωσις] or *deification* [θεοποίησις]. But even in this, the immutable, unchangeable gap between natures will remain: any "transubstantiation" of the creature is excluded. It is true that according to a phrase of St. Basil the Great preserved by St. Gregory the Theologian, creation "has been ordered to become God."⁹⁷ But this

"deification" is only communion with God, *participation* [μετουσίᾳ] in His life and gifts, and thereby a kind of acquisition of certain similitude to the Divine Reality. Anointed and sealed by the Spirit, men become *conformed* to the Divine image or prototype of themselves; and through this they become "conformed to God" [σύμμορφοι Θεῷ].⁹⁸ With the Incarnation of the Word the first fruit of human nature is unalterably grafted into the Divine Life, and hence to all creatures the way to communion with this Life is open, the way of *adoption* by God. In the phrase of St. Athanasius, the Word "became man in order to *deify* [θεοποίησῃ] us in Himself,"⁹⁹ in order that "the sons of men might become the sons of God."¹⁰⁰ But this "divinization" is acquired because Christ, the Incarnate Word, has made us "receptive to the Spirit," that He has prepared for us both the ascension and resurrection as well as the indwelling and appropriation of the Holy Spirit.¹⁰¹ Through the "flesh-bearing God" we have become "Spirit-bearing men"; we have become sons "by grace," "sons of God in the likeness of the Son of God."¹⁰² And thus is recovered what had been lost since the original sin, when "the transgression of the commandment turned man into what he was by nature,"¹⁰⁹ over which he had been elevated in his very first adoption or birth from God, coinciding with his initial creation.¹⁰⁴ The expression so dear to St. Athanasius and to St. Gregory the Theologian, Θεὸν γενέσθαι,¹⁰⁵ finds its complementary explanation in a saying of two other Cappadocian Saints: ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὸν Θεόν.¹⁰⁶ If Macarius the Egyptian dare speak of the "changing" of Spirit-bearing souls "into the Divine nature," of "participation in the Divine nature,"¹⁰⁷ he nevertheless understands this participation as a κρασις δι' ἄλλων, *i.e.*, as a certain "mingling" of the two, preserving the properties and entities of each in particular.¹⁰⁸ But he also stresses that "the Divine Trinity comes to dwell in that soul which, by the cooperation of Divine Grace, keeps herself pure—He comes to dwell

not as He is in Himself, because He is incontainable by any creature—but according to the measure of the capacity and receptivity of man.”¹⁰⁹ Explicit formulae concerning this were not established all at once, but from the very beginning the impassable gulf between the natures was rigorously marked, and the distinction between the notions κατ’ οὐσίαν (or κατὰ φύσιν) and κατὰ μετουσίαν was rigorously observed and kept. The concept of “divinization” was crystallized only when the doctrine of God’s “energies” had been explicated once and for all. In this regard the teaching of St. Maximus is significant. “The salvation of those who are saved is accomplished by grace and not by nature.”¹¹⁰ and if “in Christ the entire fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily according to essence then in us, on the contrary, there is not the fulness of the Godhead according to grace.”¹¹¹ The longed-for “divinization” which is to come is a likeness by grace, και φανῶμεν αὐτῷ ὁμοιοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκ χάριτος θεώσιν.¹¹² And even by becoming partakers of Divine Life, “in the unity of love,” “by co-inhering totally and entirely with the whole of God,” [ἄλος δλω περιχώρησας ολικῶς τῷ Θεῷ] by appropriating all that is Divine, the creature “nevertheless remains outside the essence of God,”—χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν ταυτότητα.¹¹³ And what is most remarkable in this is the fact that St. Maximus directly identifies the deifying grace with the Divine good pleasure as regards creation, with the creative fiat.¹¹⁴ In its efforts to acquire the Spirit, the human hypostasis becomes a vehicle and vessel of Grace; it is in a manner imbued with it, so that by it God’s creative will is accomplished—the will which has summoned that-which-is-not into being in order to receive those that will come into His communion. And the creative good pleasure itself concerning each and every particular is already by itself a descending stream of Grace—but not everyone opens to the Creator and God Who knocks. Human nature must be freely discovered through a responsive movement, by overcoming the self-isolation of its

own nature; and by denying the self, as one might say, receive this mysterious, and terrifying, and unspeakable double-naturedness for sake of which the world was made. For it was made to be and to become the Church, the Body of Christ.

The meaning of history consists in this—that the freedom of creation should respond by accepting the pre-temporal counsel of God, that it should respond both in word and in deed. In the promised double-naturedness of the Church the reality of created nature is affirmed at the outset. Creation is *the other*, another nature willed by God's good pleasure and brought forth from nothing by the Divine freedom for creation's own freedom's sake. It must conform itself freely to that creative standard by which it lives and moves and has its being. Creation is not this standard, and this standard is not creation. In some mysterious way, human freedom becomes a kind of "limitation" on the Divine omnipotence, because it pleased God to save creation not by compulsion, but by freedom alone. Creation is "other," and therefore the process of ascent to God must be accomplished by her own powers—with God's help, to be sure. Through the Church creaturely efforts are crowned and saved. And creation is restored to its fulness and reality. And the Church follows, or, rather, portrays the mystery and miracle of the two natures. As the Body of Christ, the Church is a kind of "plenitude" of Christ—as Theophan the Recluse says—"just as the tree is the 'plenitude' of the seed."¹¹⁵ And the Church is united to Her Head. "Just as we do not ordinarily see iron when it is red-hot, because the iron's qualities are completely concealed by the fire," says Nicholas Cabasilas in his *Commentary on the Divine Liturgy*, "so, if you could see the Church of Christ in Her true form, as She is united to Christ and participates in His Flesh, then you would see Her as none other than the Lord's Body alone."¹¹⁶ In the Church creation is forever confirmed

and established, unto all ages, in union with Christ, in the Holy Spirit.

Translated from the Russian

IV
EVIL

The Darkness of Night

"Evil Is Among Us"

The existence of evil is a paradox and a mystery.

The Existence of Evil as a Paradox

IN A WORLD which is created by God and whose laws and purposes are established by Divine wisdom and goodness—how is it possible that evil exists? For evil is precisely that which opposes itself to and resists God, it perverts his designs and repudiates his ordinances. Evil is that which is not created by God. And since the Divine will establishes the reasons for everything which exists,—and this Sovereign will alone establishes “sufficient reasons”—one can assert that evil, as evil, exists despite a lack of reasons, exists without a single reason for its very existence. As St. Gregory of Nyssa stated, it is “an unsown herb, without seed and without root.” One could say: *phaenomenon omnino non fundatum*. It is God alone who establishes the foundations of the world.

Certainly there are always and everywhere causes and reasons for evil. But the *causality* of evil is deeply peculiar.

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The causes and reasons of evil are always an absurdity, more or less veiled. This strange causality is not included in the ideal "chain" of God's universal causality; it splits and disfigures it. It is a causality which rivals that of the Creator, as if it came from a destroyer of the world. And this destructive power—whence does it come? For all real power belongs to God alone. One wonders whether the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of God. And, nevertheless, this illegitimate power is not at all an anaemic phantom. It is really a force, a violent energy. And the opposition of evil to God is very active. The Good is seriously limited and oppressed by the insurrection of evil. God himself is engaged in a struggle with these powers of darkness. And in this struggle there are very real losses, there is a perpetual diminution of the Good. Evil is an ontological danger. Universal harmony, willed and established by God, is really decomposed. The world is fallen. The entire world is surrounded by a dismal twilight of nothingness. No longer is it that world which was conceived and created by God. There are morbid innovations, new existences—false existences but real. Evil adds something to what is created by God, it has a "miraculous" force of *imitating* creation—indeed, evil is productive in its destructions. In the fallen world there is an incomprehensible surplus, a surplus which has entered existence against the will of God. In a certain sense, the world is stolen from its Master and Creator. It is more than an intellectual paradox; it is rather a scandal, a terrible temptation for faith, because, above all, this destruction of existence by evil is in a large measure irreparable. The lofty "universalist" hope is prohibited us by the direct witness of Holy Scripture and by the explicit teaching of the Church. There will be exterior darkness for "the sons of perdition" in the world to come! In the case of perseverance in evil, all the devastations and perversions produced by it will preserve themselves forever in the paradoxical eternity of hell. Hell is a sinister testimony to the staggering power of evil. In

the final reckoning of this historical struggle between Divine Goodness and evil, all the ravages produced among unrepentant beings will only be simply acknowledged by the final decree of condemnation. The perverse split, introduced into the world of God by an act of usurped power, seems to be eternal. The unity of the world is compromised forever. Evil seems to have eternal conquests. The obstinacy in evil, its resolved impenitence, is never covered by the omnipotence of God's compassion. We are now already in the realm of the full mystery.

The Existence of Evil as a **Mystery**

God has his response to the world of evil. "The ancient law of human freedom," as St. Irenaeus states, is still respected by God, who has granted from the beginning this dignity to spiritual beings. Any coercion or compulsion by Divine Grace is excluded. God has in fact responded to evil authoritatively once for all through his Beloved Son who came upon earth to bear here the sins of the world and the sins of all humanity. God's absolute response to evil was the Cross of Jesus, the sufferings of the Servant of God, the Death of the Incarnate Son. "Evil begins on earth, but it disquiets heaven, and causes the Son of God to descend to earth," stated a Russian preacher of the 19th century. Evil causes God himself to suffer, and he accepts this suffering to the end. And the glory of eternal life shines forth victoriously from the tomb of God Incarnate. The Passion of Jesus was a triumph, a decisive victory. But it is rather a triumph of Divine Love which calls and accepts without any coercion. From this time on the very existence of evil is given to us only within this framework of the Co-Suffering Love of God. And also the Love, and even the sublime majesty of God, are revealed to us in the enigmatic frame-

work of evil and sin... *Felix culpa quae tantum et talem meruit h ab eve Redemptorem.*

One defines evil as nothingness. Certainly evil never exists by itself but only inside of Goodness. Evil is a pure negation, a privation or a mutilation. Undoubtedly evil is a lack, a defect, *dejectus*. But the structure of evil is rather antinomic. Evil is a void of nothingness but a void which exists, which swallows and devours beings. Evil is a powerlessness; it never creates but its destructive energy is enormous. Evil never ascends; it always descends. But the very debasement of being which it produces is frightening. Nevertheless, there is an illusory grandeur itself in this baseness of evil. Occasionally there is something of genius in sin and in evil. Evil is chaotic, it is a separation, a decomposition constantly in progress, a disorganization of the entire structure of being. But evil is also, without doubt, vigorously organized. Everything in this sad domain of deception and illusion is amphibolic and ambiguous. Undoubtedly evil lives only through the Good which it deforms, but which it also adapts to its needs. But this deformed "Universe" is a reality which asserts itself.

Actually, the problem of evil is not at all a purely philosophical problem, and that is why it can never be resolved on the neutral plane of a theory of being. It is no longer a purely ethical problem and on the plane of natural morality one can never surmount the correlativity of good and evil. The problem of evil only takes on its proper character on the religious plane. And the meaning of evil is a radical opposition to God, a revolt, a disobedience, a resistance. And the unique source of evil, in the strict sense of the term, is sin, the opposition to God and the tragic separation from Him. Speculation about the freedom of choice is always barren and ambiguous. Freedom of choice, the *libertas minor* of St. Augustine and the "*gnomic will*" ["*θέλημα γνωμικόν*"] of St. Maximos the Confessor, is a disfigured freedom, a freedom diminished and impover-

ished, a freedom as it exists after the fall among fallen beings. The duality of purpose, the two correlative directions, do not belong to the essence of the primordial freedom of innocent beings. It must be restored to penitent sinners through asceticism and Grace. And original sin was not just an erroneous choice, not just an option for the wrong direction, but rather a refusal to ascend toward God, a desertion from the service of God.

Actually, choice as such was not at all possible for the first sinner because evil did not yet exist as an ideal possibility. If, however, it was a choice, it was not a choice *between* good and evil but only a choice between God and himself, between service and sloth. And it is precisely in this sense that St. Athanasius interpreted the fall and original sin in his work *Contra Gentes*. The vocation of primordial man, innate in his very nature, was to love God with filial devotion and to serve him in the world of which man was designated to be prophet, priest, and king. It was an appeal from the paternal love of God to the filial love of man. Undoubtedly to follow God involved a total surrender to Divine arms. This was not yet a sacrifice. Innocent man had nothing to sacrifice, for everything he possessed came from the Grace of God. Here there is something more profound than a voluptuous attachment to the world. It was rather a tragedy of a misguided love. According to St. Athanasius, the human fall consists precisely in the fact that man limits himself to himself, that man becomes, as it were, in love with himself. And through this concentration on himself man separated himself from God and broke the spiritual and free contact with God. It was a kind of delirium, a self-erotic obsession, a spiritual narcissism. And through this man isolated himself from God and soon became aware of being involved in the external cosmic flow. One can say it was a de-spiritualization of human existence. All the rest came as a result—the death and decomposition of human structure. In any case, the fall was realized first in

the realm of the spirit, just as it already was in the angelic world. The meaning of original sin is the same everywhere—self-eroticism, pride, and vanity. All the rest is only a projection of this spiritual catastrophe into the different areas of human structure. Evil comes from above, not from below; from the created spirit and not from matter. It is more profound than a false choice of direction, more profound even than a choice between an inferior and a superior good. Rather, it was the infidelity of love, the insane separation from the Only One who is worthy of affection and love. This infidelity is the main source of the negative character of evil. It was a primordial negation and it was fatal.

It is necessary to take precaution and not identify the infirmity of fallen nature with the inherent imperfection of all created nature. There is nothing morbid or sinister in the "natural imperfection" of created nature except what is penetrated "from above" *after* the consummated fall. In pre-fallen nature, one can perhaps speak of lack and flaws. But in the fallen world there is something more—a perversion, a revolt, a vertiginous blasphemy, violence. It is the domain of usurpation. The dark tide of this perverted love envelops all creatures and the entire cosmos. Behind all the negations of evil one always discerns something quasi-positive, this initial licentiousness, the egoistic arbitrariness of finite personalities. The fallen world is de-centralized, or rather it is oriented around an imaginary or fictitious center. One could say perhaps that the circle (with a unique center) is deformed, becoming an ellipse with two points of reference—God and anti-God. Being, in any case, is dynamically divided in two. There are now two tendencies which intersect and cross each other, both remaining essentially different. One could say there are two worlds within one: there are the Two Cities of St. Augustine. Evil, beginning with a practical atheism, puts itself in the place of God, resulting in a theoretical atheism and consequently in a resolved deification of itself. And in this *dualized* world true freedom

does not exist. Freedom of choice is only a remote and pale reflection of real freedom.

Evil is created by personal agents. Evil, in the strict sense of this word, exists only in persons or in their creations and their acts. Physical and cosmic evil also originates from these personal acts. And that is why evil can have a power, can be active. For evil is a perverse personal activity. But this activity inevitably spreads itself to the impersonal. Evil de-personalizes personality itself. Complete de-personalization, however, can never be achieved; there is a potential limit which can never be attained. But the tendency and the aspiration of evil toward this limit of total disintegration is energetically accentuated everywhere. Even demons never cease being persons. It is the intrinsic form of their existence which cannot be lost. But, since personality *is* the "image of God" in spiritual beings, personal character can only be preserved in a constant conversation with God. Separated from God, personality vanishes, is stricken with a spiritual sterility. The isolated personality, which encloses itself within itself, often loses itself. In the state of sin there is always tension between the two internal solicitations: the "I" and something impersonal, represented by instincts or rather by passions.

Passions are the place, the seat of evil in the human person. "Passions," τα πάθη of the Fathers and of the Greek masters of spirituality, are active, they entrap—it is the person possessed by passions who is passive, who suffers constraint. Passions are always impersonal; they are a concentration of cosmic energies which make the human person its prisoner, its slave. They are blind and they blind those whom they possess. The impassioned man, "the man of passions," does not act on his own, but is rather acted upon: *fata trahunt*. He often loses even the consciousness of being a free agent. He doubts the existence and the possibility of freedom in general. He adopts rather the "*necessarionist*" concept of reality [the expression of Charles Rénouvier].

And, as a consequence, he loses his personality, his personal identity. He becomes chaotic, with multiple faces, or rather—masks. The “man of passions” is not at all free, although he can give an impression of activity and energy. He is nothing more than a “ball” of impersonal influences. He is hypnotized by these influences which actually have a power over him. Arbitrariness is not freedom. Or, perhaps, it is an imaginary freedom which engenders servitude. In the spiritual life we begin precisely with a struggle against passions. And “impassibility” is actually the main goal of spiritual ascent.

“Impassibility,” the ἀπάθεια of the Greeks, is in general poorly understood and interpreted. It is not an indifference, not a cold insensibility of the heart. On the contrary, it is an active state, a state of spiritual activity, which is acquired only after struggles and ordeals. It is rather an independence from passions. Each person’s own “I” is finally regained, freeing oneself from fatal bondage. But one can regain oneself only in God. True “impassibility” is achieved only in an encounter with the Living God. The path which leads there is the path of obedience, even of servitude to God, but this servitude engenders true freedom, a concrete freedom, the real freedom of the adopted sons of God. In evil the human personality is absorbed by the impersonal milieu, even though the sinner may pretend to be free. In God the personality is restored and reintegrated in the Holy Spirit, although a severe discipline is imposed on the individual.

Evil is revealed to us in the world at first under the aspect of suffering and sorrow. The world is empty, cold, indifferent (cf. “the indifferent nature” in Pushkin). It is a non-responding wasteland. We all suffer because of evil. Evil, disseminated everywhere in the world, causes us to suffer. And the contemplation of this universal suffering brings us sometimes to the brink of despair. Universal suffering was not discovered for the first time by Schopenhauer. It was attested to already by St. Paul (Rom. 8:20-22) and he has

given us a very clear explication: evil is introduced in the creature by sin. All creation suffers. There is a cosmic suffering. The entire world is poisoned by evil and malevolent energies, and the entire world suffers because of it.

The intricate problem of Theodicy was first inspired by these facts of suffering. It was one of the primary questions of Dostoevsky. The world is hard, cruel, and pitiless. And the world is terrible and frightening: *tenor antiquus*. There is chaos in the world, there are subterranean storms, an elemental disorder. And man feels himself frail and lost in this inhospitable world. But evil encounters us not only externally, in an exterior milieu, but also internally, in our own existence. We also are sick—we ourselves—and we suffer because of it. And again there is an unexpected discovery—not only do we suffer from evil, but we *do* evil. And sometimes one is delighted with evil and unhappiness. One is sometimes enraptured by the *Fleurs du mal*. One sometimes dreams of an "ideal of Sodom." The abyss—it has a sinister appeal. Sometimes one loves ambiguous choices. One can be enchanted by them. It is easier to do evil than to do good. Everyone can discover in himself this "subterranean" darkness, the subconscious full of malignant seeds, full of cruelty and deceit. Alas—the analyses of Dostoevsky (and of many others) are not morbid dreams of a pessimist who looks at life through a black glass. It is a truthful revelation of the sad reality of our existential situation. And one could find the same revelations in the ancient teachers of Christian spirituality. There is a delirium, a spiritual fever, a *libido* at the core of "this world/" at the core of our existence. One cannot ask an insane or maniacal person for reasons. He does not have reasons for his folly, he has lost his reason, he is insane. Origen was very close to the correct solution when he attributed the origin of evil, in the world of spirits, either to boredom and idleness [*desidia et lahoris taedium in servando bono*], or to a satiety of Divine contemplation and love [*De princ.* II, 9-2; and 8-3]. In any case, with regard to

us now, we find in our heart and in our intelligence many revivals of the same paroxysms of delirium, the same absurdities. *Libido* is not the same thing as carnal concupiscence. It is a broader term. It is synonymous with self-eroticism, originating from sin. Evil in man is an ignorance [$\alpha\gamma\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$] and an insensibility, the blindness of reason and the hardness of the heart. Man seals himself up, encloses himself in himself, he isolates and separates himself. But evil is multi-form and chaotic. There are contrasting forms in evil: the aggressive form—*der Wille zur Macht*, sadism; and the solipsistic form—indifference, “the cold heart.” Evil is divided within itself: it is a discord and a disharmony, *inordinatio*. Evil is ambiguous, wavering, variable. It does not have its own stable character. The seat of evil in man is in the depths of the heart, and not only on the empirical plane. Nature itself is affected, nature itself is no longer pure. And it is rather dynamic, a dynamic or functional perversion which is not yet consolidated in a metaphysical transformation. The existence of evil is a parasitical existence; evil lives because of the Good, *ex ratione boni*. The elements are the same in the original world and in the fallen world. But the principle of organization is changed. And although dynamic, the perversion is inconvertible. He who has descended voluntarily into the abyss of evil cannot reascend from there by himself. His energies are exhausted. Without doubt, even in the demoniac depths the creature remains the work of God and the traits of Divine design are never effaced. The image of God, obscured by the infidelity of sin, is nevertheless preserved intact, and that is why there is always, even in the abyss, an ontological receptacle for Divine appeal, for the Grace of God. This is true even for those who obstinately shut themselves off from the appeal of the Cross, who have always rendered themselves incapable of receiving the vivifying gifts of this Divine Love, the gifts of the Paraclete. Metaphysical identity is not destroyed even among the demons. Demons are still, according to a phrase by St.

Gregory of Nyssa, angels by nature, and angelic dignity is not completely abolished in them.

But perhaps we could say that this image of God in man is paralyzed in a certain sense, and rendered ineffective after the separation from the One who should always be reflected in this image, in this living and personal mirror. It is not enough to begin again the ascent to God—it is necessary to have the living co-operation of God himself, who restores the circulation of spiritual life in a dead man, enslaved in and paralyzed by sin and evil. The paradox of evil resides precisely in this split of human existence and in the entire cosmic structure; it resides in the dynamic splitting of life in two, a split which resulted from the separation from God. It is as though there were two souls within each person. Good and evil are strangely mixed. But no synthesis is possible. "Natural" Good is too weak to resist evil. And evil exists only through the Good. Human unity is seriously compromised, if not lost. The Grace of God alone can surmount this human impasse.

Formal analysis of evil is not enough. The existence of evil is a reality on the religious plane. And only through spiritual effort can one understand and resolve this paradox, surmount this scandal, and penetrate the mystery of Good and Evil.

Translated from the French
by RICHARD HAUGH

v

REDEMPTION

Redemption

The Incarnation and Redemption

“**THE WORD BECAME FLESH**”: in this is the ultimate joy of the Christian faith. In this is the fulness of Revelation. The Same Incarnate Lord is both perfect God and perfect man. The full significance and the ultimate purpose of human existence is revealed and realized in and through the Incarnation. He came down from Heaven to redeem the earth, to unite man with God for ever. “And became man.” The new age has been initiated. We count now the “*anni Domini*.” As St. Irenaeus wrote: “the Son of God became the Son of Man, that man also might become the son of God.”¹ Not only is the original fulness of human nature restored or re-established in the Incarnation. Not only does human nature return to its once lost communion with God. The Incarnation is also the new Revelation, the new and further step. The first Adam was a living soul. But the last Adam is the Lord from Heaven [1 Cor. 15:47]. And in the Incarnation of the Word human nature was not merely anointed with a superabundant overflowing of Grace, but was assumed into an intimate and hypostatical unity with the Divinity itself. In that lifting up of human nature into an everlasting communion with the Divine Life, the Fathers of the early Church unanimously saw the very essence of salvation, the basis of the whole re-

deeming work of Christ. "That is saved which is united with God," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus. And what was not united could not be saved at all. This was his chief reason for insisting, against Apollinarius,² on the fulness of human nature, assumed by the Only Begotten in the Incarnation. This was the fundamental motive in the whole of early theology, in St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Maximus the Confessor. The whole history of Christological dogma was determined by this fundamental conception: the Incarnation of the Word as Redemption. In the Incarnation human history is completed. God's eternal will is accomplished, "the mystery from eternity hidden and to angels unknown." The days of expectation are over. The Promised and the Expected has come. And from henceforth, to use the phrase of St. Paul, the life of man "is hid with Christ in God" [Colossians 3:3]....

The Incarnation of the Word was an absolute manifestation of God. And above all it was a revelation of Life. Christ is the Word of Life, *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς*... "and the life was manifested, and we have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us" [1 John 1:1-2].³ The Incarnation is the quickening of man, as it were, the resurrection of human nature. But the climax of the Gospel is the Cross, the death of the Incarnate. Life has been revealed in full through death. This is the paradoxical mystery of the Christian faith: life through death, life from the grave and out of the grave, the mystery of the life-bearing grave. And we are born to real and eternal life only through our baptismal death and burial in Christ; we are regenerated with Christ in the baptismal font. Such is the invariable law of true life. "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die" [I Cor. 15:36].

"Great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh" [I Timothy 3:16]. But God was not manifest

in order to recreate the world at once by the exercise of His omnipotent might, or to illuminate and transfigure it by the overwhelming light of His glory. It was in the uttermost humiliation that this revelation of Divinity was wrought. The Divine will does not abolish the original status of human freedom or "self-power" [το αὐτεξούστον], it does not destroy or abolish the "ancient law of human freedom."⁴ Herein is revealed a certain self-limitation or "*kenosis*" of the Divine might. And more than that, a certain *kenosis* of Divine Love itself. Divine love, as it were, restricts and limits itself in the maintenance of the freedom of the creation. Love does not impose the healing by compulsion as it might have done. There was no compelling evidence in this manifestation of God. Not all recognized the Lord of Glory under that "guise of the servant." He deliberately took upon Himself. And whosoever did recognize, did so not by any natural insight, but by the revelation of the Father [cf. Matt. 16:17]. The Incarnate Word appeared on earth as man among men. This was the redeeming assumption of all human fulness, not only of human nature, but also of all the fulness of human life. The Incarnation had to be manifested in all the fulness of life, in the fulness of human ages, that all that fulness might be sanctified. This is one of the aspects of the idea of the "summing up" of all in Christ (*recapitulatio*, ἀνακεφαλαιώσις) which was taken up with such emphasis by St. Irenaeus from St. Paul.⁵ This was the "humiliation" of the Word [cf. Phil. 2:7]. But this "*kenosis*" was no reduction of His Divinity, which in the Incarnation continues unchanged, ἀνευ τροπῆς. It was, on the contrary, a lifting-up of man, the "deification" of human nature, the "*theosis*." As St. John Damascene says, in the Incarnation "three things were accomplished at once: the assumption, the existence, and the deification of humanity by the Word."⁶ It must be stressed that in the Incarnation the Word assumes the original human nature, innocent and free from original sin,

without any stain. This does not violate the fulness of nature, nor does this affect the Saviour's likeness to us sinful people. For sin does not belong to human nature, but is a parasitic and abnormal growth. This point was vigorously stressed by St. Gregory of Nyssa and particularly by St. Maximus the Confessor in connection with their teaching of the will as the seat of sin.⁷ In the Incarnation the Word assumes the first-formed human nature, created "in the image of God," and thereby the image of God is again re-established in man.⁸ This was not yet the assumption of human suffering or of suffering humanity. It was an assumption of human life, but not yet of human death. Christ's freedom from original sin constitutes also His freedom from death, which is the "wages of sin." Christ is unstained from corruption and mortality right from His birth. And like the First Adam before the Fall, He is able not to die at all, *potens non mori*, though obviously He can still die, *potens autem mori*. He was exempt from the necessity of death, because His humanity was pure and innocent. Therefore Christ's death was and could not but be voluntary, not by the necessity of fallen nature, but by free choice and acceptance.⁹

A distinction must be made between the assumption of human nature and the taking up of sin by Christ. Christ is "the Lamb of God that taketh the sin of the world" [John I:29].¹⁰ But He does not take the sin of the world in the Incarnation. That is an act of the will, not a necessity of nature. The Saviour *bears* the sin of the world (rather than *assumes* it) by the free choice of love. He bears it in such a way that it does not become His own sin, or violate the purity of His nature and will. He carries it freely; hence this "taking up" of sin has a redeeming power, as a free act of compassion and love.¹¹ This taking up of sin is not merely a compassion. In this world, which "lies in sin," even purity itself is suffering, it is a fount or cause of suffering. Hence it is that the righteous heart grieves and aches over unrighteousness, and suffers from the unrighteousness

of this world. The Saviour's life, as the life of a righteous and pure being, as a life pure and sinless, must inevitably have been in this world the life of one who suffered. The good is oppressive to this world, and this world is oppressive to the good. This world resists good and does not regard light. And it does not accept Christ, it rejects both Him and His Father [John 15:23-24]. The Saviour submits Himself to the order of this world, forbears, and the very opposition of this world is covered by His all-forgiving love: "They know not what they do" [Luke 23:34]. The whole life of Our Lord is one Cross. But suffering is not yet the whole Cross. The Cross is more than merely suffering Good. The sacrifice of Christ is not yet exhausted by His obedience and endurance, forbearance, compassion, all-forgivingness. The one redeeming work of Christ cannot be separated into parts. Our Lord's earthly life is one organic whole, and His redeeming action cannot be exclusively connected with any one particular moment in that life. However, the climax of this life was its death. And the Lord plainly bore witness to the hour of death: "For this cause came I unto this hour" [John 12:27]. The redeeming death is the ultimate purpose of the Incarnation.¹²

The mystery of the Cross is beyond our rational comprehension. This "terrible sight" seems strange and startling. The whole life of Our Blessed Lord was one great act of forbearance, mercy and love. And the whole of it is illuminated by the eternal radiance of Divinity, though that radiance is invisible to the world of flesh and sin. But salvation is completed on Golgotha, not on Tabor, and the Cross of Jesus was foretold even on Tabor [cf. Luke 9:31]. Christ came not only that He might teach with authority and tell people the name of the Father, not only that He might accomplish works of mercy. He came to suffer and to die, and to rise again. He Himself more than once witnessed to this before the perplexed and startled disciples. He not only prophesied the coming Passion and death, but

plainly stated that He must, that He had to, suffer and be killed. He plainly said that "must," not simply "was about to." "And He began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders, and the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again" [Mark 8:31; also Matthew 16:21; Luke 9:22; 24:26]. "Must" [δεῖ] not just according to the law of this world, in which good and truth is persecuted and rejected, not just according to the law of hatred and evil. The death of Our Lord was in full freedom. No one takes His life away. He Himself offers His soul by His own supreme will and authority. "I have authority,"—ἐξουσίαν ἔχω—[John 10:18]. He suffered and died, "not because He could not escape suffering, but because He chose to suffer," as it is stated in the Russian Catechism. Chose, not merely in the sense of voluntary endurance or non-resistance, not merely in the sense that He permitted the rage of sin and unrighteousness to be vented on Himself. He not only permitted but *willed* it. He "must have died according to the *law of truth and love*. In no way was the Crucifixion a passive suicide or simply murder. It was a Sacrifice and an oblation. He had to die. This was not the necessity of this world. This was the necessity of Divine Love. The mystery of the Cross begins in eternity, "in the sanctuary of the Holy Trinity, unapproachable for creatures." And the transcendent mystery of God's wisdom and love is revealed and fulfilled in history. Hence Christ is spoken of as the Lamb, "who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world" [Peter 1:19], and even "that hath been slain from the foundation of the world [Rev. 13:8]."¹³ "The Cross of Jesus, composed of the enmity of the Jews and the violence of the Gentiles, is indeed but the earthly image and shadow of this heavenly Cross of love."¹⁴ This "Divine necessity" of the death on the Cross passes all understanding indeed. And the Church has never attempted any rational definition of this supreme mystery. Scriptural

terms have appeared, and do still appear, to be the most adequate ones. In any case, no merely ethical categories will do. The moral, and still more the legal or juridical conceptions, can never be more than colorless anthropomorphism. This is true even of the idea of sacrifice. The sacrifice of Christ cannot be considered as a mere offering or surrender. That would not explain the necessity of the death. For the whole life of the Incarnate One was one continuous sacrifice. Why then was this purest life yet insufficient for victory over death? Why was death vanquished only by death? And was death really a terrifying prospect for the Righteous One, for the Incarnate One, especially in the supreme foreknowledge of the coming Resurrection on the third day? But even ordinary Christian martyrs have accepted all their torments and sufferings, and death itself, in full calm and joy, as a crown and a triumph. The Chief of martyrs, the Protomartyr Christ Himself, was not less than they. And, by the same "Divine decree," by the same "Divine necessity," He "must" not only have been executed and reviled, and have died, but also have been raised on the third day. Whatever may be our interpretation of the Agony in the Garden, one point is perfectly clear. Christ was not a passive victim, but the Conqueror, even in His uttermost humiliation. He knew that this humiliation was no mere endurance or obedience, but the very path of Glory and of the ultimate victory. Nor does the idea of Divine justice alone, *justitia vindicativa*, reveal the ultimate meaning of the sacrifice of the Cross. The mystery of the Cross cannot be adequately presented in terms of the transaction, the requital, or the ransom.¹⁵ If the value of the death of Christ was infinitely enhanced by His Divine Personality, the same also applies to the whole of His life. All His deeds have an infinite value and significance as the deeds of the Incarnate Word of God. And they cover indeed superabundantly both all misdeeds and sinful shortcomings of the fallen human race. Finally, there could hardly be any

retributive justice in the Passion and death of the Lord, which might possibly have been in the death of even a righteous man. For this was not the suffering and death of a mere man, graciously supported by the Divine help because of his faithfulness and endurance. This death was the suffering of the Incarnate Son of God Himself, the suffering of unstained human nature already deified by its assumption into the hypostasis of the Word. Nor is this to be explained by the idea of a substitutional satisfaction, the *satisfactio vicaria* of the scholastics. Not because substitution is not possible. Christ did indeed take upon Himself the sin of the world. But because God does not seek the sufferings of anyone, He grieves over them. How could the penal death of the Incarnate, most pure and undefiled, be the abolition of sin, if death itself is the wages of sin, and if death exists only in the sinful world? Does Justice really restrain Love and Mercy, and was the Crucifixion needed to disclose the pardoning love of God, otherwise precluded from manifesting itself by the restraint of vindictory justice? If there was any restraint at all, it was rather a restraint of love. And justice was accomplished, in that Salvation was wrought by condescension, by a "*kenosis*," and not by omnipotent might. Probably a recreation of fallen mankind by the mighty intervention of the Divine omnipotence would have seemed to us simpler and more merciful. Strangely enough, the fulness of the Divine Love, which is intent to preserve our human freedom, appears to us rather as a severe request of transcendent justice, simply because it implies an appeal to the cooperation of the human will. Thus Salvation becomes a task for man himself also, and can be consummated only in freedom, with the response of man. The "image of God" is manifested in freedom. And freedom itself is all too often a burden for man. And in a certain sense it is indeed a superhuman gift and request, a supernatural path, the path of "deification," *theosis*. Is not this very *theosis* a burden for a self-imprisoned, selfish, and

self-sufficient being? And yet this burdensome gift of freedom is the ultimate mark of the Divine love and benevolence towards man. The Cross is not a symbol of Justice, but the symbol of Love Divine. St. Gregory of Nazianzus utters all these doubts with great emphasis in his remarkable Easter Sermon:

To whom, and why, is this blood poured out for us and shed, the great and most precious blood of God, the High Priest and Victim? ... We were in the power of the Evil One, sold to sin, and had brought this harm on ourselves by sensuality. ... If the price of ransom is given to none other than him in whose power we are held, then I ask, to whom and for what reason is such a price paid? ... If it is to the Evil One, then how insulting is this! The thief receives the price of ransom; he not only receives it from God, but even receives God Himself. For his tyranny he receives so large a price that it was only right to have mercy upon us. ... If to the Father, then first, in what way? Were we not in captivity under Him? ... And secondly, for what reason? For what reason was the blood of the Only Begotten pleasing to the Father, Who did not accept even Isaac, when offered by his father, but exchanged the offering, giving instead of the reasonable victim a lamb? ...

By all these questions St. Gregory tries to make clear the inexplicability of the Cross in terms of vindicatory justice. And he concludes: "From this it is evident that the Father accepted [the sacrifice], not because He demanded or had need, but by economy and because man had to be sanctified by the humanity of God."¹⁶

Redemption is not just the forgiveness of sins, it is not just man's reconciliation with God. Redemption is the abolition of sin altogether, the deliverance from sin and death.

And Redemption was accomplished on the Cross, "by the blood of His Cross" [Col. 1:20; cf. Acts 20:28; Rom. 5:9; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; Heb. 9:22; I John 1:7; Rev. 1:5-6; 5:9]. Not by the suffering of the Cross only, but precisely by the death on the Cross. And the ultimate victory is wrought, not by sufferings or endurance, but by death and resurrection. We enter here into the *ontological* depth of human existence. The death of Our Lord was the victory over death and mortality, not just the remission of sins, nor merely a justification of man, nor again a satisfaction of an abstract justice. And the very key to the Mystery can be given only by a coherent doctrine of human death.

II

The Mystery of Death and Redemption

In separation from God human nature becomes unsettled, goes out of tune, as it were, is decomposed. The very structure of man becomes unstable. The unity of the soul and the body becomes insecure. The soul loses its vital power, is no more able to quicken the body. The body is turned into the tomb and prison of the soul. And physical death becomes inevitable. The body and the soul are no longer, as it were, secured or adjusted to each other. The transgression of the commandment "reinstated man in the state of nature," says St. Athanasius, εἰς το κατὰ φύσιν ἐπέστρεφεν "that as he was made out of nothing, so also in his very existence he suffered in due time corruption according to all justice." For, being made out of nothing, the creature also exists over an abyss of nothingness, ever ready to fall into it. The created nature, St. Athanasius says, is mortal and infirm, "flowing and liable to decomposition," φύσις ρευστή καὶ διαλυομένη. And it is only saved from this "natural corruption" by the power of

heavenly Grace, "by the indwelling of the Word." Thus separation from God leads the creature to decomposition and disintegration.¹⁷ "For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground which cannot be gathered up again" [2 Samuel 14:14].

In Christian experience death is first revealed as a deep tragedy, as a painful metaphysical catastrophe, as a mysterious failure of human destiny. For death is not a normal end of human existence. Just the contrary. Man's death is abnormal, is a failure. God did not create death; He created man for incorruption and true being, that we "might have being," εἰς τὸ εἶναι [cf. Wisdom 6:18 and 2:23]. The death of man is the "wages of sin" [Romans 6:23]. It is a loss and corruption. And since the Fall the mystery of life is displaced by the mystery of death. What does it mean for a man to die? What is actually dying is obviously the body, for only the body is mortal and we speak of the "immortal" soul. In current philosophies nowadays, the "immortality of the soul" is emphasized to such an extent that the "mortality of man" is almost overlooked. In death this external, visible, and earthly bodily existence ceases. But yet, by some prophetic instinct, we say that it is "the man" who dies. For death surely breaks up human existence, although, admittedly, the human soul is "immortal," and personality is indestructible. Thus the question of death is first the question of the human body, of the corporeality of man. And Christianity proclaims not only the after-life of the immortal soul, but also the resurrection of the body. Man became mortal in the Fall, and actually dies. And the death of man becomes a cosmic catastrophe. For in the dying man, nature loses its immortal center, and itself, as it were, dies in man. Man was taken from nature, being made of the dust of the earth. But in a way he was taken out of nature, because God breathed into him the breath of life. St. Gregory of Nyssa comments on the narrative of Genesis in this way. "For God, it says, taking dust from the earth, fashioned man

and by His own breath planted life in the creature which He formed, in order that the earthly element might be raised by union with the Divine, and so the Divine grace in one even course might uniformly extend through all creation, the lower nature being mingled with that which is above the world."¹⁸ . . . Man is a sort of "microcosm," every kind of life is combined in him, and in him only the whole world comes into contact with God.¹⁹ Consequently man's apostasy estranges the whole creation from God, devastates it, and, as it were, deprives it of God. The Fall of man shatters the cosmic harmony. Sin is disorder, discord, lawlessness. Strictly speaking it is only man that dies. Death indeed is a law of nature, a law of organic life. But man's death means just his fall or entanglement into this cyclical motion of nature, just what ought not to have happened at all. As St. Gregory says, "from the nature of dumb animals mortality is transferred to a nature created for immortality." Only for man is death contrary to nature and mortality is evil.²⁰ Only man is wounded and mutilated by death. In the generic life of dumb animals, death is rather a natural moment in the development of the species; it is the expression rather of the generating power of life than of infirmity. However, with the fall of man, mortality, even in nature, assumes an evil and tragic significance. Nature itself, as it were, is poisoned by the fatal venom of human decomposition. With dumb animals, death is but the discontinuation of individual existence. In the human world, death strikes at personality, and personality is much greater than mere individuality. It is the body that becomes corruptible and liable to death through sin. Only the body can disintegrate. Yet it is not the body that dies, but the whole man. For man is organically composed of body and soul. Neither soul nor body separately represents man. A body without a soul is but a corpse, and a soul without body is a ghost. Man is not a ghost *sans*-corpse, and corpse is not a part of man. Man is not a "bodiless demon," simply con-

fined in the prison of the body. Mysterious as the union of soul and body indeed is, the immediate consciousness of man witnesses to the organic wholeness of his psycho-physical structure. This organic wholeness of human composition was from the very beginning strongly emphasized by all Christian teachers.²¹ That is why the separation of soul and body is the death of the man himself, the discontinuation of his existence, of wholeness, i.e. of his existence as a man. Consequently death and the corruption of the body are a sort of fading away of the "image of God" in man. St. John Damascene, in one of his glorious anthems in the Burial Service, says of this: "I weep and I lament, when I contemplate death, and see our beauty, fashioned after the image of God, lying in the tomb disfigured, dishonored, bereft of form/²² St. John speaks not of man's body, but of man himself. "Our beauty in the image of God," ἡ κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ πλασθεῖσα ὡραιότης, this is not the body, but man. He is indeed an "image of the unfathomable glory" of God, even when wounded by sin, εἰκὼν ἀρρήτου δόξης.²³ And in death it is disclosed that man, this "reasonable statue" fashioned by God, to use the phrase of St. Methodius,²⁴ is but a corpse. "Man is but dry bones, a stench and the food of worms." This is the riddle and the mystery of death. "Death is a mystery indeed: for the soul by violence is severed from the body, is separated, by the Divine will, from the natural connection and composition. . . . O marvel! Why have we been given over unto corruption, and why have we been wedded unto death?" In the fear of death, often so petty and faint-hearted, there is revealed a profound metaphysical alarm, not merely a sinful attachment to the earthly flesh. In the fear of death the pathos of human wholeness is manifested. The Fathers used to see in the unity of soul and body in man an analogy of the indivisible unity of two natures in the unique hypostasis of Christ. Analogy may be misleading. But still by analogy one may speak of man as being just "one hypostasis in two

natures," and not only *of*, but precisely *in* two natures. And in death this one human hypostasis is broken up. Hence the justification for the mourning and weeping. The terror of death is only warded off by the hope of the resurrection and life eternal.

However, death is not just the self-revelation of sin. Death itself is already, as it were, the anticipation of the resurrection. By death God not only punishes but also heals fallen and ruined human nature. And this not merely in the sense that He cuts the sinful life short by death and thereby prevents the propagation of sin and evil. God turns the very mortality of man into a means of healing. In death human nature is purified, pre-resurrected as it were. Such was the common opinion of the Fathers. With greatest emphasis this conception was put forward by St. Gregory of Nyssa. "Divine providence introduced death into human nature with a specific design," he says, "so that by the dissolution of body and soul, vice may be drawn off and man may be refashioned again through the resurrection, sound, free from passions, pure, and without any admixture of evil." This is particularly a healing of the body. In St. Gregory's opinion, man's journey beyond the grave is a means of cleansing. Man's bodily structure is purified and renewed. In death, as it were, God refines the vessel of our body as in a refining furnace. By the free exercise of his sinful will man entered into communion with evil, and our structure became alloyed with the poison of vice. In death man falls to pieces, like an earthenware vessel, and his body is decomposed again in the earth, so that by purification from the accrued filth he may be restored to his normal form, through the resurrection. Consequently death is not an evil, but a benefit (εὐεργεσία). Death is the wages of sin, yet at the same time it is also a healing process, a medicine, a sort of fiery tempering of the impaired structure of man. The earth is, as it were, sown with human ashes, that they may shoot forth in the last day, by the

power of God; this was the Pauline analogy. The mortal remains are committed to the earth unto the resurrection. Death implies within itself a potentiality of resurrection. The destiny of man can be realized only in the resurrection, and in the general resurrection. But only the Resurrection of Our Lord resuscitates human nature and makes the general resurrection possible. The potentiality of resurrection inherent in every death was realized only in Christ, the "first-fruits of them that are asleep" [1 Cor. 15:20].²⁵

Redemption is above all an escape from death and corruption, the liberation of man from the "bondage of corruption" [Romans 8:21], the restoration of the original wholeness and stability of human nature. The fulfilment of redemption is in the resurrection. It will be fulfilled in the general "quickenings" when "the last enemy shall be abolished, death" [1 Cor. 15:26: εσχρατος ἐχθρός]. But the restoration of unity within human nature is possible only through a restoration of the union of man with God. The resurrection is possible only in God. Christ is the Resurrection and the Life. "Unless man had been joined to God, he could never have become a partaker of incorruptibility," says St. Irenaeus. The way and the hope of the resurrection is revealed only through the Incarnation of the Word.²⁶ St. Athanasius expresses this point even more emphatically. The mercy of God could not permit "that creatures once made rational, and having partaken of the Word, should go to ruin and turn again to non-existence by the way of corruption." The violation of the law and disobedience did not abolish the original purpose of God. The abolition of that purpose would have violated the truth of God. But human repentance was insufficient. "Penitence does not deliver from the state of nature [into which man has relapsed through sin], it only discontinues the sin." For man not only sinned but fell into corruption. Consequently the Word of God descended and became man, assumed our body, "that, whereas man turned towards corruption, he

might turn them again towards incorruption, and quicken them from death by appropriation of his body and by the grace of the Resurrection, banishing death from them like a straw from the fire/²⁷ Death was grafted on to the body, then life must be grafted on to the body again, that the body may throw off corruption and be clothed in life. Otherwise the body would not be raised. "If death had been kept away from the body by a mere command, it would nonetheless have been mortal and corruptible, according to the nature of our bodies. But that this should not be, it put on the incorporeal Word of God, and thus no longer fears either death or corruption, for it has life as a garment, and corruption is done away in it."²⁸ Thus, according to St. Athanasius, the Word became flesh in order to abolish corruption in human nature. However, death is vanquished, not by the appearance of Life in the mortal body, but rather by the voluntary death of the Incarnate Life. The Word became incarnate on account of death in the flesh, St. Athanasius emphasizes. "In order to accept death He had a body," and only through His death was the resurrection possible.²⁹

The ultimate reason for Christ's death must be seen in the mortality of man. Christ suffered death, but passed through it and overcame mortality and corruption. He quickened death itself. By His death He abolishes the power of death. "The dominion of death is cancelled by Thy death, O Strong One." And the grave becomes the life-giving "source of our resurrection." And every grave becomes rather a "bed of hope" for believers. In the death of Christ, death itself is given a new meaning and significance. "By death He destroyed death."

III

Immortality, Resurrection, and Redemption

Death is a catastrophe for man; this is the basic principle of the whole Christian anthropology. Man is an "amphibious" being, both spiritual and corporeal, and so he was intended and created by God. Body belongs organically to the unity of human existence. And this was perhaps the most striking novelty in the original Christian message. The preaching of the Resurrection as well as the preaching of the Cross was foolishness and a stumbling-block to the Gentiles. The Greek mind was always rather disgusted by the body. The attitude of an average Greek in early Christian times was strongly influenced by Platonic or Orphic ideas, and it was a common opinion that the body was a kind of a "prison," in which the fallen soul was incarcerated and confined. The Greeks dreamt rather of a complete and final disincarnation. The famous Orphic slogan was: $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha\text{-}\sigma\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$.³⁰ And the Christian belief in a coming Resurrection could only confuse and frighten the Gentile mind. It meant simply that the prison will be everlasting, that the imprisonment will be renewed again and for ever. The expectation of a bodily resurrection would befit rather an earthworm, suggested Celsus, and he jeered in the name of common sense. This nonsense about a future resurrection seemed to him altogether irreverent and irreligious. God would never do things so stupid, would never accomplish desires so criminal and capricious, which are inspired by an impure and fantastic love of the flesh. Celsus nicknames Christians a " $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$," "a flesh-loving crew," and he refers to the Docetists with far greater sympathy and understanding.³¹ Such was the general attitude to the Resurrection.

St. Paul had already been called a "babbling" by the Athenian philosophers just because he had preached to them

"Jesus and the Resurrection" [Acts 17:18, 32]. In the current opinion of those heathen days, an almost physical disgust of the body was frequently expressed. There was also a wide-spread influence from the farther East; one thinks at once of the later Manichean inundation which spread so rapidly all over the Mediterranean. St. Augustine, once a fervent Manichean himself, has intimated in his *Cōfessiones* that this abhorrence of the body was the chief reason for him to hesitate so long in embracing the faith of the Church, the faith in the Incarnation.³²

Porphyry, in his *Life of Plotinus*, tells that Plotinus, it seemed, "was ashamed to be in the flesh," and from this Porphyry starts his biography. "And in such a frame of mind he refused to speak either of his ancestors or parents, or of his fatherland. He would not sit for a sculptor or painter to make a permanent image of this perishable frame." It is already enough that we bear it now [*Life of Plotinus*, 1]. This philosophical asceticism of Plotinus, of course, must be distinguished from Oriental asceticism, Gnostic or Manichean. Plotinus himself wrote very strongly "against Gnostics." Here, however, there was only a difference of motives and methods. The practical issue in both cases was one and the same, a "retreat" from this corporeal world, an escape from the body. Plotinus suggested the following analogy: Two men live in the same house. One of them blames the builder and his handiwork, because it is made of inanimate wood and stone. The other praises the wisdom of the architect, because the building is so skillfully erected. For Plotinus this world is not evil, it is the "image" or reflection of the world above, and is perhaps even the best of images. Still, one has to aspire beyond all images, from the image to the prototype, from the lower to the higher world. And Plotinus praises not the copy, but the pattern.³³ "He knows that when the time comes, he will go out and will no longer have need of a house." This phrase is very characteristic. The soul is to be liberated

from the 'ties of the body, to be disrobed, and then it will ascend to its proper sphere.³⁴ "The true awakening is the true resurrection from the body, not with the body. For the resurrection with the body would be simply a passage from one sleep to another, to some other dwelling. The only true awakening is an escape from all bodies, since they are by nature opposite to the nature of the soul. Both the origin, and the life and the decay of bodies show that they do not correspond to the nature of the souls."³⁵ With all Greek philosophers the fear of impurity was much stronger than the dread of sin. Indeed, sin to them just meant impurity. This "lower nature/' body and flesh, a corporeal and gross substance, was usually presented as the source and seat of evil. Evil comes from pollution, not from the perversion of the will. One must be liberated and cleansed from this filth.

And at this point Christianity brings a new conception of the body as well. From the beginning Docetism was rejected as the most destructive of temptations, a sort of dark anti-gospel, proceeding from Anti-Christ, "from the spirit of falsehood" [I John 4:2-3]. This was strongly emphasized in St. Ignatius, St. Irenaeus, and Tertullian. "Not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life" [2 Cor. 5:4]. This is precisely the antithesis to Plotinus' thought.³⁶ "He deals a death-blow here to those who depreciate the physical nature and revile our flesh," commented St. John Chrysostom. "It is not flesh, as he would say, that we put off from ourselves, but corruption; the body is one thing, corruption is another. Nor is the body corruption, nor corruption the body. True, the body is corrupt, but it is not corruption. The body dies, but it is not death. The body is the work of God, but death and corruption entered by sin. Therefore, he says, I would put off from myself that strange thing which is not proper to me. And that strange thing is not the body, but corruption. The future life shatters and abolishes not

the body, but that which clings to it, corruption and death/³⁷ Chrysostom, no doubt, gives here the common feeling of the Church. "We must also wait for the spring of the body," as a Latin apologist of the second century put it—"expectandurn nobis etiam et cor ports ver est."³⁸ A Russian scholar, V. F. Em, speaking of the catacombs, happily recalls these words in his letters from Rome. "There are no words which could better render the impression of jubilant serenity, the feeling of rest and unbounded peacefulness of the early Christian burial places. Here the body lies, like wheat under the winter shroud, awaiting, anticipating and foretelling the other-worldly eternal Spring."³⁹ This was the simile used by St. Paul. "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption: it is raised in incorruption" [I Cor. 15:42]. The earth, as it were, is sown with human ashes in order that it may bring forth fruit, by the power of God, on the Great Day. "Like seed cast on the earth, we do not perish when we die, but having been sown, we rise/⁴⁰ Each grave is already the shrine of incorruption. Death itself is, as it were, illuminated by the light of triumphant hope.⁴¹

There is a deep distinction between Christian asceticism and the pessimistic asceticism of the non-Christian world. Father P. Florenskii describes this contrast in the following way: "One is based on the bad news of evil dominating the world, the other on the good news of victory, of the conquest of evil in the world. The former offers superiority, the latter holiness. The former type of ascetic goes out in order to escape, to conceal himself; the latter goes out in order to become pure, to conquer/⁴² Contenance can be inspired by different motives and different purposes. There was, certainly, some real truth in the Orphic or Platonic conceptions as well. And indeed only too often the soul lives in the bondage of the flesh. Platonism was right in its endeavor to set free the reasonable soul from the bondage of fleshly desires, in its struggle against sensuality. And

some elements of this Platonic asceticism were absorbed into the Christian synthesis. And yet the ultimate goal was quite different in the two cases. Platonism longs for the purification of the soul only. Christianity insists on the purification of the body as well. Platonism preaches the ultimate disincarnation. Christianity proclaims the ultimate cosmic transfiguration. Bodily existence itself is to be spiritualized. There is the same antithesis of eschatological expectation and aspiration: "to be unclothed" and "to be clothed upon," again and for ever. And strange enough, in this respect Aristotle was much closer to Christianity than Plato.

