



In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE
COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Having published the documents concerned with Shariatmadari, Moghaddam Maraghei and Hassan Nazieh in the book No. 5 of the Moderates, the present book contains documents about Abbas Amir Entezam (in addition to those included in book No. 10), Bahram Bahramian, Khosrow Qashqai, Sam Sanjabi, Ali Saifpour-Fatemi, Touraj and Fereidun Nasserli.

Like the previous book, explanatory notes are provided to further familiarize the reader(s) with the text of documents concerning every one of the above mentioned individuals, with the hope of having taken another step in exposing U.S. imperialism's local bases, while having frustrated America's efforts in placing deviate currents vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution.

Muslim Students, following
the Line of the Imam.
March 1986

The Center for the Publication of
the U.S. Espionage Den's Documents
Ayatollah Taleghani and Dr. Mofatteh intersection,
P.O. Box: 15815-3489 Tel: 824005

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5. Willingness for the exchange of explanatory notes.
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6. A meeting between Adlesick and Entezam.
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9. An intelligence instruction.
10. Entezam's contact with the chief of the C. I. A. station in order to set a time for a consultative meeting.
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6. The procedures for Bahramian's correspondence with the operational address.
7. Operational address.
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9. General approval by the C. I. A. director of the operational address and the procedures for correspondence.
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16. Technical specifications of the radio set possessed by Bahramian.
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18. Radioprint activator.
19. A plan for contact and meeting.
20. Bahramian's past record provisional approval of operations commitments - contacts (secret radio contacts) - training in security and code-writing - and successes in (contact with Yazdi during the time of the attack on the embassy on February 14th).
21. The station's plans for using Bahramian's services; and the mode of meeting him.
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34. The text of Ahern's comments about Bahramian.

The contents of the documents concerning Khusro Qashqai:

1. Khusro Qashqai's past record.
2. Qashqai's biographical data.
3. Conversation with Qashqai.
4. The record.
5. Qashqai's meeting with Foneset, the representative of the American Consulate.
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14. Evaluations and views: of Qashqai's report.
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16. The military and political activities of the Qashqai Tribe.
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21. Qashqai's views on his meeting with Khomeini and the recent political changes.
22. Supplementary technical details of the previous documents.
23. The text of Ahern's hand written report about Khusro Qashqai.
24. The text of Ahern's comments about Khusro Qashqai.

The contents of the documents concerning Sanjabi and Forouhar:

1. Readiness of the C. I. A. headquarters to meet with Sanjabi.
1. (a) Information concerning the citizenship of Yazdi.
2. The turning down of Sanjabi's request by the C. I. A.
3. Sam Sanjabi (Karim Sanjabi's son) and the C. I. A.
4. Sam Sanjabi and the C. I. A.
5. Forouhar's remarks on the change of cabinet.
6. Forouhar's comments.

The contents of the documents concerning Ali Seifpur Fatemi and S. D. Rite.

- 1 . A brief account of Fatemi and his beliefs.
- 2 . The programme for contacting Fatemi after his exit from the country.
- 3 . Address and telephone number of Fatemi.
- 4 . Contact with S. D. Rite concerning Fatemi.
- 5 . The C. I. A. headquarters' directive about making contacts with Fatemi.
- 6 . Biographical data of Fatemi (and the record of his student-days, a Foreign Ministry document).
- 7 . The educational record and Fatemi's difficulty in getting American citizenship.
- 8 . Iranian students.
- 9 . Continuation of the topic of Fatemi's educational record, and his difficulty in getting American citizenship.
10. The action taken by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship concerning Ali Fatemi.

The contents of the documents concerning Touraj and Feridun Nasseri:

- 1 . The plan for contacting Touraj Nasseri and record of his past contacts.
- 2 . Determination of identity.
- 3 . Feridun Nasseri's biographic data and the record of his C. I. A. connections.
- 4 . Future plans of Dr. Nasseri.
- 5 . Feridun Nasseri's record.

Real Name: Amir Abbas Entezam.

Code Name: S. D. Plod/1.

Occupation: Prime minister Bazargan's deputy, the provisional government's spokesman, and a liberation movement member.

The present documents about Amir Entezam are in the form of classified documents, which were completed or found after the publication of book 10 concerning Amir Entezam. These documents are indicative of the continuation of the C. I. A. 's operational tactics concerning exchange of information with the provisional government of Bazargan. Two more points can be distinctly noticed in addition to that which has been mentioned in book 10: 1- Amir Entezam had connections with the C. I. A. and with George Cave (Adelisk), a senior C. I. A. agent, since the beginning of 1340 (1961). 2- In appointing Amir Entezam as ambassador to Stockholm two objectives were pursued by the leaders of the Liberation Movement (provisional government). Firstly, that he would act as the agent of the provisional government for re-establishing its connections with the C. I. A. and exchanging information with it. Secondly he was to allure the Iranians living in Europe in to returning home.

