

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

**In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful**

The Center for the Publication of
the U.S. Espionage Den's Documents

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In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent.

Foreword

The documents contained in the books 25 to 28 of the collection of the documents of the 'Den of Espionage', which were previously published and headlined as "The Moderates", generally introduced the supporters of the illegitimate interests of the U. S. A. and the plans and ambitions of the U. S. administration in activating the moderates' trend to finally substitute it for the Line of the Imam and revolution. It is to be kept in mind that these documents belonged to the political section of the Tehran-based 'Spy Den of America'.

In the meantime, part of the documents produced and later shredded and/or pulverized by the embassy-based C. I. A. Station at Tehran was also reconstructed to complement the previously published collection while clearly demonstrating America's operational and intelligence support in strengthening the moderation-trend. These documents are presented in two volumes to the Revolutionary Ummah of Iran in particular, and the people of the world in general as another proof of our nation's righteous campaign in isolating the political currents dependent on foreign powers. The first volume consists of the documents concerning Shariat Madari, while the second volume concerns notorious persons like Amir Entizam, Bahramiyan, Muqadam Maraghi, Hasan Nazih, Khusrow Qashqai, and some unknown persons like Turaj Nasiri and Ali Sayf-pur Fatimi.

The present collection exposes elements and currents that act in the name of independence, democracy, human rights and even religion in furthering colonial and exploitative causes of foreign supporters versus the deprived nations. The documents expose those parties and persons who, though being born of our own soil and fed by its resources, "despite the shattering of the myth of America's invincibility at the hands of Iranian people, seek advice from the U. S. A. in matters concerning the destiny of this country and its people". Although our country and our people have defeated U. S. A. in this land, they have not given up their connections with America. "Where should this complaint be registered?". Those groups and persons in lieu of the assurance of political support, monthly salaries and individual and political power, or rather in their love for America, consciously or unconsciously committed themselves to destroy a system that raised the banner of Islam, independence and freedom as against the widespread infidelity on earth. This group is comprised of, pseudo-holy men whose ambitions have made them ignorant of God, the pseudo-populars who voice the imperialist brand of nationalism, the nationalist muslims that are culturally western-oriented, and monarchists known for their disgrace throughout the world.

But, "It is difficult for muslims to co-operate with those pseudo-

holymen, who pretend to be loyal to Islam but are trying to undermine it. They pose a problem whose solution is hard to be found. . . It was obvious that Howayda (ex-Shah's premier) was the enemy of Islam and the muslims, what Nasiri (ex-SAVAK head) had done against the people was clear and the latter's obligation towards him obvious. . . But what are we to do with the so-called holyman who has a roasary in his hands and makes repeated claims of serving Islam? ". (A speech by the Imam: 24/9/58 Iranian Calendar Year).

These pseudo-popular individuals had no assignement other than undermining the revolution from within and burrying it in itself by sowing the seeds of discord and disunity. . . Thereby bringing about problems of the past. . . A handful of hoodlums, a handful of persons unaware of God, a handful of blokes in whose houses shameful things were discovered -- these and the likes of them -- have stood up against all the Muslims to support Carter and the likes of him. (A speech by the Imam: 19/9/58).

The story of the third contingent is the story of the fellows who were born and brought up during the fifty year reign of despotism and debauchery in our land, and who thought and acted within the ideological framework, which was propagated in the country by the great Satan.

(This is) the story of this man whose business has become known now. It is a matter of deep regret that even now these praise them, for their brains had been turned upside down. A person who was trained by them for fifty years, whose mind was made devoid of any sense of human dignity, received as a substitute a brain manufactured in the West. Howsoever great are the blows inflicted by the West upon his country and his people, even then such a person is all-admiration for the West, and makes all efforts necessary for their return. . . (A speech by the Imam: 21/9/58 Shamsi).

The line of the moderates, is that of alliance with infidels (knowingly or to the contrary), mobilized against the most decent of all men, human-beings that are to the best of their abilities, determined to establish the rule of the Quranic Laws, the traditions of the Prophet (S. A. W.) and the infallible Imams (A. S.). The example of the followers of the moderate line is the example of Abu Sufyan and persons like him, who were united in a bid to prevent the Prophet (S. A. W.) from forming a government, for they were afraid of Islam, which threatened their vested interests. These people, who are opposing Islam at present, are afraid of it due to their own interests and the interests of their masters for which they are serving foreigners. Likes of these people (in the past) were better than the present ones, for at least they did not serve others, but revolted against Islam to safeguard their own interests. These persons have risen for foreigners, and act on their behalf in order to paralyse the movement, launched by you -- the men of God. (A speech by the Imam: 39/9/58).

In the following pages we shall try to present, on the basis of the

documents, the views of the U. S. A. and those known as the followers of the moderate line concerning the Islamic Revolution, and how it is to be confronted.

The influence and infiltration of the U. S. A. in all corners of our country and the growth of the middle class in Iran gave rise to the illusion in the minds of the U. S. A. functionaries that, religion, as a revolutionary force, had become quite weak. They were under the impression that discontent with the regime of the Shah might be possibly due to the movements of the left and the rightist nationalism, inspired by the West, irrespective of their religious or secular colour. Of course, it does not mean that U. S. A. totally ignored the realities of the Iranian society and completely eliminated the perimeter of religion. It only means that the importance which was attached by the U. S. A. to the political currents of the left and the right was not attached to the religious movements. With this impression the U. S. A. studied and evaluated the nature of the anti-Shah opposition movements. In these studies, besides the two major goals of estimating the extent of discontent with the Shah and the imperial regime, and the channelization of those currents into support for the Shah, there was also a third objective, namely an identification of factions, organizations, policies and the structural make up of the opposition, in order to hire and train suitable elements that could be used in the formation of a regime supportive of U. S. interests when the Shah was confronted with serious threats. (However, it is not to be overlooked that these individuals and parties because of their very nature, willingly or unwillingly, were fed from the manager of imperialism). In this respect the U. S. A. got hold of all opportunities to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.

The uprising of the Fifteenth of Khurdad (June 5, 1962), was a warning to the U. S. A. to revise its estimation of the forces of the opposition (to the Shah). With due consideration of this uprising and the role of the aware and mujaheed, Shi'ite clergymen, and the amount of popular support for them, the U. S. A. discovered to its amazement that religion and the clerics were still unique and effective factors in mobilizing the masses against the Shah and his despotism. As a consequence, the U. S. A. chalked out a plan aimed at indentifying and recruiting certain elements from amongst the clergymen, and possibly, influence or groom from among them a personage recognized as the marja (the highest religious authority among the Shi'ite) thereby exploiting this great pillar of Shi'ism to serve its own interests. Accordingly the operational requirements of the SAVAK and C. I. A. and their collaboration in putting their plans, into effect led them to an individual named Sayyid Kazem Shariat Madari.

The viewpoint of Shariat Madari and his fellow-travellers concerning the U. S. A. issued from their belief that the absence of the U. S. A. from Iran was synonymous with the disappearance of the independence of this country. Their reason for seeking refuge in the devilish embrace of U. S. A. was that the American scarecrow could be used as a weapon against the paganism of communism and the U. S. S. R. This belief was sufficient for the U. S. A. to open an account in their favour.

Anyhow Shariat Madari until the Revolution, continued his balloon-like rise in the exalted garb of a religious authority under the explicit patronage of the SAVAK and the implicit support of the C. I. A., so that whenever a need arose he could serve to guard the interests of imperialism.

Despite all efforts, through moderate elements, in preventing the fall of the Shah and the overthrow of the imperial regime, from the national reconciliation government and the premiership of Bakhtiar, to the pacifying announcements and the covert support for the military by the pseudo-clerics, the U. S. lost all resistance before the volcanic eruption and the magnitude of the revolution, because it could neither analyze it nor confront it. Finally, that is when the Islamic Revolution promised independence, freedom and the Islamic Republic in its victory.

The main causes of America's failure to fight the Islamic Revolution were: firstly, its over confidence in the Shah's regime and its agents within the regime combined with its hopeless faith in stabilizing the monarchical system; secondly, its wrong perception of the Iranian reality due to which it equated the nationalist and the sincretic tendencies with the religious movement. On the basis of the attention it had concentrated on the former elements and the commitments of their leadership, America thought it could stall the emergence of a regime which threatened its vested interests.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the realization of the relative importance of the effective elements in this victory, America tried to utilize the same channels, with whose members it was in contact, to form a government, which could, despite outward differences with Pahlavi regime, serve the purpose of maintaining Iran as the good market it was for its military and consumer industries, as the good base it was for its espionage activities, and finally as the good and secure source it was, in supplying the energy needed by American industries. For this purpose it made an attempt to make use of its own active agents which were at the head of the moderate tendencies.

At this juncture, besides the objectives of America against the Islamic Revolution, the aims and goals of the moderate groups come also into focus. Due to the fast growth, stormy speed and effective techniques employed by the forces of the Islamic Revolution to counter the imperialist rule, these groups also, like their masters, were not able to analyze fully and comprehensively the course of events. They had to follow in an opportunist fashion the line of the revolutionary leaders and the people unwillingly in order to hide their faces, and seized upon occasional opportunities in doing so. The revolution's speedy onward move and these elements' pseudo-popularity were major factors in concealing their real nature, but due to the righteousness of the Islamic revolution and the incompatibility of truth and falsehood their filthy roles were gradually exposed.

The characteristic traits of opportunism, attempt to secure individual benefits and inability to comprehend the situation at the early stages

of the Revolution prevented these elements from taking a united stand against the Islamic Revolution. A group of them which had occupied sensitive positions and had access to possibilities for materializing its ideals, and another group hoping to occupy positions in order to be able to impose its ideas, still refrained from expressing their heart-felt opinions. But the incompatibility of their intentions with those of the nation which meant to establish the rule of Islam and was demonstrated by the formation of the Assembly of Experts, the writing down of the constitution and the implementation of Islamic precepts, led to the exposure of their real ugly faces. One group began to openly fight the Islamic Revolution, another began to undermine the Revolutionary inspirations by means placed at their disposal by the revolution itself, while some elements set upon building political organizations in a bid to pave the way for the fall of the Islamic Revolution, and expand ties with America as the major topic of their programs.

C. I. A. 's efforts in the meantime, were directed at preparing a comprehensive analytical report on the Iranian situation, determining a policy on the basis of the prepared analysis, and the implementation method for the policy. Through its agents in the army, ministries and offices and throughout individuals engaged in commercial activities, the C. I. A. gave complete priority to information-collection on all internal trends and required issues of interest, then, as summarized below, put forth the policy and its implementation method:

1- The policy of the C. I. A. vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution:

At the level of the government and with regard to the elements that were effective in Iran the U. S. A. found itself facing two different forces: first, the leadership of the Revolution and its followers and supporters; second, a wide spectrum of moderates, each of whom was directed by a different authority or was able to exercise its power effectively. The Imam's unwavering resolution to enforce the Islamic laws and establish the Sovereignty of the Quran in the society and to combat uncompromisingly all the phenomena of infidelity, right from the West up to East and their agents, forced the U. S. A. to realize that the implementation of the Imam's policy meant a fatal death-blow to the hopes of imperialism, which was trying to revive its hold on the resources of the country. America decided to fight this policy by making use of all its agents for destroying and overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Due to the loss of its active and efficient agents, America's first aim was to cultivate, bring up and install a force loyal to it, which could also have military power (The U. S. A. was mistaken because there were no such elements in the army). In this period, with the purpose of realizing the desired objective America as a first step sought to form and direct a coalition consisting of all the potential heads of various political liberal groups, the moderate religious personalities, the army officers inclined towards the West, the chiefs of tribes and different national groups for getting hold of the Provisional Government, so that ground was prepared to launch the actual programme. Naturally, in case this programme was implemented, the elements instrumental in its realization were not to be set aside, but were to be used

for promoting the policies and interests of the regime. The reason why the U. S. A. was not contented to bring to power the moderate elements was that it was forced to submit to the pressures brought about by the Imam's policy. Anyhow, America wished to install a regime that could be fully at its command. At the same time the U. S. A. lost no time in making use of all anti-revolutionary elements including the SAVAK men, Bakhtiyar, the monarchists and all those factions that openly opposed the Islamic Revolution from its very inception. As in this collection we want to devote especial attention to the moderates, we refrain from making further reference to other groups. The documents concerning them have been published in the book No.38 of this series.

2- Application of the policy line:

According to the C. I. A. 's resolution to pursue the formation of a coalition of the liberal politicians, the moderate clerics and all other moderate elements, it was, however, decided that it was shariat Madari who could help accelerate this process. The reason to select Shariat Madari as the axis of this alliance was that he possessed the qualifications of a religious authority as a marja, and in that capacity due to his credibility among the Muslim masses he could appeal them and that his personality could be instrumental in making such a coalition work. The C. I. A. did not intend to form such a coalition through merging together different constituent groups and individuals, but wished to use each of them as a separate channel for reaching the primary target of its programme. For instance, it wanted to bring out a daily paper by means of Khusrow Qashqai and Madani with the purpose of paving the ground for the desired cultural and propaganda activities; through the liberation movement (Nahzat-e Azadi) and the Provisional Government, efforts could be made to nullify and invalidate the political resolutions that would be made on the basis of the policy of the Imam; with the help of the Muslim People's Party and the leadership of Shariat Madari it aimed at starting a newspaper for giving a religious colour by his political presence to such a coalition. These programmes were duly approved by the C. I. A. Apart from solving the formal differences of various groups, this programme proved to be effective in pursuing and directing the desired policy (formation of a coalition), and served as a factor in co-ordinating them (the desired contacts between the National Front, Khusrow Qashqai etc. and Shariat Madari, as exposed by the documents, provide us an account of the first steps taken to attain this objective).

The results obtained by the C. I. A. in its efforts to realize its objectives are fully made explicit in the following documents. At the end the names of those elements are enumerated who were either members of the C. I. A. or somehow provided the C. I. A. with necessary information. The documents themselves speak volumes of their treachery and shamelessness.

The Liberation Movement:

Bahram Bahramiyan: a member of the high command of the liberation movement received salary from the C. I. A. since 1356 (1977)

Abbas Amir Intizam: an eminent leader of the Liberation Movement a C. I. A. agent from the beginning of the fifth decade of the Shamsi calendar (In a document included in this collection a C. I. A. officer, George tells the director of the C. I. A. that Amir Intizam helped him in the beginning of 1349. (1970); worked as a contact between the C. I. A. and the Bazargan government for the exchange of information.

The Nationalist Groups:

Sam Sanjabi: He was in contact with the C. I. A. at San Fransisco. By virtue of being the son of Karim Sanjabi his services were used by the C. I. A. to remain in contact with the leadership of the Nationalist front.

Khusrow Qashqai: An agent of the C. I. A. with a long record of service; his motive in co-operating with the C. I. A. was to secure assurance of financial and political support (by the C. I. A.) for pursuing its objectives vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic.

Rahmatullah Muqaddam Maraghi: a C. I. A. agent since 1349 (1970), a very old and intimate friend of the C. I. A. station at Tehran.

Hasan Nazih: a C. I. A. agent (whose record of relations with the C. I. A. goes back to the pre-revolution days).

For having full information regarding the C. I. A. connection of the moderate religious elements under the leadership of Shariat Madari refer to the documents concerning the latter.

Muslim Students, following
the Line of the Imam.

Autumn, 1364/1985.

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE
MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE

CABLES AND REPORTS NO. TEHRAN 53.59, TEHRAN
54050, TEHRAN 54167, INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED
"COMMENTS OF MOQADDAM-MARAGHEH ON",
TEHRAN 43996, INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED
"EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH",
INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED "POLITICAL ACTIVITY
AND", INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED
"MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL",
TEHRAN 53879 WERE THE LAST COPIES OF THEIR
ORIGINAL TEXTS AND THUS, VERY DULL IN COLOR;
THEREFORE, THEIR IN-BOOKS PRINTING AND
PHOTOGRAPHING WERE NOT FAVORABLY POSSIBLE. FOR
THIS REASON, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE
RE-TYPED.

The persons mentioned below contacted Shariat Madari on behalf of the
U. S. embassy and the C. I. A. or had passed reports (about him):

1. Frank Baruz

Occupation: The chairman of the Iran-American Chamber of Commerce.

Following a meeting with Shariat Madari, Baruz reported to emb-
assy that Shariat Madari told him that as he could not receive confirmed
information, he felt that he was not prepared to deal with the present
situation. The Charge d'Affairs took this statement of Shariat Madari as
an implicit invitation to the U. S. administration for supplying him with
the desired news and information to enable him to participate in the
course of events.

The C. I. A. headquarters, as a result of these reports, asked the
U. S. administration to provide the needed information to Shariat
Madari and work for establishing the proper channels in order to sup-
ply the information.

At the beginning they had decided to ask Baruz, provided he too
agreed, to tell Shariat Madari to pinpoint an intermediary of his confi-
dence (with English as his second language) and receive informations
through him, so that Baruz could give an end to his role after having
prepared the preliminaries.

Baruz was of the view that the embassy should encourage Shariat
Madari's moderate views, so that he might have confidence that he en-
joyed the approval of the U. S. government with regard to his faith in
"the necessity of retaining the foreign trade-relations of Iran". In
Shariat Madari's support, Baruz visualized the best prospects of carry-
ing on trade with Iran.

In view of the limitation of his vision regarding Shariat Madari,
which covered only a minor portion of its goal, the C. I. A. demanded
that these contacts should remain within the confines of the activities
of the embassy, and ruled out the possibilities of cooperating with
Baruz and discarded him without considering him as a potential channel.

2. Real Name: Not known.

Code Name: S. D. Valid.

Occupation: Probably he was a businessman and owned some estate
and property. He was one of the permanent spies of the
C. I. A. in the oil business, and was in contact with the
leaders of the anti-revolutionary organizations, includ-
ing Forouhar and Ali Islami among the leaders of the
Muslim Peoples Party and some of the fugitive chiefs of
the Torkaman tribes of the Mazandaran province, and
Khuzistan, and was active in making effective use of the

spying devices (advancing these activities by means of telecommunication links - receiving long-distance radio messages - which were installed for the U. S. government secretly, a mention of which is made in the document of Aban 7, 1358 (October 29, 1979), in the context of the same spy).

After knowing the views of Baruz, it was decided that S. D. Valid, who had to go to Qum on the occasion of the death anniversary of his father, would contact Shariat Madari. The main purpose of this meeting was to know the views and reactions of Shariat Madari through the tenor of his speech and the kind of reception he accorded to Valid, in order to decide the usefulness of Valid's services in the future.

In Ordibehesht (April) Valid met Shariat Madari in Qum and informed him that he had brought a goodwill message from Shariat Madari's Iranian and American friends and well-wishers in America for him. Shariat Madari was very happy to receive this message through Valid. After some conversation and explaining his position, Shariat Madari reiterated his invitation to Valid by saying, 'come once, come twice, come as many times as you wish to', and the meeting concluded. After this visit of Valid, the C. I. A. reached the conclusion that Valid's report completely corresponded with earlier reports saying that Shariat Madari was possibly interested in establishing a common channel with America.

On Ordibehesht 31 (May 21) the station decided to send Valid to Qum for ascertaining the position of Shariat Madari regarding his desire to establish (intelligence) contacts with the C. I. A.. This meeting took place on the morning of Khurdad 5 (June 26). Valid was surprised to see the eagerness and warmth with which he was received. After conveying to him the regards of the American friends and saying that they knew what role he could play in the political arena of Iran, Valid asked him that in view of the desire of his American friends he should propose the name of a person with whom they might discuss these matters. Shariat Madari told him that his political party was in need of help and he asked Valid to talk to the leaders of the party and join it. Valid told him that he also had an intention of joining the party but proposed that these contacts should better be formed through a person in whom he had complete trust and that he should be sure that these matters would be kept secret. Shariat Madari gave him the name of his son Hassan, and asked him to take to Hassan whomsoever he wanted. During his visit to the station, Valid told them that Shariat Madari knew very well what sort of relationship was going to be formed and that the American friends were no other than the U. S. government.

After that Valid went to Hassan and told him what had happened between his father and himself. During this meeting Hassan gave him his Tehran address and telephone number, and asked him to contact him along with or without the friends whenever he liked. The acting chief of the Tehran Station, Glegoroff, asked Valid to meet Hassan, but at

the same time to make some excuses, so that the swiftness of the events could be slowed for a while. In the meantime, it was also decided that Valid should join the Muslim Peoples' Party. The C. I. A. remarked that Valid had performed a great task and had established an independent and an apparently extremely confidential channel with Shariat Madari for the C. I. A.

On Khurdad 20 (June 10), Glegoroff met Hassan in the capacity of a diplomat related to the U. S. Embassy. Valid introduced them to each other and acted as an interpreter. In the meantime, it was decided that another meeting between Hassan and Valid would be arranged on Khurdad 22 (June 12) to decide the future course of action by America in this regard.

No other documents are available in connection with this meeting and the steps taken by Valid in the matter of Shariat Madari. Only one document is present in this section, according to which Valid, after he had met the eminent members of the Torkaman tribes of Gunabad region, reported to the U. S. Embassy that these tribes had an intention of launching an armed struggle, but Shariat Madari sent them word, not to start the armed resistance yet.

The point is worthy of being mentioned here that other members of the C. I. A., who were participating in the Shariat Madari drama, did not possess any knowledge of the remaining channels and links.

3. Real Name: Brigadier General Farazian.

Code Name: S. D. Janus/13.

Occupation: A high ranking officer of the Savak.

4. Real Name: Murtaza Musavi.

Occupation: Director and manager of Piranco Ltd.

Before the Revolution, Farazian had official contacts with the C. I. A. Station, and after the Revolution he retained these contacts through his occasional visits and telephone calls. During one of his early visits, after the Revolution, he introduced Musavi to one of the officials of the station, as a tradesman who had relations with Shariat Madari.

In the document dated Ordibehesht 29 (May 10), the C. I. A. has made a reference to the problem concerning Baruz and Valid in the matters of Shariat Madari, and has made an assessment of the actions taken by Farazian, in response to the desire expressed by Shariat Madari for the formation of contacts with the U. S. Government, and it is said that this was done by one of the subordinates of Shariat Madari.

Following the decision of the C. I. A. for the formation of a secure and safe channel with Shariat Madari and about certain other matters

which have been mentioned earlier, Farazian was also considered as a possible channel. But after reviewing the danger of passing the reports through an ex-SAVAK officer (Farazian) and his relationship with Shariat Madari in view of the sensitivity of the society towards the relationship between Shariat Madari and an ex-SAVAK official and the possibility of being betrayed any time, the C. I. A. was right in rejecting Farazian.