In the philosophical interpretation of its eschatological hope, Christian theology from the very beginning clings to Aristotle.⁴³ On this point he, the writer of prose amid the throng of poets, sober among the inspired, points higher than the: "divine" Plato. Such a biased preference must appear altogether unexpected and strange. For, strictly speaking, in Aristotle there is not and cannot be any "after-death" destiny of man. Man in his interpretation is entirely an earthly being. Nothing really human passes beyond the grave. Man is mortal through and through like everything else earthly; he dies never to return. Aristotle simply denies personal immortality. His singular being is not a person. And what does actually survive is not properly human and does not belong to individuals; it is a "divine" element, immortal and eternal.⁴⁴ But yet in this weakness of Aristotle is his strength. Aristotle had a real understanding of the unity of human existence. Man is to Aristotle, first of all, an individual being, an organism, a living unit. And man is one just in his duality, as an "animated body" (τὸ ἐμψυχον); both of the elements in him exist only together, in a concrete and indivisible correlation/Into the "body" the matter is "formed" by the soul, and the soul realizes itself only in its body. "Hence there is no need to inquire whether soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint (τὸ στήμα) are one, or, in general, whether

the matter of a thing is the same with that of which it is the matter" [*De anima*, 417b 6]. The soul is just the "form" of the body (εἶδος και μορφή, 407b 23; λόγος τις και εἶδος, 411a 12), its "principle" and "term" (ἀρχή and τέλος), its very being and "actuality."⁴⁵ And Aristotle coins a new term to describe this peculiar correlation: the soul is ἐντελέχεια "the first actuality of a natural body" (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ, 412a 27). Soul and body, for Aristotle they are not even two elements, combined or connected with each other, but rather simply two aspects of the same concrete reality.⁴⁶ "Soul and body together constitute the animal. Now it needs no proof that the soul cannot be separated from the body" (413a 4). Soul is but the functional reality of the corresponding body. "Soul and body cannot be defined out of relation to each other; a dead body is properly only matter; for the soul is the essence, the true being of what we call body."⁴⁷ Once this functional unity of the soul and body has been broken by death, no organism is there any more, the corpse is no more a body, and a dead man can hardly be called man at all.⁴⁸ Aristotle insisted on a complete unity of each concrete existence, as it is given *hic et nunc*. The soul "is not the body, but something belonging to the body (σώματος δέτι), and therefore resides in the body and, what is more, in a specific body (καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ). Our predecessors were wrong in endeavoring to fit the soul into a body without further determination of the nature and qualities of that body, although we do not even find that of any two things taken at random the one will admit the other (του τυχόντος ... το τυχόν). For the actuality of each thing comes naturally to be developed in the potentiality of each thing; in other words, in the appropriate matter" (414a 20: τη οικεία ὕλη).

The idea of the "transmigration" of souls was thus to Aristotle altogether excluded. Each soul abides in its "own" body, which it creates and forms, and each body has its

"own" soul, as its vital principle, "*eidos*" or form. This anthropology was ambiguous and liable to a dangerous interpretation. It easily lends itself to a biological simplification and transformation into a crude naturalism, in which man is almost completely equated with other animals. Such indeed were the conclusions of certain followers of the Stagirite, of Aristoxenus and Dikaearchus, for whom the soul was but a "harmony" or a disposition of the body (αρμονία or τόνος, "tension") and of Strato etc.⁴⁹ "There is no more talk about the immaterial soul, the separate reason, or pure thought. The object of science is the corporate soul, the united soul and body."⁵⁰ Immortality was openly denied. The soul disappears just as the body dies; they have a common destiny. And even Theophrastes and Eudemus did not believe in immortality.⁵¹ For Alexander of Aphrodisias the soul was just an "εἶδος ενυλον."⁵² Aristotle himself has hardly escaped these inherent dangers of his conception. Certainly, man is to him an "intelligent being," and the faculty of thinking is his distinctive mark.⁵³ Yet, the doctrine of *Nous* does not fit very well into the general frame of the Aristotelian psychology. It is obviously the most obscure and complicated part of his system. Whatever the explanation of this incoherence may be, the stumbling-block is still there. "The fact is that the position of νοῦς in the system is anomalous."⁵⁴ The "intellect" does not belong to the concrete unity of the individual organism, and it is not an ἐντελέχεια of any natural body. It is rather an alien and "divine" element, that comes in somehow "from outside." It is a "distinct species of soul" (ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον), which is separable from the body, "unmixed" with the matter. It is impassive, immortal and eternal, and therefore separable from the body, "as that which is eternal from that which is perishable."⁵⁵ This impassive or active intellect does survive all individual existences indeed, but it does not properly belong to individuals and does not convey any immortality to the particular beings.⁵⁶ Alexander

of Aphrodisias seems to have grasped the main idea of the Master. He invented the term itself: *νοῦς ποιητικός*. In no sense is it a part or power of the human soul. It supervenes as something really coming in from outside. It is a common and eternal source of all intellectual activities in individuals, but it does not belong to any one of them. Rather is it an eternal, imperishable, self-existing substance, an immaterial energy, devoid of all matter and potentiality. And, obviously, there can be but one such substance. The *νοῦς ποιητικός* is not only "divine," it must be rather identified with the deity itself, the first cause of all energy and motion.⁵⁷

The real failure of Aristotle was not in his "naturalism," but in that he could not see any permanence of the individual. But this was rather a common failure of the whole of ancient philosophy. Plato has the same short sight. Beyond time, Greek thought visualizes only the "typical," and nothing truly personal. Personality itself was hardly known in pre-Christian times. Hegel suggested, in his *Aesthetics*, that Sculpture gives the true key to the whole of Greek mentality.⁵⁸ Recently a Russian scholar, A. F. Lossev, pointed out that the whole of Greek philosophy was a "sculptural symbolism." He was thinking especially of Platonism. "Against a dark background, as a result of an interplay and conflict of light and shadow, there stands out a blind, colorless, cold, marble and divinely beautiful, proud and majestic body, a statue. And the world is such a statue, and gods are statues; the city-state also, and the heroes, and the myths, and ideas, all conceal underneath them this original sculptural intuition. . . . There is no personality, no eyes, no spiritual individuality. There is a "something," but not a "someone," an individualized "it," but no living person with his proper name. . . . There is no one at all. There are bodies, and there are ideas. The spiritual character of the ideas is killed by the body, but the warmth of the body is restrained by the abstract idea. There are here beautiful, but cold and

blissfully indifferent statues."⁵⁹ And yet, in the general frame of such an impersonalist mentality, Aristotle did feel and understand the individual more than anyone else. He got closer than anybody else to the true conception of human personality. He provided Christian philosophers with all the elements out of which an adequate conception of personality could be built up. His strength was just in his understanding of the empirical wholeness of human existence.⁶⁰

Aristotle's conception was radically transformed in its Christian adaptation, for new perspectives were opened, and all the terms were given a new significance. And yet one cannot fail to acknowledge the Aristotelian origin of the main eschatological ideas in early Christian theology. Such a christening of Aristotelianism we find in Origen, to a certain extent in St. Methodius of Olympus as well, and later in St. Gregory of Nyssa. The idea of *εντελέχεια* itself now receives new depth in the new experience of spiritual life. The term itself was never used by the Fathers, but there can be no doubt about the Aristotelian roots of their conceptions.⁶¹ The break between intellect, impersonal and eternal, and the soul, individual but mortal, was healed and overcome in the new self-consciousness of a spiritual personality. The idea of personality itself was a great Christian contribution to philosophy. And again, there was here a sharp understanding of the tragedy of death also.

The first theological essay on the Resurrection was written in the middle of the second century by Athenagoras of Athens. Of the many arguments he puts forward, his reference to the unity and integrity of man is of particular interest. Athenagoras proceeds from the fact of this unity to the future resurrection. "God gave independent being and life neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, but rather to men, composed of soul and body, so that with these same parts of which they are composed, when they are born and live, they should attain after the termination of this life their common end;

soul and body compose in man one living entity." There would no longer be a man, Athenagoras emphasizes, if the completeness of this structure were broken, for then the identity of the individual would be broken also. The stability of the body, its continuity in its proper nature, must correspond to the immortality of the soul. "The entity which receives intellect and reason is man, and not the soul alone. Consequently man must for ever remain composed of soul and body. And this is impossible, if there is no resurrection. For if there is no resurrection, human nature is no longer human."⁶²

Aristotle concluded from the mortality of the body that the individual soul, which is but the vital power of the body, is also mortal. Both go down together. Athenagoras, on the contrary, infers the resurrection of the body from the immortality of the reasonable soul. Both are kept together.⁶³ The resurrection, however, is no mere simple return or repetition. The Christian dogma of the General Resurrection is not that "eternal return" which was professed by the Stoics. The resurrection is the true renewal, the transfiguration, the reformation of the whole creation. Not just a return of what has passed away, but a heightening, a fulfillment of something better and more perfect. "And what you sow is not the body which is to be, but a bare kernel. . . . It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body" [I Cor. 15:37, 44]. A very considerable change is implied. And there is here a very real philosophical difficulty. How are we to think of this "change" so that "identity" shall not be lost? We find in the early writers merely an assertion of this identity, without any attempt at a philosophical explanation. St. Paul's distinction between the "natural" body (σῶμα φυσικὸν) and the "spiritual" body (σῶμα πνευματικὸν) obviously needs some further interpretation [cf. the contrast of the body "of our humiliation," τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, and the body "of His glory," τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, in Phil. 3:21].

In the period of the early controversies with the Docetists and Gnostics, a careful and precise answer became urgent. Origen was probably the first who attempted to give one. Origen's eschatology was from the very beginning vigorously denounced by many, indeed with good reason, and his doctrine of the Resurrection was perhaps the chief reason why his orthodoxy was challenged. Origen himself never claimed any formal authority for his doctrine. He offered merely some explanation, to be tested and checked by the mind of the Church. For him it was not enough to refer simply to Divine omnipotence, as the earlier writers sometimes did, or to quote certain appropriate passages of Holy Scripture. One had rather to show how the doctrine of the Resurrection fitted into the general conception of human destiny and purpose. Origen was exploring a *via media* between the fleshly conception of the *simpliciores* and the denial of the Docetists: "*fugerese et nostrorum comes, et haereticorum phantasmata,*" as St. Jerome puts it.⁶⁴ And both were dissatisfied and even offended.⁶⁵

The General Resurrection is an article of faith indeed. The same individuals will rise, and the individual identity of the bodies will be preserved. But this does not imply for Origen any identity of material substance, or identity of status. The bodies indeed will be transfigured or transformed in the Resurrection. In any case, the risen body will be a "spiritual" body, and not a fleshly one. Origen takes up the simile of St. Paul. This fleshly body, the body of this earthly life, is buried in the earth, like a seed that is sown, and disintegrates. And one thing is sown, and another rises. The germinating power is not extinguished in the dead body, and in due season, by the word of God, the new body will be raised, like the ear that shoots forth from the seed. Some corporeal principle remains undestroyed and unaffected by the death. The term Origen used was obviously Aristotelian: "το εἶδος," "species," or "form." But it is not the soul that Origen regards as the form of the

body. It is rather a certain potential corporeality, pertaining to each soul and to each person. It is the forming and the quickening principle of the body, just a seed capable of germination. Origen also uses the term λόγος σπερματικός, *ratio seminalis*.⁶⁶ It is impossible to expect that the *whol* body should be restored in the resurrection, since the material substance changes so quickly and is not the same in the body even for two days, and surely it can never be reintegrated again. The material substance in the risen bodies will be not the same as in the bodies of this life (το ὕλικὸν ὑποκείμενον οὐδέποτε εχει ταυτόν). Yet the body will be the same, just as our body is the same throughout this life in spite of all changes of its material composition. And again, a body must be adapted to the environment, to the conditions of life, and obviously in the Kingdom of Heaven the bodies cannot be just the same as here on earth. The individual identity is not compromised, because the “*eidos*” of each body is not destroyed (το εἶδος το χαρακτηρίζον το σῶμα). It is the very *principium individuationis*. To Origen the “body itself is just this vital principle. His εἶδος closely corresponds to Aristotle’s ἐντελέχεια. But with Origen this “form” or germinative power is indestructible; that makes the construction of a doctrine of the resurrection possible. This “principle of individuation” is also *principium surgendi*. In this definite body the material particles are composed or arranged just by this individual “form” or λόγος. Therefore, of whatever particles the risen body is composed, the strict identity of the psycho-physical individuality is not impaired, since the germinative power remains unchangeable.⁶⁷ Origen presumes that the continuity of individual existence is sufficiently secured by the identity of the reanimating principle.

This view was more than once repeated later, especially under the renewed influence of Aristotle. And in modern Roman theology the question is still rather open: to what extent the recognition of the material identity of the risen

bodies with the mortal ones belongs to the essence of the dogma.⁶⁸ The whole question is rather that of metaphysical interpretation, not a problem of faith. It may even be suggested that on this occasion Origen expresses not so much his own, as rather a current opinion. There is very much that is questionable in Origen's eschatological opinions. They cannot be regarded as a coherent whole. And it is not easy to reconcile his "Aristotelian" conception of the resurrection with a theory of the pre-existence of souls, or with a conception of the periodical recurrent cycles of worlds and final annihilation of matter. There is no complete agreement between this theory of the Resurrection and the doctrine of a "General *apokatastasis*" either. Many of Origen's eschatological ideas may be misleading. Yet his speculation on the relation between the fleshly body of this life and the permanent body of the resurrection was an important step towards the synthetic conception of the Resurrection. His chief opponent, St. Methodius of Olympus, does not seem to have understood him well. St. Methodius' criticisms amounted to the complete rejection of the whole conception of the εἶδος. Is not the form of the body changeable as well as the material substance? Can the form really survive the body itself, or rather is it dissolved and decomposed, when the body of which it is the form dies and ceases to exist as a whole? In any case the identity of the form is no guarantee of personal identity, if the whole material substratum is to be entirely different. For St. Methodius the "form" meant rather merely the external shape of the body, and not the internal vital power, as for Origen. And most of his arguments simply miss the point. But his emphasis on the wholeness of the human composition was a real complement to Origen's rather excessive formalism.⁶⁹

St. Gregory of Nyssa in his eschatological doctrine endeavored to bring together the two conceptions, to reconcile the truth of Origen with the truth of Methodius. And this attempt at a synthesis is of exceptional importance.⁷⁰

St. Gregory starts with the empirical unity of body and soul, its dissolution in death. And the body severed from the soul, deprived of its 'Vital power' (ζωτική δύναμις),⁷¹ by which the corporeal elements are held and knit together during life, disintegrates and is involved into the general circulation of matter. The material substance itself, however, is not destroyed, only the body dies, not its elements. Moreover, in the very disintegration the particles of the decaying body preserve in themselves certain "signs" or "marks" of their former connection with their own soul (τὰ σημεῖα του ημετέρου συγκρίματος). And again, in each soul also certain "bodily marks" are preserved, as on a piece of wax—certain signs of union. By a "power of recognition" (γνωστικῇ τη δυνάμει), even in the separation of death, the soul somehow remains nevertheless near the elements of its own decomposed body (του οικείου εφραπτομένη). In the day of resurrection each soul will be able by these double marks to "recognize" the familiar elements. This is the "εἶδος" of the body, its "inward image," or "type." St. Gregory compares this process of the restoration of the body with the germination of a seed, with the development of the human foetus. He differs sharply from Origen on the question as to what substance will constitute the bodies of the resurrection, and he joins here St. Methodius. If the risen bodies were constructed entirely from the new elements, that "would not be a resurrection, but rather the creation of a new man," και οὐκέτι αν ειη το τοιουτον ἀνάστασις, ἀλλὰ καινου ἀνθρώπου δημιουργία.⁷² The resurrected body will be reconstructed from its former elements, signed or sealed by the soul in the days of its incarnation, otherwise it would simply be another man. Nevertheless, the resurrection is not just a return, nor is *it* in any way a repetition of present existence. Such a repetition would be really an "endless misery." In the resurrection human nature will be restored not to its present, but to its normal or "original" condition. Strictly speaking, it will be

for the first time brought into that state, in which it ought to have been, had not sin and the Fall entered the world, but which was never realized in the past. And everything in human existence, which is connected with instability, is not so much a return as a consummation. This is the new mode of man's existence. Man is to be raised to eternity, the form of time falls away. And in the risen corporeality all succession and change will be abolished and condensed. This will be not only an ἀποκατάστασις, but rather a "*recapitulatio* ." The evil surplus, that which is of sin, falls away. But in no sense is this a loss. The fulness of personality will not be damaged by this subtraction, for this surplus does not belong to the personality at all. In any case, not everything is to be restored in human composition. And to St. Gregory the material identity of the body of the resurrection with the mortal body means, rather, the ultimate reality of the life once lived, which must be transferred into the future age. Here again he differs from Origen, to whom this empirical and earthly life was only a transient episode to be ultimately forgotten. For St. Gregory the identity of the form, *i.e.* the unity and continuity of individual existence, was the only point of importance. He holds the same "Aristotelian" conception of the unique and intimate connection of the individual soul and body.

The very idea of uniqueness is radically modified in Christian philosophy as compared with the pre-Christian Greek. In Greek philosophy it was a "sculptural" uniqueness, an invariable crystallization of a frozen image. In Christian experience it is the uniqueness of the life once experienced and lived. In the one case it was a timeless identity, in the other it is a uniqueness in time. The whole conception of time is different in the two cases.

IV

Time, Eternity, and Redemption

Greek philosophy did not know and was in no way prepared to admit any passage from time into eternity, the temporal seemed to be *eo ipso* transitory. That which is happening can never become everlasting. What is born must inevitably die. Only what is unborn or unoriginated can persist. Everything that had a beginning will have an end. Only that which had no beginning can be permanent; or "eternal." Therefore, for a Greek philosopher to admit future immortality meant at once to presuppose an eternal pre-existence. Thus the whole meaning of the historical process is a kind of descent from eternity into time. The destiny of man depends upon his innate germs rather than upon his creative achievements. For a Greek, time was simply a lower or reduced mode of existence. Strictly speaking, in time nothing is produced or achieved nor is there anything to be produced or achieved. The "eternal" and invariable realities are merely, as it were, "projected" into a lower sphere. In this sense Plato called time a "mobile image of eternity" (*Timaeus* 37d: εἰκὼν κινητὸν τινα̅ αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι). Plato had in view astronomical time, *i.e.* the rotation of the heavens. No real progress is visualized. On the contrary, time "imitates" eternity and "rolls on according to the laws of number" (38a, b), just in order to become like the eternal as much as possible. Time is just this permanent reiteration of itself. The basic idea is reflection, not accomplishment.⁷³ For everything which is worth existing really does exist in the most perfect manner before all time, in a static invariability of the timeless, and there is nothing to add to this perfected fulness.⁷⁴ Consequently, all that is happening is to be utterly transient. All is perfect and complete, and nothing to be perfected or completed. And therefore the burden of time, this rotation of beginnings and ends,

is meaningless and tiresome. There is no sense of creative duty in the Greek mind. The impassibility or even indifference of the sage seem to be the climax of perfection. The sage is not concerned with or disturbed by all these vicissitudes of the temporal order. He knows that everything is happening according to eternal and inviolable laws or measures. He learns amid the tumult of events to contemplate the invariable and eternal harmony of the Cosmos. The ancient philosopher out of time dreams of eternity. He dreams of the escape from this world to another, immovable, impassive, and permanent. Hence the sense of fate which was so typical before Christ. It was a climax and a limit of ancient philosophy. The temporal perspective of ancient philosophy is for ever closed and limited. Yet the Cosmos is eternal, there will be no end of cosmic "revolutions." The Cosmos is a periodical being, like a clock. The highest symbol of life is a recurrent circle. As Aristotle put it, "the circle is a perfect thing," and the circle only, not any straight line.⁷⁵ This also explains the common saying that human affairs form a circle, and that there is a circle in all other things that have a natural movement, both coming into being and passing away. This is because all other things are discriminated by time, and end and begin as though conforming to a cycle; for even time itself is thought to be a circle."⁷⁶ The whole conception is obviously based on astronomical experience. Indeed, celestial movements are periodical and recurrent. The whole course of rotation is accomplished in a certain period [the "Great Year," μέγας ἔνιαυτός]. And then comes a repetition, a new circle or cycle. There is no continuous progress in time, but rather "eternal returns," a cyclophoria.⁷⁷ The Pythagoreans seem to have been the first to profess clearly an exact repetition. Eudemus refers to this Pythagorean conception. "If we are to believe the Pythagoreans, then in a certain time I shall again be reading to you, with the same rod in my hands, and all of you, even as at this moment, will be sitting in

front of me, and in the same way everything else will come again.”⁷⁸ With Aristotle this periodical conception of the Universe took a strict scientific shape and was elaborated into a coherent system of Physics.⁷⁹ Later this idea of periodical returns was again taken up by the Stoics.

The early Stoics professed a periodical dissolution (ἐκ-πύρωσις) and *palingenesis* of all things, and then every minute detail will be exactly reproduced. There will be again a Socrates, the son of Sophroniscos and Phenareti, and he will be married to a Xanthippe, and will be again betrayed by an Anytus and a Meletes.⁸⁰ The same idea we find in Cleanthes and Chrysippus, in Poseidonius and Marcus Aurelius and all the others. This return was what the Stoics called the “universal restoration,” an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν πάντων. And it was obviously an astronomical term.⁸¹ There will be certainly some difference, but obviously no progress whatever. And on a circle all positions are indeed relative. It is a kind of a cosmic *perpetuum mobile*. All individual existences are hopelessly involved in this perpetual cosmic rotation, in these cosmic rhythms and “astral courses” [this was precisely what the Greeks used to call “destiny” and “fate,” ἡ εἰμαρμένη; *vis positionis astrorum*]. It is to be kept in mind that this exact repetition of worlds does not imply necessarily any continuity of individual existences, any survival or perseverance of the individuals, any individual immortality. The Universe itself is always numerically the same, and its laws are immutable and invariable, and each next world will exactly resemble the previous one in all particulars. But, strictly speaking, no individual survival is required for that. The same causes will inevitably produce the same effects. Nothing really new can ever happen. There is a continuity in the Cosmos, but hardly any true continuity of individuals.

Such was at least the view of Aristotle and the Aristotelians, and of some Stoics.⁸² This periodical idea was kept by the Neoplatonists as well.⁸³ It was a miserable

caricature of the resurrection. The permanence of these rotations, this nightmare of invariable cosmic predestination, a real imprisonment of every being, make this theory dull and frightening. There is no real history. "Cyclic motion and the transmigration of souls is not history," remarks Lossev wittily. "It was a history built up on the pattern of astronomy, it was indeed itself a kind of astronomy."⁸⁴ The very feeling or apprehension of time is radically changed in Christianity. Time begins and ends, but in time human destiny is accomplished. Time itself is essentially unique, and never comes back. And the General Resurrection is the final limit of this unique time, of this unique destiny of the whole creation. In Greek philosophy a cycle was the symbol of time, or rotation. In Christian philosophy time is symbolized rather by a line, a beam, or an arrow. But the difference is deeper still. From a Christian point of view, time is neither an infinite rotation, nor an infinite progression, which never reaches its goal [{"*die schlechte Unendlichkeit*" in Hegelian terminology, or ἀπειρον of the Greek philosophers}]. Time is not merely a sequence of moments, nor is it an abstract form of multiplicity. Time is vectorial and finite. The temporal order is organized from within. The concreteness of purpose binds, from within, the stream of events into an organic whole. Events are precisely events, and not merely passing happenings. The temporal order is not the realm of privation, as it was for the Greek mind. It is more than just a stream. It is a creative process, in which what was brought to existence from nothingness, by the Divine will, is ascending towards its ultimate consummation, when the Divine purpose will be fulfilled, on the last day.⁸⁵ And the center of history is the Incarnation and the victory of the Incarnate Lord over death and sin. St. Augustine pointed out this change, which has been brought about by Christianity, in this admirable phrase: "*Via nec iam sequentes, quae nobis est Christus, eo duce et salvatore, a vano et ineptōporium circuit iter fidem men-*

temque avertamus."⁸⁶ St. Gregory of Nyssa describes the vectoriality of history in this way. "When mankind attains to its fulness, then, without fail, this flowing motion of nature will cease, having reached its necessary end; and this life will be replaced by another mode of existence, distinct from the present, which consists in birth and destruction. When our nature, in due order, fulfils the course of time, then, without fail, this flowing motion, created by the succession of generations, will come to an end. The filling of the Universe will make any further advance or increase impossible, and then the whole plenitude of souls will return from the dispersed and formless state to an assembled one, and the very elements will be reunited in the self-same combination."⁸⁹ This end and this goal is the General Resurrection. St. Gregory speaks of inner fulfilment of history. Time will come to an end. For sooner or later things will be accomplished. Seeds will mature and shoot forth. The resurrection of the dead is the one and unique destiny of the whole world, of the whole Cosmos, One for all and each, an universal and catholic balance. There is nothing naturalistic about this conception. The power of God will raise the dead. It will be the new and final revelation of God, of the Divine might and glory. The General Resurrection is the consummation of the Resurrection of Our Lord, the consummation of His victory over death and corruption. And beyond historical time there will be the future Kingdom, "the life of the age to come." We are still *in via*, in the age of hope and expectation. Even the Saints in heaven still "await the resurrection of the dead." The ultimate consummation will come for the whole human race at once.⁹⁰ Then, at the close, for the whole creation the "Blessed Sabbath," that very "day of rest," the mysterious "Seventh day of creation," will be inaugurated for ever. The expected is as yet inconceivable. "It is not yet made manifest what we shall be" [1 John 3:2]. But the pledge is given. Christ is risen.

V

High Priest **and** Redeemer

In the Epistle to the Hebrews the redeeming work of Our Lord is depicted as the ministry of the High Priest. Christ comes into the world to accomplish the Will of God. Through the eternal Spirit He offers His own self to God, offers His blood for the remission of human sins, and this He accomplishes through the Passion. By His blood, as the blood of the New Testament, of the New Covenant, He enters heaven and enters within the very Holy of Holies, behind the veil. After the suffering of death He is crowned with glory and honor, and sits on the right hand of God the Father for ever. The sacrificial offering begins on earth and is consummated in heaven, where Christ presented and is still presenting us to God, as the eternal High Priest—"High Priest of the good things to come" (ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἁγαθῶν) as the Apostle and High Priest of our confession, as the minister of the true tabernacle and sanctuary of God. In brief, as the Mediator of the New Covenant. Through the death of Christ is revealed Life Everlasting, "the powers of the age to come" are disclosed and shown forth (δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αἰῶνος). In the blood of Jesus is revealed the new and living way, the way into that eternal Sabbath, when God rests from His mighty deeds.

Thus the death of the Cross is a sacrificial offering. And to offer a sacrifice does not mean only to surrender. Even from a merely moral point of view, the whole significance of sacrifice is not the denial itself, but the sacrificial power of love. The sacrifice is not merely an offering, but rather a dedication, a consecration to God. The effective power of sacrifice is love [I Cor. 13:3]. But the offering of the sacrifice is more than the evidence of love, it is also a sacramental action, a liturgical office, or even

a mystery. The offering of the sacrifice of the Cross is the sacrifice of love indeed, "as Christ also hath loved us, and given Himself for us, an offering and sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour" [Ephes. 5:2]. But this love was not only sympathy or compassion and mercy towards the fallen and heavy-laden. Christ gives Himself not only "for the remission of sins," but also for our glorification. He gives Himself not only for sinful humanity, but also for the Church: to cleanse and to hallow her, to make her holy, glorious and spotless [Ephes. 5:25]. The power of a sacrificial offering is in its cleansing and hallowing effect. And the power of the sacrifice of the Cross is that the Cross is the path of glory. On the Cross the Son of Man is glorified and God *is* glorified in Him [John 13:31]. Here is the fulness of the sacrifice. "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?" [Luke 24:26].

The death of the Cross was effective, not as a death of an Innocent One, but as the death of the Incarnate Lord. "We needed an Incarnate God; God put to death, that we might live"—to use a bold phrase of St. Gregory of Nazianzus.⁹¹ This is the "dreadful and most glorious mystery" of the Cross. On Golgotha the Incarnate Lord celebrates the Holy Service, *in ara crucis*, and offers in sacrifice His own human nature, which from its conception "in the Virgin's womb" was assumed into the indivisible unity of His Hypostasis, and in this assumption was restored to all its original sinlessness and purity. In Christ there is no human hypostasis. His personality is Divine, yet incarnate. There is the all-complete fulness of human nature, "the whole human nature," and therefore Christ is the "perfect man," as the Council of Chalcedon said. But there was no human hypostasis. And consequently on the Cross it was not *a* man that died. "For He who suffered was not common man, but God made man, fighting the contest of endurance," says St. Cyril of Jerusalem.⁹² It may be properly said that God dies on the Cross, but in His own humanity. "He who dwelleth

in the highest is reckoned among the dead, and in the little grave findeth lodging."⁹³ This is the voluntary death of One who is Himself Life Eternal, who is in very truth the Resurrection and the Life. A human death indeed but obviously death within the hypostasis of the Word, the Incarnate Word. And thence a resurrecting death.

"I came to cast fire upon the earth; and would that it were already kindled! I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how I am constrained until it is accomplished!" [Luke 12:49-50]. Fire—the Holy Spirit—descending from on high in fiery tongues in the "dreadful and unsearchable mystery of Pentecost." This was baptism by the Spirit. And Baptism, this is the death on the Cross itself and the shedding of blood, "the baptism of martyrdom and blood, with which Christ Himself also was baptized," as St. Gregory of Nazianzus suggested.⁹⁴ The death on the Cross as a baptism by blood is the very essence of the redeeming mystery of the Cross. Baptism is a cleansing. And the Baptism of the Cross is, as it were, the cleansing of human nature, which is travelling the path of restoration in the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Word. This is a washing of human nature in the outpoured sacrificial blood of the Divine Lamb. And first of all, a washing of the body: not only a washing away of sins, but a washing away of human infirmities and of mortality itself. It is the cleansing in preparation for the coming resurrection: a cleansing of all human nature, of all humanity in the person of its new and mystical First-born, in the "Second Adam." This is the baptism by blood of the whole Church. "Thou hast purchased Thy Church by the power of Thy Cross." And the whole Body ought to be and must be baptized with the baptism of the Cross. "The cup that I drink, you will drink; and with the baptism with which I am baptized, you will be baptized" [Mark 10:39; Matthew 20:23].⁹⁵

Further, the death of the Cross is the cleansing of the whole world. It is the baptism by blood of all creation, the

cleansing of the Cosmos through the cleansing of the Microcosm. "A purification not for a small part of man's world, not for a short time, but for the whole Universe and through eternity," to quote St. Gregory of Nazianzus again.⁹⁶ Therefore all creation mysteriously partakes in the mortal Passion of the Incarnate Master and Lord. "All creation changed its face in terror when it beheld Thee hanging on the Cross, O Christ.. .. The sun was darkened and of earth the foundations were shaken: All things suffered in sympathy with Thee, Who hadst created all things/⁹⁷ This was not co-suffering of compassion or pity, but rather co-suffering of awe and trembling. "The foundations of the earth were set in trembling by the terror of Thy might," co-suffering in the joyous apprehension of the great mystery of the resurrecting death. "For by the blood of Thy Son is the earth blessed." "Many indeed are the miracles of that time," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus, "God crucified, the sun darkened and rekindled again; for it was fitting that with the Creator the creatures should co-suffer. The veil rent in twain. Blood and water shed from His side, blood because He was man, and water because He was higher than man. The earth quaked, rocks were rent for the sake of the Rock. The dead rose up for a pledge of the final and general resurrection. The miracles before the grave and at the grave—who will worthily sing? But none is like the miracle of my salvation. A few drops of blood recreate the whole world and become to us what rennet is to milk, binding us together and compressing us in unity."⁹⁸

The death of the Cross is a sacrament, it has not only a moral, but also a sacramental and liturgical meaning. It is the Passover of the New Testament. And its sacramental significance is revealed at the Last Supper. It may seem rather strange that the Eucharist should precede Calvary, and that in the Upper Room the Saviour Himself should give His Body and His Blood to the disciples. "This cup is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you"

[Luke 22:20]. However, the Last Supper was not merely a prophetic rite, just as the Eucharist is no mere symbolic remembrance. It is a true sacrament. For Christ who performs both is the High Priest of the New Testament. The Eucharist is the sacrament of the Crucifixion, the broken Body and the Blood outpoured. And along with this it is also the sacrament of the transfiguration, the mysterious and sacramental 'conversion' of the flesh into the glorious spiritual food (μεταβολή). The broken Body, dying, yet, in death itself, rising again. For the Lord went voluntarily to the Cross, the Cross of shame and glory. St. Gregory of Nyssa gives the following explanation. "Christ does not wait for the constraint of treachery, nor does He await the thieving attack of the Jews, or the lawless judgment of Pilate, that their evil might be the fount and source of the general salvation of men. Of His own economy He anticipates their transgressions by means of a hierurgic rite, ineffable and unusual. He brings His own Self as an offering and sacrifice for us, being at once the Priest and the Lamb of God, that 'taketh' the sins of the world. By offering His Body as food, He clearly showed that the sacrificial offering of the Lamb had already been accomplished. For the sacrificial body would not have been suitable for food if it were still animated. And so, when He gave the disciples the Body to eat and the Blood to drink, then by free will and the power of the sacrament His Body had already ineffably and invisibly been offered in sacrifice, and His soul, together with the Divine power united with it, was in those places whither the power of Him who so ordained transported it."⁹⁹ In other words, the voluntary separation of the soul from the body, the sacramental agony, so to say, of the Incarnate, was, as it were, already begun. And the Blood, freely shed in the salvation of all, becomes a "medicine of incorruption," a medicine of immortality and life.¹⁰⁰

The Lord died on the Cross. This was a true death. Yet

not wholly like ours, simply because this was the death of the Lord, the death of the Incarnate Word, death within the indivisible Hypostasis of the Word made man. And again, it was a voluntary death, since in the undefiled human nature, free from original sin, which was assumed by the Word in the Incarnation, there was no inherent necessity of death. And the free "taking up" by the Lord of the sin of the world did not constitute for Him any ultimate necessity to die. Death was accepted only by the desire of the redeeming Love. His death was not the "wages of sin."¹⁰¹ And the main point is that this was a death within the Hypostasis of the Word, the death of the "*enhypositized*" humanity. Death in general is a separation, and in the death of the Lord His most precious body and soul were separated indeed. But the one hypostasis of the Word Incarnate was not divided, the "Hypostatic union" was not broken or destroyed. In other words, though separated in death, the soul and the body remained still united through the Divinity of the Word, from which neither was ever estranged. This does not alter the ontological character of death, but changes its meaning. This was an "incorrupt death," and therefore corruption and death were overcome in *it*, and in it begins the resurrection. The very death of the Incarnate reveals the resurrection of human nature. And the Cross is manifested to be life-giving, the new tree of life, "by which the lamentation of death has been consumed."¹⁰² The Church bears witness to this on Good Saturday with special emphasis.

"Although Christ died as man, and His holy soul was separated from His most pure body," says St. John Damascene, "His Divinity remained both with the soul and the body, continued inseparable from either. And thus the one hypostasis was not divided into two hypostases, for from the beginning both body and soul had their being with the hypostasis of the Word. Although at the hour of death body and soul were separated from each other, yet each of them was preserved, having the one hypostasis of the Word.

Therefore the one hypostasis of the Word was also the hypostasis of the body and of the soul. For neither the body nor the soul ever received any proper hypostasis, other than that of the Word. The Hypostasis then of the Word is ever one, and there were never two hypostases of the Word. Accordingly the Hypostasis of Christ is ever one. And though the soul is separated from the body in space, yet they remain hypostatically united through the Word."¹⁰³

There are two aspects of the mystery of the Cross. It is at once a mystery of sorrow and a mystery of joy, a mystery of shame and of glory. It is a mystery of sorrow and mortal anguish, a mystery of desertion, of humiliation and shame. "Today the Master of Creation and the Lord of Glory is nailed upon the Cross . . ., is beaten upon the shoulders, and receives spittings and wounds, indignities and buffetings in the face!"¹⁰⁴ The God-man languishes and suffers at Gethsemane and on Calvary until the mystery of death is accomplished. Before Him are revealed all the hatred and blindness of the world, all the obstinacy and foolishness of evil, the coldness of hearts, all the helplessness and pettiness of the disciples, all the "righteousness" of human pseudo-freedom. And He covers everything with His all-forgiving, sorrowful, compassionate and co-suffering love, and prays for those who crucify Him, for verily they do not know what they are doing. "O my people, what have I done unto thee? and wherein have I wearied thee?" [Micah 6:3, paraphrased and applied to Our Lord in the *Office of Good Friday, Matins, Antiphon XII, Troparion*]. The salvation of the world is accomplished in these sufferings and sorrows, "by His stripes we are healed [Is. 53:5]. And the Church guards us against every docetic underestimate of the reality and fulness of these sufferings "ἵνα μὴ κενωθῆ ὁ σταυρός του Χριστοῦ" [I Cor. 1:17]. Yet the Church guards us also against the opposite exaggeration, against all kenotic overemphasis. For the day of the shameful Crucifixion, when Our Lord was numbered among the

thieves, is the day of glory. "Today we keep the feast, for Our Lord is nailed upon the Cross," in the sharp phrase of St. John Chrysostom.¹⁰⁵ And the tree of the Cross is an "ever-glorious tree/' the very Tree of Life, "by which corruption is destroyed," "by which the lamentation of death is abolished." The Cross is the "seal of salvation," a sign of power and victory. Not just a symbol, but the very power of salvation, "the foundation of salvation," as Chrysostom says—*ὑπόθεσις τῆς σωτηρίας*. The Cross is the sign of the Kingdom. "I call Him King, because I see Him crucified, for it is appropriate for a King to die for His subjects." This again is St. John Chrysostom. The Church keeps the days of the Cross and cherishes them as solemnities—not only as a triumph of humility and love, but also as a victory of immortality and life. "As the life of the creation does the Church greet Thy Cross, O Lord."¹⁰⁶ For the death of Christ is itself the victory over death, the destruction of death, the abolition of mortality and corruption, "Thou diest and quickenest me." And the death of the Cross is a victory over death not only because it was followed or crowned by the Resurrection. The Resurrection only reveals and sets forth the victory achieved on the Cross. The Resurrection is accomplished in the very falling asleep of the God-man. And the power of the Resurrection is precisely the "power of the Cross," "the unconquerable and indestructible and Divine power of the honorable and life-giving Cross,"¹⁰⁷ the power of the voluntary Passion and death of the God-man. As St. Gregory of Nazianzus puts it: "He lays down His life, but He has power to take it again; and the veil is rent, for the mysterious doors of Heaven are opened; the rocks are cleft, the dead rise.. .. He dies, but He gives life, and by His death destroys death. He is buried, but He rises again. He goes down into Hell, but He brings up the souls."¹⁰⁸ On the Cross the Lord "restores us to original blessedness," and "by the Cross comes joy to the whole world." On the Cross the Lord not only

suffers and languishes, but rests, 'having fallen asleep, as Thou wert dead'¹⁰⁹ And He gives rest to man too, restores and renews him, "and resting on the tree, Thou hast given me rest, one who was overburdened with the burden of sins." From the Cross Christ sheds immortality upon men. By his burial in the grave He opens the gates of death, and renews corrupted human nature. "Every action and every miracle of Christ are most divine and marvellous," says St. John Damascene, "but the most marvellous of all is His honorable Cross. For no other thing has subdued death, expiated the sin of the first parents, despoiled Hades, bestowed the resurrection, granted power to us of condemning death itself, prepared the return to original blessedness, opened the gates of Paradise, given our nature a seat at the right hand of God, and made us the children of God, save the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ. The death of Christ on the Cross clothed us with the hypostatic Wisdom and Power of God."¹¹⁰ The mystery of the resurrecting Cross is commemorated especially on Good Saturday. As it is explained in the *Synaxarion* of that day, "on Great and Holy Saturday do we celebrate the divine-bodily burial of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and His descent into Hell, by which being called from corruption, our race passed to life eternal." This is not only the eve of salvation. It is the very day of our salvation. "This is the blessed Sabbath, this is the day of rest, whereon the Only Begotten Son of God has rested from all His deeds."¹¹¹ This is the day of the Descent into Hell. And the Descent into Hell is already the Resurrection.¹¹²

The great "three days of death" (*triduum mortis*) are the mysterious sacramental days of the Resurrection. In His flesh the Lord is resting in the grave, and His flesh is not abandoned by His Divinity. "Though Thy Temple was destroyed in the hour of the Passion, yet even then one was the Hypostasis of Thy Divinity and Thy flesh."¹¹³ The Lord's flesh does not suffer corruption, it remains incorruptible

even in death itself, i.e. alive, as though it had never died, for it abides in the very bosom of Life, in the Hypostasis of the Word. As it is phrased in one of the hymns, "Thou hast tasted of death, but hast not known corruption."¹¹⁴ St. John Damascene suggested that the word "corruption" (φθορά) has a double meaning. First, it means "all passive states of man" (τα πάθη) such as hunger, thirst, weariness, the nailing, death itself—that is, the separation of soul and body. In this sense we say that the Lord's body was liable to corruption (φθαρόν) until the Resurrection. But corruption also means the complete decomposition of the body and its destruction. This is corruption in the proper sense—or rather "destruction" (διαφθορά)—but the body of the Lord did not experience this mode of corruption at all, it remained even in death "incorrupt." That is to say, it never became a corpse.¹¹⁵ And in this incorruption the Body has been transfigured into a state of glory. The soul of Christ descends into Hell, also unseparated from the Divinity, "even in Hell in the soul, as God,"—the "deified soul" of Christ, as St. John of Damascus suggests, ψυχὴ τεθεωμένη.¹¹⁶

This descent into Hell means first of all the entry or penetration into the realm of death, into the realm of mortality and corruption. And in this sense it is simply a synonym of death itself.¹¹⁷ It is hardly possible to identify that Hell, or Hades, or the "subterranean abodes" to which the Lord descended, with the "hell" of sufferings for the sinners and the wicked. In all its objective reality the hell of sufferings and torments is certainly a spiritual mode of existence, determined by the personal character of each soul. And it is not only something to come, but to a great extent is already constituted for an obstinate sinner by the very fact of his perversion and apostasy. The wicked are actually in hell, in darkness and desolation. In any case one cannot imagine that the souls of the unrepentant sinners, and the Prophets of the Old Dispensation, who spake by

the Holy Spirit and preached the coming Messiah, and St. John the Baptist himself, were in the same "hell." Our Lord descended into the darkness of death. Hell, or Hades, is just the darkness and shadow of death, rather a place of mortal anguish than a place of penal torments, a dark "sheol," a place of hopeless disembodiment and disincarnation, which was only scantily and dimly fore-illuminated by the slanting rays of the not-yet-risen Sun, by the hope and expectation yet unfulfilled. Because of the Fall and Original Sin, all mankind fell into mortality and corruption. And even the highest righteousness under the Law could save man neither from the inevitability of empirical death, nor that helplessness and powerlessness beyond the grave, which depended upon the impossibility of a natural resurrection, upon the lack of power to restore the broken wholeness of human existence. That was, as it were, a kind of ontological infirmity of the soul, which, in the separation of death, had lost the faculty of being the true "*entelechia*" of its own body, the helplessness of fallen and wounded nature. And in this sense, all descended "into hell," into infernal darkness, as it were, into the very Kingdom of Satan, the prince of death and the spirit of negation; and they were all under his power, though the righteous ones did not partake of evil or demoniac perversion, since they were confined in death by the grip of ontological powerlessness, not because of their personal perversion. They were really the "spirits in prison."¹¹⁸ And it was into *this* prison, into *this* Hell, that the Lord and Saviour descended. Amid the darkness of pale death shines the unquenchable light of Life, and Life Divine. This destroys Hell and destroys mortality. "Though Thou didst descend into the grave, O Merciful One, yet didst Thou destroy the power of Hell."¹¹⁹ In this sense Hell has been simply abolished, "and there is not one dead in the grave." For "he received earth, and yet met heaven." Death is overcome by Life. "When Thou didst descend into death, O Life

Eternal, then Thou didst slay Hell by the flash of Thy Divinity."¹²⁰

The descent of Christ into Hell is the manifestation of Life amid the hopelessness of death, it is victory over death. And by no means is it the "taking upon" Himself by Christ of the "hellish torments of God-forsakenness."¹²¹ The Lord descended into Hell as the Victor, *Christus Victor*, as the Master of Life. He descended in His glory, not in humiliation, although through humiliation. But even death He assumed voluntarily and with authority. "It was not from any natural weakness of the Word that dwelt in it that the body had died, but in order that in it death might be done away by the power of the Saviour," says St. Athanasius.¹²² The Lord descended into Hell to announce the good tidings and to preach to those souls who were held and imprisoned there [I Peter 3:19: εν ᾧ και τοῖς εν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεῖς ἐκήρυξεν and 4:6: νεκροῖς εὐηγγελίσθη], by the power of His appearance and preaching, to set them free, to show them their deliverance.¹²³ In other words, the descent into Hell is the resurrection of the "whole Adam." Since "Hell groans below" and "is afflicted," by His descent Christ "shatters the bonds eternal," and raises the whole human race.¹²⁴ He destroys death itself, "the hold of death is broken and the power of Satan is destroyed."¹²⁵ This is the triumph of the Resurrection. "And the iron gates didst Thou crush, and Thou didst lead us out of darkness and the shadow of death, and our chains didst Thou break."¹²⁶ "And Thou hast laid waste the abode of death by Thy death today and illuminated everything by Thy light of the Resurrection." Thus Death itself is transmuted into Resurrection. "I am the first and the last: I am He that liveth, and was dead; and behold, I am alive for evermore, Amen. And I have the keys of death and of Hades" [Rev. 1:17-18].

VI

The Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Redemption

In the death of the Saviour the powerlessness of death over Him was revealed. In the fulness of His human nature Our Lord was mortal, since even in the original and spotless human nature a "*potentia mortis*" was inherent. The Lord was killed and died. But death did not hold Him. "It was not possible for him to be held by it." [Acts 2:24]. St. John Chrysostom commented: "He Himself permitted it. . . . Death itself in holding Him had pangs as in travail, and was sore bested. . . and He so rose as never to die."¹²⁷ He is Life Everlasting, and by the very fact of His death He destroys death. His very descent into Hell, into the realm of death, is the mighty manifestation of Life. By the descent into Hell He quickens death itself. By the Resurrection the powerlessness of death is manifested. The soul of Christ, separated in death, filled with Divine power, is again united with its body, which remained incorruptible throughout the mortal separation, in which it did not suffer any physical decomposition. In the death of the Lord it is manifest that His most pure body was not susceptible to corruption, that it was free from that mortality into which the original human nature had been involved through sin and Fall.

In the first Adam the inherent potentiality of death by disobedience was disclosed and actualized. In the second Adam the potentiality of immortality by purity and obedience was sublimated and actualized into the impossibility of death. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" [I Cor. 15:22]. The whole fabric of human nature in Christ proved to be stable and strong. The disembodiment of the soul was not consummated into a rupture. Even in the common death of man, as St. Gregory of Nyssa pointed out, the separation of soul and body is never

absolute; a certain connection is still there. In the death of Christ this connection proved to be not only a "connection of knowledge"; His soul never ceased to be the "vital power" of the body. Thus His death in all its reality, as a true separation and disembodiment, was like a sleep. "Then was man's death shown to be but a sleep," as St. John Damascene says.¹²⁸ The reality of death is not yet abolished, but its powerlessness is revealed. The Lord really and truly died. But in His death in an eminent measure the "*dynamis* of the resurrection" was manifest, which is latent but inherent in every death. To His death the glorious simile of the kernel of wheat can be applied to its full extent. [John 12:24]. And in His death the glory of God is manifest. "I have both glorified it and will glorify again" [v.28]. In the body of the Incarnate One this interim between death and resurrection is fore-shortened. "It is sown in dishonor: it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness: it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body: it is raised a spiritual body" [7 Cor. 15:43-44]. In the death of the Incarnate One this mysterious growth of the seed was accomplished in three days—"triduum mortis."

"He suffered not the temple of His body to remain long dead, but just having shown it dead by the contact of death, straightway raised it on the third day, and raised with it also the sign of victory over death, that is, the incorruption and impassibility manifested in the body." In these words St. Athanasius brings forward the victorious and resurrecting character of the death of Christ.¹²⁹ In this mysterious "*triduum mortis*," the body of Our Lord has been transfigured into a body of glory, and has been clothed in power and light. The seed matures. The Lord rises from the dead, as a Bridegroom comes forth from the chamber. This was accomplished by the power of God, as the general resurrection will, in the last day, be accomplished by the power of God. And in the Resurrection the Incarnation is completed, a victorious manifestation of Life within human nature, a

grafting of immortality into the human composition.

The Resurrection of Christ was a victory, not over his death only, but over death *in general*. "We celebrate the death of Death, the downfall of Hell, and the beginning of a life new and everlasting!"¹³⁰ In His Resurrection the whole of humanity, all human nature, is co-resurrected with Christ, "the human race is clothed in incorruption."¹³¹ Co-resurrected not indeed in the sense that all are raised from the grave. Men do still die; but the hopelessness of dying is abolished. Death is rendered powerless, and to all human nature is given the power or "*potentia*" of resurrection. St. Paul made this quite clear: "But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen. . . . For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised" [*I Cor. 15:13, 16*]. St. Paul meant to say that the Resurrection of Christ would become meaningless if it were not a universal accomplishment, if the whole Body were not implicitly "pre-resurrected" with the Head. And faith in Christ itself would lose any sense and become empty and vain; there would be nothing to believe in. "And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain" [v. 17]. Apart from the hope of the General Resurrection, belief in Christ would be in vain and to no purpose; it would only be vainglory. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept" [*7 Cor. 15:20*]. And in this lies the victory of life.¹³² "It is true, we still die as before," Says St. John Chrysostom, "but we do not remain in death; and this is not to die. . . . The power and very reality of death is just this, that a dead man has no possibility of returning to life. . . . But if after death he is to be quickened and moreover to be given a better life, then this is no longer death, but a falling asleep."¹³³ The same conception is found in St. Athanasius. The "condemnation of death" is abolished. "Corruption ceasing and being put away by the grace of Resurrection, we are henceforth dissolved for a time only, according to our bodies' mortal nature; like seeds cast into the earth,

we do riot perish; but sown in the earth we shall rise again, death being brought to nought by the grace of the Saviour/¹³⁴ This was a healing and a renewing of nature, and therefore there is here a certain compulsion; all will rise, and all will be restored to the fulness of their natural being, yet transformed. From henceforth every disembodiment is but temporary. The dark vale of Hades is abolished by the power of the life-giving Cross.

St. Gregory of Nyssa strongly emphasizes the organic interdependence between the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. The Resurrection is not only a consequence, but a fruit of the death on the Cross. St. Gregory stresses two points especially: the unity of the Divine Hypostasis, in which the soul and body of Christ are linked together even in their mortal separation; and the utter sinlessness of the Lord. And he proceeds: "When our nature, following its proper course, had even in Him been advanced to the separation of soul and body, He knitted together again the disconnected elements, cementing them together, as it were, with a cement of His Divine power, and recombining what was severed in a union never to be broken. And this is the Resurrection, namely the return, after they have been dissolved, of those elements that have been before linked together, into an indissoluble union through a mutual incorporation; in order that thus the primal grace which invested humanity might be recalled, and we restored to everlasting life, when the vice that had been mixed up with our kind has evaporated through our dissolution.... For as the principle of death took its rise in one person and passed on in succession through the whole of human kind, in like manner the principle of the Resurrection extends from one person to the whole of humanity.... For when, in that concrete humanity which He had taken to Himself, the soul after the dissolution returned to the body, then this uniting of the several portions passes, as by a new principle, in equal force upon the whole human race. This then is the

mystery of God's plan with regard to His death and His resurrection from the dead."¹³⁵ In another place St. Gregory explains his meaning by the analogy of the broken reed, cloven in twain. Whoever puts the broken parts together, starting from any one end, then also, of necessity, puts together the other end, "and the whole broken reed is completely re jointed." Thus then in Christ the union of soul and body, again restored, brings to reunion "the whole human nature, divided by death into two parts," since the hope of resurrection establishes the connection between the separated parts. In Adam our nature was split or dissected into two through sin. Yet in Christ this split is healed completely. This then is the abolition of death, or rather of mortality. In other words, it is the potential and dynamic restoration of the fulness and wholeness of human existence. It is a recreation of the whole human race, a "new creation" (ἡ καινὴ κτίσις),¹³⁶ a new revelation of Divine love and Divine power, the consummation of creation.

One has to distinguish most carefully between the healing of nature and the healing of the will. Nature is healed and restored with a certain compulsion, by the mighty power of God's omnipotent and invincible grace. One may even say, by some "violence of grace." The wholeness is in a way forced upon human nature. For in Christ all human nature (the "seed of Adam") is fully and completely cured from unwholeness and mortality. This restoration will be actualized and revealed to its full extent in the General Resurrection, the resurrection of all, both of the righteous and of the wicked. No one, so far as nature is concerned, can escape Christ's kingly rule, can alienate himself from the invincible power of the resurrection. But the will of man cannot be cured in the same invincible manner; for the whole meaning of the healing of the will is in its free conversion. The will of man must turn itself to God; there must be a free and spontaneous response of love and adoration. The will of man can be healed only *in freedom*, in the

"mystery of freedom." Only by this spontaneous and free effort does man enter into that new and eternal life which is revealed in Christ Jesus. A spiritual regeneration can be wrought only in perfect freedom, in an obedience of love, by a self-consecration and self-dedication to God. This distinction was stressed with great insistence in the remarkable treatise by Nicolas Cabasilas on *The Life in Christ*. Resurrection is a "rectification of nature" (ἡ ἀνάστασις φύσεως ἐστὶν ἐπανόρθωσις) and this God grants freely. But the Kingdom of Heaven, and the beatific vision, and union with Christ, presume the desire (τροφή ἐστὶν τῆς θελήσεως), and therefore are available only for those who have longed for them, and loved, and desired. Immortality will be given to all, just as all can enjoy the Divine providence. It does not depend upon our will whether we shall rise after death or not, just as *it* is not by our will that we are born. Christ's death and resurrection brings immortality and incorruption to all in the same manner, because all have the same nature as the Man Christ Jesus. But nobody can be compelled to desire. Thus Resurrection is a gift common to all, but blessedness will be given only to some.¹³⁷ And again, the path of life *is* the path of renunciation, of mortification, of self-sacrifice and self-oblation. One has to die to oneself in order to live in Christ. Each one must personally and freely associate himself with Christ, the Lord, the Saviour, and the Redeemer, in the confession of faith, in the choice of love, in the mystical oath of allegiance. Each one has to renounce himself, to "lose his soul" for Christ's sake, to take up his cross, and to follow after Him. The Christian struggle is the "following" after Christ, following the path of His Passion and Cross, even unto death, but first of all, following in love. "Hereby perceive we the love of God, because He laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. . . . Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins"

[*I John 3:16; 4:10*]. He who does not die with Christ cannot live with Him. "Unless of our own free choice we accept to die unto His passion, His life is not in us," says St. Ignatius.¹³⁸ This is no mere ascetical or moral rule, not merely a discipline. This is the ontological law of spiritual existence, even the law of life itself.