SECRET 311451Z JUL 79 STAFF

AUG 79 04 42Z

CITE DIRECTOR 485969.

TO: PRIORITY STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WMINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: STOCKHOLM 25929

1. DEPARTMENT IS SENDING TELEGRAM TO EMBASSY STOCKHOLM ASKING THEM TO CONTACT NEW IRAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTEZAM. EMBASSY IS TO PROPOSE TO ENTEZAM THAT FSO WHO WELL KNOWN TO ENTEZAM TRAVEL TO STOCKHOLM TO MEET WITH HIM.

2. FYI ONLY. THIS ACTION BEING TAKEN BY DEPARTMENT AT REACTION INVESTIGATION. IF ENTEZAM AGREES TO MEETING, PLAN HAVE FORMER DOOS TEHRAN, JOSEPH W. ADLESICK ACCOMPANY FSO AND MEET WITH ENTEZAM. COS AT HIS DISCRETION MAY INFORM CHARGE THAT MEETINGS WITH ENTEZAM ARE BEING PUSHED BY SENIOR LEVELS USC AS MEANS EXPANDING USG CONTACTS WITH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

3. ALL CONCERNED WOULD LIKE PULL OFF THIS MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. NO FILE. RWV 31 JULY 99 DRV DGC.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT
#7934

AUG 79 23Z

SECRET 051634Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488309.

TO: IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

FACT STOCKHOLM.

WMINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 485969

1. ADLESICK WILL ACCOMPANY ^{MR}MR. JOHN STEMPLE ON TRIP TO STOCKHOLM ARRIVING STOCKHOLM SUNDAY MORNING BY NORTHWEST AIRLINE FLIGHT 30.

2. REQUEST STATION MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR ADLESICK (IDEN) AND LEAVE MESSAGE WITH NORTHWEST AT AIRPORT. WOULD PREFER RESERVATIONS IN SAME HOTEL EMBASSY MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR STEMPLE.

3. NO FILE. RWV 3 AUG 99. DRV DGC.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT
#2604

S E C R E T 231342Z AUG 99 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 43996

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD


REF: DIRECTOR

1. BIEDENKOPF BRIEFED, BAZARGAN, YAZDI, AND ENTEZAM ON AREA SITUATION FOR TWO HOURS ON 22 AUGUST. CHARGE AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR ALSO PRESENT. LENGTH OF SESSION, (WAS TO BE ONE HOUR) AND NUMEROUS QUESTIONS INDICATE WELL RECEIVED.

2. AFTER BRIEFING, BAZARGAN THROUGH ENTEZAM STATED HE HOPED SIMILAR BRIEFINGS COULD BE PROVIDED EVERY TWO MONTHS, OR MORE IF SPECIAL NEED AROSE. BAZARGAN WAS TOLD RESPONSE TO THIS WOULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH CHARGE AFTER WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. ENTEZAM THEN SAID "WE HOPE YOUR ORGANIZATION WILL IMPROVE ITS TIES WITH US JUST AS OUR COUNTRIES ARE IMPROVING TIES THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE CHARGE AND DR YAZDI. ENTEZAM WAS RIGHT NEXT TO BAZARGAN AND WHEN HE SAID THIS (BAZARGAN UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH TO HAVE CAUGHT THE MEANING) BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THIS STATEMENT CAME FROM BAZARGAN. BIEDENKOPF DID NOT REVEAL RTACTION CONNECTION OR RESPOND ADLESICK APOLOGY FOR HIS INABILITY TO COME AND ENTEZAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN STOCKHOLM. ENTEZAM SAID HE DEPARTING TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 23 AUGUST AND WANTED TO SEE ADLESICK SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN. ENTEZAM HAD BEEN VISITING KHOMEINI IN QOM EARLIER IN THE DAY SO IT IS POSSIBLE HE HAS SOME INT. OF VALUE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 22 AUG 99 DRV D9C1. ALL SECRET