In order to make a decision on the establishment of contacts with Shariat Madari, it was necessary for the C. I. A. to have sufficient information about all quarters of Iran with the potential and actual participation of Shariat Madari in these affairs in order to support him as someone who could be useful for them in the future and who could protect American interests in Iran. Shariat Madari's political party (the Muslim Peoples' Party) became the object of the C. I. A. 's attention as a sure way of reaching the desired goals and a means of obtaining information. Farazian was again estimated by them as a useful person for the purpose of maintaining contacts and collecting information from this party.

For the sake of fulfilling his own individual and political ambitions, and in his desire for gaining Shariat Madari's support for the U. S. Farazian pursued his aims of becoming the chief of the future set up that was to be constituted under Shariat Madari's rule. He promptly made arrangements for the meeting between the C. I. A. and Shariat Madari and other like-minded persons, and in order to felicitate the task and clear the way for making contacts with Shariat Madari and his associates, he chose Musavi, who had the same views as himself, and like himself was an ardent supporter of Shariat Madari.

During a telephone conversation with Farazian and in a note that he sent to the officials at the Tehran Station through Musavi, Musavi stated that the funds should be collected from the wealthy officers of the SAVAK who had fled to other countries. Musavi and Farazian, both of them believed that Shariat Madari should welcome their support, provided that an active and absolutely safe channel was established. He also believed that Shariat Madari would also agree to a direct meeting.

On Ordibehesht 31 (May 21), the C. I. A. gave the approval to gather information about the Muslim Peoples' Party via Farazian and asked Farazian to ascertain whether Shariat Madari would give permission for the establishment of such a channel. During the meeting on Khرداد 7 (May 28), with the officials of the C. I. A. Farazian told them that he had made contacts with the leaders of the Muslim Peoples' Party for the second time, and they had approved the idea of working with the Americans, and added that, in case of their approval, a group of selected members of the Muslim Peoples' Party would visit Qum to discuss the matters with Shariat Madari in order to secure his approval or disapproval. Farazian further added that the supporters of Shariat Madari maintained that they were in need of economic and political assistance since they were attempting to send their representatives to the Majlis.

Glegoroff (a C. I. A. station officers) says that before launching any operations, it is necessary to obtain some fully reliable information, then calls on Farazian to collect informations on election, and the quality of the forces.

According to a report, on Khرداد 16th (June 6) C. I. A. headquarters informs the Tehran-based station that because of Shariat Madari's inclination towards the establishment of contact through his son, it has come to conclude that they are acting in a quicker-than-necessary-pace with regards to the political future of Iran. Besides, we are making our reserve forces capable of losing control over the situation, forces who despite sharing the same interests with us, might have different outlooks on how these interests could be better protected and accomplished. In this vein, the C. I. A. station in Tehran is held responsible for Farazian, arguing that it is better not to use him as a channel of contact for Shariat Madari and instead retain him as reserve reporting source on the political scene and the intelligence organization, because as a political channel he can grow more dangerous.

During his telephone conversation on Khرداد 17 (June 7) Farazian told Glegoroff that Musavi had gone to Qum and visited Shariat Madari, and Shariat Madari had completely agreed with the recommendations of Musavi and other leaders of the (M. P. P.) Muslim Peoples' Party saying that for exploring the chances of gaining support from the U. S. government, contacts should be made with the latter. After expressing his approval, which was conditional upon two things, Shariat Madari said that he promised that in return for the money that was to be paid to him he was ready to do everything that the U. S. government asked him to do. Shariat Madari asked Musavi to convince the Americans that the sum of \$5 million (the same amount that was reported by Farazian to the C. I. A.) would suffice for the purposes of... the actual expenditure required would be several times more than this amount. In the end of the conversation, Farazian emphatically told him that Shariat Madari wanted to get a decisive answer as to whether the U. S. government would support him or not, and Glegoroff tried to explain to him that such important decisions were usually taken after long deliberations and extended co-operation.

During another telephone conversation with Farazian on Khرداد 19 (June 9), Glegoroff remained firm on his earlier stand of delaying the economic assistance to Shariat Madari until getting complete information, and emphasized the need for perfect understanding. But he agreed to supply him with the information. Farazian expressed his displeasure at this, and told him that Shariat Madari's aims were quite clear, and that there was no need to waste more time in making further estimations, and that Shariat Madari needed money for winning more followers, so that those funds might be distributed among deserving persons and their loyalties be assured. He said that these funds would be utilized to meet the additional expenses of the party. In the end, Farazian told him that it would be beneficial for them if Shariat Madari entered the field with... enough... to fight against Khomeini. It was decided that Farazian would inform Musavi about the C. I. A. decision.

On Tir 25 (July 15) Musavi and Farazian had a meeting with Ahern (the C. I. A. director of the Tehran station) for two hours. During this meeting they insisted that a C. I. A. official should talk directly to Shariat Madari. Regarding the question asked by the director of the station at Tehran as to how the funds would be utilized, Musavi answered that although in the beginning, when he asked for money, Shariat Madari had thought of using it for purchasing arms for equipping the Azerbaijanians living in Tehran but 'now', he said 'the situation is a little changed'.

The meeting which took place between Ahern and Farazian and Musavi in Mordad (August), suggests the following:

Farazian again spoke about the formation of direct contact with Shariat Madari, and the C. I. A. official said that the headquarters was aware of the benefits of direct contacts but Charge d'Affairs found it difficult to find some body whose associations with the SAVAK might not hinder this contact. Farazian remarked that the C. I. A. could contact Ayatullah Zanjani, as Zanjani was the counterpart of the personality of Shariat Madari. He added that though Zanjani could not speak English, his son Farid, who was at that time in Tehran, could be used as an interpreter.

During the contacts and meetings that followed the visit of Mordad (August) and the proposal made about Zanjani, the C. I. A., Musavi and Farazian were making plans for arranging a meeting with Zanjani. During the meeting on Mehr 22 (October 14), Farazian said that Musavi had gone to Qum according to their programme, and had obtained Shariat Madari's consent for the meeting with Zanjani. He had also conveyed this message to Zanjani.

Real Name: Manuchehr Neikpur.

Code Name: S. D. Bip.

According to his own claims, this person had an old relationship with Shariat Madari by virtue of the high position of his family and their financial resources. His last personal meeting with Shariat Madari had taken place in the year 57 (1978), details of which appeared in the newspapers of Ordibehesht 18 (May 2). During his conversation of Shahriwar 20 (September 11) with the officer in-charge of the base in Philadelphia, Neikpur informed him about one Ali Akbar Shahla, who owned a small company which dealt in imported glass ware. Neikpur told him that that person was from the upper class and enjoyed Shariat Madari's confidence. He added that while he was in Iran he used to regularly visit Shariat Madari every week. Neikpur told the C. I. A. official that he was ready to arrange a meeting with Shahla. The C. I. A. headquarters asked the Philadelphia base not to do anything towards making contacts with the friend of Neikpur, but wished to acquire knowledge through him about Shariat Madari.

As it has been mentioned in the section concerning the Farazian

and Musavi connection with the C. I. A., the C. I. A. could make contacts with Ayatullah Zanjani as Shariat Madari's counterpart. In the wake of this incident the C. I. A. made efforts first to obtain his records, and then to prepare an intelligence report about the nature and extent of the relationship between the two.

After receiving several reports and coming to know the relevant views, the C. I. A. headquarters sent a message to the Tehran station stating that the contents of the file did not verify the report of a close relationship between Zanjani and Shariat Madari, but it did not rule out its possibility either, and it agreed to establish contacts with Zanjani for the sake of gathering information about Shariat Madari and the Muslim Peoples' Party through his source.

In pursuance of the request made by the station to the headquarters for receiving the records concerning Zanjani and his son Muhammad Saeed Farid Zanjani, which were relevant to the course under consideration, were sent.

Ayatullah Haj Agha Reza Zanjani, popularly known as Reza Zanjani and famous as Mulla Sayyed Reza Zanjani, whose file number was 8054 (?) - 01 and whose code identity was 'A' (the document bearing the code name of Zanjani could not be traced), was an old and intimate friend of S. D. Rup/1, the source at Tehran (an ex-army commander), who was responsible for the activities of the station. Zanjani had wide contacts throughout Iran among political dissidents and well known persons, who were not members of any organization and who included the leaders of the bazar who were positively opposed to the government. . . And after this, there are references to Farid's past record.

In one of the documents, Farazian told the official at the Tehran station that Saeed Farid, the son of Ayatullah Zanjani, in case he was found to be ready and capable of doing the job, might be considered to be used as the person responsible for keeping a watch on Shariat Madari's financial as well as public relations affairs. In another meeting, Musavi and Farazian, after suggesting a meeting with Zanjani, recommended Farid's name as an interpreter. Farid's records were asked to be presented for perusal.

America and the Moderates:

After reviewing the documents concerning the agents and spies in contact with the activities of Shariat Madari, it seems necessary to describe the American view and its aims regarding this issue. In one of the documents the director of the C. I. A. base in Tehran elaborates his programme of action in the following words:

"I wish to express my views that since the army is undergoing a period of weakness it is not possible for us to make any attempt in connection with our work at this stage. What is to be done, and what we are pursuing at present, is meant to introduce and explain our proposed

coalition that can be constituted by the political liberals, the moderate spiritual personalities and the officers of the army with the western inclination, and to secure their support in this matter. The person who more than others can accelerate the formation of this coalition is Ayatullah Shariat Madari".

In the beginning of the C. I. A. contact with Shariat Madari, the director of the base, in one of the later documents, after pointing out that the door of securing the support of Shariat Madari and his party is open, says that the main objective in this matter, as Khomeini alleges, will be to create disruption in the Islamic Movement and to weaken it so that men of ideas can assert themselves in a more reasonable way. In response to this suggestion of its base the C. I. A. headquarters proposes a correction of the view by pointing out that mere disruption is not enough, but it is to be aimed at forming a pro-American government. It is said: "The objective of our political activity is to bring to power a government that agrees to protect the interests of the U. S. A. For our acceptance of Shariat Madari's party as one of the means of attaining this objective it is essential to determine the extent of his power and influence. For the purpose of bringing about such a government which could help in expanding the American influence it was necessary to bring to power the moderate forces existing in the society. With the view that for the installation of such a government a military force was an essential pre-requisite, the C. I. A. gave top priority to the formation of some kind of dependable organizations that included army personnel and armed groups which were of the same view. This step was considered to be essential in realizing the ultimate ends of the U. S. A. The headquarters seeks from its Tehran base a clarification regarding the support of the armed groups and an estimation of their leanings towards the moves made by Shariat Madari. Of course, before materializing the efforts of forming such organizations, strengthening the foundations of a moderate government was considered to be necessary for securing the support of the masses and having a popular base among them. The C. I. A. issued the following directive in this connection:

"The best way of reaching the target of installing a moderate government enjoying the people's support would be that it should be under the leadership of either a spiritual head or a spiritual society that ought to be powerful enough for maintaining law and order".

America and Shariat Madari:

Keeping in view the general strategy of America and the C. I. A. vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution, the C. I. A. sought to execute its tactics while maintaining the maximum care for the security and intelligence sides of its strategy plan.

After the meeting between Baruz and Shariat Madari and his inability to give confirmed information about the situation, it was treated by the government of America as another invitation of co-operation

on his behalf. In addition to this, the demonstrations in Tabriz protesting against the article published in the Daily Ittila'at regarding the Muslim People's Democratic Party were mistakenly compared with the demonstrations against the article in the Daily Kayhan concerning the Imam in the month of Mehr 1356 (October 1977), and were regarded as a measure of Shariat Madari's increasing popularity. The most important of all, the general strategy of America, which has been expounded earlier, compelled the C. I. A. to execute its plan in this matter. In the first place, the C. I. A. station strongly recommended Shariat Madari's request for getting relevant information from the American government and took the necessary steps for conveying such information to him.

After the preliminary steps were taken, some of the C. I. A. agents brought the reports of Shariat Madari's desire for establishing stronger and wider bilateral relations including his request for having money at his disposal to initiate the functioning of organizations that could operate as a politico-military force all over the country. The C. I. A. came face to face with the main problems, which it had to resolve. The problems may be delineated as follows:

1- Need to be fully satisfied that the reported moves and gestures made on behalf of Shariat Madari were the same as the sources reported. (This matter was resolved to some extent through different channels established with Shariat Madari).

2- The difficulties concerning direct contact with him and in taking steps to find out a middleman that could indirectly convey their views to Shariat Madari and his group to the C. I. A. (Hassan Shariat Madari is introduced by his father to Valid so that he is introduced to the C. I. A. (the American friends). The name of Ayatullah Zanjani is also suggested to the C. I. A. by Musavi and Farazian in this connection. As far as the documents indicate, the preliminary steps of establishing contact and receiving information in this matter had been taken).

3- The steps to be taken for spreading a network of political and even military bases which were to support Shariat Madari, so that through its special characteristics the Muslim People's Party could attract the full attention of America. (Valid's membership in this party and the close relation of Musavi and Farazian with the leaders of this party were the steps for realizing this end).

4- In the event that successful results were attained in the different aspects mentioned above and summing up all of the information gained at the prior stages, the problems of co-ordination and programming for placing all the possible means at the disposal of Shariat Madari and his group by America for the purpose of overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran was to be solved. (That America turned down the unambiguous request of its sources to grant financial aid to Shariat Madari was because of two reasons: firstly, the preliminary steps had not been completed by them; secondly, it required some time to fully

and comprehensively investigate the general conditions in Iran and the fabrics of the opposition groups. The need for marking time, of course, does not mean that the U. S. A. had postponed its proposed steps. The documents reveal that simultaneous with these plans concerning Shariat Madari the C. I. A. continued to explore the possibilities of realizing its objectives through Khusrow Qashqai and Maraghei etc.

Shariat Madari:

The Past Record:

In the books about the moderates, the material concerning Shariat Madari's relations with the SAVAK and the Shah's court has been published. A document dated Ordibehesht (May 8), has recorded these relations so far as they were in the knowledge of America. There are several reports belonging to the year 1345 (1966) which tell us that Shariat Madari had comparatively good relations, and his name has been on the list of the salaried persons working for the SAVAK. As an evidence of the last claim, in a report dated Aban 1350 (November 1971) he is mentioned as the head of a religious centre at Qum drawing salaries from the Prime Ministry and the SAVAK. In another report dated 1357 (1978), Shariat Madari is mentioned as one of the most eminent clerics cooperating with the SAVAK to form a religious organization. In another one it is reported in the year 1357 (1978) that he is an eminent religious personality who through the SAVAK... will be...

The Views and Activities:

Taking note of such a record, Shariat Madari's views regarding the Imam and the Islamic Republic are easy to be identified. Shariat Madari, in response to Valid's request concerning the American friends' eagerness to know his position with regard to the existing problems, says that they should read the text of his telegram to Shaykh Muhammad Khaqani, sent in the beginning of Ordibehesht (May), that is the period when Shaykh Muhammad warned him that if the activities of the committee of that region were not put under his control he would leave Iran. Undoubtedly this message was sent to him during the days when the Imam and Ayatullah Taleghani wanted him not to leave Iran. This period coincides with his intention of visiting Qum for holding discussions. Shariat Madari advised him not to leave Abadan, even for a visit to Qum, for the affairs of the state needed him to be in Abadan. (There is no doubt that by this advice, Shariat Madari wanted to create another zone of trouble for the Islamic Republic with the purpose of staging a confrontation with the Imam in Khuzistan). His posture vis-a-vis the position of the Imam and the Islamic Republic in other matters was grounded in his theoretical and practical ambition of replacing the Imam as a force and bringing about a system and a political current which could serve to satisfy his lust for political power and his personal interests. This was not possible except by bringing to power the pro-American groups and the functionaries of the ex-regime, a majority of whom were the agents of the C. I. A., the SAVAK and the supporters of the monarchy

and friends of America. He himself, on the basis of these views, took steps to establish contacts with the C. I. A. with the full knowledge of the kinds of persons whom he was contacting, he expressed his liking for those connections and made requests to receive money from them.

Shariat Madari, after arranging a few meetings with the C. I. A. agents, made his intention precisely known to them, that his motive was not confined to receiving informations and reports from America only. (Shariat Madari's purpose for securing information regarding the then current affairs in Iran was to adopt a correct attitude towards America. He was anxious not to take a position that was not in conformity with the American view of Iran). He made a request through Musavi for the money, for in the beginning he wanted to use it for arming the people of Azarbaijan, living in Tehran, so that through them he could translate his objective into action whenever a favourable situation arose. Afterwards, in his own words, when he had a better perception of the problems, he resolved to make use of this money for the formation of a country-wide organization in Iran. He even sought help from the American elements in the planning and integrating the organizational activities of the Muslim Peoples' Party. With attention to the risks involved in such connections, Shariat Madari requested to keep them strictly secret for the sake of the security of the concerned parties. This is itself an indication of his exact awareness of what he wanted to do and what kind of connections he pursued.

In the sphere of the coordination of anti-revolutionary united front and the actualization of the provisional American strategy for making effective the activities of the moderates, either under the leadership, or with the support of moderate clerics, Shariat Madari saw to it that preliminary contacts were established, a policy of cooperation with the National Front, Muqadam, Naziyeh and Khusrow Qashai was implemented, and the necessary steps were taken for this purpose.

23 Oct 79

SECRET 222006Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 537156.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53910
B. TEHRAN 54454
C. TEHRAN 54513

EMJ

1. REGRET DELAY RESPONDING.
2. LWSURF IS INDICATOR USED FOR INFORMAL CHANNEL DIRECTLY BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STATION AND THE DCI. LETTERS ARE TO BE POUCHED ADDRESSED TO DCS IN PSEUDO IDEN SIGNED IN PSEUDONYM, AND SHOULD CARRY LWSURF INDICATOR BOTH ON OUTSIDE OF ENVELOPE AND ON LETTER ITSELF.
3. LWSURF LETTERS SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN TWO TYPEWRITTEN PAGES IN LENGTH, AND SHOULD NOT CONTAIN ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS OR REQUESTS. (THESE SHOULD BE COVERED IN NORMAL STAFF CORRESPONDENCE.)
4. GENERALLY LWSURF LETTERS CONTAIN A PARAGRAPH COVERING THE BIG PICTURE (POLITICAL ATMOSPHERICS), FOLLOWED BY OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, PERSONNEL, PROBLEMS, ETC.
5. LWSURF LETTERS MAY BE SENT AT ANY TIME, BUT THE CURRENT SCHEDULE CALLS FOR SUBMISSIONS EVERY SIX MONTHS. LETTERS FOR NE STATION CHIEFS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED IN NOVEMBER AND MAY.
6. NO FILE. RVW 220CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#2005

Edward J. Ganin

PTJ

29 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward J. Ganin

FROM : Donald C. Paquin
Chief of Station, Tehran

SUBJECT : LWSURF - Official Informal

Dear Edward,

It is four months since I met you as I prepared to leave for Tehran. The main impression of Iranian politics I have acquired in that period is that inconclusive elbowing and maneuvering for position are likely to continue for quite a while. The analysts tend to look at every development here as hastening (or postponing, as the case may be) an inevitable, decisive confrontation which will fairly soon either consolidate theocratic control or lead to its replacement by something else. I am more inclined to see the gradual erosion of Khomeini's personal authority as opening a period of disorderly -- sometimes violent -- competition, with no single contender possessing either enough guns or enough programatic appeal to overcome the opposition. Things could be very different if the military chose sides, but they are still thoroughly intimidated. Discipline is poor, professional elan practically nonexistent, and no prospective leaders have yet emerged who look as if they can restore institutional pride.

Khomeini has stumbled badly in Kurdistan, and the summary executions of Kurdish dissidents will not be forgotten. The government is now -- belatedly -- negotiating with the Kurds, but the pattern of Qom's relations with the ethnic minorities has already been set.

For all the growing dissatisfaction with the local brand of Islamic government, the radical left seems not to be profiting much -- mutually reinforcing anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments at all levels of society make it difficult for the Communists to develop mass appeal or to penetrate the Army. There is, nevertheless, substantial communist influence in the universities and in the oil fields. If oil-financed imports are not enough to prevent a disastrous winter, economic distress will probably lead to rapid growth in Communist strength.

SECRET

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 DECL REVW ON 29 Oct 99
 DERIVED FROM D9c.1.

SECRET

CITE TEHRAN 52755 APR 23 1979
TO: DIRECTOR, UNINTEL RYBAT
REF: EMBASSY, TEHRAN 4253

1. AGOS HAD LONG DISCUSSION 23 APRIL WITH CHARGE ABOUT EARLIER IN DAY FROM AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN AND LONG-TIME RESIDENT OF IRAN (REF). ALTHOUGH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME IN REF, THE AMERICAN IS MR. FRANK B. BURROWS, PRESIDENT OF IRAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. BURROWS' ROLE IN THIS AND RELATED MATTERS FOR STAYABILITY IN IRAN AS VERY DELICATE MATTERS, AND ASKED US NOT TO REPORT NAME.

2. PURPOSELY OMITTED FROM REF. ACCORDING TO CHARGE, WAS SHARIATMADARI'S COMPLAINT TO THE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTOR THAT SHARIATMADARI OCCASIONALLY FELT POORLY PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES BECAUSE HE WAS NOT ALWAYS GETTING "GOOD INFORMATION". HE ALLEGEDLY REFERRED TO RUMORS THAT RECENT TURMOIL IN KURDISTAN HAS BEEN FOMENTED BY U.S.-EDUCATED STUDENTS--RECENT RETURNERS FROM THE STATES. HOW TO EVALUATE THESE REPORTS, SHARIATMADARI ASKED? HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT PEOPLE AROUND HIM WERE PROBABLY TRYING TO USE HIM FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES AND THAT WITHOUT CONTINUED FLOW OF THE FACTS, HE WAS POORLY EQUIPPED TO RESPOND. CHARGE SAID HE INTERPRETED THIS AS THINLY VEILED INVITATION FOR SHARIATMADARI TO PROVIDE HIM WITH INFO AND KEEP HIM INFORMED. IN CHARGE'S OPINION, SHARIATMADARI COULD HAVE EXPECTED THAT HIS AMERICAN INTERLOCUTOR WOULD REPORT RESULTS OF MEETING TO EMBASSY.