VII

Baptismal Symbolism and Redemptive Reality

The Christian life is initiated with a new birth, by water and the Spirit. First, repentance is required. "ἡ μετάνοια," an inner change, intimate and resolute.

The symbolism of Holy Baptism is complex and manifold. Baptism must be performed in the name of the Holy Trinity; and the Trinitarian invocation is unanimously regarded as the most necessary condition of the validity and efficacy of the sacrament. Yet above all, baptism is the putting on of Christ [*Gal. 3:27*], and an incorporation into His Body [*I Cor. 12:13*]. The Trinitarian invocation is required because outside the Trinitarian faith it is impossible to know Christ, to recognize in Jesus the Incarnate Lord, "One of the Holy Trinity." The symbolism of baptism is above all a symbolism of death and resurrection, of Christ's death and resurrection. "Know ye not, that as many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into His death? Therefore we are buried with Him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life" [*Rom. 6:3-4*]. It can be said that baptism is a sacramental resurrection in Christ, a rising up with Him and in Him to a new and eternal life: "Buried with Him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with Him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised Him from the dead"

[Col. 2:12]—συνταφέντες αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ θάπτισματι, ἐν φ καὶ συνηγέρθητε διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν. Co-resurrected with Him precisely through burial: "for if we be dead with Him, we shall also live with Him" [2 Tim. 2:11]. For in baptism the believer becomes a member of Christ, grafted into His Body, "rooted and built up in Him" [Col. 2:7]. Thereby the grace of the Resurrection is shed abroad on all. Before it is consummated in the General Resurrection, Life Eternal is manifested in the spiritual rebirth of believers, granted and accomplished in baptism, and the union with the Risen Lord is the initiation of the resurrection and of the Life to come. "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord... Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life of Jesus might also be made manifest in our body... Knowing that He which raised up the Lord Jesus shall also raise us by Jesus, and shall present us with you.... For we know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a **building** of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we **groan**, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven... , not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up by life" [2 Cor. 3:18; 4:10, 14; 5:1, 2]. We *are* changed, not only *will be* changed. Baptismal regeneration and *ascesis* are joined together: the Death with Christ and resurrection are already **operative** within believers. The resurrection is operative not only as a return to life, but also as a lifting up or sublimation into the glory. This is not only a manifestation of the power and glory of God, but also a **transfiguration** of man, in so far as he is dying with Christ. In dying with Him, man also lives. All will rise, but only to the faithful believer is the resurrection to be a true "resurrection unto **life**." He comes

not into judgment, but passes from death to life [*John* 5:24-29; 8:51]. Only in communion with God and through life in Christ does the restoration of human wholeness gain meaning. To those in total darkness, who have deliberately confined themselves "outside God," outside the Light Divine, the Resurrection itself must seem rather unnecessary and unmotivated. But it will come, as a "resurrection to judgment" [*John* 5:29; εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως]. And in this will be completed the mystery and the tragedy of human freedom.

Here indeed we are on the threshold of the inconceivable and incomprehensible. The "*apokatastasis*" of nature does not abolish free will. The will must be moved from within by love. St. Gregory of Nyssa had a clear understanding of this. He anticipated a kind of universal "*conversio*" of souls in the after-life, when the Truth of God will be revealed and manifested with some compelling and ultimate evidence. Just at that point the limitations of the Hellenistic mind are obvious. Evidence to it seemed to be the decisive reason or motive for the will, as if "sin" were merely "ignorance/¹³⁹ The Hellenistic mind had to pass through the long and hard experience of asceticism, of ascetic self-examination and self-control, in order to free itself from this intellectualistic naiveté and illusion, and discover a dark abyss in the fallen soul. Only in St. Maximus the Confessor, after some centuries of ascetic preparation, do we find a new, remodelled and deepened interpretation of the "*apokatastasis*." All nature, the whole Cosmos, will be restituted. But the dead souls will still be insensitive to the very revelation of Light.

The Light Divine will shine to all, but those who have deliberately spent their lives here on earth in fleshly desires, "against nature," will be unable to apprehend or enjoy this eternal bliss. The Light is the Word which illuminates the natural minds of the faithful; but to others it is a burning fire of the judgment (τῆ καύσει τῆς κρίσεως). He punishes those who, through love of the flesh, cling to the nocturnal darkness of this life. St. Maximus admitted an "*apokatastasis*"

in the sense of a restitution of all beings to an integrity of nature, of a universal manifestation of the Divine Life, which will be apprehended by every one; but it does not mean that all will equally participate in this revelation of the Good. St. Maximus draws a clear distinction between an ἐπίγνωσις and a μέθεξις. The divine gifts are dispensed in proportion to the capacities of men. The fulness of natural powers will be restored in all, and God will be in all, indeed; but only in the Saints will He be present with grace διὰ τὴν χάριν. In the wicked He will be present without grace, νεκρῶν τὴν χάριν. No grace will be bestowed upon the wicked, because the ultimate union with God requires the determination of the will. The wicked will be separated from God by their lack of a resolute purpose of good. We have here the same duality of *natura* and *will*. In the resurrection the whole of creation will be restored. But sin and evil are rooted in the will. The Hellenistic mind concluded therefrom that evil is unstable and by itself must disappear inevitably. For nothing can be perpetual, unless it be rooted in a Divine decree. Evil cannot be but transitory. The Christian inference is the opposite indeed. There is some strange inertia and obstinacy of the will, and this obstinacy may remain uncured even in the universal restoration. God never does any violence to man, and the communion with God cannot be forced upon or imposed upon the obstinate. As St. Maximus puts it, "the Spirit does not produce an undesired resolve, but it transforms a chosen purpose into *theosis*."¹⁴⁰ For sin and evil come not from an external impurity, but from an internal failure, from the perversion of the will. Consequently, sin is overcome only by inner conversion and change, and repentance is sealed by grace in the sacraments.¹⁴¹

Physical death among mankind is not abrogated by the Resurrection of Christ. Death is rendered powerless, indeed; mortality is overcome by the hope and pledge of the coming resurrection. And yet each must justify that resurrection

for himself. This can be done only in a free communion with the Lord. The immortality of nature, the permanence of existence, must be actualized into the life in the Spirit. The fulness of life is not merely an endless existence. In baptism we are initiated into this very resurrection of life, which will be consummated in the last day.

St. Paul speaks of a "likeness" unto the death of Christ, τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ [*Rom. 6:5*], but this "likeness" means more than a resemblance. It is more than a mere sign or recollection. The meaning of this "likeness" for St. Paul himself was that in each of us Christ can and must be "formed" [*Gal. 4:19*]. Christ is the Head, all believers are His members, and His life is actualized in them. All are called and every one is capable of believing, and of being quickened by faith and baptism to live in Him. Baptism is a regeneration, ἀναγέννησις, a new, spiritual, and charismatic birth. As Cabasilas says, Baptism is the cause of a beatific life in Christ, not merely of life.¹⁴² St. Cyril of Jerusalem lucidly explains the true reality of all baptismal symbolism. It is true, he says, that in the baptismal font we die and are buried only "in imitation," only "symbolically" (διὰ συμβόλου). We do not rise from a real grave (οὐδ' ἀληθῶς ἐτάφημεν) and yet, "if the imitation is in an image, the salvation is in very truth," ἐν ἀληθείᾳ δὲ ἡ σωτηρία. Christ was really crucified and buried, and actually rose from the grave. The Greek word used is οὐτως. It is more and stronger than simply ἀληθῶς—"in very truth"; it emphasizes the supernatural character of the death and resurrection of Our Lord. Hence He gave us this chance, by "imitative" sharing of His Passion to acquire "salvation in reality" (τῆ μιμήσει τῶν παθημάτων αὐτοῦ κοινά χήσαντες). It is not only an "imitation," but rather a participation, or a similitude. "Christ was crucified and buried in reality, but to you it is given to be crucified, buried, and raised with Him in similitude" (ἐν ὁμοιώματι).¹⁴³ It should be kept in mind

that St. Cyril mentions not only the death, but also the burial. This means that in baptism man descends "sacramentally" into the darkness of death, and yet with the Risen Lord rises again and crosses over from death to life. "And the image is completed all upon you, for you are the image of Christ," concludes St. Cyril. In other words, all are held together by and in Christ, hence the very possibility of a sacramental "resemblance."¹⁴⁴

St. Gregory of Nyssa dwells on the same point. There are two aspects in baptism. Baptism is a birth and a death. Natural birth is the beginning of a mortal existence, which begins and ends in corruption. Another, a new birth, had to be discovered, which would initiate into eternal life. In baptism "the presence of a Divine power transforms what is born with a corruptible nature into a state of incorruption."¹⁴⁵ It is transformed through following and imitating; and thus what was foreshown by the Lord is realized. Only by following after Christ can one pass through the labyrinth of life and come out of it. "For I call the inescapable guard of death, in which sorrowing mankind is imprisoned, a labyrinth" (τὴν ἀδιέξοδον τοῦ θανάτου φρουράν). Christ escaped from this after the three days of death. In the baptismal font "the imitation of all that He has done is accomplished." Death is "represented" in the element of water, and as Christ rose again to life, so also the newly-baptized, united with Him in bodily nature, "doth imitate the resurrection on the third day." This is just an "imitation," and not "identity." In baptism man is not actually raised, but only freed from natural evil and the inescapability of death. In him the "continuity of vice" is cut off. He is not resurrected, for he does not die, he remains in this life. Baptism only foreshadows the resurrection. In baptism we anticipate the grace of the final resurrection. Baptism is a "*homiomatic resurrection*" to use the phrase of one Russian scholar. Yet in baptism the resurrection is in a way already initiated. Baptism is the

start, ἀρχή, and the resurrection is the end and consummation, πέρας ... and all that will take place in the great Resurrection already has its beginnings and causes in baptism. St. Gregory does not mean that resurrection which consists only in a remolding of our composition. Human nature advances towards that goal by a kind of necessity. He speaks of the fulness of the resurrection, of a "restoration to a blessed and divine state, set free from all shame and sorrow/" It is an apokatastasis, a true "resurrection unto life."¹⁴⁶

It must be pointed out that St. Gregory specially emphasized the need of keeping and holding fast the baptismal grace, for in baptism it is not only nature but also the will that is transformed and transfigured, remaining free throughout. If the soul is not cleansed and purified in the free exercise of will, baptism proves to be fruitless; the transfiguration is not actualized; the new life is not yet consummated. This does not subordinate baptismal grace to human license. Grace does indeed descend. But it can never be forced upon any one who is free and made in the image of God, it must be responded to and corroborated by the synergism of love and will. Grace does not quicken and enliven the closed and obstinate souls, the really "dead souls." Response and co-operation are required.¹⁴⁷ That is just because baptism is a sacramental dying with Christ, a participation in His voluntary death, in His sacrificial Love and this can be accomplished only in freedom. Thus in baptism the death of Christ on the Cross is reflected or portrayed as in a living and sacramental image. Baptism is at once a death and a birth, a burial and a "bath of regeneration," "a time of death and a time of birth," to quote St. Cyril of Jerusalem.¹⁴⁸

VIII

The Eucharist and Redemption

In the Early Church the rite of Christian initiation was not divided. Three of the sacraments belong together: Baptism, the Holy Chrism (Confirmation), and the Eucharist. The Initiation described by St. Cyril, and later on by Cabasilas, included all three.

Sacraments are instituted in order to enable man to participate in Christ's redeeming death and thereby to gain the grace of His resurrection. This was Cabasilas' main idea. "We are baptized in order to die by His death and to rise by His resurrection. We are anointed with the chrism that we may partake of His kingly anointment of the deification. And when we are fed with the most sacred Bread and do drink the most Divine Cup, we do partake of the same flesh and the same blood Our Lord has assumed, and so we are united with Him, Who was for us incarnate, and died, and rose again.... Baptism is a birth, and Chrism is the cause of acts and movements, and the Bread of life and Cup of thanksgiving are the true food and the true drink.¹⁴⁹ In the whole sacramental and devotional life of the Church, the Cross and the Resurrection are "imitated" and reflected in manifold symbols and rites. All the symbolism is realistic. These symbols do not merely remind us of something in the past. Through these sacred symbols, the ultimate Reality is in very truth disclosed and conveyed. All this hieratic symbolism culminates in the august mystery of the Holy Altar. The Eucharist is the heart of the Church, the Sacrament of Redemption in an eminent sense. It is more than an "*imitatio*." It is Reality itself, veiled and disclosed in the Sacrament.

It is "the perfect and final Sacrament," says Cabasilas, "and one cannot go further, and there is nothing to be added." It is the "limit of life"—ζωῆς τὸ πέρας. "After

the Eucharist there is nothing more to long for, but we have to stay here and learn how we can preserve this treasure to the end."¹⁵⁰

The Eucharist is the Last Supper itself, again and again enacted, but not repeated for every new celebration does not only represent, but truly *is the same* "Mystical Supper" which was celebrated for the first time by the Divine High Priest Himself, "in the night in which He was given up or rather gave Himself for the life of the world."

The true Celebrant of each Liturgy is Our Lord Himself. This was stressed with great power by St. John Chrysostom on various occasions. "Believe, therefore, that even now it is that Supper, at which He Himself sat down. For this one is in no respect different from that one. For neither doth man make this one and Himself that one, but both this and that are His own work. When therefore thou seest the priest delivering it unto thee, account not that it is the priest that does, so, but that it is Christ's hand that is stretched out."¹⁵¹ And again in *horn.* 82, 5, Col. F.44: "He that then did these things at that Supper, this same now also works them. We hold the rank of ministers. He who sanctifieth and changeth them is the Same. This table is the same as that, and hath nothing less. For it is not that Christ wrought that, and man this, but He doth this too. This is that Upper Chamber, where they were then."¹⁵² And "Christ now also is present, He who adorned that table is He who now also adorns this.... The priest stands fulfilling a figure, but the power and grace are of God."¹⁵³

All this is of primary importance. The Last Supper was an offering of the sacrifice of the Cross. The offering is still continued. Christ is still acting as the High Priest in His Church. The Mystery is all the same. The Sacrifice is one. The Table is one. The priest is the same. And not one Lamb is slain, or offered this day, and another of old; not one here, and another somewhere else. But *the same* always

and everywhere. One very Lamb of God, "who 'taketh' the sins of the world," even the Lord Jesus.

The Eucharist is a sacrifice, not because Jesus is slain again, but because the same Body and the same sacrificial Blood are actually here on the Altar, offered and presented. And the Altar is actually the Holy Grave, in which the Heavenly Master is falling asleep. Nicolas Cabasilas put this in these words: "In offering and sacrificing Himself once for all, He did not cease from His priesthood, but He exercises this perpetual ministry for us, in which He is our advocate with God for ever, for which reason it is said of Him, Thou art a priest for ever."¹⁵⁴

The resurrecting power and significance of Christ's death are made manifest in full in the Eucharist. The Lamb is slain, the Body broken, the Blood shed, and yet it is a celestial food, and "the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die but live forever in Jesus Christ," to use the famous phrase of St. Ignatius.¹⁵⁵ It is "the heavenly Bread and the Cup of life." This tremendous Sacrament is for the faithful the very "Betrothal of the Life Eternal." Because Christ's Death itself was the Victory and the Resurrection, this Victory and this Triumph do we observe and celebrate in the Sacrament of the Altar. *Eucharist* means thanksgiving. It is a hymn rather than a prayer. It is the service of triumphant joy, the continuous Easter, the kingly feast of the Lord of Life and glory. "And so the whole celebration of the Mystery is one image of the whole economy of our Lord," says Cabasilas.¹⁵⁶

The Holy Eucharist is the climax of our aspirations. The beginning and the end are here linked together: the reminiscences of the Gospels and the prophecies of the Revelation, i.e. the fulness of the New Testament. The Eucharist is a sacramental anticipation, a foretaste of the Resurrection, an "image of the Resurrection" (ὁ τύπος της ἀναπαύσεως; the phrase is from the consecration prayer of St. Basil). The sacramental life of believers is the building up of the

Church. Through the sacraments, and in them, the new life of Christ is extended to and bestowed upon the members of His Body. Through the sacraments the Redemption is appropriated and disclosed. One may add: In the sacraments is consummated the Incarnation, the true reunion of man with God in Christ.

O Christ, Passover great and most Holy! O Wisdom, Word, and Power of God! Vouchsafe that we may more perfectly partake of Thee in the days of Thine everlasting Kingdom. (*Easter Hymn, recited by the priest at every celebration.*)

VI
DIMENSIONS
OF
REDEMPTION

Cur Deus Homo?

The Motive of the Incarnation

"I am the Alpha and the Omega."
Rev. 1:8

I

The Christian message was from the very beginning the message of Salvation, and accordingly our Lord was depicted primarily as the Savior, Who has redeemed His people from bondage of sin and corruption. The very fact of the Incarnation was usually interpreted in early Christian theology in the perspective of Redemption. Erroneous Conceptions of the Person of Christ with which the early Church had to wrestle were criticized and refuted precisely when they tended to undermine the reality of human Redemption. It was generally assumed that the very meaning of Salvation was that the intimate union between God and man had been restored, and it was inferred that the Redeemed had to belong Himself to both sides, i.e. to be at once both Divine and human, for otherwise the broken communion between God and man would not have been re-established. This was the main line of reasoning of St. Athanasius in his struggle with the Arians, of St. Gregory of Nazianzus in his refutation of Apollinarian-

"*Cur Deus Homo? The Motive of the Incarnation*" appeared in *Evharistion: Hamilcar Alivisatos* (Athens, 1957), 70-79. Reprinted by permission. The translations from Latin were done by Raymond German Ciuba; those from Greek, by Stephen N. Scott.

ism, and of other writers of the IVth and Vth centuries. "That is saved which is united with God," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus.¹ The redeeming aspect and impact of the Incarnation were emphatically stressed by the Fathers. The purpose and the effect of the Incarnation were defined precisely as the Redemption of man and his restoration to those original conditions which were destroyed by the fall and sin. The sin of the world was abrogated and taken away by the Incarnate One, and He only, being both Divine and human, could have done it. On the other hand, it would be unfair to claim that the Fathers regarded this redeeming purpose as *the only reason* for the Incarnation, so that the Incarnation *would not have taken place at all, had not man sinned*. In this form the question was never asked by the Fathers. The question about the *ultimate motive* of the Incarnation was never formally discussed in the Patristic Age. The problem of the relation between the mystery of the Incarnation and the original purpose of Creation was not touched upon by the Fathers; they never elaborated this point systematically. "It may perhaps be truly said that the thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall harmonizes with the general tenor of Greek theology. Some patristic phrases seem to imply that the thought was distinctly realized here and there, and perhaps discussed."² These 'patristic phrases' were not collected and examined. In fact, the same Fathers could be quoted in favor of opposite opinions. It is not enough to accumulate quotations, taking them out of their context and ignoring the purpose, very often polemical, for which particular writings were composed. Many of these 'patristic phrases' were just 'occasional' statements, and they can be used only with utter care and caution. Their proper meaning can be ascertained only when they are read in the context, i.e. in the perspective of the thought of each particular writer.

II

Rupert of Deutz (d. 1135) seems to be the first among the medieval theologians who formally raised the question of the *motive* of the Incarnation, and his contention was that the Incarnation belonged to the original design of Creation and was therefore independent of the Fall. Incarnation was, in his interpretation, the consummation of the original creative purpose of God, an aim in itself, and not merely a redemptive remedy for human failure.³ Honorius of Autun (d. 1152) was of the same conviction.⁴ The great doctors of the XIIIth century, such as Alexander of Hales and Albert Magnus, admitted the idea of an Incarnation independent of the Fall as a most convenient solution of the problem.⁵ Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) elaborated the whole conception with great care and logical consistency. For him the Incarnation apart from the Fall was not merely a most convenient assumption, but rather an indispensable doctrinal presupposition. The Incarnation of the Son of God was for him the very reason of the whole Creation. Otherwise, he thought, this supreme action of God would have been something merely accidental or 'occasional'. "Again, if the Fall were the cause of the predestination of Christ, it would follow that God's greatest work was only occasional, for the glory of all will not be so intense as that of Christ, and it seems unreasonable to think that God would have foregone such a work because of Adam's good deed, if he had not sinned." The whole question for Duns Scotus was precisely that of *the order of Divine 'predestination' or purpose*, i.e. of *the order of thoughts in the Divine counsel of Creation*. Christ, the Incarnate, was the first object of the creative will of God, and it was for Christ's sake that anything else had been created at all. "The Incarnation of Christ was not foreseen occasionally, but was viewed as an immediate end by God from eternity; thus, in speaking about things which are predestined, Christ in human nature was predestined before others, since

He is nearer to an end." This order of 'purposes' or 'provisions' was, of course, just a logical one. The main emphasis of Duns Scotus was on the unconditional and primordial character of the Divine decree of the Incarnation, seen in the total perspective of Creation.⁶ Aquinas (1224-1274) also discussed the problem at considerable length. He saw the whole weight of the arguments in favor of the opinion that, even apart from the Fall, "nevertheless, God would have become incarnate," and he quoted the phrase of St. Augustine: "in the Incarnation of Christ, other things must be considered besides absolution from sin." (*De Trinitate*, XIII. 17). But Aquinas could not find, either in Scripture or in the Patristic writings, any definite witness to this Incarnation independent of the Fall, and therefore was inclined to believe that the Son of God would not have been incarnate if the first man did not sin: "Although God could have become incarnate without the existence of sin, it is nevertheless more appropriate to say that, if man had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate, since in Sacred Scripture the reason for the Incarnation is everywhere given as the sin of the first man." The unfathomable mystery of the Divine will can be comprehended by man only in so far as it is plainly attested in Holy Scripture, "only to the extent that [these things] are transmitted in Sacred Scripture," or, as Aquinas says in another place, "only in so far as we are informed by the authority of the saints, through whom God has revealed His will." Christ alone knows the right answer to this question: "The truth of the matter only He can know, Who was born and Who was off erred up, because He so willed."⁷ Bonaventura (1221-1274) suggested the same caution. Comparing the two opinions—one in favor of an Incarnation apart from the Fall and the other dependent on it, he concluded: "Both [opinions] excite the soul to devotion by different considerations: the first, however, more consonant with the judgment of reason; yet it appears that the second is more agreeable to the piety of faith." One should rely rather on the direct testimony of

the Scriptures than on the arguments of human logic.⁸ On the whole, Duns Scotus was followed by the majority of theologians of the Franciscan order, and also by not a few outside it, as, for instance, by Dionysius Carthusianus, by Gabriel Biel, by John Wessel, and, in the time of the Council of Trent, by Giacomo Nachianti, Bishop of Chiozza (Jacobus Naclantus), and also by some of the early Reformers, for instance, by Andreas Osiander.⁹ This opinion was strongly opposed by others, and not only by the strict Thomists, and the whole problem was much discussed both by Roman Catholic and by Protestant theologians in the XVIIth century.¹⁰ Among the Roman Catholic champions of the absolute decree of the Incarnation one should mention especially François de Sales and Malebranche. Malebranche strongly insisted on the *metaphysical necessity* of the Incarnation, quite apart from the Fall, for otherwise, he contended, there would have been no adequate reason or purpose for the act of Creation itself.¹¹ The controversy is still going on among Roman Catholic theologians, sometimes with excessive heat and vigor, and the question is not settled.¹² Among the Anglicans, in the last century, Bishop Wescott strongly pleaded for the 'absolute motive', in his admirable essay on "The Gospel of Creation."¹³ The late Father Sergii Bulgakov was strongly in favor of the opinion that the Incarnation should be regarded as an absolute decree of God, prior to the catastrophe of the Fall.¹⁴

III

In the course of this age-long discussion a constant appeal has been made to the testimony of the Fathers. Strangely enough, the most important item has been overlooked in this anthology of quotations. Since the question of the motive of the Incarnation was never formally raised in the Patristic age, most of the texts used in the later discussions could not provide any direct guidance.¹⁵ St. Maximus the Confessor (580-

662) seems to be the only Father who was directly concerned with the problem, although not in the same setting as the later theologians in the West. He stated plainly that the Incarnation should be regarded as *an absolute and primary purpose of God in the act of Creation*. The nature of the Incarnation, of this union of the Divine majesty with human frailty, is indeed an unfathomable mystery, but we can at least grasp the reason and the purpose of this supreme mystery, its *logos* and *skopos*. And this original reason, or the ultimate purpose, was, in the opinion of St. Maximus, precisely the Incarnation itself and then our own incorporation into the Body of the Incarnate One. The phrasing of St. Maximus is straight and clear. The 60th *questio ad Thalassium*, is a commentary on I Peter, 1:19-20: "[Christ was] like a blameless and spotless lamb, who was foreordained from the foundation of the world." Now the question is: St. Maximus first briefly summarizes the true teaching about the Person of Christ, and then proceeds: "This is the blessed end, on account of which everything was created. This is the Divine purpose, which was thought of before the beginning of Creation, and which we call an intended fulfillment. All creation exists on account of this fulfillment and yet the fulfillment itself exists because of nothing that was created. Since God had this end in full view, he produced the natures of things. This is truly the fulfillment of Providence and of planning. Through this there is a recapitulation to God of those created by Him. This is the mystery circumscribing all ages, the awesome plan of God, super-infinite and infinitely pre-existing the ages. The Messenger, who *is* in essence Himself the Word of God, became man on account of this fulfillment. And it may be said that it was He Himself Who restored the manifest innermost depths of the goodness handed down by the Father; and He revealed the fulfillment in Himself, by which creation has won the beginning of true existence. For on account of Christ, that is to say the mystery concerning Christ, all time and that which is in time have found the beginning and the end of

their existence in Christ. For before time there was secretly purposed a union of the ages, of the determined and the Indeterminate, of the measurable and the Immeasurable, of the finite and Infinity, of the creation and the Creator, of motion and rest—a union which was made manifest in Christ during these last times.” (M., *P.G.*, XC, 621, A-B.) One has to distinguish most carefully between the eternal being of the *Logos*, in the bosom of the Holy Trinity, and the ‘economy’ of His Incarnation. ‘Prevision’ is related precisely to the Incarnation: “Therefore Christ was foreknown, not as He was according to His own nature, but as he later appeared incarnate for our sake in accordance with the final economy.” (M., *P.G.*, XC, 624D). The ‘absolute predestination’ of Christ is alluded to with full clarity.¹⁶ This conviction was in full agreement with the general tenor of the theological system of St. Maximus, and he returns to the problem on many occasions, both in his answers to Thalassius and in his *Ambigua*. For instance, in connection with Ephesians 1:9, St. Maximus says: “[By this Incarnation and by our age] he has shown us for what purpose we were made and the greatest good will be of God towards us before the ages.” (M., *P.G.*, 1097C). By his very constitution man anticipates in himself “the great mystery of the Divine purpose,” the ultimate consummation of all things in God. The whole history of Divine Providence is for St. Maximus divided into two great periods: the first culminates in the Incarnation of the *Logos* and is the story of Divine condescension (“through the Incarnation”); the second is the story of human ascension into the glory of deification, an extension, as it were, of the Incarnation to the whole creation. “Therefore we may divide time into two parts according to its design, and we may distinguish both the ages pertaining to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine, and the ages concerning the deification of the human by grace. . . and to say it concisely: both those ages which concern the descent of God to men, and those which have begun the ascent of men to God. . . Or, to say it even better, the

beginning, the middle, and the end of all the ages, those which have gone by, those of the present time, and those which are yet to come, is our Lord Jesus Christ." (M., *P.G.*, XC, 320, B-C). The ultimate consummation is linked in the vision of St. Maximus with the primordial creative will and purpose of God, and therefore his whole conception is strictly 'theocentric', and at the same time 'Christocentric'. In no sense, however, does this obscure the sad reality of sin, of the utter misery of sinful existence. The great stress is always laid by St. Maximus on the conversion and cleansing of the human will, on the struggle with passions and with evil. But he views the tragedy of the Fall and the apostasy of the created in the wider perspective of the original plan of Creation.¹⁷

IV

What is the actual weight of the witness of St. Maximus? Was it more than his 'private opinion', and what is the authority of such 'opinions'? It is perfectly clear that to the question of the first or ultimate 'motive' of the Incarnation no more than a 'hypothetical' (or 'convenient') answer can be given. But many doctrinal statements are precisely such hypothetical statements or 'theologoumena'.¹⁸ And it seems that the 'hypothesis' of an Incarnation apart from the Fall is at least permissible in the system of Orthodox theology and fits well enough into the mainstream of Patristic teaching. An adequate answer to the question of the 'motive' of the Incarnation can be given only in the context of the general doctrine of Creation.

The Ever-Virgin Mother of God

The writer is fully aware of the inadequacy of his exposition. This is not a theological essay in the strict sense. It is only an occasional address written down in haste some time after it had been improvised. The only contention of the author was to suggest the way in which the subject should be approached and to open the discussion. The main concern in the paper was to prove that Mariology belongs to the very body of Christian doctrine or, if we allow the phrase, to that essential minimum of doctrinal agreement outside which no true unity of faith could even be claimed.

G. F.

THE WHOLE DOGMATIC teaching about our Lady can be condensed into these two names of hers: the *Mother of God* and the *Ever-Virgin*,—θεοτόκος and ἀειπαρθένος. Both names have the formal authority of the Church Universal, an ecumenical authority indeed. The Virgin Birth is plainly attested in the New Testament and has been an integral part of the Catholic tradition ever since. "Incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary" (or "Born of the Virgin Mary") is a credal phrase. It is not merely a statement of the historical *fact*. It is precisely a *credal* statement, a solemn profession of *faith*. The term "Ever-Virgin" was formally endorsed by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553). And *Theotokos* is more than a name or an honorific title. It is rather a doctrinal definition—in one word. It has been a touchstone of the true faith and a distinctive mark of Orthodoxy even before the Council of Ephesus (432). Already

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St. Gregory of Nazianzus warns Cledonius: "if one does not acknowledge Mary as Theotokos, he is estranged from God" (*Epist.* 101). As a matter of fact, the name was widely used by the Fathers of the fourth century and possibly even in the third (by Origen, for instance, if we can trust Socrates, *Hist. Eccl.*, VII, 32, and the texts preserved in catenas, e.g. *In Lucam Hom.* 6 and 7, ed. Rauer, 44. 10 and 50. 9). It was already traditional when it was contested and repudiated by Nestorius and his group. The word does not occur in Scripture, just as the term $\omicron\mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ does not occur. But surely, neither at Nicaea nor at Ephesus was the Church innovating or imposing a new article of faith. An "unscriptural" word was chosen and used, precisely to voice and to safeguard the traditional belief and common conviction of ages. It is true, of course, that the Third Ecumenical Council was concerned primarily with the Christological dogma and did not formulate any special Mariological doctrine. But precisely for that very reason it was truly remarkable that a *Mariological* term should have been selected and put forward as the ultimate test of *Christological* orthodoxy, to be used, as it were, as a doctrinal shibboleth in the Christological discussion. It was really a key-word to the whole of Christology. "This name," says St. John of Damascus, "contains the whole mystery of the Incarnation" (*De Fide Orth.*, III. 12). As Petavius aptly puts it: *Quem in Trinitatis explicando dogmate ομοουσίου vox, eumdem hoc in nostro Incarnationis usum ac principatum obtinet Θεοτόκου nomen* (*De Incarnatione*, lib. V, cap. 15). The motive and the purpose of such a choice are obvious. The Christological doctrine can never be accurately and adequately stated *unless* a very definite teaching about the Mother of Christ has been included. In fact, all the Mariological doubts and errors of modern times depend in the last resort precisely upon an utter Christological confusion. They reveal a hopeless "conflict in Christology." There is no room for the Mother of God in a "reduced Christology." Protestant theo-

logians simply have nothing to say about her. Yet to ignore the Mother means to misinterpret the Son. On the other hand, the person of the Blessed Virgin can be properly understood and rightly described only in a Christological setting and context. Mariology is to be but a chapter in the treatise on the Incarnation, never to be extended into an independent "treatise." Not, of course, an optional or occasional chapter, not an appendix. It belongs to the very body of doctrine. The Mystery of the Incarnation includes the Mother of the Incarnate. Sometimes, however, this Christological perspective has been obscured by a devotional exaggeration, by an unbalanced pietism. Piety must always be guided and checked by dogma. Again, there must be a Mariological chapter in the treatise on the Church. But the doctrine of the Church itself is but an "extended Christology," the doctrine of the "*total Christ*" *totus Christus, caput et corpus*.

The name *Theotokos* stresses the fact that the Child whom Mary bore was not a "simple man," not a human person, but the only-begotten Son of God, "One of the Holy Trinity," yet Incarnate. This is obviously the corner-stone of the Orthodox faith. Let us recall the formula of Chalcedon: "Following, then, the holy Fathers, we confess *one and the same Son* [ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν], our Lord Jesus Christ . . . before the ages begotten of the Father as to Godhead, but in the last days, for us and for our salvation, *the selfsame* [τὸν αὐτόν], born of Mary, the Virgin Mother of God, as to Manhood" [the translation is by Dr. Bright]. The whole emphasis is on the absolute *identity* of the Person: *the Same, the Selfsame, unus idemque* in St. Leo. This implies a *twofold generation* of the divine Word (but emphatically *not* a double *Sonship*; that would be precisely the Nestorian perversion). *There is but one Son*: the One born of the Virgin Mary *is* in the fullest possible sense the Son of God. As St. John of Damascus says, the Holy Virgin did not bear "a common man, but the true God" [οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ψιλόν . . . ἀλλὰ θεὸν ἀληθινόν], yet "not naked, but

incarnate" οὐ γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ σεσαρκωμένον]. The Same, who from all eternity is born of the Father, "in these last days" was born of the Virgin, "without any change" (*De Fide Orth.*, III. 12). There is here no confusion of natures. The "second γέννησις" is just the Incarnation. No *new person* came into being when the Son of Mary was conceived and born, but the Eternal Son of God was *made man*. This constitutes the mystery of the divine Motherhood of the Virgin Mary. For indeed Motherhood is a *personal* relation, a relation between persons. Now, the Son of Mary was in very truth a divine Person. The name *Theotokos* is an inevitable sequel to the name *Theanthropos*, the God-Man. Both stand and fall together. The doctrine of the Hypostatic Union implies and demands the conception of the divine Motherhood. Most unfortunately, the mystery of the Incarnation has been treated in modern times too often in an utterly abstract manner, as if it were but a metaphysical problem or even a dialectical riddle. One indulges too easily in the dialectics of the Finite and the Infinite, of the Temporal and the Eternal, etc., as if they were but terms of a logical or metaphysical relation. One is then in danger of overlooking and missing the very point: the Incarnation was precisely a mighty deed of the Living God, his most *personal* intervention into the creaturely existence, indeed, the "coming down" of a divine Person, of God *in person*. Again, there is a subtle but real docetic flavor in many recent attempts to re-state the traditional faith in modern terms. There is a tendency to over-emphasize the divine initiative in the Incarnation to such an extent that the historic life of the Incarnate itself fades out into "the Incognito of the Son of God." The direct identity" of the Jesus of history and the Son of God is explicitly denied. The whole impact of Incarnation is reduced to symbols: the Incarnate Lord is understood rather as an exponent of some august principle or idea (be *it* the Wrath of God or Love, Anger or Mercy, Judgement or Forgiveness), than as a living Person. In both cases the personal implications of the Incarna-

tion are overlooked or neglected—I mean, our adoption into true sonship of God in the Incarnate Lord. Now, something very real and ultimate happened with men and to men when the Word of God “was made flesh and dwelt among us,” or rather, “took his abode in our midst”—a very pictorial turn indeed: ἔσκηνώσεν ἐν ἡμῖν (John i. 14).

“But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman” (Gal. iv. 4, R.V.). This is a scriptural statement of the same mystery with which the Fathers were wrestling at Chalcedon. Now, what is the full meaning and purpose of this phrase: “born of woman”? Motherhood, in general, is by no means exhausted by the mere fact of a physical procreation. It would be lamentable blindness if we ignored its spiritual aspect. In fact, procreation itself establishes an intimate spiritual relation between the mother and the child. This relation is unique and reciprocal, and its essence is affection or love. Are we entitled to ignore this implication of the fact that our Lord was “born of the Virgin Mary”? Surely, no docetic reduction is permissible in this case, just as it must be avoided anywhere else in Christology. Jesus was (and is) the Eternal God, and yet Incarnate, and Mary was *his* Mother in the fullest sense. Otherwise the Incarnation would not have been genuine. But this means precisely that for the Incarnate Lord there is one particular human person to whom he is in a very special relation,—in precise terms, one for whom he is not only the Lord and Saviour, but a Son. On the other hand, Mary was the true mother of her Child—the truth of her human maternity is of no less relevance and importance than the mystery of her divine motherhood. But the Child was divine. Yet the spiritual implications of her motherhood could not be diminished by the exceptional character of the case, nor could Jesus fail to be truly human in his filial response to the motherly affection of the one of whom he was born. This is not a vain speculation. It would be impertinent indeed to intrude upon the sacred field of this unparalleled intimacy between the Mother

and the divine Child. But it would be even more impertinent to ignore the mystery. In any case, it would have been a very impoverished idea if we regarded the Virgin Mother merely as a physical instrument of our Lord's taking flesh. Moreover, such a misinterpretation is formally excluded by the explicit teaching of the Church, attested from the earliest date: she was not just a "channel" through which the Heavenly Lord has come, but truly the mother of whom he took his humanity. St. John of Damascus precisely in these very words summarizes the Catholic teaching: he did not come "as through a pipe" [ὡς διὰ σωλήνος], but has assumed of *her* [ἐξ αὐτῆς], a human nature consubstantial to ours (*De Fide Orth.*, III, 12).

Mary "has found favor with God" (Luke i. 30). She was chosen and ordained to serve in the Mystery of the Incarnation. And by this eternal election or predestination she was in a sense set apart and given an unique privilege and position in the whole of mankind, nay in the whole of creation. She was given a transcendent rank, as it were. She was at once a *representative* of the human race, and *set apart*. There is an antinomy here, implied in the divine election. She was set apart. She was put into a unique and unparalleled relation to God, to the Holy Trinity, even before the Incarnation, as the prospective Mother of the Incarnate Lord, just because it was not an ordinary historical happening, but an eventful consummation of the eternal decree of God. She has a unique position even in the divine plan of salvation. Through the Incarnation human nature was to be restored again into the fellowship with God which had been destroyed and abrogated by the Fall. The sacred humanity of Jesus was to be the bridge over the abyss of sin. Now, this humanity was to be taken of the Virgin Mary. The Incarnation itself was a new beginning in the destiny of man, a beginning of the new humanity. In the Incarnation the "new man" was born, the "Last Adam"; he was truly human, but he was more than a man: "The second man is the Lord from heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 47). As the Mother of

this 'Second Man," Mary herself was participating in the mystery of the redeeming re-creation of the world. Surely, she is to be counted among the redeemed. She was most obviously in need of salvation. Her Son is her Redeemer and Saviour, just as he is the Redeemer of the world. Yet, she is the only human being for whom the Redeemer of the world is also a son, her own child whom she truly bore. Jesus indeed was born "not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John i. 13—this verse is related both to the Incarnation and to baptismal regeneration), and yet he is "the fruit of the womb" of Mary. His supernatural birth is the pattern and the font of the new existence, of the new and spiritual birth of all believers, which is nothing else than a participation in his sacred humanity, an adoption into the sonship of God—in the "second man," in the "last Adam." The Mother of the "second man" necessarily had her own and peculiar way into the new life. It is not too much to say that for her the Redemption was, in a sense, anticipated in the fact of the Incarnation itself,—and anticipated in a peculiar and personal manner. "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee" (Luke i. 35). This was a true "theophanic presence"—in the fulness of grace and of the Spirit. The "shadow" is exactly a theophanic symbol. And Mary was truly "full of grace," *gratia plena*, *κεχαριτωμένη*. The Annunciation was for her, as it were, an *anticipated Pentecost*. We are compelled to risk this daring parallelism by the inscrutable logic of the divine election. For indeed we cannot regard the Incarnation merely as a metaphysical miracle which would be unrelated to the personal destiny and existence of the persons involved. Man is never dealt with by God as if he was but a tool in the hands of a master. For man is a living person. By no means could it be merely an "instrumental" grace, when the Virgin was "overshadowed" with the power of the Highest. The unique position of the Virgin Mary is obviously not her own

achievement, nor simply a "reward" for her "merits,"—nor even perhaps was the fulness of grace given to her in a "prevision" of her merits and virtue. It was supremely the free gift of God, in the strictest sense—*gratia gratis data*. It was an absolute and eternal election, although not unconditional—for it was conditioned by and related to the mystery of the Incarnation. Mary holds her unique position and has a "category of her own" not as a mere Virgin, but as the *Virgin-Mother*, παρθενο μη τη ρ, as the predestined Mother of the Lord. Her function in the Incarnation is twofold. On the one hand, she secures the *continuity* of the human race. Her Son is, in virtue of his "second nativity," the Son of David, the Son of Abraham and of all the "forefathers" (this is emphasized by the genealogies of Jesus, in both versions). In the phrase of St. Irenaeus, he "*recapitulated* in himself the long roll of humanity" (*Adv. Haeres.*, III, 18, 1: *longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit*), "gathered up in himself all nations, dispersed as they were even from Adam" (III, 22, 3) and "took upon himself *the old way of creation*" (IV, 23, 4). But, on the other hand, he "exhibited a *new sort of generation*" (V, 1, 3). He was the *New Adam*. This was the most drastic break in the continuity, the true *reversal* of the previous process. And this "reversal" begins precisely with the Incarnation, with the Nativity of the "Second Man." St. Irenaeus speaks of a *recirculation*—from Mary to Eve (III, 22, 4). As the Mother of the New Man Mary has her anticipated share in this very newness. Of course, Jesus the Christ is the only Lord and Saviour. But Mary is his mother. She is the morning star that announces the sunrise, the rise of the true *Sol salutis*: ἀστὴρ ἑμφαίνων τον "Ἥλιον. She is "the dawn of the mystic day," αὐγή μυστικῆς ἡμέρας (both phrases are from the Akathist hymn). And in a certain sense even the Nativity of our Lady itself belongs to the mystery of salvation. "Thy birth, O Mother of God and Virgin, hath declared joy to all the universe—for from thee arose the Sun of Righteousness,

Christ our God" (Troparion of the Feast of the Nativity of our Lady). Christian thought moves always in the dimension of personalities, not in the realm of general ideas. It apprehends the mystery of the Incarnation as a mystery of the Mother and the Child. This is the ultimate safeguard against any abstract docetism. It is a safeguard of the evangelical concreteness. The traditional ikon of the Blessed Virgin, in the Eastern tradition, is precisely an ikon of the Incarnation: the Virgin is always with the Babe. And surely no ikon, i.e. no image of the Incarnation, is ever possible without the Virgin Mother.

Again, the Annunciation is "the beginning of our salvation and the revelation of the mystery which is from eternity: the Son of God becometh the Son of the Virgin, and Gabriel proclaimeth good tidings of grace" (Troparion of the Feast of the Annunciation). The divine will has been declared and proclaimed by the archangel. But the Virgin was not silent. She responded to the divine call, responded in humility and faith. "Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word." Divine will is accepted and responded to. And this human response is highly relevant at this point. The obedience of Mary counterbalances the disobedience of Eve. In this sense the Virgin Mary is the Second Eve, as her Son is the Second Adam. This parallel was drawn quite early. The earliest witness is St. Justin (*Dial.*, 100) and in St. Irenaeus we find already an elaborate conception, organically connected with his basic idea of the recapitulation. "As Eve by the speech of an angel was seduced, so as to flee God, transgressing his word, so also Mary received the good tidings by means of the angel's speech, so as to bear God within her, being obedient to his word. And, though the one has disobeyed God, yet the other was drawn to obey God; that of the virgin Eve the Virgin Mary might become the advocate. And, as by a virgin the human race had been bound to death, by a virgin it is saved, the balance being preserved, a virgin's disobedience by a virgin's obedience" (V, 19, 1). And again:

"And so the knot of Eve's disobedience received its unloosing through the obedience of Mary; for what Eve, a virgin, bound by incredulity, that Mary, a virgin, unloosed by faith" (III, 22, 34—translation by Cardinal Newman). This conception was traditional, especially in the catechetical teaching, both in the East and in the West. "It is a great sacrament [*magnum sacramentum*] that, whereas through woman death became our portion, so life was born to us by woman," says St. Augustine (*De Agone Christ.*, 24,—in another place he is simply quoting Irenaeus). "Death by Eve, life by Mary," declares St. Jerome (*Epist.* 22: *mors per Evam, vita per Mariam*). Let me quote also an admirable and concise passage from one of the sermons of the Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow (1782-1867). He was preaching on the day of the Annunciation. "During the days of the creation of the world, when God uttered his living and mighty words: *Let there be . . .*, the Creator's words brought creatures into existence. But on the day, unique in the existence of the world, when Holy Mary uttered her humble and obedient *Let it be*, I would hardly dare to express what took place then—the word of the creature caused the Creator to descend into the world. God uttered his word here also: *You will conceive in your womb and bear a son . . . he will be great . . . and he will reign over the house of Jacob for ever*. But again that which is divine and incomprehensible occurs—the word of God itself defers its action, allowing itself to be delayed by the word of Mary: *How can this be?* Her humble *Let it be* was necessary for the realization of God's mighty *Let it be*. What secret power *is* thus contained in these simple words: *Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord; let it be to me according to your will*—that it produces an effect so extraordinary? This marvelous power is Mary's pure and perfect self-dedication to God, a dedication of her will, of her thought, of her soul, of her entire being, of all her faculties, of all her actions, of all her hopes and expectations." [*Choix de Sermons et Discours de S. Em. Mgr. Philarète, Métropolitte*

de Moscow, traduits par A. Serpinet (Paris, 1866, T. I, p. 187) ; the translation is by Dr. R. Haugh]. The Incarnation was indeed a sovereign act of God, but it was a revelation not only of his omnipotent might, but above all of his fatherly love and compassion. There was implied an appeal to human freedom once more, as an appeal to freedom was implied in the act of creation itself, namely in the creation of rational beings. The initiative was of course divine. Yet, as the means of salvation chosen by God was to be an assumption of true human nature by a divine Person, man had to have his active share in the mystery. Mary was voicing this obedient response of man to the redeeming decree of the love divine, and so she was representative of the whole race. She exemplified in her person, as it were, the whole of humanity. This obedient and joyful acceptance of the redeeming purpose of God, so beautifully expressed in the *Magnificat*, was an act of freedom. Indeed, it was freedom of obedience, not of initiative—and yet a true freedom, freedom of love and adoration, of humility and trust—and freedom of co-operation (cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haeres.*, III, 21, 8: “Mary cooperating with the economy”)—this is just what human freedom means. The grace of God can never be simply *superadded*, mechanically as it were. It has to be received in a free obedience and submission.

Mary was chosen and elected to become the Mother of the Incarnate Lord. We must assume that she was fit for that awful office, that she was prepared for her exceptional calling—prepared by God. Can we properly define the nature and character of this preparation? We are facing here the crucial antinomy (to which we have alluded above). The Blessed Virgin was *representative* of the race, i.e. of the *fallen human race*, of the “*old Adam*.” But she was also the *second Eve*; with her begins the “*new generation*.” She was set apart by the eternal counsel of God, but this “*setting apart*” was not to destroy her essential solidarity with the rest of mankind. Can we solve this antinomical mystery in

any logical scheme? The Roman Catholic dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary is a noble attempt to suggest such a solution. But this solution is valid only in the context of a particular and highly inadequate doctrine of original sin and does not hold outside this particular setting. Strictly speaking, this "dogma" is an unnecessary complication, and an unfortunate terminology only obscures the undisputable truth of the Catholic belief. The "privileges" of the divine Motherhood do not depend upon a "freedom from original sin." The fulness of grace was truly bestowed upon the Blessed Virgin and her personal purity was preserved by the perpetual assistance of the Spirit. But this was not an abolition of the sin. The sin was destroyed only on the tree of the Cross, and no "exemption" was possible, since it was simply the common and general condition of the whole of human existence. It was not destroyed even by the Incarnation itself, although the Incarnation was the true inauguration of the New Creation. The Incarnation was but the basis and the starting-point of the redemptive work of our Lord. And the "Second Man" himself enters into his full glory through the gate of death. Redemption is a complex act, and we have to distinguish most carefully its moments, although they are supremely integrated in the unique and eternal counsel of God. Being integrated in the eternal plan, in the temporal display they are reflected in each other and the final consummation is already *prefigured* and *anticipated* in all the earlier stages. There was a real *progress* in the history of the Redemption. Mary had the grace of the Incarnation, as the Mother of the Incarnate, but this was not yet the *complete* grace, since the Redemption had not yet been accomplished. Yet, her *personal* purity was possible even in an unredeemed world, or rather in a world that was in process of Redemption. The true theological issue is that of the divine election. The Mother and the Child are inseparably linked in the unique decree of the Incarnation. As an event, the Incarnation is just the *turning-point* of history,—

and the turning-point is inevitably antinomical: it belongs at once to the Old and to the New. The rest is silence. We have to stand in awe and trembling on the threshold of the mystery.

The intimate experience of the Mother of the Lord is hidden from us. And nobody was ever able to share this unique experience, by the very nature of the case. It is the mystery of the person. This accounts for the dogmatic reticence of the Church in Mariological doctrine. The Church speaks of her rather in the language of devotional poetry, in the language of antinomical metaphors and images. There is no need, and no reason, to assume that the Blessed Virgin realized at once all the fulness and all the implications of **the unique** privilege bestowed upon her by the grace of God. There is no need, and no reason, to interpret the "fulness" of grace in a literal sense as including all possible perfections and the whole variety of particular spiritual gifts. It was a fulness *for her*, she was *full* of grace. And yet it was a "specialized" fulness, the grace of the Mother of God, of the Virgin Mother, of the "Unwedded Spouse," Νύμφη ἀνύμφευτη. Indeed, she had her own spiritual way, her own growth in grace. The full meaning of the mystery of salvation was apprehended by her gradually. And she had her own share in the sacrifice of the Cross: "Yea, a sword shall pierce through thy own soul also" (Luke ii. 35). The full light shone forth only in the Resurrection. Up to that point Jesus himself was not yet glorified. And after the Ascension we find the Blessed Virgin among the Twelve, in the center of the growing Church. One point is beyond any doubt. The Blessed Virgin had been always impressed, if this word is suitable here, by the angelic salutation and announcement and by the startling mystery of the virgin birth. How could she not be impressed? Again, the mystery of her experience is hidden from us. But can we really avoid this pious guesswork without betraying the mystery itself? "But Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart" (Luke ii. 19). Her inner life had to be concentrated on this crucial

event of her story. For indeed the mystery of the Incarnation was for her also the mystery of her own personal existence. Her existential situation was unique and peculiar. She had to be adequate to the unprecedented dignity of this situation. This is perhaps the very essence of her particular dignity, which is described as her "Ever-Virginity." She is *the Virgin*. Now virginity is not simply a bodily status or a physical feature as such. Above all it is a spiritual and inner *attitude*, and apart from that a bodily status would be altogether meaningless. The title of Ever-Virgin means surely much more than merely a "physiological" statement. It does not refer only to the Virgin Birth. It does not imply only an exclusion of any later marital intercourse (which would be utterly inconceivable if we really believe in the Virgin Birth and in the Divinity of Jesus). It excludes first of all any "erotic" involvement, any sensual and selfish desires or passions, any dissipation of the heart and mind. The bodily integrity or incorruption is but an outward sign of the internal purity. The main point is precisely the purity of the heart, that indispensable condition of "seeing God." This is the freedom from passions, the true ἀπάθεια, which has been commonly described as the essence of the spiritual life. Freedom from passions and "desires," ἐπιθυμία—imperviousness to evil thoughts, as St. John of Damascus puts it. Her soul was governed by God only [θεογυβέρνητον], it was supremely attached to him. All her desire was directed towards things worthy of desire and affection (St. John says: τεταμμένη, attracted, gravitating). She had no passion [θύμον]. She ever preserved virginity in mind, and soul, and body,—καὶ νῶ, καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι ἀειπαρθενεύουσιν (*Homil. 1, in Nativitatem B.V. Mariae 9 and 5, Migne, Ser. Gr. XCVI, 676 A and 668 C*). It was an undisturbed orientation of the whole personal life towards God, a complete self-dedication. To be truly a "handmaid of the Lord" means precisely to be ever-virgin, and not to have any fleshly preoccupations. Spiritual virginity is *sinlessness*, but

not yet "perfection," and not freedom from temptations. But even our Lord himself was in a sense liable to temptations and was actually tempted by Satan in the wilderness. Our Lady perhaps had her temptations too, but has overcome them in her steady faithfulness to God's calling. Even an ordinary motherly love culminates in a spiritual identification with the child, which implies so often sacrifice and self-denial. Nothing less can be assumed in the case of Mary; her Child was to be great and to be called the Son of the Highest (cf. Luke i. 32). Obviously, he was one who "should have come," the Messiah (cf. Luke vii. 19). This is openly professed by Mary in the *Magnificat*, a song of Messianic praise and thanksgiving. Mary could not fail to realize all this, if only dimly for a time and gradually, as she pondered all the glorious promises in her heart. This was the only conceivable way for her. She had to be absorbed by this single thought, in an obedient faithfulness to the Lord who "hath regarded the lowliness of his handmaiden" and "hath done (for her) great things." This is precisely the way in which St. Paul described the state and the privilege of virginity: "the unmarried woman, and the virgin, thinks about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy in body and in spirit" (1 Cor. vii. 34, Douay version: Ἰναὶ ἁγία καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ πνεύματι). The climax of this virginal aspiration is the holiness of the Virgin Mother all-pure and undefiled.

