

S E C R E T 311400Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54636

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDTRAMP SDPLOD

1. SDTRAMP/I SAID AT 29 OCTOBER MEETING THAT NASSER MINACHI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, HAS ASKED HIS HELP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF AMIR ENTEZAM'S PROPOSED NEWSPAPER. T/I HAS ATTENDED ONE PLANNING SESSION, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROJECT IS STILL IN THE EMBRYONIC STAGE. DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN REGARDING CIRCULATION, EDITORIAL CONTENT, LANGUAGES IN WHICH THE PAPER IS TO BE PUBLISHED, AND PRINTING LOCALE (I.E., TEHRAN OR SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE).

2. T/I OPINED THAT THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, EVEN ASSUMING IT GETS OFF THE GROUND.

3. WILL MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS ACTIVITY AND ADVISE AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FILE: 201-867764. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9.C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

1. NO PROBLEM REJECTION

2. PROPOSED EXTENSION OF A'S VISIT RAISES QUESTIONS OF HIS SAFETY AND OF SDPLOD/I'S (P/I'S) EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT REACTION MANIPULATION OF THE REVOLUTION. KNOWING NO MORE THAN WE DO ABOUT A'S PROFILE HERE DURING HIS PCS TOURS, MUST DEFER TO HIM AND HQS FOR CONSIDERATION OF PERSONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A SERIES OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS. REGARDING POSSIBLE POLITICAL FALLOUT, WE THINK THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS INVOLVED, AND THE CHARGE ADVISES THAT HE IS CONCERNED. WE ASSUME THAT A'S PROLONGED PRESENCE COULD NOT BE CONCEALED FROM THE IRANIANS, AND THAT NO INNOCUOUS PRETEXT SUCH AS TOURISM WOULD BE CREDIBLE. AT LEAST SOME OF THE PROPOSED CONTACTS WOULD THEREFORE PRESUMABLY HAVE TO BE DECLARED TO P/I AND COMPANY.

IN ORDER PERMIT EVALUATION OF THE RISKS AND BENEFITS
MAY IDENTIFY THEM FOR US, AND INDICATE

E C R E T 311422Z OCT 79 STAFF

TREASURY

CITE TEHRAN 54636

TO: DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL SDTRAMP SDPLOD

1. SDTRAMP/I SAID AT 29 OCTOBER MEETING THAT WASSER MINACHI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, HAS ASKED HIS HELP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF AMIR ENTEZAM'S PROPOSED NEWSPAPER. T/I HAS ATTENDED ONE PLANNING SESSION, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROJECT IS STILL IN THE EMBRYONIC STAGE. DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN REGARDING CIRCULATION, EDITORIAL CONTENT, LANGUAGES IN WHICH THE PAPER IS TO BE PUBLISHED, AND PRINTING LOCALE (I.E., TEHRAN OR SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE).

2. T/I OPINED THAT THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, EVEN ASSUMING IT GETS OFF THE GROUND.

3. WILL MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS ACTIVITY AND ADVISE AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FILE: 201-867764. RVW 31OCT99 DRV DS.C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 543216 S E C R E T

HUSAYN/YAZDI TALKS HELD IN HAVANA, IRAQ WOULD STILL LIKE TO SETTLE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. THEIR CONCERN IS THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE IN FULL CONTROL AND HUSAYN DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS."

3. APPRECIATE STOCKHOLM COOPERATION ON SDPL0D/1 CASE.

4. FILE 201-962054. RVW 29OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT

#3945

~~SECRET~~ 79 04 13z
01 NOV

S E C R E T 311613Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543216.

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDPLOD

1. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 HE WAS PLANNING TO DEPART TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 25 OCTOBER. HE WAS GOING TO PICK UP HIS WIFE IN STOCKHOLM THEN PROCEED TO OSLO TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS. WHILE IN TEHRAN, SDPLOD/1 WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND ASKED US FOR ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE MAY HAVE WHICH BEARS ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND PASSING FOLLOWING REPORT TO SDPLOD/1, EMPHASIZING THAT REPORT FORWARDED BY ADLESICK IN REPLY TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY SDPLOD/1 IN TEHRAN.

2. TEXT OF REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT IRANIAN POLICY WAS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE ITS CLAIM TO BAHRAIN ISLAND THE IRAQI VIEW WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS DETAILING THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN.

"PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IRAN WAS ACTIVELY PURSUING ITS CLAIM TO BAHRAIN, IRAQI LEADER SADAM HUSAYN HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI IN HAVANA DURING THE COURSE OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAS SOME PROBLEM IN DETERMINING THE PROPER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PGOI. SADAM HUSAYN HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. AT THE MOMENT THE IRAQIS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE PGOI, AS THEY INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT MUCH AND REAL POWER LIES IN THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WHICH IS HOSTILE TO IRAQ.

"DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PURSUE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE

1

SECRET OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS , DIRECTOR.

NI ACT DIRECTOR , PARIS.

WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY

EYES ONLY FOR COS , PARIS AND MR.GEORGE CAVE

REF: DTRECTOR , 536769

1. ACOS CALLED SDPLOD/] AT OFFICE ON AFTERNOON OF 2] OCTOBER AND TOLD HIM THAT MR.GEORGE CAVE WANT TO DISCUSS REF MATTER WITH HIM TOMORROW STOKHOLM.SDPLOD/] SAID THAT HIS PLANS HAD---CHANGED AGAINAND HE WOULD BE STAYING IN TEHRAN UNTIL THURS-DAY ,25OCTOBER . ACOS TOLDSDPLOD/] THAT MR.CAVE WOULD TRY TO COME - TEHRAN BEFORE 25 OCTOBER FOR MEETING. SDPLOD/] REPLIED THAT MEETING IN TEHRAN WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO HIM. ACOS TOLD SDPLOD/] THAT IN CASE MR. CAVE COULD NOT MEET IN TEHRAN BEFORE 25 OCT, WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM TO KEEP TRACK OF HIS SCHEDULE-LE-

2. SDPLOD/] OFFICE NUMBER IS 666-885RPT 666-885. RESIDENCE PHONE NOT AVAILABLE . RVW 2] OCT 99 DRV D9C.] .

a SECRET

SECRET /ETX]/EOT

JAUMOTTE

~~PL00-19~~

~~PL00-19~~

ENTEZAM

666-885

Mr. Cave wishes
discuss matter
revealed at meeting
with Charge.

Mr. Cave will be
in Stockholm
when E. arrives
22 Oct.

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF

CITE:TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO :IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR.

NIACT PARIS, DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY

EYES ONLY FOR COS PARIS AND MR.GEORGE CAVE

REF: A.DIRECTOR 536767
B.TEHRAN 54539

1. SINCE REF B. HAVE LEARNED THAT SDPLD/] TOOK PART IN MEETING WHICH CHARGE AND MR. HENRY PRECHT HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN - AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI TO PASS MESSAGE ON RN OUT STAY'S HEALTH AND IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN UNITED STATES. SDPLD/]'S REACTION WAS THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT EFFORTS OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES.

2. YAZDI WAS SOMEWHAT SCEPTICAL OF NECESSITY FOR TREATMENT IN NEW YORK OR EVEN UNITED STATES AND MADE SUGGESTIONS BASED ON HIS OWN PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.

3. SINCE SDPLD/] NOW FULLY APPRISED OF RN OUT STAY'S PLANS, IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO ADVISE HIM THAT MR.CAVE HAS IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE FOR HIM. PLS ADVISE WHETHER HQS STILL WANTS STATION TO ALERT SDPLD/] THAT MR.CAVE WANTS TO MEET HIM IN EUROPE AS POSSIBLE (RVW 2]OCT 99DRVD9C.).

ALL SECRET/

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTION)

TO : IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR.

NIACT DIRECTOR ,PARIS

WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY

REF : A.DIRECTOR 536766

B.PARIS]37]5

] . CHARGE AND MR.HENRY PRECHT MET SDPLOD/] MORNING OF 2] OCT
ON PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED CALL. SDPLOD/] TOLD CHARGE THAT HE STILL
PLANS TO DEPART FOR STOCKHOLM ON 22 OCTOBER. CHARGE DID NOT DISC
-USS RN OUT STAY WITH SDPLOD/].

RVW2]OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 201022Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54536 (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO: PARIS, LONDON INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD

REFS: A. PARIS 13694 (NOT SENT LONDON)
B. TEHRAN 54526
C. TEHRAN 54527 (NIT 10,778)
D. TEHRAN 54528 (NIT 10,779)
E. TEHRAN 54502

1. REFS B-E BEING RELAYED LONDON PARIS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 20OCT99 DRV D9C.1.

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 19235Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54533

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
VNINTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 536170

~~KP. CAVE~~ DEPARTED TEHRAN FOR PARIS FRIDAY MORNING, 19
OCTOBER. RVW 19OCT99 DRV ESC.3. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

PPJ

200ct79 08 25z

S E C R E T 191800Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 13694

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD

1. PLEASE RELAY ALL SDPLOD/I TRAFFIC PARIS AND LONDON FOR ADLESICK INFO.

2. NO FILE. RWV 19 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.
S E C R E T

done
PPS

19Oct79 04 07z

S E C R E T 182250Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 535235.

TO: F MORITTY, TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT SDPRETEXT

HRAN 54511

WE AGREE THERE NO REASON TO DISCLOSE TO GNGRAPH
E'S TRAVEL IRAN OR OUR EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO PGOI'S
IT IN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW RECENT
LEVEL EXCHANGE WITH GNGRAPH ON IRANIAN SITUATION, BELIEVE
WOULD TDY LONDON BRIEFLY ENROUTE HQS FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS
RECENT GNGRAPH PAPER ON IRAN AS POINT OF DEPARTURE. REQUES
GOS/COM CONCURRENCE.

2. CONCUR NO CONTACT WITH SDPRETEXT THIS TRIP.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE ACCOUNT OF ANY DISCUSSIONS HELD
PAR WITH SDPLOD/1 ON RESUMPTION SOME FORM INTEL RELATIONSHIP.

4. NO FILE. RVW 18OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
R E T.

*no reply
needed*

1. THERE IS SPLIT IN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. THE SPLIT IS PRIMARILY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE BASIC ECONOMIC POLICY WAS DRAWN UP BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM . THE POLICY WAS BASICALLY A FREE MONEY POLICY CALLING FOR A TWO PRONGED PROGRAM OF (a) MAKING MONEY AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY ON SOFT TERMS SO THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY COULD CONTINUE AND (b) PROVIDE EXTENSIVE FUNDS FOR LABOR INTENSIVE PROJECTS SO AS TO LOWER THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE. ALI MOINFAR MINISTER OF OIL OPPOSED THIS PLAN WITH A PLAN OF HIS OWN CALLING FOR A POLICY OF TIGHT MONEY. THE CABINET VOTED FOR THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN WITH 12 CABINET MEMBERS APPROVING OF IT. HOWEVER, MOINFAR WAS ABLE TO CONVINCED THE GOVERNMENT TO GO SLOW. THERE HAS BEEN SOME CHANGES IN THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN AS A RESULT OF MOINFAR S ACTION BUT THESE ARE MINOR IN NATURE AND THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN IS NOW READY FOR IMPLIMENTATION.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NO FORN -- NO CONTRACT --

OR CON

COUNTRY:IRAN

SUBJECT:

SOURCE:

- 1.THE REFERENDUM FOR THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE HELD IN THE NEAR FUTURE.MAJLIS ELECTIONS WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REFERENDUM.PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN HAS DECIDED THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT A MAJORITY OF CLERICS FROM GETTING ELECTED TO THE MAJLIS.IN MID OCTOBER,THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT,INCLUDING HIMSELF,FOREIGN MINISTER EBRAHIM YAZDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM CONFERRED WITH AYATULLAH KHOMIENI ON THIS SUBJECT .THEY WISHED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CONVINCING KHOMIENI THAT THE MAJLIS MUST HAVE A SECULAR MAJORITY.THEY ALSO WANTED TO PREVENT HIM FROM GIVING HIS SUPPORT TO LARGE NUMBER OF CLERICS AS THEY BELIEVE THAT ANYONE PUBLICLY SUPPORTED BY KHOMIENI WILL WIN.
- 2.DESPITE THE NEED TO BROADEN ITS BASE PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS,THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF BUILDING INSTITUTIONS THAT COULD STRENGTHEN IT.SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ,SLOW PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN REORGANIZING THE MILITARY AND THIS SHOULD BE OF SOME HELP TO THE GOVERNMENT.HOWEVER,EFFORTS TO BRING THE PASDARAN UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF THE ARMY HAVE FAILED.THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL STILL CONTROLS THE PASDARAN.

S C R E T
CITE: TEHRAN

OCT 79

TO: DIRECTOR INFO AMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT
MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TEL AVIV.

WNINTEL SDPLOD INTEL

SUPDATA: SDPLOD/}. DIRECTOR SEE TEHRAN WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT
DISSEM. NO LIAISON. NO FILE. NO INDEX. OBTAINED BY ADLESICK. FIELD
REPORT NO. NIT--10,779. CL BY 015356.

PAQUIN

REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN

NO CONTRACT ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: EFFECT OF KURDISH FIGHTING ON IRANIAN RELATION WITH IRAQ.

1. DURING THE PAST WEEK, THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN DETERIORATED CONSIDERABLY IRANIAN MILITARY TOOK OVER 100 CASUALTIES DURING THE PAST WEEK : PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN IS TRYING TO DEVISE SOME WAY OF ENDING THE FIGHTING A HURRY AS HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW IS THAT THE ONLY LASTING SETTLEMENT TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM MUST COME FROM THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA AND THIS CANNOT BE STARTED UNTIL THE SITUATION RETURNS TO NORMAL.

2. DURING HIS VISIT TO HAVAN FOR THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN. DURING THIS CONVERSATION, YAZDI ASSURED HUSAYN THAT IRAN WAS ENGAGING IN NO AGITATION AMONG THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, ADDITIONALLY IRAN HAD NO DESIGNS ON BAHRAIN. NOR WOULD THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION BE EXPORTED TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AT THE TIME YAZDI AND HUSAYN AGREED TO MEET LATER, EITHER IN TEHRAN OR BAGHDAD. YAZDI TOLD HUSAYN THAT THEY COULD THEN DISCUSS THE CONTINUATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT WERE THE BASIS OF THE MARCH BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

3. UPON RETURN TO IRAN. YAZDI WAS PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE NEWSPAPER JUMHURI ISLAMI FOR HAVING CONFERRED WITH HUSAYN IN HAVAN. GIVEN THE CURRENT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN YAZDI IS AFRAID THAT ANY PUBLIC OVERTURE TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL MEET WITH SEVERE CRITICISM IN IRAN. THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT HAD CONSIDERED HAVING MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAN DID NOT INTEND TO EXPORT THE REVOLUTION AND WAS DOING NOTHING AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ. THE COMPLICATION IS THAT THE LEADER OF SHIA COMMUNITY IN IRAQ IS INDEPENDENT OF KHOMEINI AND IF HE CHOSE TO IGNORE OR QUESTION KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

4. ACQ:] 8 OCTOBER] 1979.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN. SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAM ABAD, JIDDA, KARACHE, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEWDEHLI, TELAVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHOD -S INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACT ION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW] 8 oct 99 DRV D9C.] CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTION CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. S E C R E T

PAGE 2 53#4-, 54526 S E C R E T

GAVE HIM HIS HOME PHONE NUMBER IN U.S. P/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL FROM EUROPE IF ANYTHING COMES UP. HE MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION WHICH ADLESICK WILL DISCUSS WHEN RETURNS TO HQS. P/1 ASKED IF WE HAD ANY PROBLEM WITH CONTINUING THE CONTACT THROUGH HIM. ADLESICK SAID NO, WE WERE DISPOSED TO PROCEED AT A PACE SET BY THEM.

3. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

BT
#4526

SECRET 181602Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54526

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT (SDPLOD)

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54527

1 B. TEHRAN 54528

1. ADLESICK MET WITH SDPLOD/1 ALONE FOR ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS AFTERNOON OF 18 OCTOBER. WILL BE REPORTING INTEL SEPARATELY. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT AFTER BRIEFINGS ON 15 OCTOBER, HE, YAZDI AND BAZARGAN HAD MET AND DISCUSSED BRIEFINGS. WHILE BRIEFINGS INTERESTING THEY WERE NOT PRECISELY WHAT BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 THEIR WANTS AT THE MOMENT WERE BASICALLY FOR TACTICAL INFORMATION ON KURDISH SITUATION AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ON WHO SUPPORTING KURDS AND WHY. THIS LED TO LONG DISCUSSION IN WHICH ADLESICK APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY DISABUSED SDPLOD/1 OF ANY ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQIS IN SUPPORTING IRANIAN KURDISH INSURRECTION. P/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD HOPED THAT ADLESICK WOULD HAVE MADE A POSITIVE SUGGESTION ON HOW THEY COULD EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM THE KURDISH PROBLEM. WHILE IT MAY SEEM INCREDIBLE, WHAT THEY REALLY WANT IS FOR US TO DEVISE SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS. ADLESICK SUGGESTED THAT THEY SEEK TO DEAL WITH KURDISH SITUATION THROUGH VEHICLE OF OLD TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT. TURKS WORRY ABOUT ANY UNSETTLED CONDITION IN KURDISTAN AND WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME CHANCE TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH IRANIANS. P/1 ASKED IF USG COULD PROVIDE ANY INCENTIVES TO TURKEY AND IRAQ TO HELP SETTLE KURDISH PROBLEM. POINTED OUT TO P/1 THAT USG DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY THOUGHT USG WOULD ENCOURAGE IRANIAN TURKISH COOPERATION ON KURDISH PROBLEM. EMPHASIZED TO P/1 THAT WHILE THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ SUPPORTING KURDS, LAST THING THAT IRAQ WOULD WANT TO SEE WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH REPUBLIC FORMED ON IRANIAN SOIL.

2. WITH REGARD TO LIAISON, SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE CONTACT TO BE WITH HIM FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ADLESICK

S E C R E T 181150Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54511

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, LONDON.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPRETEXT

1. WISH RAISE WITH HQS QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS WISE FOR ADLESICK TO STOP BY IN LONDON ON THIS TRIP. DO NOT THINK WE WANT TO REVEAL MEETINGS WITH YAZDI AND ~~(SD PLOD/1)~~ TO ~~(GNGRAPP)~~ AT THIS TIME. DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY MERIT IN SEEING THEM IN SITUATION WHERE WE ARE NOT GOING TO BENEFIT MUCH, AS BELIEVE IF DO MEET WITH THEM IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONCEAL FACT THAT ADLESICK HAD MADE TRIP TO TEHRAN.

2. ADDITIONALLY THERE SEEMS TO BE NO PRESSING REASON TO SEE ~~(SDPRETEXT)~~ AT THIS TIME. SINCE HE HAS NOT CONTACTED ADLESICK, THERE IS PROBABLY NOTHING NEW ON ~~(SD JANUS/32)~~ ALL WE COULD GET FROM HIM IS CURRENT RUMOR MILL AMONG IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN ENGLAND.

3. PLEASE ADVISE HQS VIEWS.

4. FILE: 201-215177. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 54502 S E C R E T
ARGUMENTS THAN HE WAS TO YAZDI'S. WHAT STRUCK CHARGE WAS THAT
BY END OF MEETING YAZDI HAD DROPPED HOSTILE ATTITUDE EVINced
IN RECENT MEETINGS AND EVEN INDICATED SOME PROGRESS IN SETTLING
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, HE WENT SO FAR AS
TO ADMIT THAT SOME OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS MAY BE CAUSED BY LACK
OF COORDINATION ON IRANIAN SIDE.

5. AT END OF MEETING ADLESICK POINTED OUT TO BOTH YAZDI AND
SDPLOD/1 THAT KIND OF TACTICAL INFORMATION THAT THEY WANTED ON
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WAS IN GREAT PART COLLECTABLE BY TECHNICAL
MEANS AND URGED THEM TO MAKE USE OF THEIR CAPABILITIES.

6. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 17 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 170751Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54502

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

MINTEL RYBAT (SDPLOD)

1. CHARGE, MR. RON SMITH AND ADLESICK MET WITH YAZDI AND SDPLOD/1 FOR TWO HOURS AFTERNOON OF 16 OCTOBER. SUBSTANCE OF MEETING BEING REPORTED BY CHARGE VIA STATE CHANNELS. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT CHAMRAN UNABLE TO ATTEND MEETING BECAUSE HE WAS DETAINED IN KURDISTAN. THEY EXPECTED HIM BACK IN TEHRAN MOMENTARILY. ADLESICK PLANNING TO STAY COUPLE OF DAYS IN HOPE CHAMRAN SHOWS UP. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 THEY CONTINUE MUCH INTERESTED IN REESTABLISHING LIAISON.

2. CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE CONVERSATION DEALT WITH IRAG AND KURDISH PROBLEM. YAZDI HAS FAIRLY UNSHAKABLE BELIEF THAT ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH IRAGIS IN SUPPORTING KURDISH INSURRECTION. WE WERE ABLE TO POINT OUT HOW HIGHLY UNLIKELY THIS IS, BUT FACT THAT YAZDI BROUGHT IT UP A SERIOUS IRANIAN CONSIDERATION INDICATES DEGREE OF PARANCIA ABROAD IN EAZERGAN GOVERNMENT.

3. MR. SMITH GAVE VERY GOOD BRIEF ON SOVIET ENERGY PROBLEMS. FROM DISCUSSION WITH YAZDI, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE UNAWARE OF CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR CANCELLING GAS CONTRACT WITH SOVIETS. BELIEVE THAT THIS BRIEFING TOGETHER WITH ADLESICK BRIEFING HAS GIVEN THEM FACTUAL INFORMATION TO MULL OVER WHEN CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT. AT ONE POINT IN THIS DISCUSSION, YAZDI RATHER NAIVELY SAID THAT HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND SOME OF OUR POINTS IN LIGHT OF SOVIET OVERTURES TO HIM WHICH HAD BEEN VERY FRIENDLY RECENTLY. WE POINTED OUT THAT GIVEN THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE SOVIETS HAD LITTLE IN THE WAY OF ALTERNATIVES BUT TO BE FRIENDLY FOR THE TIME BEING. THE CRUNCH WOULD COME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BECAME A NET OIL IMPORTER.

4. SDPLOD/1 IS DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL 20 OCTOBER. DURING COURSE OF MEETING HE SEEMED MORE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN

TO : PRIORIORTY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI SDPLOD

REF: TEHRAN

1.IDEN : 66-68-85 RPT 66-68-85 .

2.NO FILE . RVW]]OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T PAQUIN

S E C R E T

CITE TEHRAN

TO : PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI SDPLD

REF: DIRECTOR 527715

]SDPLD/] TOLD CHARGE THAT , FOR SECURITY, HE STAYS OVER NIGHT AT DIFFERENT PLACES SAID HE CAN USUALLY BE REACHED AT IDEN UNIT - ABOUT]900 HOURS.

2. ADLESICK AND BRIEFING OFFICER WILL BE MET. SHOULD THERE BE ANY DIFFICULTY AT AIRPORT , ADLESICK SHOULD CONTACT EMBASSY . PREFEARABLY BEFORE CALLING SDPLD/]. NUMBERS ARE 8]-00-9], 82-50-9] AND 82-90-5]. CHARGE'S EXTENSION, FOR USE DURING OFFICE HOURS, IS]6000R]602 MARINE SECURITY GUARD IS]2]4.

3. PLS ADVISE IT INTERARY.

4. NO FILE. RVW]]OCT 99DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

PAQUIN

A E 2 STOCKHOLM 26286 S E C R E T

4. PER STATE INSTRUCTIONS DCM HAS MEETING WITH
DLO AT 1400 HOURS TODAY (5 OCT) BEFORE LATTER LEAVES
FOR BRISBANE DCM ON ABOVE TO AVOID CROSSING WIRTS AND
ADVERTENT FAUX PAS.

5. FILE. 01-96205 . FW 75 OCT 99 DRV DSC.
S E C R E T

BT
5286

6 Oct 79 15 48 Z

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TE STOCKHOLM 26286

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTE: FYBAT FGI AJAJA SDP.OD

EN: DIRECTOR 525381

*Forward
Change 2 Oct*

1. PASSED IBEX MATERIAL WITH REF CAVEAT 5 OCTOBER. SDP/1
WAS STAYING TEHRAN THROUGH 17 OCT, THEN RETURN STOCKHOLM TO
PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN OSLO AND HELSINKI. THIRTY OF FORTY DAYS
AFTER THAT, HE WILL RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR ELECTIONS AND FORMATION
OF NEW GOVERNMENT. WE NOT SURE HOW LONG HE WILL BE ASSIGNED
STOCKHOLM AND ASSERTED HE INDIFFERENT TO ASSIGNMENT SINCE HE
JUST A "SOLDIER" IN SERVICE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

2. SDP/1 TOOK OPPORTUNITY SPONTANEOUSLY TO RAISE GOI
DISSENT WITH STATE OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. NEW
REGIME HAD BEEN IN POWER 3-9 MONTHS AND U.S. HAD TAKEN NO
INITIATIVES TO SOLVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS ALTHOUGH, ACCORDING TO
SDP/1, WE UNDERSTOOD THESE PROBLEMS AND HAD THE SOLUTIONS TO
THEM. THIS LEFT REGIME WITH IMPRESSION THAT U.S. PLAYING WAIT-
AND-SEE GAME WITH OBJECTIVE OF INTERFERING IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS
IN FUTURE. GIVEN THE PAST, IT WAS UP TO US TO MAKE PROPOSALS
AND MOST OF THE "SACRIFICES." SDP/1 SAID "THEY" DISLIKED THE
RUSSIAN, BUT SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN TO SEE GOI "100 TIMES,
HAD BEEN KICKED OUT 100 TIMES" BUT PERSISTED IN OFFERING HELP
AND SOLUTIONS". ASKED WHAT "PROBLEMS" HE REFERRED TO, SDP/1
MENTIONED ONLY "SPARE PARTS" AND "BLOCKED FUNDS".

3. SANDAGGER MADE NO COMMENT DURING THIS MONOLOGUE, WHICH
DELIVERED POLITELY BUT FIRMLY, EXCEPT TO DENY, OF COURSE, THAT
U.S. HAD ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS. SDP/1
SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE, BUT LACK OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES
LEFT GOI WITH BAD IMPRESSION FUELED BY PAST AND CURRENT
CRITICISM OF REGIME, INCLUDING RECENT REMARKS BY CHARGE IN TEHRAN
RE ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS. SDP/1 SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE
SPEAKING FRANKLY AND WANTED ME TO CONVEY HIS REMARKS TO USG.

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OO RUQMHR
DE RUFHRS #3025 3031452
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301446Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1535
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1410
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 087
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5551
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 4679
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 328
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1642
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S E C R E T ALGIERS 3025

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RABAT FOR DAS CONSTABLE

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/30/89 (HAYNES, ULRIC, JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, OVIP, AG, US

SUBJ: 25TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 281872, B. MONROVIA 8576, C. TRIPOLI 1709,
D. STATE 282984

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DEPENDING ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZ-
INSKI AND GOA PRESIDENT BENDJEDID AND/OR FOMMIN BENYAHIA,
FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE CONTACTS FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND LEADING MEMBERS OF OTHER DELE-
GATIONS TO BE PRESENT FOR CELEBRATIONS (REF A, PARA 11):

A) SPAIN - SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SPECIFICALLY RE-
QUESTED MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOA MINISTER OF THE
PRESIDENCY (I.E., SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT) PEREZ-
LLORCA AND GOA MFA DIRGEN FOR AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST AGUIRE-
BENGOA;

B) FRANCE - FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA IS EXPLORING POS-
SIBLE INTEREST OF SECGEN OF QUAI DE LEUSS IN MEETING WITH DR.
BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS;

C) LIBYA - IF GOL PRESIDENT QADHAFI DOES ATTEND CELE-
BRATIONS, LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SHOWED CAUTIOUS IN-
TEREST IN PROPOSING HE MEET WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI (REFTEL C);

D) IRAN - IRANIAN CHARGE IN ALGERIA INFORMED HE TODAY HE
CABLED TEHRAN TO DETERMINE POSSIBLE INTEREST OF PR. BAZARGAN
OR OTHER MEMBERS OF GOI DELEGATION IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZ-
INSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS (REFTEL D).