3. AS NO WILL HAVE BEEN SEEN, SHARIATMADARI ALONG WITH TALEGHANI AND SENIOR AYATOLLAH IN KHUZESTAN, KHAQANI, ARE DOING MORE STANCE BETWEEN THEM. KHUZESTAN, KHAQANI, ARE DOING MORE SUCCESS. SHARIATMADARI'S POPULARITY IS APPARENTLY DECREASING. DEMONSTRATORS IN TABRIZ 23 APRIL PROTESTED AGAINST RECENT ETTEFAQ SINGLE WRITTEN BY PRO-KHOMAYNI MULLAH WHICH OPPOSED CREATION OF KHOMAYNI MULLAH

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 52755 APR 23 1979
SHARIATMADARI'S MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY OF IRAN PRO-TESTORS APPARENTLY INSISTED THAT ANYONE INSULTING SHARIATMADARI SHOULD BE TRIED IN ISLAMIC COURT. THIS IS ALL TO REMINISCENT OF THE CLUMSY JANUARY 1978 NEWSPAPER ATTACK ON KHOMAYNI, THE SPARK WHICH SET LOOSE THE FORCES WHICH ULTIMATELY TOPPLED SHAN CURRENT ISLAMIC REGIME WAS ITS OWN SHARE OF HAM-HANDED ASSISTANTS.

4. RECALL THAT SOME THOUGHT WAS GIVEN TO CONTRACTING SHARIATMADARI AT THE TIME STATION RECEIVED THE LINK TO SDFORGIVE/PLS PROVIDE OPS SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CONTACTS, DIRECT OR OTHERWISE, PL STATION MAY HAVE HAD WITH SHARIATMADARI. ACCORDING TO PRESH PLANNING LEAVE THE COUNTRY SOON ON VISIT TO EGYPT (THIS MAY BE GARBLE SINCE IT SEEMS UNLIKELY PDL WOULD WANT KEY FIGURE TO ABSENT HIMSELF AT THIS TIME).

5. SDVALID/PLANNING TO GO TO BOM 29 APRIL FOR COMMEMORATION FATHER'S DEATH. AND HE HAD AGREED TO CALL ON SHARIATMADARI FOR US AND "MISSION" TO SERVE HIM WELL. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE V/PL AS WE ARE NOT SURE V/PL COULD HANDLE IT. BELIEVE V/PL'S REPORT OF SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION HE HAS WITH SHARIATMADARI AND WELCOME THIS RECEIVES WILL GIVE SOME CLUE AS TO V/PL'S POSSIBLE FUTURE UTILITY THIS ROLE.

6. IREQ TRACES BURROWS.
7. FILE DEFER. RW 24 APR 79 DRV DSC J. ALL SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET 020157Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 430253

TO: TEHRAN

UNMINTED RYBAT

REF: TEHRAN 52709

2 MAY 79 18 54z

1. HQS HAS NO RECORD OF ANY CONTACT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS INTEL REPORTS, DATING FROM 1966, WHICH GENERALLY SHOWED HIM TO HAVE FAIRLY DECENT RELATIONS WITH THE SHAH AND ALSO TO BE ON SAVAK'S PAYROLL. AS EXAMPLES OF THE LATTER A NOV 1978 REPORT NAMED HIM AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE QOM RELIGIOUS CENTER WHOSE RECEIVED FUNDS FROM THE PRIME MINISTRY AND SAVAK. A 1971 REPORT NAMED SHARIAT-MADARI AS ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO WAS WORKING WITH SAVAK TO FORM A RELIGIOUS CORPS. A 1979 REPORT SAID HE WAS A MAJOR RELIGIOUS FIGURE BEING PAID BY SAVAK. ASSUME STATION HAS RECEIVED SUFFICIENT BACKGROUND AND BIO FROM EMBASSY, BUT IF NOT PLEASE ADVISE AND HQS WILL FORWARD.

2. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN SHARIAT-MADARI'S APPARENT DESIRE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM USG. CONSIDER THIS TO OFFER EXCELLENT POTENTIAL, AND WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE SUCH IF A SUITABLE ANS OF DELIVERY TO HIM CAN BE FOUND. BASED ON REF WE ARE AWARE OF BURROWS' DELICATE SITUATION BUT WONDER IF HE MIGHT AGREE TO L SHARIAT-MADARI THAT USG WOULD PROVIDE CONFIDENTIAL (IN LISH) INFORMATION TO HIM TO ASSIST HIM IN ASSESSING (IN ERNAH) SITUATION IRAN BUT ORIGINS AND EFFECTS OF THE IRAN BLLEN OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. BURROWS COULD PERHAPS SUGGEST TO THAT HE COULD APPOINT A TRUSTED COURIER (PREFERABLY ENGLISH SPEAKING) WHO WOULD PICK UP ITEMS AT A PRE-DETERMINED SITE. BELIEVE DIRECT EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH SHARIAT-MADARI WOULD DESTROY HIS AL CREDIBILITY. AFTER ARRANGEMENTS MADE BURROWS WOULD DESTROY HIS SIDED USE OF BURROWS SIMPLY OUR INITIAL THOUGHT HOW OUT ITTED INFORMATION. SOLICIT DETAILED SUGGESTIONS FROM STATION OTHER WAYS APPROACH AND DELIVERY COULD BE MADE. IF DECISION MADE TO PAS INFORMATION TO SHARIAT-MADARI WE WOULD PROBABLY

Mun Case

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 430253 SECRET
 WANT TO BEGIN WITH STATION SELECTED ITEMS FROM ARC OF CLO
 MATERIAL. IF HE PROVES RECEPTIVE WE COULD MOVE ONTO MO
 MATERIAL. REQUEST STATION RELEWS, AFTER DISCUSSING ABOVE
 GENERAL TERMS WITH CHARGE.
 3. NO TRACES BURROWS. WOULD APPRECIATE BIO DATA
 CLEARANCE TO OPS INVOLVEMENT PLANNED.
 4. NO FILE. RFW 1 MAY 79 DRW DSC.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET 061208Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 32947 (GLEZOR) (ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL SOVALID ORBOLSTER

REFS: A. TEHRAN-12199

B. DIRECTOR-452223

1. SOVALID V/1 REPORTED A WAY THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AN AUDIENCE WITH SHARIATMADARI IN ROOM 50 APRIL. V/1 WAS ECSTATIC OVER RESULTS OF THE SESSION, WHICH WERE CLEARLY BEYOND HIS EXPECTATIONS. WHILE THERE IS SOME THIN UNDEL TAKE FROM THE MEETING THE ATMOSPHERICS ARE MORE INTERESTING THAN THE INFORMATION PASST FOLLOWING IS V/1'S ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING.

2. AFTER SHARIATMADARI HAD ACKNOWLEDGED KNOWING V/1'S FATHER AND FAMILY, V/1 EXPLAINED HIS PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND SAID THAT HE WAS BRINGING A MESSAGE OF GOOD WISHES TO SHARIATMADARI FROM HIS IRANIAN AND AMERICAN FRIENDS IN THE U.S. V/1 SAID SHARIATMADARI WARMED TO THIS, AFTER WHICH V/1 SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SHARIATMADARI A FEW QUESTIONS.

3. SHARIATMADARI'S RESPONSES TO V/1'S QUERIES DID NOT, FOR THE MOST PART, ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED IN PRESS AND STATE TRAFFIC ABOUT SHARIATMADARI'S POLITICAL POSITIONS. SHARIATMADARI TOLD V/1 THAT HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH BAZARGAN WHO HE SAID LETS HIMSELF BE USED BY "OTHERS". HE DID SAY THAT FOR "AMERICAN FRIENDS" TO KNOW WHERE HE STOOD ON ISSUES, THEY SHOULD READ TEXT OF THE CABLE HE SENT TO AYATOLLAH SHAYK MUHAMMED KHAGAN KHUZESTAN'S TOP CLERGYMAN, IN LATE APRIL WHEN THE LATTER WAS THREATENING TO QUIT IRAN UNLESS KOMITEN ACTIVITIES THERE WERE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. (STATION TRYING TO LOCATE NEWS STORY ON CABLE AND GET TRANSLATION). SHARIATMADARI SAID THAT WHILE KHOMENI AND TALEGHANI WERE APPEALING TO KHAGANI NOT TO LEAVE IRAN AND WERE INVITING HIM TO COME TO ROOM FOR TALKS, SHARIATMADARI HAD ADVISED KHAGANI NOT TO LEAVE ABADAN AT ALL, EVEN TO GO TO ROOM, SINCE THE COUNTRY NEEDED HIM THERE.

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4. V/1 INQUIRED ABOUT SHARIATMADARI'S VIEW OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION. SHARIATMADARI SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOWN THE DRAFT DRAFT PRIOR TO ITS PUBLICATION AND HAD BEEN ASKED FOR HIS COMMENTS. HE THEN SMIRKED AND TOLD V/1 "WE HAVE ADDED OUR COMMENTS, BUT TO DO SO WE HAD TO APPEND SEVERAL NEW SHEETS OF PAPER". V/1 HAD IMPRESSION THAT SHARIATMADARI THOUGHT CONSTITUTION LEFT A LOT TO BE DESIRED. HE TOLD V/1 THAT HE FORESAW THE CONSTITUTION BEING APPROVED IN ABOUT THREE MONTHS, BUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE ELECTIONS COULD BE HELD.

5. V/1 TOLD C/O THAT SEVERAL TIMES DURING MEETING HE THOUGHT HE HAD OVERSTATED HIS WELCOME WITH SHARIATMADARI, BUT THAT TWICE WHEN HE TRIED TO LEAVE, SHARIATMADARI HAD INSISTED THAT HE NOT. WHEN V/1 ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEE HIM AGAIN, SHARIATMADARI RESPONDED "COME ONCE, TWICE, AS OFTEN AS YOU LIKE". V/1 SAID OTHERS WAITING TO SEE SHARIATMADARI THOUGHT V/1 HAD A SPECIAL "IN" WITH HIM, AND ASKED HIM ON WAY OUT TO ACT AS INTER-MEDIARY FOR THEM.

6. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HOW BADLY V/1 WANTED TO SUCCEED IN THIS ASSIGNMENT AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR EMBELLISHMENT, V/1'S REPORT IS STILL CONSISTENT WITH RECENT INDICATIONS THAT SHARIATMADARI MAY WANT TO DEVELOP SOME WORKABLE CHANNEL TO THE U.S.G. (SEPARATE MESSAGE REPORTING SOJANUS'S PROPOSAL IN THIS REGARD FOLLOWS.) BELIEVE IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO SEND V/1 TO ROOM AGAIN, ONCE WE DECIDE IF AND HOW TO PURSUE THIS OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITY.

7. FILE: 201-959311. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET 101220Z MAY 79 STAF
CITE TEHRAN 53228 (GLEBOFF ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR,
INTELL RYEAT

REFS: S. TEHRAN 52799
DIRECTOR 430253
D. TEHRAN 52947
D. TEHRAN 52969

1. REFS ALL CONCERNED WITH REPORTED INDICATIONS THAT
AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI MAY WISH A LINK WITH THE U.S.G.

2. AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF A COB PARTICIPATED IN FOUR-WAY
CONVERSATION AT SOCIAL FUNCTION INVOLVING F. BURROWS AND
MEASBY OFFICERS STEMPER AND STAY OR ON SUBJECT OF BURROWS
MEETING WITH SHARIATMADARI. BURROWS IS HARDLY A RELUCTANT
QUESS ON SUBJECT AND IN IT BURROWS ACTIVELY PROMOTING A
REFRING BETWEEN EMBASSY OFFICIALS AND SHARIATMADARI WHOM HE
DESCRIBES AS AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS WHOSE SH HOPE IN IRAN
VERY CRITICAL OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS WHOSE SH HOPE IN IRAN
IN IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT IT IS BURROWS' IDEA THAT
MEETING TAKE PLACE. IT IS INCORPORATED IN SHARIATMADARI
BURROWS BASICALLY BELIEVES THAT SHARIATMADARI
WOULD PASSAGE SHARIATMADARI
WAS U.S. BLESSING AS HE BELIEVES AT HE WILL FEEL ASSURED THAT
BUSINESS TO REMAIN IN IRAN BURROWS IS CONCERNED ON NEW FOREIGN
OFFICER TO THE INTERMEDIARY BURROWS IS OFFERED TO INTRODUCE EMBASSY
MEETING WITH SHARIATMADARI (UNKNOW) WHO HAD ARRANGED HIS OWN

3. OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF MR. BURROWS IS THAT HE
WAS NOT BE SUITABLE FOR THE UNWANTED REF B. BURROWS
PROBABLY FEEL THIS WAS NOT THE DESIRES WHICH HE WOULD
WANTS AND IT IS ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT HE SHOULD
FORMS WOULD LIKE TO SHARIATMADARI UP TO
BUT KHOMENI ANTI-BURROWS ACTS, WE ALSO CANNOT
CERTAIN THAT THE SURE A ARE ACCURATE REFLECTION

FACE 02 TEHRAN 53228 SECRET
OF SHARIATMADARI'S WISHES, OR EVEN THAT SHARIATMADARI HIMSELF
DESIRES CONTACT WITH U.S.G.

4. THE APPROACH THROUGH SOJANUS/13 IS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR.
IN THIS ONE, A SUBORDINATE OF SHARIATMADARI MADE THE MOVE AND
AGAIN WE CANNOT BE SURE SHARIATMADARI APPROVES.

5. NONETHELESS, THE DOOR IS OPEN TO BACK SHARIATMADARI
AND HIS OWN PARTY. GIVEN KHOMENI'S PUBLIC CHARGES THAT THE
AMERICANS ARE OUT TO SPLIT THE UNITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVE-
MENT, ANY MOVES TOWARD CONTACT WITH SHARIATMADARI MUST BE MADE
CAREFULLY AND WITH UTMOST ATTENTION TO SECURITY. WE BELIEVE
A CLEARER PICTURE OF SHARIATMADARI'S OWN POSITION ON CONTACT
WITH THE U.S. AND HIS EXPECTATIONS FROM SUCH CONTACT IS NEEDED.
WILL ATTEMPT ACQUIRE THIS INFO. OUR OBJECTIVE IN THIS AS
KHOMENI CHARGES, WOULD BE TO SPURT AND WEAKEN THE ISLAMIC
MOVEMENT SO THAT MORE RATIONAL VOICES CAN BE HEARD. WE SOLICIT
HIS GUIDANCE AS TO VALIDITY THIS OBJECTIVE FROM POLICY VIEWPOINT.

6. FILE DEFER. RW 13MAYSS BRW D90.1. ALL SECRET

11 MAY 79 01 04z

SECRET 110029Z MAY 79 STAFF

TO DIRECTOR 436211.

FROM: PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT SDJANUS

REF: A. TEHRAN 52969
B. DIRECTOR 436253
C. TEHRAN 52999

1. APPRECIATE INFO ON SDJANUS/13'S (J/13) CONTACT WITH HARIAT-MADARI (SM) GROUP. WE ACCEPT J/13'S INFO RE CONTACTS AS IN PAST HE HAS APPEARED TO BE POLITICAL ANIMAL AND PROBABLY STILL SEES HIMSELF AS EVENTUAL CHIEF OF A NEW SERVICE UNDER A SM DOMINATED GOVT. BASED ON SM'S COMMENTS TO BURROWS. SO VALID/1'S MEETING WITH SM, AND NOW J/13'S INFO, WE CAN MAKE A STRONG ASSUMPTION THAT SM IS PUTTING OUT FEELERS TO US. UNLESS WE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN PROVIDING SM WITH INFORMATION HE CLAIMED HE NEEDED. WE STILL WANT TO DO SO, PROVIDED A SATISFACTORY CHANNEL CAN BE FOUND. J/13 CERTAINLY SEEMS TO OFFER A CHANNEL. WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE ADVISABILITY OF PASSING IT THROUGH A FORMER SDJANUS OFFICIAL, OR FOR THAT MATTER IF SM WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT IT THROUGH J/13. HOWEVER, DO NOT WISH ELIMINATE THIS OPTION UNTIL AFTER OTHERS EXPLORED AND FOUND WANTING.

2. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF THIS IS PROPER TIME TO GIVE THE CONTINUING CHAOS ON THE IRANIAN SCENE) TO BEGIN PLANNING FOR POLITICAL ACTION, WE WILL NEED MORE FACTS FROM STATION ABOUT THE LOCAL SITUATION. OUR POLITICAL ACTION GOAL IN IRAN WOULD BE TO PROMOTE A GOVT FAVORABLE TO U.S. INTERESTS. TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO SM'S PARTY AS ONE MEANS OF ACHIEVING OUR GOAL WE MUST DETERMINE ITS STRENGTH AND DEPTH. HOW DID J/13 ARRIVE AT HIS FIGURE OF EIGHT MILLION PEOPLE READY TO JOIN? IS SM CALLING THE SHOTS FOR THE PARTY, OR IS HE MERELY INTENDED TO BE A FIGUREHEAD WHO IS THE UNIDENTIFIED NUMBER TWO MAN J/13 IS IN CONTACT WITH? WHO ARE THE IMPORTANT CADRE? IF J/13 CAN ANSWER THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS IT WILL HELP US DETERMINE IF SM'S PARTY IS A VIABLE ENTITY.

TO DIRECTOR 436211 SECRET

3. HQS HAS NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO HOSAFI, FIROUZI, OR SAID SAID. A LONG SHOT ON HOSAFI MIGHT BE ALI ASSAFI (ENCRYPTED NO) 201-789983, WHO WAS NEW CHIEF DEPT VIII IN SEPT 1978. FIROUZI POSSIBLE DR. SEFOLLAH FORUZIN, DPOB 1920 RESHT. HELD SECURITY JOBS IN G-2. JOINED SDJANUS 1957 AS CHIEF JUDICIAL SECTION DEPT III. BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF DEPT III IN 1963. IN LATE 60'S AND IN 1970'S IN CHARGE OF DEPT I ADMINISTRATION (PERSONNEL FINANCED). AS OF JUNE 1975 WAS GRADE NINE (HIGHEST POSSIBLE). WAS ANTI-SHAKH, REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN NY FOR DEMONSTRATING AGAINST EMPRESS FARAH. IN VIEW SON'S ACTIVITIES FORUZIN SUBMITTED SUGGESTION, WHICH MADE SDRED FURIOUS. SDRED DECLINED ACCEPT SUGGESTION.

4. FIELD SECURITY CHECK ON FARRID WOULD INVOLVE CHECKING ON MEMBERS, EMPLOYEES, ETC. WHICH HQS PREFERENCES NOT TO DO AT THIS TIME. ALSO, IF FARRID U.S. PERSON, WE WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN HIS PERMISSION PRIOR TO SUCH A CHECK. ONE MOHAMMED SAID FARID (NO 778291), IRANIAN STUDENT AT NYU 1965, WAS ACTIVE IN TUDEI. SECURITY HAS FILE ON ONE S. RAHMI FARID DPOB 27 SEP 1962 IRAN. HE RETIRED AND POSSIBLY DESTROYED BUT WE ARE CHECKING AND WILL USE. WILL ALSO QUERY SDENORMOUSY/1 NEXT OPPORTUNITY.

5. HAVE ADVISED J/13 SON IN PARIS THAT I TEHRAN CONTACT INITIATED AND NO NEED DISCUSS MATTER ON PHONE WITH J/13. ALSO SON THAT IF FURTHER CONTACT VIA CUMMISKY NECESSARY SON WOULD ADVISE US AND WE WILL PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH PARIS OFFICER CAN RELAY MESSAGES SECURELY. SON AGREES.

6. SM ASSIGNED 201-BELOW.

7. FILE: 201-962845. RWV 9 MAY 98 DRW D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

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12 MAY 79 02 03z

SECRET 120158Z MAY 79 STAFF

Excellent call

SITE DIRECTOR 437267.

OO: TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53025
B. DIRECTOR 430253
C. DIRECTOR 436211

1. BASED ON REF A COMMENTS RE BURROWS AGREE WITH STATION WE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CONDUIT FOR WHICH WE ARE SEARCHING. OUR ORIGINAL SUGGESTION RE USE OF BURROWS WAS FOUNDED ON BELIEF SHARIAT-MADARI HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE RATHER THAN BURROWS. WE SHARE STATION'S VIEW THAT WE MUST BE CERTAIN SHARIAT-MADARI WANTS A CHANNEL TO THE USG BEFORE WE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH IT, AND THAT IF ESTABLISHED IT MUST BE AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE.

2. OUR INTENTION IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI IS TO HELP DEVELOP A "MODERATE OPTION." OUR GOAL IS NOT TO SPLIT THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT BUT RATHER TO EXPAND THE MODERATE FORCES WITHIN IT TO THE POINT WHERE THEY BECOME DOMINANT. THE EXISTENCE OF A STRONG MODERATE FACTION DOMINATING THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MIGHT WELL ATTRACT, AT LEAST IN THE FORM OF A COALITION THOSE WITH MODERATE SECULAR VIEWS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WHILE THOSE RADICAL LEFTIST FACTIONS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REMAIN ENEMIES OF ANY MODERATE MOVEMENT THEY WOULD AGAIN BE FORCED INTO THE POSITION OF EXTREMISTS OF THE LEFT. HOPEFULLY, A BROAD BASED MODERATE MOVEMENT WOULD EMERGE WITH SMALL LEFTIST AND RIGHTIST GROUPS ON THE FLANK.

3. HOWEVER, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION SOMETHING CLOSE TO NORMAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY CAN EXIST. THE PRESENT REALITY IS THAT THE GUNS, AND THUS THE REAL POWER, ARE IN THE HANDS OF THE RADICALS. UNLESS SOME FORM OF RELIABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION (E.G. THE AR...) IS RESURRECTED, AND MODERATE IRANIAN'S GATHER UP THE COURAGE TO FORCEFULLY EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, THE PROPER CLIMATE TO PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WILL NOT BE PRESENT. ALTERNATIVELY, IF

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 437267 SECRET
THE SHARIAT-MADARI GROUP HAVE ITS OWN ARMED BACKERS? DO ANY OF THE CURRENTLY EXISTING ARMED FACTIONS EITHER SHOW SUPPORT FOR SHARIAT-MADARI OR COULD THEY BE ATTRACTED TO HIS MOVEMENT?

4. WE HAVE EXPRESSED IN REF C OUR POLITICAL ACTION GOAL, WHICH IS TO PROMOTE A GOVT FAVORABLE TO U.S. INTERESTS, IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THIS GOAL CAN PROBABLY BEST BE ATTAINED THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MODERATE, POPULARLY SUPPORTED GOVT WHICH IS EITHER LED, OR HAS THE BLESSING OF, THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY AND HAS THE STRENGTH TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. WHILE THE GOAL IS SIMPLE TO DEFINE WE ARE STILL IN SEARCH OF THE MECHANISMS TO OBTAIN IT AND ENCOURAGE STATION COMMENTS AND IDEAS IN THIS VEIN.