Cardinal Newman in his admirable "Letter addressed to the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D., on occasion of his Eirenicon" (1865) says very aptly: "Theology is occupied with supernatural matters, and is ever running into mysteries, which reason can neither explain nor adjust. Its lines of thought come to an abrupt termination, and to pursue them or to complete them is to plunge down the abyss. St. Augustine warns us that, if we attempt to find and to tie together the ends of lines which run into infinity, we shall only succeed in contradicting ourselves . . ." *{Difficulties felt by Anglicans*

in *Catholic Teaching*, 5th ed., page 430). It is widely agreed that the ultimate considerations which determine a true estimate of all particular points of the Christian tradition are doctrinal. No purely historical arguments, whether from antiquity or from silence, are ever decisive. They are subject to a further theological scrutiny and revision in the perspective of the total Christian faith, taken as a whole. The ultimate question is simply this: does one really keep the faith of the Bible and of the Church, does one accept and recite the Catholic Creed exactly in that sense in which it had been drafted and supposed to be taken and understood, does one really believe in the truth of the Incarnation? Let me quote Newman once more. "I say then," he proceeds, "when once we have mastered the idea, that Mary bore, suckled, and handled the Eternal in the form of a child, what limit is conceivable to the rush and flood of thoughts which such a doctrine involves? What awe and surprise must attend upon the knowledge, that a creature has been brought so close to the Divine Essence?" (*op. cit.*, page 431). Fortunately, a Catholic theologian is not left alone with logic and erudition. He is led by the faith; *credo ut intelligam*. Faith illuminates the reason. And erudition, the memory of the past, is quickened in the continuous experience of the Church. A Catholic theologian is guided by the teaching authority of the Church, by its living tradition. But above all, he himself *lives in the Church*, which is the Body of Christ. The mystery of the Incarnation is still, as it were, continuously enacted in the Church, and its "implications" are revealed and disclosed in devotional experience and in sacramental participation. In the Communion of Saints, which is the true Church Universal and Catholic, the mystery of the New Humanity is disclosed as a new existential situation. And in this perspective and living context of the Mystical Body of Christ the person of the Blessed Virgin Mother appears in full light and full glory. The Church now contemplates her in the state of perfection. She is now seen as inseparably united with her

Son, who "sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty." For her the final consummation of life has already come—in an anticipation. "Thou art passed over into Life, who art the Mother of Life," acknowledges the Church, "Neither grave nor death had power over the Mother of God . . . for the Mother of Life hath been brought into Life by him who dwelt in her ever-virgin womb" (Troparion and Kontakion for the feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, κοίμησις). Again, it is not so much a heavenly reward for her purity and virtue, as an "implication" of her sublime office, of her being the Mother of God, the *Theotokos*. The Church Triumphant is above all the worshipping Church, her existence is a living participation in Christ's office of intercession and his redeeming love. Incorporation into Christ, which is the essence of the Church and of the whole Christian existence, is first of all an incorporation into his sacrificial love for mankind. And here there is a special place for her who is united with the Redeemer in the unique intimacy of motherly affection and devotion. The Mother of **God is truly the common** mother of all living, of the whole Christian race, born or reborn in the Spirit and truth. An affectionate identification with the child, which is the spiritual essence of motherhood, is here consummated in its ultimate perfection. The Church does not dogmatize much about these mysteries of her own existence. For the mystery of Mary is **precisely the mystery of the Church**. *Mater Ecclesia* and *Virgo Mater*, both are birthgivers of the New Life. And both are *orantes*. The Church invites the faithful and helps them to grow spiritually into these mysteries of faith which are as well the mysteries of their own existence and spiritual destiny. In the Church they learn to contemplate and to adore the living Christ together with the whole assembly and Church of the firstborn, which are written in heaven (cf. Heb. xii. 23). And in this glorious assembly they discern the eminent person of the Virgin Mother of the Lord and Redeemer, full of grace and love, of charity and compassion—"More honorable

than the cherubim, more glorious than the seraphim, who without spot didst bear the Eternal Word." In the light of this contemplation and in the spirit of faith the theologian must fulfil his office of interpreting to believers and to those who seek the truth the overwhelming mystery of the Incarnation. This mystery is still symbolized, as it was in the age of the Fathers, by a single and glorious name: Mary—*Theotokos*, the Mother of God Incarnate.

The Sacrament of Pentecost

THE CHURCH IS ONE. This does not merely mean that there is only one Church, but that the Church is a unity. In it mankind is translated into a new plane of existence so that it may perfect itself in unity in the image of the life of the Trinity. The Church is one in the Holy Spirit and the Spirit "construes" it into the complete and perfect Body of Christ. The Church is predominantly one in the fellowship of the sacraments. Putting it in another way, the Church is one in Pentecost, which was the day of the mysterious foundation and consecration of the Church when all the prophecies about her were fulfilled. In that "terrible and unknown celebration" the Spirit-Comforter descends and enters the world in which He was never present before in the same way as He now begins to dwell. Now He enters the world to abide in it and to become the all-powerful source of transfiguration and deification. The bestowal and the descent of the Spirit was a unique and unrepeatable Revelation. On that day, in a moment, an inexhaustible source of living water and Life Eternal was disclosed here on earth.

Pentecost, therefore, is the fulness and the source of all sacraments and sacramental actions, the one and inexhaustible spring of all the mysterious and spiritual life of the Church. To abide or to live in the Church implies a participation in

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Pentecost. Moreover, Pentecost becomes eternal in the Apostolic Succession, that is in the uninterruptibility of hierarchical ordinations in which every part of the Church is at every moment organically united with the primary source. The lines of power proceed from the Upper Room. Apostolic Succession is not merely, as it were, the canonical skeleton of the Church. Generally speaking, the hierarchy is primarily a charismatic principle, that is—a “ministry of the sacraments,” or “a divine economy.” And in this capacity precisely the hierarchy is an organ of the Catholic unity of the Church. It is the unity of grace. It is to the Church what the circulation of the blood is to the human body. Apostolic Succession is not so much the canonical as the mystical foundation of Church unity. It is associated with the divine rather than with the human side of the Church. Historically the Church remains actually one in its priesthood. It is precisely by this Apostolic uninterruptibility of successive ordinations that the whole Church is bound into a unity of the body from a unity of the Spirit. And there is only one way and one approach: to draw near and to drink from the one spring of life, once revealed.

The peculiar function of bishops is to be the organ of Apostolic Succession. The bishop differs from the priest in his power to ordain, and in this alone. Nor is this only a canonical privilege and only a power of jurisdiction. It is a power of sacramental action beyond that possessed by the priest. In the celebration of the Eucharist the bishop has no precedence over the priest and can never have it, for the priest has full power to celebrate, every priest being primarily appointed for the purpose of offering the Eucharistic Sacrifice. It is as the celebrator of the divine Eucharist that the priest is the minister and the builder of Church unity. The unity of the Body of Christ springs from unity in the Eucharistic meal. But in addition to this the bishop has his own particular duty in the building up of Church unity, not as the offerer of the Bloodless Sacrifice but as the ordainer. The Last Supper and

Pentecost are inseparably bound up with one another. The Comforter descends when the Son has been glorified in His death on the Cross. But still they are two sacraments which cannot be merged the one into the other.

The same applies to the two degrees in orders: the bishop is above the priest and it is through the episcopate that Pentecost becomes universal and eternal. Moreover every particular Church through its bishop, or, to put it more exactly, in its bishop, is included in the Catholic fulness of the Church as a whole. Through its bishop it is linked up with the past and with antiquity. Through its bishop it forms a part of the living organism of the Body of the Church Universal. For every bishop is ordained by many bishops in the name of the undivided episcopate. In its bishop every single Church outgrows and transcends its own limits, and comes into contact with and merges into other Churches, not in the order of brotherly love and remembrance alone, but in the unity of mysterious and gracious life.

Every local Church therefore finds its center and its unity in the bishop, not so much because he is its local head and pastor, but because through him it is included in the mysterious "*sobornost*" ["*catholicity*"] of the Church-body for all times. "We affirm that the order of bishops is so necessary for the Church that without it the Church is not a Church and a Christian is not a Christian, and that they cannot be even so called. For the bishop is a successor of the Apostles through the laying on of hands and invocation of the Holy Spirit, having successively received the power bestowed from God to loose and to bind. He is a living image of God on earth, and owing to the divine activity and power of the Holy Spirit is the abundant source of all the sacraments of the Church Universal through which salvation is obtained. We consider that a bishop is as essential to a Church as breath is to man and the sun to the world" (the *Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs to the Bishops of Great Britain*, 1723, par. 10).

On the Day of Pentecost the Spirit descends not only on the Apostles, but also on those who were present with them; not only on the Twelve but on the entire multitude (compare Chrysostom's *Discourses* and his interpretation of *Acts*). This means that the Spirit descends on the whole of the Primitive Church then present in Jerusalem. But though the Spirit is one, the gifts and ministrations in the Church are very varied, so that while in the sacrament of Pentecost the Spirit descends on all, it is on the Twelve alone that He bestows the power and the rank of priesthood promised to them by Our Lord in the days of His flesh. The distinctive features of priesthood do not become blurred in the all-embracing fulness of Pentecost. But the simultaneity of this Catholic outpouring of the Spirit on the entire Church witnesses to the fact that priesthood was founded within the *sobornost* of the Church.

It is with this that the direct prohibition of ordination in a "general" or abstract" Sense (*viz.*, without a definite appointment to a Church or a congregation) is directly associated (IV. Oecum., Rule No. 6). Secret ordination is also prohibited. It must always be public and open, in the Church itself, before the people and with the people. Moreover, a participation of the "people" in the ordination itself is required, and not only as reverent spectators who follow the prayers. The binding "*aksios*" or "amen" is not merely an accompaniment, but also a witness, and an acceptance. The power to ordain is bestowed on bishops and on bishops alone. But it is given to them within the Church as to the pastors of a definite flock. And they can and should realize this power only in the *sobornost* of the Church and in agreement with the entire Body—namely, the priests and the people—and not in a "general" or "abstract" way. This means that the bishop should abide in the Church, and the Church in the bishop.

The ancient stipulation that a bishop should be ordained by two or three bishops is especially significant (Apost. I.). The implication of this requirement is quite obvious (*cf.*

Matt. xviii. 16, "that at the mouth of two witnesses or three every word may be established"). But to what do the bishops who ordain witness? In the ordination of a bishop no separate bishop can act for himself as a bishop of a definite and particular local Church for as such he remains an outsider so far as any other diocese or bishopric is concerned. He acts as a representative of the *sobornost* of the co-bishops, as a member and sharer of this *sobornost*. In addition to this it is implied that these bishops belong to a particular diocese and as ruling bishops are not separated and indeed are inseparable from their flocks. Every co-ordainer acts in the name of Catholic *sobornost* and fulness (cf. I. Oecum., rule 4: "it is most seemly for a bishop to be appointed by all the bishops of that region; but if this happens to be inconvenient either for some special reason or owing to the distance, let at least three of them assemble in one place, and let those who are absent signify their acquiescence in writing, and then let them proceed with ordination").

Again, these are not only canonical, or administrative, or disciplinary measures. One feels that there is a mystical depth in them. No realization or extension of Apostolic Succession is otherwise possible, apart from the unbreakable *sobornost* of the whole Church. Apostolic Succession can never be severed or divorced from the organic context of the life of the entire Church, although it has its own divine root. In the Roman rite one bishop alone ordains, but the presence of "witnesses" or "assistants" is required, who thus confirm the fulness and the *sobornost* of the sacramental act. The main point lies here in the co-operation of the whole Church, even though it may be taken for granted and represented symbolically. Under normal conditions of Church life Apostolic Succession should never become reduced to an abstract enumeration of successive ordainers. In ancient times Apostolic Succession usually implied first of all a succession to a definite cathedra, again in a particular local *sobornost*. Apostolic Succession does not represent a self-sufficient chain or

order of bishops. It is an organ and a system of Church oneness. Moreover, not only "holy orders" [*ordo*], but also the "priestly power" [*jurisdictio*] are congruent in grace. "Jurisdiction" signifies the concreteness of the bishop's power and dignity, and it stands precisely for *sobornost*, viz.—organic unity with a particular body of Church people; Therefore apart from "jurisdiction," that is in the mere self-sufficiency of the episcopal *rank*, the power to ordain cannot be practised. If such an "abstract" ordination cannot be recognized as "valid" [*valida*], it is, nevertheless, not only "illegal" [*illicita*], but also mystically defective. For every rupture of canonical bonds simultaneously implies a certain loss of grace, namely— isolation, estrangement, neglect, mystical forgetfulness, limitation of Church outlook, and decrease of love. For Apostolic Succession has been established for the sake of unity and *sobornost*, and must never become the vehicle of exclusiveness and division.

The Apostolicity of the Church is not exhausted by the uninterruptedness of this priestly succession from the Apostles. Apostolic Succession must not be severed from Apostolic Tradition, and in fact never can be. Apostolic Tradition is not only a historical reminiscence, nor does faithfulness to Tradition mean simply an obstinate insistence on what is ancient, still less does it demand an archaic adaptation of the present to the manners or standards of the past. Tradition is not Church archeology but spiritual life. It is the memory of the Church. It is, firstly, an uninterrupted current of spiritual life proceeding from the Upper Room. Nor is faithfulness to Apostolic Tradition faithfulness to antiquity alone, but a living link with all the fulness of Church life. Faithfulness to Tradition is similarly a participation in Pentecost, and Tradition represents a fulfilment of Pentecost—"Howbeit when He, the Spirit of Truth, is come, He shall guide you unto all truth" (John xvi. 13). Generally speaking, Tradition is not so much a safeguarding and conservative principle, as a progressive and adducible one—the

beginning of life, renewal, and growth. Apostolic times are not only an external example for imitation or repetition, but an eternally renewed spring or experience and life in grace. Tradition is the power to teach, confess, witness, and proclaim out of the depth of the experience of the Church, which remains always the same and unimpaired. And this "power to teach" [*potestas magisterii*] is included in Apostolic Succession and based on it. The power to teach is conferred precisely on the episcopate—it is the most apostolic "power."

But this "power" is a function of the Catholic fulness of the Church. "*De omnium fidelium ore pendeamus, quia in omnem fidelem Spiritus Dei spirat.*" The hierarchy in its teaching capacity represents, as it were, the lips of the Church. This does not mean that the hierarchy acquires its teaching credentials from the people of the Church, for it has them from the Holy Spirit, as an "anointing of truth" [*charisma veritatis certum*], according to the expression of St. Irenaeus of Lyons, in the sacrament of ordination. But this is the right or power to express and witness to the faith and experience of the Church. The hierarchy teaches as an organ of the Church. Therefore it is limited by the "consent of the Church" [*e consensu ecclesiae*], and again not so much in the order of canonic as of spiritual life and evidence. To the hierarchy alone is given the right to teach and witness in the Church. But the hierarchy is not a self-sufficient and complete "teaching body" in the Church. The hierarchy then only teaches in a Catholic way when it truly holds and contains the Church within itself. Every local Church has the right to a "teaching voice" only in the person of its bishop, which, however, does not exclude the right to freedom of opinion. On the other hand the bishop also has the "power to teach" only within the Church, only within the actual *sobornost* of his people and flock. The bishop receives this power and ability to teach, not from his flock, but from Christ Himself, in Whose ministry of teaching he participates through the grace of Apostolic Succession. But the power to be, as it were, the

heart of his people is conferred on him, and therefore the people also have a right and duty to witness, to consent, and to refuse consent, in the search for full unanimity and the fulness of *sobornost*.

The power to teach is therefore based on a two-fold continuity. Firstly, the uninterruptibility of spiritual life in the Church as the "fulness of Him that filleth all in all" (Eph. i. 23). All the meaning and grandeur of the Christian life lies in the acquiring of the Spirit. We enter into communion with the Spirit in the sacraments, and we must strive to be filled with the Spirit in prayer and action. This constitutes the mystery of our inner life. But even in this it is assumed that we belong to the Church and are part of its very texture. Each individual way of life is also included in *sobornost*, and this means that it is conditioned and limited by Apostolic Succession. Secondly, a universal communion for all time or a union in the sacraments is Only possible through the uninterruptibility of priestly succession. The historical development of the Church, its organic integrity in revealing the fundamental "*depositum fidei*" are alike based on Apostolic Succession. The Catholic fulness of the teaching of the Church is only possible for us through Apostolic Succession which supersedes the historical relativity of separate epochs, and which also acts as a check for an inner differentiation between what is varying and what is permanent. The freedom of theological investigation and opinion finds support and a foundation for itself in this hierarchical "anointing of the truth." It is precisely Apostolic Succession which allows us in our theology to rise above and beyond the spirit of our times and enter into the fulness of truth.

Generally speaking, the efficacy and the reality of the sacraments does not depend on the faith of those who partake of them. For the sacraments are accomplished by the power of God, and not of man, and the frailty and imperfection of an individual priest is made good by the mysterious participation of the entire Church in his actions-Hire Church

which has appointed him and authorized him to fulfil the "ministry of the Sacraments." However, in spite of this, it is hardly possible to isolate completely the objectively-gracious moment of the sacraments. For example, how can Apostolic Succession be preserved when Apostolic Tradition has been broken together with the continuity of the spiritual life? In any case an injury to faith cannot but be reflected in one way or another in the hierarchy of such communities in which the Apostolic "deposit of faith" has not been safeguarded, and where the fulness of Tradition has been diminished by breaches in historical continuity. Especially does this apply to cases where the injury affects the basic motives of the "succession" itself, when Eucharistic faith becomes dimmed, and when the idea of priesthood becomes vague. One might add that in such cases the empirical link with the fulness of Church life both past and present is usually severed, and the community becomes self-contained and isolated, so that an empirical separation or schism takes place. Such a will to isolation and, as it were, solitude cannot but affect that ministry of the Church the whole meaning of which lies in the preservation and expression of unity. Again this is not only a question of legality or "jurisdiction." Not so much canonically as mystically every priest acts on behalf of and in the name of the whole Church—and only thus is his Divine ministry full of mystical value. The Eucharist is one and undivided and can only be celebrated within the mystical limits of the Catholic Church. How can a "dissenter" celebrate the Eucharist?

Still more equivocal is the continuity of the Apostolic Succession in schismatic bodies, particularly if it has been continued, or even "re-established" precisely for the sake of making the separation permanent. How can the hierarchical chain persist in division, when its very *raison d' être* is unity? And how can schismatic hierarchs act on behalf of and in the name of the Catholic Church? Yet Church life in practice witnesses to the fact that this is possible, and that the life

in grace in schismatical bodies is not extinguished and exhausted, at any rate, to be sure, not immediately. However, we cannot think it possible that it should go on unimpaired, precisely for the reason that one cannot sharply isolate different aspects of the organic whole of Church life. Human and historical isolation even if they do not altogether lead to the severing of Apostolic Succession must at any rate weaken it mystically. For the unity in grace can only come to be revealed in the "mystery of freedom," and only through a return to Catholic fulness and communion can every separated hierarchical body recover its full mystical significance. Simultaneously with this return there is the acceptance of the Apostolic "deposit of faith" in all its completeness. Apostolic Succession is only strengthened by faithfulness to and fulfilment of Apostolic Tradition. In their inseparableness lies the fulness of Pentecost.

CONSENSUS ECCLESIAE NOV. 24, 1934

[Two explanatory notes to Professor **Florovsky's** article on
"The Sacrament of Pentecost."]

I. *"To the hierarchy alone is given the right to teach and witness in the Church"* This does not mean that the clergy and laity are merely destined to an unconditional and formal obedience to the episcopate. It does not similarly imply that "the right to teach" is conferred on the bishops apart from the people. On the contrary, there should be no room for exclusiveness in the Church. In this way the sharp contrast which exists in the Roman Church between the "teaching" and the "learning" Church is relinquished; It is more correct to speak of the *co-ordination* between all the strata, or elements, within the Church. I emphasize again "the bishop also has the "power to teach" only within the Church, only within the actual *s ob orno st* of his people and

flock.” Everyone in the Church is called not only to obedience but also to understanding. Precisely in questions of faith and dogma everyone is constrained by personal responsibility. It is preferable not to speak of “responsibility”—the term is too formal—it is better to say that everyone should *dwell in truth*. The flock must not only listen but also acquiesce. It is not authority that decides so much as an inner evidence of spiritual life. Within the boundaries of unbroken *sobornost* there exists an allocation of activities and tasks. *At any rate everyone is called to be a living example and witness to his faith and trust, to teach and help everyone.* This is not the question at issue. Nor is it even one of theological research, which formally cannot be delimited by any position in the Church. *The question is one of the right of dogmatic witness on behalf of the Church.*

- Again, the power of the hierarchy does not assume that truth, as it were, is revealed automatically to the bishop, by force of his ordination and dignity, or that he can discover it without consultation and communion with that Church outside of which he loses all “power,” generally speaking. However, only to him, and to him alone, is given the right to speak in a *Catholic* way. It is not only a canonical privilege or right. It is bound up with the fact that the bishop as such is a mystical center of his flock, which unites in him in the oneness of sacramental fellowship. The fact that not infrequently bishops are not sufficiently good theologians does not contradict this statement. In such a case they are forced to find support in other priests who are more learned than they. This has been the case from the most ancient times: we have merely to recall Eusebius of Caesarea, whose chief councillor was Basil the Great. This is no greater contradiction than the simple fact that there do exist unworthy bishops and even unworthy Christians, generally speaking. Even laymen can and must study, discuss, preach, write, and argue; they can similarly disagree with bishops. *But to witness on behalf of the Church is given only to the bishop.* One can also put it

thus: *the right of an opinion and of advice* is given to all, but the "*power to teach*" is bestowed on the hierarchy alone—of course, in the unbreakableness of *soborny* fellowship. The scarcity of learned bishops in the Orthodox Church in recent times is to be greatly regretted, but it is in no way linked with this main postulate.

As regards "*lay theologians*" in Russia, it can be hardly said that they have the power to teach on behalf of the whole Church—which does not in any way limit their great historical significance. For the voice of laymen must be heard in the Orthodox choir. The leader of the choir, however, can only be a bishop. There are various gifts, and all gifts are necessary. Only one, however, is appointed shepherd and the staff is entrusted to him. "And the sheep follow Him: for they know His voice" (John x. 4).

II. The disunity within the Christian world implies, of course, its mystical weakness, and here nothing is clear. I would only like to emphasize one point. *The very fact of division in the Church is a paradox and an antinomy.* A falling away from the Church is more comprehensible than division in the Church, while the very efficacy of the sacraments in schism [*raskól*] does not in itself do away with the undoubted fact that even the spirit of division is an unhealthy symptom. It is not easy to develop this point of view, for it is precisely a paradox. However, I think that the West separated itself *from the East*, and that the guilt of the West is greater. All the history of Roman deviations witnesses to this, and they continue to burden the Anglican Church as well. However, this brings us to a new and very complicated theme, namely, that of the division of the Churches, and it will be wiser to return to it separately on another occasion.

On the Veneration of the Saints

CHRIST HAS CONQUERED THE WORLD. This victory is further unveiled and fulfilled in the fact that He built His Church. In Christ and through Christ the unity of mankind was brought about truly for the first time, for those who believed in His Name become the Body of Christ. And through uniting with Christ they unite likewise with each other in a most sincere concord of love. In this great unity all empirical distinctions and barriers are done away with: differences of birth in the flesh are effaced within the unity of a spiritual birth. The Church is a new people filled with grace, which does not coincide with any physical boundaries or any earthly nation—neither Greeks nor Jews, and a struggle of faith, through the "Mystery of water," through a union with Christ in the "Mysterious font," through the "grace of becoming sons"; i.e. "sons of God" for Whom "were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth." In Holy Christening the one to be enlightened leaves "this world" and forsakes its vanity, as if freeing himself and stepping out of the natural order of things; from the order of "flesh and blood" one enters an order of grace. All inherited ties and all ties of blood are severed. But man is not left solitary or alone. For according to the expression of the Apostle "by one Spirit are we all baptized," neither Scythians nor Barbarians—and this nation does not

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spring through a relationship of blood but through freedom into one Body. The whole meaning of Holy Christening consists in the fact that it is a mysterious acceptance into the Church, into the City of God, into the Kingdom of Grace. Through Christening the believer becomes a member of the Church, enters the "one Church of angels and men," becomes a "co-citizen of the saints and ever with God," according to the mysterious and solemn words of St. Paul—one comes "to mount Zion, and to the city of the Living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and Church of the firstborn, which are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect." And in this great throng he is united unto Christ. For, "*unus Christianus—nullus Christianus*"

The essence of the Church is in its unity, for the Church is the Mansion of the One Spirit. This is not an external and empirical unity or catholicity. The Ecumenical character of the Church is not something external, quantitative, spacial, not even any geographical quality, and does not at all depend on the universal dispersal of believers. The visible unity of the Church is merely a result but not a foundation for the catholicity of the Church. Geographical "universality" is a derivative and not an essential necessity. The catholicity of the Church was not diminished in the first ages of Christianity when communities of the faithful were scattered like small islands, almost lost in the immense world of unbelief and resistance. It is likewise not diminished now when the majority of mankind is not with Christ. "Though a town or even a province fall away from the Ecumenical Church," says Metropolitan Philaret, "the Ecumenical Church will always remain a complete and incorruptible body." Likewise the Church will remain Ecumenical in the "last days" when it will be compressed into the "little flock," when the mystery of "retreat" will be revealed and when

faith will hardly be found on earth. For the Church is Catholic according to its *nature*.

If one seeks for external definitions, then perhaps the Ecumenical nature of the Church is best expressed by the feature of its "*all-timeness*" (of its running through all times). For believers of all ages and all generations, who are alive now, who lived, and who will be born, belong to it in the same way. They all form one body, and through the same prayer are united into one before the one throne of the Lord of Glory. The experience of this unity through all times is revealed and sealed in the whole cycle of Divine worship. In the Church *time is mysteriously overcome*. The outpouring of grace seems to stop time, to stop the run of minutes and seasons, to overcome even the general order of consecutiveness and the disconnectedness of those things which took place at different times. In a unity with Christ through grace, in the gift of communion with the One Spirit, men of different epochs and generations become our living contemporaries. Christ reigns equally in the Church—among the departed and among the living, for God is not God of the dead but of the living.

The Church is a Kingdom not of this world but an eternal Kingdom, for it has an eternal King—Christ. The Church is a kind of mysterious image of eternity and a foretaste of the Resurrection of all. For Christ the Head of the Body is "*the life and the resurrection*" of His servants and brothers. The measure of births has not yet been filled and the stream of time still flows. The Church is still in its historical wanderings but even now time has no power and no strength in it. It is as if the Apocalyptic moment is forestalled—when there shall be no more time and all time shall cease. Earthly death, the separation of the soul from the body, does not sever the tie between those who have faith, does not part and does not separate co-members in Christ, does not exclude the deceased from the limits and composition of the Church. In the prayer for the departed and

in the order for burial we pray Christ "our immortal King and God" to send the souls of the departed "to the habitations of the holy," "to the abodes of the righteous," "to the bosom of Abraham," where all the righteous are at rest. And with special expressiveness in these parting prayers we remember and call on the hosts of the righteous, and on the Mother of God, and on the powers of heaven, and on the holy martyrs and on all the saints as on our heavenly co-citizens in the Church. With powerful emphasis the all-timely and catholic consciousness of the Church is disclosed in the order of burial. The faithful who attain to a genuine union with Christ Himself in their struggle and in the saving "mysteries" cannot be parted from Him even by death. "Blessed are they who die in the Lord—their souls shall abide with the blessed." And the prayers for the departed are a witness and measure of the *catholic consciousness* of the Church.

Reverently the Church watches for any signs of grace which witness and confirm the earthly struggle of the departed. By an inner sight the Church recognizes both the righteous living and departed, and the feeling of the Church is sealed by the witness of the priesthood of the Church. In this recognition of its brothers and members who have "attained to perfection" consists the mystical essence of that which in the Christian West is termed the "canonization of saints," and which is understood by the Orthodox East as their glorification, magnification and blessedness. And firstly it is a glorification of God "Wonderous is the Lord in His saints." "God's saints," said St. John of Damascus, "reigned over and mastered their passions and kept uninjured the likeness unto the image of God, according to which they were created; they of their own free will united themselves with God and received Him into the habitation of their heart, and having thus received Him in communion, through grace, they became in their very nature like unto Him." In them God rests—they became "the treasures and the

pure habitations of God." In this the mystery was accomplished. For as the ancient fathers said—the Son of God became man so that men could be deified, so that sons of men should become sons of God. And in the righteous who attain to love this measure of growth and "likening" unto Christ is fulfilled. "The Saints in their lifetime already were filled with the Holy Spirit," continues St. John of Damascus, "and when they died the grace of the Holy Spirit was still present with their souls and with their bodies in the graves, and with their images and with their holy ikons not because of their nature but because of grace and its activity. . .the saints are alive and with daring they stand before the Lord; they are not dead. . .the death of saints is more like falling asleep than death," for they "abide in the hand of God"; that is, in life and in light. . .and "after He Who is Life itself and the source of life was ranked among the dead, we consider no more as dead those who depart with a hope of resurrection and with faith in Him." And it is not only to get help and intercession that the Holy Spirit teaches every believer to pray to the glorified saints but also because this calling on them, through communion in prayer, deepens the consciousness of the catholic unity of the Church. In our invocation of the saints our measure of Christian love is exhibited, a living feeling of unanimity and of the power of Church unity is expressed; and, conversely, doubt or inability to feel the intercession of grace and the intervention of saints on our behalf before God witnesses not only to a weakening of love and of the brotherly and Church ties and relationships but also to a decrease in the fulness of faith in the Ecumenical value and power of the Incarnation and Resurrection.

One of the most mysterious anticipations of the Orthodox Church is the contemplation of the "Protecting Veil of the Mother of God," of Her constant standing in prayer for the world, surrounded by all the saints, before the throne of God. "Today the Virgin stands in the Church and with

hosts of saints invisibly prays to God for us all; angels and high priests worship; apostles and prophets embrace each other—it is for us that the Mother of God prays unto the Eternal God!" Thus the Church remembers the vision which was once seen by St. Andrew, the fool for Christ's sake. And that which was then visibly revealed remains now and will stand for all ages. The "Contemplation of the Protecting Veil" of the Mother of God is a vision of the celestial Church, a vision of the unbreakable and ever-existent unity of the heavenly and the earthly Church. And it is also a foreseeing that all existence beyond the grave, of the righteous and the saints, is one untiring prayer, one ceaseless intercession and mediation. For love is the "union of all perfection." And the blessedness of the righteous is an abiding in love. The Great Eastern saint St. Isaac the Syrian, with incomparable daring, bore witness to the all-embracing power which crowns a Christian's struggles. According to his words this struggle for God acquires fulness and completeness and attains its aim in purity—and purity is "a heart which is merciful to every created being." And what is a heart that has its mercy? asks the saint, and answers: "A burning of the heart for all creation for men, birds, beasts, demons and all creatures. And from remembrance of them and contemplation of them such a man's eyes shed tears: because of a great and strong compassion which possesses his heart and its great constancy, he is overwhelmed with tender pity and he cannot bear, or hear of, or see any harm or any even small sorrow which creatures suffer. And therefore he prays hourly with tears for the dumb animals, and for the enemies of Truth and for those who harm him that they should be guarded and that they should be shown mercy; and also for all the reptiles he prays, from this great compassion which is constantly aroused in his heart in likeness to God." And if even on earth so fiery is the prayer of saints, even with a more fiery flame it burns "there" in the "embrace of the Father" on the bosom of

Divine Love, close to God, Whose Name is Love, Whose care about the World is Love. And in the *Church Triumphant* prayers for the whole Catholic Church do not cease. As St. Cyprian said—Christian prayer is for all the world; everyone prays not only for himself but for all people, for all form one, and so we pray not with a particular individual prayer but with one common to all, with one soul in all. The whole deed of prayer must be determined by an ecumenical consciousness and unanimous love, which includes likewise those whose names are known to God alone. It is not characteristic of a Christian to feel himself alone and separated from all, for he is saved only in the unity of the Church. And the crown of all prayer is that flaming love which was expressed in the prayer of Moses: "Forgive their sin; and if not, blot me, I pray Thee, out of Thy book which Thou hast written..." The center of Church worship is Eucharistic worship. Here the *whole* Church is united also. Here a sacrifice is made and prayers are offered "for all and for all things," here the whole Church is remembered the militant and the triumphant. In the mystery-action of the Liturgy "the powers of heaven invisibly celebrate with us," they are present and celebrate with the celebrating priest. And unto great saints it was granted sometimes by God's grace to contemplate in visible form that which is hidden from the sight of the sinful—the co-celebration of the angels. Thus it is known that St. Seraphim of Sarov on one occasion was granted to see the triumphant entrance of the Lord of Glory surrounded by hosts of angels. Such an entrance of the Lord of Glory is often represented in ikon form on the walls of the holy Altar, and not only as a symbol but likewise as an indication that invisibly all this actually takes place. And all the ikon decoration of the Church generally speaks of the mysterious unity, of the actual presence of the saints with us. "We picture Christ, the King and the Lord, without separating Him from His army, for the Army of the Lord are the saints"—said St. John of

Damascus. Holy ikons are not only images of remembrance, "images of the past and of righteousness," not only pictures, but are actually sacred things with which, as the fathers explained, the Lord is "present" and by grace is "in communion" with them. There exists some mysterious objective tie between the "image" and the "Prototype," between the likeness and the one who is represented, which is specially marked in miracle-working ikons which show God's power. "A venerated worship" of holy ikons clearly expresses the idea of the Church's conception of the past: it is not only a remembrance directed to something gone, but a vision by grace of something fixed in eternity, a vision of something mysterious, a presence by grace of those who are dead and parted from us, "a joyful vision of a unity of all creation."

All creation has a Head in Christ. And through His Incarnation the Son of God, according to the wonderful expression of St. Irenaeus of Lyons, "*again* commenced a long row of human beings." The Church is the spiritual posterity of the Second Adam and in its history His redemptive work is fulfilled and completed, while His love blossoms and flames in it. The Church is a fulfillment of Christ and His Body. According to the bold words of St. John Chrysostom, "only then is the Fulfiller the Head when a perfect body shall be formed." There is some mysterious movement—which started from the awe-filled day of Pentecost, when in the face of the first chosen few it was as if all creation received a fiery christening by the Spirit towards that last aim, when in all its glory the New Jerusalem shall appear and the Bridal Feast of the Lamb shall begin. In the stretch of ages the guests and the chosen are being collected. The people of the eternal Kingdom are being assembled. The Kingdom is being selected and set aside beyond the limits of time. The fulfillment shall be accomplished in the last resurrection—then the complete fulness and glory and the whole meaning of Church *catholicity* shall be revealed.

Holy Ikons

THE FIRST SUNDAY OF LENT is Orthodox Sunday.

It was established as a special memorial day of the Council at Constantinople in 843. It commemorates first of all the victory of the Church over the heresy of the Iconoclasts: The use and veneration of Holy Ikons was restored. On this day we continue to sing the troparion of the Holy Image of Christ: "*W*ereverence *Thy sacred Image O Christ...*"

At first glance, it may seem to be an unsuitable occasion to commemorate the glory of the Church and all the heroes and martyrs of the Orthodox Faith. Would it not be more reasonable to do so rather on the days dedicated to the memory of the great Ecumenical Councils or of the Fathers of the Church? Is not the veneration of Ikons rather a piece of an external ritual and ceremonial? Is not Ikon-painting rather just a decoration, very beautiful indeed, and in many ways instructive, but hardly an article of Faith? Such is the current opinion, unfortunately widely spread even among the Orthodox themselves. And it accounts for a sore decay of our religious art. We usually mistake Icons for "religious pictures," and therefore have no difficulty in using the most unsuitable pictures as Ikons, even in our churches. Too often we simply miss the religious significance of Holy Ikons. We have forgotten the true and ultimate purpose of Ikons.

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Let us turn to the witness of St. John of Damascus—one of the first and greatest defenders of Holy Ikons in the period of struggle—the great theologian and devotional poet of our Church. In one of his sermons in the defense of Ikons he says: "I have seen the human image of God, and my soul is saved." It is a strong and moving statement. God is invisible, He lives in light unapproachable. How can a frail man see or behold Him? Now, God has been manifested in the flesh. The Son of God, Who is in the bosom of the Father, "came down from heaven" and "became man." He dwelt among men. This was the great move of Love Divine. The Heavenly Father was moved by the misery of man and sent His Son because He loved the world. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." *John 1:18*. The Ikon of Christ, God Incarnate, is a continuous witness of the Church to that mystery of the Holy Incarnation, which is the basis and the substance of our faith and hope. Christ Jesus, Our blessed Lord, is God Incarnate. It means that since the Incarnation, God is visible. One can now have a true image of God.

The Incarnation is an intimate and personal identification of God with man, with the needs and misery of man. The Son of God "was made man," as it is stated in the Creed, "for us men and for our salvation." He took upon Himself the sins of the world, and died for us sinners on the tree of the Cross, and thereby He made the Cross the new tree of life for believers. He became the new and Last Adam, the Head of the new and redeemed Humanity. The Incarnation means a personal intervention of God into the life of man, an intervention of Love and Mercy. The Holy Ikon of Christ is a symbol of this, but much more than a mere symbol or sign. It is also an efficient sign and token of Christ's abiding presence in the Church, which is His Body. Even in an ordinary portrait there is always something of the person represented. A portrait not only reminds us

of the person, but somehow conveys something of him, i.e. represents the person, i.e. "makes present again." It is even more true of the sacred Image of Christ. As the teachers of the Church have taught us—and especially St. Theodore of Studium, another great confessor and defender of Holy Ikons—an Ikon, in a sense, belongs to Christ's personality itself. The Lord is there, in His "Holy Images."

Therefore not everyone is permitted to make or paint Ikons, if they are to be true Ikons. The Ikon-painter must be a faithful member of the Church, and he must prepare himself for his sacred task by fasting and prayer. It is not just a matter of art, of artistic or technical skill. It is a kind of witness, a profession of faith. For the same reason, the art itself must be wholeheartedly subordinate to the rule of faith. There are limits of the artistic imagination. There are certain established patterns to be followed. In any case, the Ikon of Christ must be so executed as to convey the true conception of His person, i.e. to witness to His Divinity, yet Incarnate. All these rules were strictly kept for centuries in the Church, and then they were forgotten. Even unbelievers were permitted to paint Christ's ikons in the churches, and therefore certain modern "ikons" are no more than pictures, showing us just a man. These pictures fail to be "Ikons" in any proper and true sense, and cease to be witnesses of the Incarnation. In such cases, we just "decorate" our churches.

The use of Holy Ikons has always been one of the most distinctive features of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Christian West, even before the Schism, had little understanding for this dogmatic and devotional substance of Ikon-painting. In the West it meant just decoration. And it was under Western influence that Ikon-painting has also deteriorated in the Orthodox East in modern times. The decay of Ikon-painting was a symptom of a weakening of faith. The art of Holy Ikons is not a neutral matter. It appertains to Faith.

There should be no hazard, and no "improvisation," in the painting of our churches. Christ is never alone, St. John of Damascus contended. He is always with His saints, who are His friends for ever. Christ is the Head, and true believers are the Body. In the old churches the whole state of the Church Triumphant would be pictorially represented on the walls. Again, this was not just a decoration, nor was it simply a story told in lines and colors for the ignorant and illiterate. It was rather an insight into the invisible reality of the Church. The whole company of Heaven was represented on the walls because it was present there, though invisibly. We always pray at Divine Liturgy, during the Little Entrance, that "Holy Angels may enter with us to serve with us." And our prayer is, no doubt, granted. We do not see Angels, indeed. Our sight is weak. But it is told of St. Seraphim that he used to see them, for they were there indeed. The elect of the Lord do see them and the Church Triumphant. Ikons are signs of this presence. "When we stay in the temple of Thy glory, we seem to stand in the Heavens."

Thus, it is quite natural that on the Sunday of Orthodoxy we should not only celebrate the restoration of Ikon-veneration, but also commemorate that glorious body of witnesses and believers who did profess their faith, even at the cost of their worldly security, prosperity, and life itself. It is a great day of the Church. In fact, on this Sunday we do celebrate the Church of the Incarnate Word: we celebrate the redeeming Love of the Fathers, the Love Crucified of the Son, and the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit, made visible in the whole company of the faithful, who did already enter into Heavenly Rest, into the Joy Everlasting of their Lord and Master. Holy Ikons are our witness to the glory of the Kingdom to come, and already present.

The "*Immortality*" of the Soul

ARE CHRISTIANS, AS CHRISTIANS, necessarily committed to the belief in the Immortality of the human soul? And what does Immortality actually mean in the Christian universe of discourse? These questions are by no means just rhetorical ones. Etienne Gilson, in his Gifford lectures, felt himself compelled to make the following startling statement: "On the whole," he said, "Christianity without an Immortality of the soul is not altogether inconceivable, —the proof is that it has been so conceived. What is, on the contrary, absolutely inconceivable, is Christianity without a Resurrection of Man."¹ The striking feature of the early history of the Christian doctrine of Man was that many of the leading writers of the second century seem to have emphatically denied the (natural) immortality of the soul. And this does not seem to be an exceptional or extravagant opinion of certain writers only, but rather the common teaching of the age. Nor was this conviction completely abandoned in a later age. Bishop Anders Nygren, in his famous book, *Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna*, praises the Apologists of the second century precisely for this courageous

¹"The 'Immortality' of the Soul" first appeared as "The Resurrection of Life" in the *Bulletin of Harvard University Divinity School*, XLIX, No. 8 (April, 1952), 5-26. Reprinted by permission of the author.

statement and sees in it an expression of the true Evangelical spirit. The main emphasis was then, as in Nygren's opinion it should ever be, rather on the "Resurrection of *the body*" than on the "Immortality of *the soul*."² An Anglican erudite of the XVIIth century, Henry Dodwell (1641-1711, one-time Camden "Praelector" of History in the University of Oxford), published in London a curious book, under a rather bewildering title:

An Epistolary Discourse, proving, from the Scriptures and the First Fathers, that the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal; but immortalized actually by the Pleasure of God, to Punishment; or to Reward, by its Union with the Divine Baptismal Spirit. Wherein is proved, that None have the Power of giving this Divine Immortalizing Spirit, since the Apostles, but only the Bishops (1706).

Dodwell's argument was often confused and involved. The main value of the book, however, was in its immense erudition. Dodwell, probably for the first time, collected an enormous mass of information on the early Christian doctrine of Man, even if he could not use it properly himself. And he was quite right in his contention that Christianity was not concerned with a *natural* "Immortality," but rather with the soul's *supernatural* Communion with God, "Who only hath immortality" (I Tim. 6:16). No wonder that Dodwell's book provoked a violent controversy. A formal charge of heresy was brought against the author. Yet, he found some fervent supporters. And an anonymous writer, "a Presbyter of the Church of England," published two books on the subject, presenting a careful study of the Patristic evidence that "the Holy Spirit (was) the Author of Immortality, or Immortality (was) a Peculiar Grace of the Gospel, (and) no Natural Ingredient of the soul," and that "Immortality (was) *preternatural* to Human Souls, the Gift of Jesus Christ, collated by the Holy Spirit in Baptism."³ What was of special interest in that controversy was that Dodwell's thesis was opposed chiefly by the "liberals" of that day, and his

greatest literary opponent was the famous Samuel Clarke, of St. James, Westminster, a follower of Newton and a correspondent of Leibniz, notorious for his unorthodox beliefs and ideas, a typical man of the age of Latitudinarianism and Enlightenment. It was an unusual sight: "Immortality" contested by an "Orthodox" and defended by a Latitudinarian. In fact, it was rather what one should have expected. The belief in a *natural* Immortality was one of the few basic "dogmas" of the enlightened Deism of that time. A man of the Enlightenment could easily dismiss the doctrines of Revelation, but could not afford any doubt on the "truth" of Reason. Gilson suggested that "what is known under the name of the 'Moralist' doctrine of the XVIIth century was originally a return to the position of the Early Fathers and not, as seems to be usually believed, a manifestation of a libertine spirit."⁴ As a general statement, it is untenable. The whole situation in the XVIIth century was much more complex and mixed up than Gilson apparently surmised. Yet, in the case of Dodwell (and some others) Gilson's guess is fully vindicated. There was an obvious "return to the positions of the First Fathers."

II

The Soul as 'Creature'

St. Justin, in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, tells the story of his conversion. In his quest for truth he went first to Philosophers, and for a time was fully satisfied with the teaching of Platonists. "The perception of incorporeal things quite overwhelmed me, and the Platonic theory of ideas added wing to my mind." Then he met a Christian teacher, an elderly and respectable man. Among the questions raised in the course of their conversation was that of the nature of the soul. We should not call the soul immortal, contended

the Christian. "For, if it were, we would certainly have to call it unbegotten also," ε! ἀθάνατός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος δηλαδῆ. This was, of course, the thesis of the Platonists. Now, God alone is "unbegotten" and immortal, and it is for that very reason that He is Divine. The world, on the other hand, is "begotten," and the souls make part of it. "Perhaps, there was a time when they were not in existence." And therefore they are not immortal, "since the world has appeared to us to be begotten." The soul is not life by itself, but only "partakes" of life. God alone is life, the soul can but *have* life. "For the power to live is not an attribute of the soul, as it is of God." Moreover, God gives life to souls, "as He pleases." All created things "have the nature of decay, and are such as may be blotted out and cease to exist." Creatures as such are "corruptible" (*Dial.*, 5 and 6). The main classical proofs of immortality, derived from *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, are disavowed and declined, and their basic presuppositions openly rejected. As Professor A. E. Taylor pointed out, "to the Greek mind ἀθανασία or αφθαρσία regularly signified much the same things as 'divinity' and included the conception of ingenerability as well as of indestructibility."⁵ To say "the soul is immortal" would be for a Greek the same as to say "it is uncreated," i.e., eternal and "divine." Everything that had a beginning was bound to have an end. In other words, for a Greek, "immortality" of the soul would immediately imply its "eternity," i.e., an eternal "pre-existence." Only that which had no beginning could last for ever. Christians could not comply with this "philosophical" assumption, as they believed in Creation, and therefore they had to deny "immortality" (in the Greek meaning of the word). The soul is not an independent or self-governing being, but precisely a *creature*, and its very existence it owes to God, the Creator. Accordingly, it cannot be "immortal" *by nature*, i.e., by itself, but only by "God's pleasure," i.e., *by grace*. The "philosophical" argument for (natural) "immortality" was based on the

"necessity" of existence. On the contrary, to say that the world is *created* is to emphasize, first of all, its radical *contingency*, and precisely—a contingency in the *order of existence*. In other words, a *created* world is a world which *might not have existed at all*. That is to say that the world is, utterly and entirely, *ab olío*, and in no sense *a se*? As Gilson puts it, "there are some beings that are radically different from God at least in this that, unlike Him, they might not have existed, and still may, at a certain time, cease to exist/" "May cease" however, does not mean necessarily "will (actually) cease." St. Justin was not a "conditionalist," and his name has been invoked by the defenders of a "conditional immortality" quite in vain. "I do not say, indeed, that all souls die..." The whole argument was polemical, and its purpose was to stress belief in Creation. We find the same reasoning in other writings of the second century. St. Theophilus of Antioch insisted on the "neutral" character of Man. "*By nature.*" Man is neither "immortal" nor "mortal," but rather "capable of both," δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων. "For if God had made him immortal from the beginning, He would have made him God." If Man from the beginning had chosen things immortal, in obedience to God's commandments, he would have been rewarded with immortality and have become God, "an adoptive God," *deus assumptus*, Θεὸς ἀναδειχθεὶς (*Ad Autolyicum* II, 24 and 27). Tatian went even further. "The soul is not in itself immortal, O Greeks, but mortal. Yet *it* is possible for it not to die" (*Oratio ad Graecos*, 13). The thought of the early Apologists was not free from contradictions, nor was it always accurately expressed. But the main contention was always clear: the problem of human immortality had to be faced in the context of the doctrine of Creation. One may say also: not as a metaphysical problem only, but as a religious one, first of all. "Immortality" is not an attribute of the soul, but something that ultimately depends upon man's actual relationship with God, his Master and Creator, Not only

the ultimate destiny of Man can be achieved only in Communion with God, but even Man's existence itself and his "survival" or endurance depend upon God's will. St. Irenaeus continued the same tradition. In his struggle against the Gnostics he had a special motive to emphasize the creaturely character of the soul. It does not come from "another world," exempt from corruption; it belongs precisely to this created world. It has been contended, says St. Irenaeus, that in order to stay in existence souls had to be "unbegotten" (*sed o port ere eas aut innascibiles esse ut sint immortales*), for otherwise they would have to die with the body (*vel si generationis initium acceperint, cum corpore mori*). He declines this argument. As creatures, the souls "endure as long as God wills them to endure" (*perseverant autem quoadusque eas Deus et esse, et perseverare voluerit*). *Perseverantia* here obviously corresponds to the Greek: διαμονή. St. Irenaeus uses almost the same phrases as St. Justin. The soul is not life by itself; it partakes of life, by the grant of God (*sic et anima quidem non est vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi praestitam vitam*). God alone is Life and the only Giver of Life (*Adversus haereses*, II, 34.). Even Clement of Alexandria, in spite of his Platonism, would occasionally recall that the soul was not immortal "by nature" (*Adumbrationes in I Petri 1:9: hinc apparet quoniam non est naturaliter anima incorruptibilis, sed gartia Dei . . . perficitur incorruptibilis*).⁷ St. Athanasius would demonstrate the immortality of the soul by arguments which can be traced back to Plato (*Adv. Gentēs*, 33), and yet he insisted very strongly that everything created is "by nature" unstable and exposed to destruction (*ibidem*, 41 : φύσιν ρευστήν ἢ οὐσσαν καὶ διαλυομένην). Even St. Augustine was aware of the necessity to qualify the immortality of the soul: *Anima hominis immortalis est secundum quendam modum suum; non enim omni modo sicut Deus (Epist. VFF, ad Hieronymum)*. "According to the mutability of this life, it may be said to be mortal." (*In Jo.*, tr. 23, 9; cf. *De Trinitate*,

I.9.15, and *De Civ. Dei*, 19.3: *mortalis in quantum mutabilis*). St. John of Damascus says that even Angels are immortal not by nature, but only by grace (*De fide orth.* II,3: οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ χάριτι), and proves it more or less in the same way as the Apologists (*Dial. c. Manich.*, 21). We find the same emphatic statement in the "synodical" letter of St. Sophronius, the Patriarch of Jerusalem (634), which was read and favorably received at the Sixth Ecumenical Council (681). In the latter part of his letter Sophronius condemns the errors of the Origenists, the pre-existence of the soul and apokatastasis, and states plainly that "intellectual beings" (τα νοητά), though they do not die (θνήσκει δὲ οὐδαμῶς), nevertheless "are not immortal *by nature*" but only by the *grace of God* (*Mansi*, XI, 490-492; *Aligne*, LXXXVII. 3, 3181). It may be added that even in the XVIIth century this early tradition was not forgotten in the East, and we have an interesting contemporary record of a dispute between two Greek bishops of Crete exactly on this question: whether the soul was immortal "by nature" or "by grace."⁸ We may conclude: When we discuss the problem of Immortality from a Christian point of view, we must keep in mind the creaturely nature of the soul. The very existence of the soul is contingent, i.e., as it were, "conditional." It is conditioned by the creative *fiat* of God. Yet, a *given* existence, i.e., an existence which is not necessarily implied in the "essence," is not necessarily a transient one. The creative *fiat* is a free but *ultimate* act of God. God has created the world simply *for existence*: ΕΚΤΙΣΕ ΓΑΡ Εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα (Wis. 1:14). There is no provision for revoking this creative decree. The sting of the antinomy is exactly here: the world has a *contingent beginning*, yet *no end*. It stands by the immutable will of God.⁹

III

Man Is Mortal

In current thinking nowadays, the "immortality of the soul" is usually overemphasized to such an extent that the basic "mortality of man" is almost overlooked. Only in the recent "existentialist" philosophies are we again strongly reminded that man's existence stands intrinsically *sub specie mortis*. Death is a catastrophe for man. It is his "last (or rather, ultimate) enemy" εσχάτος ἐχθρὸς (I Cor. 15:26). "Immortality" is obviously a *negative* term; it is correlative with the term "death." And here again we find Christianity in an open and radical conflict with "Hellenism," with Platonism first of all. W. H. V. Reade, in his recent book, *The Christian Challenge to Philosophy*,¹⁰ very aptly confronts two quotations: "And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14) and "Plotinus, the philosopher of our time, was like one ashamed of being in the flesh" (Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus*, I). Reade then proceeds: "When the message of Christmas Day and Porphyry's brief summary of his master's creed are thus brought into direct comparison, it should be plain enough that they are totally incompatible: that no Christian can possibly be a Platonist, nor any Platonist a Christian; and of this elementary fact the Platonists, to do them justice, were perfectly aware."^{10a} I would only add that, unfortunately, Christians did not seem to be aware "of this elementary fact." Through centuries, down to our own age, Platonism has been the favorite philosophy of Christian wise men. It is not our purpose now to explain how it could and did happen. But this unfortunate misunderstanding (not to say more) has resulted in an utter confusion in modern thinking about death and immortality. We may still use the old definition of death: it is a separation of soul from body, ψυχῆς χωρισμός ἀπὸ σώματος (Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, 2; he quotes

Chrysippus). For a Greek it was a *liberation*; a "return" to the native sphere of spirits. For a Christian it was *the catastrophe*, a frustration of human existence. The Greek doctrine of Immortality could never solve the Christian problem. The only adequate solution has been offered by the message of Christ's Resurrection and by the promise of the General Resurrection of the dead. If we turn again to Christian antiquity, we find this point clearly made at an early date. St. Justin was quite emphatic on the point. People "who say there is no resurrection of the dead, and that their souls, when they die, are taken to heaven are not Christian at all" (*Dial.*, 80). The unknown author of the treatise *On Resurrection* (traditionally ascribed to St. Justin) states the problem very accurately. "For what is man but a reasonable animal composed of body and soul? Is the soul by itself man? *No*, but the soul of man. Would the body be called man? *No*, but it is called the body of man. If neither of these is by itself man, but that which is made up of the two together is called man, and God has called *man* to life and resurrection, He has called *not a part*, but *the whole*, which is the soul and the body" (*De resurr.*, 8). Athenagoras of Athens develops the same argument in his admirable treatise *On the Resurrection of the Dead*. Man was created by God for a definite purpose, for perpetual existence. Now, "God gave independent being and life neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, but rather to men, composed of soul and body, so that with these same parts of which they are composed, when they are born and live, they should attain after the termination of this life their common end; soul and body compose in man *one living entity*." There would no longer be a man, Athenagoras argues, if the completeness of this structure were broken, for then the identity of the individual would be broken also. The stability of the body, its continuity in its proper nature, must correspond to the immortality of the soul. "The entity which receives intellect and

reason is *man*, and not *the soul alone*. Consequently man must for ever remain composed of soul and body." Otherwise there would be no man, but only parts of man. "And this is impossible, if there is no resurrection. *For if there is no resurrection, the nature of men as men would not continue*" (15). The basic presupposition of the whole argument is that the body intrinsically belongs to the fullness of human existence. And therefore man, *as man*, would cease to exist, if the soul had to remain for ever "disembodied." It is precisely the opposite of what the Platonists contended. The Greeks dreamt rather of a complete and ultimate disincarnation. An embodiment was just the bondage of the soul. For Christians, on the other hand, death was not a normal end of human existence. Man's death is abnormal, is a failure. The death of man is "the wages of sin" (Rom. 6:23). It is a loss and corruption. And since the Fall the mystery of life is displaced by the mystery of death. Mysterious as the "union" of soul and body indeed is, the immediate consciousness of man witnesses to the organic wholeness of his psycho-physical structure. *Anima autem et Spiritus pars hominis esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam*, said St. Irenaeus (*Adv. haereses* V, 6.1). A body without a soul is but a corpse, and a soul without body is a ghost. Man is not a ghost without body, and corpse is not a part of man. Man is not a "bodiless demon," simply confined in the prison of the body. That is why the "separation" of soul and body is the *death of man himself*, the discontinuation of his existence, of his existence *as a man*. Consequently death and the corruption of the body are a sort of fading away of the "image of God" in man. A dead man is not fully human. St. John of Damascus, in one of his glorious anthems in the Burial Service, says of this: "I weep and I lament, when I contemplate death, and see our beauty, fashioned after the image of God, lying in the grave disfigured, dishonored, bereft of form." St. John speaks not of man's body, but of man himself.