3. THE ABOVE REFLECTS LIVELY INTEREST ON PART OF ALL CON-
CERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTLY IN ALGIERS (GOA OFFICIALS,
DIPLOMATS, PRESS) IN FACT THAT USG HAS FIELDDED A HIGH-POWERED
DELEGATION BY VIRTUE OF ITS HAVING DR. BRZEZINSKI AS HIT
HEAD. ONCE IN ALGIERS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI AND
OTHERS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WILL CERTAINLY ACCURE.
DELEGATION AND OTHERS SHOULD NOTE THAT ALL LOCAL OBSERVERS
CONSIDER DR. BRZEZINSKI AS MAJOR USG PROPOONENT OF POLICY OF
SUPPLYING ARMS TO MROCCO. HAYNES

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#3025

VZCZC 266
CC RUFHC
DE RUQMER #1151 2957924
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O 220904Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4369
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 11151

FOR UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 12866: PTS-2 10/22/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR. IR. US
SUBJECT: GEORGE CAVE VISIT TO TEHRAN

RFF: TEHRAN 11133

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS REFTEL INDICATES, ENTEZAM WAS AMONG GROUP THAT I BRIEFED ON SHAH'S ILLNESS AND PLANNED TRIP TO U.S. ENTEZAM UNDERSTANDS AS WELL AS ANYONE IN PGOI THE NEED FOR KEEPING POLITICAL REACTION UNDER CONTROL.

3. SINCE GEORGE CAVE HAD ALREADY DEPARTED TEHRAN WHEN WE MADE OUR REPRESENTATIONS YESTERDAY I ASSUMED HE WOULD NOT RETURN NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY NEED FOR HIM TO RETURN. I NOW UNDERSTAND THAT AGENCY HAS INSTRUCTED HIM TO RETURN FROM PARIS AND THAT HE WILL BE ARRIVING TOMORROW MORNING. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT, ASSUMING THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS IN WHICH YOU HAVE CONCURRED THAT WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN OUR HAND HERE. HOWEVER I DO WANT TO SAY THAT FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT AND IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ENTEZAM (WHO HAS NOW DISPLAYED HIS DEPARTURE FOR STOCKHOLM UNTIL LATE THIS WEEK) HIS PRESENCE WOULD NOT SEEM NECESSARY. LAINGEN
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(S)

CHALLENGING ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY. THE
YAZDI BUT IT THIS WAS AN UNPARDONABLE ERROR ON
HIS PART. YAZDI ATTEMPTED TO DRAW ANALOGY BETWEEN
KURDISH SITUATION AND THAT OF ANDREY YOUNG IN U.S.
CHARGE RESPONDED THAT ANALOGY WAS HIGHLY IMPERFECT.
WHEN ASKED ABOUT NAZIH'S WHEREABOUTS, YAZDI SAID HE
WAS ALIVE AND WELL IN TEHRAN.

9. A GREAT DEAL OF CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO
KURDISTAN. YAZDI WAS CONVINCED THERE IS MAJOR FOREIGN
SUPPORT FOR KURDISH INSURRECTION, DESCRIBING SITUATION
THERE AS SERIOUS. PCOI HAS INFORMATION WHICH THEY
CONSIDER RELIABLE INDICATING THAT U.S. AND ISRAEL
WERE COOPERATING WITH IRAQ IN FOSTERING KURDISH
INSURRECTION. CHARGE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN POINTING
OUT THAT U.S. HAD LITTLE TO GAIN BY AIDING KURDISH
REBELS. U.S. INTEREST IS IN STABILITY AND INTEGRITY
OF IRAN. ESSENTIAL U.S. INTEREST IN IRAN IS THAT OIL
KEEPS FLOWING; ANY SITUATION IN IRAN WHICH THREATEN
THAT FLOW WOULD BE VIOLETICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS.

10. WE ALSO TRIED TO GET HIM TO CONSIDER THE ABSURDITY
OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQ, NOTING THAT KIND
OF SUPPORT NEEDED BY KURDS DID NOT REQUIRE ISRAELI
INVOLVEMENT. MOREOVER, IRAQ COULD NOT RISK EXPOSURE
OF DEALING WITH ISRAEL. YAZDI SEEMED TO THINK THAT IRAQ
WOULD NOT SUPPORT KURDS ON ITS OWN. WE POINTED OUT
THAT IRAQ PROBABLY VERY CONCERNED OVER EXTENSION OF SHIA
"NATIONALISM" AND COULD WELL CONSIDER SUPPORT TO
THE KURDS AS WEAKENING PCOI. YAZDI SAID THAT ADEQUATE
ASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN TO SAHAM HUSAYN WITH REGARD
TO THE SHIA MAJORITY IN IRAQ. YAZDI INDICATED THAT IF
ISRAELI INTERFERENCE CONTINUED, IRAN WOULD HAVE TO
CONSIDER REPRISALS AMONG THE IRAQI SHIA COMMUNITY.

11. THESE AND OTHER COMMENTS BY YAZDI REFLECTED
CONSIDERABLE PARANOIA. E.G., IN DISCUSSING U.S. POLICY
TOWARD IRAN, HE SPECULATED THAT SOME GROUP WITHIN USG
PROBABLY CIA, MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO OVERTHROW
THE PCOI WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF SENIOR USG OFFICIALS. CIA
HAD LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN THE PAST. (S)

12.

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... YAZDI AND SAID BUREZAM SEEMED PLEASED WITH ... PROVIDED BY SMITH AND CAVE. YAZDI SEEMED ... ESPECIALLY PLEASED IN THE BRITISH SOVIET ENERGY ... CLAIMS. HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE EFFECT OF THE APPROACH ... OF THE GAS COMPARISON SOVIET ENERGY PLANS. HE ... THEY WERE ACTIVELY TRYING TO RAISE CURRENT ... OF GAS FROM 75 CENTS PER 1000 CUBIC FEET. ... WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES ... BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE NET ... PORTERS OF OIL SOMETIME IN THE 1951-53 TIME FRAME. ... IRAN WAS THE MOST LIKELY PLACE FOR THE SOVIETS ... TRY TO GET OIL ON FAVORABLE TERMS, YAZDI INDICATED ... ABOUT WHAT KIND OF PRESSURES COULD BE EXPECTED. ... COMMENTED THAT RECENT SOVIET OVERTURES HAD BEEN VERY ... FRIENDLY.

... WITH REGARD TO WHAT SOVIETS MIGHT BE WHEN FACED WITH ... UNDER CURRENT OIL POSITION TAKEN BY AMERICAN SIDE ... THAT HE WAS BASICALLY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING ... FACTUAL INFORMATION, THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES SEEMED ... DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS. WE POINTED OUT TO YAZDI ... THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME IN ... PAYING FOR OIL IN HARD CURRENCY AS THIS WOULD CERTAIN ... ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CURRENTLY 40 PERCENT OF SOVIET ... FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS COMES FROM OIL; THIS LOSING ... HIS INCOME IS GOING TO BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THEIR ... ECONOMIC PLANNING; WHAT MAKES IT MORE SERIOUS IS THAT THE ... LOSS WILL COME RELATIVELY SOON. INITIALLY WE EXPECT ... SOVIETS WOULD SEEK TO PURCHASE OIL ON SOFT TERMS AND ... WILL PROBABLY PUT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO AGREE TO SUCH AN ... ARRANGEMENT. YAZDI THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ... IRAN WOULD AGREE TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

... DURING DISCUSSION OF OIL, SUBJECT OF FORMER ... CHAIRMAN, HASAN NAZIR, WAS RAISED BY CHARGE. ... MAINTAINED THAT NAZIR HAD MADE A SERIOUS ERROR IN ...

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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STAT 10/13/79
APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAI
ERFTD: GC/AVE: FM
CLEAR: NONE
R: CHARGE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STAT 10/13/79
APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAI
ERFTD: GC/AVE: FM
CLEAR: NONE
R: CHARGE

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 12958: RPS-4 10/13/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PINR, IED
SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF YAZDI AND ENTEZAM

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AFTERNOON OF 15 OCTOBER, CHARGE ACCOMPANIED BY RON SMITH AND GEORGE CAVE, MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN, ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM. DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN WAS TO HAVE ATTENDED, BUT WAS ABSENT IN THEDESTAN.

3. CHARGE INITIALLY CALLED YAZDI'S ATTENTION TO A PARTICULARLY INTEMPERATE COMMENTARY PUBLISHED BY NEW YORK JOURNAL ON OCTOBER 15. YAZDI AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE ARTICLE AND PRESS TREATMENT WAS A THEME THROUGHOUT MEETING. YAZDI INSISTED THAT THERE IS AN ORGANIZED ANTI-IRANIAN CONSPIRACY IN THE U.S. PRESS. YAZDI SAID THAT WHEN IN NEW YORK HE HAD INVITED NUMEROUS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. MEDIA TO A MEETING. HE DID NOT MAKE CLEAR EXACTLY WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, OR WHEN IT TOOK PLACE. WE NOTED NO MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUCH A YAZDI PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HIS NEW YORK VISIT.

4. YAZDI ASKED WHAT USG REACTION HAD BEEN TO HIS MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY VANCE AND OTHER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS. YAZDI WAS TOLD THAT FROM U.S. POINT OF VIEW THE MEETINGS HAD NOT GONE WELL. WE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE LAID THE BASIS FOR IMPROVING IRANIAN-U.S. RELATIONS. BUT THE STAND TAKEN BY YAZDI DURING THE VANCE MEETING INDICATED TO US THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE AN EVEN SLOWER PROCESS THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. ISSUES HAD BEEN PORTRAYED AS BIGGER THAN LIFE. IN PURSUING THIS DISCUSSION, YAZDI SEEMED MORE INTEMPERATE THAN IN RECENT MEETINGS.

5. WHEN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN RESOLVING MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUES, HE CONCEDED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEM WAS DUE TO LACK OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATION ON BOTH SIDES. BUT HE WAS VOCAL IN EMPHASIZING THAT HE HAD NOT TO SEE PRACTICAL EVIDENCE OF A GENUINE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY TROUBLED TO HEAR OF PROBLEMS IN THE SECURITY AREA (THE 1974 MOU). HE CLAIMED NEITHER THE EMBASSY NOR THE MOND HAD TOLD HIM OF THIS. CHARGE EMPHASIZED USG'S READINESS TO RESOLVE ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS: YAZDI INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO HAVE SECURITY (EMBASSY, MOND) WORKING GROUP TO HANDLE

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U.S. Government Printing Office: 1976-204-850

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THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI HAD REPEATED ARAFAT'S CHARGES ON THE THREE AMBASSADORS. ENTAZAM APPEARED SUITABLY EMBARRASSED AND SAID "BUT WE HAVE ALREADY CORRECTED THAT STORY. HAVEN'T YOU SEEN IT IN TODAY'S PRESS?" ENTAZAM CONTINUED THAT IN A TALK WITH BAZARGAN AND TABATABAI, HE HAD OBTAINED AGREEMENT THAT AN IMMEDIATE RETRACTION OF THE STORY WOULD BE PRINTED IN PARS AND THEN PICKED UP BY ALL IRANIAN PRESS. (COMMENT: NO RETRACTION HAS BEEN CARRIED IN ANY OF THE PRESS TO DATE).

12. STUDENTS: ENTAZAM SAID THERE WERE ABOUT 3200 IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SWEDEN AND 30-40,000 IN EUROPE. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE STUDENTS IN SWEDEN WERE LEARNING ONLY SWEDISH RATHER THAN A WORLD LANGUAGE AND OBSERVED HE WOULD PREFER STUDENTS TO LEARN A WORLD LANGUAGE. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT THE US EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION HAD ALSO TIGHTENED ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS GRADES AND LANGUAGE ABILITY AND WAS CHECKING TO ASSURE THE INSTITUTIONS WERE PROPERLY CERTIFIED. WE HOPE THE PGOI APPRECIATES WHY OUR REFUSAL RATE OF STUDENTS IS HIGH. WE ARE TRYING TO ASSURE THAT ONLY PROPERLY QUALIFIED STUDENTS ARE ADMITTED TO THE US. ENTAZAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND THAT INDEED IRANIAN EMBASSIES ABROAD WERE IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO ASSURE IRANIAN STUDENTS DO NOT BECOME "PERPETUAL STUDENTS".

13. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THE CHARGE AGAIN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ENTAZAM WOULD HELP PGOI UNDERSTAND THAT THE US WAS TAKING ACTION TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE HOPED THAT ENTAZAM COULD DO SOMETHING TO REDUCE THE PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST THE US IN THE PRESS. ENTAZAM REPLIED THAT HE SINCERELY THOUGHT THAT THE US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP SHOULD IMPROVE AND REQUESTED AGAIN THAT THE US TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO OUR MUTUAL PROBLEMS. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY THE CHARGE, ENTAZAM SAID THAT KHOMEINI DOES DISTRUST THE US. HE TRUSTS BAZARGAN, ENTAZAM, AND YAZDI, AND THAT IS "WHY WE ARE HERE." ENTAZAM INTIMATED THAT IF THEY ARE ABLE TO PRODUCE RESULTS BY SOLVING THESE US-IRANIAN ISSUES THIS WILL HELP THEIR POSITION. ENTAZAM SAID THAT CHARGE MIGHT ASK YAZDI TO SET UP AN APPOINTMENT TO GO AND SEE KHOMEINI. (COMMENT)

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... PRESS ATTACK ON US: AS A COUNTER TO BENTAZAM'S
... EMPHASIS THAT USG WAS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
... IN THE US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP, CHARGE POINTED OUT ARTS
... THAT PGOI HAD TAKEN NO ACTION TO BE HELPFUL SUCH AS
... RETURNING TO USG MILITARY PROPERTIES, PAYMENT FOR DAMAGE
... TO USG PROPERTY, FREEDOM OF JAILING OF US CITIZENS
... AND CHARGES, EXPULSION OF JOURNALISTS AND TROUBLES
... AT EMBASSY COMPOUND. ... WE TRY TO BE
... LIKE SUPPLYING HEATING OIL TO THEM OURSELVES
... THE PGOI DO NOT SEEM TO REALIZE THE
... THIS TYPE OF THING COMES WITH THE
... IN A FREE SOCIETY SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC
... IN THE US. ... NEED
... CITIZENS ... IN THE
... GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED. THE CHARGE
... AMBASSADORS WERE CONSPIRING AT CIA
... THE REVOLUTION WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS.

... BENTAZAM BELIEVE THAT THE PGOI WAS NOT ASING THE
... IT WAS THE PRESS. THE CHARGE POINTED OUT

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DEFINING WHERE THE PGOI HAD ITSELF DELAYED IN GETTING SPARE PARTS MOVING (EMBASSY IS PREPARING A BRIEF SUMMARY) HE CALLED ON US TO PREPARE "SUGGESTIONS" OF HOW ALL OTHER PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED (I.E. IN THE FAVOR OF THE PGOI). HE SEVERAL TIMES OFFERED TO SET UP A COMMITTEE TO MEET WITH THE US SIDE WHEN WE HAD PREPARED OUR SUGGESTIONS. ALTHOUGH ENTAZAM WANTED A LETTER OF "SOLUTIONS" TO THE CLASSIFIED SPARE PARTS QUESTION, CHARGE REPLIED THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE DEALT WITH ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE CONVERSATION, ENTAZAM POINTED OUT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING AND WERE CONTINUOUSLY COMING UP WITH NEW PROPOSALS. THE US HAD NOT OFFERED ANYTHING.

F. ECONOMIC ISSUES: DURING CONVERSATION, ENTAZAM MADE SAME POINT ON ECONOMIC ISSUE AS ON MILITARY SALES: THE USG CAN DO MUCH MORE THAN IT IS PRESENTLY DOING TO HELP PGOI IRON OUT ITS COURT CASES ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. EVERY DAY, ENTAZAM SAID, WE ARE "LOSING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS" ON THESE CONTRACTS WHILE THE USG MOVES VERY SLOWLY. CHARGE SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS SORT OF STATEMENT, NOTED LIMITATIONS ON WHAT WE COULD DO VIS-A-VIS JUDICIARY UNDER OUR SYSTEM, AND OUTLINED WHAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN VARIOUS CASES (REARING AND BATES, EDS ETC).

G. CLEARANCE OF OFFICIAL CALLS: DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, CHARGE EXPLAINED TO ENTAZAM THE BACKGROUND OF HIS TALKS WITH SABAGHIAN ON THE EXECUTIONS OF THE THREE SENATORS. HE STATED THAT WHILE HE FELT THE TALKS WITH SABAGHIAN HAD BEEN PROFITABLE AND INTERESTING, HE REGRETTED EXECUTION ISSUE HAD BEEN MADE A PUBLIC ONE. ENTAZAM REPLIED THAT HE HOPED IN FUTURE THAT CHARGE WOULD LIMIT SUBSTANTIVE CALLS LIKE THIS TO BAZARGAN, YAZDI OR CHAMRAN. IF HE WANTED TO SEE OTHER PGOI OFFICIALS HE SHOULD FIRST CLEAR THE TALKS DIRECTLY WITH YAZDI. "WE ARE IN A MINORITY" ENTAZAM SAID. MANY OF THE OTHER PGOI LEADERS SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE DELICATE BALANCE THAT IRAN SHOULD MAINTAIN BETWEEN THE US AND USSR. THEY MAY WELL EXAGGERATE WHAT IS SAID IN MEETINGS AND GO PUBLIC LIKE SABAGHIAN. IF YAZDI OR ENTAZAM WERE CONSULTED FIRST THIS COULD GIVE THEM A CHANCE TO BRIEF THE OFFICIALS TO BE VISITED AHEAD OF TIME. HE AND YAZDI DID NOT WANT TO LOCK THE CHARGE'S ACCESS TO PEOPLE BUT TO ASSURE THAT NO PROBLEMS AROSE. CHARGE DEMURRED POLITELY POINTING OUT THAT ALL HIS REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS GO THROUGH THE PFA PROTOCOL OFFICE. HE POINTED OUT THAT EMBASSY FELT IT SHOULD HAVE MUCH MORE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS, ESPECIALLY THE ISLAMIC LEADERS. ENTAZAM AGREED BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE CHARGE NOT DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN SUCH MEETINGS. "IF YOU GO DEEPLY INTO A DISCUSSION THE RESULTS WILL DISTURB EVERYTHING." "BE LIKE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR" HE SAID. HE NEVER VOLUNTEERS ANY OPINIONS. INDEED HE NEVER, EVEN COMMENTS WHEN HIS GOVERNMENT IS ATTACKED BY THE IMAM AND YAZDI. HE SIMPLY FORGETS ALL ABOUT SUCH STATEMENTS. (ENTAZAM SEEMED TO INCLUDE ALL PGOI LEADERS WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CHAMRAN ON HIS LIST OF WHOSE NAMES SHOULD BE CHECKED WITH YAZDI.)

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STOCKHOLM, PLAYING A "WAITING GAME". CHARGE THEN WENT OVER QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES, POINTING OUT THAT ALTHOUGH DR. YAZDI IN NEW YORK HAD CHARGED WE WERE DELAYING DELIVERIES, MUCH OF THE DELAY LAY IN PGOI'S FAILURE TO ASSIGN FREIGHT FORWARDERS.

5. ENTAZAM STATED IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ONE OF THE MAIN UNSOLVED PROBLEMS WAS THE DELIVERY OF CLASSIFIED SPARE PARTS. CHARGE REPLIED THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA CAUSED BY OUR REGULATIONS AND BY THE NEED TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE STILL HAVING MAJOR PROBLEMS SIMPLY GETTING ACCESS TO THE F-14'S. WE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES ON CASE BY CASE BASIS. SWEEPING THIS EXPLANATION ASIDE, ENTAZAM STATED THAT "FOR US IT LOOKS LIKE YOU ARE JUST WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION FOR A NEW PLOT AGAINST THE COUNTRY." ENTAZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS NOT TRUE, BUT THAT IN GENERAL THE IRANIAN PEOPLE BELIEVED IT. IF THE US WANTS TO PROVE IT IS SINCERE, IT SHOULD COME TO THE PGOI WITH OFFERS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING CASES. THE PGOI CONSIDERS THAT THE USG IMPOSED THESE MILITARY CONTRACTS ON THE FORMER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. IF THE USG IS NOW SINCERE IN ITS DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS IT WILL SIMPLY CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS.

6. CHARGE'S REPLY OUTLINED THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE RECENTLY TO BE FORTHCOMING ON FMS QUESTIONS (WORK WITH THE TRUST FUND, BRIEFINGS, INFORMATION, ETC.). HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE SUSPICIONS OF SOME IRANIANS THAT THE USG WAS DELAYING. THERE WAS A CERTAIN IRONY, HOWEVER, THAT THE USG IS PRESENTLY BEING CRITICIZED IN THE US BECAUSE OF A US PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE USG IS DELAYING SPARE PARTS AND EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS FIGHTING GOING ON IN KURDISTAN.

7. WHILE CONVERSATION RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE PAST TIME CHARGE'S EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT WE HAD TONY WERE ANSWERED WITH ENTAZAM'S REQUESTS THAT THE USG BE MORE FORTHCOMING. SPECIFICALLY HE ASKED FOR A LETTER

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TEHRAN 10977/1

REF ID: A6277751 088 **

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151325Z OCT 79
EMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4947
RUDKFMQ/AMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0019

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHGE: STAT 10/15/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINCE
REFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 21 OF TEHRAN 10977

BT DIS

NO. 12065: GDS 10/15/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR, MASS
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S TALK WITH AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTAZAM

REF: STOCKHOLM 4184

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE CALLED ON IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTAZAM OCTOBER 13 FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION OF US IRANIAN RELATIONS. DURING DISCUSSIONS, ENTAZAM POINTED TO SUSPICION OF IRANIANS THAT US IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME WITH PGOI IN HOPES THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL FALL. HE ASKED THAT US TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO OFFER PGOI SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS SUCH AS CLASSIFIED MILITARY SPARE PARTS AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS. ENTAZAM SUGGESTED THAT CHARGE CLEAR ALL CALLS ON PGOI OFFICIALS AND OTHERS THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI SO THAT YAZDI WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROPERLY BRIEF THE OFFICIALS. CHARGE DEMONSTRATED GENTLY, POINTING OUT THAT ALL CALLS ON PGOI OFFICIALS ARE ALREADY REQUESTED THROUGH OFFICE OF CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. AT END OF CONVERSATION, ENTAZAM POINTED OUT THAT KHOMEINI "TRUSTS US" (HIMSELF, YAZDI, BAZARGAN) BUT INFERRED IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO THIS COUNTRY IF THE US COULD HELP THEM PRODUCE SOLUTIONS FOR US-IRANIAN PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE'S CALL ON AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTAZAM OCTOBER 13 WAS HELD AT PRIME MINISTER'S FORMER OFFICE (HE HAS JUST MOVED TO HOVEYDA'S OFFICE) INDICATING ENTAZAM'S CONTINUING CLOSENESS TO PM BAZARGAN. ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING WAS COOL AT OUTSET BUT WARMED UP CONSIDERABLY BY END. ENTAZAM THROUGHOUT WAS UNCOMPROMISING IN PRESENTING PGOI'S WINGS AND COULD NOT BE SWAYED FROM THE CONVICTION THAT US MUST TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION IF US-IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE TO BE IMPROVED. ENTAZAM PLAINLY CONSIDERS HIMSELF PART OF A SMALL ELITE GROUP OF MODERNISTS (BAZARGAN, YAZDI, CHAMRAN) WHO ARE TRUSTED BY KHOMEINI AND WHO ARE ENGAGED TO PROTECT IRAN AND TRY US AGAINST A CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY.

4. MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUES: CHARGE OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING OUR APPRECIATION FOR HELPFUL TALKS ENTAZAM HAD HELD WITH EMBASSY STOCKHOLM. HE WENT ON TO MENTION RECENT EVENTS IN US-IRANIAN RELATIONS, EMPHASIZING THAT WE WANTED TO MOVE AHEAD IN ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND WAS NOT, AS ENTAZAM HAD STATED TO OUR DCM IN

2

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 10977/1

In addition we have informed MOND officials in Tehran that we are prepared to participate in a continuing working group here to ensure fullest possible understanding of the FMS cases.

We understand the PGOI is also considering establishing in the U.S. an Iranian military purchasing mission to facilitate understanding of and procurement under the FMS program. The USG would welcome this.

October 15, 1979

At the same time the MOND was informed that we were prepared to sell urgently needed Iranian Air Force spare parts against new money from the PGOI totalling \$5.5 million. The MOND was informed that similar arrangements could be made for the Navy, the ground forces and Army Aviation.

Additional details on this arrangement for urgently needed spare parts had been provided by letter of July 30 to Brigadier General Emanian.

For some reason, the PGOI had not completed arrangements for all necessary freight forwarding agents as of the end of September.

As of October 9, however, the Arya Shipping line had been designated by the Iranian Navy and Army to carry their spare parts and other bulk shipments. These shipments should start moving soon.

Contract arrangements for shipment of Iranian Air Force parts are only now being completed by the PGOI. When this is done spare parts under both the emergency program and those in the Trust Fund financed pipeline can move.

FMS helicopter spare parts are currently being prepared for shipment based on arrangements worked out in late September by General Safari. These parts are expected to reach McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey later this month for pick-up by IIAF aircraft. Bell Helicopter has about 90,000 pounds of FMS related spares for delivery to McGuire under this arrangement.

Bell Helicopter also has about 110,000 pounds of commercial spares for delivery and is trying to work out charter flight for these spares. Earlier, Bell Helicopter had shipped at its own expense a quantity of spares by one C-130 and one DC-8.

During the meetings with Dr. Yazdi in New York on October 4, U.S. military representatives reviewed these and other matters. General Safari was informed that a list of all material in the pipeline and a list of closed FMS cases had earlier been provided to the PGOI. U.S. representatives reiterated our invitation to MOND officials to travel to Denver, if they wished, to review each and every FMS case file.

Iran - Military Supply Procedures Affecting Spare Parts

USG posture throughout regarding the Trust Fund has been to work to ensure that its solvency could be assured at all times as the Provisional Government of Iran (PGOI) scaled down its procurement and looks toward a new military procurement program from the U.S. at a reduced level.

This effort was made in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding with Iranian authorities of February 3, 1979, that provided for major revisions in the purchase of military materiel from the U.S. Involved were agreed cancellations, terminations, and reductions of several major programs -- all designed to meet the interests of both governments in assuring the solvency of the Trust Fund.

Insolvency of the Trust Fund would have caused termination of the entire Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for Iran, with the risk of very substantial termination liability costs for Iran.

A major element in that approach was the diversion to U.S. procurement of the Spruance class destroyers (CG-993's), resulting in July in sufficient funds being placed in the Trust Fund to ensure its continued solvency.

As part of this continuing effort to ensure fullest possible U.S.-Iran understanding on the status of the Trust Fund and all FMS cases therein, the total FMS community in the was involved during the month of August in a case by case study of the financial status of the entire Trust Fund.