DIRECTLY TO THIS COMMENT. GETTING ENTEZAM ASIDE, BIEDENKOPF EXPRESSED



S E C R E T 190104Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
CITE WASHINGTON 492294.
TO: TEHRAN.
FROM: NE/IRAN
SUBJ: WNINTEL SDPLOD
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 2596Z
B. STOCKHOLM 2397Z
1. FYI: ADLESICK DISCOVERED ON MEETING SUBJECT HAS
OPERATED 6 AUGUST THAT SUBJECT IS THE SAME PERSON WHO HAD
OPERATED WITH ADLESICK DURING EARLY 80'S. HE HAD DONE IS
A. AS, HOWEVER, AND HAD BEEN ENCRYPTED SDPLOD/1. ADLESICK
OR NEW HIS TRUE NAME. FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS CASE AND
OPPORTUNITIES NOW PRESENTED FOLLOWS SEPARATELY.
2. NO FILE. RVW 29AUG99 DRV D9C-1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET 131320Z AUG 79 STAFF
 DIRECTOR 493618
 IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN
 NINTEL RYBAT SDPL 00
 1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH ADLESICK DURING RECENT TDY STOCKHOLM
 RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH ADLESICK DURING RECENT TDY STOCKHOLM
 ENTAM AND TELL MR. AMIR WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE BRIEFING
 AFTER SEPTEMBER. PLEASE HAVE MR. AMIR ENTAM CALL DR. AMIR
 YAZ AND HAVE HIM CONTACT OUR CHARGE IN TEHRAN SO THAT TIME EXACT
 DATE FOR THE BRIEFING CAN BE SET.
 * FYI: ADLESICK PLANNING TDY TO STOCKHOLM AFTER DATE OF
 READING FIRMED UP. WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH STATE AFTER RECEIVING
 DRD FROM TEHRAN. WILL KEEP STATION ADVISED.
 * WILL 201492Z 79. RVN 12 AUG 99 DRV DSC-1. ALL SECRET

SECRET 031647Z AUG 79 STAFF
 DIRECTOR 488323
 IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN
 CONTACT STOCKHOLM
 NINTEL RYBAT AJAJA
 REF: DIRECTOR 488369
 IDEM: GEORGE CAVE. RVN 13 AUG 99 DRV DSC-1. ALL SECRET
 SECRET
 BT
 2646

SECRET 341 100 79 STAFF

32 SEP 79 04 34Z

STOCKHOLM 1620

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

MINTEL AWAJA RYBAT/SOPLOD

1. ADLESICK HAD INITIAL MEETING WITH SDPLOD EVENING OF AUGUST. FIRST QUESTION WAS WHY HAD SDPLOD BEEN ASSIGNED STOCKHOLM IN THE FIRST PLACE. P/1 SAID THAT HE WILL NOT RETURN TO TEHRAN AND TAKE ANOTHER JOB WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

2. SDPLOD SAID THAT HE HAS ONLY TWO ASSIGNMENTS IN STOCKHOLM. THE FIRST IS TO REESTABLISH THE LIAISON WITH REACTION. THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN HAD FELT THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE THESE ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN (DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CABLE.) P/1 SAID HIS OTHER MAIN RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ATTEMPT TO GET AS MANY IRANIANS AS POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND TO IRAN. HE SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME TRAVELLING AND SPEAKING TO LARGE GROUPS OF IRANIANS.

3. QUESTIONED SDPLOD ON SEAPUR BAKHTIAR. HE SAID ONE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO REPORT ON POLITICAL AMONG IRANIANS. WITH REGARD TO BAKHTIAR, HE HAS YET BEEN UNAble TO DEVELOP ANY GOOD SOURCES. HE BELIEVES THE BAKHTIAR PHENOMENON IS MOSTLY TALK. IF THERE WAS ANY ORGANIZATION GOING ON, HE IS SURE HE WOULD HAVE HEARD OF IT (WILL INCLUDE MORE ON BAKHTIAR IN SEPARATE DISSEM.)

4. P/1 SAID THAT ONCE REACTION BACK IN CONTACT WITH HIS INTEL ROLE WILL END. BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD WELCOME CONTACT WITH REACTION AND ADLESICK WILL ASSESS WHETHER IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.

5. P/1 DEFER. DRY 31 AUG 79 DRY DCCL

SECRET

BT
#6000

8 SEP 79 09 17Z

SECRET 061602Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOLC
CITE LONDON 17443 (SHIKING ACTING). SECTION
TO: WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM.

FOR: CHIEF, NE INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/IRAN, COS,
COS, STOCKHOLM

SUBJECT: WHINTEL FBI AWAJA RYBAT/OPS MEETING

SDPLOD AND ADLESICK DISCUSSED THE REACTION LIAISON ON 30 AND 31 AUGUST. AS A MEASURE THEY ATTACH TO THE RESUMPTION OF LIAISON, SDPLOD WOULD LIKE TO RESUME THE LIAISON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PLACE IMPORTANCE TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE LIAISON. SDPLOD UNDERSCORED HIS REMARKS THAT IF THEY FULLY REALIZED THAT IF THEY WERE GOING TO MOVING AGAIN, THEY WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE UNITED STATES FOR ASSISTANCE. THEY WERE FRANKLY CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES TO DEVELOP A POSITION IN IRAN ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THEY WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED AT THEIR OWN PACE AND IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO MAINTAIN U.S. INFLUENCE OVER INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS. HE SAID THAT THE ANKINGS WERE GOING TO CAUSE A PROFOUND FUTURE, AS THEY WERE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN IRAN. THEY WERE ALSO UNAWARE OF THE BASIC FACT THAT IRAN WAS GOING TO NEED EXTENSIVE ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. THUS WHATEVER IS DONE WILL HAVE TO BE DONE SO AS TO CREATE UNDER POLITICAL STRESS. SDPLOD POINTED OUT THAT THE DECLINE IN CLERICAL INFLUENCE WAS FRANKLY CONCERNING AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE WANE. BUT HE CONCEDED THAT IT COULD TAKE TWO MONTHS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF THE CLERICS WON A MAJORITY IN THE ELECTIONS, IT WOULD TAKE MUCH LONGER FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO RESUME THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT AND NEED FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