"Our beauty in the image of God" is not the body, but man. He is indeed an "image of the unfathomable glory of God," even when "wounded by sin." And in death it is disclosed that man, this "reasonable statue" fashioned by God,—to use the phrase of St. Methodius (*De resurrectione* I, 34.4: το ἄγαλμα το λογικόν), is but a corpse. "Man is but dry bones, a stench and the food of worms."¹¹ One may speak of man as being "one hypostasis in two natures," and not only *of*, but precisely *in* two natures. And in death this one human hypostasis is broken up. And there is no man any more. And therefore man longs for "*the redemption of his body*" (Rom. 8:23: την ἀπολύτρωσιν του σώματος ἡμῶν). As St. Paul says elsewhere, "not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life" (II Cor. 5:4). The sting of death is precisely in that it is "the wages of sin," i.e., the consequence of a distorted relationship with God. It is not only a natural imperfection, nor is it just a metaphysical deadlock. Man's mortality reflects man's estrangement from God, Who is the only Giver of Life. And, in this estrangement from God, Man simply cannot "endure" as man, cannot stay fully human. The *status* of mortality is essentially "*subhuman*." To stress human mortality does not mean to offer a "naturalistic" interpretation of human tragedy, but, on the contrary, it means to trace the human predicament to its ultimate religious root. The strength of Patristic theology was precisely in its interest in human mortality, and accordingly in the message of the Resurrection. The misery of sinful existence was by no means underestimated, but it was interpreted not only in ethical or moralistic categories, but in theological ones. The burden of sin consisted not only in self-accusations of human conscience, not only in the consciousness of guilt, but in an utter disintegration of the whole fabric of human nature. The fallen man was no man any more, he was existentially "degraded." And the sign of this "degradation" was Man's

mortality, Man's death. In separation from God human nature becomes unsettled, goes out of tune, as it were. The very structure of man becomes unstable. The 'union' of the soul and the body becomes insecure. The soul loses its vital power, is no more able to quicken the body. The body is turned into the tomb and prison of the soul. And physical death becomes inevitable. The body and the soul are no longer, as it were, secured or adjusted to each other. The transgression of the Divine commandment "reinstated man in the state of nature," as St. Athanasius puts it,—εἰς το κατὰ φύσιν ἐπέστρεψεν. "That as he was made out of nothing, so also in his very existence he suffered in due time corruption, according to all justice." For, being made out of nothing, the creature also exists over an abyss of nothingness, ever ready to fall into it (*De incarnatione*, 4 and 5). "For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up again" (II Samuel 14:14). "The state of nature," of which St. Athanasius speaks, is the cyclical motion of Cosmos, in which fallen man is hopelessly entangled, and this entanglement signifies man's degradation. He loses his privileged position in the order of Creation. But this metaphysical catastrophe is just a manifestation of the broken relationship with God.

IV

"I am the Resurrection, and the **Life**"

The Incarnation of the Word was an absolute manifestation of God. And above all it was a revelation of Life. Christ is the Word of Life, ὁ λόγος της ζωῆς (I John 1:1). The Incarnation itself was, in a sense, the quickening of man, as it were the resurrection of human nature. In the Incarnation human nature was not merely anointed with a superabundant overflowing of Grace, but was assumed into

an intimate and "hypostatical" unity with Divinity itself. In that lifting up of human nature into an everlasting communion with the Divine Life, the Fathers of the early Church unanimously saw the very essence of salvation: "That is saved which is united with God," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus. And what was not so united could not be saved at all (*Epist.* 101, *ad Cledonium*). This was the fundamental motive in the whole of early theology,—in St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, the Cappadocians, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Maximus the Confessor. Yet, the climax of the Incarnate Life was the Cross, the death of the Incarnate Lord. Life has been revealed in full through death. This is the paradoxical mystery of the Christian faith: life through death, life from the grave and out of the grave, the Mystery of the life-bearing grave. And Christians are born again to real and everlasting life only through their baptismal death and burial in Christ; they are regenerated with Christ in the baptismal font (cf. Rom. 6:3-5). Such is the invariable law of true life. "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die" (I Cor. 15:36). Salvation was completed on Golgotha, not on Tabor, and the Cross of Jesus was spoken of even on Tabor (cf. Luke 9:31). Christ *had* to die, in order to bestow an abundant life upon the whole of mankind. It was not the necessity of this world. This was, as it were, the necessity of Love Divine, a necessity of a Divine order. And we fail to comprehend the mystery. Why had the true life to be revealed through the death of One, Who was Himself "the Resurrection and the Life"? The only answer is that Salvation had to be a victory over death and man's mortality. The ultimate enemy of man was precisely death. Redemption was not just the forgiveness of sins, nor was it man's reconciliation with God. It was the deliverance from sin and death. "Penitence does not deliver from the state of nature (into which man has relapsed through sin), it only discontinues the sin," says St. Athanasius. For man not only sinned but "fell into cor-

ruption." Now, the mercy of God could not permit "that creatures once made rational, and having partaken of the Word, should go to ruin and turn again to non-existence by the way of corruption." Consequently the Word of God descended and became man, assumed our body, "that, whereas man turned towards corruption, He might turn them again towards incorruption, and quicken them from death by the appropriation of his body and by the grace of the Resurrection, banishing death from them like a straw from the fire" (*De incarnatione*, 6-8). Thus, according to St. Athanasius, the Word became flesh in order to abolish "corruption" in human nature. However, death is vanquished, not by the appearance of Life in the mortal body, but rather by the voluntary death of the Incarnate Life. The Word became incarnate on account of death in flesh, St. Athanasius emphasizes. "In order to accept death He had a body" (c. 44). Or, to quote Tertullian, *forma moriendi causa nascendi est* (*De carne Christi*, 6). The ultimate reason for Christ's death must be seen in the mortality of Man. Christ suffered death, but passed through it and overcame mortality and corruption. He quickened death itself. "By death He destroyed death." The death of Christ is therefore, as it were, an extension of the Incarnation. The death on the Cross was effective, not as the death of an Innocent One, but as the death of the Incarnate Lord. "We needed an Incarnate God, God put to death, that we might live," to use a bold and startling phrase of St. Gregory of Nazianzus (*Orat.* 45, in S. Pascha, 28: ἐδεήθημεν θεοῦ σαρκομένου καὶ νεκρουμένου). It was not a man that died on the Cross. In Christ there is no human hypostasis. His personality was Divine, yet incarnate. "For He who suffered was not common man, but God made man, and fighting the contest of endurance," says St. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catech.* 13, 6). It may be properly said that God died on the Cross, but in His own humanity (which was, however, "consubstantial" with ours). This was the voluntary death of One Who

was Himself Life Eternal. A human death indeed, death "according to humanity," and yet death within the hypostasis of the Word, of the Incarnate Word. And thence a resurrecting death. "I have a baptism to be baptized with" (Luke 12:50). It was the death on the Cross, and the shedding of blood,—"the baptism of martyrdom and blood, with which Christ Himself also was baptized," as St. Gregory of Nazianzus suggested (*Orat.* 37, 17). The death on the Cross as a baptism of blood, this is the very essence of the redeeming mystery of the Cross. Baptism is a cleansing. And the Baptism of the Cross was, as it were, the cleansing of the human nature, which was travelling the path of restoration in the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Word. This was, as it were, a washing of human nature in the outpoured sacrificial blood of the Divine Lamb, and first of all a washing of the body: not only a washing away of sins, but a washing away of human infirmities and of mortality itself. It was the cleansing in preparation for the coming resurrection: a cleansing of all human nature, a cleansing of all humanity in the person of its new and mystical First-born, in the "Last Adam." This was the baptism by blood of the whole Church, and indeed of the whole world. "A purification not for a small part of man's world, not for a short time, but for the whole Universe and through eternity," to quote St. Gregory of Nazianzus once more (*Orat.* 45, 13). The Lord died on the Cross. This was a true death. Yet not wholly like ours, simply because this was the death of the Incarnate Word, death within the indivisible Hypostasis of the Word made man, the death of the "enhypostatized" humanity. This does not alter the ontological character of death, but changes its meaning. The "Hypostatic Union" was not broken or destroyed by death, and therefore the soul and the body, though separated from each other, remained still united through the Divinity of the Word, from which neither was ever estranged. This was an "incorrupt death," and therefore "corruption" and "mortality" were overcome

in it, and in it begins the resurrection. The very death of the Incarnate reveals the resurrection of human nature (St. John of Damascus, *De fide orth.*, 3.27; cf. *homil. in Magn. Sabbat.*, 29). "Today we keep the feast, for our Lord is nailed upon the Cross," in the sharp phrase of St. John Chrysostom (*In crucem et latronem*, horn. 1). The death on the Cross is a victory over death not only because it was followed by the Resurrection. It is itself the victory. The Resurrection only reveals and sets forth the victory achieved on the Cross. It is already accomplished in the very falling asleep of the God-man. "Thou diest and quickenest me." .. As St. Gregory of Nazianzus puts it: "He lays down His life, but He has the power to take it again; and the veil is rent, for the mysterious doors of Heaven are opened; the rocks are cleft, the dead arise. .. He dies, but He gives life, and by His death destroys death. He is buried, but He rises again. He goes down into Hades, but He brings up the souls" (*Orat.* 41). This mystery of the resurrecting Cross is commemorated especially on Good Saturday. It is the day of the Descent into Hell (Hades). And the Descent into Hades is already the Resurrection of the dead. By the very fact of His death Christ joins the company of the departed. It is the new extension of the Incarnation. Hades is just the darkness and shadow of death, rather a place of mortal anguish than a place of penal torments, a dark "*sheol*," a place of hopeless disembodiment and disincarnation, which was only scantily and dimly fore-illuminated by the slanting rays of the not-yet-risen Sun, by the hope and expectation yet unfulfilled. It was, as it were, a kind of ontological infirmity of the soul, which, in the separation of death, had lost the faculty of being the true *entelechia* of its own body,—the helplessness of fallen and wounded nature. Not a "place" at all, but rather a spiritual state: "the spirits in prison" (I Peter 3:19). It was into *this* prison, into *this* "Hell," that the Lord and Savior descended. Amid the darkness of pale death shone the unquenchable light of Life, the Life

Divine. The "Descent into Hell" is the manifestation of Life amid the hopelessness of mortal dissolution, it is *victory* over death. "It was not from any natural weakness of the Word that dwelt in it that the body had died, but in order that in it death might be done away by the power of the Savior," says St. Athanasius (*De inc.*, 26). Good Saturday is more than Easter-Eve. It is the "Blessed Sabbath," "*Sanctum Sabbatum*,"—*requies Sabbati magni*, in the phrase of St. Ambrose. "This is the Blessed Sabbath, this is the day of rest, whereon the Only-Begotten Son of God has rested from all His deeds" (Anthem, Vespers of Good Saturday, according to the Eastern rite). "I am the first and the last: I am He that liveth, and was dead: and behold, I am alive for evermore. Amen. And I have the keys of death and of Hades" (Rev. 1:17-18). The Christian "hope of immortality" is rooted in and secured by this victory of Christ, and not by any "natural" endowment. And it means also that this hope is rooted in a *historical event*, i.e., in a *historical self-revelation* of God, and not in any static disposition or constitution of human nature.

V

The Last Adam

The reality of death is not yet abolished, but its powerlessness has been revealed. "It is true, we still die as before," says St. John Chrysostom, "but we do not remain in death, and this is not to die...the power and very reality of death is just this, that a dead man has no possibility of returning to life; but if after death he is to be quickened and moreover to be given a better life, then this is no longer death, but a falling sleep" (*In Hebr.*, hom. 17, 2: οὐ θάνατος τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κοίμησις). Or in the phrase of St. Athanasius, "like seed cast on the earth, we do not perish when we

die, but having been sown, we rise" (*De inc.*, 21). This was a healing and renewal of human "nature," and therefore all will rise, *all* will be raised and restored to the fullness of their natural being, yet transformed. From henceforth every disembodiment is but temporary. The dark vale of Hades is abolished by the power of the life-giving Cross. In the *first* Adam the inherent potentiality of death by disobedience was disclosed and actualized. In the *second* Adam the potentiality of immortality by purity and obedience was sublimated and actualized into the impossibility of death. This parallel was drawn already by St. Irenaeus. Apart from the hope of the General Resurrection, belief in Christ would be vain and to no purpose. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruit of them that slept" (I Cor. 15:20). The Resurrection of Christ is a *new beginning*. It is a "*new creation*," ἡ καινὴ κτίσις. One may say even, an *eschatological* beginning, an *ultimate* step in the history of Salvation.¹² And yet, we have to make a clear distinction between the healing of nature and the healing of the will. "Nature" is healed and restored with a certain compulsion, by the mighty power of God's omnipotent and invincible grace. The wholeness is as it were, "forced" upon human nature. For in Christ *all* human nature (the "seed of Adam") is fully and completely cured from unwholeness and mortality. This restoration will be actualized and revealed to its full extent in due time, in the General Resurrection, in the resurrection of *all*, both of the righteous and the wicked. And no one, so far as nature is concerned, can escape Christ's kingly rule, or alienate himself from the invincible power of the resurrection. But the *will* of man cannot be cured in the same invincible manner. The will of man must turn *itself* to God. There must be a free and spontaneous response of love and adoration, a "free conversion." The will of man can be cured only in the "mystery of freedom." Only by this free effort does man enter into that new and eternal life which is revealed in Christ Jesus.

A spiritual regeneration can be wrought only in perfect freedom, in an obedience of love, by a self-consecration and self-dedication to God, in Christ. This distinction was made with great insistence by Nicolas Cabasilas in his remarkable treatise on *The Life in Christ*. Resurrection is a "rectification of nature" (ἡ ἀνάστασις φύσεως ἐστὶν ἐπανόρθωσις) and this God grants freely. But the Kingdom of Heaven, and the beatific vision, and union with Christ, presuppose the desire (τροφή ἐστὶν τῆς θελήσεως), and therefore are available only for those who have longed for them, and loved, and desired. And immortality will be given to all, just as all can enjoy Divine providence. It does not depend upon our will whether we shall rise after death or not, just as it is not by our will that we are born. The death and resurrection of Christ bring immortality and incorruption to all in the same manner, because all have the same nature as the Man Christ Jesus. But nobody can be compelled to desire. Thus Resurrection is a gift common to all, but the blessedness will be given only to some (*De vita in Christo* II, 86-96). And again, the path of life is the path of renunciation, of mortification, of self-sacrifice and self-oblation. One has to die to oneself in order to live in Christ. Each one must personally and freely associate himself with Christ, the Lord, the Savior, and the Redeemer, in the confession of faith, in the choice of love, in the mystical oath of allegiance. He who does not die with Christ cannot live with Him. "Unless of our own free choice we accept to die unto His passion, His life is not in us" (St. Ignatius, *Magnes.*, 5; the phraseology is Pauline). This is no mere ascetical or moral rule, no mere discipline. This is the ontological law of spiritual existence, even the law of life itself. For only in communion with God and through life in Christ does the restoration of human wholeness gain meaning. To those in total darkness, who have deliberately confined themselves "outside God/" the Resurrection itself must seem rather unnecessary and unmotivated. But it will come, as

a "resurrection to judgment" (John 5:29 ἀνάστασις τῆς κρίσεως). And in this will be completed the tragedy of human freedom. Here indeed we are on the threshold of the inconceivable and incomprehensible. The *apokatastasis* of nature does not abolish free will, and the will must be moved from within by love. St. Gregory of Nyssa had a clear understanding of this. He anticipated a kind of universal *conversion* of souls in the after-life, when the Truth of God will be revealed and manifested with some ultimate and *compelling* evidence. Just at this point the limitations of the Hellenistic mind are obvious. Evidence seemed to *it* to be the decisive reason or motive for the will, as if "sin" were merely "ignorance." The Hellenistic mind had to pass through its long and hard experience of asceticism, of ascetical self-examination and self-control, in order to free itself from this intellectualistic *naïveté* and illusion, and discover a dark abyss in the fallen soul. Only in St. Maximus, after some centuries of ascetic preparation, do we find a new, remodeled and deepened interpretation of the *apokatastasis*. St. Maximus did not believe in the inevitable conversion of obstinate souls. He taught an *apokatastasis* of nature, i.e., a restitution of all beings to an integrity of nature, of a universal manifestation of the Divine Life, which will be evident to every one. But those who have deliberately spent their lives on earth in fleshly desires, "against nature," will be unable to enjoy this eternal bliss. The Light is the Word, that illuminates the natural minds of the faithful; but as a burning fire of the judgment (τῆ καύσει τῆς κρίσεως), He punishes those who, through love of the flesh, cling to the nocturnal darkness of this life. The distinction is between an ἐπίγνωσις and a μέθεξις. "Acknowledgment" is not the same as "Participation." God will be in all indeed, but only in the Saints will He be present "with grace" (διὰ τὴν χάριν); in the reprobate He will be present "without grace" (παρὰ τὴν χάριν). And the wicked will be estranged from God by their lack of a resolute purpose of

good.¹³ We have here the same duality of *nature* and *will*. In the resurrection the whole of creation will be restored, i.e., brought to perfection and ultimate stability. But sin and evil are rooted in the will. The Hellenistic mind concluded therefrom that evil is unstable and by itself must disappear inevitably. For nothing can be perpetual, unless *it* be rooted in a Divine decree. The Christian inference is exactly the opposite. There is the inertia and obstinacy of the will, and this obstinacy may remain uncured even in the "universal Restoration." God never does any violence to man, and communion with God cannot be forced upon the obstinate. In the phrase of St. Maximus, "the Spirit does not produce an undesired resolve but it transforms a chosen purpose into *theosis*" (*Quaest. ad Thalass.*, 6). We live in a *changed* world: it has been changed by Christ's redeeming Resurrection. Life has been given, and it will prevail. The Incarnate Lord is in very truth the Second Adam and in Him the *new* humanity has been inaugurated. Not only an ultimate "survival" is assured, but also the fulfillment of God's creative purpose. Man *is made "immortal."* He cannot commit an ultimate "metaphysical suicide" and strike himself out of existence. Yet even the victory of Christ does not force "Eternal Life" upon the "closed" beings. As St. Augustine says, for the creature "being is not the same thing as living" (*De Genest ad litt.* I, 5).

VI

"And Life Everlasting"

There is an inevitable tension in the Christian conception between "the given" and "the expected." Christians look "for the Life of the world *to come*" but they are no less aware of the Life that *had* already *come*: "for the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness,

and show unto you that eternal Life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us" (I John 1:2). This is not only a tension *in time*,—between the past, and the present, and the future. It is a tension between *destiny* and *decision*. Or perhaps one may say: Life Eternal is *offered* to Man, but he has *to receive* it. For individuals, fulfillment of "destiny" depends upon the "decision of faith," which is not an "acknowledgment" only, but a willing "participation." The Christian life is initiated with a new birth, by water and the Spirit. And first, "repentance" is required, ἡ μετάνοια, an inner change, intimate and resolute. The symbolism of Holy Baptism is complex and manifold. But above all it is a symbolism of death and resurrection, of Christ's death and resurrection (Rom. 6:3-4). It is a sacramental resurrection with Christ, by the participation in His death, a rising up with Him and in Him to a new and eternal life (Col. 2:12; Phil. 3:10). Christians are coresurrected with Christ precisely through burial: "for //we be dead with Him, we shall also live with Him" (II Tim. 2:11). Christ *is* the Second Adam, but men must be born anew and be incorporated into Him, in order to partake of that new life which is His. St. Paul spoke of a "likeness" unto the death of Christ (Rom. 6:5 σύμφυτοι...τω ὁμοιώματι του θανάτου αὐτοῦ). But this "likeness" means much more than a resemblance. It is more than a mere sign or recollection. The meaning of this likeness for St. Paul himself was that in each of us Christ can and must be "formed" (Gal. 4:19). Christ is the Head, all believers are His members, and His life is actualized in them. This is the mystery of the Whole Christ,—*totus Christus, Caput et Corpus*. All are called and every one is capable of believing, and of being quickened by faith and baptism so as to live in Him. Baptism is therefore a "regeneration," an ἀναγέννησις, a new, spiritual and charismatic birth. As Cabasilas says, Baptism is the cause of a beatific life in Christ, not merely of life (*De vita in Christo* II, 95). St. Cyril of Jerusalem in a lucid manner

explains the true reality of all baptismal symbolism. It is true, he says, that in the baptismal font we die (and are buried) *only* "in imitation," only, as it were, "symbolically," διὰ συμβόλου, and we do not rise from a real grave. And yet, "if the imitation is in an image, the salvation is in very truth." For Christ was really crucified and buried, and actually rose from the grave. The Greek word is οντως. It is even stronger than simply ἄληθῶς, "in very truth." It emphasizes the ultimate meaning of Christ's death and resurrection. It was a new achievement. Hence He gave us the chance, by "imitative" sharing of His Passion (τη μιμήσει...κοινωνήσαντες), to acquire salvation "in reality." It is not only an "imitation," but a "similitude," τὸ ὁμοίωμα. "Christ was crucified and buried in reality, but to you it is given to be crucified, buried, and raised with Him in similitude." In other words, in baptism man descends "sacramentally" into the darkness of death, and yet with the Risen Lord he rises again and crosses over from death to life. "And the image is completed all upon you, for you are an image of Christ," concludes St. Cyril. In other words, all are held together by and in Christ; hence the very possibility of a sacramental "resemblance" (*Mystag.* 2.4-5, 7; 3.1). St. Gregory of Nyssa dwells on the same point. There are two aspects in baptism. Baptism is a birth and a death. Natural birth is the beginning of a mortal existence, which begins and ends in corruption. Another, a new birth, had to be discovered, which would initiate into everlasting life. In baptism "the presence of a Divine power transforms what is born with a corruptible nature into a state of incorruption" (*Orat. cat.*, 33). It is transformed through following and imitating; and thus what was foreshown by the Lord is realized. Only by following after Christ can one pass through the labyrinth of life and come out of it. "For I call the inescapable guard of death, in which sorrowing mankind is imprisoned, a labyrinth." Christ escaped from this after the three days of death. In the baptismal font "the imitation of

all that He has done is accomplished." Death is "represented" in the element of water. And as Christ rose again to life, so also the newly-baptized, united with Him in bodily nature, "does imitate the resurrection on the third day." This is just an "imitation," μίμησις, and not "identity." In baptism man is not actually raised, but only freed from natural evil and the inescapability of death. In him the "continuity of vice" is cut off. He is not resurrected for he does not die, but remains still in this life. Baptism only foreshadows the resurrection; in baptism one anticipates the grace of the final resurrection. Baptism is the start, ἀρχή, and the resurrection is the end and consummation, πέρας; and all that takes place in the great Resurrection already has its beginnings and causes in baptism. One may say, baptism is an "Homiotic resurrection" (*Orat. cat.*, 35). It must be pointed out that St. Gregory specially emphasized the need of keeping and holding fast the baptismal grace. For in baptism it is not nature only, but the will as well, that is transformed and transfigured, remaining free throughout. And if the soul is not cleansed and purified in the free exercise of will, baptism proves to be fruitless. The transfiguration is not actualized, the new life is not yet consummated. This does not subordinate baptismal grace to human license; Grace does indeed descend. Yet it can never be forced upon any one who is free and made in the image of God: it must be responded to and corroborated by the synergism of love and will. Grace does not quicken and enliven the closed and obstinate souls, the really "dead souls." Response and coöperation are required (c. 40). That is just because baptism is a sacramental dying with Christ, a participation in His voluntary death, in His sacrificial love; and this can be accomplished only in freedom. Thus in baptism the death of Christ on the Cross is reflected or portrayed as in a living and sacramental image. Baptism is at once a death and a birth, a burial and a "bath of regeneration," λουτρόν της παλιγγενεσίας: "a time of

death and a time of birth,' ' to quote St. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Mystag.* II, 4). The same is true of all sacraments. All sacraments are instituted just in order to enable the faithful "to participate" in Christ's redeeming death and to gain thereby the grace of His resurrection. In sacraments the uniqueness and universality of Christ's victory and sacrifice are brought forward and emphasized. This was the main idea of Nicolas Cabasilas in his treatise *On the Life in Christ*, in which the whole sacramental doctrine of the Eastern Church was admirably summarized. "We are baptized just in order to die by His death and to rise by His resurrection. We are anointed with the chrism that we may partake of His kingly anointment of deification (*theosis*). And when we are fed with the most sacred Bread and do drink the most Divine Cup, we do partake of the same flesh and the same blood our Lord has assumed, and so we are united with Him, Who was for us incarnate, and died, and rose again... Baptism is a birth, and Chrism is the cause of acts and movements, and the Bread of life and the Cup of thanksgivings are the true food and the true drink" (*De vita* II, 3,4,6, etc.). In the whole sacramental life of the Church the Cross and the Resurrection are "imitated" and reflected in manifold symbols. All that symbolism is realistic. The symbols do not merely remind us of something in the past, something which has passed away. That which took place "in the past" was a beginning of "the Everlasting." Under all these sacred "symbols," and in them, the ultimate Reality is in very truth disclosed and conveyed. This hieratic symbolism culminates in the august Mystery of the Holy Altar. The Eucharist is the heart of the Church, the Sacrament of Redemption in an eminent sense. It is more than an "imitation," or mere "commemoration." It is Reality itself, at once veiled and disclosed in the Sacrament. It is "the perfect and ultimate Sacrament" (τὸ τελευταῖον μυστήριον), as Cabasilas says, "and one cannot go further, and there is nothing to be added." It is the "limit of life,"

ζωῆς τὸ πέρας. "After the Eucharist there is nothing more to long for, but we have to stay here and learn how we can preserve this treasure up to the end" (*De vita* IV, i,4,15). The Eucharist *is* the Last Supper itself, enacted, as it were, again and again, and yet not repeated. For every new celebration does not only "represent," but truly *is the same* "Mystical Supper" which was celebrated for the first time (and *for ever*) by the Divine High Priest Himself, as a voluntary anticipation and initiation of the Sacrifice of the Cross. And the true Celebrant of each Eucharist is always Christ Himself. St. John Chrysostom was quite emphatic on this point. "Believe, therefore, that even now it is that Supper, at which He Himself sat down. For this one is in no respect different from that one" (*In Matt.*, horn. 50,3). "He that then did these things at that Supper, this same now also works them. We hold the rank of ministers. He who sanctifieth and changeth them is the Same. This table *is* the same as that, and hath nothing less. For it is not that Christ wrought that, and man this, but He doth this too. This is that Upper Chamber, where they were then" (*Ibid.*, horn. 82,5). All this is of primary importance. The Last Supper was an offering of the sacrifice, of the sacrifice of the Cross. The offering is still continued. Christ is still acting as the High Priest in His Church. The Mystery is all the same, and the Priest is the same, and the Table is one. To quote Cabasilas once more: "In offering and sacrificing Himself once for all, He did not cease from His Priesthood, but He exercises this perpetual ministry for us, in which He is our advocate with God for ever" (*Explan. div. liturg.*, c. 23). And the resurrecting power and significance of Christ's death are in the Eucharist made manifest in full. It is "the medicine of immortality and an antidote that we should not die but live for ever in Jesus Christ," to quote the famous phrase of St. Ignatius (*Ephes.*, 20.2: φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτος του μη ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν εν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ). It is "the heavenly Bread

and the Cup of life." This tremendous Sacrament is for the faithful the very "Betrothal of the Life Eternal," just because Christ's death itself was the Victory and the Resurrection. In the Eucharist the beginning and the end are linked together: the memories of the Gospel and the prophecies of the Revelation. It is a *sacramentum juturi* because it is an *anamnesis of the Cross*. The Eucharist is a sacramental anticipation, a foretaste of the Resurrection, an "image of the Resurrection" (ὁ τύπος τῆς ἀναστάσεως,—the phrase is from the consecration prayer of St. Basil). It is but an "image," not because it is a mere sign, but because the history of Salvation is still going on, and one has to look forward, "*to look for the life of the age to come*"

VII

Christians, as Christians, are not committed to any philosophical doctrine of immortality. But they are committed to the belief in the General Resurrection. Man is a creature. His very existence is the grant of God. His very existence is contingent. He exists by the grace of God. But God created Man for existence, i.e., for an eternal destiny. This destiny can be achieved and consummated only in communion with God. A broken communion frustrates human existence, and yet Man does not cease to exist. Man's death and mortality is the sign of the broken communion, the sign of Man's isolation, of his estrangement from the source and the goal of his existence. And yet the creative *fiat* continues to operate. In the Incarnation communion is restored. Life is manifested afresh in the shadow of death. The Incarnate is the Life and the Resurrection. The Incarnate is the Conqueror of death and Hades. And He is the First-fruit of the New Creation, the First-fruit of all those who slept. The physical death of men is not just an irrelevant "natural phenomenon," but rather an ominous

sign of the original tragedy. An "immortality" of disembodied "souls" would not solve the human problem. And "immortality" in a Godless world, an "immortality" without God or "outside God," would be an eternal doom. Christians, as Christians, aspire to something greater than a "natural" immortality. They aspire to an everlasting communion with God, or, to use the startling phrase of the early Fathers, to a *theosis*. There is nothing "naturalistic" or pantheistic about the term. Theosis means no more than an intimate communion of human persons with the Living God. To be with God means to dwell in Him and to share His perfection. "Then the Son of God became the son of man, that man also might become the son of God" (St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haeres.* III, 10.2). In Him man is forever united with God. In Him we have Life Eternal. "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord" (II Cor. 3:18). And, at the close, for the whole creation the "Blessed Sabbath," the very "Day of rest," the mysterious "Seventh day of creation," will be inaugurated, in the General Resurrection and in "the World to come."

VII
ESCHATOLOGY

The Last Things and the Last Events

Behold, I make all things new—Rev. 21.5

ESCHATOLOGY was for a long time a neglected field in modern theology. The arrogant phrase of Ernst Troeltsch—*Das eschatologische Bureau ist meist geschlossen* ["The bureau of eschatology is for the most part closed"]—was distinctively characteristic of the whole liberal tradition, since the Age of the Enlightenment. Nor is this neglect for eschatological issues fully overcome in contemporary thought. In certain quarters eschatology is still regarded as an obsolete relic of the forlorn past. The theme itself is avoided, or it is summarily dismissed as unreal and irrelevant. The modern man is not concerned with the last events. This attitude of neglect was recently reinforced by the rise of theological Existentialism. Now, Existentialism does claim to be itself an eschatological doctrine. But it is a sheer abuse of terms. Eschatology is radically interiorized in its existentialist reinterpretation. It is actually swallowed up in the immediacy of personal decisions. In a sense, modern Existentialism in theology is but a fresh variation on the old Pietistic theme. In the last resort, it amounts to the radical dehistoricization of the Christian faith. Events of history are eclipsed by the

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events of inner life. The Bible itself is used as a book of parables and patterns. History is no more than a passing frame. Eternity can be encountered and tasted at any time. History is no more a theological problem.

On the other hand, precisely in the last few decades, the basic historicity of the Christian faith has been reassessed and reaffirmed in various trends of contemporary theology. This was a momentous *shift in theological thinking*. Indeed, it was a return to Biblical faith. Of course, no elaborate "philosophy of history" can be found in the Bible. But there is in the Bible a comprehensive vision of history, a perspective of an unfolding time, running from a "beginning" to an "end," and guided by the sovereign will of God toward the accomplishment of His ultimate purpose. The Christian faith is primarily an obedient witness to the mighty deeds of God in history, which culminated, "in those last days," in the Advent of Christ and in His redemptive victory. Accordingly, Christian theology should be construed as a "Theology of History." Christian faith is grounded in events, not in ideas. The Creed itself is a historical witness, a witness to the saving or redemptive events, which are apprehended by faith as God's mighty deeds.

This recovery of the historic dimension of the Christian faith was bound to bring the eschatological theme into the focus of theological meditation. The Bible and the Creed are both pointing to the future. It has been recently suggested that Greek philosophy was inescapably "in the grip of the past." The category of the future was quite irrelevant in the Greek version of history. History was conceived as a rotation, with an inevitable return to the initial position, from which a new repetition of events was bound to start again. On the contrary, the Biblical view opens into the future, in which new things are to be disclosed and realized. And an ultimate realization of the divine purpose is anticipated in the future, beyond which no temporal movement can proceed—a state of consummation.

In the witty phrase of von Balthasar, *die Eschatologie ist der "Wetterwinkel" in der Theologie unserer Zeit* ["Eschatology is the 'eye of the storm' in the theology of our time"].¹ Indeed, it is a "subtle knot" in which all lines of theological thinking intersect and are inextricably woven together. Eschatology cannot be discussed as a special topic, as a separate article of belief. It can be understood only in the total perspective of the Christian faith. What is characteristic of contemporary theological thought is precisely the recovery of the eschatological dimension of the Christian faith. All articles of faith have an eschatological connotation. There is no common *consensus* in the contemporary theology of "the Last Things." There is rather a sharp conflict of views and opinions. But there is also a new widening of the perspective.

Emil Brunner's contribution to the current discussion was both provocative and constructive. His theology is a theology of hope and expectation, as it befits one who stands in the Reformed tradition. His theology is inwardly oriented toward "the Last Events." Yet, at many points, his vision is limited by his general theological presuppositions. Indeed, his theology reflects his personal experience of faith—what he himself calls—*die gläubige Existenz*.

II

The mystery of the Last Things is grounded in the primary paradox of Creation. According to Brunner, the term Creation, in its Biblical use, does not denote the manner in which the world did actually come into existence, but only the sovereign Lordship of God. In the act of Creation God posits something totally other than Himself, "over against" Himself. Accordingly, the world of creatures has its own mode of existence—derivative, subordinate, dependent, and yet genuine and real, in its own kind. Brunner is quite formal

at this point. "A world which is not God exists alongside of Him." Thus, the very existence of the world implies a certain measure of self-imposed "limitation" on the side of God, His *kenosis*, which reaches its climax in the cross of Christ. God, as it were, spares room for the existence of something different. The world has been "called into existence" for a purpose, in order that it manifest the glory of God. The Word is the principle and the ultimate goal of Creation.

Indeed, the very fact of Creation constitutes the basic paradox of the Christian faith, to which all other mysteries of God can be traced back, or rather in which they are implied. Brunner, however, does not distinguish clearly, at this point, between the very "being" of God and His "will." Yet, the "being" of God simply cannot be "limited" in any sense. If there is a "limitation," it can refer only to His "will," insofar as another "will" has been "called into existence," a will which could not have existed at all. This basic "contingency" of Creation testifies to the absolute sovereignty of God. On the other hand, the ultimate climax of the creative *kenosis* will be reached only in "the Last Events." The sting of the paradox, of the *kenosis*, is not in the existence of the world, but in the possibility of Hell. Indeed, the World may be obedient to God, as well as it may be disobedient, and in its obedience it would serve God and manifest His glory. It will be not a "limitation," but an expansion of God's majesty. On the contrary, Hell means resistance and estrangement, pure and simple. However, even in the state of revolt and rebellion, the world still belongs to God. It can never escape His Judgment.

God is eternal. This is a negative definition. It simply means that the notion of time cannot be applied to His existence. Indeed, "time" is simply the mode of creaturely existence. Time is given by God. It is not an imperfect or deficient mode of being. There is nothing illusory about time. Temporality is real. Time is really moving on, irreversibly.

But it is not just a flux, as it is not a rotation. It is not just a series of indifferent "time-atoms" which could be conceived or postulated as infinite, without any end or limit. It is rather a teleological process, inwardly ordained toward a certain final goal. A *telos* is implied in the very design of Creation. Accordingly, what takes place in time is significant—significant and real for God Himself. History is not a shadow. Ultimately, history has a "metahistoric" goal. Brunner does not use this term, but he stresses strongly the inherent "finitude" of history. An infinite history, rolling on indefinitely, without destination or end, would have been an empty and meaningless history. The story is bound to have an end, a conclusion, a *katharsis*, a solution. The plot must be disclosed. History has to have an end, at which it is "fulfilled" or "consummated." It has been originally designed to be "fulfilled." At the end there will be no history any more. Time will be filled with eternity, as Brunner puts it. Of course, eternity means in this connection simply God. Time has meaning only against the background of eternity, that is—only in the context of the divine design.

Yet, history is not just a disclosure of that primordial and sovereign design. The theme of actual history, of the only real history we know about, is given by the existence of sin. Brunner dismisses the query about the origin of sin. He only stresses its "universality." Sin, in the biblical sense of the term, is not primarily an ethical category. According to Brunner, it only denotes the need for redemption. Two terms are intrinsically correlative. Now, sin is not a primary phenomenon, but a break, a deviation, a turning away from the beginning. Its essence is apostasy and rebellion. It is this aspect of sin that is emphasized in the biblical story of the Fall. Brunner refuses to regard the Fall as an actual event. He only insists that without the concept of the Fall the basic message of the New Testament, that is—the message of salvation would be absolutely incomprehensible. Yet, one should not inquire into the "when" and "how" of the Fall.

The essence of sin can be discerned only in the light of Christ, that is—in the light of redemption. Man, as he can be observed in history, always appears as sinner, unable not to sin. The man of history is always "man in revolt." Brunner is fully aware of the strength of evil—in the world and in the history of man. He commends the Kantian notion of radical evil. What he has to say about the Satanic sin, as different from man's sin, about the superpersonal Satanic power, is impressive and highly relevant for theological inquiry, as much as all that may inevitably offend and disturb the mind of modern man. But the major question remains still without answer. Has the Fall the character of an event? The logic of Brunner's own argument seems to compel us to regard it as event, as a link in the chain of events. Otherwise it would be just a symbol, a working hypothesis, indispensable for interpretative purposes, but unreal. Indeed, the end of history must be regarded, according to Brunner, as "an event," howsoever mysterious this event will be. "The beginning" also has the character of "event," as the first link in the chain. Moreover, redemption is obviously "an event" which can be exactly dated—indeed, the crucial event, determinative of all others. In this perspective it seems imperative to regard the Fall as event, in whatever manner it may be visualized or interpreted. In any case, redemption and Fall are intrinsically related to each other, in Brunner's own interpretation.

Brunner distinguishes clearly between the creatureliness as such and sin. Creatures come from God. Sin comes from an opposite source. Sinfulness is disclosed in events, in sinful acts and actions. Indeed, it is an abuse of power, an abuse of freedom, a perversion of that responsible freedom which has been bestowed upon man in the very act by which he was called into existence. Yet, before the abuse became a habit, it had to have been exercised for the first time. The revolt had to have been started. Such an assumption would be in line with the rest of Brunner's exposition. Otherwise

one lapses into some kind of metaphysical dualism which Brunner himself vigorously denounces. In any case, creatureliness and sinfulness cannot be equated or identified.

Indeed, Brunner is right in suggesting that we must start from the center, that is, with the glad tidings of redemption in Christ. But in Christ we contemplate not only our desperate "existential predicament" as miserable sinners, but, above all, the historical involvement of men in sin. We are moving in the world of events. Only for that reason are we justified in looking forward, to "the Last Events/'

The course of history has been radically challenged by God—at one crucial point. According to Brunner, since the coming of Christ, time itself has been charged, for believers, with a totally new quality—*eine sonst unbekannte Entscheidungsqualität* ["an otherwise unknown quality of decision"]. Ever since, believers are confronted with an ultimate alternative, confronted now—in this "historic time." The choice is radical—between heaven and hell. Any moment of history may become decisive—for those who are bound to make decisions, through Christ's challenge and revelation. In this sense, according to Brunner, "the earthly time is, for faith, charged with an eternity-tension"—*mit Ewigkeitsspannung geladen*. Men are now inescapably called to decisions, since God has manifested His own decision, in Christ, and in His Cross and Resurrection. Does it mean that "eternal decisions"—that is, decisions "for eternity"—must be made in this "historic time"? By faith—in Jesus Christ, the Mediator—one may, already now, "participate" in eternity. Since Christ, believers dwell already, as it were, in two different dimensions, both inside and outside of the "ordinary" time—*hoc Universum tempus, sive saeculum, in quo cedunt morientes succeduntque nascentes* [this universal time, or age, in which the dying give place to those being born. St. Augustine, *Civ. Dei*, XV.I]. Time has been, as it were, "polarized" by Christ's Advent. Thus, it seems, time is related now to eternity, that is to God, in a dual manner. On the one hand,

time is always intrinsically related to the eternal God, as its Creator: God gives time. On the other hand, time has been, in those last days, radically challenged by God's direct and immediate intervention, in the person of Jesus Christ. As Brunner says himself, "temporality, existence in time, takes on a new character through its relationship to this event, Jesus Christ, the *eph h' apax* of history, the once-for-all quality of His cross and Resurrection, and is newly fashioned in a paradoxical manner that is unintelligible to thinking guided by reason alone."²

We have reached the crucial point in Brunner's exposition. His interpretation of human destiny is strictly Christological and Christocentric. Only faith in Christ gives meaning to human existence. This is Brunner's strong point. But there is an ambiguous docetic accent in his Christology, and it affects grievously his understanding of history. Strangely enough, Brunner himself addresses the same charge to the traditional Christology of the Church, claiming that it never paid enough attention to the historic Jesus. It is a summary charge which we cannot analyze and "refute" just now. What is relevant for our purpose now is that Brunner's Christology is obviously much more docetic than that of the Catholic tradition. Brunner's attention to the historical Jesus is utterly ambiguous. According to Brunner, Christ is a historic personality only as man. When He "unveils Himself"—that is, when He discloses His Divinity to those who have the eye of faith—He is no more a historical personality at all. In fact, Christ's humanity, according to Brunner, is no more than "a disguise." The true self of Christ is divine. To faith Christ discards His disguise, His "incognito," to use Brunner's own phrase. "Where He discloses Himself, history disappears, and the Kingdom of God has begun. And when He unveils Himself, He is no longer an historical personality, but the Son of God, Who is from everlasting to everlasting."³ This is a startling language, indeed.

Actually, Christ's humanity is just a means to enter

history, or rather—to appear in history. God's relation to history, and to human reality, is, as it were, no more than tangential, even in the crucial mystery of Incarnation. Actually, Christ's humanity interests Brunner only as a medium of revelation, of divine self-disclosure. Indeed, according to Brunner, in Christ God has really found a firm footing in humanity. But this does not seem anything more than that God has now challenged man in his own human element, on his own human ground and level. In order to meet man, God had to descend—to man's own level. This may be understood in a strictly orthodox way. Indeed, this was the favorite thought of the ancient Fathers. But Brunner denies any real interpenetration of divine and human aspects in Christ's person. In fact, they are no more than "aspects." Two elements meet, but there is no real unity. Christ of faith is only divine, even if in a human disguise. His humanity is just a means to enter history, or rather—to appear in history. Is history just a moving screen on which divine "eternity" is to be projected? God had to assume a beggar's robe of man, for otherwise He would be unable to encounter man. There was no real "assumption" of human reality into the personal experience of the Incarnate. The role of Christ's humanity was purely instrumental, a disguise. Basically it is a sheer "Docetism," however much attention may be given to "historic Jesus." After all, "historic Jesus" does not belong, in this interpretation, to the realm of faith.

Real decisions are not made on the plane of history, says Brunner. "For that is the sphere in which men wear masks. For the sake of our "masquerade," that is, for the sake of our sinful mendacity, Christ also, if I may put it like this, has to wear a mask; this is His Incognito."⁴ Now, in the act of faith, man takes away his mask. Then, in response, Christ also discards His mask, His human disguise, and appears in His glory. Faith, according to Brunner, breaks down history. Faith itself is a kind of a "metahistoric" act, which transcends history, or even discards it. Indeed, Brunner

stresses the uniqueness of God's redemptive revelation in Christ. For man it only means that the challenge is radical and ultimate. Man is now given a unique opportunity, or occasion, to make his decision, to overcome his own limited humanity, and even his intrinsic temporality—by an act of faith which takes him beyond history, if only in hope and promise, till the final *kairos* has come. But is human history ultimately just a masquerade? According to Brunner's own emphatic statement, temporality as such is not sinful. Why, then, should divine revelation in Christ discard history? Why should historicity be an obstacle to God's self-revelation, an obstacle that must be radically removed?

In the last resort, the radical change in history—the New Age, released by Christ's Advent—seems to consist only in the new and unprecedented opportunity to take sides. God actually remains as hidden in history as He has been before, or, probably, even more than before, since the ultimate incommensurability of divine revelation with the human masquerade has been made self-evident and conspicuous. God could approach man only in disguise. The actual course of history has not been changed, either by God's intervention, or by man's option. Apart from the decision of faith, history is empty, and still sinful. The intimate texture of actual historic life has not been affected by the redemptive revelation. Nevertheless, a warning has been given: The Lord comes again. This time He is coming as Judge, not as Redeemer, although Judgment will actually accomplish and stabilize redemption.

By faith we can now discern an "eschatological tension" in the very course of history, although it would be idle and in vain to indulge in any kind of apocalyptic calculations. This tension seems to exist on the human level alone. The eschatological *interim* is the age of decisions—to be taken by men. God's decision has been already taken.

As a whole, Christian history, according to Brunner, was a sore failure, a history of decay and misunderstanding. This

is an old scheme, firmly established in Protestant historiography at least since Gottfried Arnold. The primitive Christian community, the *ecclesia*, was a genuine Messianic community, "the bearer of the new life of eternity and of the powers of the divine world," as Brunner puts it. But this primitive *ecclesia* did not survive, at least as an historic entity, as an historic factor. Brunner acknowledges partial and provisional "advents" of the Kingdom of God in the course of history. But all these "advents" are sporadic. Where faith is, there is *ecclesia* or Kingdom. But it is hidden, in the continuing "masquerade" of history. Ultimately, the ongoing history is a kind of testing ground, on which men are challenged and their responses are tried and tested. But does the "saving history" still continue? Is God still active in history, after the First Advent—or is history now left, after the great intervention of Christ, to man alone, with that eschatological provision that finally Christ comes again?

Now, history is obviously but a provisional and passing stage in the destiny of man. Man is called to "eternity," not to "history." This is why "history" must come to its close, to its end. Yet, indeed, history is also a stage of growth—the wheat and the tares are growing together, and their ultimate discrimination is delayed—till the day of harvest. The tares are growing indeed, rapidly and wildly. But the wheat is growing also. Otherwise there would be no chance for any harvest, except for that of tares. Indeed, history matures not only for judgment, but also for consummation. Moreover, Christ is still active in history. Brunner disregards, or ignores, that component of Christian history. Christian history is, as it were, "atomized," in his vision. It is just a series of existential acts, performed by men, and, strangely enough, only negative acts, the acts of rebellion and resistance, seem to be integrated and solidarized. But, in fact, *ecclesia* is not just an aggregate of sporadic acts, but a "body," the body of Christ. Christ is present in the *ecclesia* not only as an object of faith and recognition, but as her Head. He is

actually reigning and ruling. This secures the Church's continuity and identity through the ages. In Brunner's conception Christ seems to be outside history, or above it. He did come once, in the past. He is coming again, in the future. Is He really present now, in the present, except through the memory of the past and the hope of the future, and indeed in the "metahistoric" acts of faith?

Creation, according to Brunner, has its own mode of existence. But it is no more than a "medium" of divine revelation. It must be, as it were, transparent for divine light and glory. And this strangely reminds us of the Platonizing gnosis of Origen and his various followers. The whole story is reduced to the dialectics of eternal and temporal. Brunner's own term is "parabolic."

III

The notion of "the end"—of an ultimate end—is a paradoxical notion. An "end" both belongs to the chain or series, and breaks it. It is both "an event" and "the end of all events." It belongs to the dimension of history, and yet it dismisses the whole dimension. The notion of "the beginning"—first and radical—is also a paradoxical notion. As St. Basil has said once, "the beginning of time is not yet time, but precisely the beginning of it" (Hexaem. 1.6). It is both an "instant" and more than that.

Of the future we can speak but in images and parables. This was the language of the Scripture. This imagery cannot be adequately deciphered now, and should not be taken literally. But in no sense should it be simply and bluntly "demythologized." Brunner is formal at this point. The expected *Parousia* of Christ must be regarded as "an event." The character of this event is unimaginable. Better symbols or images can be hardly found than those used in the Bible. "Whatever the form of this event may be, the whole point

lies in the fact that it will happen."⁵ The Christian *kerygma* is decisive at this point: "the ultimate redemptive synthesis has the character of an event." In other words, the *Parousia* belongs to the chain of historic "happenings," which it is expected to conclude and to close. "A Christian faith without expectation of the *Parousia* is like a ladder which leads nowhere but ends in the void." At one point, in any case, we can go beyond images: it is Christ that is coming. The *Parousia* is a "return," as much as it is an ultimate novelty. "The Last Events" are centered around the person of Christ.

The end will come "suddenly." And yet it is, in a certain sense, prepared inside of history. As Brunner says, "the history of man discloses radically apocalyptic traits." At this point he indulges in metaphysical speculations. "The swing of the pendulum becomes ever faster." This acceleration of the *tempo* of human life may reach the point at which it can go no further. History may simply explode suddenly. On the other hand, and on the deeper level, disharmonies of human existence are steadily increasing: there is "an ever-widening split in the human consciousness." Of course, these suggestions have no more than a subsidiary or hypothetical value. Brunner tries to commend the paradoxical concept of the end to the modern mind. But they are also characteristic of his own vision of human reality. History is ever ready to explode, it is vexed and overburdened with unresolved tensions. Some years ago a Russian religious philosopher, Vladimir Th. Ern, suggested that human history was a kind of "catastrophical progress," a steady progression toward an end. Yet the end was to come from above, in a *Parousia*. Accordingly, it was to be more than just a "catastrophe," or an immanent or internal "judgment"—a disclosure of inherent contradictions or tensions. It was to be an absolute judgment, the Judgment of God.

Now, what is Judgment? It is no less "an event" than the *Parousia*. It is an ultimate encounter between the sinful humanity and the Holy God. First of all, it will be an ultimate

disclosure or manifestation of the true state of every man and of the whole mankind. Nothing will be left hidden. Thus, Judgment will terminate that state of confusion and ambiguity, of inconclusiveness, as Brunner puts it, which has been characteristic of the whole historic stage of human destiny. This implies an ultimate and final "discrimination"—in the light of Christ. It will be an ultimate and final challenge. The will of God must be finally done. The will of God must be ultimately enforced. Otherwise, in the phrase of Brunner, "all talk of responsibility is idle chatter." Indeed, man is granted freedom, but it is not a freedom of indifference. Man's freedom is essentially a responsive freedom—a freedom to accept God's will. "Pure freedom" can be professed only by atheists. "To man is entrusted, of man is expected, merely the echo, the subsequent completion, of a decision which God has already made about him and for him."⁶ There is but one fair option for man—to obey; there is no real dilemma. Man's purpose and goal are fixed by God.

All this is perfectly true. Yet, at this Very point, the vexing question arises. Will actually all men accept, at the Last Judgment, God's will? Is there any room for radical and irreversible resistance? Can man's revolt continue beyond Judgment? Can any creaturely being, endowed with freedom, persist in estrangement from God, which has been persistently practised before, that is—to pursue its own will? Can such a being still "exist"—in the state of revolt and opposition, against the saving will of God, outside God's saving purpose? Is it possible for man to persevere in rebellion, in spite of the call and challenge of God? Is the Scriptural picture of separation—between the sheep and the goats—the last word about man's ultimate destiny? What is the ultimate status of creaturely "freedom"? What does it mean that finally the will of God must and will prevail? These are queer and searching questions. But they cannot be avoided. They are not dictated only by speculative curiosity. They are "existen-

tial" questions. Indeed, the Last Judgment is an awful mystery, which cannot, and should not, be rationalized, which passes all knowledge and understanding. Yet, it is a mystery of our own existence, which we cannot escape, even if we fail to comprehend or understand it intellectually.

Brunner emphatically dismisses the "terrible theologoumenon" of double predestination, as incompatible with the mind of the Bible. There is no eternal discrimination in God's creative design. God calls all men to salvation, and for that purpose He calls them into existence. Salvation is the only purpose of God. But the crucial paradox is not yet resolved. The crucial problem is, whether this only purpose of God will be actually accomplished, in all its fullness and comprehensiveness, as it is admitted and postulated in the theory of universal salvation, for which one may allege Scriptural evidence. Brunner rejects the doctrine of the *Apokatastasis*, as a "dangerous heresy." It is wrong as a doctrine. It implies a wrong security for men—all ways lead ultimately to the same end, there is no real tension, no real danger. And yet, Brunner admits that the doctrine of the forgiving grace, and of the justification by faith, leads logically to the concept of an universal redemption. Can the will of the omnipotent God be really resisted or, as it were, overruled by the obstinacy of feeble creatures? The paradox can be solved only dialectically—in faith. One cannot know God theoretically. One has to trust His love.

It is characteristic that Brunner discusses the whole problem exclusively in the perspective of the divine will. For that reason he misses the very point of the paradox. He simply ignores the human aspect of the problem. Indeed, "eternal damnation" is not inflicted by "the angry God." God is not the author of Hell. "Damnation" is a self-inflicted penalty, the consequence and the implication of the rebellious opposition to God and to His will. Brunner admits that there is a real possibility of damnation and perdition. It is dangerous and erroneous to ignore that real possibility.

But one should hope that it will never be realized. Now, hope itself must be realistic and sober. We are facing the alternative: either, at the Last Judgment, unbelievers and unrepentant sinners are finally moved by the divine challenge, and are "freely" converted—this was the hypothesis of St. Gregory of Nyssa; or their obstinacy is simply overruled by the divine Omnipotence and they are saved by the constraint of the divine mercy and will—without their own free and conscious assent. The second solution implies contradiction, unless we understand "salvation" in a forensic and formalistic manner. Indeed, criminals may be exonerated in the court of justice, even if they did not repent and persevere in their perversion. They only escape punishment. But we cannot interpret the Last Judgment in this manner. In any case, "salvation" involves conversion, involves an act of faith. It cannot be imposed on anyone. Is the first solution more convincing? Of course, the possibility of a late "conversion"—in "the eleventh hour," or even after—cannot be theoretically ruled out, and the impact of the divine love *is* infinite. But this chance or possibility of conversion, before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, sitting in glory, cannot be discussed *in abstracto*, as a general case. After all, the question of salvation, as also the decision of faith, is a personal problem, which can be put and faced only in the context of concrete and individual existence. Persons are saved, or perish. And each personal case must be studied individually. The main weakness of Brunner's scheme is in that he always speaks in general terms. He always speaks of the human condition and never of living persons.