Meetings were held in Washington and Denver (August 22-28) to review the results of this study. PGOI was invited to send representatives but declined.

ARMISH/MAAG representatives participated in this meeting, returning to Tehran in early September with a representative from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). This team then reviewed the Trust Fund and Memorandum of Understanding of February, 1979, with PGOI authorities (MOND, MFA and services).

In early August (letter to Col. Kamkar of August 4) the PGOI was informed that non-sensitive FMS items in the pipeline and financed by the Trust Fund were ready to move, subject to shipping arrangements being arranged by the PGOI.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tehran, Iran

October 15, 1979

Dear Mr. Ambassador:


When we talked the other day you asked me for a piece of paper describing the status of spare parts deliveries as we see it.

A piece of paper of this kind is attached. I hope it will be useful.

I appreciated the opportunity to talk frankly about some of the problems in United States-Iranian relations. As the Secretary indicated to Dr. Yazdi in New York, our purpose is to work closely with your government in every way possible to build a relationship based on the new realities in Iran.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,



L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure

His Excellency Amir Entezam,
Ambassador,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tehran, Iran.

CHARGE:LBLaingen:em 10/15/79

cc: A/MAAG and DAO

7. ENTEZAM REFERRED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTRUST OF THE SOVIET UNION BY LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IS THE MOST ACTIVE IN TEHRAN, VISITING GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS DAILY WITH OFFERS OF ANY AND ALL KINDS OF ASSISTANCE. HE IS CONSISTENTLY REBUFFED BUT CONSISTENTLY SURFACES TO TRY AGAIN. SOVIET ACTIVITY IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO US POSTURE, ENTEZAM SAID, WHICH IN THE EYES OF MANY TOP IRANIANS, IS COMPLETELY PASSIVE. IN RESPONSE, DCM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE NOT TO TAKE US AT ITS WORD THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND MUTUAL INTEREST. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT ENTEZAM MIGHT CALL ON CHARGE LAINGEN WHEN NEXT IN TEHRAN TO DISCUSS US POLICY. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND NOTED HE WILL BE IN TEHRAN OCTOBER 9-17.

8. ENTEZAM LEFT FOR PARS¹ OCTOBER 6. A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE THERE WILL BE TO SET UP AN IRANIAN "NEWSPAPER" TO BE PUBLISHED IN GERMAN, FRENCH AND ENGLISH. FOR DISTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT EUROPE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE SIMILAR TO AN OPERATION NOW CARRIED OUT IN WASHINGTON -- THE VOICE OF IRAN -- AND THE PURPOSE WAS TO DESCRIBE THE GOALS, METHODS, POLICIES AND PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION.

9. ENTEZAM WILL RETURN TO STOCKHOLM OCTOBER 18 AND WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN OSLO AND HELSINKI SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

KENNEDY-MINOTT

BT

#4164

5. AS FOR NAZIH, ENTEZAM SAID HE IS "SAFE" IN HIDING. EXCELLENT LAWYER AND MANAGER BUT INDISCREET IN HIS COMMENTS. SEVERAL REMARKS IN A SPEECH BY NAZIH A MONTH AGO, EXPRESSING ANGER AND CASTING SUSPICIONS FOR SLOW ECONOMIC PROGRESS, SPELLED HIS DOOM IN OIL MONOPOLY. ENTEZAM SAID HE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF NAZIH "BELIEVE HE CAN BE SAVED."

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7953

INFO RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 261

BT

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4164

EXDIS

6. ENTEZAM'S FOCUS NEVER DEVIATED FAR FROM US-IRANIAN RELATIONS. HE DESCRIBED THE SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT HE AND OTHER FOREIGN-EDUCATED, FOREIGN-TRAVELED IRANIAN WERE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF US FAILURE TO CONVEY THOSE SIGNALS WHICH WOULD INDICATE US ACCEPTANCE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND A WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE REVOLUTION ON BASIS OF EQUALITY AND RESPECT. ENTEZAM SAID THE US KNOWS EXACTLY HOW TO RESPOND TO CURRENT IRANIAN NEEDS --- AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS, AN UNBLOCKING OF IRANIAN FUNDS IN US, RAW MATERIALS FOR IRANIAN INDUSTRIES, ECT. WHILE US OFFICIALS IN TEHRAN AND IN WASHINGTON MOUTH ENCOURAGING WORDS, THEY FAIL TO TAKE THE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THEM. THE SUSPICION GROWS AMONG THOSE WHO KNOW THE US BEST THAT WASHINGTON IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME. IF THAT IS THE STRATEGY, IT WILL FAIL, ENTEZAM SAID. IRAN HAS ITS SHARE OF DIFFICULTIES, THERE ARE ADMITTEDLY SERIOUS DIFFERENCES ON HOW FAR AND FAST TO PROCEED WITH THE REVOLUTION, BUT ALL ARE UNITED IN THE SENSE THAT "THE KING YOU SUPPORTED" OR ANY OTHER KING WILL NEVER BE ALLOWED TO GOVERN. THE US WILL PAY A HIGH PRICE FOR THIS WAITING GAME. ENTEZAM SHRUGGED OFF SUGGESTIONS THAT US LAWS AND NOT US POLICY WERE DELAYING SHIPMENTS TO IRAN, E.G., OF HELICOPTER SPARE PARTS. HE SAID THAT US SUCCESSFULLY FOUND WAYS TO PROVIDE WHAT THE SHAH WANTED, WHEN HE WANTED IT. THE US COULD EASILY -- "IN A MOMENT" -- FIND WAYS TO ASSIST TEHRAN NOW.

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FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
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INFO RUEKMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 266
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John B10

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4164

CHARGE

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EXDIS

E.O. 12365: RDS-4 12/9/99 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IN
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH ENTEZAM

10/10 PDL-Cann

REF: (A) STATE 258415, (B) TEHRAN 14667

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DCM CALLED ON ENTEZAM TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, AS SUGGESTED REFTEL, ON OCTOBER 5. ENTEZAM'S WILLINGNESS TO DESCRIBE SPECIFIC CHANGES, SUCH AS NEW CABINET PERSONALITIES, HOWEVER, WAS CONSISTENTLY PUT ASIDE IN HIS DETERMINATION TO DISCUSS US-IRANIAN RELATIONS GENERALLY. HE LAMENTED AT LENGTH THE FAILURE OF U.S. TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH WOULD IMMEDIATELY IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF BAZARGAN AND THOSE AROUND HIM, LIKE ENTEZAM, WHO "DESPITE REBUFS FROM US" ARE STILL DETERMINEDLY PRO-WEST, AND BEGIN TO SOFTEN THE ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, "THE LEADER WITH WHOM YOU (THE US) MUST GET ALONG."

Do we know about this? If not, let's send quick cable to Dept & ask for background. B

3. IT WAS CLEAR AT AN EARLY POINT THAT ENTEZAM'S HEART AND MIND WERE NOT AND WOULD NOT BE FOCUSED ON DESCRIBING NEW CABINET MEMBERS. HE DID SAY THAT, LOOKED AT AS A WHOLE, CABINET CHANGES WOULD HARDLY AFFECT THE BASIC POLITICAL THRUST OF BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT OR DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN. IF ANYTHING, NEW PERSONALITIES WOULD STRENGTHEN DETERMINATION TO CLEAN UP THE PAST AND GET ON WITH TASK OF CONVERTING IRAN IN NEXT SEVERAL YEARS INTO TRUE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. SEVERAL NEW MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY YADOLLAH SAHABI AND HIS SON, EZZATULLAH SAHABI, ARE CONSIDERED "VERY RELIGIOUS," AND HOPEFULLY, WILL HELP TO EASE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECULAR FIGURES AND CLERICS.

Tom - what is your reading of Entuzam - mine is that he is still on outs?

4. IN BRIEFEST TERMS, ENTEZAM RESPONDED TO NEW CABINET NAMES AS FOLLOWS:
-- CHAMRAN-BRILLIANT ENGINEER, ABSOLUTELY DEDICATED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT LEADER. SPENT 15 YEARS IN US, WORKED ON SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAMS AT BELL LABORATORIES UNTIL US "KICKED HIM OUT" FOR HIS POLITICAL VIEWS. CHAMRAN WILL BE ONE OF GREATEST LEADERS OF REVOLUTION. DESPITE HARSH TREATMENT BY US, CHAMRAN WANTS TO MAINTAIN OPEN DOOR TO US. "IT WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR YOUR COUNTRY TO IGNORE CHAMRAN AND IRAN'S (DEFENSE)NEEDS."
--FOROUHAR - EXCELLENT LAWYER, ABOUT 50, WAS A LEADER OF THE IRANIAN NATION MOVEMENT.
--SEPAHBODI - MID-40'S, MEMBER OF FREEDOM PARTY "AS I AM." (ENTEZAM PROBABLY REFERRING HERE TO LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN - LMI.)
--EZZATULLAH SAHABI - ENGINEER, GRADUATE OF UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN, ABOUT 52. RESISTANCE MOVEMENT MEMBER WITH ENTEZAM.
--BANIASSADI - EARLY 40'S GRADUATE OF US COLLEGE.
--HABIBI - FREEDOM PARTY MEMBER, RESIDENCE IN FRANCE, ABOUT 48.
--YADOLLAH SAHABI - ABOUT 74, "VERY RELIGIOUS," FATHER OF EZZATULLAH SAHABI.

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INFO RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4247
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6852
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5773
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2746
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2735
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 257
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2922
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1421
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5300

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3638

9. ENTEZAM WILL ARRIVE IN COPENHAGEN ON SEPTEMBER 4 FOR FOUR DAYS, DURING WHICH HE WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS. HE WILL SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEED TO OSLO, HELSINKI AND REYKJAVIK FOR SAME PURPOSE.

10. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION, ENTEZAM WAS EXTREMELY WARM, OPEN AND FRIENDLY YET VERY SERIOUS WHEN DISCUSSING CURRENT EVENTS IN IRAN. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US WOULD NEVER AGAIN ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO "INSULATED FROM THE TRUTH FOR SUCH A LONG PERIOD AS 25 YEARS." HE SAID THE US COULD HAVE KNOWN THE TRUE FEELINGS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE " BUT CERTAIN AMONG YOU DIDN'T WISH TO KNOW THE TRUTH."

11. ENTEZAM AND HIS WIFE, A FORMER STUDENT AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY, SPOKE WARMLY ABOUT THEIR RESIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA. ANVAR ENTEZAM IS A PETITE, BEAUTIFUL WOMAN WITH A FIN SENSE OF HUMOR AND AN OPEN AND AFFECTIONATE MANNER. SHE SPEAKS COLLOQUIAL AMERICAN ENGLISH AND IS A VERY CHIC DRESSER. THE ENTEZAMS HAVE THREE CHILDRED, AGES 9, 7 AND 2. KENNEDY-MINOTT
BT
#3638

ENTEZAM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH DCM WHEN LATTER WAS CHARGE, AND WOULD, OF COURSE, WISH TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

8. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED SOME DISTASTE FOR SWEDISH MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY KURKISH SITUATION, AND OF ITS DESCRIPTION OF HIM. AS INDICATED REFTTEL, SWEDISH PRESS HAS LAMBASTED ENTEZAM AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF KHOMEINI'S FANATICISM WHICH HAS LED TO BARBARIC CRUSHING OF KURDS. ENTEZAM SAID HE WAS UNHAPPY AS WELL WITH SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENT ON GOI'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL EFFORT AGAINST THE KURDS.

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SIONALS, I.E., IRANIANS WITH TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS. HE SAID THERE WERE MANY MORE IRANIANS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY STUDENTS, THAN OFFICIAL STATISTICS INDICATED BECAUSE DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME MANY, IF NOT MOST, STUDENTS FEARED EXPOSURE TO IRANIAN EMBASSIES. HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT MANY IRANIAN STUDENTS ALSO HAD BEEN SAVAK AGENTS. THROUGH DISCUSSION GROUPS, SEMINARS AND PRESS CONFERENCES, ENTEZAM SAID, HE WOULD MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO REACH THESE IRANIANS. THE GOI, HOWEVER, WOULD BE UNABLE TO SUBSIDIZE THEIR RETURN TO IRAN OR PROMISE THEM "PROGRAMS" OR EMPLOYMENT WHEN THEY RETURNED. HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD RETURN OUT OF THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITH AND A SENSE OF NATIONALISM AND PRIDE. ENTEZAM ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE BETWEEN 3,000-3,500 IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SWEDEN, A CONSIDERABLY HIGHER FIGURE THAN HAS BEEN MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY. ENTEZAM DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN IRANIANS AND IRANIAN STUDENTS OF KURDISH ORIGIN IN SWEDEN. NOR DID HE MENTION THAT 200 KURDS HAD MARCHED ON HIS EMBASSY ON AUGUST 25 AND THAT THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF HIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN OCCUPIED THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK BY GROUP OF KURDISH STUDENTS ENGAGED IN HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST THE "CRUSHING" OF THE KURDS.

5. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY WAS CERTAIN THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MIXED UP "INDIRECTLY, NEVER DIRECTLY," WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S CURRENT REBELLION, WHICH HE THOUGHT THE ARMY WOULD SOON CRUSH. HE SAID THAT KHOMEINI'S "CALL TO ARMS" WAS A NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT ACT AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE RESPONSE OF ALL TRUE IRANIANS. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS CAPABLE OF ERADICATING MARSIXT, LENINIST AND MAOIST THOUGHT AS WOULD BE SEEN AS EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE. WHEN ASKED HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE FOR SITUATION TO STABILIZE, HE SAID BETWEEN SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR.

6. ENTEZAM SAID THAT WHILE IRAN'S NEEDS ARE GREAT, THERE IS NO NEED FOR MORE ARMS SO MUCH AS A NEED FOR SPARE PARTS, PARTICULARLY FOR HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT. HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 HELICOPTERS GROUNDED BECAUSE OF IMPROPER MAINTENANCE AND UNAVAILABILITY OF SPARE PARTS. HE TERMED THIS PARTICULAR NEED AS "VITAL." HE EXPLAINED THAT THE SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES FOR HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT WERE OVERLOADED WITH SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT BUT THAT THERE WAS A PAUCITY OF BASIC REQUIRED HARDWARE. HE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WOULD HELP GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO US OFFICIALS AND AMBASSADOR ASSURED HIM THAT HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON.

7. ENTEZAM AND AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT A MASSIVE EFFORT WAS REQUIRED NOW TO EDUCATE BOTH IRANIANS AND AMERICANS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S RESPECTIVE PROBLEMS AND ABOUT EVENTS IN IRAN. AMBASSADOR ASSURED ENTEZAM OF HIS DESIRE TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIM.

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RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6851
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5772
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2745
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2734
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 256
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2921
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1420
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5299
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POL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3638

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 9/1/99 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, SW
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH NEW AMBASSADOR OF IRAN

REF: STOCKHOLM 3629 (NOTAL)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ABBASS AMIR ENTEZAM, IRAN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN (AND THE OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES) CALLED ON AMBASSADOR AUGUST 30, LESS THAN 48 GOURS AFTER PRESENTING CREDENTIALS TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION, ENTEZAM COVERED THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS DIPLOMATIC MISSION, THE KURDISH REBELLION, US-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND HIS DISTASTE FOR THE SWEDISH MEDIA. END SUMMARY.
3. ABBASS AMIR ENTEZAM, FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT AND LEADER OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, PRESENTED CREDENTIALS AS IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ON AUGUST 28 TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF. ON AUGUST 30, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, ENTEZAM PAID COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR AT RESIDENCE. IT WAS AN AMIABLE, OPENLY FRIENDLY MEETING, DURING WHICH ENTEZAM VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION ON THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS MISSION, US-IRANIAN RELATIONS, THE KURDISH PROBLEM, AND THE SWEDISE MEDIA.
4. SPEAKING IN A SERIOUS, NO-NONSENSE VEIN, ENTEZAM SAID A PRINCIPAL TASK FACING HIM IS TO UNDERTAKE EXTENSIVE TRAVEL THROUGHOUT EUROPE (THE IMPRESSION HE LEFT WAS ALL OF EUROPE) TO CONTACT AND EDUCATE TWO PRIMARY GROUPS OF IRANIANS ABOUT THE "REALITIES" AND "TRUTH" OF THE REVOLUTION: STUDENTS AND PROFES-

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INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2545
BT
SECRET STATE 218664

Return to BL

MODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 8/20/99 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINR, IR

SUBJECT: BRIEFING

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BRIEFING OFFICER ROBERT CLAYTON AMES WILL ARRIVE ON AF-168 AUGUST 21 AT 10:00 P.M. FROM PARIS. HE WILL HAVE A COURIER LETTER IN ORDER TO PROTECT BRIEFING MATERIALS IN HIS POSSESSION. AMES'S PASSPORT X135101 ISSUED JUNE 1, 1978, IN WASHINGTON. PLEASE MEET AND ASSIST.

3. IF FEASIBLE SUGGEST YOU CONDUCT REHEARSAL OF BRIEFING WITH AMES BEFORE GOING TO MEETING WITH IRANIANS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#8664

3:00

*- Who to go?
- PM: office
first*

Entezan
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INFO RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 0258
BT
SECRET STOCKHOLM 3328

CN 586

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ROGER CHANNEL

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CHRON

*Say that I'll
need to get in
touch w/Wa*

EO 12065: XDS-4 8/14/99 (CANNEY, PAUL) OR-H
TAGS: PINT, IP
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

REF: A) STATE 208779, B) CANNEY-PRECH TELCON

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS INDICATED REF B, ENTEZAN WILL BE IN TEHRAN AUGUST 18-22. HE DEPARTS STOCKHOLM AUGUST 15 FOR BONN "TO HELP SOLVE THE STUDENT PROBLEM" AND DEPARTS FRANKFURT AUGUST 17 FOR TEHRAN.
3. DCM CONVEYED PRECHT MESSAGE. ENTEZAN SAID HE WOULD EITHER CALL DR. YAZDI BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR IRAN OR IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL THERE RE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING. ENTEZAN UNDERSTANDS THAT THE BRIEFING MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD IT BEEN SCHEDULED FOR PERIOD AFTER SEPT 12. ENTEZAN SAID CHARGE LAINGEN WOULD BE CONTACTED AFTER HIS CONVERSATION WITH YAZDI TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS.

KENNEDY-MINOTT

BT
#3328

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-221

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FM GEORGETOWN WASHDC
TO RUEAHR/AMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3895
INFO RUEKXMC/AMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5200
BT
U S O B E T STATE 208779

JA

ROBERT STANNEL

U.S. 1985: LPS-3, 8/10/99 (PRECHT, HENRI)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

IS ASKING OUR CHARGE IN STOCKHOLM TO INFORM
THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE BRIEFING ANY
DAY AFTER SEPTEMBER 12. THE CHARGE WILL ASK ENTEZAM
TO CONTACT DR. YAZDI AND HAVE YAZDI CONTACT YOU SO THAT
CONTACT DAY FOR THE BRIEFING CAN BE SET. WE ARE
FOLLOWING THIS PROCEDURE TO ASSURE THAT ENTEZAM AND YAZDI
ARE FULLY COORDINATED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE
BRIEFING.

YOU SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME RAISE THE SUBJECT OF A
DISCUSSION WITH DR. YAZDI OR THE PRIME MINISTER. IF THE
SUBJECT IS RAISED WITH YOU, YOU SHOULD ASK WHO WILL BE
AUTHORIZED TO ATTEND AND SAY THAT YOU WILL BE BACK IN
CONTACT AFTER FURTHER COMMUNICATION WITH WASHINGTON.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT GEORGE CAVE WILL MAKE ANOTHER
TRIP TO STOCKHOLM FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH ENTEZAM.
DEFERRED APPROVAL FOR SUCH A TRIP PENDING ADDI-
TIONAL REVIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT. COOPER

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OF EIGHT 50-WATT TRANSMITTERS AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN TO BROADCAST "SUBVERSIVE" MATERIAL. MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION HAD LOCATED THEM AND CONFISCATED ALL GEAR. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS WERE A PROBLEM. IN ONE CASE, PGOI GAVE PERMISSION FOR OVERFLIGHT OF MADANZARAN AT 21,000 FEET. PLANE CAME IN AT 4000 AND EN ROUTE TO PERSIAN GULF DROPPED AT LEAST ONE LARGE PACKET TO DISSIDENT KURDS. PGOI HAS IN HAND REQUESTS FOR BALUCHISTAN OVERFLIGHTS WHICH IT HAS NOT APPROVED. ENTEZAM SAID PGOI IS NOW CONVINCED GEORGE HABBASH WAS IN KHUZISTAN THREE TIMES AND HAS BEEN FINANCING ARABS THERE.

14. ENTEZAM SAID REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS CURRENTLY
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 03 STATE 206891/03

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REVIEWING TWO ALTERNATE ECONOMIC PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF COUNTRY. ENTEZAM SAID PLAN HE HIMSELF HAD ORGANIZED CALLS FOR MORE DEEP-CUTTING MEASURES TO PUT TWO TO THREE MILLION BACK TO WORK. ALTERNATIVE PLAN CALLS FOR LESS STRINGENT ACTIONS TO GET 500,000 TO A MILLION OFF UNEMPLOYMENT ROLLS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT ON DETAILS.

15. BIO NOTE: IN CONVERSATION, FOLLOWING EMERGED: ENTEZAM GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN ENGINEERING IN 1955, THEN WORKED AS A CONSULTING ENGINEER UNTIL HE WENT TO PARIS FOR ELEVEN MONTHS IN 1963. FROM 1964-66 HE STUDIED AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, WHERE HE GOT AN M.A. IN ECONOMICS. HE WORKED IN US FROM 1966 UNTIL MARCH 1969, WHEN HE RETURNED TO TEHRAN AS A CONSULTING ENGINEER. HE SET UP HIS OWN FIRM IN 1971 WHICH HE HAS JUST DISBANDED. HE SOLD ALL HIS HOLDINGS EXCEPT THOSE IN SMALL FOOD PROCESSING OPERATION (FOR WHICH THE FEDAYAN ACCUSE HIM OF BEING A CAPITALIST). HE IS MARRIED, HAS ONE OTHER DAUGHTER ABOUT COLLEGE AGE, AND TWO YOUNGER SONS, ABOUT FOUR AND SIX. HIS WIFE WAS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT COMING TO STOCKHOLM, BUT HAS BEEN UNDERGOING SOME HOMESICKNESS RECENTLY. VANCE
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HAS SAID HE WOULD NOT. ENTEZAM THOUGHT THAT BAZARGAN WOULD BE A RELUCTANT CANDIDATE, BUT WOULD BE FORCED TO RUN, AND WOULD BE THE BEST CHOICE. FEDAYAN AND LEFT ARE NO REAL PROBLEM IF PGOI CAN ACT SERIOUSLY -- I.E., TAKE DECISIVE STEPS WHEN IT MUST. ENTEZAM WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH EXTERNAL SUPPORT BEING GIVEN BY SOVIETS, LIBYANS, AND IRAQIS TO VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS, PARTICULARLY KURDS AND KHUZISTAN ARABS. EXCEPT FOR EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM. ENTEZAM BELIEVES MOST ARE HAPPY WITH NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND EVEN KURDS BECAME WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WHEN PGOI MOVED ARMY FORWARD.

10. ENTEZAM DESCRIBED RESULTS OF RECENT SHUFFLE IN PGOI. HE SAID FIVE WHO WERE MOVED INTO PGOI FROM REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ARE NOW KNOWN, THOSE WHO WENT FROM GOVERNMENT TO COUNCIL ARE NOT. HE DECLINED TO GIVE NAMES FOR SECURITY REASONS. COUNCIL HAS STABILIZED WITH 25 MEMBERS AND WILL STAY THIS WAY. (NOTE: THIS IS MORE THAN OTHERS HAVE CLAIMED.) COMMUNICATION IS MUCH BETTER BETWEEN COUNCIL AND PGOI SINCE SHIFT. AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI BECAME DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER AND TOOK OVER REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS (PASDARAN) FROM DR. CHAMRAN, WHO BECAMES DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AS WELL AS A DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER. OTHER DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER IS AYATOLLAH KHAMENI. ALSO GOING TO DEP. MIN. OF INTERIOR IS AYATOLLAH MAHDAVI-KANI, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF COMMITTEES AND FULFILLS SAME ROLE IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THIS HAS WORKED BETTER THAN ENTEZAM THOUGHT IT WOULD.

11. FIFTH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER GIVEN PGOI JOB IS ABDOL HASSAN BANI-SADR, WHO WAS ASKED TO BECOME DEP. ECON MIN IN CHARGE OF BANKING SYSTEM. HE REFUSED TITLE, BUT HAS GRUDGINGLY TAKEN ON JOB. ENTEZAM WAS ABSOLUTELY ACID ABOUT BANI-SADR, DESCRIBING HIM AS MENACE WHO WANTS TO TALK AND COMPLAIN, BUT DOES NOT WANT RESPONSIBILITY. HE HAD SIMILAR BUT LESS HARSH WORDS FOR HIS OLD ACQUAINTANCE SADEQ GHOTBZADEH OF NATIONAL RADIO/TV (NIRT), WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS SOLID KHOMEINI LOYALIST BUT ONE WHO IS "NOT AMENABLE" TO NECESSARY PGOI DIRECTION.

12. IN ADDITION TO CHAMRAN, ABDOLFAZZL BAZARGAN (PM'S NEPHEW) AND SADEQ TABATABAI ARE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS. ABBAS SAMII IS NOW HEAD OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S YOUNGER BROTHER IS VICE MINISTER OF HEALTH.

13. ON SUBJECT OF EXTERNAL THREATS, ENTEZAM SAID PGOI HAD EVIDENCE OF SOVIET HANKY-PANKY, INCLUDING PLACEMENT

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INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2503
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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 206891/02

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A MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS MEN ON IT AND WILL BE EXPECTED TO FINISH DELIBERATIONS WITHIN A MONTH. ENTEZAM SAID CURRENT PLAN IS TO HAVE REFERENDUM ON CONSTITUTION IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND JOINT PRESIDENTIAL/PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS A MONTH OR SIX WEEKS LATER. KHOMEINI IS A GOOD MAN WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN "AKHOUNDISM" -- CLERICAL DOMINANCE OF EVERYTHING -- BUT HE IS UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM RADICALS AROUND HIM TO OUST THOSE WHO ARE MERELY "GOOD MOSLEMS" AND REPLACE THEM WITH CLERICS. ENTEZAM IS RESIGNED TO FACT THAT CLERICAL TYPES WILL PROBABLY WIN MORE THAN HALF OF SEATS IN NEW PARLIAMENT AND CAUTIONED US AND OTHERS THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH CLERICS FOR FOUR YEARS. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED HOPE (BUT WITH DOUBT IN HIS VOICE) THAT MODERATES COULD CONTINUE TO DOMINATE GOVERNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS. HE SEES THIS AS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL TO RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN MIDDLE CLASS AND GETTING ECONOMY GOING.

8. IN REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTION ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S EMERGENCE, ENTEZAM PASSED MATTER OFF, SAYING BAKHTIAR WAS "PROBABLY TRYING TO PROMOTE THE BOOK HE'S WRITING." HE SAW BAKHTIAR AS NO THREAT TO THE PGOI. NATIONAL FRONT AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT SIMPLY CAN'T COMPETE WITH RELIGIOUS PARTIES AT POLLS, AND THEY ARE NOT PRONE TO VIOLENCE. KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY UNDER AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI WILL EMERGE AS STRONGEST GROUP. THIS BOTHERS ENTEZAM, SINCE BEHESHTI AND AYATOLLAHS RAFSANJANI AND MOUSAVVI ARE PRINCIPAL AMONG THOSE URGING

KHOMEINI TO TURN TO CLERICS FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR KHOMEINI TO MOVE TO TEHRAN, WHERE PGOI COULD SEE HIM MORE THAN THREE HOURS EVERY WEEK.