5. FILE: 201-960845. RVW 11 MAY 99 DRV DSC.1 ALL
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SECRET 16137Z MAY 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 3809 (CLEBOROFF A/TINGD)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR
UNINTEL RYBAT SOJANUS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 436271
B. DIRECTOR 437287

1. REFS WERE EXCELLENT. BELIEVE WE ARE NOW CLOSE TOGETHER
IN OUR THINKING RE WHAT COULD DEVELOP INTO A MAJOR AND EXTREMELY
VALUABLE OPERATIONAL UNDERSTANDING.

2. FOLLOWING INFO OBTAINED FROM 15 MAY PHONE CONVERSATION
PASSED TO MELLOTTE EVENING 14 MAY BY IDEN WHO IS FRIEND WHO
IS SMELTERING J/13. IDEA OF INFLUENCE SUPPORT FOR COOPERATION
WITH SHARHATMADAT (S-M) HAS BEEN DISCUSSED SOLELY BETWEEN J/13
AND IDEN, AND MELLOTTE HAS ADVISED J/13 THAT THIS MUST REMAIN
THE CASE UNTIL WE AND HEADQUARTERS CAN WEIGH THE SITUATION.
IDEN'S ORIGINAL IDEA WAS TO OBTAIN FUNDS FROM WEALTHY SAVAK OF-
FICIALS WHO HAVE LEFT ABROAD. J/13 SUGGESTED THAT HE (J/13)
DISCUSS POSSIBILITY WITH RIYAZI. BOTH J/13 AND IDEN BELIEVE
THAT S-M WOULD WELCOME SUPPORT IF A VIABLE AND ABSOLUTELY SELF-
SUPPORTING CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED. IDEN ALSO BELIEVE S-M WOULD AGREE
TO MEET DIRECTLY, BY THIS HE REMAINS A MOOT QUESTION IN ABSENCE
OF ASSURANCES, ETC. RIYAZI SEES ADVANTAGE OF DIRECT CONTACT
WITH S-M AS ONE OF PROVIDING US WITH CLEAR KNOWLEDGE WE ARE IN-
TEMPERING TO ACCOMPLISH. BUT INDIRECT CONTACT EXACTLY WHAT S-M IS
MORE SECURE AND PROVIDE PLAUSIBLE DENIAL OF RELATIONSHIP TO
IT MIGHT ALSO PERMIT US TO WORK ON IDEN AS UNILATERAL
PENETRATION S-M BROUGH

3. J/13 DESCRIBES IDEN AS A SUCCESSFUL ROAD AND BUILDING
CONTRACTOR, A SHY PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE
REVOLUTION, AND WHO HAS BEEN FINANCIALLY COMMITTED TO S-M AND HAS PARTY
J/13 SAYS IDEN IS VERY POPULAR SOCIALLY AND IS A SOLID LIBERAL.

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DEMOCRATIC UNFORTUNATELY HE DOES NOT KNOW ENGLISH. J/13
THAT HE TRUSTS IDEN COMPLETELY AND MELLOTTE MUST ADD THAT IDEN
HANDLED OUR CAREFUL PASS IN A DISCIPLINED AND COOL MANNER.
WE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET CASE OFFICER DIRECTLY IN TEHRAN OR
ABROAD IF DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN PERSIAN.

WHO ARE PRESENTLY LOYAL TO S-M AND CLAIMS THAT MORE WILL FOLLOW.
AS EXPECTED, S-M HAS THE AZERBAIJANI COMMUNITY TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL CLAIMS SUPPORT FROM THE RADICAL PARTY OF FAHMYTOL-
LAH MOGHADAM-ARABERS, GORAN GROUPS, SOME KINDS AND VARIOUS
BUSINESSMEN AND WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS IN TEHRAN AND OTHER CITIES.
J/13 WILL PROVIDE DETAILS LATER, BUT CITES FROM S-M CONTROL
BALAGHI, IDEN, DR. AHMAD ALIZADEH, MOLAROLSHAN, SADEGH
KHOSROUSHANI, S-M, SAHAB ALIZADEH, SAHAB ALIZADEH, SAHAB ALIZADEH
AS PARTY LEADERS. S-M (UNIDENTIFIED), AND SHABAN ALIZADEH
TEHRAN AND TABRIZ. THE PARTY CENTRAL ORGANIZATION IS PLANNED
OFFICES IN AZERBAIJAN, KHORASTAN, GUILAN, AND SOME PROVINCIAL
AREAS. ACCORDING TO J/13, S-M HAS OR CAN GET PRESS BACKING FROM
THE IRANIAN NATIONAL PARTY GROUP (NOT FURTHER DEFINED), J/13 AND
IDEN CLAIMS THAT PARTY FUNDS ARE LIMITED CONSIDERING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AT HAND. IDEN ADDS THAT MORE FUNDS ALSO
MEAN MORE ARMS. IDEN ADDS THAT MORE FUNDS ALSO
S-M MAKES MOST STATEMENTS. RE PARTY DECISIONS, IDEN SAYS THAT
PARTY ADMINSYSTEMS, BUT SOMETIMES DISCUSSES WITH HIS THAT
ACCORDING TO J/13, S-M'S RECENT ATTACK ON ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
IS THE BEGINNING OF A CAMPAIGN WHEREBY S-M WILL SPEAK OUT ON
IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUES. MELLOTTE ASKED J/13 AGAIN IF S-M
WILL GO INTO OPEN POSITIONS TO KHOMENI AND J/13 SAID THAT HE
S-M) WOULD INDEED TAKE HIS BREAK WHEN THE TIME WAS OPPORTUNE
TWO OR THREE MONTHS HENCE.

4. J/13 SUBMITTED PARA FOUR REF A IS A GREEN CARD HOLDER
AND IS THE SON OF A HIGHLY RESPECTED TOLMAN FIRM SAJANI, WHO ACCORDING TO J/13
INCLUDE A COPY OF REF A IN HIS FILE. J/13 SAYS OVER THE PHONE THAT HE WOULD
ERUSAL, BUT THIS SUBJECT'S NEW PUBLICATION FOR OUR
SUBJECT SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED DURING OUR BRUSH CONTACT.
E NIGHT ABLY SERVE S-M. FIND RAISER/PUBLIC RELATIONS SPOKES-

8 Tolman
Mol...
C...
L...

PAGE 3
MAN. WITH MANY WEALTHY IRANIANS HAVING FLED ABROAD, THE PEOPLE
IS NOT DO MUCH THE LACK OF MONEY FOR S-M AS GETTING A FUND
RAISING CAMPAIGN ORGANIZED AND UNDERWAY. IF REACTION IS TO
PLAY A COVERT ROLE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE MIGHT SUGGEST OFFER-
ING S-M PROFESSIONAL ADVICE ON THE TECHNIQUES OF FUND RAISING
AND THE MECHANICS OF HOW TO MOUNT A PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE'S PLUS "SEED MONEY" TO
GET THEIR EFFORT STARTED. IN TRUTH MANY MODERATE VOICES IN
IRAN ARE INTIMIDATED AND TRAUMATIZED BY KHOMEINI'S KONTAM
TACTICS AND EVEN J/13 AND IDEN SAY THAT THE S-M PEOPLE BELIEVE
THAT THEY ARE SOMEWHAT BEHIND THE POWER CURVE AND THAT TIME IS
RUNNING OUT.

6. REQUEST PRIORITY HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON IDEN. WOULD
ALSO APPROPRIATE DESK ANALYSIS (IDENTIFICATION AND COVER RELATION-
SHIPS OF NAMES AND GROUPS) CITED IN PARA FOUR ABOVE. IT IS
QUITE EVIDENT THAT J/13 HAD DIFFICULTY IN WRITING IN ENGLISH
AND WE WILL ASK HIM FOR VERBAL CLARIFICATION WHEN WE SPEAK BY
PHONE ON 20 MAY. WITH HEADQUARTERS CONCURRENCE, WE PLAN NEXT
TO DISCUSS WITH J/13 THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT IDEN CAN REACH
THE POSSIBILITY OF COVERT INFLUENCE (NOT REACTION) CONTACT WITH
C.M. AT THIS LUNCHEON. J/13'S ROLE WOULD NOT BE MENTIONED TO

7. FILE: 201-850847, 201-149066. R/W 16 MAY 99 DRV DSC.
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C P I E

SECRET 161342 MAY 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 53084 (LEGOROFF ACTING)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,
W/INTEL RYBAT SDJANGS
REF: TEHRAN 58095

1. IDEN: MA SEYED MORTIEZ A M O S S I
DOB: CIRCA 1926
DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN OF PIRANGLD AWI
ID TEHRAN.

2. FILE: 201-80847, 201-149066. R/W 16 MAY 99 DRV
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SECRET 11416Z MAY 79 STAFF
TEHRAN 166 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

T DIRECTOR
W WTEL RYBAK
REF: A. TEHRAN 52909
B. DIRECTOR 436211
C. DIRECTOR 437267
D. TEHRAN 53023
E. TEHRAN 53125

1. PROPOSE TAKE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL STEPS IN ORDER
TO MAXIMIZE DESIRABILITY AND POTENTIAL OF DEVELOPING CLANDESTINE
CHANNEL TO SHARAH MADARI (SM):

A. THROUGH EDJANUS/13, CONTINUE TO DEVELOP NEEDED
FACTS ABOUT SM'S MUSLIM PEOPLES' REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP).
INSIST THAT JVA DETERMINE WHETHER SM HAS AUTHORIZED AND SUP-
PORTS CREATION OF THIS CHANNEL. SM HAS AUTHORIZED AND SUP-
PORTS CREATION OF THIS CHANNEL. UNLESS SM LEAVES THE COUNTRY, IT IS PROBABLY UNWISE FROM
A SECURITY STANDPOINT TO MEET HIM DIRECTLY.

B. SEND SD VALID/1 BACK TO QOM FOR ANOTHER VISIT WITH
SM. THIS COULD IN EFFECT BE A "TROLLING" EXERCISE, WITH WVA
ALERT FOR ANY SIGNALS GIVEN OUT BY SM BUT NOT PRESENTING HIM-
SELF AS BEING THERE AS AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ANYBODY.

C. GUIDE SDROTTERIA'S POLITICAL STEPS SO AS TO
MAXIMIZE THE EFFECT HE IS ABLE TO HAVE ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE
OPPOSITION AND TO MAXIMIZE HIS FI AND CA VALUES TO US. IN
THIS REGARD, HAVE ALREADY RECOMMENDED TO R/4 THAT WE CAST HIS
LINE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT (NF), PROVIDING THE NF REWARDS HIM
WITH AN INFLUENTIAL POSITION. WITHIN THE NF, R/4 SHOULD WORK
TO BUILD A FORCE THAT IS MODERATE AND PRO-U.S. WHILE REPORTING
REGULARLY ON DEVELOPMENTS. STATION HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED TO
R/4 THAT HE IS AN IDEAL FULL-SCALE POLITICAL ACTIVITY NOW. WE HAVE
SUGGESTED REWARDING (A) AHMAD SADEH HAJ SEYED JAMADI,

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 166 SECRET
THE INTERIOR MINISTER, TO GET A BETTER FIX ON THE PGOI'S PLANS
FOR ELECTIONS IN QOM AND KHAGANI IN KHORRAMSHAHR. R/4
SAYS THIS IS A GOOD IDEA AND HE INTENDS TO DO IT AND TRY TO
EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF A LASH-UP. (C) GENERAL JAM IN LONDON,
THIS R/4 WILL TRY TO DO ON HIS NEXT TRIP ABROAD. HE LIKES JAM
AND BELIEVES HE HAS A ROLE TO PLAY AT THE PROPER TIME. R/4 IS
STILL MOVING WITH HIS IDEA OF A QASHGAI TRIBAL COUNCIL WHICH
COULD PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF
COORDINATION WITH OTHER TRIBAL GROUPS.

2. WVA TOLD R/4 OF OUR PLEASURE AT SEEING HIM AND
ADMIRAL MADANI AHEAD WITH THE PLAN TO ESTABLISH A NEWSPAPER
IN TEHRAN. NOTHING IN THIS REGARD WAS SAID TO R/4 AT
OUR LATEST MEETING. IT MAY BE WORTH SUPPORTING R/4 IN THIS
VENTURE OR R/4 SAYING AND MADANI HAVE PLENTY OF MONEY, BUT WOULD
WELCOME EXPERTISE.

3. AS A PLAN SUGGESTS, IT WOULD BE OUR OBJECTIVE
TO BRING TOGETHER U.S. MODERATES FROM THE RELIGIOUS, SECULAR
POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES, PROBABLY USING R/4 AS OUR PRI-
MARY ACTION VEHICLE AND CATALYST. THE CLANDESTINE CHANNEL TO
SM ANGLE NEEDS TO BE RESEARCHED MORE, BUT R/4 IS READY TO GO
AND MAY BE WORTH TRYING TO CREATE SUCH A CHANNEL IF R/4 CAN
HIMSELF DEVELOP AN ALLIANCE OF SORTS WITH SM (WE COULD, IF WE
CHOOSE, DUMP IN MONEY FOR SM THROUGH R/4).

4. WELCOME R/4'S COMMENTS.

5. FILE. DEFER. RVW 21 MAY 79 DRV DS C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

25 MAY 79

E C R E T 242333Z MAY 79 STAFF
THE DIRECTOR 445413 SECTION 1 OF 2
O: PRIORITY TEHRAN
NINTEL RYBAT SDJANUS

ETS: A. TEHRAN 53095
B. DIRECTOR 436211

1. NO HQS TRACES ON MORTIEZA MOSSAVI.

2. RAHMATOLLAH MOGHALAM--MARGHEH AKA HT COL MOGFADAM IS SUBJECT 201-237926, ENCRYPTED IDEN. WAS GRANTED ON NOV 1961 FOR USE POLITICAL REPORTING AS WELL AS BLACK PROPAGANDIZING THROUGH THIRD PARTY. WAS LONGTIME FRIEND OF TEHRAN STATION DATING BACK TO 1953. COPENHAGEN 25817, 28 FEB 79 REPORTED HE HAD BEEN APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF AZERBAIJAN AND THAT SDPRANK/1 DESCRIBED HIM AS HIS CLOSEST FRIEND IN IRAN. (A 17 MAY 79 WIRE SERVICE REPORT SHOWS HE STILL IS GOVERNOR.) HE WAS ALSO ONCE MAYOR OF TEHRAN. COPENHAGEN STATED IF INTERESTED THEY COULD PROBABLY ENCOURAGE MORE INTENSIVE CONTACT BY SDPRANK/1. PER OCR INFO LAMBRAXIS VISITED HOME OF RAHMATOLLAH MOGFADAM 12 JUNE 78. PRESENT WERE FOUR LEADERS OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENT, BAZAIGAN, SANJABI, FORUQAN, AND SEYEDJARADE. THEY TOLD LAMBRAXIS THAT SHABESTARIZADEH HAD RECENTLY DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO THEM FROM OM ASSURING THEM SM WOULD NOT TALK WITH GOI OR REACH ANY AGREEMENTS WITHOUT INCLUDING THEM. SHABESTARIZADEH WAS OPPOSITION LEADER WITH FIRST NAMES OF RAJI HASHAM. EMBASSY SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FULL BIO. IF NOT ADVISE AND WE WILL FORWARD.

3. WE HAVE NO INFO ON GORAN GROUP BUT BELIEVE GORAN MAY BE INCORRECT TRANSLITERATION OF KORAN. IDENTITY OF SHALE-KH MUSALMAN IS UNCERTAIN. IN A DEBRIEFING OF SDPRETEXT/1 HE IDENTIFIED THIS GROUP AS SHARIAT-MADARI'S (SM) PARTY. HOWEVER, ANOTHER GROUP WHICH USES THE SAME NAME IN PERSIAN, USES ENGLISH NAME OF ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MUSLIM MASSES OF IRAN. IT IS CENTERED IN KHORASAN PROVINCE.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 445413 E C R E T
4. NO INFO ON BALAGHI, ALIZADEH, OR KHOSROWSHAMI.

5. FNITA-15206, 29 NOV 1968, REPORTED AN ATTOLLAH SYED BUIK SANJANI AS PROMINENT LEADER OF DEVOTEES OF THE SHAH PARTY. HE WAS ALSO MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE BRITISH AGENT. WE WILL ADVISE FURTHER WHAT RECORDS SEARCH REVEALS ON THIS.

6. RE PARA 4 REF B FARID TURNED OUT TO BE A SURGEON IN A BRAZIL (INDIAN) HOSPITAL.

7. FROM ABOVE TRACES, INFO FROM J/13, AND OTHER SOURCES, WE CAN ASCERTAIN THAT SM'S MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY EXISTS IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SM'S APPEAL TO MODERATES WILL MAKE HIM A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH IN THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF IRAN IF HE DECIDES TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE. HOWEVER, AT PRESENT OTHER FORCES OF EQUAL, OR PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANCE, ARE ALSO IN EXISTENCE. ACCORDING TO ANALYSTS, NEBASTI'S "ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY", WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS THE SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI AND THE POWER HE REPRESENTS, IS ANOTHER PRIME GROUPING. WHILE THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A POLITICAL PARTY ALONG WESTERN LINES, IT IS A POLITICAL ENTITY WHICH FUNCTIONS THROUGH THE CLERICAL APPARATUS WHILE DISSATISFACTION WITH KHOMEINI MAY BE GROWING. WE SEE THIS GROUP AS THE ONE STILL ABLE TO ORGANIZE THE MASSES OF SOUTH TEHRAN AND GET THEM OUT ON THE STREETS. THE THIRD MAJOR GROUP THAT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED IS THE "NATIONAL FRONT". DESPITE ITS CURRENT WEAKNESS, ALTHOUGH SANJABI MAY BE WORKING HARD TO RESURRECT IT, WE CANNOT PREDICT ITS FUTURE BUT IT STILL HAS THE POTENTIAL TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. WHILE THE SHAH HAS THE GAME, THE NF WOULD PROBABLY HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME REUNITING ITS FORMER DIVERSE ELEMENTS INTO ONE ORGANIZATION (E.G. NIT 10,601).

8. OTHER INFORMATION INDICATES THE "NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT". UNDER LATEH HEDAYATOLLAH MATIN-DASTARI, IS APPEALING TO SECULAR PROGRESSIVES, LIBERALS, AND LEFT OF CENTER INDIVIDUALS. ANOTHER PLANE, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE LARGER TRIBAL GROUPING WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE ANY OUTCOME BY SUPPORTING PARTY MOST LIKELY TO IMPLEMENT THEIR DESIRES FOR AUTONOMY.

9. SMALL RADICAL GROUPS, OTHER THAN THE CHARAKS, FORMING UNDER VARIOUS NAMES BUT DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY, ALSO ARE APPEAR-

PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 445413 S E C R E T
ING. FURTHERMORE, WE MUST NOT FORGET AMATOLLAH TALEGANI AND HIS
LARGE FOLLOWING OF MOUABEDDIN. AT THIS POINT, POTENTIAL OF THESE
GROUPS APPEARS TO BE PRIMARILY DISRUPTIVE.

10. FOR GOING DESCRIPTION VAGUE AS IT IS, BRIEFLY REPRESENTS
POLITICAL SCENE AS WE SEE IT. WE MUST HAVE CLEARER UNDERSTANDING
OF FORCES AT WORK, EXACTLY WHERE SM FITS IN AND HIS POTENTIAL
FOR SUCCESS BEFORE WE CAN COMMIT OURSELVES TO SPECIFIC POLITICAL
ACTION. OBVIOUSLY AT PRESENT WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION
TO MAKE THIS JUDGMENT. STATION HAS MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS TOWARD
THIS GOAL BUT MORE IS NEEDED. FIRST WE MUST BE SURE THAT WE NOT
MISREADING SIGNALS AND THAT SM DOES WANT CONTACT. PERHAPS ONE
TIME DIRECT MEETING WITH HIM MAY BE CALLED FOR WITH SUBSEQUENT,
INDIRECT CHANNEL. OTHER METHODS OF ESTABLISHING THE LINK ARE
PROBLEMATIC. WE ACCEPT STATION'S RESERVATIONS RE BURROWS WITHOUT,
HOWEVER, DISMISSING HIM AS POTENTIAL CHANNEL BUT STILL HOLD OUR OWN
RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A CHANNEL TO NYELAZON
ARRANGED BY A FORMER SDJANUS OFFICIAL. WE REALIZE THE DIFFICULTY
STATION HAS IN DEALING WITH SDJANUS/13 VIA IMPERSONAL COMMO BUT
REQUEST YOU CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. DOES SM KNOW THAT J/13 IS WORKING FOR HIM?
B. DOES SM RECOGNIZE J/13 AS A FORMER SDJANUS OFFICIAL?
IF HE IS NOT AWARE OF J/13'S BACKGROUND, HOW WOULD HE REACT IF HE
WERE TO LEARN IT FROM SOMEONE ELSE?
C. WOULD SM ACCEPT J/13, OR SOMEONE CLOSE TO J/13, AS
A CUTOFF TO US? BELIEVE WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO J/13 THAT THESE
POINTS CAUSE US A PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR
TO J/13 THAT PERTINENT INTELLIGENCE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE MUST
COME BEFORE ANY PROMISES OF SUPPORT.

11. RECALL THAT, AROUND DECEMBER/JANUARY, TBY EMBASSY
POLITICAL OFFICER DAVE PATTERSON HAD MET WITH SM, WHO APPARENTLY
PLEASED AT EMBASSY CONTACT. HAS EMBASSY HAD MORE RECENT DIRECT
CONTACTS WITH SM? YOU MAY WISH DISCUSS WITH CHARGE POINTING OUT
THAT, ALTHOUGH COVERT EMBASSY CONTACTS NORMAL IN PRE-KHOMEINI PERIOD
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE MORE DISCRETION AND, RATHER THAN LOSE
EMBASSY CONTACT WITH SM ENTIRELY, STATION UNIQUELY EQUIPPED CON-
TINUE RELATIONSHIP WITH SM FOR PURPOSE OF INTEL COLLECTION. IN
ANY CASE, STATION MAY BE ABLE EXPLOIT SOME ELEMENT OF PATTERSON

BT
#5971

PAGE 4 DIRECTOR 445413 S E C R E T
CHANNEL AND SUGGEST YOU EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY AS POTENTIAL THIRD
ALTERNATIVE FOR ESTABLISHING INDIRECT CONTACT.

12. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE NOTED SCWASHINGTON 31026 POSSIBILITY.