The problem of man is for Brunner essentially the problem of sinful condition. He is afraid of all "ontic" categories. Indeed, man is sinner, but he is, first of all, man. It is true, again, that the true stature of genuine manhood has been exhibited only in Christ, who was more than man, and not a man. But in Christ we are given not only forgiveness, but also the power to be, or to become, children of God, that

is—to be what we are designed to be. Of course, Brunner admits that believers can be in communion with God even now, in this present life. But then comes death. Does faith, or—actually—one's being *en Christo*, make any difference at this point? Is the communion with Christ, once established by faith (and, indeed, in sacraments), broken by death? Is it true that human life is "a being unto death." Physical death is the limit of physical life. But Brunner speaks of the death of human persons, of the "I." He claims that it is a mystery, an impenetrable mystery, of which rational man cannot know anything at all. But, in fact, the concept of this "personal death" is no more than a metaphysical assumption, derived from certain philosophical presuppositions, and in no way a *datum* of any actual or possible experience, including the experience of faith. "Death" of a person is only in the estrangement from God, but even in this case it does not mean annihilation. In a sense, death means a disintegration of human personality, because man is not designed to be immaterial. The bodily death reduces the integrity of the human person. Man dies, and yet survives—in the expectation of the general end. The ancient doctrine of the Communion of Saints points to the victory of Christ: In Him, through faith (and sacraments), even the dead are alive, and share—in anticipation, but really—the everlasting life. *Communio Sanctorum* is an important eschatological topic. Brunner simply ignores it altogether—surely not by accident but quite consistently. He speaks of the condition of death, not of personal cases. The concept of an immortal soul may be a Platonic accretion, but the notion of an "indestructible person" is an integral part of the Gospel. Indeed, only in this case there is room for a general or universal Judgment, at which all historic persons, of all ages and of all nations, are to appear—not as a confused mass of frail and unprofitable sinners, but as a congregation of responsive and responsible persons, each in his distinctive character, congenital and acquired. Death is a catastrophe. But persons survive, and

those *in Christ* are still alive—even in the state of death. The faithful not only hope for life to come, but are already alive, although all are waiting for Resurrection. Brunner, of course, is fully aware of this. In his own phrase, those who believe “will not die into nothingness but into Christ/* Does it mean that those who do not believe “die into nothingness”? And what is “nothingness”—“the outer darkness” (which is probably the case) or actual “nonbeing”?

It is also true that full integrity of personal existence, distorted and reduced by death, will be restored in the general Resurrection. Brunner emphasizes the personal character of the Resurrection. “The New Testament faith knows of no other sort of eternal life except that of the individual persons.”⁷ The flesh will not rise. But some kind of corporeality is implied in the Resurrection. All will rise, because Christ is risen. Now, Resurrection is at once a Resurrection into life—in Christ, and a Resurrection—to Judgment. Brunner discusses the general Resurrection in the context of faith, forgiveness, and life. But what is the status of those who did not believe, who did not ask for forgiveness, and never knew of the redemptive love of Christ, or probably have obstinately denounced and rejected it as a myth, as a fraud, as a deceit, or as an offense for the autonomous personality?

And this brings us back again to the paradox of the Judgment. Strangely enough, at this point Brunner speaks more as a philosopher than as a theologian, precisely because he tries to avoid metaphysical inquiry, and all problems which have been suppressed reappear in disguise. Brunner puts the question in this way: how can we reconcile divine Omnipotence and human freedom, or—on a deeper level—divine holiness (or justice) and divine mercy and love. It is a strictly metaphysical problem, even if it is discussed on the scriptural basis. The actual theological problem is, on the other hand: what is the existential status of unbelievers—in the sight of God, and in the perspective of the human

destiny? The actual problem is existential—the status and destiny of individual persons. For Brunner the problem is obscured by his initial choice—his sweeping bracketing together of all men as sinners, without any real ontic or existential discrimination between the righteous and the unrighteous. Indeed, all are under the Judgment, but, obviously, not in the same sense. Brunner himself distinguishes between those who fail being tempted, and those who choose to tempt others and to seduce. He knows of deliberate perversion. But he does not ask, how an individual human person may be affected, in his inner and intimate structure, by deliberate and obstinate perversion, apostasy and “love for evil.” There is a real difference between weakness and wickedness, between frailty and godlessness. Can all sins be forgiven, even the non-avowed and non-repentent? Is not forgiveness received only in humility and in faith? In other words, is “condemnation” just a “penalty,” in the forensic sense, or a kind of negative “reward”? Or is it simply a manifestation of what is hidden—or rather quite open and conspicuous—in those who have chosen, by an abuse of “freedom,” that wide path which leads into Gehenna.

There is no chapter on Hell in any of Brunner’s books. But Hell is not just a “mythical” figure of speech. Nor is it just a dark prospect, which—one wants to hope—may never be realized. *Horribile dictu*—it is a reality, to which many human beings are even now committed, by their own will, or at least—by their own choice and decision, which may mean, in the last resort, bondage, but is usually mistaken for freedom. “Hell” is an internal state, not a “place.” It is a state of personal disintegration, which is mistaken for self-assertion—with certain reason, since this disintegration is grounded in pride. It is a state of self-confinement, of isolation and alienation, of proud solitude. The state of sin itself is “hellish,” although it may be, by an illusion of selfish imagination, mistaken for “Paradise.” For that reason sinners chose “sin,” the proud attitude, the Promethean attitude. One may make of “Hell” an ideal, and pursue it—deliberately

and persistently. "*Là où je suis, là est ma volonté libre et là où est ma volonté libre, l'enfer absolu et éternel est en puissance.*" (Marcel Jouhandeau, *Algèbre des valeurs morales*). Indeed, ultimately, it is but an illusion, an aberration, a violence, and a mistake. But the sting of sin is precisely in the denial of the divinely instituted reality, in the attempt to establish another order or regime, which is, in contrast with the true divine order, a radical disorder, but to which one may give, in selfish exaltation, ultimate preference. Now, sin has been destroyed and abrogated—it can not be said that "sin" has been redeemed, only persons may be redeemed. But it is not enough to acknowledge, by faith, the deed of the divine redemption—one has to be born anew. The whole personality must be cleansed and healed. Forgiveness must be accepted and assessed in freedom. It cannot be imputed—apart from an act of faith and gratitude, an act of love. Paradoxically, nobody can be saved by love divine alone, unless it is responded to by grateful love of human persons. Indeed, there is always an abstract possibility of "repentance" and "conversion" in the course of this earthly or historic life. Can we admit that this possibility continues after death? Brunner will hardly accept the idea of a "Purgatory." But even in the concept of Purgatory no chance of radical conversion is implied. Purgatory includes but believers, those of good intentions, pledged to Christ, but deficient in growth and achievement. Human personality is made and shaped in this life—at least, it is oriented in this life. The difficulty of universal salvation is not on the divine side—indeed, God wants every man "to be saved," not so much, probably, in order that His will should be accomplished and His Holiness secured, as in order that man's existence may be complete and blessed. Yet, insuperable difficulties may be erected on the creaturely side. After all, is "ultimate resistance" a greater paradox, and a greater offense, than any resistance or revolt, which actually did pervert the whole order of Creation, did handicap the deed of redemption? Only

when we commit ourselves to a Docetic view of history and deny the possibility of ultimate decisions in history, in this life, under the pretext that it is temporal, can we evade the paradox of ultimate resistance.

St. Gregory of Nyssa anticipated a kind of universal conversion of souls in the afterlife, when the Truth of God will be revealed and manifested with compelling evidence. Just at that point the limitation of the Hellenic mind is obvious. Evidence seemed to it to be the decisive motive for the will, as if "sin" were merely ignorance. The Hellenic mind had to pass through a long and hard experience of asceticism, of ascetic self-examination and self-control, in order to overcome this intellectualistic naïveté and illusion and discover a dark abyss in the fallen soul. Only in St. Maximus the Confessor, after some centuries of ascetic preparation, do we find a new and deepened interpretation of the *Apokatastasis*. Indeed, the order of creation will be fully restored in the last days. But the dead souls will still be insensitive to the very revelation of Light. The Light Divine will shine to all, but those who once have chosen darkness will be still unwilling and unable to enjoy the eternal bliss. They will still cling to the nocturnal darkness of selfishness. They will be unable precisely to enjoy. They will stay "outside"—because union with God, which is the essence of salvation, presupposes and requires the determination of will. Human will is irrational and its motives cannot be rationalized. Even "evidence" may fail to impress and move it.

Eschatology is a realm of antinomies. These antinomies are rooted and grounded in the basic mystery of Creation. How can anything else exist alongside of God, if God is the plenitude of Being? One has attempted to solve the paradox, or rather to escape it, by alleging the motives of Creation, sometimes to such an extent and in such a manner as to compromise the absoluteness and sovereignty of God. Yet, God creates in perfect freedom, *ex mera liberalitate*, that is, without any "sufficient reasons." Creation is a free gift of

unfathomable love. Moreover, man in Creation is granted this mysterious and enigmatic authority of free decision, in which the most enigmatic is not the possibility of failure or resistance, but the very possibility of assent. Is not the will of God of such a dimension that it should be simply obeyed—without any real, that is, free and responsible, assent? The mystery is in the reality of creaturely freedom. Why should it be wanted in the world created and ruled by God, by His infinite wisdom and love? In order to be real, human response must be more than a mere resonance. It must be a personal act, an inward commitment. In any case, the shape of human life—and now we may probably add, the shape and destiny of the cosmos—depends upon the synergism or conflict of the two wills, divine and creaturely. Many things are happening which God abhors—in the world which is His work and His subject. Strangely enough, God respects human freedom, as St. Irenaeus once said, although, in fact, the most conspicuous manifestation of this freedom was revolt and disorder. Are we entitled to expect that finally human disobedience will be disregarded and “dis-respected” by God, and His Holy Will shall be enforced, regardless of any assent? Or it would make a dreadful “masquerade” of human history? What is the meaning of this dreadful story of sin, perversion, and rebellion, if finally everything will be smoothed down and reconciled by the exercise of divine Omnipotence?

Indeed, the existence of Hell, that is, of radical opposition, implies, as it were, some partial “unsuccess” of the creative design. Yet, it was more than just a design, a plan, a pattern. It was the calling to existence, or even “to being,” of living persons. One speaks sometimes of the “divine risk”—*le risque divin*, says Jean Guitton. It is probably a better word than *kenosis*. Indeed, it is a mystery, which cannot be rationalized—it is the primordial mystery of creaturely existence.

Brunner takes the possibility of Hell quite seriously.

There is no security of "universal salvation/" although this is, abstractly speaking, still possible—for the omnipotent God of Love. But Brunner still hopes that there will be no Hell. The trouble is that there is Hell already. Its existence does not depend upon divine decision. God never sends anyone to Hell. Hell is made by creatures themselves. It is human creation, outside, as it were, of "the order of creation."

The Last Judgment remains a mystery.

NOTES

Notes and References

CREATION AND CREATUREHOOD

¹St. Maximimus the Confessor in *Lib. de div. nomin. schol.*, in V. 8, PG iv, 336.

²This relationship is vividly elucidated by Augustine, *De Genesi ad lit.* V. 5, PL xxxiv, 325: factae itaque creaturae motibus coeperunt currere tempora: unde ante creaturum frustra tempora requiruntur, quasi possint inveniri ante tempora tempora... potius ergo tempora à creatura, quam creatura cœpit à tempore; utrumque autem ex Deo; cf. *de Genesi c. manich.* I. 2 PL xxiv, 174, 175; *de Civ. Dei*, XI, t, PL xli, 321; quis non videat quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid àliqua mutatione mutaret; c 322: procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore; *Confess.* XI, 13, PL xxxii, 815-816 et passim. Cf. P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde*, II (Paris, 1914), pp. 462 ff.

³St. Basil the Great in *Hexam.* h. 1, η. 6, PG xxix, c. 16.

⁴St. Gregory of Nyssa *Or. eath. m.*, c. 6, PG xlv, c. 28; cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* I, 3, PG xciv, 796: "for things whose being originated with a change [ἀπὸ τροπῆς] are definitely subject to change, whether it be by corruption or by voluntary alteration."

⁵St. Gregory of Nyssa *De opif. hom.* c. XVI, PG xlv, 184; cf. *Or. cath.* T., c 21, PG xlv, c 57: ["The very transition from nonentity to existence is a change, non-existence being changed by the Divine power in being"] (Srawley's translation). Since the origin of man comes about "through change," he necessarily has a changeable nature.

⁶St. John Damascene *De fide orth.* II, 1, PG xciv, c 864. Οὐδὲ γὰρ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἡμέραις καὶ ἡμέραις καὶ ἡμέραις καὶ ἡμέραις ἀριθμῆσεται, εἶσαι δὲ μᾶλλον μίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἀνέσπερος. The whole passage is of interest: Λέγεται πάλιν αἰὼν, οὐ χρόνος, οὐδὲ χρόνου τι μέρος, ἡλίου φορὰ καὶ δρόμῳ μερουμένον, ἡγουν δι* ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν συνιστάμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπαρεκτινόμενον τοῖς αἰδίοις συνιστάμενον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπαρακτεινόμενον τοῖς αἰδίοις, οἷόν τι χρονικὸν κίνημα, και διάστημα.

⁷Cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 29, *PG* xxxi, 89-81: καὶ ἤρκαται, οὐ πάυτεται.

⁸St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XII, c. xv, *PL* XLI, 363-5.

⁹The Works of Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, "*Discourses and Speeches*," vol. III (Moscow, 1877), p. 436, "Address on the Occasion of the Recovery of the Relics of Patriarch Alexey," 1830.

¹⁰St. Augustine, *Conjessiones*, XI, 4, *PL* xxxii, c 812.

¹¹St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 38, *In Theoph.*, n. 7, *PG* xxxvi, c 317.

¹²St. John Damascene, *De fide Orth.* I, 13, *PG* xcvi, c 583 [Russian, I, 183].

¹³St. Augustine, *De Genest ad lit.*, I, imp. c 2: non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihilo. . . quapropter creaturam universam neque substantialem Deo, neque coaeternam fas est dicere, aut credere. *PL* xxxiv, c 221.

¹⁴St. Macarius of Egypt, *Horn.* XLIX, c. 4, *PG* xxxiv, c 816.

¹⁵St. Athanasius, *C. arian.* *Or.* 1, n. 20, *PG* xxvi, c 53.

¹⁶St. Athanasius, *C. arian.* *Or.* 2, n. 2, *P G* xxvi, c. 152.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, *C. arian.* *Or.* I, n. 21, c 56.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, *C. arian.* *Or.* 3, nff 60ss., c 448 squ.

¹⁹St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus*, XV, *PG* LXXV, c 276: τὸ γέννημα . . . ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας του γεννῶντος πρόεισι φυσικῶς;—(τὸ κτίσμα) . . . ἔξωθεν ἔστιν ὡς ἀλλότριον; ass. xviii, c. 313: το μὲν ποιεῖν ἐνεργείας ἐστί, φύσεως δὲ το γενναν; φύσις δὲ καὶ ἐνεργεία οὐ ταυτόν.

²⁰St. John Damascene *De fide orth.* I, 8, *PG* xciv, c. 812-813; cf. St. Athanasius *C. arian. or.* 2, n. 2, *PG* xxvi. He rebukes the Arians for not recognizing that καρπογόνοσ ἐστίν αὐτῆ ἡ Θεία οὐσία. The same expression is to be found in St. Cyril's writings.

²¹St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 45 in *S. Pascha*, n. 28, *PG* xxxvi, 661.

²²*Ibid.*, n. 8, col. 632.

²³St. Augustine, *De Genest ad lit.*, I, 5, *PL* xxxiv, c. 250.

²⁴St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* XL in *S. Baptism*, *PG* xxxvi, 424.

²⁵St. John Damascene, *C. Manich* n. 14, *PG* xciv, c 1597.

²⁶St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima et resurr.*, *PG* XLVI, 93 B.

²⁷. Waddingi, IV, Paris, 1891. This whole discourse of Duns Scotus

is notable for its great clarity and profundity. Duns Scoti question disputatae de rerum principio, quaestio IV, articulus I, n. 3 and 4,—*Opera omnia*, editio nova iuxta editionem.

²⁸Origen, *De princ.* III, 5, 3, PG 327, English translation of G. W. Butterworth.

²⁹V. V. Bolotov, *Origen's Doctrine of the Holy Trinity*, St. Petersburg, 1879, p. 203.

³⁰Origen, *De princ.* I, 2, 10, PG 138-9.

³¹*Ibid.*, *Nota ex Methodio Ol. apud Phot. Bibl. cod.*, 235, sub *linea*, n. (40).

³²St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XII, 15, PL XLI, c. 36.

³³St. Methodius, *De creatis*, apud *Phot. Bibl. col.* 235, PG ciii, c 1141.

³⁴St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 45, n. 5, PG xxxvi, c 629: ἐννοεῖ; *Carm.* 4, *theol.* IV, *De mundo*, c. 67-68, PG xxxv II, 421.

³⁵St. Athanasius, *C. arian. Or.* 2, n. 2, PG xxvi, c 152—δεύτερόν ἐστι το δημιουργεῖν του γεννᾶν τον Θεόν,—πολλῶ πρότερον,—τὸ ὑπερ-κείμενον της βουλήσεως.

³⁶Cf. V. V. Bolotov, "On the Filioque Question, III: The significance of the sequence of the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity according to the view of the Eastern Fathers," *Christian Readings* ([Khristskoe Chtenie] Russian), 1913, Sept., pp. 1046-1059.

³⁷St. Augustine, *De div. quaest.* qu. 28, PL XLVI, c 18: nihil autem majus est voluntatis Dei; non ergo ejus causa quaerenda est.

³⁸St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Carm. theol.* IV—*De mundo*, v. 67-68, PG xxxvii, 421: κόσμοι τύπους ...

³⁹St. Athanasius, *Ad Serap. Ep.* III, n. 5, PG xxvi, c. 632.

⁴⁰St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* I, 2, PG xciv, c 865; St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 45 in *S. Pascha*, n. 5, PG xxxvi, c 629.

⁴¹St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.*, I, 9, PG xciv, c. 837.

⁴²St. John Damascene, *De imagin.*, I, 10, PG xciv, c. 1240-1241.

⁴³*Ibid.*, c. 1340: "The second aspect of the image is the thought of God on the subject of that which He will create, that is, His pre-eternal counsel, which always remains equal to itself; for the Divinity remains unchangeable and His counsel is without beginning" [δεύτερος τρόπος εικόνας, ἢ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ των ὑπ' αὐτου επομένων εννοια, τοὔτέστιν ἢ προαιώνιος αὐτου βούλησις, ἢ αὐτῶ σαύτως ἔχουσα].

⁴⁴Dionysius the Areopagite, *De divin. nomin.* V, π. 8, PG III, c. 824; cf. c. VII, π. 2, c. 868-869.

⁴⁵St. Maximus the Confessor, *Scholia in liberus de divine nominitus*

in cap. V 5,—PG iv, c 31; cfr. n. 7—Cf. n. 7, c. 324A: "In the cause of all things, everything is preconstituted [προϋρέστηκεν], as in an idea or prototype"; n. 8, c. 329A-B: *cm ποιησιν αὐτοτελή ἀϊδιον του ἀϊδίου Θεοῦ τὴν ἰδέαν, ἦτοι το παράδειγμα φησί.* In contrast to Plato, who separated the ideas of God, Dionysius speaks of "images" and "logoi" in God. Cf. A. Brilliantov, *The Influence of Eastern Theology on Western Theology in the Works of Eriugene* (St. Petersburg, 1898), pp. 157 ff., 192 ff.

⁴⁶St. Augustine, *De Genest ad Lt.*, I, V, c. 18, *PL* xxxiv, c. 334; cf. *De Trin.*, I, IX, c. 6 vel s. n. 9, *PL* XLII, c. 965: *alia notitia rei in ipsa se, alia in ipsa aeterna veritate*; cf. *ibid.*, I, VIII, c. 4 vel s. n. 7, c. 951-952. See also *De div. qu.*, 83, qu. 46, n. 2., *PL* XL, c. 30: *ideae igitur latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere... Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quia in divina mente continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriuntur, neque intereant, secundum cas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.*

⁴⁷St. Maximus the Confessor, *Lib. de div. nom. s hol.*, *mi*, 3, *PG* iv, 352: *τὰ γὰρ ὄντα... εἰκόνες εἰσὶ καὶ ὁμοιώματα τῶν δείων ἰδεῶν... ὡν εἰκόνες τὰ τῆς κτίσεως ἀποτελέσματα.*

⁴⁸St. Maximus the Confessor, *Lib. de div. nom. schol.*, V, 5, *PG* iv, 317; *ὄν μετέχουσα/.*

⁴⁹St. Maximus the Confessor, *De charit.*, c. iv, c. 4, *PG* xc, c. 1148: *τὴν ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Δημιουργὸς τῶν ὄντων προϋπάρχουσαν γνώσιν, ὅτε ἐβουλήθη, οὐσίωσε καὶ προεβάλετο;* *Lib. de div. nom. schol.*; IV, 14, *PG*, iv, 265. One must also take into consideration different aspects of the image as described by St. John Damascene, *De imag.* II, 19, *PG* xciv, 1340-1341: The first aspect of the image is natural, *φυσικός*—the Son. The second image is the pre-eternal counsel—*ἐν τῷ Θεῷ*. The third aspect is man, who is an image by imitation:—*ὁ κατὰ μίμησιν ὑπὸ Θεοῦ γενόμενος*—since one who is created cannot have the same nature as He who is not created. In this passage St. John Damascene perceives the likeness of man to God in the fact that the soul of every man consists of three parts; cf. *Fragm.*, *PG* xcv, 574. By indicating difference of natures in God and in man, the divine nature of the eternal ideas of His counsel is emphasized. The notion of "image" received its final definition only during the Iconoclastic period, especially in the writings of St. Theodore the Studite. He connects the possibility of having icons with the creation of man according to the image of God. "The fact that man is created according to the image and likeness of God indicates that making icons is to some extent a divine occupation." (St. Theod. Stud. *Antirrh.* III, c. 2, 5, *PG* xciv. St. Theodore follows here the ideas of *Areopagitica*. In this case it is enough to mention that St. Theodore underscores the indissoluble connection between the "image" and the "proto-image," but makes a sharp distinction between them in essence of nature. Cf. *Antirrh.* III, c 3, 10, col. 424: "The one is not separate from the other, except in respect to the distinction of essences" [*τῆς οὐσίας διάφορον*]. Cf. K.

Schwartzlose, *Der Bilderstreit* (Gotha, 1890), pp. 174 ff.; the Rev. N. Grossou, *St. Theodore the Stylite, His Times, His Life, His Works* (Kiev, 1908), Russian, pp. 198 ff.; 180 ff.; A. P. Dobroklonsky, *St. Theodore the Studite*, Vol. I (Odessa, 1901 [1914]), Russian.

⁵⁰A penetrating and thorough investigation of the problem of ideas is given by a noted Roman Catholic theologian, F. A. Staudenmaier, *Die Philosophie des Christentums*, Bd. I (the only published), "Die Lehre von der Idee" (Gieszen, 1840), and also in his monumental work *Die Christliche Dogmatik*, Bd. III, Freiburg im Breisgau 1848 (recently reprinted, 1967).

⁵¹*Discourses and Speeches of a Member of the Holy Synod, Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow*, part II, Moscow, 1844, p. 87: "Address on the Occasion of the Recovery of the Relics of Patriarch Alexey." (Russian)

⁵²St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.*, I, 4, PG xciv, 800.

⁵³*Ibid.*, I, 9, c 836.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, I, 4, c 797.

⁵⁵For a survey of this question see I. V. Popov, *The Personality and Teachings of the Blessed Augustine*, Vol. I, part 2 (Sergiev Posad, 1916, and *Lichnos' i Uchenie Blazhennago Avgustina*), pp. 330-370 ff. (Russian)

⁵⁶In the words of Athenagoras, *Legat.* c. 10, PG vi, c. 908: ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. Cf. Popov, pp. 339-41; Bolotov, pp. 41 ff.; A Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du II^e siècle de notre ère* (Paris, 1912). On Origen, see Bolotov, pp. 191 ff. From the formal aspect, the distinction between "essence" and "energies" goes back to Philo and Plotinus. Nevertheless, in their view God receives his own character, even for Himself, only through His inner and necessary self-revelation in the world of ideas, and this "cosmological sphere" in God they named "Word" or "Mind." For a long time the cosmological concepts of Philo and Plotinus retarded the speculative formulation of the Trinitarian *mystery*. In fact cosmological concepts have no relation to the mystery of God and Trinity. If Cosmological concepts must be discarded, then another problem appears, that of the relationship of God to the world, indeed of a *free* relationship. The problem is relationship in the conception of the "pre-eternal counsel of God." On Philo see M. D. Muretov, *The Philosophy of Philo of Alexandria in its Relation to the Doctrine of St. John the Theologian on the Logos*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1885); N. N. Gloubokovsky, *St. Paul the Apostle's Preaching of the Glad Tidings in its Origin and Essence*, Vol. II (St. Petersburg, 1910), pp. 23-425; V. Ivanitzky, *Philo of Alexandria* (Kiev, 1911); P. J. Lebreton, *Les origines du dogme de la Trinité* (Paris, 1924), pp. 166-239, 570-581, 590-598; cf. excursus A, "On the **Energies**," pp. 503-506. Cf. also F. Dölger, "Sphragis," *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Alterthums*, Bd. V, Hf. 3-4 (1911), pp. 65-69.

⁵⁷St. Basil the Great, *C. Eun.*, I, II, 32, PG xxix, 648; cf. St. Athanasius, *De decret.*, n. II, PG xxv, c 441 : "God is in all by His goodness and

power, and He is outside of all in His own nature" [κατὰ τὴν ἴδιαν φύσιν].

⁵⁸St. Basil the Great, *Ad Amphil.*, PG xxxii, 869, A-B.

⁵⁹St. Basil the Great, *C. Eun.*, I, I, n. 14, PG xxix, 544-5; cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 28, 3, PG xxxvi, 29; *Or.* 29, col. 88B.

⁶⁰St. Gregory Nazianzos, *Or.* 38, in *Theoph.*, n. 7, PG xxxvi, 317.

⁶¹St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Cant. cant.* h. xi, PG xlix, 1013 B; *In Phalm.* II, 14, PG xlv, 585; cf. V. Nesmelov, *The Dogmatic System of St. Gregory of Nyssa* (Kazan, 1887), pp. 123 ff.; Popov, pp. 344-49.

⁶²St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Quod non sint tres dii*, PG xlv, 121B: "We have come to know that the essence of God has no name and it is inexpressible, and we assert that any name, whether it has come to be known through human nature or whether it was handed to us through the Scriptures, is an interpretation of something to be understood of the nature of God, but that it does not contain in itself the meaning of His nature itself... On the contrary, no matter what name we give to the very essence of God, this predicate shows something that has relation to the essence" [τὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτήν]. Cf. *C. Eunom.* II, PG xlv, c. 524-5; *De beatitud.*, *Or.* 6, PG xlv, 1268: "The entity of God in itself, in its substance, is above any thought that can comprehend it, being inaccessible to ingenious conjectures, and does not even come close to them. But being such by nature, He who is above all nature and who is unseen and indescribable, can be seen and known in other respects. But no knowledge will be a knowledge of the essence"; *In Ecclesiasten*, h. VII, PG xlv, 732: "and the great men speak of the works [ἔργα] of God, but not of God." *St. John Chrysostom Incompreh. Dei natura*, h. III, 3, PG xlviii, 722: in the vision of Isaiah (vi, 1-2), the angelic hosts contemplated not the "inaccessible essence" but some of the divine "condescension,"—"The dogma of the unfathomability of God in His nature and the possibility of knowing Him through His relations towards the world" is presented thoroughly and with penetration in the book of Bishop Sylvester, *Essay on Orthodox Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I, (Kiev, 1892-3), pp. 245 ff.; Vol. II (Kiev, 1892-3), pp. 4 ff. Cf. the chapter On negative theology in Father Bulgakov's book, *The Unwaning Light* (Moscow, 1917), pp. 103 ff.

⁶³St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.*, I, 14, PG xciv, 860.

⁶⁴Bishop Sylvester, II, 6.

⁶⁵Cf. *ibid.*, II, 131.

⁶⁶St. John Chrysostom, *In Hebr.* h-2, n. 1.

⁶⁷St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.*, I, 13, PG xciv, 852.

⁶⁸The Eastern patristic distinction between the essence and energies of God has always remained foreign to Western theology. In Eastern theology it is the basis of the distinction between apophatic and cataphatic theology. St. Augustine decisively rejects it. See Popov, pp. 353 ff.; Cf. Brilliantov, pp. 221 ff.

⁶⁸Dionysius Areopagite, *De div. nom.*, II, 5, PG iii, 641.

⁷⁰Cf., for example, *De coel. hier.*, II, 3, c 141.

⁷¹*Ep. I, ad Caium*, c. 1065A.

⁷²*De div. nom.*, xi, 6, c 956.

⁷³Dionysius Areopagite, *De div. nom.*, I, 4, PG iii, 589; St. Max. Schol. in V 1; PG iv, 309: πρόδοτον δέ την Θεϊαν ἐνέργειαν λέγει, ἥτις πασαν οὐσίαν παρήγαγε; is contrasted here with αὐτός ὁ Θεός.

⁷⁴*De div. nom.*, IV, 13, PG iii, 712.

⁷⁵*De div. nom.*, V, 8, PG iii, 824; V, 5-6, c 820; XI, 6, c. 953, ss. Cf. Brilliantov's whole chapter on the *Areopagitica*, pp. 142-178; Popov, pp. 349-52. The pseudo-epigraphic character of the *Areopagitica* and their close relationship with Neo-platonism does not belittle their theological significance, which was acknowledged and testified to by the authority of the Church Fathers. Certainly there is need for a new historical and theological investigation and appraisal of them.

⁷⁶Dionysius Areopagite, *De div. nom.*, IX, PG iii, c 909.

⁷⁷St. Gregory Palamas, *Capit. phys., theol. etc.*, PG cl, c 1169.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, cap. 75, PG cl, 1173: St. Gregory proceeds from a threefold distinction in God: that of the *essence*, that of the *energy*, and that of the Trinity of the Hypostases. The union with God κατ' οὐσίαν is impossible, for, according to the general opinion of the theologians, in entity, or in His essence, God is "imparticipable" [ἀμεθέκτον]. The union according to hypostasis [καθ' ὑπόστασιν] is unique to the Incarnate Word: cap. 78, 1176: the creatures who have made progress are united to God according to His energy; they partake not of His *essence* but of His *energy* [κατ' ἐνέργειαν]: cap. 92, 1168: through the partaking of "God given grace" they are united to God Himself (cap. 93). The radiance of God and the God-given energy, partakers of which become deified, is the grace of God [χάρις] but not the essence of God [φύσις]: cap. 141, 1220; cap. 144, 1221; Theoph. col. 912: 928D: cf. 921, 941. Cf. the Synodikon of the council of 1452 in Bishop Porphyrius [Uspensky]'s book, *History of Mt. Athos*, III, 2 (St. Petersburg, 1902), supplements, p. 784, and in the *Triodion* (Venice, 1820), p. 168. This is the thought of St. Maximus: μεθεκτός μὲν ὁ Θεός κατὰ τας μεταδόσεις αὐτοῦ, ἀμέθεκτος δὲ κατὰ τὸ μηδὲν μετέχειν της οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, *apud Euth. Zyg. Panopl.*, tit. 3, PG cxxx, 132.

⁷⁹Bishop Porphyrius, 783.

⁸⁰St. Gregory Palamas, *Theoph.*, PG cl, 941.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 940: εἰ καὶ διενήνοχε της φύσεως, οὐ διασπᾶται ταύτης. Cf. *Triodion*, p. 170; and Porphyrius, 784: "Of those who confess one God Almighty, having three Hypostases, in Whom not only the essence and the hypostases are not created, but the very energy also, and of those

who say that the divine energy proceeds from the essence of God and proceeds undividedly, and who through the procession designate its unspeakable difference, and who through the undivided procession show its supernatural unity... eternal be the memory." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 169, Porphyrius, 782—ένωσις Θείας ούσίας και ενεργείας άσύγγχτων... και διαφορά άδιόστατη. See St. Mark Eugen. *Ephes. Cap. Syllog.*, apud W. Gasz, *Die Mystik des N. Cabas Has* (Greiszwald, 1849), App. II, c 15, p. 221: έπομένην... άελ και σύνδρομον.

⁸²St. Gregory Palamas, *Cap.*, 127, *PG cl*, 1209: ούτε γαρ ούσία έστιν, ούτε συμβεβηκός; p. 135, 1216: τὸ γάρ μη μόνον ουκ άπογινόμενον, άλλ' ούδ' εϋξησιν ή μείωσιν ήντιναουσιν επιδεχόμενον, ή έμποιουν, ουκ έσθ' όπως αν συναριθμοιτο τοις συμβεβηκόςιν... άλλ' έστι και ώς άληθώς έστιν, ού συμβεβηκός δέ έστιν, έπειδη παντάπασις άμετάβλητόν έστιν, άλλ' ούδδ' ούσία και γάρ ού των καθ' έαυτὸ ύφεστηκότων έστιν;... Έχει άρα ό Θεός και δ ουσία, και δ μη ούσία καν ειμή συμβεβηκός καλεϊτο, τήν Θεϊαν δηλονότι βουλήν και ένεργειαν; *Theoph.* p. 298: τήν δέ θεατικήν δύναμιν τε και ένεργειαν του πάντα πριν γενέσεως ειδότος και τήν αύτου έξουσίαν και τήν πρόνοιαν; c.f. p. 937, 956.

⁸³St. Gregory Palamas, *Cap.* 96, *PG cl*, 1181: ει... μηδέν διαφέρει της Θεϊας ούσίας ή Θεϊα ένεργεια, και το ποιειν, δ της ένεργείας έστι, κατ' ούδέν διοίσει του γενναν και έκπορευειν, α της ούσίας έστιν... και τα ποιήματα κατ' ούδέν διοίσει του γεννήματος και του προβλήματος; cf. *Cap.* 97, 98, 100, 102; *Cap.* 103, 1192: ούδδ' τῶ θέλειν δημιουργεί Θεός, άλλά το πεφυκέναι μόνον; c 135, 1216: ει τω βούλεσθαι ποιεί ό Θεός, άλλ' ούχ' άπλώς τφ πεφυκέναι, άλλο άρα το βούλεσθαι, και ετερον τὸ πεφυκέναι. S. Mark of Ephesus, apud Gasz., s. 217: έτ ι ει ταυτόν ούσία και ένεργεια, ταύτη τε και πάντως αμα τφ ειναι και ενεργειν τὸν Θεόν άνάγκη' συναϊδιος άρα τφ Θεῶ ή κτίσις έξ άιδίου ενεργουντα κατά τοϋς έλληνας.

⁸⁴St. Gregory Palamas, *Cap.* 125, *PG cl*, 1209; St. Mark of Ephesus, apud Gasz., c 14, s. 220; c. 9, 219; c. 22, 225: ει πολυποίκιλος μὲν ή του Θεοϋ σοφία λέγεται τε και έστι, πολυποίκιλος δέ αύτου ή ούσία ουκ έστιν, έτερον άρα ή αύτου ούσία και έτερον ή σοφία; c 10, 209.

⁸⁵St. Gregory Palamas, *Theoph.*, *PG cl*, 929; 936; 941; St. Mark of Ephesus, apud Gasz., c 21, s. 223.

⁸⁶Byzantine theology concerning the powers and energies of God still awaits monographic treatment, much the more so since the greater part of the works of St. Gregory Palamas are still in MSS. For the general characteristics and theological movements of the times, see Bishop Porphyry's book, *First Journey into the Athonite Monasteries and Sketes*, part II, pp. 358 ff., and by the same author, *History of Mt. Athos*, part III, section 2, pp. 234 ff.; Archimandrite Modestus, *St. Gregory Palamas, Archbishop of Thessalonica* (Kiev, 1860), pp. 58-70, 113-130; Bishop Alexey, *Byzantine Church Mystics of the XIV Century* (Kazan, 1906), and in the Greek of G. H. Papamichael, *St. Gregory Palamas*,

Archbishop of Thessalonica (St. Petersburg-Alexandria, 1911); cf. the Review of the book by J. Sokolov in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education*, 1913, April-July issues. The Eastern distinction between essence and energy met with severe censure from Roman Catholic theology. Petavius speaks of it at great length and most harshly. Petavius, *Opus de theologiacis*, ed. Thomas, Barri-Ducis (1864), tomus I, I, I, c. 12-13, 145-160; III, 5, 273-6.

⁸⁷St. Athanasius, *C. arian. Or.* III, c 62-63, *PG* xxvi.

⁸⁸St. Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigu.*, *PG* xci, c 1261-4.

⁸⁹St. Athanasius, *C. arian.*, II, 31, *PG* xxvi, c 212: "It was not for our sake that the Word of God received His being; on the contrary, it is for His sake that we received ours; and all things were created... for Him (Col. i.16). It was not because of our infirmity that He, being powerful, received His being from the One God, that through Him as by some instrument we were created for the Father. Far be it. Such is not the teaching of the truth. Had it been pleasing not to create creatures, nevertheless the *Word was with God*, and in Him was the Father. The creatures could not receive their being without the Word, and that is why they received their being through Him, which is only right. Inasmuch as the Word is, by the nature of His essence, Son of God; inasmuch as the Word is from God and is God, as He Himself has said, even so the creatures could not receive their being but through him."

⁹⁰St. Methodius of Olympus, *Conviv.*, VI, I, *PG* xviii, c. 113.

⁹¹St. John Damascene, *C. Jacobitas*, n. 52, *PG* xciv, 144.

⁹²*Ibid.*, *De fide orth.*, I, 8, c 812.

⁹³St. Symeon, Βίβλος των ἠθικῶν, III—St. Symeon le Nouveau Theologien, *Traitées théologiques et Ethiques "Sources Chrétiennes,"* No. 122 (Paris, 1966), p. 414: "Ἐνθεν τοι καὶ βλέπόμενος παρὰ πάντων καὶ πάσας βλέπων αὐτὸς τὰς ἀναριθμήτους μυριάδας καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὄμμα εχὼν ἀεὶ ἀτενίζον καὶ ἀμετακινήτων ἰστάμενον, ἐκαστος αὐτῶν δοκεῖ βλέπεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖνου ἀπολαύειν ὀμίλιας καὶ κατασπάξεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ... ἄλλος ἄλλο τι δεικνύμενος εἶναι καὶ διαιρῶν ἑαυτὸν κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστω, καθά τις ἔστιν ἀξίος..."

⁹⁴St. Gregory Palamas, *Theoph.*, *PG* cl, 941.

⁹⁵Cf. ἀπεικόνισμα in St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De hom. οφί.*, *PG* xlv, 137. St. Augustine happily distinguishes and contrasts *imago ejusdem substantiae*, *man. August. Quaest. in heptateuch*, I, V, qu. 4, *PL* xxxiv, c 749. For the most complete catalogue of the opinions of the Church Fathers on the "image of God" in Russian, see V. S. Serebrennikov, *The Doctrine of Locke on the Innate Principles of Knowledge and Activity* (St. Petersburg, 1892), pp. 266-330.

⁹⁶St. Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigu.*, *PG* xci, c 1093.

⁹⁷St. Gregory of Nazianzos, *Or.* 43, *In laudem Basil. Magni*, *PG* xxxvi, c 560.

⁹⁸St. Amphilochius, *Or I In Christi natalem*, 4.

"St. Athanasius, *Ad Adolph.*, 4, *PG* xxvi, 1077.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, *De in carn. et c. arian.*, 8, c. 996.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, *C. arian.*, I, 46, 47, c. 108-109.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, *De incarn. et c. arian.*, 8, c. 998.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, *De incarn.*, 4, c. *PG* xxv, 104: εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπέστρεπεν.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, *C. arian.*, II, 58-59, c. 272-3. Cf. N. V. Popov, *The Religious Ideal of St. Athanasius*, Sergiev Posad, 1903.

¹⁰⁵ For a summary of citations from St. Gregory see K. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältniss zu den grossen Kappadoziern* (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1904), p. 166; cf. also N. Popov, "The Idea of Deification in the Ancient Eastern Church" in the journal *Questions in Philosophy and Psychology* (1909, II-97), pp. 165-213.

¹⁰⁶Cf. Holl, 124-125, 203 ff.

¹⁰⁷St. Macarius of Egypt, hom. 44, 8, 9, *PG* xxxiv: ἀλλαγῆναι καὶ μεταβληθῆναι . . . εἰς ἑτέραν κατάστασιν, καὶ φύσιν θεῖαν.

¹⁰⁸Cf. Stoffels, *Die mystische Theologie Makarius des Aegyptars* (Bonn, 1900), pp. 58-61.

¹⁰⁹St. Macarius of Egypt, *De amore*, 28, *PG* xxxiv, 932: ἐνοικεῖ δέ οὐ καθ' ὃ ἐστίν.

¹¹⁰St. Maximus the Confessor, *Cap. theol. et. oecon. cent.*, I, 67, *PG* xci, 1108: κατὰ χάριν γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν σωζωμένων σωτηρία.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, *Cent.*, II, 21, col. 1133.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, *Ad Ioannem cubic, ep.*, XLII, c. 639; cf. *Div. cap.*, I, 42, *PG* xc, 1193; *De charit.*, c. III, 25, c. 1024: κατὰ μετουσίαν, οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν, κατὰ χάριν, οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, *Ambigu.*, 127^a: "being deified by the grace of the Incarnate God"; *PG* xci, 1088, 1092.

¹¹³St. Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigu.* 222: The goal of the creature's ascension consists in this—that, having united the created nature with the uncreated by love, in order to show them in their unity and identity—ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν δειξείη—after having acquired grace and integrally and wholly compenetrating with the whole of God to become all that is God—παν ἔτι πέρ σέτιν ὁ Θεός—*PG* xci, 1038; cf. also Anastasius of Sinai Ὁδηγός, c. 2, *PG* lxxxix, c. 77: "Deification is an ascension towards the better, but it is not an increase or change in nature—οὐ μὴν φύσεως μειώσεις, ἢ μετὰστασις—neither is it a change of one's own nature."

¹¹⁴St. Maximus the Confessor, 43 *Ad Ioann. cubic, PG* xci, 639: "He has created us for this purpose, that we might become participants of the Divine nature and partakers of eternity's very self, and that we might appear to Him in His likeness, by deification through grace, through which is

brought about the coming-into-being [ἡ οὐσῶσις] of all that exists, and the bringing-into-being and genesis of what does not exist—καὶ ἡ τῶν μὴ ὄντων παραγωγή καὶ γένεσις.

¹¹⁵Bishop Theophan (the Recluse), *Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians* (Moscow, 1882), in Russian, pp. 112-113, to the Ephesians, I, 23.

¹¹⁶Nicholas Cabasilas, *Stae liturgiae expositio*, cap., 38, PG CL, c 452. (Russian version—*Writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church concerning the Divine Services of the Orthodox Church* [St. Petersburg, 1857]), p. 385.

REDEMPTION

¹St. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, III. 10.2: ut fieret filius hominis, ad hoc ut et homo fieret filius Dei, *M.G.* VII, c 875; cf. III.19.1, coll. 939-940; IV.33.4, c 1074; V. praef., c. 1120. See also St. Athanasius, *De incarnatione*, 54, *M.G.* XXV, c 192: αὐτός γὰρ ἐνανθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.

²St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Epist. CI, ad Cledonium*, *M.G.* XXXVII, c. 118-181: ὁ δὲ ἤνωται τῷ Θεῷ τοῦτο καὶ σώζεται.

³Cf. St. Ignatius, *Ephes. VII.2*: "in death true life," ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, Pt. II, v. II. 1, p. 48.

⁴The phrase is by St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haereses*, IV.37.1, *M.G.* VII, c 1099: "*vet er em le gem libertatis humanae manifestavit, quia liber um eum Deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam, ad utendum sententiam Dei voluntarie, et non coactum a Deo.*"

⁵*Ibid.*, III. 18.1: *sed quando incarnatus est, et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem praestans.*" (c. 932); III.18.7: *quapropter et per omnem venit aetatem omnibus restituens eam quae est ad Deum communionem.* (c. 937); II.22.4: *sed omnem aetatem sanctificans per illam, quae ad ipsum erat, similitudinem . . . ideo per omnem venit aetatem, et in infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes, in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes aetatem . . ., in juvenibus juvenis, exemplis juvenibus fiens et sanctificans Domino; sicut senior in senioribus etc.,* c. 784. Cf. F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock, *Irenaeus of Lugdunum, A Study of his Teaching* (Cambridge, 1914), p. 158 f.; A. d'Ales, *La doctrine de la récapitulation en S. Irénée, Recherches de Science religieuse*, VI, 1916, pp. 185-211.

⁶St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* III.12, *M.G.* XCIV, c. 1032: τὴν πρόσληψιν, τὴν ὑπαρξιν, τὴν θέωσιν αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου.

⁷St. Gregory of Nyssa, *In Ecclesiastes*, h. VII, *M.G.* XLIV, p. UW 725: "evil, considered by itself, does not exist apart from free choice." See on St. Gregory of Nyssa J. B. Aufhauser, *Die Heilslehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa* (München, 1910); F. Hilt, *Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Mensch* (Köln, 1890). In St. Maximus the distinction between "nature" and "will" was the main point in his polemics against the monotheletists. There is a "natural will" (θέλημα φυσικόν), and this is sinless; and

there is a "selective will (θέλημα γνωμικόν), and this is the root of sin. This "natural will" is just what makes man a free being, and freedom belongs to man by nature, as well as reason. Without this "natural will" or freedom man simply would not be man at all, οὐ χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἀδύνατον. See St. Maximus, *Ad Marynum*, c. 5, *M.G. XCI*, c. 45: θέλημα γὰρ ἐστὶ φυσικὸν δύναμις τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτικὴ, καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων, συνεκτικὴν πάντων ἰδιομάτως; cf. 49. This "natural will" is not any definite choice or resolve, not yet a προαίρεσις, but rather a presupposition of all choices and decisions, an innate impulse of freedom, an ὄρεξις, or an *appetitus*, as Comfēbis renders the term, and not yet a γνώμη, *s. ententia*. Cf. *Disputatio cum Pyrrho*, c. 304: οὐδεὶς γὰρ ποτε θέλειν διδάσκει. ἀρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ φύσει λογικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ φύσει λογικὸν καὶ φύσει αὐτεξούσιον. τὸ γὰρ αὐτεξούσιον... θέλησις ἐστίν. On St. Maximus see H. Straubinger, *Die Christologie des hl. Maximus Confessor* (Diss. Bonn, 1906). A brief but excellent study on the whole of the theology of St. Maximus is given by S. L. Epifanovich, *St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine Theology* (Kiev, 1915) [Russian].

*See also M. Lot Borodine, *La Doctrine de la "déification" dans l'Église grecque jusqu'au XI siècle*, *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. CV, CVI and CVII, 1932-1933; J. Gross, *La Divinisation du chrétien d'après les Pères Grecs* (Paris, 1938).

*Cf. St. Maximus, *ad Marynum presb.*, *M.G. XCI*, 129: κατ' ἐξουσίαν ἀπειροδύναμον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὑπεύθυνον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκτισίς ἦν ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ κένωσις ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοῦ σαρκωθέντος. That was why St. Maximus categorically denied the penal character of Our Lord's death and sufferings.

¹⁰"Taketh" seems to be a more accurate rendering of the Greek αἶρων, than the "taketh away" of both the Authorized and Revised Versions, or rather, both meanings are mutually implied. See Bishop Westcott's *The Gospel according to St. John*, I (1908), p. 40. The word αἶρειν may mean either (1) to take upon him or (2) to take away. But the usage of the LXX and the parallel passage, 1 John 3:5, are decisive in favor of the second rendering (Vulg. *qui tollit*, all. *qui aufert*); and the Evangelist seems to emphasize this meaning by substituting another word for the unambiguous word of the LXX (φέρειν, beareth). It was, however, by "taking upon Himself our infirmities" that Christ took them away (Matt. 8:17); and this idea is distinctly suggested in the passage in Isaiah (53:11). The present tense marks the future result as assured in the beginning of the work, and also as continuous (cf. 1 John 1:7). The singular ἁμαρτίαν "is important, in so far as it declares the victory of Christ over sin regarded in its unity, as the common corruption of humanity, which is personally realized in the sins of the separate men." Cf. A. Plummer's *Commentary* (1913), p. 80: "taketh away rather than beareth is right, Christ took away the burden of sin by bearing it; but this is not expressed here, although it may be implied"; τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, "regarded as one great burden or plague." Archbp. J. H. Bernard, *Gospel according to St. John* (1928), I, 46-47, describes the present tense

"taketh" as *futurum praesens*, "not only an event in time, but an eternal process."

¹¹See St. Maximus, *ad Marynum*, M.G. XCI, c 220-221: οὐκ ἐλώσιν δὲ ποίαν φασεῖ; τὴν οὐσιώδη, καθ' ἣν τὰ προσόντα φυσικῶς ἑκάστον ἔχοντα οἰκειοῦται διὰ τὴν φύσιν ἢ τὴν σχετικὴν καθ' ἣν τὰ ἀλλήλων φυσικῶς στέργομεν τε καὶ οἰκειούμεθα, μηδὲν τούτων αὐτοὶ πάσχοντες ἢ ενεργοῦντες. St. Maximus was concerned here with the problem of Our Lord's "ignorance." The same distinction in St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* III, 25, M.G. XCIV, c 1903: "It should be known, that the act of appropriation (οὐκείωσις) involves two things: one the natural and essential (φυσικὴ καὶ οὐσιώδης), and the other the personal and relative (προσωπικὴ καὶ σχετικὴ). The natural and essential is that in which the Lord by his love to man has assumed our nature and all that belongs to it (τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ πάντα), really and truly became man and experienced the things which are of nature. The personal and relative appropriation is that in which someone for some reason (e.g. through love or compassion), takes upon himself another's person (τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑποδύεται πρόσωπον) and says something having no relation at all to himself, in the other's stead and to his advantage. In this sense the Lord appropriated to Himself both the curse and our desertion, things having no relation to nature (οὐκ ὄντα φυσικά), but it was thus that He took our person and placed Himself in line with us (μεθ' ἡμῶν τασσόμενος)."

¹²Cf. Bp. Westcott, *ad locum*, II.125: "Christ came that He might suffer, that He might enter into the last conflict with sin and death, and being saved out of it win a triumph over death by dying"; Archbp. Bernard, II.437, translates; "and yet for this very purpose," *scil.*, that His ministry should be consummated in the Passion... The Glorification of the Father (5:28) is achieved not only by the obedience of the Son, but rather by the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose, the victory over death and evil."

¹³Cf. P. M. J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon St. Luc* (1921), p. 267, ad loc. "*marque le decret divin*"; A. Plummer, *Commentary on St. Luke*, 1905, p. 247: "it expresses logical necessity rather than moral obligation (ἔφειτεν, Hebr. 2:17) or natural fitness (ἐπρέπεν, Hebr. II.10). "It is a Divine decree, a law of the Divine nature, that the Son of Man must suffer"; B. E. Easton, *The Gospel according to St. Luke*, Edinb. (1926), ad loc., p. 139; δει, "by divine decree," especially as set forth in the Old Testament.

¹⁴Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, *Sermon on Good Friday* (1816), *Sermons and Speeches*, I (1973), p. 94 [Russian].

¹⁵The Scriptural evidence in favor of the Ransom conception is very scarce. Λύτρον does indeed mean "ransom," but the word is used in the New Testament only once, in the parallel passages Mark 10:45 and Matt. 20:28, and the main emphasis seems to be here rather on the "loosing" effect of Christ's Messianic ministry, than on ransoming in the strict sense. The primary meaning of the verb λύω is just to "loose" or to "set free." The word ἀντίλυτρον occurs in the New Testament also only

once: 1 Tim. 2:6. The middle λυτρουσθαι, both in Luke 24:21 and in Titus 2:14, or in I Peter 1:18f., does not necessarily imply any "ransom"-motive. "Jedenfalls wäre es völlig verkehrt für Titus II.14 und I Petri I.18 zu behaupten: weil in dem Sprachgebrauch der LXX λυτρουσθαι als Gottestat nicht die Lösegeld-Vorstellung enthält, enthält es sie auch an diesen Stellen nicht" [Büchsel in Kittel's Wörterbuch, IV.6, s. 353]. Λύτρωσις in Luke I.68 is no more than simply "salvation" (cf. 5:69, 71, 77). Hebr. 9:12: αἰωνίαν λύτρωσα/ does not imply any ransom either. "An ein Lösegeld ist wohl hier kaum gedacht, wenn auch vom Blute Jesu die Rede ist. Die Vorstellung in Hebr. ist mehr kultisch als rechtlich" (Büchsel, s. 354). Ἀπολύτρωσις in Luke 21:28 is the same as λύτρωσις in 1:68 or 2:38, a redeeming Messianic consummation. This word is used by St. Paul with the same general meaning. See Büchsel, s. 357f. "Endlich muss gefragt werden: wie weit ist in ἀπολύτρωσις die Vorstellung von einem λύτρον, einem Lösegeld oder dergleichen noch lebendig? Soll man voraussetzen, das s ueberall, wo von ἀπολύτρωσις die Rede ist, auch an ein λύτρον gedacht ist? Ausdrücklich Bezug genommen wird auf ein Lösegeld an keiner der Ἀπολύτρωσις—Stellen... Wie die Erlösung zustande kommt, sagt Paulus mit der ἐλαστήριον—Vorstellung, was überflüssig wäre, wenn in ἀπολύτρωσις die Lösegeldν or Stellung lebendig wäre... Die richtige deutsche Übersetzung von ἀπολύτρωσις ist deshalb nur Erlösung oder Befreiung, nicht Loskauf, ausnahmweise auch Freilassung Hebr. 11:35 und Erledigung Hebr. 9:15."

¹⁶St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *orat.* XLV, in *S. Pascha*, 22, *M.G.* XXXVI, 653.