9. ON QUESTION OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, ENTEZAM SAID TALEQANI AND BEHESHTI WILL RUN, EVEN THOUGH TALEQANI

REVOLUTION TO KEY FIGURES AND DEAL WITH PROBLEMS THAT EMERGE IN ALL COUNTRIES. ONLY AMBASSADORS APPOINTED TO DATE ARE EITHER "RELIGIOUS FANATICS" OR CAREER MEN WHO ARE NOT CLOSE TO REVOLUTION. HE PICKED SWEDEN AS BASE BECAUSE THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO REPEAT NO PROBLEMS IN SWEDISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS, AND THIS GIVES HIM ROOM TO MOVE AROUND.

7. ENTEZAM WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN IRANIAN POLITICS. RECENT SHIFT OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCILMEN TO PGOI AND VICE VERSA WAS CASE WHERE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL GOT MORE THAN IT GAVE, VIS-A-VIS PGOI. NEWLY ELECTED COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS

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TOUCH WITH PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY EVERY 15 - 20 DAYS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PUSH FOR A MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI; C) EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE LATER IN FALL, PERHAPS WHEN NEW PERMANENT ADMINISTRATION IS IN PLACE. ENTEZAM MADE PITCH FOR "SOMEONE LIKE RICHARD COTTAM OR RAMSAY CLARK" TO BE US AMBASSADOR.

4. ENTEZAM SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL THINGS US COULD DO TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SINCERITY TOWARD NEW REGIME. THESE WOULD HELP PGOI DEAL WITH THOSE BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHO REMAINED DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF US PAST: A) PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ANY INTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI WITH OUTSIDE SUPPORT; B) BE AS HELPFUL IN ARRANGING FOR SPARE PARTS FOR IRANIAN MILITARY; C) CANCEL "PENALTY CLAUSES" TOTALING DOLS 1.3 BILLIONS DOLLARS (SIC); D) ASSIST IRANIAN INDUSTRIES TO GET RAW MATERIALS -- SOME US COMPANIES HAD REFUSED TO SEND MATERIALS AND TECHNICIANS; AND E) OPEN UP US VISA PROCESSING OPERATION IN TEHRAN -- THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS WANTED TO GO TO THE US. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY WANTS MORE STUDENTS TO GO TO THE US AND OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES. HE CITED EXAMPLE OF INDIA, WHICH TOOK 5000 IRANIAN STUDENTS THIS YEAR INSTEAD OF NORMAL 1500, AND HOPED US COULD FOLLOW THAT EXAMPLE.

5. STEMPERL SAID HE WOULD REPORT ENTEZAM'S SUGGESTIONS AND URGED PGOI TO CONTACT EMBASSY ON PROBLEMS OF MILITARY SPARES AND COMPANY NEEDS. IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE NO HOLDUPS EXCEPT PERHAPS IN SOME CASES WHERE BILLS HAD NOT BEEN PAID. ON QUESTION OF TECHNICIANS, STEMPERL NOTED THAT REVOLUTIONARY COURT ACTIVITIES AGAINST FOREIGNERS--HOLDING PEOPLE IN JAIL AND IN COUNTRY--GOT AROUND US BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND DID NOT HELP CONTEXT. ON QUESTION OF ISSUING VISAS, ENTEZAM WAS TOLD THAT NEW US FACILITY WOULD BE READY TOWARD END OF AUGUST, BUT THAT SECURITY SITUATION HAD TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE IT COULD BE FULLY OPENED. THIS MEANT PRESENT EMBASSY GUARDS HAD TO GO AND BE REPLACED BY UNIFORMED POLICE OR ARMY OUTSIDE US COMPOUND. ENTEZAM

TOOK NOTE, AND SAID HE WOULD WORK TO RESOLVE SITUATION "COMPLETELY TO YOUR SATISFACTION" ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO TEHRAN IN A WEEK TO TEN DAYS. STEMPERL URGED HIM TO CONSULT CHARGE LAINGEN UPON ENTEZAM'S RETURN TO TEHRAN.

6. ENTEZAM INDICATED HE IS SERVING AS PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL "SUPER AMBASSADOR" FOR EUROPE TO EXPLAIN

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 206891/01

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4, 8/7/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, IR
SUBJECT: TALKS WITH AMIR ENTEZAM

SUMMARY: ENTEZAM HAD SUGGESTIONS FOR GRADUALLY IMPROVING IRAN-US TIES. HE IS SERVING AS KIND OF "SUPER AMBASSADOR" FOR NEW PGOI IN EUROPE. ENTEZAM IS CONCERNED ABOUT RADICAL RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT AND ON KHOMEINI. CONSIDERABLE FRICTION EXISTS BETWEEN HIGHLY RELIGIOUS RADICALS AROUND KHOMEINI AND MERELY "GOOD MOSLEMS" IN LIBERATION MOVEMENT WHO ARE RUNNING GOVERNMENT. ENTEZAM SLOUGHED OFF RECENT BAKHTIAR REEMERGENCE AS NO MAJOR EVENT. SECURITY AGAINST LEFTISTS WILL BE NO PROBLEM IF PGOI CAN ACT "SERIOUSLY." ENTEZAM COMMENTED ON ELECTIONS, PGOI ORGANIZATION, EXTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. MAJOR NEW ECONOMIC PROPOSALS FOR RECOVERY PROGRAM NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BIO NOTES. END SUMMARY.

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON AUGUST 5, FSO STEMPEL FLEW TO SWEDEN TO ELICIT VIEWS OF IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTEZAM ON PRESENT IRANIAN SITUATION. ABOUT FOUR AND A HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD OVER TWO DAYS. FOLLOWING CABLE REPORTS HIGHLIGHT OF THESE TALKS, APRANGED BY SUBJECT MATTER.

3. AFTER STEMPEL OPENED CONVERSATION WITH ASSURANCES OF US GOOD WILL TOWARD PGOI, BRIEF DISCUSSION OF US TIES FOLLOWED. MAJOR POINTS MADE BY ENTEZAM WERE: A) NORMALIZATION SHOULD PROCEED SLOWLY TO EASE SUSPICIONS OF THOSE ILL-DISPOSED TO THE US; B) IN TERMS OF CONTACTS WITH NEW PGOI, PROBABLY BEST THING TO DO IS TO KEEP IN

6. ON TIMING, WE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH WEEK OF AUGUST 20. ASSUMING BRIEFER COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE HERE ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. CHARGE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON BEGINNING AUGUST 27, IF PRESENT PLANS CONFIRMED. ALTERNATIVE TO THESE DATES MIGHT BE WEEK BEGINNING SEPT 10.

7. I AM A BIT DUBIOUS ABOUT RAISING THIS ISSUE WITH PM BAZARGAN DURING COURTESY CALL AUGUST 11. UNLESS I CAN BE SURE THAT ENTEZAM WILL BY THAT TIME HAVE INFORMED PM OF HIS EXCHANGE WITH STEMPER AND CAVE. REFFEL IS NOT

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CLEAR WHETHER BAZARGAN (AND OTHERS MENTIONED) IS BEING INFORMED OF THE PROPOSED EXERCISE NOW OR WILL BE ONLY AFTER FIRST SESSION IN TEHRAN. I CAN DO SOME PROBING DURING CONVERSATION BUT ANY CLARIFICATION FROM DEPT WOULD HELP. LAINGEN

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ROGER CHANNEL
SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

L.C. 12065: XIS-4 8/7/99 (LAINGEN, L.E.) CR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINS
SUBJ: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH PGOI
REF: STATE 206729

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT; ACTION CABLE)
2. EXCHANGE BETWEEN ENTEZAM AND FSO STEMPL is VERY MUCH WHAT WE EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ENTEZAM'S EARLIER APPROACHES TO BOTH NAAS (TEHRAN 05401) AND ME (TEHRAN 07290). I THINK WE WILL WANT TO FEEL OUR WAY RATHER CAREFULLY ON THIS EXERCISE, MAKING FIRST BRIEFING FULL ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE OUR BCNA FIDES BUT RECOGNIZING ALSO THAT SOME DISCRETION IN FIRST ROUND IS APPROPRIATE IN WHAT IS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUSINESS THAT INVOLVES A CAST OF CHARACTERS AND A SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ABOUT WHICH OUR INFORMATION IS STILL LIMITED.
3. WE THINK THE EMPHASIS IN ANY INITIAL BRIEFINGS AS TO POSSIBLE INTERNAL THREATS TO THE PGOI SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO SUCH THREATS. DRAWING THE LINE SUFFICIENTLY SO AS TO KEEP US OUT OF INTERNAL MACHINATIONS, WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE PGOI, WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT IT MUST BE A CONTINUING REPORT.
4. WHILE PROBABLY DIFFICULT AT THE OUTSET, WE SHOULD TRY TO SEE THIS EXERCISE EVOLVE IN WAY THAT WILL BRING SOME INTELLIGENCE RETURN TO US AS WELL; E.G., ON PGOI POLICY TOWARD IRAQ, IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS IN AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE PGOI, THE TUBER, ETC.
5. WE AGREE WITH CAVE'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO ENTEZAM'S IDEA OF HAVING A PERMANENT CONTACT IN TEHRAN TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. HAVING BRIEFER COME FROM WASHINGTON WILL HELP OUR COVER ARRANGEMENTS HERE. HOWEVER WE COULD REEXAMINE THIS WHEN WE SEE HOW THE EXERCISE DEVELOPS.

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4. CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT CONCLUDED WITH QUESTION OF DATES. ENTEZAM RULED OUT WEEK OF AUGUST 27, SINCE HE MUST PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 28. MATTER WAS LEFT THAT USG WOULD GET BACK TO ENTEZAM THROUGH US CHARGE IN STOCKHOLM WHETHER BRIEFING COULD BE WEEK OF AUGUST 28 OR IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD BE PRESENT IN TEHRAN FOR FIRST BRIEFING, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR SUBSEQUENT ONES. IN RESPONSE TO USG CONCERN FOR SECURITY, ENTEZAM SAID RECEIPTS OF INFORMATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO PRIME MINISTER RAZAFGAN, ENTEZAM, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI, AND ONE OTHER IRANIAN ENTEZAM WOULD NAME LATER WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL. CAVE UNDERLINED FACT THAT MUCH SENSITIVE MATERIAL COULD NOT BE REDUCED TO PAPER BUT COULD ONLY BE PROVIDED ORALLY. ENTEZAM HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS. (no file)

5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REACTION TO THIS EXCHANGE AND ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE AS TO HOW WE PROCEED. WOULD YOU WISH TO RAISE SCHEDULING ON BRIEFING AND MODALITIES WITH PRIME MINISTER WHEN YOU SEE HIM AUGUST 11? VANCE
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E.O. 12865 XDS-4, 8/7/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PROU, PINS

SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH PCOI

SUMMARY: PCOI VERY MUCH WISHES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE THREATS TO PCOI. VENUE WILL BE TEHRAN. DATES REMAIN TO BE SET. END SUMMARY.

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING DISCUSSIONS (SEPTEL, MOJIB) BETWEEN IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ENTEZAM AND ESO STEMPEL IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 5, AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED STRONG CONTINUING PCOI INTEREST IN EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH US REGARDING POSSIBLE INTERNAL THREATS TO PCOI WITH EMPHASIS ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT. ENTEZAM PUT SUCH DISCUSSION AT TOP OF HIS LIST OF SUGGESTIONS FOR US ACTIONS WHICH WOULD GRADUALLY LEAD TO IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. HE SAID DECISION TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN PERSONALLY APPROVED BY KHOMEINI.

3. FOLLOWING DAY STEMPEL INTRODUCED FORMER TEHRAN CRI OFFICER GEORGE CAVE TO ENTEZAM FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING WHAT BRIEFING WOULD INVOLVE AND MODALITIES. CAVE OUTLINED SENSITIVE NATURE OF MATERIAL AND NEED F CLOSEST CONFIDENCE. ENTEZAM SAID PCOI WISHED TO HAVE SUCH EXCHANGES IN TEHRAN WHERE THEY WOULD BE CLOSER TO SCENE OF ACTION. CAVE SAID USG WOULD SEND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING OFFICER TO TEHRAN. HIS CHARGE IN TEHRAN WOULD COORDINATE EVENT. ENTEZAM SAID HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE CONTINUING BUSINESS, AND CAVE SAID USG SAW IT AS SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT BE DONE EVERY THREE TO SIX MONTHS, WITH SPOT INFORMATION BEING PASSED IF PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. ENTEZAM ASKED IF THERE COULD BE A CONTACT IN TEHRAN TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS. CAVE SAID THAT WAS SUBJECT FOR FUTURE; THERE WAS NO ONE THERE NOW. (NOTE: CAVE WAS INTRODUCED AS SENIOR BRIEFING OFFICER FROM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. TERM CIA WAS NEVER USED.)

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E.O. 12065:GDS 8/1/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PEPR, IR, SW

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM

REF: STOCKHOLM 3147

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1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. STEMPEL WILL ARRIVE SUNDAY, AUGUST 5 VIA NORTHWEST FLIGHT NO. 30 AT 9:15 A.M., AND WILL DEPART ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 7. PLEASE MEET AND LODGE, AND ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM PREFERABLY LATE ON SUNDAY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW-UP MEETING ON MONDAY. CHRISTOPHER
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AND GOI POLICY. THE PEOPLE OF IRAN HAVE LONG SUSPECTED AND FEARED SOVIET ENCRAGEMENT AND SIMILAR WARNINGS HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO MOSCOW.

3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, ENTEZAM SAID HE PLANS TO BE AN ACTIVE AMBASSADOR, NOT ONLY IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES TO WHICH HE WILL BE ACCREDITED, BUT AS A ROVING AMBASSADOR THROUGHOUT EUROPE. HE IMPLIED THAT, AS A FORMER HIGH OFFICIAL OF GOI, HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY TEHRAN TO KEEP A CLOSE WATCH OVER IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH ALL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS (AS WELL AS IRANIAN AMBASSADORS IN THESE CAPITALS). THE PURPOSE, HE SAID, WAS TO LIFT THIS PARTICULAR POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN FROM THE SHOULDERS OF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. HE MENTIONED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE MOST PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO VISIT WEST GERMANY SOON "TO CLEAR UP A SMALL PROBLEM." IN SWEDEN, HE PLANS TO MEET REGULARLY WITH COUNTRYMEN HERE (MOST ARE IN THE STUDENT COMMUNITY) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT ALL IRANIANS, INCLUDING THOSE IN COMMUNIST PARTY, CAN WORK FOR THE GOOD OF IRAN. THUS FAR HE HAS MET WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED IRANIAN STUDENTS TO REQUEST THEIR COOPERATION AND TO EXPLAIN WHY IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO SUSPEND FOR A PERIOD THE GOI'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR STUDIES. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD WEED OUT THE "PROFESSIONAL" STUDENTS AS WELL AS THE ACADEMICALLY POOR STUDENTS AND WILL EVENTUALLY PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE WITH GOOD RECORDS.

4. ENTEZAM RECALLED HIS TIME IN NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN THE EARLY '50'S. A GOOD FRIEND OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AT THAT TIME IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS POLITICAL OFFICER RICHARD COTTAM (PHONETIC, ENTEZAM NOT SURE OF SPELLING). HE SAID COTTAM WAS ONE OF THE FEW AMERICAN DIPLOMATS WHO UNDERSTOOD AT THE TIME THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE US INSISTENCE ON PUTTING THE SHAH IN POWER. ENTEZAM SAID COTTAM MAINTAINED HIS INTEREST IN IRAN, HAD MET KHOMEINI IN PARIS LAST OCTOBER AND HAD VISITED TEHRAN IN NOVEMBER. HE THOUGHT COTTAM WAS NOW TEACHING AT AN EAST COAST UNIVERSITY (POSSIBLY PRINCETON OR PENNSYLVANIA), AND HE REMARKED ON WHAT A WISE STEP WOULD BE TAKEN, IN HIS VIEW, IF THE US WERE TO APPOINT COTTAM AS THE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO IRAN.

5. IN WELCOMING ENTEZAM TO STOCKHOLM, CHARGE ASSURED HIM OF THE EMBASSY'S INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH HIS MISSION, EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL WHENEVER APPROPRIATE. ENTEZAM SAID HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THIS EARLY CONTACT AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PASS TO HIM WHATEVER "NEW INFORMATION OF MUTUAL INTEREST" MIGHT BECOME AVAILABLE.

6. COMMENT: CHARGE LAINGEN'S DESCRIPTION OF ENTEZAM AS A CHARMING INTELLIGENT, AND HIGHLY ARTICULATE REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IS COMPLETELY ACCURATE. ENTEZAM IS INDEED ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US AND SEEMS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN HELPING TO RESTORE GOOD US-GOI BILATERAL RELATIONS. EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH ENTEZAM AS FREQUENTLY AS POSSIBLE. CANNEY

2 AUG 79 07 40z

CHARGE
D CHRON

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OO RUQMR
BE RUDKPMQ #3159 2131430
ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O R #11358Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7343
INFO RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 250
RUBKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6802
RUBKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4013
RUBKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5726
RUBISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2712
BT
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 3159

KIDIS

NO 12065: GBS 8/1/85 (CANNEY PAUL F) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR IR SW
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH IRANIAN AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM

REF: TEHRAN 3089 (NOTAL), B) STATE 198060 (NOTAL),
C) STOCKHOLM 3147 (NOTAL)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. CHARGE MET WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM AFTERNOON JULY 31 IN ENTEZAM'S OFFICE. THE FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT ARRIVED IN STOCKHOLM IN LATE JULY AND WILL BE ACCREDITED TO THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES (RESIDENT IN STOCKHOLM). HE IS SCHEDULED TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF ON AUGUST 28. ENTEZAM RECALLED HIS STUDENT DAYS AT BERKELEY, HIS GENUINE ADMIRATION FOR MANY AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION OVER US POLICY IN IRAN OVER PAST 25 YEARS, AND HIS DETERMINATION NOW TO HELP REBUILD GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT RAPPROCHMENT COULD ONLY COME ABOUT ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT, NO US INTERFERENCE IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NO DISTURBANCE OF IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE. HE SAID US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY CONFUSED POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN TODAY. DESPITE THE DAY TO DAY BACK AND FORTH, THE IRANIANS ARE BUILDING, ALBEIT PAINFULLY SLOWLY, AN ISLAMIC MODEL WHICH, SEVERAL YEARS HENCE, OTHER COUNTRIES WILL WISH TO DUPLICATE. IRAN WISHES GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND OTHERS, BUT THEY WILL BE DEVELOPED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR IRAN, ITS ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. IF THE US HAS NOT LEARNED A LESSON FROM THE REVOLUTION AND ATTEMPTS ARE MADE NOW OR LATER TO REKINDLE THE KINDS OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH EXISTED UNDER THE SHAH, THE ENMITY TOWARD THE US MANIFESTED OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS WILL BECOME A PERMANENT FEATURE OF IRANIAN PUBLIC OPINION

*Show to Farnsworth
Seno
Hart
J. Miller*

33

SL

31 JUL 79 312

URGENT 180511Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3127
TO DIRECTOR/STATE DEPT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3774
BT
S W O R E T STATE 120887

(8/11)

39

THIS ONLY FOR THE CHARGE AND THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12866: GDS, 7/2/79 (PREPACT, HENRY)

TAGS: AMER, IR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTIZAM

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEFORE HE LEFT TEHRAN FOR HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT AS AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM, AMIR ENTIZAM TOLD OUR DEPUTY THAT HE WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH USE OFFICIALS ONCE HE WAS OUTSIDE OF IRAN, AS ONE OF THE KEY MEMBERS OF THE PGOI INTERNAL CIRCLE WHILE HE WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, ENTIZAM COULD, IF HE WAS WILLING, IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE.
3. IF YOU PERCEIVE NO OBJECTION, WOULD YOU FIND AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH HIM AND TO RAISE THE FOLLOWING POINTS DISCREETLY:
 - WOULD HE BE MENTIONED IN YOUR LINE OF DISCUSS IRANIAN POLICY FOLLOWING HIS ARRIVAL IN STOCKHOLM.
 - IF AMBASSADOR ENTIZAM WOULD FIND IT CONVEINIENT WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO SEND FORMER TEHRAN POLITICAL OFFICIALS SOME OFFICIALS FOR A MEETING. THE MEETING COULD BE HELD ON A RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE. IT COULD BE HANDLED DISCREETLY.
 - ENTIZAM IS BEHAVING HIS ASSIGNMENT ON THE POLITICAL SCENE AND HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN A TRIP TO VANCE



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RR RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #6468 2001153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191014Z JUL 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5068
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3538
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 186468

19 JUL 79 11 30 Z

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/9/99 (MCAFFEE, WILLIAM)

TAGS: PINR, IR, SW

SUBJECT: (U) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON NEW IRANIAN
AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN, ABAS AMIR-ENTEZAM

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 2492, B) TEHRAN 6550

1. (C) THE DEPARTMENT HAS LITTLE TO ADD TO REFTEL B.
IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO STOCKHOLM, HOWEVER, THAT AMIR-
ENTEZAM ALWAYS MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE US
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, FOR WHOM HE SAYS HE
HAS MUCH RESPECT. HE ALSO CLAIMS TO HAVE FRIENDS ALL OVER
THE UNITED STATES.

2. (LOU) THE DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY
ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, OR PHOTOGRAPHS, THAT
BECOME AVAILABLE ON AMIR-ENTEZAM DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT
TO STOCKHOLM. EVALUATIVE COMMENTS ON HIS PERFORMANCE
WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. VANCE

BT
#6468

NNNNEXO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TEHRAN 8089

DE RUQMHR #8089 212 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZK
O 310423Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2971
INFO RUDYFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2011
BT

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL
CHRG: STATE 7/31
APPRV: CH3:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: CHG:LBLAINGEN/BJH
CLEAR: NONE
DISIR: CHG POL RE CHRON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 20069

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, IR
SUBJ: NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN

REF: TEHRAN 7315 (NOTAL), STATE 198060

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT TO THE DEPT OF CABLE SENT JULY 15

1. I HAVE SENT YOU A LETTER TELLING YOU ABOUT IRAN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN (WHO WILL ALSO BE ACCREDITED TO THE OTHER FOUR SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES). HOWEVER THE POUCH SERVICE FROM HERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY SLOW TO YOUR PART OF THE WORLD AND SO I OUGHT TO ALERT YOU TO HIS ARRIVAL THERE THIS PAST WEEK.

2. ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM, WHO WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HERE AND ALSO GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, IS A CHARMING MAN, URBANE AND WESTERN IN STYLE AND HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE U.S., BUT HE HAS ALSO BEEN AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY INNER CIRCLE. JUST WHY HE HAS LEFT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR TO US AND ANYTHING YOU CAN PICK UP ON THAT SUBJECT FROM HIM WOULD BE USEFUL. HE IS ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH US, SO I AM SURE HE WILL SEEK YOU OUT AT AN EARLY DATE. WE COMMEND HIM WARMLY. LAINGEN

BT
#8089

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TEHRAN 8089

Tehran, July 11, 1979

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you again for sparing time in your busy schedule to permit me to see you before your departure. Your kindness was a further indication to me of what I believe continues to be a good reservoir of friendship toward my country in Iran.

I have written to each of our Ambassadors in Scandinavia telling them of your appointment and your impending arrival there. I know they will welcome seeing you.

Again, my best wishes for your success in your new assignment. I look forward very much to seeing you on your first visit back to Tehran.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Abbas Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister,
Tehran.

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-2-

Having said all that, we confess to being without real intelligence as to his departure. He will be meeting and talking with you, and we would welcome anything you can tell us about his views and composure from that distance. Indeed, anything that he might have to offer on the inner circles of the leadership here and their inter-relationship will be of interest to us.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

cc: Hon. Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Hon. Louis A. Lerner
Hon. Warren D. Manshel
Hon. Rozanne L. Ridgway

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran, Iran
July 13, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

The Honorable
Rodney Kennedy-Minott
American Ambassador
Stockholm, Sweden

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

You will soon have an Iranian colleague in the person of Abbas Amir Entezam, formerly Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman here, who has been named by his government to be Ambassador to Sweden with accreditation to Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland, as well. Lucky man!

I am sending copies of this letter to each of your colleagues in these other four countries.

We will send you separately some biographic information about Entezam. Briefly, he is an unusually polished and urbane and westernized Iranian, very much in the inner circle of the revolution here in Iran, but hardly a revolutionary in style or appearance. He has spent considerable time in our country and knows and likes the United States very much. You will like him.

One of the more frequently posed questions on the diplomatic circuit here currently is, "Why is Entezam leaving?" We don't have a very good answer to that yet. He has said to some of us here that he might be in a better position to answer that in Stockholm than here. The assumption is that his departure is to some degree at least a product of intrigue and maneuvering within the inner circles of the revolution and it has resulted in his feeling more comfortable outside Iran at the moment. He tells us that he intends to continue to be actively involved and interested in what goes on here, albeit at a distance.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/98 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

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... DEPUTY PM AMIR ALI QERMI
... SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES--
... STRONGLY WHEN I SAW HIM FOR
... TO SHARE ON BOTH IRANIAN
... INTENTIONS TOWARD IRAN.
... BUSINESS OF TELLING THE
... DOMESTIC POLITICS, BUT
... CONSIDERING WHETHER THERE IS
... OF THE IRAQ REQUEST.

... HIS CONCERN OVER IRAQI
... (REF A) AND THAT BAZARGAN
... OCCASION WITH SULLIVAN. IN
... CLEAR THAT HIS CONCERN
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... MY RESPONSE TO GENERAL
... BAGHDAD REPORTING AVAILABLE HERE.
... SECTION THERE ON SEVERAL
... OUR INTEREST IN IRAN
... REPORTS OF ESCALATING
... I ADDED THAT I WOULD
... IN A POSITION
... YOUR SPECIFIC.

... DEPARTURE FOR STONINGLY
... POINT MIGHT BE, AS SUGGESTED
... SPOKESMAN (LADARBALEH), BUT
... AS A SPOKESMAN AS A SPOKESMAN AVAILABLE
... POINT.

... BALANCE ON THIS OVERALL
... POSITIVE RESPONSE WOULD
... ASSESSMENT OF THE
... DEMONSTRATE THAT WE
... STRONG INTEREST IN STABILIZING
... ASSUMING THAT WHAT WE COULD PASS

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EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON REGARDING THE TIGHTENING COMMODITIES MARKET AND THE NEED TO ACT PROMPTLY IF MAJOR PURCHASES WERE CONTEMPLATED.

6. MOVING ON TO THE ISSUE OF TREATMENT OF MINORITIES I REMINDED ENTEZAM OF THE GREAT INTEREST IN THE U.S., PARTICULARLY IN THE CONGRESS, IN THIS SUBJECT. I THEN ASKED HIM ABOUT HAI AND DANIELPOUR (REF B), NOTING THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY WASHINGTON TO CHECK THE ACCURACY OF REPORTS THAT THEY WERE CURRENTLY ON TRIAL. ENTEZAM WAS COMPLETELY IGNORANT OF THE FACT THAT THEY HAD EVEN BEEN ARRESTED, BUT PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND LET US KNOW THE RESULTS OF HIS INQUIRY.