13. IN SUMMARY, WE STILL SKEPTICAL THAT SDJANUS/13 OFFERS
MEANS OF ESTABLISHING INITIAL CONTACT WITH SM. HOWEVER, IF
AFTER HAVING CONSIDERED ABOVE, STATION STILL BELIEVES HE REPRESENTS
DES OF AVAILABLE OPTIONS, CONCUR WITH YOUR DISCUSSING WITH J/13
QUESTION OF COVERT CONTACT WITH SM FOR PURPOSE OF OBTAINING IN-
FORMATION DISCUSSED ABOVE.

14. WILL ADDRESS TEHRAN 33166, WHICH FIRST RECEIVED, SEPARATEL

15. FILE: 201-960645. RW 22 MAY 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
#59 2

281859Z MAY 75 STAFF
FM 52048 (GLEGROFF ACT)
DIRECTOR.

NTL 52048 SO JANUS

TEHRAN 52048
DIRECTOR

THIS CABLE REPORTS RESULTS OF DISCUSSION WITH SP-5
RELATIONSHIP WITH ANATOLIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY
PARTY, STATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF
MOVEMENT IN POLITICAL ACTIONS ON THE QUESTION OF
OPERATE GROUPS FOLLOW SEPARATELY CERTAIN KRANIAN
AND SUBSEQUENT CABLES ON THIS SUBJECT INCLUDING THIS
TEHRAN 5287 OF 22 MAY WHICH REPORTS EMBASSY
W/TE SM'S COUP AND CO-FIRMS MAY EMBASSY CONTACT
REPORT REF 22

1. J/13 BEGAN BY STATING THAT HE HAD AGAIN BEEN IN TOUCH
WITH SOME OF THE TOP PEOPLE IN THE IRANIAN PEOPLES' REPUBLICAN
PARTY AND THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE INTERESTED IN ONE CONCEPT OF CO-
OPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS. J/13 SAID HE HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN
THESE LEADERS, WHO WERE INTERESTED FOR THE NAMES OF
SELECTED PEOPLE FROM THE ARMY, THE NAMES HE HAD
ABOUT THE PROPOSITION, THAT IF WE AGREED, WE WOULD
J/13 SAID HE WAS THINKING OF HIMSELF AS A MEMBER OF THIS
GROUP. GLEGROFF PERIODICALLY APPROVED OF THE IDEA.
NOT A GOOD IDEA FOR HIMSELF FOR SEVERAL REASONS. AT THE
END OF THE CONVERSATION, J/13 SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THEY
UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT AND HE DID TELL J/13 TO HAVE HIS
FRIENDS TRY TO CONTACT THE SM'S TO GET THEIR REACTION TO THE
THEY WOULD OPERATE UNDER THE SM'S REACTION TO THE STEP

2. J/13 SAID THE SM'S REACTION TO THE STEP
AND POLITICAL GROUPS WOULD BE TO GET THEIR SUPPORTERS

TEHRAN 52048 S... GREAT
... TO THE MAJORITY GLEGROFF SAID THAT WE
... IN IRAN SO CONFUSED AND THAT WE
... IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET THE COMPLETE
... FRIENDS INFORMED OF THE COMPLETE
... DID THEY HAVE GOOD IDEAS OF HOW
... POLITICAL FORCES WHICH THEY COULD
... WAS MUCH CONFUSION IN THEIR
... WOULD BE LOGGING TO US TO
... THIS WE REALIZED WE HAD OUR
... (W/TE SUSPECTED) J/13 SAID
... TO BEGIN ORGANIZING
... J/13 SAID THE IMPORTANCE
... ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD
... REASON HAS BEGUN PRELIMINARY
... FRONT WAS THE ONLY CONTACT
... ACCORDING TO J/13

3. WE TOLD J/13 THAT IN PRIN
ABLE TO DISCUSS WITH THE SM'S
MAYBE TO TALK ABOUT THE
NOW WE KNOW WHETHER THE
LINK TO THE AMERICANS
VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE
BETTER, IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR
AMERICANS WITH THE IDEA. J/13
NOT TALK THE INITIATIVE
WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN
VIEWS, PERIOD. J/13 SAID
PREPARED TO MEET SOMEHOW

4. GLEGROFF SAID HE WOULD
CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO THE
PREPARE SOMEHOW
J/13 SAID HE WOULD
THE BASIC QUESTION
C/13 SAID HE WOULD
RECEIVE

7 JUN 79 02 36Z

R 12 02210Z JUN 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 452047

PRIORITY TEHRAN

INTEL RPT AT SDVALTD

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53295
B. TEHRAN 53259
C. TEHRAN 53254
D. AM EMBASSY TEHRAN 53287

1. AS RESULT OF RAPIDLY UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO SHARI' MADANI'S (SM) WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT VIA SON HASSAN. MEETING WAS CONVENED AMONG INTERESTED HQS PARTIES ON A JUNE 6 THAT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO MAKE A PROPER JUDGMENT ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF POLITICAL ACTION IN IRAN AND THAT WE MAY BE MOVING TOWARD POLITICAL ACTION TOO QUICKLY BASED ON THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE. IN ADDITION WE RISK LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE SITUATION TO OUR ASSETS WHO MAY HAVE THEIR OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS AND GOALS. ALTHOUGH OUR OWN INTERESTS GENERALLY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF SDJANUS/IS, SDVALTD/1, AND SDROTTER/4, THEIR VIEWS ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE SHOULD MOVE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY AT VARIANCE WITH OURS.

2. CONCUR WITH STATION MEETING WITH SM'S SON HASSAN. HOWEVER, REQUEST CLEGGORFE LIMIT HIMSELF TO ACTING OUT ROLE OF POLITICAL OFFICER INTERESTED IN MEETING ONE OF IRAN'S LEADING PERSONALITIES, AND WHO, TO PROTECT SM'S REPUTATION AND POLITICAL FUTURE, INSISTS THAT CONTACT BE HANDLED DISCREETLY. NO SUPPORT OF ANY TYPE SHOULD BE IMPLIED OR DISCUSSED AT THIS POINT, ALTHOUGH IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED BY HASSAN, NEITHER IS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THAT NONE IS POSSIBLE IN FUTURE. THE PURPOSE OF CONTACT IS TO ASSESS HASSAN AS POTENTIAL REPORTING ASSET, PUTTING RELATIONSHIP ON CLANDESTINE BASIS, AND CREATING OPTION OF POSSIBLE SUPPORTING SM AT SOME FUTURE TIME. NO TRACES ON HASSAN. ALSO NOTE EMBASSY'S CONTACTS WITH SM SUPPORTER PER REF D. ASSUME STATION COORDINATE

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 452047 6 E C E T
POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH DOM SO WE DO NOT CROSS WIRES WITH EMBASSY ACTIVITIES.

3. DEFER TO STATION RE PARA 4 REF C. HOWEVER, BELIEVE I BEST WE DISENGAGE FROM J/IS SM CHANNEL AS QUICKLY AND GRACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE. WE CERTAINLY DESIRE TO KEEP J/IS AS A REPORTING ASSET ON THE POLITICAL AND INTEL SERVICE SCENE, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DISSEMINATED KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN CONNECTION UNNECESSARILY AND BELIEVE HIS BACKGROUND POSES TOO GREAT A RISK AS A POLITICAL CHANNEL.

4. WITH REGARD TO SDROTTER/1 (R44), WE HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN MONITORING HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND ANY RESULTING INTEL. WE COME IN CONCEPT OF MEDIA PROPOSAL AS ONE PLANNED TO HELP BRING TOGETHER MODERATES FROM THE RELIGIOUS, SECULAR, POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES. WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ARTICLES FOR HIS NEWSPAPER IF WHEN IT IS ESTABLISHED. UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE COULD CONSIDER PROVIDING EXPERTISE IF REQUIRED.

5. WE NEED EXPANDED REPORTING CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A FIRM UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEALING POWER GROUPS IN IRAN AND FROM WHAT TO PROVIDE POLICY MAKERS WITH A BETTER APPRECIATION OF WHERE THEIR INTERESTS LIE AND WHAT ACTION OPTIONS ARE REALISTIC. ONLY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD WE ANTICIPATE DEBATE BROADENED POLITICAL ACTION TASKING IDEALLY, WE WANT TO HAVE REPORTING ASSETS IN THE OTHER MAJOR CENTERS OF THE COUNTRY ADDITIONAL CIBRAL AND MILITARY COVERAGE. ASSETS IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND OTHER POWER GROUPS. WHILE THIS ADMITTEDLY IS A LONG TERM PROGRAM, SOME ASSETS ARE ALREADY IN PLACE WHO CAN BE TRAINED TO PROVIDE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE AWARE OF THE INCREASED BURDEN ON A TWO MAN STATION AND WILL CONTINUE TO SPOT POTENTIAL ASSETS AS BEST WE CAN FROM BACK HERE TO SUPPORT TEHRAN'S EFFORTS.

FILE: 201-960845. RW 5 JUNE 99 DRV DGC-1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET 07 222Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 03.76 (GLEGROFF, ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNTZEL RYBA

REF: A. TEHRAN 53248

B. TEHRAN 53257

C. DIRECTOR 53169

Sve. D.P.R.

SCHEDULED PHONE CONTACT WITH SD JANI/13 TOOK PLACE ON JUNE 13. SOMEWHAT SHEEPISHLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAD REFLECTED HIS OWN FORGETFUL AND HE SAID SM HAD "FULLY AGREED" WITH THE MOSAVI AND OTHER LEADERS OF MUSLIM PARTY HAD MADE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPORT FROM US. UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS PEOPLE PUT OUT TENTATIVE FEELERS AND NOT MIDE-VISORSA. ACCORDING TO JANI SM SAID HE HAD AGREEMENT. FIRST, THE CONTACTS SHOULD BE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND EQUALITY. WHEN GLEGROFF ASKED JANI SHOULD BE NO SUPERIOR-INFERIOR RELATIONSHIP; TWO EQUAL PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE. SM SAID HE PROMISED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REPAY ANY MONEY WHICH USG WOULD BE ASKED TO LEND TO HIM. JANI REPORTEDLY INSTRUCTED MORTEZA-MOSSAVI TO ADVISE AMERICANS REALIZE THAT THE \$5 MILLION SUPPORT FIGURE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE COSTLY AND OVERALL NEED FOR

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 53376 SECRET

BE BORNE BY US. SM DID NOT SUGGESTED THAT USG MIGHT HAVE TO

4. JANI SAID MORTEZA-MOSSAVI RETURNED FROM A SENSE OF URGENCY FOR THIS MATTER. SM THINKS NOW IS THE TIME TO BEGIN ORGANIZING SERIOUSLY. HE WANTS TO EMPHASIS ON AZERBAIJAN, SO AS TO LOCK UP HIS EMPHASIS IN OTHER KEY (BUT UNNAMED) PROVINCES. BY STARTING NOW HE CAN REACH HIS OBJECTIVES.

5. IN TERMS OF MECHANICS, SM SAID HE PREFERRED FOR SECURITY REASONS TO MEET WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIAL SAID HE HAD REJECTED ATTEMPTS BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR MEET HIM IN LONDON WHO KNEW BRIT WAS TRYING TO SET ARRANGED. JANI HAD NO SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHO MIGHT BE OTHER THAN MORTEZA-MOSSAVI, WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH TO KNOW OF THE ARRANGEMENT, NOT EVEN HIS SON.

6. JANI SAID SM HAD ALSO SAID HE HAD MOVED TO HIS BECOMING BETTER INFORMED ON CURRENT ISSUES. THIS WAS THE REFRAIN WHICH HAD BEEN BLAYED TO FRANK BURROWS AFTER LATTER'S MEETING WITH SM. JANI SAID BURROWS ABOUT THE LATEST ROW WITH WASHINGTON. HE NEEDS TO BE INFORMED SO HIS GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE IS ALSO CURIOUS WHETHER THERE IS ANYBODY AT WASHINGTON WHO WOULD BE HELPFUL.

7. AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION WITH GLEGROFF, JANI SAID SM HIMSELF WANTED TO KNOW ON AN URGENT BASIS WHETHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS USUALLY REQUIRE SOME DEBATE AND CONSENSUS. JANI SAID SM HOPED TO BE ABLE TO GET TO WASHINGTON AND NEEDED TO KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GET TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

8. WE HAVE ANOTHER PHONE CONTACT WITH JANI CREDITED FOR

PAGE 3
9 JUNE

TEHRAN 53376 SECRET

WILL BASE OUR COMMENTS TO HIM ON DIRECTOR'S ST. RC

PLAN TEL
NEED TO
SUBSTANTIAL

WE BELIEVE IT PREMATURE TO TALK OF COMMIT-
MENTS PARTY BUT WILL NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITIES
COLLABORATION AT SOME TIME IN FUTURE.

ALL SECRET
SECRET

TEHRAN 201-960845; 201-149266

R/VW 7 S.C. 1.

SECRET
TEHRAN 53395 GLEGOROFF ACTING
O: DIRECTOR
MINTEL RYBAT
TEHRAN 53376

1. IN SCHEDULED PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ED JAMES
GLEGOROFF EXPLAINED THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED AT THE
TIME TO GIVE SHARI'RHADARI (SM) AN ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT.
IT OUR POSITION THAT MORE INFORMATION FIRST NEEDED
POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN AND FORCES AT WORK HERE
ADDED THAT SINCE SM HAD WANTED TO KNOW SO QUICKLY
WHETHER WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE HIM MONEY, GLEGOROFF
TO RESPOND CATEGORICALLY IN THE NEGATIVE. FROM OUR
KIND OF AN OPERATION COULD ONLY BE ENTERED INTO AFTER
PLANNING AND FULL AGREEMENT ON ARMS.

2. J/13 SAID HE WOULD GET THIS MESSAGE TO
MOUSSAVI. HE SAID SM'S AIMS IN THIS WERE CLEAR, AND
NOT NEED MORE TIME TO UNDERSTAND THEM. WE SHOULD
ORGANIZING IN EARNEST. ORGANIZING FOR WHAT, GLEGOROFF
THERE ARE TO BE ELECTIONS THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE
WHO COULD SAY NOW THERE WILL BE ELECTIONS? J/13 SAID
UNDERSTAND THAT AS AN IMPORTANT RELIGIOUS FIGURE,
PEOPLE CAME TO SM WITH REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE AND
MONEY IN ORDER TO GATHER MORE FOLLOWERS (IN THE SENSE
MARJAS DERIVE THEIR POSITIONS AND IMPORTANCE BY THE
NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS THEY HAVE). SM WOULD DOLE OUT
WORTHY PEOPLE AND THEREBY OBTAIN THEIR LOYALTY.
PARTY. J/13 AGAIN STRESSED TO COVER OVERHEAD EX-
PENSES OF THE
IN AZERBAIJAN AND OTHER PROVINCES (SEE III-10,636
AZERBAIJAN GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S REMARKS ABOUT BRO-KAD
ORGANIZATIONAL WORK IN HIS PROVINCE). J/13 SAID
FEEL TIME IS ON HIS SIDE. J/13 CHIDED GLEGOROFF
AS HE SAW IT, FOR END USE EACH DOLLAR IS PUT TO
GLEGOROFF SAID

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 53393 S E C R E T
SHOULD REALIZE IT MUCH IN OUR INTEREST THAT SM SHOULD FEEL
ENOUGH TO COME OUT WITH VIEWS THAT CHALLENGE KHOMEINI.

5. J/13 THEN INQUIRED ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO KEEP
OF THE TRUTH OF SITUATIONS AFFECTING IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
(PARA 7 REF). GLEGOROFF SAID WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO SHARE
FACTS WITH SM BUT THAT AGAIN, THE MODALITIES WERE LONG
BEING WORKED OUT. IN COURSE OF GIVING J/13 A BRIEF
AS WE SEE IT, GLEGOROFF MENTIONED POSSIBILITY THAT IRANIAN
MENT MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN BREAKING DIPLOMACY
WOULD BE ALL THE MORE NECESSARY NOT TO GIVE THEM PRETEXT
SO, SUCH AS ACCUSATION INVOLVEMENT WITH SM. J/13 SAID
PASS THIS MESSAGE.

4. IN ORDER TO KEEP J/13 CHANNEL TO SM ALIVE, FOR
LONGER, WE TOLD J/13 WE WOULD HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT
POLITICAL SITUATION FOR HIM TO PASS ON TO MORTAZA-HUSSAIN
GLEGOROFF TOLD J/13 WE WERE STILL WAITING FOR HQS INFLIT
PHONE CON WITH J/13 SCHEDULED FOR 16 JUNE, AT WHICH TIME
ON SOME MORE QUERIES.

3. ASKED J/13 ABOUT HIS OWN SITUATION. HE SAYS
HOLDING AND WAITING, BUT IN ABSENCE OF LOCK-SOLEID SUARIA
HE IS NOT GOING BACK TO WORK. J/13 SAID HE MANAGING OK
NOT NEED ANY HELP FROM US.

6. STATION WILL PROVIDE FURTHER COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SEPARATELY.

7. FILE 201-14986; 201-96884. RVN 10JUN99 DRM D
ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 101818Z JUN 79 STAFF
SITE TEHRAN 53393 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
UNINTEL RYBAT SDVALID
REF: A. TEHRAN 53376
B. DIRECTOR 452647

1. GLEGOROFF MET HASSAN SINA RIAI T M A D A R I A
LATTER'S TEHRAN HOME MORNING 10 JUNE. SDVALID/1 MADE THE INTRODUCTION
(GLEGOROFF WAS "MR. FRANK") AND AT HASSAN'S REQUEST HE
TO ACT AS INTERPRETER. HASSAN UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH WELL ENOUGH
IS RELUCTANT TO SPEAK IT. MEETING LASTED 40 MINUTES, AND WAS
CORDIAL.

2. PER PRIOR AGREEMENT, W/1 EXPLAINED TO HASSAN THAT
HAD BEEN GIVEN GLEGOROFF'S NAME AS THE PROPER U.S. EMBASSY OFFICER
TO CONTACT BY W/1'S "AMERICAN FRIENDS". GLEGOROFF IS POLITICAL
OFFICER IN EMBASSY. LATTER WANTED MEETING TO BE HELD IN VERY
DISCREET WAY SO AS TO PROTECT INTERESTS OF BOTH. HASSAN ASKED
QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS. HE SAID HE WELCOMED CHANCE TO MEET AND
DISCUSS POLITICAL MATTERS WITH GLEGOROFF AND, AT CLOSE, SAID HE
WANTED TO SEE YOU AGAIN." AS REGARDS W/1, HASSAN NOW LOOKS
TO BEGIN ORGANIZING THE U.S. (WASHINGTON) BRANCH OF THE MUSLIM
PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP) AMONG IRANIANST THERE. HQS
WANT TO TALK FURTHER WITH W/1 ABOUT THIS DURING HIS VISIT.

3. FORMAT FOR MEETINGS WAS PRIMARILY QUESTION-ANSWER
OBJECTIVES WERE TO MEASURE HASSAN'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS
SITUATION OPENLY, ASSESS HIS ATTRACTIVENESS AS OPS CANDIDATE,
TO COMPARE THE SUBSTANCE AND THRUST OF THIS MEETING WITH THE
SINCE WE ARE GETTING SEPARATELY VIA SDJANUS/13. WE DID NOT
ANY INTEL BREAKTHROUGHS AND THERE WERE NONE.

4. HASSAN SAID HE SPENDS FOUR DAYS PER WEEK IN TEHRAN FOR
ON MPRP ACTIVITIES, AND THE OTHER THREE IN CON. HE SAID
DEFENSIVELY, THAT THE PARTY HAS NO "BIB NAMES" (THE DECLINING

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 53398 S E C R E T

NAME LEADERS' AND HE SAYS THERE IS NO REAL ATTEMPT AT THIS TIME WITH OTHER IRANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, SO MANY PARTIES NOW BEING FORMED AND SO FEW TAKEN IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO BE OUT SEEKING ALLIANCES. NATIONAL FRONT WAS HAVING PROBLEMS MERELY IN GETTING TO JELL. HASSAN BELIEVES IT TOO MUCH TO EXPECT AN IRAN-WIDE ORGANIZATION, BUT BY CONCENTRATING ON PARTICULARLY AZERBAIJAN, AN EFFECTIVE PARTY COULD BE BUILT. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A TIME-FUSE ON THIS, SINCE IT WOULD BE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S HAND TO DECLARE ELECTIONS TO THE MAJLIS AFTER THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN APPROVED.

5. HE SEES HIS JOB AS GETTING THE PARTY READY FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE PARTY HAS NOT PROGRESS OF ENDORSING CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE; ORGANIZING IS A GAME FOR NOW.

5. HASSAN DECLINED TO SPECULATE ON THE ROLES OF FEDERAL OR REVOLUTIONARY GUARD IN ELECTION ORGANIZATION TO THE DEMANDS OF THE KURDS AND PERHAPS OTHER NATIONAL FOR REGIONAL AUTONOMY. HASSAN EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEMS IN SUPPORT OF AUTONOMY WOULD BE A FACTOR IN GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY. HE THOUGHT EXTERNAL FORCES WERE BEHIND THOSE MOVEMENTS, AND IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TO SUADE THESE FOREIGN BACKERS TO CEASE, THE PROBLEMS WOULD GO AWAY.

6. WHEN THE RATHER STIFF QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION BEGAN TO LOOSEN, HASSAN ASKED FOR THE REAL REASON FOR OPPOSITION TO CUTLER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MOBUTU IN ZAIRE. HASSAN ASKED WHETHER THE PGOI WOULD WANT HIM TO HAVE HERE. HASSAN ASKED WHETHER SENATE RESOLUTION CRITICAL OF IRAN. HASSAN ASKED WHETHER MAZDI OR KHOMEINI REALLY BEHIND CUTLER'S DECISION. HASSAN NODDED. IN ORDER TO SUGGEST THAT CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL INFO MIGHT BE EXCHANGED WITH HASSAN WE INQUIRED WHETHER HE HAD HEARD THAT ENTEZAM WOULD BE LEAVING. HASSAN SAID HE HAD NOT, AND ASKED A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT

PAGE 3 TEHRAN 53398 S E C R E T

7. WHEN MEETING ENDED, THERE WAS FRIENDLY SHAKING OF HANDS AND PRO-FORMA PERHAPS "HOPE TO SEE YOU AGAIN", BUT CERTAINLY NO INDICATION FROM HASSAN THAT HE SEIZED OF FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN CONTACT WITH AMERICANS. HIS REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS WERE ALL DISPASSIONATE AND POLITE AND OF BOILER-PLATE VARIETY. HASSAN SEEMED QUITE CAUTIOUS, PERHAPS NATURALLY SO FOR FIRST MEETING. HE HAD NO APPARENT OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE HIMSELF. HASSAN HAS ANOTHER MEETING WITH HASSAN 12 JUNE, WHICH SET UP TO DISCUSS FURTHER WHAT WILL BE TO DO FOR THE PARTY IN THE U.S. HASSAN WOULD WANT TO BE ALERT FOR ANY FEEDBACK ON 19 JUNE MEETING WHICH HASSAN MAY GIVE AT THAT TIME.