¹⁷St. Athanasius, *De incarnatione*, 4-5, *M.G.* XXV, c 194; Robertson's translation (London, 1891, pp. 7-10): "as soon the thought came into their heads, they became corruptible, and being enthroned death ruled over them... for being once nought by nature they were called into being by the indwelling and love of the Word; thence it followed, that, when they lost their understanding of God, they lost also their immortality; and this means: they were suffered to remain in death and corruption." Cf. *Contra Gentes* 41, col. 81-84.

¹⁸St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio cat.*, 6, Srawley p. 81: ὡς αν συνεπι-
θα[η] τω θειω το γήϊνον και μια τις κατὰ τὸ ὁμότιμον διὰ πάσης
της κτίσεως ἢ χάρις διήκοι, της κάτω φύσεως πρὸς τὴν ὑπερκό-
σμιον συ κερνα μένη ς. Srawley's translation, p. 39-40.

¹⁹St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima resurr.*, *M.G.* XLVI, c. 28; cf. *De opific. hominis*, cap. 2-5, *M.G.* XLIV, col. 133 ss. The idea of the central position of man in the cosmos is strongly emphasized in the theological system of St. Maximus the Confessor.

²⁰St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. cat.*, cap. 8, "the potentiality of death which was the distinctive mark of the dumb creatures," τὴν προς το νεκρουσθαι δύναμιν ἢ της ἀλόγου φύσεως ἐξαίρετος ἦν, p. 43-44 Srawley; cf. *De anima et resurr.*, *M.G.* XLVI, c. 148: "that which passed to human nature from dumb life," σχημα της ἀλόγου φύσεως. *De opif. hominis*, 11, *M.G.* XLIV, c. 193: "what was bestowed upon dumb life for self-preservation, that, being transferred to human life, became pas-

sions." The interpretation of the "coats of skins" in the Biblical narrative as of the mortality of the body is connected with that; cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ortio* 38, n. 12, *M.G.* XXXVI, c. 324. The Valentinian Gnostics seem to have been the first to suggest that the "coats of skins" in Genesis 3:21 meant the fleshly body; see St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haereses*, I.5.5, *M.G.* VII, c. 501: ὑστερον δὲ περιτεθεισθαι λέγουσιν αὐτῷ τον δερμάτινον χιτῶνα, τουτο δὲ το αἰσθητὸν σαρκίον εἶναι λέγουσι; cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Valentinianos*, 24, p. 201 Kroymann: *carnalem superficiam postea aiunt choico supertextam, et hanc esse pelliceam tunicam obnoxiam sensui; De carnis resurr.*, 7, p. 34 Kroymann; *ipsae erunt carnis ex limo reformation*. Clement of Alexandria, a quote from Julius Cassianus, of the Valentinian school, *Stromata*, III, 14, p. 230 Stählin II: χιτῶνας δὲ δερματίνους τα ἰ ὁ Κασσιανὸς τὰ σώματα. *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, 55, 125 Stählin III: τοις τρισὶν ἄσωμάτοις ἐπὶ του Ἄδὰμ τέταρτον ἐπενδύεται τὸν χοϊκόν, τοὺς δερματίνους χιτῶνας. E. R. Dodds suggested that this interpretation was in connection with old Orphic use of the word χιτῶν. "The word χιτῶν seems to have been originally an Orphic-Pythagorean term for the fleshly body. In this sense it is used by Empedocles, fragm. 126 Diels, σαρκῶν ἀλλόγνωστι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι, with which may be compared Plato *Gorg.* 523c, where the fleshly body is described as, an ἄμφοισμα, which the soul takes off at death. The clean linen tunic of the Orphic votary perhaps symbolizes the purity of his "garment of flesh." Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, a revised text with translation, introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 307. Porphyry on several occasions calls the fleshly body a "coat of skin."

²¹Cf. Athenagoras, *De resurr.*, 15, p. 65-67 Schwartz; Pseudo-Justin, *De resurrectione*, ap. Holl, *Fragmente vornicänischen Kirchenväter aus den Sacra Parallela*, Harnack-Gebhardt, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, XX.2, 1889, fig. 107, p. 45: τί γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἢ το ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστὸς ζῶον λογικόν; μὴ οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ψυχὴ ἀνθρωπος; βν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ' μὴ οὖν καλεῖτο σῶμα ἀνθρώπου; δν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου σῶμα καλεῖται' εἶπεν οὖν κατ' Ἰδὸν μὲν τούτων ουδέτερον ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων συμπλοκῆς καλεῖται ἄνθρωπος, κέκτηκε δὲ ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ζωὴν καὶ ἀνάστασιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ το μέρος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον κέκτηκεν αὐτόν. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haereses*, V.6.1, *M.G.* VII, c. 1137: *anima autem et Spiritus pars hominis esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam; perfectus autem homo commistio et adunatio est animae, assumptis Spiritum Patris, et admistae ei carne, quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei; c. 1138: neque enim plasmatio carnis ipsa secundum se homo perfectus est, sed corpus hominis, et pars hominis. Neque enim et anima ipsa secundum se homo, sed anima hominis, et pars hominis. Neque Spiritus homo, Spiritus enim, et non homo vocatur, Commistio autem et unio horum omnium perfectum hominem efficit; Tertullian, *De carnis resurrectione*, c. 40, p. 83 Kroymann III: *nec anima per semet-ipsam homo, quae figmento jam homini appellato postea inserta est; nec caro sine anima homo, quae post exsilium animae cadaver inscribitur, ita vocabulum homo conseratum substantiarum duarum quodammodo fibua est etc.*; St. Methodius, *De resurrectione*, I.34.4, p. 272 Bonwetsch: ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἄληθέστατα*

λέγεται κατά φύσιν οὔτε ψυχὴ χωρὶς σώματος, οὔτ' ἂν πάλιν σωμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ συστάσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος εἰς μίαν τὴν του καλοῦ μορφήν συντεθέν. In later times some Fathers, however, adapted the Platonic definition of man; see for instance St. Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, I.27.52, *M.L.* XXXII, c 1332: *homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali corpore atque terreno utens*; In *Joan. Evang.* tr. XIX, 5, 15, *M.L.* XXXV, c 1553: *Quid est homo? anima rationales habens corpus. Anima rationalis habens corpus non facit duas personas, sed unum hominem.*

²²Hapgood, *Service Book*, p. 386; cf. 389-390.

²³Many of the Fathers regarded the "image of God" as being not in the soul only, but rather in the whole structure of man. Above all in his royal prerogative, in his calling to reign over the cosmos, which is connected with the fulness of his psycho-physical composition. This idea was brought forward by St. Gregory of Nyssa in his *De opificio hominis*; later it was strongly emphasized by St. Maximus the Confessor. And, probably under the influence of St. Maximus, St. Gregory Palamas emphasized the fulness of the human structure, in which an earthly body is united with the reasonable soul, as the preeminent title of man to be regarded as the "image of God," *Capita physica, theol.* etc., 63, 66, 67, *M.G.* CL, col. 1147, 1152, 1165.

²⁴St. Methodius, *De resurr.*, I.34.4, Bonwetsch 275: τὸ ἔγαλμα τὸ λογεῖν.

²⁵Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio cat.*, 35, ed. Srawley, p. 133; Eng. transl. p. 103; c. 8, p. 46, transl. p. 47; *De mortuis*, *M.G.* XLVI, col. 520, 529; *Orat. fun. de Placid.*, XLVI, 876-877. St. Gregory here echoes St. Methodius, the similarity is even in the terms used; see Srawley's comparison in the introduction to his edition of the "Catechetical Oration," p. xxv-xxviii. The analogy of refinement itself is taken from St. Methodius: see *De resurr.* I.43.2-4, Bonwetsch (1917), p. 291; 42.3, p. 288-289; cf. *Symp.* ix.2, Bonw. 116. Methodius reproduces the tradition of Asia Minor. See in Theophilus of Antioch, *ad Autolicum* II.26, Otto s. 128 ss. Almost word for word St. Irenaeus, *adv. haeres.* III.23.6; 19.3, *M.G.* VII, 964, 941; 23-111; cf. fig. XII, c. 1233, 1236. The same in Hippolytus, *adv. Graecos*, 2, *ap. Hell*, TU XX.2, fig. 353, s. 140. St. Epiphanius includes large sections from Methodius in his *Panarion*, *haeres.* 64, cap. 22-29, ed. Holl II, 435-448. St. Basil also held the conception of death as a healing process, *Quod Deus non est auctor malor.*, 7, *M.G.* XXXI, 345; also St. John Chrysostom, *De resurr. mort.* 7, *M.G.* L, c. 429.

²⁶St. Irenaeus, *adv. haeres.* III.18.7: ἤνωσεν οὐδὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Θεῷ (*lat.*: *haerere facit et adunavh*), *M.G.* VII, c. 937; 19.2: *non enim proteramus aliter incorruptelam et immortalitatem percipere, nisi adunati fuissetus incorruptelae et immortalitati, nisi prius incorruptela et immortalitas facta fuisset id quod et nos, ut absorberetur quod erat corruptibile ab incorruptela*; c. 939; V.12.6: *hoc autem et in semel totum sanum et integrum redintegravit hominem, perfectum eum sibi praeparans ad resurrectionem*, c. 1155-1156.

²⁷St. Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, 6-8; *M.G.* XXV. c 105-109; Robertson's translation, p. 10-15.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 44, col. 126; 28, c 143; cf. *Or. 2 in Arianos*, 66, *M.G.* XXVI, 298.

²⁹*De incarn.*, 21, c 133; 9, c. 112; *Or. 2 in Arianos*, 62-68; c 289-292. See also in St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio cat.*, cap. 32, Srawley 116-117: "if one inquires further into the mystery, he will say rather, not that death happened to Him as a consequence of birth, but that birth itself was assumed on account of death, μη διὰ τὴν γένεσιν συμβεβηκέναι τὸν θάνατον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμπαλιν τοῦ θανάτου χάριν παραληφθῆναι τὴν γένεσιν. For the ever-living assumed death, not as something necessary for life, but in order to restore us from death to life." See also the sharp utterance of Tertullian, *De carne Christi*, 6, *M.L.* II, URY 746: *Christus mori missus, nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori posset, . . . forma moriendi causa nascendi est.* However, all that does not presume that the Incarnation depends exclusively upon the Fall and would not have taken place, had not man sinned. Bp. Westcott was right in suggesting "that the thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall harmonizes (better) with the general tenor of Greek theology"; *Commentary on the Epistles of St. John* (London, 1883), the excursus on "The Gospel of Creation," p. 275. Cf. Excursus I, *Cur Deus homo?*

³⁰Celsus *ap.* Origen., *Contra Celsum*, V.14: ἀτεχνῶς σκωλήκων ἢ ἐλπίς, ποῖα γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ποθήσειεν ἔπι σῶμα σεσηπός;

³¹Koetschau 15; and VII.36 and 39, p. 186, 189.

³²St. Augustine, *Confessiones*, 1.V, X.19-20, *ed.* Labriolle, p. 108 ss.: *multumque mihi turpe videbatur credere figuram te habere humanae carnis et membrorum nostrum liniamentis corporalibus terminari . . . metuebam it a que credere incarnatum, ne credere cogerer ex carne inquinatum . . .* It was just the "embodiment," the life in a body, that offended St. Augustine. In his Manichean period St. Augustine could not get beyond corporeal categories at all. Everything was corporeal for him, even the Intellect, even Deity itself. He emphasizes that in the same chapters where he is speaking of the shame of the Incarnation: "*et quoniam cum de Deo meo cogitare vellem, cogitare nisi moles corporum non noveram . . . neque enim videbatur mihi esse quicquam, quod tale non esset. . . quia et mentem cogitare non noveram nisi earn subtile corpus esse, quod tarnen per loci spatia diffunderetur* [V. 19, 20, p. 108, 110]; *non te cogitabam, Deus, in figura corporis humani . . . sed quod te aliud cogitarem non occurebat . . . corporeum tarnen aliquid cogitare cogerer . . . quoniam quidquid privabam spatiis talibus, nihil mihi esse videbatur, sed prorsus nihil* [VII.1, p. 145-146] . . . All is corporeal, but there are stages or levels, and the "bodily-existence" is the lower level. One has to get out of that. The "materialistic" presuppositions of Manicheanism did not calm this rather instinctive "abhorrence of the body."

³³Plotinus, V.8.8: παν γὰρ τὸ κατ' ἄλλου ποιηθέν διαν τις θαυμάση, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο εχει τὸ θαῦμα, καθ' ὃ εστι πεποιημένον.

³⁴Plotinus, II.9.15 to the end.

³⁵Plotinus, III.6.6: ἡ δὲ ἀληθινὴ ἐγρήγορσις ἀληθινὴ ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος ἀνάστασις. The polemical turn of these utterances is obvious. The body is το ἀλλότριον, which does not properly belong to the human being [I.6.7]; it is what comes in at the earthly birth [το προσπλασθέν ἐν τη γενέσει IV.7.14]. Cf. R. Arnou, *Le désir de Dieu dans la Philosophie de Plotin* (Paris, 1924), p. 201: "Le mot est a noter Le sensible est comme un enduit, une espèce de crépissage, une couche de peinture qui n'entre pas dans l'essence de l'être, mais qui s'ajoutant du dehors, peut être grattée sans l'altérer, car elle reste toujours 'l'autre'." One has to dominate this alien element of the composition, but one can achieve that only by running away, or "thither": ἀλλὰ οὐ καθαρὸν το δυνάμενον κρατεῖν, εἰ μὴ φύγοι, I.8.8. Plotinus does not suggest a suicide, like the Stoics, but rather an inner effort to overcome or dominate all lower desires and carnal affections, to concentrate on one's own self and to ascend towards the good; I.6.7: ἀναβατέον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; 6.9: ἀνάγε ἐπὶ σαυτὸν καταλειπεῖν μόνην καὶ μὴ μετ' ἄλλων ἢ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπουσαν κτλ.; VI.9.4: μόνος εἶναι ἀποστίας πάντων. Of course, man is not soul alone, but rather soul in a certain relation, ἐν τοιῷδε λόγῳ, and Plotinus clings to the Platonic definition [*Alcib.* 129e: τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον], IV.7.5.8. But he declines the Aristotelian conception of an ἐντελέχεια. In any case, the body is an obstacle for the spiritual ascension (ἐμπόδιον), a source of sorrows and desires, IV.8.2.3. And the soul can be free and truly independent (κυριωτάτη αὐτῆς καὶ ἐλευθέρᾳ) only without the body, ἀνευ σώματος, III.1.8. The incarnate existence of the soul is, both for Plotinus and for Plato himself, only a transitory and abnormal, an unhappy episode in her destiny, an outcome of the "fall"; and the soul will soon forget this earthly life altogether when she has "returned" and ascended into glorious bliss, through death or ecstasy. The comparison of the incarnate and sensual life with a sleep comes from Plato [e.g. *Tim.* 52b], it was quite usual in Philo. The image of escape is Platonic too: "One has to endeavor to run thither from here as quickly as possible." *Theaet.* 176a: ἐνθέντε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν. And the true philosopher is one who is ready and willing to die, and whose whole life is but an "exercise in dying," or even, a "rehearsal of death," μελέτη θανάτου, *Phaedo* 64a. See J. Burner, in his edition of the *Phaedo*, 1911, Notes, p. 28 and 72: μελέτη "means the 'practising' or 'rehearsal' of death"; cf. *Phaedo* 67d: φύσις καὶ χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; 81a: τεθνάναι μελετώσα ραδίως; cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato, The Man and His Work*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1927), p. 178ff.; "μελέτη means the repeated practice by which we prepare ourselves for a performance," and not just a meditation of death; it is precisely a "rehearsal," p. 179, note. Cf. later in Cicero, *Tusc.* I.30: "tota enim philosophorum vita ut ait idem(s) commentatio mortis est; and Seneca, *Epist.* 26: egregia res est mortem condiscere. Prof. Taylor stresses the Platonic phrase: "before he was man" (*Memo* 86a: οὐ μὴ ἢ ἄνθρωπος), and comments: "This way of speaking about our ante-natal conditions is characteristic for *Phaedo* too: it implies that the true self is not as is commonly thought, the embodied soul, but the soul *simpliciter*, the body being the instrument (ὄργανον) which the soul "uses," and the consequent definition of

"man" as a "soul using a body as its instrument," p. 138, note 1. Cf. John Burnet, "Introduction" to his edition of the *Phaedo*, p. LIII: "It is sufficiently established that the use of the word ψυχή to express a living man's true personality is Orphic in its origin, and came into philosophy from mysticism. Properly speaking, the ψυχή of a man is a thing which only becomes important at the moment of death. In ordinary language it is only spoken of as something that may be lost; it is in fact 'the ghost,' which a man 'gives up'."

³⁸Cf. Büchsel, s.v. ἀπολύτρωσις, in Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, IV, s. 355: "Die ἀπολύτρωσις του σώματος ist Rom. VIII.23 nicht die Erlösung vom Leibe, sondern die Erlösung des Leibes. Das beweist der Vergleich mit v.21 unweigerlich. Wie die Geschöpfe zur Freiheit der Herrlichkeit gelangen, indem sie frei werden von der Sklaverei der Vergänglichkeit, so sollen auch wir zur υιοθεσία, d.h. zur Einsetzung in die Sohnesstellung mit ihrer Herrlichkeit, gelangen, indem unser Leib, der tot ist um der Sünde willen (v.10), von diesem Todeslose frei wird und Unvergänglichkeit bzw. Unsterblichkeit anzieht [1 Cor. XV.53, 54]. Leiblosigkeit ist für Paulus nicht Erlösung, sondern ein schrecklicher Zustand [2 Cor. V.2-4] etc."

³⁹St. John Chrysostom, *de resurrectione mortuorum*, 6, M.G. L, c 427-428.

⁴⁰Minutius Felix, *Octavius*, 34, ed. Halm, p. 49.

⁴¹V. F. Ern, *Letters on Christian Rome*, 3rd letter, "The Catacombs of St. Callistus," *Bogoslovskii Vestnik*, 1913 (January), p. 106 [Russian].

⁴²St. Athanasius, *De incarnatione*, 21, M.G. XXV, p. 123.

⁴³St. Justin regarded the belief in the General Resurrection as one of the cardinal articles of the Christian faith: if one does not believe in the Resurrection of the dead, one can hardly be regarded as a Christian at all; *Dial.* 80, M.G. VI, 665: οἱ καὶ λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι νεκρῶν ἀνάστασις, ἀλλ' ἅμα τῷ ἀποθανεῖν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβανέσθαι εἰς οὐρανόν, μὴ ὑπολαμβάνετε αὐτοὺς χριστιανοὺς. Cf. E. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, I (Paris 1932), p. 177: "On surprendrait aujourd'hui beaucoup de chrétiens en leur disant que la croyance en l'immortalité de l'âme chez certains des plus anciens Pères est obscure au point d'être à peu près inexistante. C'est pourtant un fait, et il est important de le noter parce qu'il met merveilleusement en relief l'axe central de l'anthropologie chrétienne et la raison de son évolution historique. Au fond, un Christianisme sans immortalité de l'âme n'eût pas été absolument inconcevable et la preuve en est qu'il a été conçue. Ce qui serait, au contraire, absolument inconcevable, c'est un Christianisme sans résurrection de l'Homme." See Excursus II, *Anima mortalis*.

⁴⁴Paul Florensky, *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, An Essay in Christian Theodicy* (Moscow, 1914), p. 291-292 [Russian].

⁴⁵Cf. the most interesting remarks of E. Gilson in his Gifford lectures, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, I (Paris, 1932), the whole chapter IX, *L'anthropologie chrétienne*, p. 173 ss. Gilson seems to have underestimated the Aristotelian elements in Early Patristics, but he gives an excellent *mis au point* of the whole problem.

⁴⁴In his early dialogue *Eudemus, or On the Soul*, composed probably ca. 354 or 353, Aristotle still clings close to Plato and plainly professes the belief in an individual survival or immortality of the soul. It was a kind of a sequel to the *Phaedo*, a book of personal consolation like it. There was the same intimate quest for immortality, for the after-life, "a fervor of longing for the peace and security of the heavenly plains" [W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin, 1923); English translation by R. Robins, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934, p. 40]. It is worth noticing that even so early Aristotle used to describe the soul as an "*eidōs*," although not in the same sense as in his later writings; Simpl., in *De anima* III.62, frg. 46 Rose; Heitz p. 51: καὶ δια τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ διαλόγῳ εἶδος τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπαινεῖ τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν δεκτικὴν λέγοντος τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὄλην, ἀλλὰ νοητικὴν ὡς τῶν ἀληθῶν δευτέρως εἰδῶν γνωστικὴν. In his later works, and specially in *De anima*, Aristotle abandons and criticizes his earlier view. And in his *Ethics*, in any case, he has no "eschatological" perspective whatever. "Now death is the most terrible of all things, for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead" [*Eth. Nicom.* III.6, 1115a 27]. Yet, he suggests, "we must, as far as we can, make ourselves immortal (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us" [1177b 33]. But this means only that one has to live in accordance with reason, which reason is hardly human, but rather superhuman. "But such a life would be too high for man (κρεῖττω ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον), for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him" [1117b 26]. The very purpose of human life, and the complete happiness of man, consists in a contemplation of the things noble and divine [1177a 15]. "And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy but for a short time (μικρόν χρόνον), for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be, etc." [*Metaphysics*, 7, 1072b 15]. It would be a divine life, and it is beyond the human reach. "God is always in that good state in which we sometimes (ποτέ) are" [1.25]. Even contemplation does not break the earthly circle of human existence. No after-death destiny is mentioned at all. The attempt of Thomas Aquinas and of his school to read the doctrine of human immortality into Aristotle was hardly successful. One may adapt the Aristotelian conception for Christian purposes, and this was just what was done by the Fathers. But Aristotle himself obviously "was not a Moslem mystic, nor a Christian theologian" [R. D. Hicks, in the "Introduction" to his edition of *De anima*, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1934, p. XVI].

⁴⁵*De anima*, 402a 6: ἐστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζώων; 412b 16: τό τι ἢ εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος; 415b 8: τοῦ ζώοντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή; 415b 17: το τέλος; *De part. anim.* 641a 27: ὡς ἡ κινουσα καὶ ὡς το τέλος; *Metaph.* 7. 10, 1035b 14: ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία κατὰ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τό τι ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῶδε σώματι.

⁴⁶Aristotle plainly rejected any speech of "communion," "composition," or "connection" of soul with body (συνουσία ἢ σύνθεσις ἢ σύνδεσμος); "the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually," ἐστι δ' ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφή

τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν, τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δ' ἐνεργόν. *Metaph.* H. 6 1045b 9s. Cf. F. Ravaisson, *Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote* (Paris, 1836), I, p. 419-420: The soul is "la réalité dernière d'un corps," that which gives it life and proper individuality. "Elle n'est pas le corps, mais sans le corps elle ne peut pas être. Elle est quelque chose du corps; et ce quelque chose n'est pas ni la figure, ni le mouvement, ni un accident quelconque, mais la forme même de la vie, l'activité spécifique qui détermine l'essence et tous ses accidents"; cf. O. Hamelin, *Le Système d'Aristote*, p. 374: "cette aptitude à fonctionner est précisément ce qu'Aristote appelle l'entéléchie première du corps."

⁴⁷G. S. Brett, *A History of Psychology, Ancient and Patristic* (London, 1912), p. 103; cf. H. Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, I.2 (Gotha, 1884), s. 13f. Prof. E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* (Glasgow, 1904), I, p. 274ff., points out the complete originality of the Aristotelian conception of the soul. "The Aristotelian idea of the soul is, indeed, a new and original conception." The soul is to Aristotle not the Intelligence, but just "the form which realizes, or brings into activity and actuality, the capacities of an organic body." And therefore, there can hardly be any *inter-relation* of the soul and the body, for they are really one and the same reality: "soul and body seem to be taken by him as different, but essentially correlated aspects of the life of one individual substance." And yet this is only one of the aspects of the Aristotelian conception. And in many respects Aristotle comes back to a Platonic idea of a composite being, σύνθετον, in which the heterogeneous elements are combined, a spiritual principle and a material body, p. 282, 317.

⁴⁸*De part. anim.* 641a 18: ἀπελθούσης γοῦν (τῆς ψυχῆς) οὐκέτι ζῶων ἔστι; *Meteor.* IV.12, 389b 31: νεκρός ἄνθρωπος ὁμωνύμος.

⁴⁹On Aristoxenus, see Zeller, II.2, s. 888 and note: ap. Cicer. *Tusc.* I.10.20, *ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (animam)*; ap. Lactantium, *Instit.* VII. 13, *qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in corpore-*, on Dikaearchus, Zeller, s. 889f and notes: Cicer. *Tusc.* I.10.21, *nihil esse omnino animum et hoc esse nomen totum inane*; *Sext. Pyrrh.* II.31, μή εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν; *Math.* VII, 349, μηδὲν εἶναι αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχον σῶμα; on Strato, Zeller, s. 916f and notes.

⁵⁰G. S. Brett, p. 159.

⁵¹See Zeller, s. 864ff.

⁵²Alexander of Aphrodisias, in *De anima*, 16.2 Bruns; 21.24: φθαρτοῦ σώματος εἶδος; cf. Zeller, III.1, s. 712ff.

⁵³*De anima*, 129a 28: ἡ νοητικὴ ψυχὴ; *Eth. Nicom.* X.7, 1178a 6: "since reason more than anything else is man," εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος.

⁵⁴R. D. Hicks, p. 326; E. Rohde, *Psyche, Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, 3 Aufl. (193), B. II, s. 305, suggested that the whole doctrine of *Nous* was simply a survival of Aristotle's early Platonism. This idea was taken up by W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 332: "In

this connection the third book *On the soul*, which contains the doctrine of *Nous*, stands out as peculiarly Platonic and not very scientific. This idea is an old and permanent element of Aristotle's philosophy, one of the main roots of his metaphysics... On and around the psycho-physical theory of the soul was subsequently constructed, as it appears, without, however, bridging the gulf between two parts whose intellectual heritages were so different... The doctrine of *Nous* was a traditional element, inherited from Plato."

⁵⁵*De gen. anim.* II.3, 736b 27: λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον, οὐθέν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κοινώνει σωματική ἐνέργεια; *De anima*, 413b 25: ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι καθάπερ τὸ αἶδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ; 430a 5: soul and body cannot be separated, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος; "there is, however, no reason why some parts (of the soul) should not be separated, if they are not actualities of any body whatsoever," διὰ τὸ μηθένος εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχίας; 430a 17: καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγῆς, τῆ οὐσίας ὧν ἐνέργεια... , χωρισθεὶς δ' ἔστι, μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἶδιον... ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός καὶ ἀνευ τοῦτο οὐδέν.

⁵⁶*De anima*, 430a 25: οὐ μνημονεύομεν δ' ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἄλλα... ..δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός; cf. 408b 27: διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει, οὔτε φιλεῖ; the meaning is obvious: whatever does survive in man after his physical death, the memory is lost, and therewith the individual continuity. See Zeller, II.2, p. 574, n. 3: *die Continuität des Bewusstseins zwischen dem Lehen des mit der leidentlichen Vernunft verbundenen und des von ihr freien Nus sowohl nach rückwärts wie nach vorwärts aufbebt* ; cf. G. Rodier, in the notes to his edition, II, p. 465 s. This was the interpretation of ancient commentators too.

⁵⁷Alexander of Aphrodisias, in *De anima*, 89.11 Bruns: καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς χωριστός τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγῆς ἄλλω, ἀ πάντα αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ὕλης εἶναι ὑπάρχει. Χωριστός τε γὰρ καὶ αὐτός καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν διὰ τοῦτο. Ἀπαθὴς δὲ ὧν καὶ μὴ μιγμένους ὕλη τινὶ καὶ ἀφθαρτος ἐστίν, ἐνέργεια ὧν καὶ εἶδος χωρὶς δυνάμεως τε καὶ ὕλης' τοιοῦτον δὲ ὄν δέδεικται ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοῦς; 90.23-91.1: ὁ οὖν νοούμενος ἀφθαρτος ἐν ἡμῖν οὗτος ἐστὶν διὰ χωριστός τε ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀφθαρτος νοῦς, ὃν καὶ θύραθεν Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει, νοῦς ὁ ἔξωθεν γινόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς, οὐδὲ ἡ ἔξις; *Mantissa*, 108, 22: θύραθεν ἐστὶ λεγόμενος νοῦς ὁ ποιητικὸς, οὐκ ὧν ἴδιον καὶ δυνάμις τις τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν γινόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν αὐτὸν νοώμεν; 113: χωριστός δὲ λέγεται ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς καὶ χωρίζεται ἡμῶν, οὐχ ὡς μετ' ὧν που καὶ ἀμειβῶν τόπον, ἀλλὰ χωριστός μὲν ὡς καθ' αὐτὸν τε ὧν καὶ μὴ σὺν ὕλη, χωριζόμενος δὲ ἡμῶν τῷ μὴ νοεῖσθαι κτλ. . . . This interpretation is accepted by most modern scholars: F. Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote* (Paris, 1837), I, p. 587-588; Ch. Renouvier, *Manuel de Philosophie*

ancienne (Paris, 1844), II, 134, note 3; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, II, 301ff.; E. Zeller, II.2, s. 566f.: "gelehrt hat er nur die Fortdauer des denkenden Geistes, alle Bedingungen des persönlichen Daseins dagegen hat er ihm hierbei entsagen;. . .so wenig uns seine Metaphysik einen klaren und widerspruchlosen *Aufschluss* über die Individualität gab, ebensowenig gibt uns seine Psychologie einen solchen über die *Persönlichkeit*"; O. Hamelin, *Système d'Aristote*, 2ed. (Paris), p. 387; "Aristote a laissé le problème sans solution, ou plutôt peut-être il a volontairement évité de le poser." The mediaeval interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of the soul was very different. Thomas Aquinas and others insisted that Aristotle himself made a distinction between an animal soul and an "intelligent soul" of man, and that he regarded this human soul as an immortal and surviving individual being. One can agree that the Aristotelian conception could be remolded to such an effect, and this was precisely what was done by the Fathers. But it is hardly probable that Aristotle himself professed an individual immortality. The Thomistic thesis was presented with great vigor by M. De Corte, *La Doctrine de l'Intelligence chez Aristote* (Paris, J. Vrin, 1934). But the author himself had to concede that Aristotle never thought in the terms of personality, but perhaps subconsciously [p. 91ss].

⁵⁸Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*, S.W. x.2, s. 377: "In seinen Dichtern und Rednern, Geschichtsschreibern und Philosophen hat Griechenland noch nicht in seinem Mittelpunkte gefasst, wenn man nicht als Schlüssel zu Verständniss die Einsicht in die Ideale der Skulptur mitbringt, und von diesem Standpunkt der Plastik aus sowohl die Gestalten der epischen und dramatischen Helden, als auch die wirklichen Staatsmänner und Philosophen betrachtet"; see the whole of the section on Sculpture, which was for Hegel a peculiarly "classical art," s. 353ff.

⁵⁹A. F. Lossev, *Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology*, t. I (Moscow, 1930), p. 670, 632, 633. This book is a valuable contribution to research on Plato and Platonism, including Christian Platonism. Passed by the ordinary censorship in Soviet Russia, the book was very soon confiscated and taken out of circulation upon the insistence of anti-religious leaders, and the whole stock was apparently destroyed. Very few copies survived. The author was probably imprisoned. Cf. also Lossev's earlier book, *Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science* (Moscow, 1927), a fine thrilling study of Neoplatonism, particularly of Proclus, with valuable excursus on the earlier thinkers. Both are in Russian.

⁶⁰This unity of man is brought forward by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the important passage of his commentary, in *De anima*, 23.8: ὡς γὰρ οὐ λέγομεν βαδίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὕτως καὶ, ὅσας ἄλλας ἐνεργείας τε καὶ κινήσεις ὡς ἐμψυχός τε καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐνεργεῖ, οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνεργοῦσα τε καὶ κινουμένη . . . ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ ἐν ἐκείναις τὸ ζῶον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνεργῶν, καθ' ἣν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπῶς.

⁶¹It is true that Nemesius of Emesa, in his famous treatise *De natura hominis*, formally rejected the Aristotelian definition of the soul, as of an ἐντελέχεια of the body; *M.G.* XL, c. 565: οὐ δύναμιν τοίνυν ἢ ψυχὴ, κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος εἶναι· ἀλλ' οὐσία

αὐτοτελής, ἀσώματος. But his position was rather exceptional, since he was inclined to admit the pre-existence of the soul.

⁶²Athenagoras, *De resurrectione mort.*, 13, p. 63 Schwartz: ἀπλανεστάτω δὲ πεπιστεύκαμεν ἐχεγγύω τη του δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς γνώμη, καθ' ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ σώματος νουν τε συγκατασκεύασεν αὐτω και νόμου ἐμφυτον ἐπὶ σωτηρία και φυλακή τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ διδυμένον: ἡ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως αἴτια πιστοῦται την εἰς ἀεὶ διαμονήν, ἡ δὲ διαμονὴ την ἀνάστασιν, ἢ ε χωρὶς οὐκ ἀν διαμεῖναι ἄνθρωπος, ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων εὐδῆλον ὡς τῆ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτια και τη γνώμη του ποιήσαντος δείκνυνται σαφῶς σαφῶς ἢ ἀνάστασις; 15, p. 65: εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κοινῶς ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ του κατὰ την γένεσιν αὐτῇ συναρμοσθέντος σώματος εχει την σύστασιν και μῆτε τῆ φύσει του σώματος χωρὶς ἀπεκλήρωσεν Θεὸς την τοιάνδε γένεσιν ἢ την ζωὴν και τον σύμπαντα θίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων ἠνωμένοις ἀνθρώποις, ἴν, ἐξ ὧν ἦνῶνται καὶ ζῶσι, διαβιώσαντα εἰς εν τι και κοινὸν καταλήξεωσιν τέλος, δεῖ, πάντως ἐνός οντος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ζῶου του καὶ πάσχοντος ὅποσα πάθη ψυχῆς και ὅποσα του σώματος ἐνεργούντος τε και πράττοντος ὅποσα τῆς αισθητικῆς ἢ τῆς λογικῆς δεῖται κρίσεως, προς εν τι τέλος ἀναφέρεσθαι πάντα τον ἐκ τούτων εἰρμόν, ἵνα πάντα και διὰ πάντων συντρέχη προς μίαν ἀρμονίαν και την αὐτήνσμπάθειαν, ἀνθρώπου γένεσις, ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ἀνθρώπου ζωὴ, ἀνθρώπου πράξεις και πάθη και θίος και το τῆ φύσει προσήκον τέλος; p. 66: ταύτης γὰρ χωρὶς οὐτ' ἂν ἐνωθεῖη, τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις, οὐτ' ἂν συσταίη τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ φύσις; ὁ δὲ και νουν και λόγον δεξάμενος ἐστι ἄνθρωπος, ου ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ἄνθρωπον ἄρα δεῖ τον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντα διαμεῖναι εἰς ἀεὶ, τουτον δὲ διαμεῖναι ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀνιστόμενον· ἀναστάσεως γὰρ μὴ γινομένης, οὐκ ἀν ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων διαμεῖναι φύσις. On the Aristotelian background of Athenagoras' conception see M. Pohlerz, *Zeitschrift für die Wissens ch. Theologie*, Bd. 47, s. 241 ff.; cf. E. Schwartz, *index graecus* to his edition of *Athenagoras*, s.v. Eldos, s. 105. See also J. Lehmann, *Die Auferstehungslehre des Athenagoras*, Diss. (Leipzig, 1890).

⁶³Cf. E. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, I (Paris, 1932), p. 199: "Lorsqu'on pèse les expressions d'Athénagore, la profondeur de l'influence exercée par la Bonne Nouvelle sur la pensée philosophique apparaît à plein. Créée par Dieu comme une individualité distincte, conservé par un acte de création continuée dans l'être qu'il a reçu de lui, l'homme est désormais le personnage d'un drame qui est celui de sa propre destinée. Comme il ne dependait pas de nous d'exister, il ne depend pas de nous de ne plus exister. Le decret divin nous a condamnés a l'être; faits par la création, refaits par la rédemption, et à quel prix! nous n'avons le croix qu'entre une misère ou une béatitude également éternelles. Rien de plus résistant qu'une individualité de ce genre, prévue, voulue, élue par Dieu, indestructible comme le decret divin lui-même qui l'a fait naître; mais rien aussi qui soit plus étranger à la philosophie de Platon comme à celle d'Aristote. Là encore, à partir du moment ou elle visait

pleine justification rationnelle de son espérance, la pensée chrétienne se trouvait contrainte à l'originalité."

⁶⁴St. Jerome, *Epist.* 38, *alias* 61, *ad Pammachium*.

⁶⁵Cf. Origen, *De Principiis*, II.10.3, Koetschau 184: *qui vel pro intellectus exiguitate, vel explanationis inopia valde vilem et abjectum sensum de resurrectione corporis introducunt*.

⁶⁶Cf. F. Prat, *Origène, Le théologien et l'exégète* (Paris, 1907), p. 94: "Contre son habitude, Origène se montre disciple trop fidèle du Stagirite"; E. de Faye, *Origène, Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée*, v. III (Paris, 1928), p. 172, suggested that Origen knew Aristotle quite well and had studied directly at least *De anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. "Notre théologien est beaucoup plus redevable à Aristote qu'on ne le suppose. Directement ou indirectement, il a subi son influence. Celle ci s'est fait sentir notamment dans le domaine de la science de l'homme." And de Faye insisted that one could never understand Origen's ideas on the soul without a careful and detailed confrontation with those of Aristotle. See also R. Cadiou, *La Jeunesse d'Origène* (Paris, 1935), p. 119.

⁶⁷Origen dealt with the doctrine of the Resurrection on several occasions: first in his early commentary on the first Psalm and in a special treatise *De resurrectione*, which is now available only in fragments preserved by Methodius and in the *Apology of Pamphilus*; then in *De Principiis*; and finally in *Contra Celsum*. There was no noticeable development in his views. See *Selecta in Ps. 15, M.G. XII*, c 1906: *δπερ πότε ἔχαρκτηρίζετο ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τουτο χαρκτηρισθήσεται ἐν τῷ πνευματικῷ σώματι*; c 1907: *ὁ σπερματικὸς λόγος ἐν τῷ κόκκῳ του σίτου δραξάμενος τῆς παρακειμένης ὕλης, καὶ δι' ἄλης αὐτῆς χωρίσας κτλ.*; cf. *ap. Method. De resurr.* I.22.3, p. 244 Bonw.: *τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκειμενον οὐδέποτε ἔχει ταῦτὸν διόπερ οὐ κακῶς ποταμὸς ἄνωμασε τὸ σωμα, διότι ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκριβὲς τάχα οὐδὲ δύο ἡμερῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκειμενον ταυτὸν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν . . . καν ρευστή ἢ ν ἢ φύσις του σώματος, τῷ τὸ εἶδος τὸ χαρκτηρίζον τὸ σῶμα ταῦτὸν εἶναι, ὡς καὶ τοὺς τύπους μένειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς τὸς τὴν ποιότητα Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου τὴν σωματικὴν παριστάνοντος . . . τουτο τὸ εἶδος, καθ' ὃ εἰδιοποιεῖται ὁ Παῦλος καὶ ὁ Πέτρος, τὸ σωματικόν, ὃ ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει περιτίθεται πᾶσιν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπὶ τὸ κρειττον μεταβάλλον. The same ap. Pamphil. *Apologia pro Origene*, cap. 7, *M.G. S VII*, c. 594: *nos ver o post corruptionem mundi eosdem ipsos futuros esse homines dicimus, licet non in eodem statu, neque in iisdem passionibus*; p. 594-5: *per illam ipsam substantialem rationem, quae salva permanet; ratio illa substantiae corporalis in ipsis corboribus permanebat*; p. 595: *rationis illius virtus quae est insita in interioribus ejus medullis; De Princ. II. 10.I, Koetschau: virtus re surrectionis; schema aliquid; 10.3: Ita namque etiam nostra corpora velut granum cadere in terram putanda sunt; quibus insita ratio, ea quae substantiam continet corporalem, quamvis emortua fuerint corpora et corrupta atque dispersa, verbo tamen Dei ratio illa ipsa quae semper in substantia corporis salva est, erigat ea de terra, et restituat ac reparat, sicut ea virtus quae est in grano frumenti . . . Dei jussu ex terreno et animat corpore corpus reparat spiritale, quod habitare possit in coelis; Sic et in ratione**

*homanorum corporum manent quaedam surgendi antiqua principia, et quasi έντεριώνη id est seminarium mortuorum, sinu terrae confouetur. Cum autem iudicii dies advenerit, et in voce Archangeli et in novissima tuba tremuerit terra, movebuntur statim semina, et in puncto horae mortuos germinabunt; non tamen easdem carnes, nec in his formis restituent quae fuerunt; cf. III.6.Isq., Koetschau, 280 ss.; III.6.6., p. 288: sed hoidem (corpus), abjectis his infirmitatibus in quibus nunc est, in gloriam transmabitur spiritale effectum, ut quod fuit indignitatis vas, hoc ipsum expurgatum fiat vas honoris et beatitudinis habitaculum; Contra Celsum, IV.57, Koetschau 330: διό και την άνάστασιν τών νεκρών άναδεχόμενοι μεταβολάς φάμεν γένεσθαι ποιότητων τών εν σώμασιν' έκει σπειρόμενά τινά αυτών εν φθορά εγείρεται εν άφθαροσία και σπειρόμενα εν άτιμία εγείρεται εν δόξη κτλ.; V.18, ρ : ού το γενησόμενον σώμα φήσι σπειρεσθαι, άλλ' άπό του σπειρομένου και γυμνου βαλλομένου επί την γη ν λέγει, διδόντος του Θεού έκάστω τών σπερμάτων ίδιον σώμα, οιονει άνάστασιν γίγνεσθαι' άπό του καταβεβλημένου σπέρματος εγειρομένου στάχυος έν τοις τοιοιόδε' οιονει έν νάπτω ή επί μεζονος δένδρου έν έλαίας πυρην ή τινη τών άκροθρόων; V.23, ρ. : ημείς μεν συν ού φάμεν το διαφθαρέν σώμα επανέρχεσθαι εις την έξ άρχής φύσιν λέγομεν γάρ ώσπερ επί του κόκκου του σίτου εγείρεται στάχυς, ουτω λόγος τις εγκείται τω σώματι, άφ' οδ μη φθειρομένου εγείρεται το σώμα έν αφθαροσία. He contrasts himself, his view, with the Stoic idea on an identical repetition. See D. Huetius, *Origeniana*, 1.II, c II, q.9; *de resurrectione mortuorum*, M.G. XVII, c 980 sq.; Redepenning, *Origenes* (Bonn, 1846), Bd. II, s. 118ff.; C Ramers, *Des Origenes Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches*, In. Diss. (Trier, 1851); J. B. Kraus, *Die Lehre des Origenes über die Auferstehung der Toten*, Programm (Regensburg, 1859), J. Denis, *La Philosophie d'Origène* (Paris, 1884), p. 297 ss.; Ch. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Oxford, 1886), p. 225-227, 265f., 291; the soul has a vital assimilative "spark," or "principles," which lays hold of fitting matter, and shapes it into a habitation suited to its needs; the same process, by which it repairs the daily waste of our organism now, will enable it then to construct a wholly new tenement for itself; L. Atzberger, *Geschichte der Christlichen Eschatologie innerhalb der Vornizaenischen Zeit* (Freiburg i/Br., 1896), s. 366-456; N. Bonwetsch, *Die Theologie des Methodius von Olympus*, *Abhandlungen d. K. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, N.F. VII, 1904, s. 105 ff.; F. Prat, *Origène*, p. 87 ss.; G. Bardy, *Origène*, *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Cath.*, t.XI, 1931, c 1545 s.; R. Cadiou, *La Jeunesse d'Origène*, p. 117 ss.: "*virtualité physique ou l'idée du corps*," "*une idée active*," "*à la fois une idée et une énergie*" (p. 122, note); "*l'âme conserve toujours les virtualités d'une vie physique proportionnées à ses besoins*." Cf. also Bp. Westcott's article on Origen in *Smith and Wace Dictionary*, IV, 1887.*

⁶⁸Among the late scholastics, Durandus of San Porciano must be mentioned, "*doctor resolutissimus*" (d. 1332 or 1334). He puts the question: "*Supposito quod anima Petri fieret in materia quae fuit in corpore Pauli, utrum esset idem Petrus qui prius er at?*" and answers positively: "*cuicumque materiae uniatur anima Petri in resurrectione, ex quo est eadem forma secundum numerum per consequens erit idem Petrus secundum numerum*";

quoted by Fr. Segarra, S.J., *De identitate cor poris mortalis et corporis resurgentis* (Madrid, 1929), p. 147. See *Quaestiones de Novissimis, auctore L. Billot, S.J., Romae 1902, thesis XIII*, p. 143 sq.

⁶⁹See St. Methodius' *De resurrectione* in the complete edition of Bonwetsch, specially the 3rd book. Cf. Bonwetsch, *opus cit.*, S. 119 ff.: J. Farges, *Les idées morales et religieuses de Méthode d'Olympe* (Paris, 1929); Folke Bostrom, *Studier till den Grekiska Theologins Frälsningslära* (Lund, 1932), s. 135 ff. and *passim*.

⁷⁰Of St. Gregory of Nyssa's writings, his dialogue *De anima et resurrectione*, his homilies *De opificio hominis* and the *Great Catechetical oration* are of special importance. See the introductory article of Srawley in his edition of the *Catechetical oration*, specially on the relation of St. Gregory to St. Methodius. Cf. Hilt, *Des heil. Gregors von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen* (Köln, 1890); F. Kiekamp, *Die Gotteslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nyssa*, I (Münster, 1895), s. 41 ff.; K. Gronau, *Poseidonius und die jüdisch-christliche Genesis-exegese* (Berlin, 1974), s. 141 ff., emphasizes the influence of Poseidonius and specially of his commentary on the *Timaeus*; Bostrom, *op. cit.*, s. 159.

⁷¹The term ζωτική δύναμις is of Stoic origin and comes probably from Poseidonius. The first instance of its use is in Diodoros of Sicily, *Hist.* II, 51, and the source of Diodoros on this occasion is supposed to be just Poseidonius [on Arabia]. Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* II.9, 24; *omne igitur quod vivit, seu animal aive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem, ex quo intellegi debet earn caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem; comp.* 88.51, 127: (*genera omnium rerum*) *quae quidem omnia earn vim seminis habent in se ut ex uno plura generentur*. Carl Reinhardt, *Poseidonius* (München, 1921), s. 244, points out that the Greek word, rendered by Cicero with "vis seminis," could hardly be λόγος σπερματικός, but rather δύναμις σπερματική. «Σπερματικός λόγος ist ein Begriff des alten Intellectualismus, eine Bezeichnung für die Weltvernunft, die zeugend wird, damit die Welt vernünftig werde; daher die Verbindung zwischen den λόγος und den Qualitäten. Was Cicero, d.h. Poseidonius, unter 'vis seminis' versteht, ist angeschaute, in der Natur erlebte, physikalisch demonstrierte Lebenskraft, ein Zeugen, das wohl planvoll ist, aber vor allem Zeugen ist und bleibt. Bestimmte sich die Kategorien, worein der Begriff σπερματικός λόγος gedacht war, durch die Korrelate Materie und Vernunft, ὕλη καὶ λόγος, so bestimmt sich die Kategorien, worein der Begriff 'vis seminis' gedacht ist, durch die Korrelate Kraft und Wirkung." The term ζωτική δύναμις is used with a terminological precision by Philo and Clement of Alexandria.

⁷²St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima et resurrectione*, M.G. XLIV, col. 225 sq.

⁷³Cf. A. E. Taylor's *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928), *ad locum*, p. 184 ff., and the *Excursus* IV, "The concept of Time in the *Timaeus*," p. 678-691; see also A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 446 ff. and A. Rivaud, *Introduction to his Edition of the Timaeus* (Paris, 1925); cf. also an interesting comparison of the two mentalities by L. Labertonniere,

Le réalisme Chrétien et l'idéalisme grec (Paris, 1904), and the book by J. Guittou, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et St. Augustin* (Paris, 1933).

⁷⁴See Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* II.11, 337b 35: "for what is of necessity coincides with what it always, since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'; hence a thing is eternal, if its 'being' is necessary; and if it is eternal, its 'being' is necessary; and if the 'coming-to-be' of a thing is therefore necessary, its 'coming-to-be' is eternal; and if eternal, necessary"; τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἰεὶ αἰμα... καὶ εἰ ἡ γένεσις τοῖνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, αἰδιος ἢ γένεσις τούτου, κοῦ εἰ αἰδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης. The argument is quite clear. If there is really a reason for a thing, *cur potius sit quam non sit*, there can be no reason whatever, why this thing should have not been from eternity, since otherwise the reason for its existence would not have been sufficient, *i.e.*, necessary or eternal. Cf. *De part. anim.* I.1, 639b 23; *De gen. anim.* II.1, 731b 24; *Physic.* III.4, 203b 30; see A. Mansion, *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne* (Louvain, 1913), p. 169 ss.

⁷⁵Aristotle, *De Caelo* I.2, 269a 29: "the circle is a perfect thing (κύκλος τῶν τελειῶν), which cannot be said of any straight line; not of any infinite line: for if it were perfect, it would have a limit and an end; nor of any finite line: for in every case there is something beyond it, since any finite line can be extended."

⁷⁶Aristotle, *Physica* IV.14, 223b 29; cf. *De gen. et corr.* II.11, 338a 3: "it follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical, *i.e.*, must return upon itself." διὸ ἀνάγκη κύκλω εἶναι; I.14: ἀπλῶς ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ ἔρα κινήσει καὶ γενέσει ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης; *Probl.* XVII.3, 986a 25: "Just as the course of the firmament and of each of the stars is a circle, why should not also the coming-to-be and the decay of perishable things be of such a kind that the same things again come into being and decay? This agrees with the saying that 'human life is a circle.'" And so we should ourselves be "prior" and one might suppose the arrangement of the series to be such that it returns back in a circle to the point from which it began and thus secures continuity and identity of composition. If then human life is a circle, and a circle has neither beginning nor end, we should not be "prior" to those who lived in the time of Troy, nor they "prior" to us by being nearer to the beginning." On the circular movement in Aristotle see O. Hamelin, *Le Système d'Aristote*, 2 ed. (Paris, 1931), p. 366 ss.; J. Chevalier, *La Notion du Nécessaire chez Aristote et chez ses prédécesseurs, particulièrement chez Platon* (Paris, 1915), p. 160 s., 180 s.; R. Mugnier, *La Théorie du Premier Noteur et l'évolution de la Pensée Aristotélicienne* (Paris, 1930), p. 24 ss.

⁷⁷See P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde, Histoire des Doctrines Cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic*, t.I (Paris, 1914), p. 65 ss., *La Grande Année, La périodicité du monde selon les philosophes antiques*; p. 275-296, *La Grande Année chez les Grecs et les Latins, après Aristote*; t. II (1914), p. 447 ss., *Les pères de l'Église et la Année*. Cf. Hans Meyer, *Zur Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft aller Dinge*, in *Festgabe A. Ebr hard* (Bonn, 1911), s. 359 ff.

⁷⁸Eudem. *Physic.* III, frg. 51, ap. Simplic., *In Physic.* IV.12, 732.27

Diels: ει δέ τις πιστεύσεις τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὥστε πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῶ, καγὼ μυθολογήσω το ράθδου εχω ὑμῖν καθημένοις, ουτω και τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ,μοίως ἔξει κτλ. Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, V.21, Koetschau 22: τῶν γὰρ ἀστέρων κατὰ τινὰς περιόδους τεταγμένους τοὺς αὐτοὺς σχηματισμοὺς και σχέσεις προς ἀλλήλους λαμβανόντων, πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ὁμοίως εχειν φασί: τοις δτε το αὐτό σχήμα τς σχέσεως τῶν ἀστέρων περιεῖχεν ὁ κόσμος, ἀνάγκη τοῖνυν κατὰ τουτον τον λόγον τῶν ἀστέρων ἐκ μακρῶς περιόδου ἐλθόντων ἐπὶ την αὐτὴν σχέσιν προς ἀλλήλους, οποιαν εἶχον ἐπὶ Σωκράτους, πάλιν Σωκράτη γενέσθαι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν κτλ. This idea of the periodical succession of worlds seems to have been traditional in Greek philosophy. See Eusebius of Caesarea, *Praep. Evang.* I.8, M.G. XXI, 56, and Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 1.16, on Anaximandros: ἐξ ἀπείρου αἰῶνος ἐνακυκλουμένων πάντων αὐτῶν [Eusebius' authority in this chapter is Pseudo-Plutarch's *Stromata*]. Simplicius, *In Physic.* VIII.I, 1121.13 sq. Diels, mentions also Anaximenes, Heraclitus and Diogenes, as well as the Stoics; all of them believed that the Cosmos was eternal (ἄε_ μὲν φασιν εἶναι κόσμον), but periodically changed and renewed ἄλλοτε ἄλλον γινόμενον ν κατὰ τινὰς χρόνων περιόδους; cf. Simplic, *In De Caelo*, I.10, 294.4-6 Heiberg.

⁷⁹P. Duhem, I, p. 275: "*alors survient Aristote, qui rattache logiquement ce croyance à son système rationnel de Physique ... , la vie du Monde sublunaire est, toute entière, une vie périodique*"; cf. p. 164 s.: "*Les mouvements locaux des corps célestes sont périodiques; au bout d'un certain temps, ces corps reviendront aus positions qu'ils occupent aujourd'hui; or périodicité des mouvements locaux des êtres incorruptibles entraîne nécessairement la périodicité des effets dont ces mouvements sont causes, c' est-à-dire des transformations produites en la matière corruptible; les générations, donc, et les corruptions qui se produisent aujourd'hui se sont déjà produites une infinité de fois dans le passé; elles se reproduiront, dans l'avenir, une infinité de fois, ... la vie dit l'Univers entière sera une vie périodique.*"

⁸⁰Tatianus, *Adv. Graecos*, c. 5, Amim I.32, 109: τὸν Ζήνωνα διὰ της ἐκπυρώσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίστασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοις αὐτοις, λέγω δὲ "Ἀνητον και μελέτην ἐπὶ τῷ κατηγορεῖν; Stob. *Ecl.* I, 171.2 W., Amim II. 596, 183, on Zeno, Cleantes and Chrysippos: την οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἶον εἰς σπέρμα το πυρ, και πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμῃσιν, οἶα πρότερον ἦ ν; cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, V.20, p. 21 Koetschau: οἱτοι δι' οἱ ἄνδρες φασί τη ἐξῆς περιόδῳ τοιαυτα εσεσθαι, και Σωκράτη ν μὲν πάλιν Σωφρονίσκου υἱὸν και Ἀθηναῖον εσεσθαι, και τὴν Φαιναρέτην γημαμένην Σωφρονίσκῳ πάλιν αὐτὸν γεννήσειν. Κὰν μὴ ὀνομάζωσιν οὖν το της ἀναστάσεως ὄνομα τὸ πράγμα γε δηλοῦσιν ὅτι Σωκράτης ἀπὸ σπερμάτων ἀρξάμενος ἀναστήσεται τῶν Σωφρονίσκου και ἐν τη υστερα Φαιναρέτης διαπλασθήσεται και ἀναστραφεῖς Ἀθήνησι φιλοσοφήσει, κτλ.