7. I THEN SOLICITED ENTEZAM'S VIEWS ON HOW THINGS WERE GOING DOMESTICALLY FOR THE PGOI WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SERIES OF MEETINGS THAT HAD BEEN HELD IN QOM LAST WEEK BETWEEN THE CABINET AND KHOMEINI AND KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ENTEZAM SAID THAT THE PGOI CONTINUES TO HAVE MANY PROBLEMS, MOST OF WHICH WERE CAUSED BY IDEALISTIC PEOPLE WHO WANT TO HELP." HE SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE THESE, AND THAT "WE--AND YOU--MUST BE PATIENT." THE PGOI, HE CONTINUED, HAS HAD DIFFICULTY ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY BUT IS INEVITABLY HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR WHATEVER HAPPENS. MANY PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT LEAVE THE PGOI ALONE TO GET ON WITH THE JOB OF RUNNING THE NATION'S AFFAIRS EVEN THOUGH THESE SAME PEOPLE DID NOT HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO RUN THINGS THEMSELVES. ENTEZAM SAID THAT THE PGOI HAS TRIED TO CONVINCE THESE PEOPLE TO STOP INTERFERING, AN EFFORT, HE CLAIMED, WHICH HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI. HE THEN CHARGED THAT THE LEFT HAS PURPOSELY TRIED TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION AND THAT IT HAD BEEN SUPPORTED IN THIS BY THE SOVIETS. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD SHARE ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN WITH THE PGOI.

8. I COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT IRAN FREQUENTLY APPEARS TO BE LOOKING FOR TROUBLE IN THAT A NUMBER OF POLITICALLY PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS HAD MADE STATEMENTS WHICH OTHERS COULD ONLY REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE. ENTEZAM SIGHED AND SAID THAT ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION HAD BEEN TO LEAD EVERYONE TO THINK THAT HE COULD SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE NATION. HE SAID THERE HAD EVEN BEEN DIFFICULTY IN THIS REGARD WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IT WAS IRAN'S POLICY TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY ITS NEIGHBORS, BUT THAT VERY DAY NEW PGOI SPOKESMAN SADEGH TABATABAIE, ENTEZAM SAID, HAD MADE A STATEMENT THAT WAS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO THE PGOI'S POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ. THE SAME PROBLEM EXISTED AT SADEGH GHOTBZADEH'S NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (NIRT). NIRT'S BUDGET IS PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE PGOI HAS NO CONTROL OVER PROGRAMING, HE SAID.

9. ENTEZAM SAID THAT VERY SHORTLY AFTER THE REVOLUTION IN FEBRUARY THE PGOI CONCLUDED THAT EVERYONE, WHETHER IT BE THE GOVERNMENT HIMSELF, THE COMMITTEES, THE GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION OR THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, WAS WORKING AGAINST

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CUR RELATIONS INTO PERSPECTIVE. ON THE SUBJECT OF AN AMBASSADOR, I SUGGESTED (AS I HAD WITH YAZDI) THAT FOR THE MOMENT "THE LESS SAID, THE BETTER;" THAT OUR POSITION REMAINED AS THE DEPT SPOKESMAN HAD EXPRESSED IT, BUT NOTED UNOFFICIALLY THAT WE OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT INSIST ON SENDING SOMEONE THE IRANIANS DID NOT WANT. I ADDED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AWHILE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE TO EVERYONE'S SATISFACTION. I WISHED HIM WELL IN STOCKHOLM.

4. TURNING TO BUSINESS MATTERS, I THANKED ENTEZAM FOR HIS EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE SUCH MATTERS AS THE DISPOSITION OF THE U.S. ARMY COMMISSARY STOCKS AND THE RETURN OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, BUT NOTED THAT WE HAVE CONTINUED TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES OWING TO THE DIVIDED AUTHORITY IN ACTUAL CONTROL OF THE MATERIEL AND PROPERTY IN QUESTION. ENTEZAM SEEMED SURPRISED THAT THE MATTER OF COMMISSARY STOCKS HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED. HE REITERATED THE PGOI'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE MOST OF THEM, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE ABOUT IT. WHEN I NOTED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ORDERLY DISPOSAL OF ALL ISSUES LEFT OVER FROM THE PREVIOUS ERA OF MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. SO THAT WE COULD GET ON IN DETERMINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RELATIONSHIP IRAN NOW WANTS IN THIS AREA, ENTEZAM SAID THE PGOI HAS PROCEEDED CAUTIOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT AND PRESSURES ON THE PGOI, PARTICULARLY FROM THE LEFT, TO ACT PRECIPITOUSLY.

5. I ALSO RAISED GTE WITH HIM, AGAIN POINTING OUT THE NEED TO COMPROMISE IN CASES WHERE THE COMPANIES ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. I NOTED THAT OTHER COMPANIES ARE WATCHING NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE INVOLVING GTE AND WILL BE INFLUENCED IN A MAJOR WAY BY THEIR PERCEPTION OF IRAN'S WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE. ENTEZAM SEEMED RELATIVELY UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CASE, BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE MINISTER OF PTT ESLAMI LATER THE SAME DAY, AND WOULD CONVEY MY VIEWS TO HIM. I ALSO NOTED THE RETURN OF DUPONT EXECUTIVES, WHICH PROMPTED ENTEZAM TO ASSURE ME THAT FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS IN IRANIAN ENTERPRISES THAT ARE NATIONALIZED WILL BE ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED. FINALLY, IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, I NOTED THE RECENT BRIEFING PROVIDED TO THE IRANIAN

RUCMHR #7864/01 #189 **
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RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DCHA
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JEDDA
RUESBLX/AMEMBASSY KABUL
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUETC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUQOMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
RUZFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
BT
SECRET SECTION TEHRAN 07064

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: STATE 7/E/79
APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAI
TRFTD: PO: VLTOMSET
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: SHG CHRG

BDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

NO. 12065: XDS-4 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, PINR, SHUM, SOCI, IR, IZ, UR, EINV,
- BDIS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM

REF: (A) TEHRAN 6941, (B) STATE 175106, (C) TEHRAN 5401
- (D) BAGHDAD 1213

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM
JULY 7 I REITERATED OUR DESIRE TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS
OF NORMALIZING OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. I ALSO RAISED A
NUMBER OF BUSINESS ITEMS, INCLUDING OUTSTANDING MILITARY
ISSUES, THE GTE CASE, AND TREATMENT OF MINORITIES. ENTEZAM
REVIEWED THE PROBLEMS THE PGOI HAS HAD IN ASSERTING ITS
AUTHORITY OVER THE INFORMAL PARALLEL SYSTEM OF REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEES. HE ASKED ONCE AGAIN THAT WE SHARE INFORMATION
ON ACTIVITIES BOTH WITHIN IRAN AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
WHICH MIGHT BE OF IMPORTANCE TO IRANIAN SECURITY. END
SUMMARY.

3. I BEGAN MY PRESENTATION USING THE SAME APPROACH ON U.S.-
IRANIAN RELATIONS THAT I HAD EARLIER WITH YAZDI (REF A).
I THANKED ENTEZAM SPECIFICALLY FOR THE THINGS HE HAD DONE
TO FACILITATE MOVING TOWARD A MORE NORMAL, MUTUALLY BENE-
FICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE POST-
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD. I MENTIONED, IN THIS REGARD, HIS
JUNE 21 PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WE SAW AS HELPFUL IN PUTTING

2

Tehran, July 3, 1979.

Excellency:

As you may know, I have come to Tehran to succeed Charlie Naas as Charge d'Affaires ad interim at this Embassy pending the arrival of a new Ambassador from my country.

Charlie Naas has told me of the courtesies you showed to him and, through him, to this Embassy on a variety of occasions over the past several months. My Government has asked that I convey specifically our appreciation for the comments you made about the United States-Iranian relations in a media broadcast of June 21. As I mentioned to the Foreign Minister yesterday, a comment such as yours, as well as the Foreign Minister's statement of June 27, help greatly in developing a better understanding among our two peoples and governments in the difficult but important task of rebuilding a new relationship that reflects the new realities in Iran.

I am sure that you are very much pre-occupied with preparations to take up your new assignment in Scandinavia. Please permit me to express my congratulations on your assignment and my best wishes for your continued success in it.

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Abbas Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister,
Tehran.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6552

GOVERNMENT IN OFFICIAL MATTERS. WHILE WE CANNOT BE
CERTAIN OF THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEPARTURE FROM
THE CABINET, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A MOVE THAT HE MAY
INDEED WELCOME AND PERHAPS EVEN ENCOURAGED. LAINGER

BT
#6552

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6552

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 8552

J. Clavin

DE RUCMER #6550 , 175 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2217
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0003
RUDAHHQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0006
RUEKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0005
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0001
BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 8/24
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH/B
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL-2 RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06550

L.O. 12065: GDS 6/24/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PDIR, PINR, IR, SW
SUBJ: NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN

WJL

REF: STOCKHOLM 2492

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ABBAS AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS SERVED AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC AND REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF MEHDI BAZARGAN SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR. HE HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESS RELATIONS (SERVING AS THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN) AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE PRIME MINISTRY.

3. AMIR-ENTEZAM IS ABOUT 46 YEARS OLD. HE GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN THE MID-50'S WITH A DEGREE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. HE SUBSEQUENTLY ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS WHERE HE WAS GRANTED A MASTER'S DEGREE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY WHERE HE RECEIVED A DEGREE IN STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING. WHILE IN THE U.S. HE REPORTEDLY MARRIED AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. AFTER FOLLOWING HIS GRADUATION WORKED FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN THE SAN FRANCISCO AREA. WHEN HE RETURNED TO IRAN HE FIRST WORKED FOR A PRIVATE CONSULTING FIRM BUT LATER FOUNDED HIS OWN BUSINESS WHICH ENGAGES IN THE IMPORT OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT.

4. AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS BEEN ONE OF THE STRONGEST ADVOCATES OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. IN THE REZAI CABINET. BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE CONNECTION, HE HAS OCCASIONALLY BEEN ACCUSED OF AN AMERICAN STOOGES, BUT IN GENERAL HE HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE ACCUSATIONS. AS RECENTLY AS MAY 1979 IN AN INTERVIEW HE SPOKE IN A REASONABLE MANNER ON THE NEED FOR IRAN TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE U.S.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY DISCOURAGED BY THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS AUTHORITY. HE RECENTLY TOLD OUR ATTACHE IN TEHRAN THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN MISLEADEN TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN THE SITUATION HERE TO NORMAL IN THE SPACE OF A FEW MONTHS.

6. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CONTINUING INTERFERENCE OF POLITICALLY POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 8552

CONFIDENTIAL 1977-271533

CONFIDENTIAL

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TEHRAN 6378

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2117
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 2143
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06378

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SERIES: STATE S/
APPROV: CHG: CWMA
EXFED: POL: VITC
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL: R F

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR, IZ
SUBJ: IRANO-IRAQI RELATIONS
REF: A. TEHRAN 6292, B. BAGHDAD 1308

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE)

2. DURING JUNE 18 FAREWELL CALL DEPUTY PM AMIN ENTEZAM ASKED CHARGE WHAT INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAQI INTENTIONS TOWARD IRAN. AFTER REMARKING THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHO CAST THE FIRST STONE, CHARGE OUTLINED THE KINDS OF CONCERNS EITHER ENGENDERED OR EXACERBATED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (REFFELS) AND SPECULATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A "PRICKLY HEDGE" ALONG IRAQ'S BORDER WITH IRAN A LA ONE-TIME BRITISH POLICY ON THE DURAND LINE. ENTEZAM HAD LITTLE TO SAY BUT DID INDICATE GENUINE SURPRISE WHEN THE CHARGE MENTIONED THE INFLAMMATORY NATURE OF RECENT IRANIAN ARABIC LANGUAGE SERVICE BROADCASTS. HE MADE A WRITTEN NOTE TO HIMSELF AND CONCEIVABLY WILL ATTEMPT TO INTERJECT SOME MODERATION. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT HIS PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS, BUT DRAW ATTENTION TO THE MATTER FOR THE LIGHT IT SRELS ON THE LACK OF COORDINATION EVEN WITHIN THE RELATIVELY CONFINED CIRCLE OF THE P301. WE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT SADEGH GHOTEZADEH, THE CONTROVERSIAL HEAD OF THE RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION, MAY HAVE BEEN MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WIPOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. NAAS

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6378

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323



... OF THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT.

... DURING THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION WHICH RANGED OVER A VARIETY OF TOPICS COVERED IN SECTIONS 1-4, I AM COMING BACK TO THE FRUSTRATIONS HE, AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS IN THE PGOI AS WELL, HAS EXPERIENCED IN DEALING WITH THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAN. SEVERAL TIMES HE NOTED THE PROPENSITY OF PEOPLE NOT IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY BUT WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CLOUT TO MAKE OFF-AND-ON-STATEMENTS THAT MAKE THE PGOI'S TASKS ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT. AFTER MANY YEARS OF DICTATORSHIP, HE SAID: THESE PEOPLE ARE FREE. THEY THINK THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO SAY WHATEVER THEY WANT. EVERYONE WANTS TO BE A LEADER. AT ANOTHER POINT I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS APPOINTMENT TO SWEDEN AND HE REPLIED, "IT MAY BE EASIER FOR US TO TALK TO ONE ANOTHER IN STOCKHOLM. WE ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN A FEW MONTHS TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS. BUT THESE PEOPLE KEEP INTERFERING. I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS. WE NEED YOUR HELP IN THIS REGARD. WE MUST BE PATIENT, EVEN IN THE CASE OF TWO YEARS."

... WHILE KATZMAN APPEARS GENUINE IN HIS EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL TOWARD THE U.S. AND SEEMS TO COMPREHEND AS WELL AS IRANIANS IN POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE THESE DAYS DO THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH US. HE HAS BEEN SORE DOWN BY HIS EXPERIENCE AS DEPUTY PM. HIS DESPAIR WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS WAS ONLY MODERATELY ALLEVIATED BY REMINDERS (AS HE SAID TO HIMSELF AS TO ME) THAT IRAN, AFTER ALL, HAS EXPERIENCED A VERY TRAUMATIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME AND PATIENCE TO SET THINGS BACK IN ORDER. NAAS

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DECLASS. AUTHORITY: E.O. 11652
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06379

LIMDIS

M.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/95 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IR
SUBJ: U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 153316

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: IN FAREWELL CALL ON DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM I REPHRASED WITH HIM THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. HE EXPRESSED PGOI'S DESIRE FOR NORMALIZATION BUT APPEARED TO BE QUITE FRUSTRATED BY THE OBSTACLES POSED TO THIS BY THE PARALLEL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENTS HERE. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY POLCOONS I PAID A FAREWELL CALL ON DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM JUNE 19. I PROVIDED HIM WITH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REPTEL (WHICH HE HAD EARLIER REQUESTED). HE TOOK CAREFUL NOTES AND SAID THAT THE DATA WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HE INTENDED TO HOLD WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE SAID THAT HE ALSO INTENDED TO ELABORATE AT THAT TIME THE PGOI'S DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT HE AND THE REST OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE PGOI LOOK FORWARD TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZE THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME. "IT MAY TAKE ONE YEAR OR TWO MONTHS," HE SAID, "BUT WE KNOW THAT WE HAVE MANY INTERESTS IN COMMON." I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO FURTHER THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS. NOTING THAT WE HAVE NO MAJOR POLICY DIFFERENCES, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT LIMIT OUR FLEXIBILITY IN SUCH MATTERS AS CONTRACTS. NONETHELESS, I ASSURED HIM OF OUR BASIC GOODWILL.

4. A SHORT DISCUSSION OF A SCURRILOUS PRESS ARTICLE ENDED WHICH ENTEZAM FINDED BY SAYING THAT HIS OVERRRIDING CONCERN IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PGOI AND THE U.S. NOT WHAT THE PAPERS MAY SAY TO THEM. IN THIS REGARD, HE ASKED IF I WOULD TELL HIM ABOUT OUR POLICY OUTLINE FOR AN AMBASSADOR. I TOLD HIM QUITE FRANKLY THAT THE PGOI REJECTION OF AMBASSADOR CUTLER AND GREAT HOPES OF ME IN WASHINGTON THAT NOW HAVE TO BE SCOTCHED OUT. FIRST, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY IMMEDIATE MOVE TO REPLACE HIM. IN ANY EVENT, I ADDED, THE NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS IS RELATIVELY SLOWLY AND THEREFORE THE PGOI SHOULD BE PATIENT. I SUGGESTED THAT I WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ON THIS ISSUE UNTIL LATE JULY WHILE CAREFULLY ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY APPROPRIATE MENTION FOR AMBASSADOR CUTLER, ETC. (SEE REF TO AMBASSADOR CUTLER)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

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AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
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BT

Johnson
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C R E T TRIPOLI 2893

LIPDIS

1.0. 12069: XDS-1 6/3/99 (COOPER, JAMES R.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, LY, IR
SUBJECT: (S) PGOI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

REF: TEMRAN 5491

(S) POST WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING COPY OF ANY PAPER ON
LIBYAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN PREPARED FOR TRANSMITTAL
TO ENTEZAN. SINCE LIBYA APPEARS LIKELY TO RESURFACE IN
TEMRAN'S FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH ENTEZAN, WE WOULD APPRECIATE
RECEIVING DEP PM'S OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING JALLUD VISIT TO
IRAN AND LIBYAN COMMENTS RE STATUS OF IRAN MUSA BADR.

ELUCKER

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S F O R E T/IMBIS

MEMPHIS 5401

1. ACTION REQUESTED: IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT THE
RISK OF SHARING INFORMATION ON PLO, IRAQI AND LYBIAN
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN IS OUT-WEIGHED BY POTENTIAL
REWARDS OF CLOSER COOPERATION WITH PGOI, REQUEST THAT
PAPER BE PREPARED WHICH WE CAN GIVE TO ENTGRAM. MAAS

S F O R E T/IMBIS

MEMPHIS 5401

BY ASSETS 12
0211R MAY 88
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
RUBRO/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1 178
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY AMU TEHRAN 0207
RUBRO/OSINT BAGHDAD 0208
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY BAHRUT 0211
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0208
RUBRO/AMCONSUL BAHRAN 0207
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0204
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM 0208
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0207
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0208
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY Nicosia 0208
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0207
RUBRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0208

CLASS: SECRET
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TIME: 02:08

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TCNR T TEHRAN 05401

LINDIS

TO: 18665: USIA 02080 (TEHRAN, T.I.) 02-0
INFO: PINE, PINT, IT
SUB: PROI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT; ACTION REQUESTED)

1. DURING MEETING WITH CHARGÉ MAY 28, 1988, AMIR ENTEZAM
RAISED ONCE AGAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO SHARE
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH US. AS YOU WILL RECALL,
I HAD EARLIER PROVIDED HIM WITH A PAPER ON APPEALISMAN.
DURING MAY 24 MEETING ENTEZAM HAD SAID THAT THIS INFOR-
MATION HAD BEEN USEFUL, BUT THAT PROI WAS REALLY MORE
INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS. ON
MAY 28 HE WENT FURTHER, SAYING THAT PROI WAS CONCERNED
ABOUT POSSIBLE MEEDEING BY IRAQIS IN KHUZESTAN PROVINCE
AS WELL AS ACTIVITIES OF FIO AND LYBIANS. ENTEZAM SAID
THAT PROI HAD INFORMATION THAT IRAC HAD RECENTLY
VISITED SEVERAL GULF COUNTRIES, PERHAPS MORE THAN ONCE,
PRESUMABLY WITH A VIEW TO CAUSING TROUBLE FOR IRAN. HE
STATED THAT THE ILO OFFICE IN AMMAN ALSO GIVES THE PROI
SOME CONCERN. THEN, SHAKING HIS HEAD, HE SAID THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT COULD DO NOTHING ABOUT IT FOR THE MOMENT
BECAUSE IT WAS KHOMENI'S DECISION THAT IT BE OPENED.

2. CHARGÉ TOLD ENTEZAM THAT, QUITE FRANKLY, SECURITY
MANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT PROVIDE PROI WAS OF GREAT
CONCERN. ENTEZAM QUICKLY REJOINED THAT HE HAD SHARED
INFORMATION ON APPEALISMAN ONLY WITH IR BAHARGAN AND
I UNDERSTAND THE PAPER HAD BEEN DESTROYED. COMMENT:
THINK THAT IN FACT THE INFO GOT SOMEWHAT HIGHLY DISSEMI-
NATED SINCE MOHAMMAD YAZDI AT LEAST KNEW THAT WE HAD
GIVEN IT WHEN CHARGÉ CALLED ON HIM MAY 24.) CHARGÉ
TELLS ENTEZAM THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO POSSIBILITY OF
OBTAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON THE GULF
ACTIVITIES OR IS INTERESTED IN.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 4677

1243 MAY 79
TEHRAN
URGENT WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1265

CHRG: STATE
APPRV: CHG: C
PRETD: CHG: C
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: NONE

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN #4677

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
FROM: AMIR, IR
SUBJ: REZA AMINI

To: Mr. Shellenberg

REF: DATE 11243

1. (CONTAINS INFO; THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)
2. AT END OF MEETING WITH PRIMIN BAZARGAN (DEP PRIMIN AMIR ENTEZAM AND ACTG POL COUNSELOR STEMPUL ALSO PRESENT) I RAISED CASE OF REZA AMINI AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBED OUR FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM. AMIR ENTEZAM TURNED TO THE PRIMIN AND IN FARSI SAID TO HIM "THIS IS THE PROBLEM I TOLD YOU ABOUT AND WE ARE WORKING ON IT." WITHOUT INTERROGATIONS FROM PRIMIN, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID TO ME "WE WILL PASS THIS APPROACH TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND EXPECT TO HAVE SOMETHING ON IT SHORTLY."
3. A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE KOMITEH STRUCTURE TOLD ACTING POL COUNSELOR MAY 4 AND MAY 6 THAT HE BELIEVED WAY WAS NOW CLEAR FOR FAVORABLE ACTION ON AMINI CASE. WE HOPE SO. NAAS

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TEHRAN 4677

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MORE THAN ONE PLAIN OF IRAN'S WATERS. CHERRY RECORDED THAT THIS SOURCE DID NOT HAVE PROBLEM CONNECTED WITH SHIPPING VESSEL'S TOWARDING INJUNCTION AGAINST SHIPPING GOODS TO IRAN. CHERRY NOTICED FOOT HAD NOT BEEN REPRESENTED AT HEARING AND OPINED THAT IF IT HAD, INJUNCTION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. CHERRY REQUEST COMEBRIMS? WAS BEING WORKED OUT. NOT ADVISED WHAT IS POSSIBLY A GOOD LAWYER TO ADVISE ON EMPLICATED CASE. THE BELONG TO CONTRACTS TO AVOID SUCH FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

CHERRY SAID THAT FOOT HAD DISCOVERED IN 1964 APPROXIMATELY 100,000 GALLONS OF SPARE PARTS OF SORE KIND AT SAHEL AIRFIELD. IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD IN 1964 IT BECAME KNOWN TO HIGH COMMAND. CHERRY SUGGESTED IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICIALS THIS WITH UNUSUALY MORE OFFICE IN PROBLEM DEVELOPED.

W. FERRAM DISCOVERED THAT PROCLAME CONGRUOUS R.C. ARE STILL VAGUELY IN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER GARRI'S BUILDING, BUT VOUCHERS TO GO TO OR IN CASE OF AN UNDESIRABLE AND APPROVED THE SYMPOSIUM WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS. CHERRY SAID SOURCE HAD COMMENTED THAT I MUST SEE OFFICER OF IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND INVESTIGATION WERE FOR IRAN AND BEING USED TO BE HAD. INDIVIDUAL HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY CHERRY. SOURCE OFFICER SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO GO TO IRAN AND DID NOT WANT TO GO. CHERRY ASKED THE OFFICIAL TO BE IN IRAN, INTERVIEWED AND REPORTED RESULTS OF VISIT AND OFFICE IN IRANIAN AIR FORCE OFFICER, AND GAVE HIS OPINION IF THERE WOULD BE OTHER INVESTIGATION. WAYS

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 3301

R 141300Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0200

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 33071

ORIG: STATE
APPR: SMO:CANAA
DREF: POL:JSTEMPEL
CLEAR: MAAG:PCAST
DISTR: POL CAG CHRO
MAAD BY

7.0.12265: GDS 4/18/79 (STEMPEL, J.)OR-
TARS: PGOV, MILL, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ENTEZAM ADMITTED REGIME WAS HAVING INTERNAL PROBLEMS, URGED US AND OTHERS NOT TO INTERVENE. SAID REVIEW OF U.S. CONTRACTS WOULD HOPEFULLY BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. NOTED PGOI HELICOPTER FORCE IS VIRTUALLY OUT OF SPARES. REPLACEMENTS ARE A PROBLEM DUE TO DIFFICULTIES IN U.S. HE MENTIONED PROJECTED \$ MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF PGOI SPARES LODGED IN TEXAS. HE TOOK A DIM VIEW OF COMMITTEE HARASSMENT OF IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY (IAS). END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE AND ACTIC POL CHIEF CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM APRIL 15 TO DISCUSS NUMBER OF SMALL PROBLEMS. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST WERE DISCUSSED:

4. ENTEZAM INDICATED ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MADE MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS, BUT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT BY EMPHOFFS' EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO NAME MEMBERS, NOTING THIS INFO IS STILL CONFIDENTIAL. WHEN CHARGE TRIED TO DRAW HIM OUT ON STATUS OF REVOLUTION, ENTEZAM DIVERTED DISCUSSION TO U.S. CONTRACTS, AND SAID MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GEN RIANI IS HEADING COMMITTEE WHICH IS DRAWING UP NEW THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR PGOI ARMED FORCES AND REVIEWING ALL CONTRACTS. ENTEZAM SAID PROCESS SHOULD BE FINISHED, HOPEFULLY, IN ONE OR TWO WEEKS. THEN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO TALK MORE ABOUT U.S.-IRAN TIES AND FUTURE OF U.S. CONTRACTS. MEANWHILE, PGOI WAS HAVING QUOTE SOME INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, UNQUOTE AND ENTEZAM SAID HE HOPED U.S. WAS NOT INVOLVED; PGOI DID NOT WANT ANY INTERVENTION FROM FOREIGN POWERS. CHARGE CUT SHORT WHAT SOUNDED LIKE CANNED REMARKS (PERHAPS FOR BENEFIT OF OTHER IRANIAN READING AT A DESK IN CORNER OF ROOM) WITH FLAT STATEMENT THAT U.S. WAS NOT INTERVENING AND HAD NOT INTERVENED IN RECENT IRANIAN EVENTS. AFTER CONVERSATION GRADUALLY FASED AWAY FROM IMPRESSIONS OF FORMAL POSITIONS, ENTEZAM VOLUNTEERED THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN HAD MET WITH SOVIETS, BRITISH AND CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES TO STRESS IRAN'S INDEPENDENT POLICIES AND DESIRE TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS. EMPHOFFS PLAYED LIGHTLY ON THEME OF THOSE WHO SPREAD DISINFORMATION TO DISTURB GOOD U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS, AND ENTEZAM AGREED APPRECIATION OF POINT.