8. FILE: 201-96084 ; 201-955511. RWV 12 JUN 89 RWV
ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

1

S E C R E T 250126Z JUL 79 INTEL

25 Jul 79 3 49z

CITE DIRECTOR 482081.

TO: TEHRAN INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL,
KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

WNINTEL INTEL

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 FOR DISSEM PER FIELD DISSEM
LINE.

1

TDFIRDB-315/13092-79

DIST: 24 JULY 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: ALLEGED EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF SHARIAT MADARI-
BACKED POLITICAL GROUP (DOI: JULY 1979)

SOURCE : AN IRANIAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.
HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS.

1. A PROMINENT BAZAARI (MERCHANT), ALI E S L A M I, A WELL-TO-
DO, "OLD SCHOOL" BUSINESSMAN WITH BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THE AGRICUL-
TURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY FIELD, IS CURRENTLY A CLOSE CONFIDANT AND
POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION/MARCH ORGANIZER FOR AYATOLLAH SEYED KAZEM
S H A R I A T - M A D A R I. ESLAMI CLAIMS THAT HE HAS SOME THIRTY
THOUSAND PEOPLE PREPARED TO MARCH AND DEMONSTRATE AGAINST AYATOLLAH
RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I IN THE SOUTH TEHRAN AREA. ESLAMI CLAIMED TO
BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE THE DEMONSTRATORS ON TWO HOURS NOTICE. JAILED FOR
THREE MONTHS BY THE COMMITTEES, HE CLAIMED HE HAD BRIBED HIS WAY TO
FREEDOM. HE STATED HE ORGANIZED THE DEMONSTRATORS IN THE ONE AND ONE.
HALF MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS INCARCERATION:

2. ESLAMI ALLEGED TWO INSTANCES IN WHICH HIS UNITS HAVE ACTED
AGAINST KHOMEINI. THE FIRST WAS AN ATTACK ON THE KHOMEINI RESIDENCE
APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS AGO INVOLVING THE USE OF A HAND GRENADE.
THE PURPOSE WAS TO PROVE TO THE POPULATION IN GENERAL THAT THERE WERE
EXISTING CAPABLE FORCES OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI.

3. THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS TO SEND APPROXIMATELY 1,000 IRANIAN
WOMEN TO QOM TO OBTAIN THE RETURN OF THEIR PERSONAL JEWELRY WHICH THEY
HAD DONATED TO KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT SHORTLY AFTER THE SHAH WAS DEPOSED.
THE INTENTION OF THIS GESTURE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE LACK OF FAITH IN
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S CURRENT GOVERNMENT.

4. ACCORDING TO ESLAMI, THE TIME IS PARTICULARLY RIPE TO MOVE
AGAINST KHOMEINI BUT THERE IS NO POLITICAL LEADER OR "DICTATOR" TO

1

FILL THE POWER VACUUM. THE CONSENSUS AT THIS TIME AMONG THE GROUP IS THAT ANY STRONG MAN THEY SELECT MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERESTS AND IT IS FELT THAT NO PERSON OTHER THAN THE SHAH CAN MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. ESLAMI FURTHER STATED THAT HIS GROUP PLANNED TO DISPOSE OF AYATOLLAH SADEQ K H A L K E A L I, IF HE WERE NOT DEAD ALREADY.

5. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING ESLAMI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SHARIAT-MADARI, SEE TEHRAN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1586 DATED 1 JUNE 1979.)

6. ACQ: (19 JULY 1979)

7. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV (CHIEFS OF MISSION ONLY)

8. WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO STATE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 24JUL99 DRV D9C.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT
#0009

19 JUL 79

SECRET 190857Z JUL 79 STAFF

INFO: TEHRAN 53713

TO: DIRECTOR

WNNINTEL SDJAMIS ORBOLSTER

REF: A. TEHRAN 53696 (NIT-10,661)
B. DIRECTOR (169170)
C. DIRECTOR 435939

1. EGS HAD TWO HOUR MEETING 16 JULY WITH SDJAMIS AND MOUSAVI. AS ANTICIPATED, THEY REPROACHED US FOR NOT HAVING MADE A DECISION REGARDING SUPPORT FOR SHARIATMADARI, AND EXPRESSED REQUEST FOR SUPPORT, AND JAMIS REVEALED HIS BACKGROUND TO THEIR REACTION REPRESENTATIVE TALK DIRECTLY TO SHARIATMADARI. JAMIS REPORTED SEPARATELY.

2. BOTH JAMIS AND MOUSAVI--ESPECIALLY THE LATTER--WERE MAINLY EXPECTING SOME POSITIVE WORD REGARDING SUPPORT TO SHARIATMADARI, AND JAMIS THOUGHT WE MUST BE FULLY INFORMED ON THE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS BEING CONDUCTED BY MUSTAFA CHAMRANI. OUR OBJECTIVE FOR THE MEETING THUS BECAME TO LOWER THEIR EXPECTATIONS WHILE PRESERVING THEIR DISPOSITION TO COOPERATE.

3. EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT OUR INABILITY TO PROVIDE MATERIAL SUPPORT MAY HAVE INHIBITED THEM FROM SHARING EVERYTHING THEY KNOW, WE WERE LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT NOT EVEN MOUSAVI, THE ACTUAL CONTACT MAN, KNOWS VERY MUCH ABOUT S-M'S ORGANIZATION OR PROGRAM. HE DESCRIBED S-M'S OBJECTIVES IN FLAG AND MOTHERHOOD TERMS, THEN, WHEN PRESSED A LITTLE, SAID S-M AND HIS PARTY OFFERED TO ALL THE "FOREIGNERS" BROUGHT BACK TO RUN THE GOVERNMENT--LISTED YAZDI, ENJIZAN, AND GHOTBADEH AS EXAMPLES. (LATER, MOUSAVI REPEATED TIMES, DESCRIBING IT AS AN OPINION OF HIS OWN WHICH HE THINKS S-M SHARES.) WE WANTED TO KNOW HOW OUR HELP, IF FORTHCOMING, WOULD BE USED, AND WERE TOLD THAT PARTY'S NEEDS NO LONGER THE SAME AS WHEN SUBJECT FIRST RAISED. ORIGINALLY, ACCORDING TO MOUSAVI, S-M'S DISTRESS AT ARBITRARY KOMITEH VIOLENCE HAD LED WITH

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 53711 SECRET
TO PROPOSE ARMING 1,000 AZERBAIJANIS IN TEHRAN TO OVERTHROW MOUSAVI; HE WOULD HAVE USED OUR MONEY TO BUY THE GUNS. THE SITUATION IS NOW LESS EXTREME AND MOUSAVI WAS ABLE TO TELL US THAT S-M NO LONGER PROPOSES SUCH AN EXTREME SOLUTION; WE WERE UNABLE TO LEARN WHAT IN FACT HE DOES PROPOSE TO DO. FOR THE RECORD, WE WERE TO IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE PARTY'S FINANCIAL NEED IS LESS PRESSING THAN WHEN AID WAS FIRST REQUESTED.

MOUSAVI SAID THAT RAHMATOLLAH NOGADAYI MARAGHEHI IN FULL COOPERATION WITH S-M, BUT WAS UNABLE EXPLAIN TACTICAL REASONING PURPOSE OF EACH ORGANIZING HIS OWN PARTY. IN RESPONSE TO ABOUT S-M'S ALLIANCES WITH MILITARY, ETHNIC, AND RELIGIOUS FIGURES, MOUSAVI SAID THERE ARE TIES TO MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ, BUT URGED US TO APPROACH S-M DIRECTLY FOR DETAILS. (HERE, AS ELSEWHERE, WE GOT IMPRESSION THAT MOUSAVI, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS HAVING INFORMATION NOT PERMITTED TO SHARE, WAS NOT IN FACT WELL INFORMED.)

BOTH MOUSAVI AND JAKI KEPT PUSHING THE DESIRABILITY OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH S-M. TO OUR QUESTION ABOUT RISK TO S-M FROM VISIT BY OFFICER UNDER JOURNALISTIC COVER, LEAVING ASIDE THE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS OF COVER MECHANICS, WE THINK THE IDEA WORTH EXPLORING. A ONE-SHOT BUT THOROUGH ELICITATION SESSION CONDUCTED BY A FARSI-SPEAKING OPERATIONAL VETERAN (ADLESICK??) WOULD CLARIFY MOUSAVI'S SIGHT ABOUT S-M'S DISPOSITION TO DEAL DIRECTLY, IF ONLY TO QUANTIFY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS KEY LEADER AND HIS ORGANIZATION AND ALLIANCES.

MAIN POSSIBLE DRAWBACK IS ONE DISCUSSED AT HQS RE: MOUSAVI'S DEPARTURE. IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE JUL 13 MOUSAVI WHO SPEAKS AUTHORITY AT VELY WHEN IT PURPORTS TO SPEAK FOR S-M AND THE PAUCITY OF FACTUAL INFORMATION ELICITED AT OUR 16 JULY MEETING IS NOT REASSURING. ANOTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEM IS THE MERSIAN DEPENDENCY BY DROMEY. THEIR NEED TO GET A SIGN FROM EYBROUHER IS SO URGENT THAT THEY CANNOT INTERPRET OUR AGREEMENT TO AT LEAST, IF NOT S-M HIMSELF, TO IMPLY COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT, OUR DISCUSSION OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH S-M IMPLIES COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT, OUR DISCUSSION NOT WITHSTANDING.

ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, WE MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING THE

PAGE 3 TEHRAN 53712 SECRET
ON 17/13 AND MOUSAVI'S FIRST MEETING WITH A STRANGER BEING NEWS; THEY SAY HE IS BETTER INFORMED, AND BY EXTENSION MORE THAN TIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF S-M THAN THEY APPEARED. WE THINK THAT, IF S-M'S INTEREST IS FINITELY ESTABLISHED, WE COULD BE CAREFUL PREPARATION TO MINIMIZE THE RISK THAT DIRECT CONTACT WILL CREATE INFLATED EXPECTATIONS. NEXT MEETING WITH JUL 15 IS HELD FOR 28 JULY AND WE WOULD WELCOME HIS VIEWS, EVEN IF IT COMES BEFORE WE SEE HIM.

8. PLS PROVIDE AVAILABLE BACKGROUND ON MOUSAVI.

9. HAVE JUST SEEN FBI'S LONDON TRANSLATION OF USEFUL INTERVIEW WITH S-M PUBLISHED 17 JULY. RECOMMEND IT TO YOUR ATTENTION.

10. FILE: 201-149066; 201-960845. R/W 19 JUL 99
ALL SECRET, SECRET

S E C R E T ...327Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53.59

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDJANUS QRBOLSTER

REF TEHRAN 53..3

1. MEETING WITH SDJANUS (J/13) AND MOUSAVI HELD AUGUST. NEITHER HAD INFORMATION OF ANY SUBSTANCE TO CONVEY. MAIN AGENDA WAS THEIR PROPOSAL RE CONTACT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI (S-M).

2. J/13 WANTED TO KNOW HQS REACTION TO HIS PITCH FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH S-M. WE SAID HQS RECOGNIZES ADVANTAGES OF DIRECT CONTACT, BUT THERE IS PROBLEM FINDING SOMEONE (1) WHO HAS FLUENT FARSI (2) WHOME TRAVEL HERE NOT PROHIBITED BY ASSOCIATION WITH SDJANUS. J/13 ACCEPTED THIS, AND SUGGESTED IF NO ONE CAN BE FOUND TO COME HERE, WE COULD DEAL WITH AYATOLLAH FNU ZANJANI WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS S-M'S ALTER EGO, AND AS ALREADY WITTING OF J/13'S INTERMEDIARY ROLE BETWEEN US AND J/13 SAID THAT ZANJANI DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH, BUT THAT HIS SON FARID WHO NOW IN TEHRAN, COULD BE USED AS INTERPRETER. ACCORDING J/13, FARID LIVES IN NEW YORK; HIS ADDRESS WAS GIVEN ONE OF PAQUIN'S PREDECESSORS DURING EARLY DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT.

3. STATION FILES CONTAIN NOTHING ON ZANJANI, AND WE HQS FORWARD BACKGROUND INFO. FYI: POLITICAL COUNSELOR IS FAMILIAR WITH ZANJANI AS LONGTIME ASSOCIATE OF BAZARGAN. BUT UNABLE CONFIRM ALLEGED CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH S-M.

4. TIME DID NOT PERMIT THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE AND WE ANY CASE PREFERRED TO DEFER FURTHER PENDING RECEIPT OF HQS INFO ON THE SUBJECT. QUESTIONS ANSWERS

A. DOES ZANJANI ACTUALLY HAVE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 53.59 S E C R E T

..... BY J/13?

B. IF HE DOES, WILL HE GIVE US THE ON ORGANIZATION AND PLANS WHICH WE UNABLE TO GET FROM AND MOUSAVI?

C. ARE THERE REAL SECURITY ADVANTAGES TO DEALING WITH ZANJANI INSTEAD OF DIRECTLY WITH S-M?

D. HQS HAS NOT YET COMMENTED ON J/13'S PROPOSAL PARA FIVE REF. WE STILL BELIEVE IT MERITS CONSIDERATION, ONE-SHOT EXERCISE, IF WE CAN SATISFY OURSELVES S-M REALLY WANTED IT. REQUEST HQS VIEWS ON THIS ACCOMP..... REQUEST INFO PER PARA FOUR ABOVE.

6. NEXT MEETING WITH J/13 SCHEDULED FOR 7 AUGUST.

7. FILE: ZOI-149066. RVW 7 AUG 99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

14 AUG 1967 07 07 Z

SECRET 142152Z AUG 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 494196.

Shariat Madari

TO: TEHRAN
MINTEL/SOLANUS/STOLSTER
REF: TEHRAN 50859

1. TEHRAN 52969, 7 MAY 79, REQUESTED TRACES ON SAID FARID WHO IN PUBLISHING BUSINESS IN N.J. DIRECTOR 43621, 11 MAY 1979, REPORTED THAT ONE MOHAMMED SAID FARID WHO WAS STUDENT AT NYU IN 1965 AND ACTIVE IN TUDEN WAS SUBJECT 201-778091. TEHRAN 53859, 11 MAY 1979, REPORTED BACK THAT FARID WAS SON OF AYATOLLAH SANJANI (ZANJANI). HQS HAS REVIEWED 201-778091 AND RUN TRACES ON AYATOLLAH ZANJANI. RESULTS OF WHICH FOLLOW.

2. SUBJECT 201-778091, MOHAMMED SAID FARID, WAS REPORTED IN JUNE 65 AS PART TIME STUDENT NYU AND ACTIVE IN TUDEN. DPOB: 30 JULY 1936 (OR 1932), ZANJAN, IRAN. EMPLOYED LANA KNITWEAR INC., UPPER MONTCLAIR, N.J. IN 1967, ADDR: 380 UPPER RIVER DRIVE, APT 4H, PASSAIC, N.J. SAID FARID WAS LISTED AS VP IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF ISA OF THE U.S. (ISAU) AS OF SEPT 1966. PER NIRA-19130, 21 JUN 1965, H. SAID FARID, REGISTERED AS PART TIME STUDENT AT NYU, AND FATHER AYATOLLAH SEYED, FARID HAVE RECORD OF TUDEN ACTIVITY IN IRAN. STATE DEPT INFO 7 OCT 67 REPORTED MOHAMMED SAID FARID, DPOB AS STATED ABOVE, ARRIVED U.S. 1959. APPLIED FOR PRA DEC 55. EMPLOYED LANA KNITWEAR, RESIDENCE PASSAIC, AS STATED ABOVE. FULL NAME WAS GIVEN AS MOHAMMED SAID FARID ZANJANI NIRA 1521, 13 SEP 67, WHICH REPORTED ON 14TH ANNUAL ISA CONGRESS STATE (MOHAMMED S. FARID AS VP OF SAN (SIC) AND LEADER OF SPLINE GROUP OF N.Y. CHAPTER WHICH FORMER N.Y. CHAPTER I PASSAIC

3. AYATOLLAH HAJ AGHA REZA ZANJANI AKA REZA ZANJANI AKA MULLAH SEYED REZA ZANJANI IS SUBJECT 201-106064, WAS ENCRYPTED IDENTIA DOB CIRCA 1905. LONG-TIME AND CLOSE FRIEND OF FORMER TEHRAN ASSET SDROPEY1 WHO KEPT STATION ADVISED OF HIS ACTIVITIES. SDROPEY1 WAS SOMETIMES RELUCTANT TO CONTACT ZANJANI BECAUSE OF

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 494196 SECRET ZANJANI RETAINED A SPORADIC WATCH ON HIM (ZANJANI) BY SAVAK, INCLUDING THE DISSENT WIDE CIRCLE OF CONTACTS THROUGHOUT IRAN INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHED POLITICAL AND PROMINENT NON-MEMBERS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT. ZANJANI INCLUDING THE BAZARI. WAS STRONGLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT. MOHAMMED HAD BEEN APPOINTED WITH BAKER KAZEMI AND BAKHTIAR BY DR. KAZEMI TO A THREE-MAN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO OVERSEE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW THIRD NATIONAL FRONT WHICH WAS BEING FORMED BY KAZEMI ON MOSADEQ'S INSTRUCTIONS. NIRA-19130, 21 JUNE 1965, REPORTED THAT STATION CONTACT JALAL MAZDI (ENCRYPTED IDEN B, 201-78012) ENGINEER IN NIIOC INTRODUCED STATION OFFICER MADENSKY TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW WHO WAS SON OF AYATOLLAH ZANJANI. BROTHER-IN-LAW S. RAHIM FARID WAS NAT. U.S. CIT AND MARRIED TO U.S. CIT, FOUR CHILDREN. STUDIED SETON HALL UNIVERSITY, N.Y. ADDR: 10, BOX 108, BRAZIL, INDIANA. (GENERAL SURGEON) WAS ASSIGNED 201-778090. HIS YOUNGER BROTHER WAS H. SAID FARID, DPOB CA 1932, STUDENT NYU WHO WAS ASSIGNED 201-778091. TEHRAN 6283, 29 SEP 66, REPORTED OFFICIALS OF SYRIAN LEGATION TEHRAN WERE IN TOUCH WITH NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NRM) THRU SEYED REZA ZANJANI. NRM PASSING TO SYRIAN MATERIAL RE IRANIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDE ON SUEZ FOR BROADCAST ON RADIO CAIRO.

4. FILE REVIEW DOES NOT SUBSTANTIATE ALLEGATION THAT ZANJANI CLOSE TO SHARIAT MADARI, BUT OF COURSE NEITHER DOES THIS EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY. SINCE THERE IS APPARENT LANGUAGE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH ZANJANI AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEAL THROUGH SAN FARID, MIK WOULD DEPEND ON DURATION FARID'S STAY IN TEHRAN AND STATION'S ASSESSMENT HIS SUITABILITY/RELIABILITY. ON BALANCE WAS DISINCLINED PUBLISH THIS LEAD.

5. COMMENTS ON OTHER ASPECTS FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

FILE: 201-149066, 201-778091, 201-106064 RWN 13AUG69
SECRET

S E C R E T 281208Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54050

TO: DIRECTOR.

KNINTEL INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54051 (NIT-10,700)

1. REF INFO OBTAINED BY SDJANUS/13 FROM MOUSAVI.MOUSAVI WAS PRESENT, WITH J/13 INTERPRETING, AND WE WERE ABLE TO CLARIFY SEVERAL POINTS WHICH OBSCURE IN J/13'S INTIAL PRESENTATION. WE ASKED MOUSAVI IF HE HAD ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM SHARIAT-MADARI: HE WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF.

2. NO FILE. RVW 28 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 061209Z SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 508509.

TEHRAN.

KNINTEL SDJANUS

TEHRAN 54113
TEHRAN 54057
DIRECTOR 404192

AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO MEET WITH ZANJANI FOR PURPOSES OF GATHERING INTELLIGENCE ON MFR AND SHARIAT-MADARI (S-M) IN CONNECTIONS. WITH SDJANUS/13 (J/13) ACTING AS INTERPRETER. ZANJANI SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF PICTURE. POINT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ZANJANI MEETING IS FOR INFORMATION GATHERING PURPOSES AND NO COMMITMENTS, SUPPORT OR OTHERWISE, SHOULD BE READ INTO IT. WILL BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF S-M IS AWARE OF MEETING. ZANJANI PURPORTS TO BE ACTING AS HIS SPOKESMAN. EXPECT MEETING WILL IMPROVE J/13 OWN POSITION WITH S-M FORCES AND HOPE TO GIVE HIM GREATER ACCESS TO MFR INFORMATION, AS WELL AS SHOW HIM THAT HIS EFFORTS HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT WITH US. WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER INFO ON MEETING ARRANGEMENTS AND COVER ROLE STATION OFFICER INTENDS PLAY. PLS CLARIFY WHETHER ACQUIRVI HAS BEEN TOLD THAT FAQUIN IS STATION OFFICER.