⁸¹Cf. Oapke, s.v. ἀποκατάστασις in Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, I, s. 389: "Vor allem wird ἀποκατάστασις *terminus technicus* für die Wiederherstellung des kosmischen Zyklus." See *Lact. Div. Institut.* VII.23, Amim

II.623, 189: Chrysippus . . . in libris *yuos de providentis* scripsit haec intulit: και ἡμας μετὰ το τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινων εὐλημμένων χρόνου εἰς δ νυν εσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα; Nemesius, *De natura homin.*, cap. 38, Amim II.625, 190: τῶν ἀστερων ὁμοίως πάλιν φερομένων, εκαστον ἐν τη προτερα περιόδω γινόμενον ἀπαράλλακτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι: εσεσθαι γάρ πάλιν Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα κατ' εκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοις αυτοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις . . . καὶ πασαν πόλιν καὶ κώμην καὶ ἄγρον ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι κτλ.

⁸²Heraclitus and Empedocles did not believe in any numerical persistence of individuals. Things do perish altogether, and in the next world will be merely reproduced, but not the same, rather as similars. See Simpl. *In Di Caelo*, I.10, 307.14 Heiberg: φθειρούμενον δὲ καὶ πάλιν γινόμενον; 295, 4: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς το γινόμενον οὐτ' αὐτόν τω φθαρῆντι φησίν, εἰ μὴ, ἀρα κατ' εἶδος. For Aristotle no individual identity existed in the sublunar world, changeable and corruptible. In the successive periods there will be no *numeric* identity, as in the celestial sphere, but only a *similarity*, continuity of species; from Aristotelian Physics this idea was inherited by the later schools. See Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* II.2, 338b 16: ἀνάγκη τω εἶδει, ἀριθμῷ δὲ μὴ ἀνακάμπτειν; Probl. XVII.3, 796a 27: "to demand that those who are coming into being should be numerically identical is foolish, but one would rather accept the theory of the identity of the species," τω εἶδει; cf. also Eudemus *ap. Simpl.*, *In Physic.* V.4, 886 Diels: διό τω εἶδει ἐν τούτῳ ρητέον, καὶ οὐ τω ἀριθμῷ. See O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 402; Mugnier, *op. cit.*, p. 26 ss. It is not quite clear to what extent the Stoics did admit an individual immortality. Alexander of Aphrodisias suggests a positive answer, *In Analyt. prior.*, 180.39 Wallies, Amim II.624, 189: πάλιν πόντα ταῦτά ἐν τω κόσμῳ γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀριθμόν. Cicero, *T usc.* I.32, gives another information: "Stoici diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant"; in any case they do not survive the ἐκπόρωσις; see L. Stein, *Die Psychologie der Stoa*, I (Berlin, 1886), s. 144 f, and Zeller, ULI, 582 f. Smeckel, *Die Philosophie des mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1902), s. 250 and *Anm.* 3 contests this view. In any case, Origen had to deal with a Stoic teaching that rejected a numerical identity of the recurrent individuals. "Not the same Socrates, but somebody fully alike," ἵνα μὴ Σωκράτης πάλιν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀπαράλλακτος τις τω Σωκράτη, γάμησων ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα Ξανθίππη, καὶ κατηγορηθῆσάμενος ὑπὸ ἀπαράλλακτων Ἀνήτων καὶ Μελήτων; *Contra Celsum*, IV.68, Koetschau 338, and *Amim* II.626, 190. Origen objected that in this case the world itself would not have to be the same always, but also only ἀπαράλλακτος ἕτερος ἑτέρω. But obviously he misses the point: for the Stoics, just because the Cosmos is always the same (ἡ αὐτὴ τάξις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους), every particular has to be repeated in the same shape, but nothing more is required for the uniformity of the whole.

⁸³Plotinus, IV.6.12; V.7.1-3. Cf. Guitton, *op. cit.*, 55: "Plotin applique à toute existence ce schéma circulaire ..., le cycle mythique est pour lui le type d'existence." See also Proclus, *Institutio theologica*, prop. 54, 55, 199, ed. Dodds, p. 52, 54, 174 and notes *ad loca*.

⁸⁴Lossev, *Symbolism*, p. 643. Cf. Guitton, *op. cit.*, p. 359-360: "Les

Grecs se représentaient la présence de l'éternel dans le temps sous la forme de retour cyclique. Inversement, ils imaginaient volontiers que le temps se poursuivait dans l'éternel et que la vie présente n'était qu'un épisode du drame de l'âme: ainsi voulaient les mythes...ici la pensée chrétienne est décisive... Les âmes n'ont pas d'histoire avant leur venue. Leur origine, c'est leur naissance; après la mort la liberté est abolie avec le temps et l'histoire cesse. Le temps mythique est condamné. Les destinées se jouent une fois pour toutes... Le temps cyclique est condamné... "

⁸⁵Cf. my article, "L'idée de la Creation dans la Philosophie Chrétienne," *Logos, Revue internationale de la pensée orthodoxe*, I (Bucharest, 1926). See the article on creation contained in this volume.

⁸⁶St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XII.20; cf. Nemesius, *De hominis natura*, c. 38, *M.G.* XL, c 761: εἰς ἅπαξ γὰρ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, καὶ οὐ κατὰ περίουρον εἶσθαι, τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δοξάζει λογία.

⁸⁹St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima et resurrectione*, *M.G.* XLVI.

⁹⁰There is only one exception. "The grave and death were not able to hold back the *Theotokos*, who is ever-watchful in prayers" [Kontakion on the day of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin]. The resurrection has already been actualized in full for the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God, by virtue of her intimate and unique union with Him Whom she bore.

⁹¹St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat. XLV*, in *S. Pascha*, 28, *M.G.* XXXVI, c 661: ἐδέθημεν Θεοῦ σαρκωμένου καὶ νεκρωμένου.

⁹²St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* XIII, 6, *M.G.* XXXIII, 780; cf. St. Basil, in *Ps.* 48, 4; *M.G.* XXIX, 440.

⁹³Office of Good Saturday, Canon, at Matins, *Irmos IX*, Hapgood, Service Book, p. 222.

⁹⁴St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat.* 39, 17, *M.G.* XXXVI, 356, cf. *Carmina* I.I, ser. II,4, ves.24-92, *M.G.* XXXVII, c 762.

⁹⁵It is hardly possible to agree with the interpretation suggested by J. H. Bernard, "A Study of St. Mark X.38, 39" *Journal of Theol. Studies*, XXVIII (1927), pp. 262-274. The "cup of sufferings" does include death as well. And it is very doubtful whether we can interpret the verb βαπτίζεσθαι as meaning merely "to be overwhelmed" [sc. with the floods of misfortune], so as to reduce the meaning of the Lord's saying only to this: "You will be overwhelmed by the same flood of tribulation by which I am being overwhelmed."

⁹⁶St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat.* 43, 13; *M.G.* XXXVI, c 640; cf. 24, c. 656; as well *Orat.* 4, 68; *M.G.* XXXV, c. 589.

⁹⁷*Matins of the Good Friday, stikhira idiomela*, Hapgood, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁹⁸St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat.* 45, 29, *M.G.* XXXVI, c 661, 664; cf. *Carmina*, I.I, ser. 1, vs. 77-80, XXXVII, c. 462-463: "And He gave to mortals a twofold purification; one of the Eternal Spirit, and by it He cleansed in me the old stain, which comes from the flesh; and the other of our blood, for I call mine the blood Christ, My God, has poured, the

redemption of the original infirmities and the salvation of the world." Cf. the interesting explanation why the Lord suffered in the open air, in St. Athanasius, *De incarnatione*, 25, *M.G.* XXV, c. 170: "for being lifted up on the Cross, the Lord cleansed the air of the malignity both of the devil and of demons of all kinds." The same idea occurs in St. John Chrysostom, in *Crucem et latronem*, *M.G.* XLIX, c. 408-409: "in order to cleanse all her defilement"; the Lord suffered not in the temple but in an open place, for this was the universal sacrifice, offered for the whole world.

⁹⁹St. Gregory of Nyssa, *In Resurrectionem*, or. I, *M.G.* XLVI, col. 612.

¹⁰⁰The whole question of the relation between the Last Supper and the Crucifixion was studied by M. de la Taille, *Mysterium Fidei* (Paris, 1921), *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*, ed. by Fr. Lattey, Cambridge Catholic Summer Schol, 1922; *Esquisse du Mystère de la Foi suivi de quelques éclaircissements* (Paris, 1923); *The Mystery of Faith and Human Opinion contrasted and defined* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930). Fr. de la Taille insists that the Last Supper and the Crucifixion were one Sacrifice, and the Last Supper was a sacramental and sacerdotal action, a liturgy, a sacred rite, by which Christ pledged Himself to death in the sight of His Father and of men; It was a sacramental offering and presentation. The sacrifice of Redemption, the sacrifice of His Passion and Death, was offered in the Upper Room.

¹⁰¹It is sometimes suggested that, death being the common law of human nature, Christ had to die simply because He was truly man. And His obedience was consummated in that He submitted Himself to the Divine decree of common human mortality. See, for instance, P. Gal tier, "Obeissant jusqu'à la mort," *Revue de l'Ascétique et de la Mystique*, I (1920, Toulouse), pp. 113-149 [Patristic documentation]. This argument is not at all convincing. Everything depends here upon our anthropological presuppositions.

¹⁰²Stikhira on the 3rd Sunday of Lent, Vespers.

¹⁰³St. John of Damascus, *de fide orth.*, III, 27, *M.G.* XCIV, c. 1907; cf. *Homil. in M. Sabbat.* 29, *M.G.* XCVI, c. 632. This is not a subtle speculation, but a logical implication of the strict Chalcedonian dogma. An established Christological terminology is presupposed, and specially the doctrine of the "enhypostasia" of the human nature in the Word, first formulated by Leontius of Byzantium and then developed by St. Maximus the Confessor. Earlier writers sometimes failed to present this idea of the preservation of both human elements in an unbroken unity with the Word with complete clearness. See K. Baehr, *Die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (Sulzbach, 1834); G. Jouassard, *L'abandon du Christ par Son Père durant sa Passion d'après la tradition patristique* (Lyon, 1923) [thesis]; "L'abandon du Christ d'après St. Augustin," *Revue des sciences relig.*, IV, 1925, pp. 310-326; *L'abandon du Christ au Croix dans la tradition grecque des IV et V siècles*, *ibid.*, V, 1925, pp. 609-633; J. Lebon, "Une ancienne opinion sur la condition du corps du Christ dans la mort," *Revue de l'histoire écl.* (XXIII, 1927), pp. 5-03, 209-241; E. Schiltz, *Le problème théologique du corps du Christ dans la mort*, *Divus Thomas* [Plaisance], 1935. See Excursus III, Verba derelictionis.

¹⁰⁴*Third Sunday in Lent, Matins, Adoration of the Cross.*

¹⁰⁵*St. John Chrysostom, in Crucem et latronem, h.I.M.G. XLIX, c 399.*

¹⁰⁶*Tuesday of the 4th week of Lent, siedalen.*

¹⁰⁷Prayer in Lent at Great Compline.

¹⁰⁸St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat. 41*, ed. Mason, pp. 105-106.

¹⁰⁹Exapostillarion at Easter Matins.

¹¹⁰St. John Damascene, *de fide orth.* IV, 11, *M.G. XCIV*, c 1128-1129; cf. St. Ignatius, *Smyrn.* 5; Lightfoot, 303; St. Irenaeus, *adv. haeres.* 11.20.3: *per passionem mortem destruxit . . . vitam autem manifestavit, et ostendit veritatem et incorruptionem donavit*, Harvey I.393; *M.G. VII.778*, c. 1135; V.23.2: *venit ad passionem pridie ante sabbatum, quae est sexta conditionis dies, in qua homo plasmatus est, secundum plasmationem ei eam quae est a morte, per suam passionem donans*, Harvey, II.389. Earlier in St. Justin, *Apol.* I, 63, Otto I, 174. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, in *Hebr.* II.14, *M.G. LXXIV*, c 965: "the death of Christ is, as it were, the root of life." Also St. Augustine, in *Ioann.* tr. XII, 19, 11: *ipsa morte liberavit nos a morte; morte occisus mortem occidit . . . mortem suscepit et mortem suspendit in cruce . . . , in morte Christi mors mortua est, quia vita mortua occidit mortem, plenitudo vitae deglutivit mortem*, *M.L. XXXV*, c 1489-1490.

¹¹¹Vespers of Good Saturday.

¹¹²In Byzantine iconography, from the late 7th century the Resurrection of Christ was invariably represented as the Descent into Hell, from which the Lord leads Adam and others. It meant the destruction of the bonds of death. The iconography depended directly upon liturgical texts and rites and was a pictorial interpretation of the same experience. A certain influence of the apocryphal literature is obvious, particularly that of the *Evangelium Nicodemi* and of Pseudo Epiphanius' *Homily of Good Saturday* [*M.G. XLIII*, 440-464]. A survey of monuments and their liturgical parallels is given by N. V. Pokrovsky, *The Gospel in the Monuments of Iconography*, especially Byzantine and Russian, *Acts of the VIIIth Archeological Congress in Moscow 1890*, v.I, p. 398f; G. Rushforth, *The Descent into Hell in Byzantine Art*, Papers of the British School at Rome, I (1902), p. 114f. Cf. G. Millet, *Recherches sur l'iconographie de l'Evangile aux XIV, XV et XVI siècles d'après les monuments de Mistre, de la Macédoine et de Mont Athos* (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 109, Paris 1916), p. 396 ss. Millet states plainly, that "*l'iconographie primitive du Crucifiement montrait non point Jésus souffrant sur la Croix, mais Dieu triomphant par son sacrifice volontaire. Elle s'attachait non au drame humain, mais au dogme*" [396]. See also Pokrovsky, p. 314 ff. and especially J. Reil, *Die altchristliche Bildzyklen des Lebens Jesu, Ficker's Studien*, N. F. Hf. 10, 1910, p. WQ ff. Reil says of the early representations on sarkophagi "*Es findet sich keine Leidenszene, in der Christus als Leidender dargestellt ist. Es erscheint immer stets als einer, der über dem Leiden steht . . . Die Verspottung selbst sieht wie eine Verherrlichung, die Dornkrönung wie ein Siegerkrönung aus*" [21-22]. The emotional and dramatic motives make their first appearance in Byzantine art not earlier than the late XIth century,

in the West still later, only after the spreading of the Franciscan ideas and ideals; see Millet, pp. 399-400, 555ss, and O. Schonewul, *Die Darstellung Christi, Ficker's Studien*, N. P., Hf. 9, 1909.

¹¹³Matins of Good Saturday, 6th song, First Troparion.

¹¹⁴Second Sunday after Easter, Matins, Canon, 4th Song, 1st troparion; cf. the *synaxarion* of Good Saturday: "For the Lord's body suffered the corruption, that is, the separation of the soul from the body. But in no wise did it undergo that sort of corruption (διαφθορά), which is the complete destruction of the flesh and decomposition."

¹¹⁵St. John of Damascus, *de fide orth.*, III.28, *M.G.* XCIV, c 1097, 11900. This distinction of the two meanings of "corruption" had a special importance after the so-called "Aphtharto-docetic" controversy. But it was clearly made even by Origen, *In Ps. XV*, 10, *M.G.* XII, c 1216. A vindication of Julian of Halicarnassus on the charge of heresy was attempted by R. Dragner, *Julien d'Halicarnasse et sa controverse avec Sévère d'Antioche sur l'incorruptibilité du corps de Jesus-Christ* (Louvain, 1924); cf., however, M. Jugie, *Julien d'Halicarnasse et Sévère d'Antioche, Échos d'Orient*, XXIV (1925), p. 129-162, and his earlier article, *La controverse galanite et la passibilité du corps de Jesus Christ*, in the *Dictionnaire de la théologie cath.*, v.VI (1920), pp. 1002-1023. The main problem is what the real meaning of the Passion and death of Our Lord is.

¹¹⁶St. John Damascene, *de fide orth.*, III.29, *M.G.* XCIV, 1101. Cf. Epiphanius, *Panarion, haer. XX*, 2; ed. Holl, I.230; *haer. XLIX*, 52, *M.G.* XLII, c 287-305-308; St. Cyril of Alexandria *de incarn. Unigeniti*, *M.G.* LXXV, c 1216: ψυχὴ δὲ θεῖα; St. Augustine, *de Symbolo ad catech. sermo alius*, c. VII, 7, *M.L.* XL, c 658: *totus ergo Filius apud Patrem, totus in Cru ce, totus in inferno, totus in Paradiso quae et latronem introduxit.*

¹¹⁷It was clearly stated by Rufinus, *Comm. in Symbolum Apostolorum*, c. 18, *M.L.* XXI, col. 356. *Sciendum sane est quod in Ecclesiae Romanae symbolono, habetur additum, "descendit ad inferna": sed neque in Orientis ecclesiis habetur hic sermo; vis tamen v erbt eadem videtur esse in eo, quod "sepultus" dicitur;* see St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech. IV*, 11, *M.G.* XXXIII, 469.

¹¹⁸I Peter 3:19: φυλακῆ, *Vulg. I carcer.* i.e. a place of confinement; under guard; Calvin suggested: "rather a watch-tower," [*Inst. II*. 16.97]; Acts 2:24: τὸ θανάτῳ variant of Acts 2:31: εἰς ᾗδην obviously with reference to Psalm 16:19. "Hades" means here "death," nothing more. For the whole history of this term in Christian usage see G. L. Prestige, "Hades in the Greek Fathers," *Journal of Theol. Studies*, XXIV (July, 1927), pp. 476-485. In liturgical texts, in any case, "Hell" or "Hades" denotes always this hopelessness of mortal dissolution.

¹¹⁹Easter-kontakion, Hapgood, 230: cf. St. John Damascene, *de fide orth.* III.27: "for just as darkness is dissolved on the introduction of light, so is death repulsed on the assault of Life, and for all comes life and for the destroyer destruction," *M.G.* XCIV (1907); also III.28, c 1100.

¹²⁰Vespers of Good Friday, troparion. Used as well as the Sunday

troparion of the 2nd tone. This is also the main idea of the "Catechetical oration," ascribed to St. John Chrysostom appointed to be read at Easter Matins. Cf. St. John Damascene, *de fide orth.*, III.29, M.G. XCIV, c 1101: J. N. Karmiris in his book proves quite convincingly that the whole tradition of the Church was always unanimous on the victorious and triumphant character of the Descent into Hell. See Origen, in *I Kings*, hom. 2, M.G. XII, 1020: εἰς τα χωρία ἐκεῖνα οὐχ ὡς δοῦλος τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ὡς XII, 1020: κατελήλυθεν εἰς τα χωρία ἐκεῖνα οὐχ ὡς δοῦλος τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ὡς δεσπότης παλασσιον; in *Cant.*, 1.II, M.G. XIII, 184: et ipse in morte fuerit voluntarie, et non ut nos necessitate peccati; solus est enim qui fuit inter moruos litber; St. John Damasc., in *M. Sabbat.*, 31, M.G. XCVI, 633: ἐν νεκροῖς μὲν ἦν, ἄλλα ζῶν, ὡς ἐλεύθερος.

¹²¹This idea was brought forward with great emphasis by Calvin and shared by some other Reformed theologians, but at once was resented and vigorously repudiated by a great number of both Reformed and Catholic divines, as a "new, unheard-of heresy." Calvin put a great stress on that article of the Apostles Creed. "*Mox tamen fiet, tanti interesse ad redemptionis nostrae summam, ut ea praeterita multum ex mortis Christi jructu depereat.*" "*Nibilactum eart, si corporea tantum morte de junctus fuisset Christus: sed operae simul pretium erat, ut divinae ultionis severitate sentiret: quo ex irae ipsius intercederet, et satisfaceret justo judicio. U.nde enim eum oportuit cum injerorum copiis aeternaeque mortis horrore, quasi consertis manibus, luctari . . . sed alius majus et excellentius jretium fuisse, quod diros in anima cruciatus damnati ac perditii hominis pertulerit . . . quantum enim fuis set, secure et quasi per lusum prodire ad subeundam mortem . . . Et sane nisi poenae juisset particeps anima, corporibus tantum juisset Redemptor.*" *Ioannis Calvinii, Institutio christianae religionis*, ed A. Tholuck, Berolini (1834), I.II, c. 16, 8-12, pp. 332-337; English translation by Henry Beveridge, Calvin Translation Society (Edinburgh, 1845), v.88, pp. 57-62: "The omission of it greatly detracts from the benefit of Christ's death. . . . Nothing had been done if Christ had only endured corporeal death. In order to interpose between us and God's anger and satisfy His righteous judgement it was necessary that He should feel the weight of Divine vengeance. Whence also it was necessary that He should engage, as it were, at close quarters with the powers of hell and horrors of eternal death. . . . He bore in His soul the tortures of condemned and ruined man. . . . How small a matter had it been to come forth securely and, as it were, in sport to undergo death. . . . And certainly had not His soul shared in the punishment, He would have been a Redeemer of bodies only." See also the French redaction (1539), Jean Calvin, *Institution de la religion chrétienne*, ed. Pannier, II, 107-108: "*Ce n'estoit rien si Jesus Christ se fist seulement acquite d'une mort corporelle, mais il jalloit aussi qui il sentist la séverité du Jugement de Dieu, à fin d'intercéder, et comme s'opposer que son ire ne tombast sur nous, en satis f aisant a i celle. Pour cefaire, il est oit expédient qu'il bataillast, comme main à main, à l'encontre des puysances d'Enjer et de l'horreur de la mort éternelle. . . . Mais nous disons qu'il a soustenu la pesanteur de la vengeance de Dieu, en tant qu'il a esté jrapé et affligé de sa main et a expérimenté tous les signes que Dieu monstre aux pécheurs, en se courrouceant contre eux et les punissant!*" This interpretation obviously depends upon the penal conception of Atonement, it stands and falls with it. As a matter of fact, a somewhat similar interpretation of the

Descent into Hell was suggested before Calvin by Nicolas of Cusa.

¹²²St. Athanasius, *de Incarnatione*, 26, *M.G.* XXV, col. 141.

¹²³Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *de recta fide ad Theodos.*, 22, *M.G.* LXXVI, c 1165, *hom. pasch.* VII, *M.G.* LXXVII, c 352; St. John Chrysostom, *hom. in Matt.* 26, 3, *M.G.* LVII: "How are the gates of brass wiped away and the iron doors destroyed? Through His body...." Then for the first time was an immortal body shown and it did destroy the power of death: τότε γὰρ πρῶτον ἐδείχθη σῶμα ἀθάνατον, καὶ διαλύον του θανάτου την τυραννίδα. It manifested that the power of death is broken, του θανάτου δείκνυσε την ισχὸν ἀνημμένην; St. John Damascene, *de fide orth.* III, 29, *M.G.* XCIV, c. 110. Of the Western Fathers see St. Augustine, *ep.* 164, *ad Euodium*, 12, 13, 16, 21, *M.L.* XXXIII, c 714, 715, 716. An excellent presentation of Orthodox doctrine of the Descent into Hell was given by J. N. Karmins, Ἡ εἰς Ἄδου κάθοδος του Χριστοῦ ἐξ ἀπόψεως ὀρθοδόξου (Athens, 1939), p. 156; cf. J. Dietelmair, *Historia dogmatis de descensu Christi ad inferos litteraria* (Altorfii, 1762); H. Quillet, *s. voce*, in the *Dict. de la théol. cath.*, t. IV; K. Gschwind, *Die Niederfahrt Christi in die Unterwelt, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen* (1911); F. Cabrol and A. de Meester, *s. voce*, in the *Dict. d'Archéologie char. et de liturgie*, t. IV, 1916; C Schmidt, *Gespräche Jesu mit seinen Jüngern nach der Auferstehung, Texte und Untersuchungen*, XLIII (1919), Excursus II, *Der Descensus ad inferos in der alten Kirche*, s.45 3-576; J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*, XX (1932); K. Prumm, *Die Darstellungen des Hadesfahrtes des Herrn in der Literatur der alten Kirche, Kritische Bemerkungen zum ersten Kapitel des Werkes von J. Kroll, Scholastik X* (1935); J. Chaîne, *s. voce* [Vigoureux], *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, Supplément, t. II (1934), c. 395ss. The Patristic conception of a ransom paid to the devil needs a special investigation in connection with the doctrine of the Descent into Hell. But it seems that in most cases the Devil stands simply for Death. The best dossier and analysis of Patristic texts and references is given by J. Rivière, *Le dogme de la Redemption, Essai d'étude historique* (Paris, 1905), the whole chapter, "La question de droit des demons," p. 373 [there is an English translation, London, 1911]; and again in his own books: *Le dogme de la Rédemption, Études critiques et documents* (Louvain, 1931). Here is Rivière's conclusion. "Dès lors, dire que le Christ s'est livré au démon pour prix de notre rachat ne serait-ce pas tous simplement une manière métaphorique d'enseigner qu'Il s'est livré à la mort pour notre salut?" [*Revue des sciences religieuses*, X, p. 621]. See Excursus IV, *Descensus ad inferna*.

¹²⁴Easter Canon, 6th song, Irmos, Hapgood 230.

¹²⁵Easter Vespers.

¹²⁶Monday of Easter week, *Theotokaria*, 4th song.

¹²⁷St. John Chrysostom, in *Acta Apost. hom.* VII, *M.G.* LX, c 57: καὶ αὐτὸ ὥδινε κατέχων αὐτὸν ὁ θάνατος, καὶ τα δεινὰ ἐνέπασχεν; Chrysostom has in view the words of Acts: τὰς ὥδινας του θανάτου [Acts 2:24]; cf. Ps. 17:5-6. Strack-Billerbeck, *ad Acta* II.24: "Stricke des

Todes," or "Weben des Todes" [2:617-618]. Cf. in the Liturgy of St. Basil, the Prayer of Consecration: καὶ κατελθὼν ἡ διὰ τοῦ σταυροῦ εἰς τὸν Ἄδη ὡς ἵνα πληρώσῃ εαυτοῦ τὰ πάντα, ἔλυσε τὰς οὐδύνας τοῦ θανάτου· καὶ ἀναστὰς τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ ὁδοποιήσας πάσῃ σαρκὶ τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, καθότι οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν κρατεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ ἀρχηγῶ ἡ τῆς ζωῆς, ἐγένετο ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων, πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἵνα ἡ αὐτὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πάσι πρωτεύων.

¹²⁸Office for the Burial of a Priest, *Stikhira idiomela* by St. John of Damascus, Hapgood, p. 415.

¹²⁹St. Athanasius, *De incarn.* 26, *M.G.* XXV, c. 141; cf. St. John Chrysostom in *Ioann.* h. 85, [al. 84], 2: "By all means He shows that this is a sort of new death, for everything was in the power of the dying One and death did not come to His body until He so desired," κοινὸν τοῦ θάνατον τοῦτον ὄντα, *M.G.* LIX, c. 462.

¹³⁰Easter Canon, 2nd song, 2nd Troparion, Hapgood p. 231.

¹³¹Sunday Matins, siedalen of the 3rd tone.

¹³²"Christ is first-born from the dead." Col. I:18. Born, as it were, from the grave. Resurrection is a new mysterious birth into full immortality, into a new and perpetual, i.e. "eternal," life. And death itself issues into a birth. "The first that shall rise from the dead." *Ads* 26:23: "The first begotten of the dead." *Rev.* 1:5. Cf. J. Chaîne, *Dict. d.l. Bible, Suppl.*, t.II, p. 418: "*La résurrection est comparée à un enfantement de la part du sœchol. Jésus est le premier parmi les hommes qui soit sorti du sein de l'Hadès.*"

¹³³St. John Chrysostom, in *Hebr.* h. 17, 2, *M.G.* LXIII, c. 129.

¹³⁴St. Athanasius, *De incarn.* 21, *M.G.* XXV, c. 132.

¹³⁵St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. catech.*, c. 16, Srawley, 70-72: πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρρηκτον ἐνωσιν τοῦ διασχισθέν συναρμόσας . . . οἷον ἀπὸ τινός ἀρχῆς εἰς πᾶσαν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν τῇ δυνάμει κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐκ τοῦ διακριθέντος ἐναντι διαβαίνει. Cf. *adv. Apollinarium*, cap. 17, *M.G.* XLV, 1153, 1156: "Death is but the separation of soul and body, but He, who has united both soul and body in Himself, did not separate Himself from either. . . Being simple and uncomposed, He was not divided, when body and soul were separated; on the contrary, He rather accomplishes their union, and by His own indivisibility does bring even the separated into unity, τῷ γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀδιαιρέτω καὶ τὸ διηρημένον εἰς ἐνωσιν ἀγει. The Only Begotten God Himself raises the human nature united with Him, first separating the soul from the body, and then co-uniting them again, and so the common salvation of nature is achieved."

¹³⁶St. Gregory of Nyssa, *adv. Apollin.*, c. 55, *M.G.* XLV, c. 1257, 1260.

¹³⁷Nicolas Cabasilas, *De vita in Christo*, II.86-96, ed. Gass, *Die Mystik des Nicolaus Cabasilas* (1849), pp. 46-48. Gass's edition is reproduced in

M.G. CL. A French translation by S. Broussaleux has been recently published by "Irénikon."

¹³⁸St. Ignatius, *Magnes* 5, Lightfoot p. 117-118. The language of Ignatius is molded on that of St. Paul; comp. Rom. 6:5, 8:1f, 29; 2 Cor. 4:10, Phil. 3:10, 2 Tim. 2:11 (Lightfoot, *ad locum.*)

¹³⁹St. Maximus, *Quaest. ad Thalassium*, qu. 39, Schol. 3, M.G. XC.393.

¹⁴⁰St. Maximus, *Quaest. ad Thalass.* 6, M.G. XC, c 280; cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haereses*, IV.31.I, M.G. VII, c 1105: οὕτω καὶ ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸς μὲν οἶος τε ἦν παρασχεῖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τέλειον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀδύνατος λαβεῖν αὐτό· νήπιον γὰρ ἦν; καὶ 1607: ἐκείνος δὲ ἀρτι γεγονῶς, ἀδύνατος ἦν λαβεῖν αὐτό, ἢ καὶ λαβὼν χωρῆσαι, ἢ καὶ χωρῆσας κατασχεῖν.

¹⁴¹On the whole question of "universal salvation" see E. P. Pusey's still unantiquated pamphlet: *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?* 1879, 1880. Andreas of Caesarea, in his *Commentary on Revelation*, gives an interesting terminological summary. (See the whole of chapter 62, ad XX.5, 6, on the "first resurrection" and the "second death," M.G. CVI, c 412-413; cf. also ch. 59, ad XIX, 21, c. 406.) There are two kinds of life and two kinds of death, and therefore two kinds of resurrection too. The first life is that of the fallen man, "temporary and fleshly" (πρόσκαιρος καὶ σαρκική). The second life is Life eternal, which is promised to the saints in the age to come. The first death is the separation of the soul and body, a death "of the flesh" (ὁ τῆς σαρκός) and for a time only (πρόσκαιρος), up to the second resurrection. The "second death" is the "eternal" condemnation, which is prepared for the sinners in the age to come, eternal torments and confinement in Gehenna (ὁ τῆς εἰς γέενναν ἔκπομπῆς). Again, the "first resurrection" is a spiritual regeneration, a "quickening from the deadly deeds," and the second and ultimate resurrection is that of the bodies, which are to be relieved out of corruption and transformed into incorruption. Πρῶτος τοίνυν ὁ σωματικὸς θάνατος, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ παρακοῇ δοθεὶς ἐπιτιμίαν ὁ δεύτερος, ἡ αἰώνιος κόλασις; πρώτη δὲ ἀνάστασις ἢ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐργῶν ζωοποίησις· δεύτερα δὲ ἢ ἐκ φθορᾶς τῶν σωμάτων εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν μεταποίησις.

¹⁴²N. Cabasilas, *De vita in Christo*, II.95, Gass 48.

¹⁴³St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Mystag.* II. 4-5, 7, M.G. XXXIII, c. 1080-1081, 1084; cf. 8II.2, c. 1089. See also St. Basil, *de Spiritu* S. 55, M.G. XXXII, c 126, 129.

¹⁴⁴St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Myst.* III.1, M.G. XXXIII, c 1088.

¹⁴⁵St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. cat.*, 33, Srawley 123, 126.

¹⁴⁶St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. catech.* 35, Srawley 129-130.

¹⁴⁷St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. cat.* 40, Srawley 159-164; cf. *Orat.* 1 in 5. *Pascha*, M.G. XLVI, c 604 s.; *de propos. sec. Deum*, M.G. XLV, c 289. This was the reason St. Gregory so vigorously attacked those who used to postpone baptism till the later period of life. The benefit of baptism is

thereby diminished, since not enough time is left to actualize the baptismal grace by the creative effort of a godly life (*M.G.* XVI, c 416-432). On the other hand, St. Gregory admits that the benefits of baptism will sooner or later be extended to and appropriated by everyone, i.e. that "baptism" in some form will be administered to all men. This idea is organically connected with the doctrine of "*apokatastasis*" and of the healing character of the whole after-life up to the final consummation. Hence the idea of a plurality of baptisms; and the last baptism will be that of fire, which nobody can escape. Similar ideas are to be found in St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat.* 39, 19, *M.G.* XXXVI, c 357; repeated by St. John Damascene, *de fide orth.*, IV.3, *M.G.* XCIV, c 1124-1125.

¹⁴⁸St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Mystag.* II, 4, *M.G.* XXXIII, r. 1081. Cf. N. Cabasilas, *De vita in Christo*, II, 10.

¹⁴⁹N. Cabasilas, *De vita in Christo*, II.3, 4, 6, Gass 28-29.

¹⁵⁰N. Cavasilas, *De vita in Christo*, IV. 1, 4, 15, Gass 81, 82, 84-85.

¹⁵¹St. John Chrysostom, in *Matt. horn.* 50, 3, *M.G.* LVIII, c 50f.

¹⁵²*Ibidem.horn.* 82, 5, col. 744.

¹⁵³*De proditione Judae*, I.6, *M.G.* XLIX, c 380.

¹⁵⁴Nicolas Cabasilas, *Explanatio div. liturgiae*, c. 23, *M.G.* CL, c On the "sacramental" remembrance and representation of Christ's death in the Eucharist, see Odo Casel, *Das Mysteriengedächtniss der Messliturgie im Lichte der Tradition, Jahrbücher für die Liturgiewissenschaft*, VI (1925), s. 113-204. "*Das Gedächtniss selbst besteht in der nach Vorbild des letzten Abendmahles gestalteten rituellen Begehung des Erlös un gs werkes. Dies Gedächtniss ist zugleich das Opfer. Es ist nicht subjektives Sicherinnern, sondern objektive Wirklichkeit unter dem Ritus, mit anderen Worten Symbol, Gleichnissbild, Mysterium. Die Anamnese stempelt also die ganze heilige Handlung zum realen Gedächtniss: der Erlösungstod wird unterdem Schleier der Ritus Wirklichkeit [130]...Dies Mysterium enthält so konkrete Wirklichkeit, dass es vollständig mit der Tat identifiziert wird, dies es mystisch darstellt; so sehr dass man von der symbolischen Darstellung im Mysterium auf die Geschichtlichkeit der Tat zurückschliessen kann. Es ist also auf beiden Seiten dieselbe eine Tat; nur ist sie im zweiten Falle unter Symbolen verbergen. Das Mysterium bringt genau so die Erlösung, wie jene erste Heil st at; ja es est die Erlösung [153]...Nicht das historische Ereignis hebt sich wieder aus der Vergangenheit hervor; Christus stirbt nicht wieder historisch-real; aber die Heilstat wird sakramental, in mysterio, in sacramento, gegenwärtig und dadurch für die Heilsuchenden zugänglich [174]...Die historisch vorgangene Passion wird sakramental gegenwärtig [186]."* Casel provides a copious Patristic documentation. One may consult his other essays as well. Cf. Darwell Stone, *The Eucharistic Sacrifice* (1920), and A. Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist* (1925).

¹⁵⁵St. Ignatius, *Ephes.* XX.2, Lightfoot, 8F.

¹⁵⁶N. Cabasilas, *Expos. liturgias*, c. 16, *M.G.* CL, 404. See Bp. Aulen's

article in *The Ministry and Sacraments*, ed. Headlam and Dunkerley (1937). "Now, in the act of commemoration we look back to the historical events and the Sacrifice as we see them in the right light, in the light of the Resurrection. Therefore in celebrating the Lord's death we are not performing a funeral service, not yet a mere memorial of a martyrdom; the Sacrament is not only a Sacrament of suffering Love, but also of victorious Love. We praise and magnify the living 'Kyrios' who comes to us in His holy Supper."

CUR DEUS HOMO?
THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

¹*Epist. 101, ad Cleodonium* (M., P.G., 37, col. 118).

²Bishop B. F. Westcott, "The Gospel of Creation," in *The Epistles of St. John, The Greek Text with notes and essays*, Third Edition. (Macmillan, 1892), p. 288.

³Rupertus Tuitensis, *De Gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaeum*, lib. 13, (M., P.L., 148, col. 1628): "Here it is first proper to ask whether or not the Son of God, Whom this discourse concerns, would have become man, even if sin, on account of which all die, had not intervened. There is no doubt that He would not have become mortal and assumed a mortal body if sin had not occurred and caused man to become mortal; only an infidel could be ignorant as to this. The question is: would this have occurred, and would it somehow have been necessary for mankind that God become man, the Head and King of all, as He now is? What will be the answer?" Rupert then quotes from St. Augustine about the eternal predestination of the saints (*De Civitate Dei*, 14. 23.) and continues: "Since, with regard to the saints and all the elect there is no doubt but that they will all be found, up to the number appointed in God's plan, about which He says in blessing, before sin, 'Increase and multiply,' and it is absurd to think that sin was necessary in order to obtain that number, what must be thought about the very Head and King of all the elect, angels and men, but that He had indeed no necessary cause for becoming man, but that His love's 'delights were to be with the children of men.' [Proverbs 8:31]" Cf. also *De Glorificatione Trinitatis*, lib. 3. 20 (M., P.L., 169, col. 72): "Therefore, we say quite probably, not so much that man [was made] to make up the number of the angels [i.e., for those who had fallen], but that both angels and men were made because of one man, Jesus Christ, so that, as He Himself was begotten God from God, and was to be found a man, He would have a family prepared on both sides... From the beginning, before God made anything, it was in His plan that the Word [*Logos*] of God, God the Word [*Logos*], would be made flesh, and dwell among men with great love and the deepest humility, which are His true delights." (Allusion again to Proverbs 8:31.)

⁴Honorius of Autun, *Libellus octo quaestionum de angelis et homine*,

cap. 2 (M., *V.L.*, 172, col. 72): "And therefore the first man's sin was not the cause of Christ's Incarnation; rather, it was the cause of death and damnation. The cause of Christ's Incarnation was the predestination of human deification. It was indeed predestined by God from all eternity that man would be deified, for the Lord said, 'Father, Thou hast loved them* before the creation of the world,' [cf. John 17:24]; those, that is, who are deified through Me... It was necessary, therefore, for Him to become incarnate, so that man could be deified, and thus it does not follow that sin was the cause of His Incarnation, but it follows all the more logically that sin could not alter God's plan for deifying man; since in fact both the authority of Sacred Scripture and clear reason declare that God would have assumed man even had man never sinned. [*S. Script., Jn. 17:24, reads me¹ for

⁵Alexander Halensis, *Summa theologica*, ed. ad. Claras Aquas, dist. 3, qu. 3, m. 3; Albertus Magnus, *In 3, 1. Sententiarum*, dist. 20, art. 4, ed. Borgnet, t. 28, 361: "On this question it must be said that the solution is uncertain, but insofar as I can express an opinion, I believe that the Son of God would have been made man, even if sin had never been."

⁶Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, 3, dist. 19, ed. Wadding, t. 7, p. 415. Cf. *Reportata Parisiensis*, lib. 3, dist. 7, qu. 4, schol. 2, ed. Wadding, t. 11, 1, p. 451. "I say, nevertheless, that the Fall is not the cause of Christ's predestination. Indeed, even if one angel had not fallen, or one man, Christ would still have been predestined thus—even if others had not been created, but only Christ. This I demonstrate thus: anyone who wills methodically first wills an end, and then more immediately, those things which are more immediate to the end. But God wills most methodically; therefore, He wills thus: first He wills Himself, and everything intrinsic to Himself; more directly, so far as concerns things extrinsic, is the soul of Christ. Therefore, in relation to whatever merit and before whatever demerit was foreseen, He foresees that Christ must be united to Him in a substantial union... The disposition and predestination is first complete concerning the elect, and then something is done concerning the reprobate, as a secondary act, lest anyone rejoice as if the loss of another was a reward for himself; therefore, before the foreseen Fall, and before any demerit, the whole process concerning Christ was foreseen... Therefore, I say thus: first, God loves Himself; second, He loves Himself by others, and this love of His is pure; third, He wills that He be loved by another, one who can love Him to the highest degree (in speaking about the love of someone extrinsic); fourth, He foresees the union of that nature which ought to love Him to the highest degree, although none had fallen [i.e., even if no one had fallen]... and, therefore, in the fifth instance, He sees a coming mediator who will suffer and redeem His people; He would not have come as a mediator, to suffer and to redeem, unless someone had first sinned, unless the glory of the flesh had become swelled with pride, unless something needed to be redeemed; otherwise, He would have immediately been the whole Christ glorified." The same reasoning is in the *Opus Oxoniense*, dist. 7, qu. 3, scholium 3, Wadding 202. See P. Raymond, "Duns Scot," in *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique*, t.4, col. 1890-1891, and his article, "Le Motif de l'Incarnation: Duns Scot et l'École scotiste," in *Études Franciscaines* (1912); also R. Leiberger, *Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Leipzig, 1900), s. 250.

⁷*Summa theol.*, 3^a, qu. 1, art. 3; in 3 *Sentent.*, dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 3.

⁸Bonaventura, in 3 *Sentent.*, dist. 1, qu. 2, ed. Lugduni (1668), pp. 10-12.

⁹Cf. A. Michelé, "Incarnation," in *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique*, t. 7, col. 1495 ss. John Wessel, *De causis Incarnationis*, lib. 2, c. 7, quoted by G. Ullman, *Die Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, Bd. 2 (Gotha, 1866), s. 398 ff. On Naclantus see Westcott, *op. cit.*, p. 312 ff. Andreas Osiander, *An Filius Dei fuit incarnatus, si peccatum non intervenisset in mundum? Item de imagine Dei quid sit? Ex certis et evidentibus S. Scripturae testimoniis et non ex philosophicis et humanae rationis cogitationibus derompta explicatio* (Monte Regia Prussiae, 1550); see I. A. Dorner, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, 2 Aufl. (1853), Bd. 2, s. 438 ff. and 584; Otto Ritschi, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, Bd. 2 (Leipzig, 1912), s. 462. Osiander was vigorously criticized by Calvin, *Institutio*, lib. 2, cap. 12, 4-7, ed. Tholuck, 1, s. 304-309.

¹⁰See for instance the long discussion in "Dogmata Theologica" of L. Thomassin (1619-1695) in tomus 3, *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*, 2, cap 5 to 11, ed. nova (Parisiis, 1866), pp. 189-249. Thomassin dismisses the Scotist theory as just a "hallucination," contradicted openly by the evidence of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers. He gives a long list of Patristic passages, mainly from St. Augustine. Bellarmin (1542-1621) dismisses this idea in one phrase: "For if Adam had remained in that innocence wherein he had been created, doubtless the Son of God would not have suffered; He probably would not even have assumed human flesh, as even Calvin himself teaches"; *De Christo*, lib. 5, cap. 10, editio prima Romana (Romae, 1832), t. 1, p. 432. Petavius (1583-1652) was little interested in the controversy: "This question is widely and very contentiously disputed in the schools, but, being removed from the controversy, we will explain it in a few words." There is no evidence for this conception in Tradition, and Petavius gives some few quotations to the opposite effect. "Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus," tomus 4, *De Incarnatione*, lib. 2, cap. 17, 7-12, ed. (Venetiis, 1757), pp. 95-96. On the Protestant side see a brief discussion in John Gerhard, *Loci Theologici*, Locus Quartus, "De Persona et Officio Christi," cap. 7, with valuable references to the earlier literature and an interesting set of Patristic quotations; ed. Sd. Preuss (Berolini, 1863), t. 1, pp. 513-514, and a longer one in J. A. Quenstedt, *Theologia Didactico-Polemica, sive Sy sterna Theologicum (Wittebergae*, 1961), Pars 3 & 4, Pars 3, Cap. 3, Membrum 1, Sectio 1, Quaestio 1, pp. 108-116. On the other hand, Suarez (1548-1617) advocated a reconciliatory view in which both conflicting opinions could be kept together. See his comments on *Summa*, 3^a, Disput. 4, sectio 12, and the whole Disp. 5^a, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Berton (Parisiis, 1860), pp. 186-266.

¹¹François de Sales, *Traité de l'amour de Dieu*, livre 2, ch. 4 and 5, in *Oeuvres, édition complète*, t. 4 (Annecy, 1894), pp. 99ss. and 102ss. Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion*, édition critique par Armand Cuvillier (Paris, 1948), tome 2, Entretien 9, 6, p. 14: "Oui assurément l'Incarnation du Verbe est le premier et le principal des desseins de Dieu; c'est ce qui justifie sa conduite"; *Traité de la Nature*

et de la Grâce (Rotterdam, 1712), Discours 1, 1, p. 2. Seconde Éclaircissement, p. 302ss.; *Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique* (Paris, 1715), p. 300: "Il suit évidemment, ce me semble, de ce que je viens de dire, que le premier et le principal dessein de Dieu dans la création, est l'Incarnation du Verbe: puisque Jesus Christ est le premier en toutes choses... et qu'ainsi, quand l'homme n'aurait point péché, le Verbe se serait incarné"; cf. p. 211 and *passim*. See for further information: J. Vidgrain, *Le Christianisme dans la philosophie de Maler anche* (Paris, 1923), pp. 99ss. and 112ss.; H. Gouhier, *La Philosophie de Malebranche et son Expérience Religieuse* (Paris, 1926), p. 22ss.; J. Maydiou, "La Création du Monde et l'Incarnation du Verbe dans la Philosophie de Malebranche," in *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* (Toulouse, 1935). It is of interest to mention that Leibniz also regarded the Incarnation as an absolute purpose in creation; see quotations from his unpublished papers in J. Baruzi, *Leibniz et l'Organisation religieuse de la Terre* (Paris, 1907), pp. 273-274.

¹²The Scotist point of view has been presented by a Franciscan, Father Chrysostome, in his two books: *Christus Alpha et Omega, seu de Christi universalis regno* (Lille, 1910, published without the name of the author) and *Le Motif de l'Incarnation et les principaux thomistes contemporains* (Tours, 1921). The latter was a reply to the critics in which he assembled an impressive array of Patristic texts. The Thomist point of view was taken by Father E. Higon, *Le Mystère de l'Incarnation* (Paris, 1913), p. 63ss., and Father Paul Galtier, S. J. *De Incarnatione et Redemptione* (Paris, 1926); see also Father Hilair de Paris, *Cur Deus Homo? Dissertatio de motivo Incarnationis* (Lyons, 1867) [includes an analysis of Patristic texts from the Thomist point of view]. Cf. also the introduction in the book of Dr. Aloysius Spindler, *Cur Verbum, car o factum? Das Motiv der Menschwerdung und das Verhältnis der Erlösung zur Menschwerdung in den christologischen Glaubenskämpfen des vierten und fünften christlichen Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn, 1938) ["Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur—und Dogmengeschichte," hsgg. von A. Ehrhard und Dr. J. P. Kirsch, Bd. 18, 2 Heft].

¹³See note 1 above.

¹⁴Fr. Sergii Bulgakov, *Agnets Bozhii* (Paris, 1933), p. 191 ff. (in Russian). French translation, *Du Verbe Incarné* (Paris, 1943).

¹⁵Dr. Spindler was the only student of the problem using the proper historical method in handling the texts.

¹⁶Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Liturgie Cosmique: Maxime le Confesseur* (Paris, Aubier, 1947), pp. 204-205; Father Balthasar quotes *Qu. ad Talas* s. 60 and adds that St. Maximus would have taken the Scotist side in the scholastic controversy, yet with an important qualification: "Maxime de reste est totalement étranger au postulat de ce débat scholastique qui imagine la possibilité d'un autre ordre du monde sans péché et totalement irréel. Pour lui la Volonté préexistante' de Dieu est identique au monde des 'idées' et des 'possibles': l'ordre des essences et l'ordre des faits coincident en ce point suprême" (in the German edition, *Kosmische Liturgie*, s. 267-268). See also Dom Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., "The

Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor" in *Studia Anselmiana* (Romae, 1955), fasc. 36, ch. 4, pp. 155ff.

¹⁷The best exposition of the theology of St. Maximus is by S. L. Epifanovich, *St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine Theology* (Kiev, 1915; in Russian); cf. also the chapter on St. Maximus in my book, *The Byzantine Fathers* (Paris, 1933), pp. 200-227 (in Russian). In addition to the book of Father von Balthasar, quoted above, one may consult with profit the "Introduction" of Dom Polycarp Sherwood to his translation of *The Four Centuries on Charity* of St. Maximus, *Ancient Christian Writers*, No. 21 (London and Westminster, Md., 1955). See also Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor* (Lund, 1965).

¹⁸See the definition of "theologoumena" by Bolotov, *Thesen über das "Filioque,"* first published without the name of the author ("von einem russischen Theologen") in *Revue Internationale de Théologie*, No. 24 (Oct.-Dec., 1898), p. 682: "Man kann fragen, was ich unter Theologoumenon verstehe? Seinem Wesen nach ist es auch eine theologische Meinung, aber eine theologische Meinung derer, welche für einen jeden 'Katholiken' mehr bedeuten als gewöhnliche Theologen; es sind die theologische Meinungen der hl. Väter der einen ungeteilten Kirche; es sind die Meinungen der Männer, unter denen auch die mit Recht *hoi didaskaloi tes oikoumenês* genannten sich befinden." No "theologoumenon" can claim more than "probability," and no "theologoumenon" should be accepted if it has been clearly disavowed by an authoritative or "dogmatic" pronouncement of the Church.

THE "IMMORTALITY" OF THE SOUL

¹*L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale* (2 ed., Paris, 1944), p. 179.'

²*Agape and Eros: The History of the Christian Idea of Love* (London, 1938), II:I, pp. 64 ff.

³The author is usually identified as Joseph (or John) Pitts, but nothing is known about the man. The name is given in old catalogues (e.g., of the British Museum, etc.) and bibliographies. The book-titles are too long to be given here in full. Both books were published in 1706. Dodwell defended his position in a book: *A Preliminary Defence of the Epistolary Discourse, Concerning the Distinction between Soul and Spirit* (London, 1707). Dodwell's starting point seems to be St. Irenaeus; s. *Dissertation es in Irenaeum, auctore Henri co Dodwello, A.M., etc., Oxoniae, 1689, p. 469 ff.*—I am dealing with the whole controversy in another essay of mine, *The problem of Man in English theology and philosophy of the XVIIIth century*, to be published shortly.

⁴Gilson, 179, n. I.

⁵A. E. Taylor, *Plato: The man and his work*, p. 176; cf. J. Lebreton, *Histoire du Dogme de la Trinité*, t. II (Paris, 1928), p. 635 ff.

⁶Cf. my article: "The Idea of Creation in Christian Philosophy," *The Eastern Churches Quarterly*, VIII, Supplementary issue: Nature and Grace, 1949; s. also Gilson, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV: "Les êtres et leur contingence," p. 63 ff.

⁷Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, 1941, p. 52.

⁸It may be argued, however, that the translation (by Cassiodorus) is not reliable.

⁹The record of the disputation between Athanasius Caravella, Bishop of Hiera, and Neophytus Patellarius, Metropolitan of Crete, with the participation of Panagiotis Nicousius, the famous dragoman of Porta, who was instrumental in the publication of the "Orthodox Confession" of Peter Moghila in Holland and of the Acts of the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672, was published by Archimandrite Arsenius (Ivascenko). "Description of a Manuscript, once in

the Library of the Monastery of Mount Sinai," *Khristianskoe Chtenie*, 1884, July—August, pp. 181-229.

⁹This point was very well worked out by Hermann Schultz in his valuable book: *Die Voraussetzungen der christlichen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit* (Göttingen, 1861).

¹⁰London: S.P.C.K., 1951.

^{10a}*Op. cit.*, p. 70. In the Eastern rite John 1:1-17 is the lesson for Easter, and not for Christmas (as in the West).

¹¹The Order for the Burial of the Dead, in Hapgood, *Service Book of the Holy Orthodox-Catholic Apostolic Church*, etc., Revised edition (New York, Association Press, 1922), pp. 386, 389-390.

¹²The word καινός in the New Testament use does not mean only anything *new*, but rather something *final*, "that belongs to the final consummation." The word seems to have throughout an eschatological accent. Cf. Behm's article *sub voce*, in Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, III, 451 ff.

¹³St. Maximus, *Quaest. ad Thalassium*, qu. 39, sch. 3; *Capit. quinquies cent.* II. 39. Urs von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Maximus der Bekenner* (Freiburg i/Br., 1941), 367 ff. (or French edition, Paris, 1947, pp. 265 ff.). Unfortunately, Balthasar's interpretation is, at least, incomplete.

THE LAST THINGS AND THE LAST EVENTS

¹Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Eschatologie," *Fragen der Theologie Heute*. Feiner, Trütsch, Böckle, editors (Zürich: Köln, 1958), pp. 403-421.

²Brunner, *Eternal Hope* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954), p. 48.

³Brunner, *The Mediator* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), p. 346.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 346.

⁵Brunner, *Eternal Hope*, p. 138.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 148.