5. ENTEZAM THEN SAID PGOI DID HAVE REAL PROBLEM: ITS HELICOPTERS WERE OUT OF SPARES, AND U.S. WOULD NOT GIVE

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TEHRAN 3301

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OWN IMPRESSION THAT THE CHARGES ARE MISTAKEN. AS A SENIOR ADVISER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY DR. AMINI IS REQUIRED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE NEWS WORLD; HE IS NOT THE TYPE OF PERSON TO "CONSPIRE." ENTEZAM NODDED AND TOOK NOTES BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

6. COMMENT: THIS CASE IS BEYOND ENTEZAM'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WE FEAR. CHARGE HAS ASKED FOR A MEETING ASAP WITH DEPUTY PM YAZDI, WHO IS MORE INVOLVED IN KOMITAY AFFAIRS. POL COUNSELOR HAS ALSO ARRANGED ANOTHER MEETING WITH KHOMEINI INTIMATE DR. BEHESHTI FOR NEXT FRIDAY (APRIL 13) WHEN THE ISSUE WILL AGAIN BE RAISED, IF AMINI IS STILL UNDER DETENTION. NAAS##

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: GBLAMBRAKIS
NONE
POL, CONS, ICA

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
USICA WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/9/99 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR
SUBJ: ARREST OF USICA NATIONAL EMPLOYEE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM APRIL 7, CHARGE RAISED THE ARREST OF USICA EMPLOYEE DR. REZA AMINI. HE SAID THERE IS PERCEPTION OF A PATTERN IN THIS ARREST, ALONG WITH ARRESTS OF SOME OTHER IRANIANS WHO WORK FOR AMERICAN FIRMS.

3. ENTEZAM WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH OTHER ARRESTS MENTIONED (IRANIANS WORKING FOR AIU AND MOTOROLA, SEPTEL) BUT SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE OF AMINI. SPECIFIC INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT AMINI AND FIVE OTHERS HAD BEEN MEETING TO CONSPIRE AGAINST THE REVOLUTION. THESE CHARGES ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION. THERE IS NO ANTI-AMERICAN PATTERN INTENDED, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID.

4. CHARGE SAID HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR NO SUCH PATTERN INTENDED, BUT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER REPORTS ON AMINI CASE AS WELL AS OTHERS. AMIR ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD DO THIS WHEN HE COULD.

5. CHARGE ADDED THAT AMINI HAS WORKED FOR THE AMERICAN EMBASSY (USIS) FOR OVER 30 YEARS. HE DOES WHAT IS NORMAL FOR SENIOR ADVISORS OF THE EMBASSY, A JOB WHICH HAS EXISTED IN IRANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TOO, CHARGE WAS SURE. HE HAS KNOWN DR. AMINI PERSONALLY OVER ONE YEAR AND FOUND IT HARD TO CREDIT SUCH CHARGES AGAINST HIM. POL COUNSELOR, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, ADDED HIS

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S CENTRAL INTEREST WAS THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN AND THAT WE ARE CURRENTLY DOING NOTHING, AND IN THE FUTURE WE WOULD DO NOTHING, TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY.

4. AMIR ENTEZAM REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN THE SAME WAY IT DESIRED GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES; THE PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, HE NOTED, HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT PUBLICLY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES HAD TO APPRECIATE THAT FOR 25 YEARS THE U.S. HAS BEEN VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVIOUS MONARCHICAL REGIME AND IN 1953 HAD HELPED REVERSE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE BY RETURNING THE SHAH TO THE THRONE. IT WAS, THEREFORE, UNDERSTANDABLE THAT EMOTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WERE WIDESPREAD AND THAT NORMALIZATION MUST BE APPROACHED CAREFULLY. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ASSURANCE THAT USG IS NOT INVOLVED IN TROUBLESOME EVENTS MENTIONED AND HOPED THAT WERE TRUE.

5. OTHER SUBJECTS RAISED WITH THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ARE REPORTED SEPARATELY. NAAS##

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
CHG: CWNAAS
NONE
CHG, POL, ICA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/9/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AMIR ETEZAM

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I MADE A COURTESY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ETEZAM ON APRIL 7 AND INFORMED HIM THAT, ON THE BASIS OF A RECENT MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND IRAN'S NEW CHARGE IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS MY OWN RECENT CONVERSATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT, THE UNITED STATES DESIRES TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN AT A STEADY PACE. I NOTED THAT, DESPITE THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN IRAN, SOME SHARED BASIC INTERESTS CAN BE THE FOUNDATION FOR GOOD RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE, STABILITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS ARE OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES.

3. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE SINCE THE REVOLUTION FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS NOT TO EMBARRASS OR TO COMPLICATE THE LIFE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY THOUGHTS HE AND OTHERS MIGHT HAVE DURING THE PERIOD I WOULD BE CHARGE ON STEPS THAT EITHER SIDE MIGHT TAKE TO PUSH THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS FURTHER AHEAD. I SUGGESTED THAT WE HAVE FRANK DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN WASHINGTON AND NOT LET SUSPICIONS FESTER. FOR EXAMPLE, I NOTED, SOVIET PROPAGANDA IS COVERING IRAN WITH CHARGES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH PLACES AS KURDESTAN AND TURKESTAN AND THAT SOME PARTS OF THE IRANIAN PRESS WERE REPEATING THIS VERY PROPAGANDA. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, HIMSELF, HAD RECENTLY SAID AMERICAN AGENTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TROUBLES IN THESE TWO AREAS. I ASKED HIM TO ASSURE THE AYATOLLAH THAT THE

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ZNY SSSSS ZZM
O R 220850Z MAR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE *88
INFO RUQNGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 015
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 022
RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 028
RUEHMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 024
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 3167

AMB
DCM
POL
CHRON

LINDIS

EQ 12060 DCS 3/22/79 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM H) OR-W
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJ: SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN

REF: TEHRAN 3152

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT
2. ON MARCH 21, I MENTIONED TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM FACT THAT I HAD LEARNED FROM AN IRANIAN FRIEND ABOUT "AUTONOMY" COMMITTEES BEING FORMED IN AZERBAIJAN. ENTEZAM SAID HE HAD SIMILAR INFORMATION AND WAS DISTURBED BY ITS IMPLICATIONS.
3. HOWEVER, WHEN I ASKED TURKISH AMBASSADOR IF HE HAD ANY SUCH REPORTS, HE EXPRESSED VIEW INFORMATION WAS EXAGGERATED. HE FELT AZERBAIJANIS SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH BAZARGAN, BECAUSE "HE WAS ONE OF THEIR OWN".

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TAKE OFF AND MAX CLIMB OUT. WE RETURNED TO MEHRABAD AND WERE PLACED UNDER GUARD AGAIN. THE ISSUE OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE 24 AMERICANS WAS LENGTHLY DISCUSSED AND OUR FATE SEEMED TO BE A TRIP TO THE MAJOR KHOMEINI "COMMITTEE" IN TEHRAN. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE AGAIN CAME TO OUR AID, THE MUJAHEDDEEN COLONEL WHO HAS HELPED THE U.S. EMBASSY ON 14 FEB WAS ON THE SCENE AND ASSISTED US IN OUR RETURN TO THE EMBASSY INSTEAD OF THE "COMMITTEE." THE TRIP BACK WAS LIKE A TRIP THROUGH NO-MANS LAND. WE WERE STOPPED SEVERAL TIMES, BUSES WERE SURROUNDED BY MANY HEAVILY ARMED MEN AND WE WERE HELD AT GUN POINT UNTIL PAPERS WERE CLEARED. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 WE ARRIVED SAFE, ONCE AGAIN IN THE WOMB OF THE EMBASSY.

D. DURING OUR TIME SPENT AT MEHRABAD THE DATT SAW COL HOMAYOAN, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 1ST TRANSPORT WING AND COL HOSSEINI. THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS WERE NOT DIVULGED. THE DATT OBSERVED BRIG GEN IMAYAN AT 1ST TRANSPORT HQS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TALK WITH HIM.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (S/NOFORN) THE TRIP WAS VERY ENLIGHTENING AS WE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS NO CENTRAL CONTROL AND EACH CHECK POINT/OFFICE IS ITS OWN COMMAND. WORK GETS DONE BUT IT IS VERY COMPARTMENTALIZED. ACTION IS SLOW BUT THE WHEELS ARE GRINDING. HOMOFARS ARE IN CHARGE IN SOME AREAS AND WE OBSERVED A FEW OFFICERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF HOMOFARS. HOWEVER, THE BASE CAMP AT KAPKAN WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT JA'AL FROM MASHAD. WITHOUT THE MUTUAL CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GEN IMAYAN AND THE PRIME MINISTER REPRESENTATIVE, THE MISSION WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN FLOWN.

REVIEW 03 MAR 85

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ORIGINATOR USDAO TEHRAN		DATED 02 MARCH 79	CLASSIFICATION SECRET DEFROG		CONTROL NUMBER 79-100		
DATE RECEIVED IN DIA		SUSPENSE DATE		REGISTERED NUMBER	FILE DESIGNATION ICR 49210		
DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL USDAO TEHRAN MSG ID: 3 040 0110 79, Sec 790202, SUBJ: TWRP REPORT TO MARINA (C). (PCC, ICM, SECRET DEFROG)///////// //////////NOTHING FOLLOWS//////////							
OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE
1				4			
2				5			
3				6			
DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box)							
THE MATERIAL LISTED HEREON HAS BEEN <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED <input type="checkbox"/> TORN AND PLACED IN BAG NO. _____ AND COMMITTED TO THE AUTHORIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITY (DIAR 50-2)							
SIGNATURE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL		OFFICE SYMBOL		SIGNATURE WITNESSING OFFICIAL		OFFICE SYMBOL	
		DATE				DATE	

DIA FORM 13 (1-68) DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD

(Previous Edition is Obsolete)

DIAR 50-2

U.S. G.P.O. 1976-721-484/59

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(1ST TFB), VISIT AT THE COMMUNICATIONS SIGHT AND THE IMPRESSIVE 0200 RETURN TO THE EMBASSY FROM THE AIRPORT.

17. THRU 21. OMITTED

22. DETAILS: (S/NOFORN) A. ON THE MORNING OF 27 FEB 79 DATT AND AAIRA WERE MET AT THE EMBASSY BY TWO MEMBERS OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER EMTEZAM'S STAFF. WE WERE DRIVEN TO MEHRABAD AIRPORT WITH OUR MUJAHEDDEEN GUARD AND THE STAFF MEMBERS MR. SARMARD AND MR. ZAGER-NADER. ALL MOVED SMOOTHLY UNTIL WE ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE STOPPED AND REQUIRED TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS FOR ENTRY. THE LETTERS FROM EMTEZAM CARRIED ONLY AS MUCH WEIGHT AS THE INSPECTORS WISHED TO GIVE. EACH NEW CHECK POINT OR MEETING IS A CONTACT WITH WHAT SEEMS TO BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT UNITS. ONE IS AT THE MERCY OF EVERY IRANIAN WITH A REASON TO CHECK PASSES. EACH IS IN CHARGE AND EACH MUST GIVE HIS APPROVAL. WITH THE FRONT GATE BROACHED IT WAS ONLY A SHORT DRIVE TO THE MILITARY BASE COMMITTEE', (LOCAL GROUP MADE UP OF A MULLAH AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PRECINCT OR FACILITY), WHICH AGAIN HAD TO PASS OUR CREDENTIALS. NEXT ON TO BASE OPERATIONS. THE BASE WAS FUNCTIONING AFTER A FASHION BUT WE WERE TOLD THE TRANSPORT WING WAS ON STRIKE! WE WOULD NEED APPROVAL OF A LARGER COMMITTEE' AND THEN ORDERS FROM THE C-130 CREWS SUPERIORS; AT THAT POINT THE CREW WOULD THEN DECIDE IF THEY WOULD FLY THE MISSION. AS STATED BEFORE AND DRIVEN HOME BY THIS EXCHANGE - IN THE REVOLUTION PEOPLE ARE FREE TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WISH. AN IRANIAN AF CAPTAIN TOLD AAI THAT IN THE PAST THEY DID AS THEY WERE ORDERED, HOWEVER, NOW THEY COULD DECIDE IF IT WAS A GOOD MISSION. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE ALTERED OUR FATE. AS THE DATT AND MR. ZAGER-NADAR WERE SEARCHING FOR COMMITTEE APPROVAL THEY HAPPENED UPON THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, BRIG GENERAL ASGHAR IMAYAN, WHO WAS HAVING A STAFF MEETING WITH SOME OF HIS SENIOR HOMOFARS AND OFFICERS. BRIG GEN IMAYAN WAS A SCHOOL CHUM OF MR. ZAGER-NADAR, AND THE MISSION WAS THEN QUICKLY APPROVED. THIS MEANT THAT WE COULD TAKE OFF, FOUR AND ONE-HALF HOURS AFTER ENTRY ONTO THE AF BASE. BEFORE DEPARTURE, WE HAD TO EAT LUNCH WITH THE PEOPLES SOLDIERS. LUNCH, UNLIKE IN TIMES PAST, WHICH WAS A VERY

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DAO 030279
DATT:TESCHAEFER
AAIRA:H.FJOHNSON
NONE
DAO-1

USDAO TEHRAN IRAN
DIA WASHDC/AH/AH-8/DN-2E1,
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

NIACT IMMEDIATE *RUEKJCS*
RUNAAA
RUDONBA
RUKHQQA

SECRET NOFORN MAR 79

THIS IS IIR 6 846 0116 79

1. COUNTRY: IRAN(IR)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0116 79
3. TITLE: TRIP REPORT TO KAPKAN (C)
4. OMITTED
5. DATE OF ~~REPORT~~ INFO: 790227
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790302
7. DATE/PLACE OF ACQ: 790227, KAPKAN, IRAN
8. REFERENCE: U-UED-49218, M-2E1-15016
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE A, INFO 2
10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO (DATT/AAIRA) TEHRAN, IRAN
11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR
12. PREPARING OFF: H. F. JOHNSON, CAPT, USAF, AAIRA
13. APPROVING AUTH: T. E. SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
14. SOURCE: USDAO DATT, AAIRA
15. SPECIAL INST: NOFORN CAVEAT UTILIZED TO PROTECT THE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES OF THIS OFFICE: DIRC:NO.
16. SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) ON THE 27TH OF FEB, DATT AND AAIRA TRAVELED ON A NIIAF (NATIONAL ISLAMIC IRANIAN AIR FORCE) C-130 TO A REMOTE NORTHERN AIRFIELD (KAPKAN 3717E 5849N) TO EXTRICOTE 22 AMERICAN COMMUNICATION TECHNICALS REMAINING AT THE SIGHT. INCLUDED IS A NARRATIVE OF THE DAYS EVENTS TO INCLUDE STOPS AT MEHRABAD *IRAN*

Classified by DAF
Declassify on 03 MAR 85

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LUXURIOUS AFFAIR, CONSISTED OF LUBEO PALO (RICE, LIMA BEANS AND FAT MEAT) AND THE LOCAL LAUASH (BREAD). THE SIGNIFICANT THING ABOUT LUNCH WAS THAT OFFICER, ENLISTED, HOMOFARS AND DIPLOMATS ATE FROM A SINGLE POT AND ALL TOGETHER, UNHEARD OF IN TIMES PAST. AAIRA TOLD BY TWO NIIAF LT'S THAT THEY HAD TO PULL GUARD DUTY THAT NIGHT. THEY WERE IN FACT SEEN ON POST AT 0200 IN THE MORNING.

B. AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 WE MOVED TO THE FLIGHT LINE IN SEARCH OF OUR AIRCRAFT. NO ONE KNEW THE TAIL NUMBER. WE DROVE AROUND THE ~~XXXXX~~ FLIGHT LINE UNTIL WE HAPPENED UPON ONE OF OUR CREW MEMBERS - HE KNEW THE TAIL NUMBER. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE AIRCRAFT WE WERE MET BY A HOSTILE, ANTI-AMERICAN AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. A HEATED DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEN AND OUR GUARD RESULTED IN HIS GRUDINGLY CONDESCENDING TO FLY THE MISSION. AFTER A GROUND ~~XXXXXXXX~~ BOUT FOR MAINTENANCE, A SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS FOUND AND THE FLIGHT TO KAPKAN WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE CREW IN FACT WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL IF NOT OBSTINATE. ARRIVAL AT THE FIELD WAS LIKE EVERY OTHER NEW MEETING OF THE DAY. WE WERE IN CUSTODY UNTIL PAPERS WERE APPROVED. CONSIDERING WE HAD 30,000,000 RIALS WE WERE QUICKLY APPROVED. THE DRIVE TO THE BASE CAMP WAS UNEVENTFUL, TWO MUD VILLAGES WITH NO ELECTRICITY, AND MANY PEOPLE OUT TO SEE THE NEW COMERS, WERE ALL WE PASSED. ARRIVAL AT THE CAMP FOUND US UNDER GUARD AGAIN AND PEARED AT BY THE LOCALS ANTICIPATING THEIR PAY. APPROXIMATELY 5 DAYS EARLIER THE AMERICANS TECHNICIANS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND TOLD TO SHUT DOWN THEIR EQUIPMENT. THEY HAD PERSONAL AFFECTS STOLEN AND THEIR TREATMENT WAS DETERIORATING UNTIL KHOEMINI TROOPS ARRIVED FROM THE AIRBASE AT MESHAD. THE MESHAD TROOPS TOOK GOOD CARE OF THE AMERICANS AND WERE ONLY HOLDING THEM UNTIL THE SALARIES AND ACCOUNTS WERE SETTLED. SETTLING AND PAYMENTS TOOK ABOUT FIVE HOURS. A POINT OF INTEREST IS THAT THE LT IN CHARGE OF THE MESHAD TROOPS ADMITTED TO BEING PLO AND BOOSTED OF HAVING FOUGHT ALONGSIDE YASSAR ARAFAT. THE LOCAL TROOPS WERE VISIBALLY AFRAID OF THE MESHAD TROOPS.

C. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 ALL AMERICANS WERE RELEASED TO THE DAO. TAKE-OFF WAS AT 2300L AT NIGHT FROM A 3900 FOOT BLACKED OUT STRIP BETWEEN TWO MOUNTAIN RANGES. THE NIIAF CREW DID AN EXCELLENT JOB IN THEIR MIN-RUN

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The problems essentially concern the inability of the Iranian Air Force to exercise authority at its two sites due to the intercession of local "committees" which have taken over the sites. At Behshahr, the Air Force commander, Lt. Sofazadi, reports that his own guard force has been melting away and that looting has begun. At Kapkan, General Zolali has been unable to establish any contact with Captain Mohammadi, who was last designated commander there.

It is believed that General Zolali's problem could be solved if you would provide him with some document which would establish his authority to supervise the sites. Armed with this paper, he could send Iranian Air Force teams to visit the two sites and arrange the necessary custodial undertakings. At the same time, my Air Attache could arrange that payrolls for the Iranian civilian maintenance force could be met and a system for continuing the serviceability of the sites could be organized.

If you agree with this suggestion, please make contact directly with the Iranian Air Force and advise me what function you wish my Air Attache to perform in this matter.

Sincerely,

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador

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Tehran, Iran
March 13, 1979

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Excellency:

After the departure of U.S. personnel from the Iranian Air Force station at Kapkan, you and I discussed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the equipment at that site as well as at the similar site in the Air Force station at Behshahr.

In pursuit of this subject, Brigadier General Zolali, Inspector General of the Iranian Air Force, recently asked my Air Attache, Colonel Schaefer, to provide him with some estimates of the sort of maintenance personnel who would be required to keep the sites and their associated equipment in serviceable condition. Colonel Schaefer gave this information to the Inspector General, as well as an indication that the United States Government would be prepared to continue to pay the salaries of these personnel until such time as the Government of Iran decides what action it intends to take with respect to these two sites.

After reviewing this information and discussing it with General Immanian, the Chief of the Iranian Air Force, General Zolali suggested that this Embassy inform you of problems which the Iranian Air Force has encountered in attempting to assure the security and integrity of these two sites. He asked that you direct appropriate action to permit the Air Force to carry out its responsibilities in this respect.

His Excellency
Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.

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TEHRAN 1547

O 310035Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3558
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3712
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01547

CHRG: STATE 1-31-79
APPRV: DCM:GWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:1
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
EQON-2 FM USICA
OR SHIR TABR
ISF CHRON/14

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-31-86 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (C) KHOMEINI RETURN SET; CONFRONTATION
APPARENTLY DEFERRED

REF: TEHRAN 1514

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY--KHOMEINI ARRIVAL SET. AYATOLLAH HAS AGREED TO CONSULT BEFORE CONFRONTING BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SECURITY PROVISIONS FOR ARRIVAL HAVE BEEN AGREED TO, BUT THERE REMAIN DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT ON CONTINUING SECURITY FOR KHOMEINI AND ENTOURAGE. END SUMMARY.
3. DR. MINATCHI INFORMED POLOFF EARLY MORNING JAN 31 THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR KHOMEINI ARRIVAL (REFTEL) WERE SET. SECOND MEETING HAD BEEN HELD BETWEEN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) LEADERSHIP AND GENERALS GHARABAGHI AND MOGHADDAM EVENING JAN 30 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS. THIS HAD GONE WELL (MINATCHI PROMISED FURTHER DETAILS AT NOON MEETING.).
4. DURING TELEPHONE CALL LATE EVENING JAN 30, AT WHICH MINATCHI WAS PRESENT, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HIMSELF TOOK PHONE TO ASSURE HIS TEHRAN FOLLOWERS THAT HE WOULD CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL OR MAKING ANY MAJOR STATEMENTS ABOUT GOVERNMENT. BOTH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HERE AND LMI (ENTEZAM) SAY THIS WILL AVOID ARRIVAL CONFRONTATION WITH BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. (COMMENT: THEIR EVIDENT RELIEF REGARDING THE IMMEDIATE ARRIVAL MASKED THEIR CONCERNS OVER THE LONGER TERM. BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM, AS WELL AS OTHERS, SEEM VERY CONFIDENT THAT THE CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESS WILL PRODUCE MODERATION ENOUGH TO CREATE A WORKABLE DEAL WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ARMY. WE WOULD RAISE MORE CAVEATS, BUT CLEARLY KHOMEINI'S DECISION TO CONSULT BEFORE CONFRONTING IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.)
5. BOTH MINATCHI AND SEPARATE SOURCE AROUND BAZARGAN WHO SPOKE TO BRITISH EVENING JAN 30 INDICATED THAT THERE REMAIN DETAILS OF ONGOING SECURITY FOR KHOMEINI PARTY WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. THESE ARE EXPECTED TO BE SUBJECT OF ADDITIONAL MEETINGS BETWEEN ARMY AND LMI DURING COURSE OF NEXT TWO DAYS. SULLIVAN

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4. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM FELT CONFIDENT INITIAL DANGER OF MILITARY-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. NEITHER COULD GIVE ANY ASSURANCES THAT KHOMEINI WILL NOT ANNOUNCE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND THUS PROVOKE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION, BUT MINATCHI THOUGHT KHOMEINI HAD PRETTY WELL COMMITTED HIMSELF TO CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ULEMA BEFORE MAKING DEFINITIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO IRAN AGAINST ADVICE OF LMI. MAJOR FACTORS IN THAT DECISION AS KHOMEINI EXPLAINED PERSONALLY BY PHONE TO BAZARGAN AND ENTEZAM WERE: (A) FEELING THAT KHOMEINI'S PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY TO CONTROL BURGEONING COMMUNIST THREAT (WHICH LMI IS TAKING VERY HOT VERY SERIOUSLY NOW); (B) NEED FOR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP TO PROMOTE PROPER SOLUTION AND MINIMIZE CONFRONTATION WITH MILITARY; AND (C) BELIEF THAT IF CONFRONTATION DEVELOPED, HIS PRESENCE WOULD INSURE THAT TROOPS WOULD DESERT GOVERNMENT EN MASSE AND MINIMIZE VIOLENT PHASE OF REVOLUTION. LOOKS TO US AS IF KHOMEINI WILL TRUS COME INTO IRAN PREPARED TO TAKE SITUATION AS HE FINDS IT AND DEAL WITH MATTERS ACCORDING TO "FEEL" HE GETS ON ARRIVAL. ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM, HE DOES NOT WANT VIOLENCE, BUT ALSO WANTS VICTORY. THIS SUGGESTS THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES ON HIM, TEMPTATION TO ANNOUNCE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND "SWEEP AWAY CLAPTRAP OF THE OLD REGIME" MIGHT BE ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE. BEST HOPE FOR MINIMIZING VIOLENCE THEREFORE SEEMS TO REST ON LMI AND MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PERSUADING KHOMEINI TO TAKE IT EASY ON ARRIVAL. THIS COULD BE A SHORT-ORDER PROPOSITION. SULLIVAN

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TEHRAN 1514

O 301305Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3535
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3706
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01514

CHRG: STATE 1/30/79
APPRV: DGM:CNNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:CC
CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMERAK
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM OR
ADM CHRON/11

LIMDIS

Z.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-30-79 (STEMPEL. J.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (U) KHOMEINI RETURN AWAITS AIR FRANCE OK

REF: TEHRAN 1261 (EXDIS, NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SENIOR LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) OFFICIAL ENTEZAM TELEPHONED POLOFF AT 1330 LOCAL TIME TO SAY THAT AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. ONLY THING PREVENTING KHOMEINI'S ARRIVAL PLANS GOING FORWARD WAS AIR FRANCE APPROVAL FOR CHARTER. ENTEZAM NOTED (CORRECTLY) THAT TEHRAN AIRPORT IS OPEN, AND PRESUMABLY GOI IS GIVING ITS FINAL APPROVAL TO AIR FRANCE NOW. LMI HOPED TO HAVE FINAL APPROVAL BY MIDAFTERNOON OR EARLY EVENING. ASSUMING APPROVAL; KHOMEINI WOULD DEPART PARIS LATE EVENING JAN 30 FOR ARRIVAL TEHRAN JAN 31 ABOUT 0830 TEHRAN TIME. PLANS FOR HIS ARRIVAL ARE ESSENTIALLY THOSE WORKED OUT EARLIER (SEE REFTEL): KHOMEINI WILL ARRIVE, BE MET BY SELECT COMMITTEE THEN TAKEN TO BEHESHT-E-ZARA CEMETERY VIA SHAHYAD MONUMENT (SPEECH THERE). AFTER SPEECH AT CEMETERY, HE WOULD RETIRE TO HIS QUARTERS TO RECEIVE VISITS FROM IRAN'S ULEMA AND PERHAPS PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR AND CABINET. HE WOULD REMAIN IN TEHRAN TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING FROM CDM.

3. AT JAN 30 MEETING WITH POLOFF, DR. MINATCHI PROVIDED FILL-IN ON DEAL WITH GOI WHICH LED TO RETURN PLANS. GENERAL MOGHADDAM (SAVAK) AND GHARABAGHI (CHIEF OF STAFF) MET WITH ENG. MEDHI BAZARGAN AND DR. YADOLLAH SAHARI, TOP LMI LEADERS, EVENING JAN 29. UNFORTUNATELY, HOJATOLLAH BEHESHTI AND AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI (WHO HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO ATTEND) WERE NOT THERE; THEY EXCUSED THEIR NON-ATTENDANCE BY SENDING WORD THEY WERE PARTICIPATING IN TEHRAN UNIVERSITY SIT-IN PROTESTING ARMY KILLINGS JAN 28-29. (COMMENT: THIS IS SECOND TIME THAT BEHESHTI HAS IN EFFECT DUCKED FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH KEY MILITARY LEADERS, BUT APPARENTLY GHARABAGHI WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION TO MAKE A DEAL, BECAUSE THIS CAUSED NO DIFFICULTY.) BOTH MOGHADDAM AND BAZARGAN TOLD MINATCHI AFTERWARDS MEETING WAS VERY USEFUL, DESPITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS' ABSENCE. ARMY AND LMI MEN AGREED TO DIVISION OF LABOR FOR KHOMEINI RETURN (MILITARY TO PROTECT AIRPORT AND ROAD TO SHAHYAD MONUMENT, LMI TO HANDLE SECURITY FROM THERE), AND GROUP AGREED TO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS OVER COMING DAYS AS DESIRABLE. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, MILITARY MEN SAID THEY AGREED POLITICAL CHANGES WERE NECESSARY AND MILITARY WOULD ACCEPT THESE IF CARRIED OUT UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

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TEHRAN 1514

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3499
BT
SECRET SECTION 02 TEHRAN 21447

SYDIS

END WITH SECURITY FORCES. CONVERSATION ENDED ON NOTE THAT LMI WOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT AND IDENTIFY THOSE WHO WILL DISRUPT ONE, AND USG WOULD URGE NON-VIOLENT RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATIONS.