NO FILE: 201-149268. RVW 65EPP9 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#389

15 Sep 79 04 40 Z

E C R E T 131600Z SEP 79 STATE

SITE FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

MINTEL AJAJA FORRES TRACE SDHEEP

REF: DIRECTOR 510725 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. AT 11 SEPT MEETING, NEW ASSET SUBEE B/1 (B 1) (IDEN FOR TEHRAN) GAVE PHILADELPHIA BASE OFFICER RENSLEY, IN RTACTION AL FOLLOWING POSSIBLE OPS LEAD:

NAME: ALI AKBAR S H A E L A (SUBJ)
DPOB: CA 1919; TABRIZ, IRAN
CIT: IRAN
OCC: MANAGER FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIAN STATE-WNED IMPORTED GLASSWARE SUBSIDIARY LOCATED IN BAZAAR SECTION OF TEHRAN.
ADD: BAZAAR, TEHRAN

2. SUBJ, A LONGTIME PERSONAL FRIEND OF B/1, S A FIRST COUSIN AND CONFIDANT OF AYATOLLAH KAZEM S H A R I A T - M A D A R I TOLD RENSLEY THAT HE KNEW SUBJ AND SHARIAT-MADARI MET REGULARLY EVERY FRIDAY WHEN B/1 WAS IN IRAN. (B 1 LEFT IRAN 15 JAN 79.) ACCORDING TO B/1, SUBJ HAS ALWAYS BEEN APOLITICAL IN KEEPING WITH SHARIAT-MADARI'S PHILOSOPHY THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERS (AND THEIR FAMILIES) SHOULD ATTEND MOSQUE SERVICES RATHER THAN MANAGE AFFAIRS OF STATE. NEVERTHELESS, SUBJ HAS BEEN VALUABLE TO SHARIAT-MADARI THROUGH SUBJ'S SILENT INFLUENCE IN ZERBAIJANI COMMUNITY IN THE BAZAAR. B/1 DESCRIBED SUBJ AS DEEP RELIGIOUS AND STRONG NATIONALIST. HE WAS EDUCATED IN IRAN, AND IS MARRIED WITH AT LEAST ONE DAUGHTER WHO WAS BORN IN TEHRAN. SUBJ HAS ANOTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION IN 1975 AS A TITHE ON THE SECRETARY IN TEHRAN. SUBJ SPEAKS PERSI AND TURKISH AND TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY ON BUSINESS TRIPS TO GERMANY AND CISCO). FOR THESE REASONS, B/1 SAID HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH SHARIAT-MADARI AND SUBJ WILL REMAIN STRONG AND HE WOULD NOT LAUSIBLE REASONS (AND BECAUSE OF HIS FAMILIAL TIES TO SHARIAT-MADARI). B/1 TOLD RENSLEY THAT HE IS WILLING TO USE HIS "CLAN-

PAGE 2 FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926 S E C R E T
DESTINE TELEPHONIC CHANNEL TO TRY ARRANGE MEETING WITH SUBJ IN EUROPE ON BEHALF OF RTACTION AT A FUTURE DATE. B/1 VOLUNTEERED TO ATTEMPT CONTACT SUBJ WHILE B/1 IS IN LONDON AND PARIS LATER THIS MONTH TO DETERMINE SUBJ'S PLANS TO VISIT EUROPE THIS YEAR. B/1 ALSO VOLUNTEERED TO INTRODUCE RTACTION OFFICER (IN WYBEAZON ALI S) IF SUBJ DOES MEET B/1. B/1 STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT SUBJ IS SHARIAT-MADARI'S MOST TRUSTED FRIEND AND, THEREFORE, SUBJ HAS EXCELLENT ACCESS TO AND INFLUENCE WITH SHARIAT-MADARI. B/1 WAS EQUALLY PERSUASIVE IN TELLING RENSLEY THAT HE COULD SAFELY REQUEST A MEETING WITH SUBJ OUTSIDE IRAN AND THAT SUBJ WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THIS INVITATION. B/1 SAID HE IS SURE THAT SUBJ WOULD CONSULT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI BEFORE ACCEPTING B/1'S INVITATION AND THAT SHARIAT-MADARI WOULD GIVE HIS APPROVAL

B/1 ALSO HAS HAD LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI DUE TO B/1'S PROMINENT FAMILY STATUS AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. B/1 SAID HIS LAST PERSONAL MEETING WITH SHARIAT-MADARI TOOK PLACE CIRCA 1977 IN QUM DURING EARLY STAGES OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN. B/1'S LAST COMMUNICATION WITH SHARIAT-MADARI ARRIVED CLANDESTINELY IN IRANIAN NEWSPAPERS ON 26 MARCH 79. B/1 WAS ACCUSED OF PERFORMING "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACT VITIES IN LONDON. B/1 SAID AT THAT TIME HE USED HIS CLANDESTINE TELEPHONIC CHANNEL TO TELL SHARIAT-MADARI THAT THE ACCUSATIONS WERE FALSE. SHARIAT-MADARI, USING SAME CHANNEL, SENT MESSAGE TO B/1 SAYING THAT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HIS MEDICATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT, I SHALL ASK HIM TO RETURN (TO IRAN). B/1 TOLD RENSLEY THAT SUBJ WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THESE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN B/1 AND SHARIAT-MADARI.

B/1 TOLD RENSLEY THAT HIS FATHER AND SHARIAT-MADARI WERE GOOD FRIENDS. B/1 WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN COMPLYING WITH HIS FATHER'S DYING WISH TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF B/1'S FAMILY WEALTH TO SHARIAT-MADARI IN 1975. B/1 SAID THAT HE ALSO MADE ANOTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION IN 1975 AS A TITHE ON THE WAGES OF B/1'S SON (IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT OUTSIDE SAN FRANCISCO). FOR THESE REASONS, B/1 SAID HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH SHARIAT-MADARI AND SUBJ WILL REMAIN STRONG AND HE WOULD NOT WAGTATE TO RETURN TO IRAN IF SHARIAT-MADARI ASKED HIM TO DO SO AND GUARANTEED HIS SAFETY.

PAGE 3: FR/PHILADELPHIA 11 26 S E C R E T

6. ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON B/1-RENSKLEY 11 SEPT MEETING
BEING FORWARDED BY TELEPHONE. REF REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH
EVI ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR 11 SEPT MEETING AND WILL BE PASSED
AT NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 24 SEPT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO
EVI'S PLANNED TRAVEL TO EUROPE.

7. FOR HQS: QUERY IF GUMINSKY AVAILABLE 24 SEPT FOR
PLANNED MEETING WITH B/1 AND RENSKLEY IN PHILADELPHIA HOTEL
ROOM, STARTING 1200 HOURS.

8. FILE: 281-961587. RWV 13 SEP 99 DRV D9G1.

S E C R E T
BT
749

S E C R E T 151400Z SEP 79 TAP

FR/PHILADELPHIA 11027

TEHRAN.
HOTEL AWALA FORRES TRACE

FR/PHILADELPHIA 11026

IDENT - MANOUCHEE NIKPOUR
13 SEP 99 DRV D9G1.

S E C R E T

SECRET 191345Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 51632

TO: FR/PHILADELPHIA INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDBREP

REF: FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926

1. APPRECIATE REF INFO ON SDBREP/1 (B/1) LINES TO PHILADELPHIA
MADARI (S-M). FOR PRESENT WISH TAKE NO ACTION ON CONTACT WITH
B/1 FRIEND BUT WE SHOULD REMAIN WILLING LISTEN TO WHAT B/1
WILLING PASS ALONG RE S-M. FYI, TEHRAN STATION HAS BEEN IN CONTACT
FACT FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH FOLLOWERS OF S-M WHO HAVE
PUT STRAIN ON DIRECT TOUCH WITH S-M. AS YET, BECAUSE OF IN-
HERENT SECURITY AND POLICY PROBLEMS, WE HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED
A DIRECT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH HIM. IN FACT WE ARE NOT
COMPLETELY SATISFIED HE ACTUALLY WANTS A DIRECT LINK WITH US.
TEHRAN STATION IS MOVING TO DETERMINE THIS.

2. CUMMISKY WILL PLAN TRAVEL PHILADELPHIA FOR REF MEETING
ON 2 SEPT VIA METROLINER DEPARTING WASHINGTON 0600 AND ARRIVING
PHILADELPHIA 1000. REQUEST RENSHEY MEET AT 30TH STREET STATION
IF AVAILABLE DISCUSS CASE PRIOR TO MEETING. CUMMISKY IS
5 FEET 10 INCHES, 150 POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, WILL BE
WEARING A PLAIN FLAID SUIT.

3. UNINTEL TRACES SUBJ REF.

4. FILE 201-361567. RWV 18SEP99 DMV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET 191238Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54251

TO: DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL 9RBOLSTEN SOJANUS

REF: DIRECTOR 508729

1. HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ACT ON HQS APPROVAL OF MEETING
ZANJANI BECAUSE OF SOJANUS/13 UNAVAILABILITY. HAVE BEEN CALLING
HIM, PER HIS INSTRUCTION, AT HOUSE OF HIS FRENCH-SPEAKING FRIEND
BUT HE NEVER THERE WHEN CALLED, AND FRIEND HAS SAID ONLY THAT HE
THOUGHT J/13 CONSIDERING A TRIP.
2. AT OUR LAST SESSION, WE GAVE J/13 NUMBER OF STATION
DIRECT LINE; HE HAS NOT USED IT.
3. WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO REACH J/13, AND WILL ADVISE
RESULTS.
4. FILE: 201-146866. RWV 19 SEP 99 DMV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T 091342Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54435

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDJANUS SDPROBE

REF: A. TEHRAN 54356
B. DIRECTOR 524423

1. HAVE NOT YET SEEN SDJANUS/13 (J/13) FOR MEETING INTENDED TO FINALIZE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SESSION WITH ZANJANI. WORKING THROUGH J/13'S FRENCH-SPEAKING FRIEND, WE ARRANGED FOR TWO-DAY POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 4 OCTOBER; THIS DONE TO ACCOMMODATE A VISITOR ASSOCIATED WITH COS' COVER JOB. NEITHER J/13 NOR MOUSAVI APPEARED AT THE APPOINTED TIME, AND WE INFER THAT OUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE GARBLED BY THE INTERMEDIARY. LATTER DID NOT ANSWER HIS PHONE ON 7 OR 8 OCTOBER, AND J/13 HAS NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF NUMBER GIVEN HIM SEVERAL WEEKS AGO.

2. AT LAST MEETING WITH SDPROBE/1, WE INQUIRED ABOUT ZANJANI'S PERSONAL CONSTITUENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH SHARIAT-MADARI. P/1 SAID THAT ZANJANI IS MORE POLITICAL THAN RELIGIOUS, AND HAS A MODEST FOLLOWING AMONG INTELLECTUALS. HE DESCRIBED ZANJANI'S INFLUENCE IN AZERBAIJAN AS NEGLIGIBLE. P/1 SAID THAT THERE IS CONTACT BETWEEN ZANJANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI, AND THAT HE SAW ZANJANI AT A MEETING WITH SHARIAT-MADARI WHEN THE LATTER STOPPED IN TEHRAN AFTER RAMADAN ON HIS WAY FROM MASHAD TO QOM. P/1 DOES NOT VIEW THE RELATIONSHIP AS PARTICULARLY CLOSE.

3. WE WILL HAVE THE ABOVE IN MIND AS WE FORMULATE QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERVIEW WITH ZANJANI WHICH WE STILL HOPE TO ARRANGE. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. APPRECIATE REF B ASSISTANCE. WILL PASS THE WORD WHEN J/13 RESURFACES.

5. FILE: 201-237926. RVW 9 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

SIGNALLED OUR DESIRE FOR A MEETING. SAW HIM AND MOUSAVI IN SEPTEMBER. J/13 SAID HIS UNAVAILABILITY DUE TO MAJOR BACK SURGERY UNDERGONE BY HIS DAUGHTER IN PASADENA; HE HAD BEEN SCRATCHING AND TRYING TO GET PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY TO VISIT HER. HIS REQUEST IS NOW IN CHAMRAM'S HANDS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRIME MINISTER. MEANWHILE, J/13 ASKS THAT WE CHECK ON DAUGHTER'S CONDITION; HE SEEMS NOT SATISFIED WITH INFORMATION OBTAINED BY US. HE SAID CUMMISKEY CAN INQUIRE THROUGH J/13 SON. WILL APPRECIATE HQS CHECKING ON THIS. NEXT MEETING WITH J/13 SCHEDULED FOR 4 OCTOBER.

3. AS MOUSAVI TELLS IT, ZANJANI HAS HIS OWN BASE OF SUPPORT AMONG THE AZERBAIJANI TURKS (MAYBE THAT IS WHY S-M, DESCRIBING ZANJANI AS THE SUPPORT OF ONLY THREE MILLION AZERBAIJANI TURKS).

WE HAVE ASKED MOUSAVI TO RECOMMEND ANOTHER MEETING TO ZANJANI (OR OTHER SELECTED SITE).

6. FILE: 201-149066. RVW 30 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
C R E T

SDJANUS/13. MR. FARAZIAN. FORMER
SENIER SAVAK OFFICER (POSSIBLY
BRIGADIER OR MAJOR GENERAL)
SPECIALTY: INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS.
OFFICE: 2ND OR THIRD FLOOR (LEFT
SIDE OF STAIRS), IN OFFICE BUILDING
JUST NORTH OF RUSSIAN DEPARTMENT
STORE ON EX-NADER SHAH.

AGE: 50-55.

PURPOSE OF CONTACT: (1) INFORMATION
ON ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF
SAVAMA, TO WHICH MR. F. WAS
UNPAID (?) CONSULTANT; (2) INFORMATION
ON CLERICAL ROLE IN IRANIAN POLITICS.
MR. F. OFFERED TO ARRANGE A MEETING,
THROUGH AN ASSOCIATE MR. MOUSAVI,
WITH AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI.
WASHINGTON THOUGHT ITS PURPOSE MIGHT
BE MISUNDERSTOOD, AND DISAPPROVED.
MR. F.; APPARENTLY AT MR. M. SUGGESTION
PROPOSED AYATOLLAH ZANJANI AS BEING
ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE BUT NOT ASSOCIATED
WITH A POLITICAL PARTY. WASHINGTON
APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE. ZANJANI WAS TO
BE ASKED TO DETERMINE IF S.M HAD
ANY INFORMATION HE WANTED TO PASS.
AS OF 4 NOVEMBER, MEETING NOT
1 YET ARRANGED.

SDJANUS/13.

MEANS OF CONTACT: MEETINGS ARRANGED
BY PHONE CALL TO MR. F. AT OFFICE
OR AT HOME OF RELATIVE (BROTHER-IN-
LAW?). MEETINGS AT OFFICE.

RE (1) ABOVE: INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
ON PLANS TO EMPLOY FORMER SAVAK
OFFICERS WHO HAD WORKED AGAINST
FOREIGN EMBASSIES, AND ON TARGETING
OF SAVAMA ON COMMUNIST, WEST
EUROPEAN, AND U.S. EMBASSIES.

PAYMENT: NONE.

*Mr. Mousavi is a layman, and a businessman (nature of the business not
known). Age: 50-55. Has office in North Tehran. He is a supporter of
he
Shariat-Madari, but whether he is directly connected with the Ayatollah
is not known.

SDJANUS/13. Mr. Farazian.

Mr. F had official contact with the Station before the Revolution. After the Revolution, he remained in contact by telephone. First meeting with him was in late July or early August, in his office in the building just north of the Russian Department Store on ex-Nader Shah. At one of the early meetings, Mr. F brought along Mr. Mousavi, whom he described as a businessman.

Meetings were held on an irregular basis, on the average every three or four weeks.

Mr. F said that he was in touch with Mustafa ~~xxxxxx~~ Chamran, as an informal and unpaid consultant on the organization of SAVAMA. He said he attended some meetings of SAVAMA officials; he is believed to have been in contact with Mehdi Chamran, either in the context of such meetings or via individual appointments.

Mr. F reported the substance of one meeting, in which operational priorities were discussed. Most of the participants wanted to give top priority to the presumed intelligence activities of the Soviet Embassy, with second priority given to the U.S. Embassy. One participant argued that top priority be given to the U.S. Embassy. Mr. F gave the name of this official, but it is not recalled.

In this same context, Mr. F described a proposal ~~xxxx~~ for SAVAMA to hire approximately 50 former SAVAK officers who had experience in counter-intelligence work against foreign embassies. This project underwent various ~~xxx~~ changes: at first, they were to be employed part-time; ~~xxxx~~ then the whole thing was to be abandoned and all pensions canceled for former SAVAK officers; then, at least some of the original 50 were to be hired on a

full time basis.

Mr. Mousavi was introduced as a supporter, but not as a representative, of Shariat-Madari. (Mr. F said that Mousavi knew Paquin only as an Embassy officer.) Neither Mr. F nor Mousavi seemed well informed of S-M's views or of the organization and program of his political party, and offered to arrange a meeting between S-M and one of our officers on an "information only" basis. Washington disapproved this, on the ground that S-M might misunderstand our purposes, and because of difficulty of travel to Qom. Mr F and Mousavi then suggested that Ayatollah Zanjani could provide information on S-M's party, as well as any views that S-M wished to have conveyed. As of 4 November, it was understood that Mr. Mousavi was making arrangements for a meeting with Ayatollah Zanjani.

SDVALID/1.

In May or early June, Glegoroff had one meeting with Hassan, son of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. Recollection is not certain on this point, but it is believed that SDVALID/1 arranged the meeting and served as interpreter. It is also believed that Hassan was not told that Glegoroff was anything other than a regular Embassy officer. (The other possibility is SDFORWARD/1. If, as believed, it was SDVALID/1, the latter subsequently made a trip to the U.S., from which he returned as previously noted.)

Real Name: Rahmatullah Muqadam Maraghei.

Code Name: S. D. Prob.

Muqadam Maraghei was an old friend of the C. I. A. station in Tehran since Aban 1332 (October 1953), and in Aban 1340 (October 1961) a letter of approval was issued to employ him for supplying political reports and also for launching secret hostile propaganda campaigns (against anti-American). The relevant document can be seen in the file containing documents about Shariat Madari. (document No. 12)

After Maraghei was appointed as the governor of Azarbaijan by the provisional government, the Americans decided to re-establish contacts with him via S. D. Prank. Apparently this idea could not be materialized until Murdad 58 (August 1979), when Muqadam would have returned from Azarbaijan to Tehran. Then, Hasa Gawa, one of the C. I. A. agents posted in the Embassy of Japan would introduce him to the director of the C. I. A. station at Tehran for re-establishing contacts. After this introduction, their weekly meetings were held at the residence of Hasa Gawa.

In his reports Maraghei gave extensive information concerning the Iranian provisional government, government officials, events in Kurdistan, the Revolutionary Council, the Experts' Council and about his associations with the Radical Movement and Shariat Madari. To bring about an improvement in Irano-U. S. relations, in one of the meetings he suggests that one of the Americans should meet with the Imam, in a bid to open a channel of access between the diplomatic mission, or the Station and the other Ulema. Similarly, he consulted with the C. I. A. about plans for forming a political united front in association with his Radical Movement and other parties like the National Front and the Muslim People's Party of Shariat Madari.

Maraghei had (long term) associations with the Political section of the U. S. Embassy as well as the C. I. A. section. After re-establishing contacts with him in Mehr 58 (September 1979), the C. I. A., in order to save him from becoming conspicuous, asked the political section of the embassy to break relations with him, since his repeated visits would have increased the possibility of his becoming obvious, (the political section was apparently not aware of the problems and connections of the C. I. A.).

SECRET 091206Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54167

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDPROBE INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54166 (NIT-10,720)

1. SDPROBE/1 OBTAINED PARA ONE REF FROM SON OF SHARIATMADARI. HIS KURDISH SOURCES ARE NOT NAMED; THEY APPEAR TO BE CASUAL INFORMANTS, BUT WE NOT CERTAIN YET PRECISELY WHERE HE GETS HIS INFORMATION ON THAT SUBJECT.

2. NO FILE. RVW 9 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET 011323Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53825

TO: DIRECTOR INFO COPENHAGEN.

WNINTEL SDJAMUS SDPROBE SDPRANK SDPUTCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 484635

B. TEHRAN 53670 (NOT SENT/NEEDED COPENHAGEN)

1. WE WONDER IF REF B MAY HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED DURING PREPARATION OF REF A. ON 1 AUGUST, IDEN REF B REPEATED HIS INTENTION TO INTRODUCE CGS TO MOGHADAM AS SOON AS LATTER RETURN FROM TRIP TO AZERBAIJAN. WE HAVE ALREADY ARRANGED A VISA PUSH FOR MOGHADAM'S SON, AND THIS SEEMS LIKELY TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR EFFORT TO BUILD PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP.

2. WHATEVER OTHER ANGLES HOS MAY WISH PURSUE, ASSUME YOU WILL WANT US TO CONTINUE THIS LOCAL APPROACH.

3. IT IS CLEAR THAT IDEN REF B PERCEIVES HIMSELF TO BE COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH RTACTON. REQUEST ASS GN 201 NO CRYPTONYM. ASSUME FAIRLY COMPLETE BIC AVAILABLE HOS.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-237926, 201-105900, 201-229725.
UW 1 AUG 99 DRV WSC. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET 211030Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54289

TO: DIRECTOR

WHINTEL INTEL

1. SDPROBE/I PROVIDED THESE FRAGMENTS ON 201 3053, 7341

A. YAZDI, SABBAGHIAN, CHAMRAN, AND TABATABAI HAVE COMBINED TRY TO IMPROVE THEIR COLLECTIVE POWER POSITION. THEIR INTENTION IS PRESUMABLY TO GUARANTEE THEIR PRESENCE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS COMBINATION HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF RUMOR, BUT THERE IS ALSO SOME DEFINITE EVIDENCE WHICH PARTIALLY CONFIRMS IT. (COMMENT: WE WERE UNABLE TO LEARN WHAT THIS EVIDENCE IS.)

B. TALEQANI MUST IN FACT HAVE BEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH. THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE. (COMMENT: SDPROBE/I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD NOT KNOWN, BEFORE TALEQANI'S DEATH, OF HIS PRESIDING OVER THE COUNCIL.)

C. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE A FAIRLY STABLE MEMBERSHIP, MEETS TWO, OFTEN THREE, TIMES A WEEK AT THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING. (COMMENT: SDPROBE/I'S IMPRESSION OF A STABLE MEMBERSHIP IS BASED, AS FAR AS HE COULD LEARN, ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT SOME WEEKS AGO OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS MINISTERIAL UNDERSECRETARIES, AND OF THE SIMULTANEOUS ELEVATION OF SEVERAL P801 MINISTERS TO COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP.)

2. NO FILE. RVV 21SEP99 BRV D9C.1.
SECRET

REPORT CLASS SECRET - UNINT - WAFORM - AND CONTRACT

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: STATEMENTS OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI ABOUT HIS ULTIMATUM TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MAHABAD SEIGE, AN EMIGRE AND INTERNAL OPPOSITION POLITICS (DOA) LATE OCTOBER 1979

SOURCE: A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS.

1. AYATOLLAH KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI SAID IN LATE OCTOBER 1979 THAT HE HAD INTERVENED TO BRING AN END TO THE GOVERNMENT SEIGE OF MAHABAD IN WEST AZERBAIJAN. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SENT AN EMISSARY TO INTERIOR MINISTER HASHEM SADEGH QAZVINI, DEMANDING THAT THE SEIGE BE LIFTED. IF THE SEIGE CONTINUED, HE WOULD MOBILIZE AZERBAIJANI TURKS TO LIFT IT BY FORCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: SHARIAT-MADARI DID NOT SAY WHEN THE ULTIMATUM HAD BEEN DELIVERED. QAZVINI RECENTLY APPOINTED TO TRY TO DEVISE A SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH REBELLION. THE TEHRAN TIMES HAS REPORTED THAT THE SEIGE OF MAHABAD WAS CONTINUING ON 28 OCTOBER, BUT HAD BEEN PARTLY LIFTED ON 24 OCTOBER.)