7. COMMENT: EVENTS OF PAST 24 HOURS HAVE CLEARLY RAISED HAZARDS ON BOTH SIDES, BUT ENCOURAGING FACTOR IS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TRY AGAIN. ACCORDING TO MODERATE POLITICAL FORCES, DR. NASSER MINATCHI, MILITARY INDICATED THEY VERY MUCH WANT MEETING WHEREAS THEY HAVE BEEN STAND-OFFISH FOR PAST WEEK. ENTEZAM WAS PLEASED THAT SECURITY MEETING WOULD GO FORWARD, BUT PREOCCUPIED WITH PROBLEM OF GETTING LINES OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BACK ON RAILS. HE SHED SOME LIGHT ON EARLIER EFFORTS WHEN HE NOTED THAT IN FIRST AGREEMENT HE HAD WORKED OUT WITH BAKHTIAR, PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED WELCOME KHOMEINI, THEN RESIGN. KHOMEINI HAD AGREED TO REAPPOINT BAKHTIAR AND FINALLY TO LET HIM PICK HIS OWN CABINET. IN SECOND AGREEMENT, BAKHTIAR HAD PROPOSED TRIP TO PARIS WITHOUT CONDITIONS; THIS HAD EVENTUALLY BEEN FOUND UNACCEPTABLE. SCENARIO ABOVE SEEMS REASONABLE, EXCEPT THAT KHOMEINI APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONVINCED TO AT LEAST TENTATIVELY DECIDE TO CANCEL ORIGINAL (FIRST) AGREEMENT BEFORE JAN 29 VIOLENCE GOT UNDERWAY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM DISCUSSION THAT ENTEZAM THINKS PARIS ENCOURAGE PROBABLY SPIKED FIRST AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT. ACCORDING TO ONE JOURNALIST WHO WAS AT BAKHTIAR PRESS CONFERENCE MORNING JAN 29, PRIME MINISTER DEFINITELY BELIEVED HE HAD HAD AN AGREEMENT FROM KHOMEINI SIDE THAT WAS RENEGED UPON. MINATCHI FEELS ORIGINAL AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY STILL WORKABLE IN SOME FORM IF BAKHTIAR CAN SAY A FEW NICE WORDS ABOUT KHOMEINI PUBLICLY. APPEARS FROM INFO THAT WE ARE BACK WHERE WE WERE FIVE DAYS AGO. ENTEZAM POSITIONS A LITTLE STIFFER AND MORE

THIS, LMI WAS GOING TO MEET WITH GENERALS MOHRADAM AND GHARAFAGHI EVENING JAN 29 TO TRY AND WORK OUT SAFE ARRIVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BAKHTIAR PRESS CONFERENCE MORNING JAN 29 HAD NOT IMPROVED MATTERS, BUT AT LEAST AIRPORT WAS GOING TO BE OPEN. ENTEZAM URGED USG IN STRONGEST TERMS TO PRESS MILITARY FORCES NOT FRT NOT TO FIRE WEAPONS AT CROWD BUT TO USE ANY OTHER METHODS OF CROWD CONTROL WHENEVER POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD MAXIMIZE POSSIBILITY SITUATION COULD BE RETRIEVED. EVEN SO, ENTEZAM WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. EMBOFF BLUNTLY TOLD ENTEZAM THAT IN VIEW OF USG, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT HAD TO WORK OUT ACCOMMODATION WITH MILITARY OR ELSE IT WOULD FALL PREY TO DEPREDAATIONS OF OTHERS WHO WANTED VIOLENCE AND ANARCHY, NOT SETTLEMENT. ENTEZAM SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TRUST BAKHTIAR; HE HAD NOT KEPT HIS WORD TO KEEP THE ARMY QUIET. EMBOFF SAID GOI FELT LMI HAD NOT KEPT ITS WORD, SINCE VIOLENCE HAD STARTED. EMBOFF AND ENTEZAM AGREED THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT COMPLICATED PROBLEM OF TRUST; SITUATION WAS TOO CRITICAL TO STAND ON BYGONES, HOWEVER, AND BOTH SIDES HAD TO WORK FOR SOME KIND OF ARRANGEMENT TO PERMIT KHOMEINI TO ARRIVE SAFELY.

6. ENTEZAM SAID IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO GET KHOMEINI INTO COUNTRY AND "CUT OUT THE MIDDLE MEN". EMBOFF ASKED IF THIS MEANT PARIS STAFF. ENTEZAM REPLIED VERY CAREFULLY: YAZDI WAS ALL RIGHTS; HE (ENTEZAM) HAD KNOWN HIM A LONG TIME. EMBOFF PRODDED HIM ON REST OF ENTOURAGE, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING UNLESS HE COULD SAY SOMETHING GOOD AND WAS "THEREFORE SAYING NOTHING". IN-COUNTRY RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND LMI LOCAL ORGANIZATION WERE MUCH MORE MODERATE THAN PARIS GROUP, UNDERSTOOD COUNTRY BETTER, AND HAD HEALTHIER RESPECT FOR RADICAL LEFTIST CAPABILITIES THAN "PARIS BUNCH". EMBOFF ENCOURAGED LMI TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENT. ENTEZAM SAID HE HIMSELF WAS LMI OFFICIAL WHO HAD NEGOTIATED WITH BAKHTIAR AND WAS WILLING TO DO SO AGAIN IF NECESSARY; RIGHT NOW, LMI WAS FOCUSING ON UNDERSTAND-

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S E C R E T / E X D I S

TEHRAN 1447

O 291326Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3437
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01447

CHRG: STATE 1/29/79
APPRV: DCM:GWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTMP
CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMB
DISTR: DCM-2 AMB DA
DUMMY/CHRON

[Handwritten initials]

POL 12-2

FNDS

R.O. 12265: RDS-4 1-29-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINR, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) WILL TRY AGAIN FOR
- DEAL WITH GOI

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL SAYS DESPITE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ANGER OVER ARMY SHOOTINGS OF PAST TWO DAYS, MOVEMENT WILL ATTEMPT AT EVENING MEETING JAN 29 TO WORK OUT SUCCESSFUL DEAL WITH MILITARY TO ALLOW KHOMEINI TO RETURN TO IRAN. TWO PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT AGREEMENT WERE FRUSTRATED BY SHOOTINGS AND, SOURCE THOUGHT, PERHAPS BY "CONFUSION" IN PARIS. LMI HOPES KHOMEINI CAN BE BROUGHT TO IRAN WHERE MODERATING ELEMENTS OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND IN-COUNTRY LMI ORGANIZATION CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR. BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCK IS PUBLIC REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR BY KHOMEINI AND GREATER LEVEL OF EXASPERATION ON BOTH SIDES THAN EXISTED FIVE DAYS AGO. END SUMMARY.
3. LMI'S AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED FOR MEETING WITH POLOFF STEMPEL (AND TO UNDERLINE URGENCY, EVEN OFFERED TO COME TO EMBASSY'S CARAVANSARI RESTAURANT IN VIEW OF DIFFICULT SECURITY SITUATION) LATE MORNING JAN 29. HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING LMI ANGER AT ARMY'S SHOOTING OF DEMONSTRATORS OVER PAST TWO DAYS, AND SAID LMI FIGURES FOR JAN 27 UNIVERSITY SHOOT-OUT WERE 43 DEAD, 330 INJURED. HE NOTED POLICE IN SANANDAJ HAD "RUN WILD" ON JAN 28, AFTER KILLING OF POLICEMAN DAY BEFORE, AND SHOT DOWN 200. (COMMENT: THESE FIGURES ARE PROBABLY HIGH.) ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY HEARD PRIME MINISTER GIVE ORDERS TO ARMY TO ARREST ENTIRE SANANDAJ POLICE FORCE DURING MEETING JAN 28 AFTER READING SAVAK REPORT WHICH BLAMED POLICE FOR INCIDENT.
4. EMBOFF NOTED ARMY SEEMED UPSET WITH VIOLENCE OF PAST TWO DAYS, BUT OUR INFORMATION INDICATED BOTH DAYS' ACTIVITIES WERE STARTED BY THOSE OTHER THAN LMI-ASSOCIATED FORCES. ENTEZAM SAID HIS MOVEMENT WAS ALSO CERTAIN TUDEH ELEMENTS HAD BEGUN JAN 27 SHOOTING AT UNIVERSITY, AND THAT PERHAPS GOI PROVOCATEUR HAD STARTED ROCK-THROWING JAN 29. ENTEZAM SAID VIOLENCE WAS STILL GOI'S FAULT, AND HAD DISRUPTED DEAL WITH KHOMEINI. EMBOFF SAID PERHAPS THIRD PARTIES WERE TRYING TO DISRUPT DEAL. LONG BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AND FACT IT HAD INCREASED ANGER ON ALL SIDES AND IMPROVED POLITICAL SOLUTION.

5. ENTEZAM SAID BASIC PROBLEM NOW WAS KHOMEINI REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR BECAUSE OF THE BLOODLETTING. DESPITE

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TEHRAN 1

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FOUR MONTHS), AND RETURNING ON SAME PLANE WITH AYATOLLAH. ANOTHER SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR WORKING OUT AGREEMENT, RETURNING TO PACIFY ARMY AND THEN WELCOMING KHOMEINI.

6. IN EFFORT TO GIVE POLITICAL PROCESS TIME TO WORK, TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE ISSUED ANNOUNCEMENT MORNING JAN 28 UNDER SIGNATURE OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLING FOR 48 MORE HOURS CALM WHILE PRIME MINISTER "ARRANGES RETURN" OF KHOMEINI. BOTH ENTEZAM, AND MINATCHI THINK SOLUTION AT LEAST TO ARRIVAL PROBLEM MUST BE SET BY THAT TIME, OR LMI AND OTHERS WILL HAVE TROUBLE CONTROLLING CROWD REACTION.

7. COMMENT: MINATCHI IS NOT USUALLY GIVEN TO CONCERN OVER VIOLENCE, AND HE IS CLEARLY WORRIED. NUMBER OF U.S. JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ABOUT IN CITY OVER PAST THREE DAYS REPORT MOOD BOTH OF CROWDS AND OF ARMY IS GENERALLY TIGHTER. BUT QUESTION AT THIS POINT IS WHETHER POLITICAL PROCESS CAN CREAK THROUGH TO ENOUGH OF A SOLUTION TO HEAD OFF A CRUNCH BEFORE HOT HEADS TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. SULLIVAN

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TEHRAN 1379

3

C O N F I D E N T I A L

0 261236Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3454
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 31379

CHRG: STATE
APPRV: DCM: CWNA
DRFTD: POL: JDS TEM
CLEAR: POL: GBLAMBRA
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DC
ECON-2 PM OR
CHRON/12

F.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-28-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL POT BOILING VIGOROUSLY, THREAT OF
VIOLENCE GROWS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: BAKHTIAR'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WILL GO TO PARIS WAS TRIGGERED FRANTIC MEETINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN AND BETWEEN TEHRAN AND PARIS. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY WANT HIM TO NEGOTIATE KHOMEINI RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE FOR FEAR OF VIOLENCE, WHILE LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) APPEARS TO BE MORE CONCERNED FOR A COMPLETE POLITICAL DEAL. CROWDS WHICH HAVE GATHERED (SOME FROM PROVINCES) TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ARE RESTIVE. TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE CALLED FOR CALM FOR 48 MORE HOURS, BUT POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IS SUBSTANTIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MODERATE POLITICAL BROKER MINATCHI AND LMI'S ENTEZAM OVER PAST 24 HOURS, IT APPEARS THAT BAKHTIAR'S DECISION TO GO TO PARIS WAS WORKED OUT WITH CHIEF KHOMEINI LIEUTENANT IN TEHRAN BEHESHTI AND NUMBER OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. IT ALSO INVOLVED CONSIDERABLE TELEPHONE WORK WITH PARIS. APPARENTLY DEAL AGREED TO LATE EVENING JAN 27 JUST INCLUDED BAKHTIAR-KHOMEINI MEETING; LEADERS ARE MEETING VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGH DAY OF JAN 28 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS, AND UNCERTAINTY LEVEL IS HIGH ALL AROUND.

4. MINATCHI BELIEVES CRITICAL POINT IS TO GET BAKHTIAR AND KHOMEINI TOGETHER TO SET TIME FOR KHOMEINI'S RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. CROWDS WHICH HAVE ASSEMBLED IN TEHRAN OVER PAST FEW DAYS TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH ARE BECOMING RESTIVE. SPEAKERS AT MOURNING RALLY JAN 27 EXPLICITLY STATED THAT IF KHOMEINI DID NOT RETURN JAN 28, ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD BEGIN JAN 30. BOTH MODERATE TYPES AND LMI ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT UNDUO DELAY IN PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL DEAL THAT WILL BRING KHOMEINI BACK WILL MEAN VIOLENCE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. POTENTIAL FOR UNCONTROLLED REACTIONS BY GANGS OF PROVINCIAL VISITORS IS GROWING. THERE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED REPORTS OF SOME LOOTING IN SOUTH TEHRAN AND OTHER INCIDENTS ELSEWHERE. SEVERAL OF OUR UNIVERSITY SOURCES SAY RADICAL FACTIONS TO LEFT OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ARE CALLING FOR "MORE ACTIVE" STRUGGLE. HOWEVER, SITUATION REMAINS UNDER CONTROL FOR NOW.

5. LMI'S ENTEZAM BELIEVES BAKHTIAR SHOULD WORK OUT FULL POLITICAL DEAL IN PARIS BECAUSE, UNLESS HE DOES SO, HE WILL BE HOSTAGE TO ARMY WHEN IT COMES TIME TO IMPLEMENT ANY AGREEMENT IN TEHRAN. ONE SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR MAKING SOME SORT OF OBEISANCE TO KHOMEINI, GETTING THE AYATOLLAH'S NOD TO BE PRIME MINISTER UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD (THREE-

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TEHRAN 13

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIAC IMMEDIATE 3241

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01077

EXDIS

HAD HEARD TWO RUMORS: FIRST WAS THAT GEN OVEISSI HAD FLOWN BACK TO IRAN IN IRANIAN ARMY AIRCRAFT; SECOND WAS THAT SEVERAL GENERALS HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM IN U.S. EMBASSY. POLOFF FLATLY DENIED RUMORS AND ENTEZAM ACCEPTED THIS.

8. IN SEPARATE BRIEF CONVERSATION, EMBOFF LEARNED FROM DR. NASSER MINATCHI (MODERATE RELIGIOUS POLITICAL BROKER) THAT MEETING BETWEEN LMI LEADERS AND MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY GO FORWARD EVENING JAN 22 OR EARLY MORNING JAN 23. MINATCHI COMMENTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO IRAN JAN 26 DESPITE ADVISE OF ALL HIS POLITICAL ALLIES HERE. (COMMENT: BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM ARE DISDAINFUL AND DISTRUSTFUL OF THOSE AROUND KHOMEINI IN PARIS. THOUGH NEITHER WOULD SAY A DIRECT WORD AGAINST KHOMEINI CONFIDANTES YAZDI AND GHOTBZADEH, BOTH WERE QUITE CLEAR IN THEIR FEELINGS.)

9. MINATCHI ALSO ALLUDED TO CONFLICT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IN IRAN OVER HOW BEST TO HANDLE KHOMEINI PROBLEM. MINATCHI WAS GOING TO QOM AFTERNOON JAN 22 FOR LONG TALK WITH MAJOR AYATOLLAHS THERE ON HOW TO MINIMIZE VIOLENCE WHEN KHOMEINI RETURNS. HE SEEMED CERTAIN THAT "QOM TRIANGLE" OF AYATOLLAHS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BACK ANY KHOMEINI STRATEGY WHICH DID NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL FIG LEAF TO COVER IT. (COMMENT: WE HAVE HEARD BRAVE TALK FROM THE QOM GROUP BEFORE, BUT IT HAS MELTED AWAY BEFORE KHOMEINI ONSLAUGHT. WE ARE NOT RPT NOT CONVINCED THIS TIME WILL BE DIFFERENT.)

10. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: SITUATION IS TAKING ON RITUAL ELEMENTS: KHOMEINI IS PUSHING, HIS IN-COUNTRY ALLIES (LMI) ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES AND TRYING TO MAKE A DEAL, AND LOTS OF HINTS ARE BEING MADE THAT USG SHOULD CARRY THE BALL FOR BOTH SIDES. PERSIAN PENCHANT FOR PUTTING OFF SERIOUS COMPROMISE BETWEEN OVRUSHING OPPONENTS UNTIL THE LAST HOUR IS TURNING POLITICAL ARENA INTO ONE VAST GAME OF "CHICKEN." THIS DOES NOT HAVE STABILIZING EFFECT ON PARTICIPANTS WHEN DONE REPEATEDLY (NOV 5, MOHARRAM, ASHURA, ARBAEIN, AND NOW). MILITARY IS FACED WITH STRIKE OF SENIOR WARRANT OFFICERS (HOMOPARSY IN ISFABAN, HAMEDAN, DEZFUL, AND MASHAD, ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM). ON OTHER SIDE, BY ADMISSION OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, OPPOSITION'S MODERATE CLERGY ARE BECOMING RESTIVE WITH UNCOM-PROMISING KHOMEINI LINE. BEST HOPE FOR NOW IS THAT EACH PARTY'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS WILL INCLINE IT TO COMPROMISE RATHER THAN SEEK HARD-LINE CONFRONTATION. SULLIVAN

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CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

TEHRAN 1077/2

5. POLOFF REPLIED THIS WAS SOMETHING USG COULD NOT DO, NOR WOULD IT EVEN BE USEFUL -- RECIPIENTS OF THIS ADVICE WERE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO ENTRENCH AND SCREAM "AMERICAN PRESSURE," THAN TO HEED IT. ENTEZAM SAID THIS SEEMED ONLY WAY TO AVOID BLOODBATH OR ARMY TAKEOVER. EMBOFF REPLIED COMPROMISE STILL SEEMED BEST SOLUTION. BAKHTIAR HAD LEGITIMACY, EVEN IF KHOMEINI DIDN'T ACCEPT IT. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI WOULD NOT ACCEPT LEGITIMACY OF ANY PRESENT RULING ORGANS -- PRIME MINISTER, PARLIAMENT OR REGENCY COUNCIL. POLOFF THEN BLUNTLY SAID PERHAPS IT WAS TIME SOMEBODY EXPLAINED TO KHOMEINI THAT COMPROMISE WAS ONLY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO BLOODSHED. GOVT DID NOT SEEM READY TO SURRENDER, NOR WOULD MILITARY LET IT GO EVEN IF IT DID. ATTEMPT BY KHOMEINI TO SET UP RIVAL GOVT UPON HIS ARRIVAL COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. ENTEZAM GULPED A BIT AND ASKED IF THIS MEANT POSSIBILITY OF COUP. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT POSSIBILITY HAD NOT YET BEEN WHOLLY ABSENT FROM SCENE AT ANY TIME IN RECENT PAST. NO ONE, NOT MILITARY, NOR USG, NOR OPPOSITION REALLY WANTED EVENTS TO COME TO THIS.

6. ENTEZAM THEN CHANGED SUBJECT, AND SAID LMI WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH A U.S. TEAM TO DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN AND TO TRY TO AVOID CONFLICTS BETWEEN USG AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHICH WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. EMBOFF SAID HE WAS ALWAYS INTERESTED IN ANY POINTS LMI HAD TO MAKE, BUT IT SEEMS A BIT PREMATURE TO HAVE MAJOR DISCUSSIONS ON THIS POINT WHILE POLITICAL JOCKEYING WAS STILL SO INTENSE. ENTEZAM SAID OFFER REMAINED OPEN.

7. IN RELATED MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS AT END OF CONVERSATION, ENTEZAM CONFIRMED CALL POLOFF HAD RECEIVED FROM LMI'S TAVAKOLI TO EFFECT THAT ENTEZAM WOULD BE PRINCIPAL LMI CONTACT WITH EMBASSY FROM NOW ON. ENTEZAM ALSO SAID LMI

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TEHRAN

O 221358Z JAN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIAGY IMMEDIATE 3240
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01077

CHRG: STATE 1/22/79
 APPRY: MIN: CWNAAS
 DEFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL
 CLEAR: POL: GBLAMBRAK
 DISTR: DDD AMB MIN-2
 DUMMY/CHRON

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: RDS-4 1/11/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
 TAGS: FINS, FORS, PGOV
 SUBJECT: LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH; CONFLICT WITH MODERATES
 SHAPING UP

REF: TEHRAN 957

1. (C. ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: LMI'S ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF THAT LMI URGENTLY
 WANTED MEETING WITH SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO ARRANGE FOR
 PEACEFUL ARRIVAL OF KHOMEINI. LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH
 PRIME MINISTER, MAJLES, AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN.
 POLOFF STATED SUCCINCTLY THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT SOME-
 THING U.S. COULD DO AND EVEN ATTEMPTING IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY
 BE HARMFUL. COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES SEEMS NECESSARY.
 KHOMEINI ATTEMPT TO SET UP RIVAL GOVERNMENT ON HIS RETURN
 COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. SOURCE SAID LMI STILL WISHED TO
 DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN TO AVOID FUTURE CONFLICT.
 MEANWHILE, MODERATE RELIGIOUS SOURCE INDICATED OPPOSITION
 MEETING WITH MILITARY WAS CRITICAL, AND OBLIQUELY CONFIRMED
 REPORTS OF RIFT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY

3. AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF
 STEMPEL MORNING JAN 22 THAT LMI WISHED URGENTLY TO SCHEDULE
 MEETING BETWEEN KHOMEINI CHIEF BEHESHTI, LMI LEADERS
 BAZARGAN, AND GENERALS MOGHADDAM AND GHARABAGHI TO DISCUSS
 UNFOLDING KHOMEINI RETURN SITUATION AND URGED USG TO CON-
 VINCE MILITARY THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. (MINATCHI, OF SHARIAT-
 MANDI MODERATES, MADE SAME PITCH WITHIN AN HOUR OF
 ENTEZAM'S. POLOFF REPLIED TO BOTH THAT USG HAD DONE SO
 THROUGHOUT THE EVENING, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. ENTEZAM
 SAID THAT HIS APPROACH TO MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY LEAD
 TO A MEETING WITHIN 24 HOURS; A NEUTRAL PLACE HAD ALREADY
 BEEN IDENTIFIED. (ENTEZAM WOULD NOT SAY WHERE). SOURCE WAS
 VERY IMPORTANT TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL
 KHOMEINI RETURN. (COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT ENTEZAM AND
 LMI NOW ACCEPT KHOMEINI'S JAN 26 RETURN AS A
 FACT.)

4. TURNING TO POLITICAL SITUATION, LMI SAID PROBLEM WAS
 NOW WITH PRIME MINISTER, WHO DID NOT WANT TO GIVE WAY,
 DESPITE DISCUSSION ON MATTER EARLIER. ENTEZAM SAID HE
 AND ONE OTHER LMI LEADER (NOT IDENTIFIED) WERE SCHEDULED TO
 SEE BAKHTIAR LATE AFTERNOON JAN 22. THEY WOULD PUSH LMI
 TO "COMPROMISE" (HIS WORD) WHEREBY REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD GIVE
 UP GOVERNING POWERS TO KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL.
 ENTEZAM SAID BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR USG TO PRESS
 BAKHTIAR, PARLIAMENT AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN AND
 CLEAR WAY FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

GET PUBLIC SECTOR BACK TO WORK BEGINNING JAN. 21. IF COMMITTEE'S AIM WAS THE SAME, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF ITS WORK PROCEEDED FAST ENOUGH TO PREVENT CONFLICT FROM DEVELOPING, SINCE BOTH SIDES SEEM COMMITTED TO GOING BACK TO WORK. ENTEZAM UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, AND EMPHASIZED THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD ALSO HELP CONTAIN LEFTIST ELEMENTS WHICH ARE TRYING TO MAKE INROADS INTO LABOR MOVEMENT. (COMMENT: WE HOPE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS WILL MOVE FAST ENOUGH, BUT IT WILL BE CLOSE.)

3. TAVASSOLI SAID TUDEH ORGANIZERS HAVE PUT OUT BULLETINS CALLING FOR MASS LEFTIST (AND PRESUMABLY ANTI-RELIGIOUS) RALLY FOR MID-MORNING JANUARY 21. LOCATION OF DEMONSTRATION WILL BE MEIDAN-E-QAZVIN, ABOUT A MILE NORTH OF TEHRAN RAILROAD STATION ON SEENSHOM BAHMAN STREET. (COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR TUDEH AND RADICAL LEFTIST PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES, THIS WOULD BE FIRST MAJOR TEST OF TUDEH STRENGTH IN WIDER PUBLIC COMMUNITY. THIS FIRST RALLY OF ORGANIZED LEFT, IF IN FACT IT OCCURS, MIGHT EXERCISE HELPFUL PROD TO LMI'S MODERATES TO INCREASE SPEED OF THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT A MODERATE POLITICAL SOLUTION.)

4. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, DR. MINATCHI (AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTER) CONFIRMED THAT TALKS BETWEEN OPPOSITIONISTS AND BAKHTIAR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GONE FORWARD ON QUESTION OF HOW TO RESOLVE CONFLICT BETWEEN REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI COUNCIL HAD NOT YET NOT YET BEEN NAMED, PARTLY BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL GOING ON ABOUT PROJECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IT AND REGENCY COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAS RAFSANJANI AND MOTAHARI MAY LEAVE FOR PARIS JAN. 20 OR 21 IF DEAL APPEARS POSSIBLE. MINATCHI MAY ACCOMPANY THEM. PURPOSE OF TRIP WILL BE TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL MUST HAVE SOME LEGAL TIE TO PRESENT REGIME OR MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADER HERE WILL NOT

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(SEE SRP REPORTING). EVEN IF THIS IS THE CASE, LMI SEEMS TO BE IGNORING ROLE OF MILITARY, WHICH ACCORDING TO OUR LIGHTS, IS BY NO MEANS READY TO LIE DOWN AND ACCEPT IMI SOLUTION WITHOUT SOME HARD ARGUMENT AND INFIGHTING.

10. ON QUESTION OF TIMING OF KHOMEINI RETURN, THIS IS FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD ANY RESPONSIBLE MOVEMENT FIGURE SUGGEST KHOMEINI WOULD DELAY RETURN TO IRAN AS LONG AS IT TOOK TO SEE ISLAMIC STRUCTURE IN PLACE, EITHER THROUGH TAKEOVER OR COMPROMISE. PROBLEM WITH THIS PROJECTION, FROM KHOMEINI'S VIEW, MUST BE THAT HE IS ALREADY UNDER PRESSURE FROM IN-COUNTRY GROUPS TO RETURN. LOCAL PRESS HAD CARRIED SEVERAL APPEALS TO HIM TO COME BACK, AND ALI AMINI IS REPORTEDLY IN PARIS TO URGE HIM TO RETURN. WE ASSUME AT LEAST SOME OF THESE APPEALS ARE GENUINE, NOT JUST THE EXPECTED PERSIAN "TAAROF".

11. CONVERSATIONS WITH LMI FIGURES OVER PAST TWO-THREE DAYS, PLUS KINDS OF STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF PARIS (SEE REF B FOR EXAMPLE) SUGGEST SOME UNCERTAINTIES IN KHOMEINI THINKING, AND INCREASING BACK AND FORTH COMMENTS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AIDES. APPEARS TO US AT THIS POINT THAT, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS AND TALKS GO ON HERE, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL INDECISION AND SORTING OUT GOING ON IN PARIS. GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES HERE IN IRAN AS WELL AS THOSE IN PARIS, IT IS CLEAR WE ARE NEITHER OUT OF THE POLITICAL WOODS, NOR YET FULLY ENGAGED IN WHAT COULD BE INTENSELY POLITICAL PROCESS OF RECONCILING IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES. ABOUT THE ONLY REALLY POSITIVE FEATURE OF THIS IS THAT KHOMEINI, FOR WHATEVER REASON, HAS HELD BACK FROM IMMEDIATE RETURN TO IRAN, THUS LEAVING SOME ROOM FOR MORE NEGOTIATION, AT LEAST FOR NOW. SULLIVAN
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#2926

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS

TEHRAN 0926/2

181485 JAN 79
MEMBERSHIP TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3143

ON P L I D, E N, T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00926

LIMDIS

MARIM SANJABI WILL CERTAINLY BE ON COUNCIL, BUT OTHER NAMES NOT RPT NOT KNOWN. ONE IMPORTANT POINT: THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON COUNCIL. TAVASSOLI SAID PRESENT PLANS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY WORKED OUT INCLUDE SPECIAL "ADVISORY GROUP" OF KEY RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS AYATOLLAHS TALEQANI, MONTAZERI, ETC. FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF ISLAMIC COUNCIL, PRESUMABLY RESIGNATIONS OF MAJLES MEMBERS AND MINISTER, WHICH ALREADY STARTED JAN 17, WILL CONTINUE. PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR IS EXPECTED THEN "TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE" TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH WILL SCHEDULE ELECTIONS FAIRLY SOON (TAVASSOLI THOUGHT ABOUT TWO OR THREE MONTHS WERE THE WORKING TIME FRAME, BUT NO FIRM DECISION HAD YET BEEN MADE).

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMENI COUNCIL AND REGENCY COUNCIL, TO WHICH ARMY WAS OVAL, TAVASSOLI SAID HE KNEW EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO WORK OUT SOME KIND OF A DEAL, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT COMMENT: TAVASSOLI IS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF MINATCHI REPORTS -- SEE REF A, PARA TWO).

QUESTION OF KHOMENI'S RETURN IS STILL SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN, BUT CURRENT THINKING OF KHOMENI HIMSELF AS EXPRESSED TO BAZARGAN IS TO DELAY HIS RETURN UNTIL ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS INHERITED MANTLE OF POWER, AND "ARMY IS UNDER MORE CONTROL". THIS DECISION IS UNDER STEADY REVIEW. SOURCE THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN KHOMENI RETURN TO IRAN IN SIX TO TEN DAYS FROM NOW. DISCUSSION ENDED WITH SOURCE'S PROMISE TO KEEP UP MORE REGULAR CONTACT OVER NEXT FEW DAYS.

COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: TAVASSOLI WAS THE MOST FORTH-
3 MING HE HAS EVER BEEN WITH REPORTING OFFICER, AND SEEMED TO SAY BY HIS MANNER THAT USC WAS BEING MORE REALISTIC IN APPRAISAL OF SITUATION THAN IT HAD BEEN BEFORE. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS SPEAKING ON ORDERS FROM BAZARGAN, WHO THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT USC UNDERSTOOD HIS INTENTS BE PRESENTED. TO THIS DEGREE, HE WAS AS FORTH-
COMING ABOUT LMI FUTURE INTENTIONS AS HE HAS EVER BEEN BEFORE, AND WILLING TO SPECIFY AREAS IN WHICH HE WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED. WHILE HE EITHER DOESN'T KNOW ABOUT EFFORTS TO RECONCILE REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMENI COUNCIL (REF A) OR IS A MASTER DISSSEMBLER (REPORTING OFFICER BELIEVES THE FORMER), HE IS CONVINCED THAT SOLUTION FOR TRANSFER WILL BE WORKED OUT. BREEZY WAY TAVASSOLI AND ENTENZAM PASS OVER PROBLEMS OF FORMING LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ISLAMIC COUNCIL SUGGESTS SOME CREDENCE TO RUMORS THAT BAZARGAN ALREADY DONE A DEAL OF PORTS WITH KHOMENI

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REPLACEMENT BY BOMBINI-ESTABLISHED SOLUTION. (DEAL SEEMS TO BE ROOM FOR HORSE-TRADING, HOWEVER.)

3. ENTEZAM SAID BOMBINI HAS JUST ESTABLISHED (JAN 17) COMMITTEE OF FIVE TO RESOLVE PRESENT STRIKES. BAKARJAN, WHO LED OIL COMMITTEE, WOULD BE EXCLUDED SO HE COULD MONITOR OIL SITUATION AND IRI'S YELDER SPATMAN, DR. YABOLLAH SAHABI WOULD CHAIR NEW GROUP, OF WHICH ENTEZAM IS TO BE A MEMBER. ENTEZAM DECLINED TO NAME OTHER MEMBERS AT THIS TIME. COMMITTEE WAS JUST STARTING WORK THAT MORNING, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE MOST STRIKES WITHIN A FEW DAYS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE TALKS EFFORTS TO BLOCK STRIKE SETTLEMENT, ENTEZAM SAID OIL FIELDS WERE SPECIAL CASE, AND RADICAL LEFTISTS DID NOT OPT NOT SEEM TO POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO SETTLEMENTS ELSEWHERE.

(COMMENT: AS LONG-TIME BELIEVERS IN MURPHY'S LAW, WE ARE NOT SO SURE PROCESS WILL GO THAT SMOOTHLY.) SULLIVAN BY

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-215-323

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CHRGF: STATE 1/17/79
APPRV: MIN:GWAAAS
DRTD: POL:JLSTEMPEL:P
CLEAR: POL:BELAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL:AMB MIN-2
DUMMY/CHRON

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TEHRAN 0833
SECRETARY GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS

U.O. 12068: RIS-4 1/17/79 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINE, FORS, IS
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) FORMS STRIKE
COMMITTEE, OPPOSITIONISTS DISCUSSING NEXT STEPS

SUMMARY: LMI BELIEVES SITUATION IN IRAN WILL STABILIZE BY
JAN 21. KHOMEINI HAS NO PLANS TO RETURN TO IRAN BEFORE
JAN 21, BUT COULD DO SO WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO A WEEK.
LMI WANTS REGENCY COUNCIL AND MAJLES TO MELT AWAY, BUT
MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS IN SHARIAT-MADARI CAMP ARE SEEKING
COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE EITHER JOINT OPERATION OF
TWO COUNCILS OR MERGER. LMI SOURCE SAYS KHOMEINI HAS
ESTABLISHED A COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING STRIKES; IT
BEGAN WORK JAN 17. END SUMMARY

1. LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AMIR ENTEZAM TOLD POLOFF
STEMPEL THAT SITUATION AFTER SHAH'S DEPARTURE HAD DEVELOP-
ED BETTER THAN ANYONE HAD HOPED. HE THANKED U.S. GRA-
DUOUSLY AND EXTENSIVELY FOR WORKING WITH MILITARY TO PRE-
VENT BLOWUP. ENTEZAM SAID LMI HAD CONTACTED KHOMEINI AND
AYATOLLAH HAD DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO RETURN TO IRAN IN
IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WHEN PRESSED, ENTEZAM SAID NO FINAL
DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, BUT LMI THOUGHT SITUATION WOULD
STABILIZE FAIRLY WELL -- CROWD WOULD HAVE ONE BIG CHANCE FOR
EMOTIONAL OUTFOURING AT JAN 19 MARCH -- BY JAN. 21.
KHOMEINI WOULD NOT COME BACK BEFORE THEN, BUT MIGHT DO SO
WITHIN NEXT SEVEN DAYS. DECISION STILL BEING CONSIDERED
IN PARIS.

2. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUESTION AS TO HOW POLITICAL
SITUATION WOULD DEVELOP, ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI WOULD "INVITE"
MAJLES AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO MELT AWAY. IF THEY FAILED
TO TAKE THE HINT, THEY WOULD BE PRESSED HARDER AND DUMPED
BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. POLOFF GOT MORE CONCILIATORY
VERSION FROM DR. NASSER MINATCHI, AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI
SUPPORTER, WHO SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL OPPOSITION
GROUPS WOULD BE MEETING WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS TO SEE HOW
PROBLEM OF DUAL GOVERNMENT -- REGENCY COUNCIL AND ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL COULD BE RESOLVED. MINATCHI'S
PREFERRED SOLUTION IS TO MERGE THE TWO COUNCILS, AND THIS
HAS SOME STRONG SUPPORT. OTHER OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED
ARE JOINT MEETING OF TWO GROUPS, OR PARALLEL ACTIONS
(SUCH AS BOTH GROUPS DESIGNATING SAME PRIME MINISTER).
MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI HAS NOW RETURNED FROM
PARIS AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SERIES OF MEETINGS.
MINATCHI PRESSED NOT TO KNOW WHAT WORD MONTAZERI WAS
BRINGING BACK FROM PARIS. (COMMENT: WHILE KHOMEINI'S
POSITION MAY EVOLVE THROUGH DISCUSSION, ENTEZAM'S VIEW
SUGGESTS LMI WILL GO INTO SUCH A MEETING ARGUING SIMPLY
FOR "DISAPPEARANCE" OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR

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TEHRAN 00784

C 161248Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3048
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00784

CHRG: STATE 1-16-79
APRV: EGM: CWNAAS
PRFTD: POL: JDSTAMP
CLEAR: POL: GELAMER
DISTR: POL-3 AMB D
ECON-2 PM US
OR SHIR TAB
ISF CHRON/1

E.C. 12065: PIS-4 1-16-99 (STEMPEL, J.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PORS
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN POSTPONED

1. AMIR ENTEZAM, LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER TELEPHONED POLOFF ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF AFTER SHAH'S PLANE LEFT TO INFORM EMBASSY AYATOLIAH KHOMEINI WILL NOT RPT NOT BE RETURNING TO IRAN "IN THE NEAR FUTURE." HE KEYED THIS DECISION TO POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

2. ABOVE REPRESENTS LMI'S BEST INFORMATION, BUT ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOTE THAT A) TIME FRAME IS UNSPECIFIED, AND B) LMI IN RECFNT DAYS HAS COOLED ON IDEA OF IMMEDIATE KHOMEINI RETURN. KHOMEINI'S PARIS ENTCOURAGE MAY HAVE OTHER IDEAS WHICH COULD CHANGE KHOMEINI'S INTENTION ON SHORT NOTICE.

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AYATROGON WERE ~~WRONG~~ IN IMPLYING THAT KHOMEINI WOULD ATTACK ANY COUNTRY WHICH GIVES THE SHAH REFUGE. ENTEZAM SAID (AND WE HOPE HE SPEAKS ACCURATELY FOR KHOMEINI CAMP) THAT KHOMEINI UNDERSTANDS IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO OFFER SHAH ASYLUM IN U.S. OR EUROPE TO GET HIM OUT OF IRAN, AND COUNTRY THAT DOES SO WOULD NOT BE PENALIZED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

5. GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTEDLY TAKING OVER SECURITY FROM POLICE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF COUNTRY ARE "PROBABLY" LMI ACTION TEAMS. ENTEZAM SAID ALL THOSE WHO HAD TAKEN OVER IN THE NORTH, AROUND TABRIZ AND ELSEWHERE IN EAST AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE WERE DEFINITELY LMI. REPORTS WERE NOT IN FROM MORE SOUTHERN CITIES SUCH AS SHIRAZ. ALSO ON POSITIVE NOTE, ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM, MASS UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATION JAN 13, WHICH HAD AT ITS PEAK 230,000 PEOPLE (ACCORDING TO LMI, MORE EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS SAY JUST UNDER 100,000) WAS "ONE HUNDRED PER CENT CONTROLLED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT." ENTEZAM SAID LMI WAS AGREEABLY SURPRISED BY THIS, SINCE TUDER HAD BEEN STRONG IN UNIVERSITIES. (COMMENT: ENTEZAM CLEARLY THOUGHT THIS OUTCOME HAD RESULTED FROM GOOD ORGANIZATIONAL WORK WHICH LMI HAD DONE. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE LMI EXCLUSIVE CREDIT FOR THIS, SINCE HE AND OTHERS THOUGHT MARXISTS MAY JUST HAVE BEEN A BIT OVERWHELMED ON THIS OCCASION.) LMI WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATIONS WEEK-END OF JAN 18-19, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SHAH IS STILL IN IRAN OR NOT.

6. ENTEZAM NOTED THAT LMI HAD WELL-ADVANCED PLANNING FOR DAY OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE. AYATOLLARS HAD MADE SOME CALMING STATEMENTS AND WOULD MAKE OTHERS. LMI HAD TEAMS OF ITS OWN PREPARED TO PROTECT STATUES AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS. WHEN POLOFF ASKED ABOUT THESE GROUPS AND THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING SECURITY IN TOWNS, ENTEZAM SAID THEY CAME FROM VARIETY OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS. (COMMENT: WE SUSPECT AT LEAST SOME OF THEM AND MOST OF THEIR ORGANIZERS ARE MUJAHIDDIN OR MUJAHIDDIN RELATED.)

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TEHRAN 22678

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2974
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 22678

CHRG: STATE 1-14-79
APPRV: DCM:CVNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL:GBLANBARK
DISTR: DCM-2 AMB POL
CHRON/5

EXDIS

EXDIS

F.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-14-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: LMI ON PRESENT EVENTS

SUMMARY: ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF NAMING OF REGENCY COUNCIL GIVES LMI NO DIFFICULTY. LMI EXPECTS MAJLES WILL APPROVE BAKHTIAR. KHOMEINI'S PROJECTED RETURN TO IRAN NOT RPT NOT AS FIRM AS PRESS REPORTS INDICATE. SOME GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING OVER SECURITY ARE LMI UNITS, FULL INFO NOT AVAILABLE ON OTHERS. THERE WILL BE CONTINUED DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGH WEEKEND JAN 18-19. JAN 13 UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONTROLLED BY LMI. LMI PLANS FOR POST-SHAH CALM ARE ADVANCING. END SUMMARY.

1. POLOFF STEMPEL MET WITH AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH WAS NAMED JAN 13 GIVES LMI NO PROBLEMS. VARASTEHAND TEHRANI WERE FORMER OPPOSITIONISTS WITH GOOD RECORDS, AND ALIABADI IS WELL THOUGHT OF. (MINATCHI OF MODERATE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OFFERED SAME VIEW.) REGENCY COUNCIL SHOULD UNDERSTAND IT WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AROUND LONG, ONCE KHOMEINI RETURNS TO IRAN. ENTEZAM SAID PROMINENT OPPOSITIONISTS WERE CONTACTED BY COURT TO SERVE, BUT ALL DECLINED. HE PERSONALLY KNEW THAT KARIM SANJABI, YADOLLAH SAHABI, AND MEHDI PAZARGAN HAD ALL TURNED SHAH DOWN.

2. ENTEZAM SAID HE BELIEVES MAJLES WILL FUSS AND MUSS AND FINALLY APPROVE BAKHTIAR. WHILE SOME OF MAJLESMEN MAY PREFER MILITARY TAKEOVER (WHICH ALL BELIEVE WOULD FOLLOW REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR), ONLY WILL VOTE FOR GOOD OF COUNTRY. LMI WILL BE DOING SOME DISCREET LOBBYING, HOWEVER, SINCE VOTE IS NOT RPT NOT FORGONE CONCLUSION.

3. ON QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN TO IRAN, ENTEZAM SAID THAT CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, KHOMEINI HAS NOT RPT NOT MADE DECISION WHEN TO RETURN. LMI GROUP HERE, INCLUDING SEYED MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, WOULD PREFER RE DELAY HIS RETURN BEYOND FIRST OR SECOND DAY TO ALLOW MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION TO SETTLE. ENTEZAM SAID HE WAS FRANKLY AFRAID FOR KHOMEINI'S SAFETY, SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHO DO NOT WISH KHOMEINI WELL. FANATICISM HAS DONE IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR NATIONAL LEADERS IN PAST FIFTY YEARS AND LMI DOES NOT WANT KHOMEINI TO BE NEXT ON THE LIST. SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAN WOULD BE TOO HORRIBLE TO THINK ABOUT IF KHOMEINI WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON HIS RETURN TO IRAN.

4. ENTEZAM SAID COUPLE OF LOCAL PERSIAN PAPERS, INCLUDING

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"WE ARE UNEQUIVOCALLY READY TO HELP." KHOMEINI DOES NOT WANT TO HARM THE ARMY "AFTER ALL, IT IS PART OF THE NATION." SOME BAKHTIAR MINISTERS HAD TOLD THE LMI AND NATIONAL FRONT (INF) THAT THEY WANTED TO RESIGN. LMI HAD ADVISED THEM TO STAY ON; A TRANSITIONAL GOVT WAS NECESSARY TO "PAVE THE WAY FOR AN EVENTUAL NATIONAL GOVT OF GOOD MEN." HE PLEDGED LMI COOPERATION TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AND ARSON, AND SERIOUS EFFORT BY KHOMEINI FORCES TO CONTROL STREET MOBS. EMBOFF SAID THIS WOULD CERTAINLY REINFORCE OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP SITUATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANNEL.

4. AT THAT POINT, EMBOFF RAISED MATTER OF WHETHER LMI COULD CONTROL ALL STREET MOBS. ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LMI WAS FRANKLY CONCERNED ABOUT THOSE WHO ENGAGED IN RANDOM VIOLENCE, SUCH AS THE GRIMM ASSASSINATION. "I CAN STATE POSITIVELY THAT NONE OF THOSE PEOPLE ARE PART OF OUR MOVEMENT." EMBOFF REMAINED SCEPTICAL, AND ASKED IF LMI AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD EXERCISE AN INFLUENCE THERE. ENTEZAM REPLIED THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO SO.

5. ENTEZAM THEN RAISED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "DELICATE POINT" OF TIMING ABOUT TRANSITIONAL GOVT. LMI FEARS SHAH WILL TRY AND RETURN -- RUMOR ALREADY HAS IT THAT GEN. OVEISSI HAS MET WITH PRESIDENT CARTER TO OBTAIN BACKING FOR A COUNTER-COUP. LMI FELT IT COULD NOT WAIT TOO LONG TO MOVE TOWARD "TRULY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT." MOVEMENT UNDERSTOOD NEED TO LET BAKHTIAR RULE LONG ENOUGH TO GET SHAH OUT OF COUNTRY, BUT THOUGHT WITHIN THREE WEEKS TO A MONTH AFTER THAT, REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD BE OBLIGED TO INSTALL NEW GOVT APPROVED BY KHOMEINI. EMBOFF DESCRIBED OVEISSI RUMOR AS HEIGHT OF ABSURDITY AND LIMITED COMMENT ON SCENARIO TO SAYING USG APPROVED OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT, BUT DID NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ON IFS AND BUTS.

6. EMBOFF ASKED ENTEZAM IF ANY THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC STATUS--WOULD ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ALLOW OR ENCOURAGE RETURN TO WORK WHEN SHAH LEFT? IF NOT, THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO COUNTRY FOR IT TO EVENTUALLY TAKE OVERR. ENTEZAM SMILED AND SAID "YES, WE HAVE SOME PLANS FOR THAT." HE INDICATED LMI HAD BEEN GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO EASING

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C O N F I D E N T I A L/LIMDIS

TEHRAN 0431/1

PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2833
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00431

REF: STATE 1/9/79
APPRV: MIN: CWNAA
DRFTD: POL: JDSTENPEL
CLEAR: POL: GPLAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DGM
ECON-2 PM OR
CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/9/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) -OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: TWO OPPOSITIONIST VIEWS -- BACKING OFF
CONFRONTATION

REF: TEHRAN 367

SUMMARY: NEW LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) SOURCE SAYS LMI WILL NOT REPT NOT CHALLENGE BAKHTIAR GOVT NOW, WILL HELP TO MAKE SHAH'S EVENTUAL DEPARTURE AS PEACEFUL AS POSSIBLE, AND URGES U.S. TO PREVENT ARMY FROM OVERTHROWING CIVILIAN EFFORT. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS MOVING FASTER IN SIMILAR DIRECTION TO TRY AND AVOID TROUBLE WHEN SHAH LEAVES COUNTRY. SOURCE BELIEVES RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION ON REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD HELP EASE SITUATION AND SAYS SHARIAT-MADARI GROUP IS PROBABLY READY TO PARTICIPATE.
END SUMMARY

1. IN TWO CONVERSATIONS MORNING JAN 9, POLOFF GOT IMPRESSION THAT BOTH MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND LMI ARE PREPARED TO TOLERATE BAKHTIAR GOVT FOR LIMITED TIME IN ORDER TO EASE SHOCK OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY. BOTH SOURCES NOW BELIEVE SHAH INTENDS TO DEPART, AND RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO EMBOFF'S URGING THAT THEIR ORGANIZATIONS PLAN NOW TO MAKE POST-DEPARTURE SCENARIO AS ORDERLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. EMBOFF MET AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, FOR FIRST TIME (STRONGLY PROTECT). PROF RICHARD COTTAM HAD VOUCHERED FOR EACH OTHERS' BONA FIDES, AND DISCUSSION IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF POST-SHAH IRAN. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED LMI BELIEF THAT "ARMY CAN NOT TURN AGAINST PEOPLE IF THE U.S. OPPOSES THIS." EMBOFF REPLIED THAT U.S., IN ITS CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, WAS URGING OBEDIENCE TO CIVILIAN GOVT, BUT LMI HAD BETTER STRAIGHTEN ITSELF OUT ABOUT EXTENT AND DEPTH OF U.S. INFLUENCE WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, ESPECIALLY ON VITAL ISSUES WHERE OFFICER PERCEPTIONS MAY NOT BE SUBJECT TO MUCH FOREIGN PERSUASION. AFTER SHORT DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "CONTROL" AND "INFLUENCE", ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED LIMITATION ON U.S. ROLE (AT LEAST FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION).

3. EMBOFF REITERATED THAT U.S. WAS OPPOSED TO IDEA OF MILITARY COUP, DID NOT THINK IT WAS A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO IRAN'S PROBLEMS, AND HAD SO STATED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. FOR THIS REASON, USG WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT LMI AND OTHERS WERE DOING TO PREVENT PROVOCATION TO MILITARY WHICH WOULD LEAD TO UNREST AND CHAOS WHEN SHAH LEFT IRAN. ENTEZAM STATED

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3. COTTAM DESCRIBED AMIR AMIR-ENTEZAM, AN IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN, AS PROBABLY A VERY IMPORTANT LEADER AMONG THE KHOMEINI FACTION. AMIR-ENTEZAM TOLD COTTAM HE WISHED TO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY. COTTAM APPARENTLY ENCOURAGED HIM IN THAT DIRECTION.

4. MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS, ACCORDING TO COTTAM, WOULD TOLERATE BAKHTIAR AS LONG AS ANTI-SHAH MOVEMENT DID NOT LOSE MOMENTUM. SHOULD THEY SENSE THAT SPIRITS WERE WANING AMONG DEMONSTRATORS THEY WOULD STEP UP ATTACKS ON BAKHTIAR. BAKHTIAR WAS REGARDED AS A WEAK PERSONALITY, UNABLE TO RESIST THE SHAH'S OFFER OF THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP NO MATTER WHAT THE COST TO IRAN.

5. COTTAM DESCRIBED IN SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL REGENCY COUNCIL IDEA MENTIONED PARA. 4 REFTEL. COUNCIL WOULD BE COMPOSED OF A GENERAL OFFICER SELECTED BY THE SHAH, ALI AMINI (WHOM THE SHAH BELIEVED WAS LOYAL BUT WHO REALLY SUPPORTED THE OPPOSITION), BENESTI (KHOMEINI'S CHIEF LIEUTENANT IN IRAN), PROGRESSIVE LAWYER NAZIEH AND, TO BREAK TIE VOTES, EMPRESS FARAH. SANJABI WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER; PARLIAMENT WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND ELECTIONS CALLED, NEW MAJLIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REVISE THE CONSTITUTION TO ELIMINATE THE SHAH.

6. FINALLY, COTTAM DESCRIBED A CONVERSATION WITH A RETIRED COLONEL WHO SAID THAT ALL OF THE RETIRED COLONELS (MEN FIRED BY THE SHAH) WERE REVOLUTIONARY BECAUSE THEY WERE LITERATE. MOST OF THE GENERALS WERE ILLITERATE AND INDEED THAT WAS WHY THE SHAH HAD PROMOTED THEM. THE GENERALS WOULD REMAIN LOYAL BUT THE COLONELS COULD ONLY TAKE SO MUCH STRAIN. LARGE NUMBERS OF COLONELS AND LOWER RANKING OFFICERS WERE BELIEVED TIED IN TO THE KHOMEINI ORGANIZATION. KHOMEINI'S GROUP HAD RECENTLY BEEN GIVING THE MILITARY PRIORITY ADDITIONAL ATTENTION. VANCE
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ACTION

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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 9302

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CONFIDENTIAL STATE 004510

E.O. 112065 GDS, 1-7-85, (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: FURTHER REPORT OF RICHARD COTTAM

REF: TEHRAN 00366

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ACTION
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1. DEP OFF CALLED COTTAM JANUARY 7 FOR REPORT TO SUPPLEMENT REFTEL. COTTAM STRESSED THAT GROUP AROUND KHOMEINI AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN WERE FEARFUL OF A MILITARY COUP WHICH WOULD LEAD TO BLOODY REPRESSION. HE SAID THAT IN HIS FINAL DAYS IN TEHRAN, JANUARY 2-3, OPPOSITIONISTS WERE QUITE DEFINITE IN THEIR INFORMATION ABOUT A COUP. THEY HAD NAMES OF SIX GENERALS, INCLUDING OVEISSI, RABII, AND KHOSROWDAD PLUS THREE OTHERS COTTAM COULDN'T REMEMBER WHO WERE THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY LEADERS. COUP PLANS BEING DRAWN UP IN A BUILDING OWNED BY "RESEARCH CORPORATION" ON SHAH ABBAS AVENUE. ACCORDING TO THE OPPOSITION, THE PLANNERS HAD DIVIDED TEHRAN INTO SIX DISTRICTS EACH UNDER A GENERAL OFFICER. ARRESTS AND APPLICATION OF STRICT MILITARY CONTROLS WOULD BE SET IN MOTION AT A GIVEN SIGNAL. MANY IN THE OPPOSITION FEARED THE U.S. WOULD BACK SUCH A COUP.

2. DESPITE HATRED FOR U.S. AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION, COTTAM FOUND KHOMEINI'S CIRCLE AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN

READY TO THINK IN SOPHISTICATED TERMS ABOUT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS AFRAID OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DESIROUS OF RELYING ON THE U.S. FOR IRAN'S DEFENSE. THEY DID NOT WANT A FORMAL DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP BUT DID WANT U.S. BACKING AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWERS THOUGHT MOSCOW WOULD BE GREATLY DISTURBED BY A GOVERNMENT IN IRAN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO MIGHT EXERCISE INFLUENCE BEYOND IRAN'S BORDERS, INCLUDING AMONG SOVIET MUSLIMS.