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHARIAT-MADARI VIGOROUSLY DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH EXILED FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIYAR. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIYAR HAD MADE ONE INITIATIVE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT, BUT THAT THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM. SHARIAT-MADARI EXPLICITLY DENIED THAT HE WAS MADE OR INTENDS TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT BAKHTIYAR.

5. SHARIAT-MADARI SAID THAT HE IS ADVISING THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PARTY (MPRP) TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH AYATOLLAH RUMOLLAH BAKHTIYAR AND THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. (SOURCE COMMENT: SHARIAT-MADARI WAS SPEAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF KHOMEINI'S DENUNCIATION OF THE MPRP'S PUBLIC MEETING OF 19 OCTOBER, AT WHICH THERE WERE CALLS FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS.) SHARIAT-MADARI PERCEIVES KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY TO BE DECLINING, AND THAT HE BELIEVES IT WILL BECOME POSSIBLE, PERHAPS WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS, FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS TO VOICE THEIR CRITICISMS MORE FREELY.

OVER SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. MOQADDAM IDENTIFIED FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI AS ONE OF FIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO THINKS ARE LEADING THE CAMPAIGN TO CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITY. MOQADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD KNOWN YAZDI BEFORE THE REVOLUTION AND REGARDED HIM AS BASICALLY MODERATE, EVEN PRO-WESTERN. NOW, HE SAID, IT SEEMS THAT YAZDI AND THE OTHERS IGNORING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AS THEY STRUGGLE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POWER. MOQADDAM IDENTIFIED THE OTHERS IN THE GROUP AS DEFENSE MINISTER MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SADEQ TABATABAEE, INTERIOR MINISTER HASHEM SABAGHIAN, AND NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION DIRECTOR SADEQ GHOTBZADEH.

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (7 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-10,763.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN (CHARGE ONLY). SENT TO AMMAN MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 9 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1 CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

SECRET 180704Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54438

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDPROBE

1. AT 6 OCTOBER STAFF MEETING, DURING DISCUSSION OF SD/UTTY/A AFFAIR, CHARGE INSTRUCTED ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO CONTACT SDPROBE/A AS ~~THE~~ SOURCE ON ATMOSPHERICS OF THIS CASE. POLCOUNS RESPONDED IT PERHAPS BEST WAIT UNTIL DUST SETTLES. AS CHARGE HAS ON OTHER OCCASIONS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN P/I, WE CONCLUDED THAT THIS THE MOMENT TO SURFACE OUR CONTACT. CHARGE OBVIOUSLY CONTENT TO LEAVE THINGS AS THEY ARE, AND GIVEN POLCOUNS REACTION WE ANTICIPATE NO NEED FOR CEASE AND DESIST ORDER TO POLITICAL SECTION WHICH WOULD TEND TO REVEAL THE RELATIONSHIP.

2. UPSHOT WAS THAT CHARGE ASKED US TO EXPLORE WITH P/I WHAT HE (AND WE) SEE AS INTENSIFIED IRANIAN PARANOIA. DISCUSSION OF THIS WITH P/I LED TO SOME SPECULATION AS TO MEANS OF LIMITING THE ATTENDANT DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. P/I SUGGESTED, AS HAS SDURN/P/I, THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE CONTACT WITH KHOMEINI. HE SAID HE THINKS, EVEN A PRO FORMA EXPRESSION OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION, AND OF CONCERN OVER STATE OF OUR RELATIONS, WOULD DO SOME GOOD. (NOT MENTIONED BY P/I WAS POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A MEETING, IF IT WENT ACCEPTABLY WELL, MIGHT OPEN UP MISSION OR STATION ACCESS TO OTHERS OF THE ULEMA.)

3. P/I FIRST SUGGESTED DICK COTTAM AS GOOD CHOICE TO SEE KHOMEINI, EXPLAINING THIS ON BASIS THAT COTTAM HAS ALREADY MET HIM, AND FACT OF PRIOR ACQUAINTANCE CONSTITUTES SOME ADVANTAGE. P/I SAID HE REGARDS APPROACH BY CHARGE OR OTHER U.S. OFFICIAL AN EQUALLY VIABLE APPROACH, AND CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE THINKS THAT FOR US TO KEEP OUR DISTANCE FROM KHOMEINI SIMPLY LEAVES THE FIELD TO INFLUENCES HOSTILE TO US. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAS NO IDEA WHO IN FACT DOES INFLUENCE KHOMEINI'S THINKING.

4. SUBSTANCE PARAS TWO AND THREE ABOVE HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO THE CHARGE

5. FILE: 201-237926. RVW 10 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
SECRET

SECRET 121714Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

SITE WASHINGTON 531200. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL, DFDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: MNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER
NIT'S 10,720 THROUGH 10,720 REVIEWED 10 OCTOBER 1979.

OBJECTIVE: S.I.B. RATING: 5
FIELD NO NIT-10,720 NO OPACT
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15783-79, 9 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDPROBE/1, FULL CONTROLS

BT
#9535

PAGE 4 WASHINGTON 531200 SECRET

SUBJECT: 1. KHOMENI ATTITUDE TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS
IN KURDISTAN;
2. ABSENCE OF IRAQI INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN"
COMMENT: IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE REPORTING ON HOW
KHOMENI VIEWED THE KURDISH SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THE CAPTURE
OF THE KURDISH TOWNS. ALSO, AS STATION KNOWS, THERE CONTINUES
TO BE ENDLESS SPECULATION ON POSSIBLE IRAQI INVOLVEMENT IN IRANIAN
MINORITY MOVEMENTS. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

2. NO FILE. RVW 12OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#9536

13 OCT 79 25Z

Out Intel

*Rec'd
ADP*

19 OCT 79 11Z

SECRET 181820Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

SITE WASHINGTON 534861. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE; NE/INTEL

SUBJECT: MNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER
NIT'S 10,721 THROUGH 10,733. NIT-10,724 IS BEING REDRAFTED
IN VIEW OF TEHRAN 54450.

OBJ: S.I.B.

NIT-10,721 NO OPACT TDFIRDB-315/15777-79 RATING: 5
9 SEPTEMBER 1979
UNILATERAL SDPROBE/1 CONTROLS: FULL

SUBJECT: "PROGRESS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS"

COMMENT: WE FEEL VERY FORTUNATE TO HAVE SDPROBE/1 IN A UNIQUE
POSITION TO GIVE US REPORTING ON THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS. VERY
MUCH OF INTEREST TO ANALYSTS. THEY WELCOME CONTINUED REPORTING ON
THIS SUBJECT. REPORT WAS USED IN THE ACSI BRIEF.

OBJ: S.I.B.

NIT-10,722 NO OPACT TDFIRDB-315/15782-79 RATING: 5
9 SEPTEMBER 1979
UNILATERAL SDPROBE/1 CONTROLS: FULL

SUBJECT: "VIEWS OF RAHMATOLLAH MARAGHEH-MOQADDAM ON PROSPECTS
FOR A NEW IRANIAN POLITICAL COALITION CENTERED ON THE
MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY"

COMMENT: THIS WAS A GOOD ANALYSIS BY SDPROBE/1 ON SHARIAT-MADARI
POSSIBILITIES IN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. ACCORDING TO GIBSON
SDPROBE/1 HAS TRIED TO TELL US SHARIAT-MADARI HAD FOLLOWERS

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 534861 SECRET
AMONG THE MUJAHIDIN AND WE DIDN'T BELIEVE HIM. SDPEPPER/1 HAS
NOW ALSO REPORTED THAT THERE IS A SHARIAT-MADARI FACTION IN THE
MUJAHIDIN. REPORT WAS USED IN THE ACSI BRIEF.

Out Intel

2

REPORT CLASS 5 & 6 R E I - MINTEL - MDROR - NO CONTRACT

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI'S REJECTION OF PROPOSAL TO DISSOLVE GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES: LATE OCTOBER 1979

SOURCE: A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS.

1. AT A CABINET MEETING ON 19 OR 20 OCTOBER, 17 OF 22 MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ISSUED A PROCLAMATION, OFFERED BY PRIME MINISTER MEHRIZ BAZARGAN, CALLING FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS WHICH IS REVISING THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION. ON 21 OCTOBER, BAZARGAN AND FIVE OTHER CABINET MEMBERS WENT TO QOM TO SEEK THE APPROVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BAZARGAN ADDED THAT THE ASSEMBLY IS EXCEEDING ITS AUTHORITY IN COMPLETELY REJECTING THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND THAT IT HAS EXCEEDED ITS LEGITIMATE TENURE.

2. KHOMEINI CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL, AND HARSHLY REBUKED BAZARGAN FOR SPONSORING IT. HE ACCUSED BAZARGAN AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF BEING IN LEAGUE WITH CRITICS OF THE ASSEMBLY ESPECIALLY AYATOLLAH M. G. A. D. A. M. - M. A. R. A. G. E. J. AND OTHER ASSOCIATED WITH THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP). SOURCE COMMENT: KHOMEINI HAD ALREADY, IN A SPEECH ON 20 OCTOBER, DENOUNCED THE MEETING SPONSORED BY THE MRP. (FIELD COMMENT: IS OCTOBER PUBLIC MEETING SPONSORED BY THE MRP.) (FIELD COMMENT: BAZARGAN TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY.)

1979 OCT 19 STAFF

TEHRAN

REF: INT-10,780

1. SOURCE OBTAINED REF INFO DIRECTLY FROM ENTEZAM

2. SOURCE SURPRISED TO FIND THAT P/1 SEEMED TO CONSIDER BAZARGAN NOT AN ALL-RAA OUT. P/1 SAID HE HAD HEARD BAZARGAN URGING THE ASSEMBLY TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY. WE CANNOT BE SURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES REPUTATING THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY BUT P/1 IS AN EXPERIENCED AND WELL-KNOWN PERSON WHOSE COMMENTS ARE NOT TO BE LIGHTLY DISMISSED.

TITLE: 22 OCTOBER, 1979, DDC:1 ALL SECRET

3. PARTY AS A RESULT OF KHOMEINI VIOLENT REACTION TO THE DISSOLUTION PROPOSAL, THE LEADERS OF THE MRRP, THE RADICAL MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL FRONT HAVE POSTPONED FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF A COALITION OF THE THREE GROUPS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE ALLIANCE IS ALREADY A FACT, AND THE FRIDAY PUBLIC MEETINGS, SUCH AS THE SESSION ON 19 OCTOBER ARE SPONSORED BY ALL THREE GROUPS.)

4. AGG: IRAN, TEHRAN (25 OCTOBER 1979), FIELD NO. NIT 12788.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN. SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JYDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASSIFIED E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION/EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RUM 2699 DRV DSC. BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS DECLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

E C R E T 2608-02 OCT 29 INTEL

TEHRAN 54397 ZNY XXXX

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV

INFO: AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV

DATA: AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV. DIRECTOR SEE TEHRAN 24596 NO INDEX. NO FILE. RAQUN. FIELD NO. NIT-10, 88.

TDFIRDC-315/188

20 79

SECRET 260853Z OCT 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 54596

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR
WMINTEL INTEL

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54597 (NIT-18, 788)
B. TEHRAN 54398 (NIT-18, 789)

1. SDPROBE/1 ACQUIRED PARAS ONE AND
MINISTER JAVADI, WHO ACCOMPANIED BAZARGAN
PARTICIPATED IN PARA THREE DECISION.

2. F/1 ACQUIRED REF B INFO DIRECTLY FROM
ROOM ON 25 OCTOBER.

3. NO FILE. RWV 2600799. DRV D9C.1.

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR
FROM: STAFF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR
FROM: STAFF

ALL SECRET

SECRET 260810Z OCT 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 54599

TO: DIRECTOR
WMINTEL SDPROBE

1. AT 25 OCTOBER MEETING, SDPROBE/1 SAID HE
DURING HIS 25 VISIT TO COM. HE SAID THAT HE
PRACTICE AT KHOMEINI'S COURT. HE WAS PLACED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
VISITORS BEFORE BEING USHERED INTO THE PRESENCE. HE SAID THAT
DURING THIS SESSION, KHOMEINI REFUSED TO MEET HIS DELEGATION
WHENEVER REQUESTED PRIVATE MEETING, HE WAS TOLD THAT KHOMEINI
2. F/1 SAID HE THINKS THE GESTURE MAY HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILE
ANYWAY. HE ADDED THAT SHARIAT-NADARI COULD BE HELD IN THE
PROVOKE THE KIND OF PUNITIVE ACTION SUFFERED BY HANSA
TOOK THE LIBERTY OF SECONDING THAT MOTION

3. FILE: 201-237926. RWV 2600799. DRV D9C.1.

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR
FROM: STAFF

ALL SECRET

AMERICAN EMBASSY, TEHRAN
REFERRAL OF VISA APPLICANT
(Category II)

L.O.U.

44 RMC
TO : Consular Section
FROM: Referring Officer:
THRU: Approving Officer: THOMAS L. AHERN *TA*
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1979

I request a waiver of personal appearance
for the following applicant(s) who I be-
lieve meet the criteria for such waiver:

Name: RAHMATOLLAH MARAGHE MOGHADAM

Documents Included: PPT, NIV APPLICATION
AND PHOTO

Justification: PER ORAL CONVERSATION

L.O.U.

2 NOV 79 11 39Z

SECRET 012217Z NOV 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 544541
OF TEHRAN.
INTEL AUSA (SRPROB)
1. SRPROB/1 GRANTED POA 28 OCT 1979.
2. FILE 201-237926. RYM 01NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET
#6334



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SD PROBE/1. MR. MOQADDAM-MARAGHEH,
FORMER GOVERNOR OF EAST AZERBAIJAN,
MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS,
AGE: 55-60. ADDRESS: NORTH SIDE OF
MIR-E-DAMAD, NEAR NAFT. MARRIED,
ONE SON AT SCHOOL IN U.S. EUROPEAN
LANGUAGES: FRENCH, ENGLISH. INTRO-
DUCTION BY JAPANESE DIPLOMAT, MR.
HASEGAWA, AT MR. M'S HOME, IN AUGUST
MEETINGS AT SAME PLACE, WEEKLY
PURPOSE OF CONTACT: ① INFORMATION
ON PROGRESS OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS;
② INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION AND
MEMBERSHIP OF IRANIAN POLITICAL
PARTIES; ③ INFORMATION ON PROGRESS AND
PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION; ④ VIEWS
ON IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS.
RE ①: PRIMARY EMPHASIS WAS ON
QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, I.E., ROLE OF
CLERGY, ROLE OF PEOPLE, VELAYAT-E-
FAQIH ETC. ALSO: DESCRIPTION OF
ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS, ESPECIALLY ON
ARTICLES 5 AND 15.
RE ②: INFORMAL STRUCTURE AND AZERBAI-
JANI ETHNIC BASE OF SHARIAT-MADARI'S
PARTY; S-M'S AND MR. M'S PROGRAM
TO BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR
3 THE REVOLUTION VIA ELECTIONS TO THE

Real Name: Hassan Nazieh.

Code Name: S. D. Putty.

According to the document No. 1, Nazieh was in contact with
C. I. A. before August 2, 1979 and even prior to the victory of the Isla-
mic Revolution. The C. I. A. had again expressed willingness to estab-
lish contacts with Nazieh through Josef W. Adelsick (Adelsick was
the deputy chief and later the chief of the Tehran-based C. I. A. station
in pre-revolution years). In this connection the C. I. A. tried to get in-
formation on Nazieh's scheduled trips outside of Iran.

C. I. A. headquarters informed the C. I. A. station in Tehran to
postpone the plan until Adelsick's arrival in Tehran, so that he could
evaluate Nazieh's willingness to co-operate in a briefing session that
was supposed to be held prior to October 1979 when Nazieh was to meet
with the station's officer.

3 AUG 79 2-2

SECRET 021343Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 487419.

TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: A. LONDON 16438
B. PARIS 11198

1. CONCUR KILTINGER TDY FRANCE TO MEET FATOLLAH. PROCESSING
POA

2. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH FATOLLAH, PLS TRY TO DETERMINE
ANY AND ALL TRAVEL PLANS OF NAZIH (IDEN) IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
HQ'S WOULD LIKE TO REESTABLISH CONTACT OUTSIDE OF IRAN BETWEEN
NAZIH AND HIS FORMER REACTION CONTACT, JOSEPH W. ADLESICK, AT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

3. FILE: 201-229725. RW 8AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
SECRET

03 25

SECRET 021353Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 487429.

TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: DIRECTOR 487429.

1. IDEN IS SPOUTTY/L

2. FILE: 201-229725. RW 8AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

15 SEP 79 1750Z

S E C R E T 18227Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: KUWAIT 300220

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR LANG TEHRAN.

INFO: PRIORITY

REF: KUWAIT 300220 (R001-0011)

1. SOURCE (S/A) OBTAINED REF FROM AN OFFICIAL (INFO) OF NIOC WHO ADVISED S/A TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT TO KUWAIT IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1979 OF NIOC DIRECTOR IJSSAN N/A IN THE INTERESTS OF WHAT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN.

2. SOURCE OPERIONED S/A CLOSELY ON THE REASON FOR THE REASONING BEHIND S/A AND S/A WAS ADAMANT THAT THE REASONS CITED REF ARE CORRECT THAT THE NIOC OFFICIAL GAVE.

3. SOURCE MET WITH ADVANT/1 RETURNS FROM HIS CURRENT VISIT TO TEHRAN. S/A WILL QUESTION HIM ABOUT THE SITUATION THERE.

4. SOURCE ALSO RECEIVED THAT HE HAS HEARD FROM SEVERAL RECENT TRAVELERS FROM TEHRAN THAT THE PLO/PAKISTAN OFFICES IN TEHRAN AND PLO/PAKISTAN OFFICE WAS CLOSED ON THE PRETEXT OF OPERATING LIMITED FACILITIES. AT THE ORDER OF THE NIOC THE ARAB OFFICE WAS CLOSED AT THE ORDER OF ADMIRAL MADANI. COVENANTS OF NON-INTERFERENCE. BOTH CLOSURES WERE CARRIED OUT QUIETLY AND WITHOUT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ACCORDING TO S/A'S SOURCES.

5. FILE# 201-0001000. RVM 15SEP79 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

BT
0020

20 SEP 79 1730Z

S E C R E T 18227Z SEP 79 STAFF
TO: DIRECTOR 31699Z.

INFO: PRIORITY KUWAIT INFO TEHRAN.
UNCLASSIFIED SDCOSMO SDCUTTY

REF: KUWAIT 300220

1. THE NIOC OFFICIAL REFERRED TO IN PARA ONE HAD SDCUTTY/1, WITH WHOM HE VERY INTERESTED IN ARRANGING CO-OPERATION OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN.

2. P/S PURPOSE R/V VISIT KUWAIT DISCREETLY WITH SDCOSMO/1 AND KEEP R/S AND TEHRAN INFORMED OF P/1'S ITINERARY, PROVIDING AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE, SO EDT BY P/1 FORMER CASE OFFICE CAN BE ARRANGED.

3. FOR TEHRAN: REQUEST ANY INPUT ON P/1 TRAVEL WHICH BE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

4. FILE# 201-222725. RVM 10SEP79 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

R E T

S E C R E T 260023Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 520874.

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN.

KNINTEL RYBAT SDPUTTY

RFYS: A. TEHRAN 54311
B. STOCKHOLM 26212


1. APPRECIATE STATION INITIATIVE. A THIRD CHOICE IS TO DEFER PLANS UNTIL ADLESICK ARRIVES TEHRAN AND STATION CAN MOVE AHEAD AGAINST SDPUTTY/1 IN TANDEM WITH HIM. FYI: IT TENTATIVE HQS PLAN FOR ADLESICK TO TDY TEHRAN FOR OCTOBER BRIEFING MENTIONED REF B. THIS HAS ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF SDPUTTY/1 WILLINGNESS COOPERATE BY ADLESICK BEFORE STATION OFFICER EXPOSED TO P/1.

2. IF HOWEVER STATION BELIEVES IT SHOULD MOVE NOW, AGREE BEST ARRANGE THROUGH SDPROBE/1. IN SUCH EVENT, THERE MIGHT BE CERTAIN COVER ADVANTAGES IN NOT USING ADLESICK'S NAME.

3. FILE: 231-229725; 201-237926. RVW 25 SEP 99
DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2783

OFFICE INT. SECURITY
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979



REF: FIRDB-818/13350-79
DIST: 02 NOVEMBER 1979

SIR: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
OR CLASSIFIED UNLESS UNIFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON
BUSINESS INFORMATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
HASSAN NAZIH UNDER PROTECTION OF AYATOLLAH SHAHRIAT-
MAHDI (DOB: EARLY OCTOBER 1929)
SOURCE: SENIOR IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS AN
INDIVIDUAL OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. HE IS BELIEVED
TO HAVE GOTTEN ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION CITED BELOW.
1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR AND
HIS WIFE RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE FORMER DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY HASSAN NAZIH IS HIDE-
ING IN THE TEHRAN HOME OF AYATOLLAH SYEED KAZEM SHAHRIAT-
MAHDI. NAZIH WENT INTO HIDING IN THE AYATOLLAH'S HOME
AND WAS PROTECTED FROM HIS JOB AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY IN A GOVERNMENT SHAKEDUP IN EARLY OCTOBER
1979. NAZIH AT THAT TIME BECAME THE SUBJECT OF THE TEHRAN
PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATION WHICH LED TO A WARRANT
FOR HIS ARREST. NAZIH APPARENTLY HAS BEEN ABLE TO USE THE
PROTECTION PROVIDED BY SHAHRIAT-MAHDI'S POSITION TO KEEP HIMSELF
FROM BEING BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

2. BAKHTIAR'S GROUPS ALSO BELIEVE THAT NAZIH HAS TAKEN
HIDDEN DOCUMENTS WHICH PROVE THAT SUBSTANTIAL IRANIAN
RESERVES HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION (PLO). THESE GROUPS BELIEVE THAT THESE DOCUMENTS
MAY BE USED TO ASSIST BAKHTIAR'S MOVEMENT IN
OPERATING THAT THE KHORRAMI GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED MCC
SERIES WITH THE PLO. IRAN IS GENERALLY ASSUMED AND WOULD
WHAT IS THE TIME OF SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS IRANIAN MONEY IS
BEING FUNNLED OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

3. DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1979
4. INFO DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, LONDON, PARIS, BEIRUT