PAGE 2 LONDON 17443 S E C R E T
SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT IN SEEKING TO RESUM
SINCE THEY HAD DEALT WITH US IN THE PAST AND
THE RELATIONSHIP, THEY WERE HOPEFUL THAT OTH
HANDLED VIA THE LIAISON THAT WERE NOT SPECIF
INTELLIGENCE LIAISON. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THE
UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND IDEAS
HANDLE VARIOUS PROBLEMS. ADLESICK TOLD SDP/OD/1
RESUMED THE LIAISON IT WOULD BE FOR INTELLIGE
OF RE-ESTABLISHING A LIAISON, THEN WE COULD PL
HAD THE Y BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE BAZERGAN
DILEMMA FACING NEW GOVERNMENT IS THAT AS INDI
WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE US IN GENERAL AND IR
LAH, BUT ARE FACED WITH A POPULATION READY WIT
3. ADLESICK SUGGESTED THAT HE AND SDP/OD/1
OF RE-ESTABLISHING A LIAISON, THEN WE COULD PL
THE APPROVAL OF OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.
THIS AND ADDED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MADE THE
ESTABLISH THE LIAISON. ADLESICK TOLD SDP/OD/1
OF VIEW. THE LIAISON WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THEIR
TO BE COVERED IN SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD IN
III WAS IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THE FACT OF THE
SECRET. BAZERGAN HAD ALREADY TOLD MENDI CHAMR
HANDLE THE LIAISON DIRECTLY IN TEHRAN ONCE IT
SDP/OD/1 ADDED THAT CHAMRAN HAD BEEN THE FOURTH
READ THE BRIEFING, BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO M
KURDISTAN.

4. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD CONSIDERED T
NIO AS A GOOD START. THEY HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH
IT HAD ANSWERED SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THEY HAD
SUBJECT MATTER BRIEFED. TOLD SDP/OD/1 THAT WE
QUESTIONS PUT TO THE BRIEFER BY DR. YAZDI AND
LOT OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE INTERESTED IN
THROUGH P OJECT IBEX. SPHATUS ALSO HAD A SIGN
HAD BEEN ALUNBLE IN THE PAST. SDP/OD/1 SAID I
IBEX BUT AS UNANIME OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE
GAVE HIM GENERAL BRIEFING ON IBEX SYSTEM CAPAB
THEM ASKED IF WE COULD PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON IB
GESTED THAT SDP/OD/1 AND OTHER SENIOR MEMBERS OF

PAGE 3 LONDON 17443 S E C R E T
GET A BRIEFING FROM AIRFORCE OFFICERS INVOLV
ADLESICK NAMED BG ASREJADID AS HAVING HEADED
MENTIONED COL. JALALI AS BEING WELL VERSED IN
ABDU... ADLESICK ADDED THAT IN THIS WAY W
ING ANY SUSPICION ON THE PART OF THE BAZERGAN
MAY W... H TO MISLEAD THEM WITH REGARD TO IBEX.
ASRE J... ID'S NAME AND ALSO JALALI'S HE SAID T
LIKE TO... HAVE OUR VIEWS AS THEY WERE NOT SURE
MONTHLY... HE AIR FORCE ACTUALLY IS (ADLESICK TH
AN INT... ESTING ADMISSION). SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT
TO TEHR... N FOR ANY DISCUSSIONS ON RESUMING THE
NOT WAN... ANYTHING TOO TECHNICAL, ALTHOUGH WITH
ING BAC... GROUND HE COULD UNDERSTAND TECHNICAL D
WELL. HE SUGGESTED THAT ADLESICK FORWARD SUCH
THROUGH... COS, STOCKHOLM WHO WAS INTRODUCED TO S
MEETING... RCOMMEND THAT WE SEND SDP/OD/1 BRIE
IBEX CAP... ABILITIES. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PERSON
AND BE... INTERESTED IN THE DEDICATED COMMUNICATI
5. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE TIMING OF HOLDIN
TEHRAN... PROVIDING BOTH SIDES AGREE ON RE-ESTABL
SOMETIME... IN EARLY OCTOBER WAS AGREED UPON. WE
DIFFICULT... NS COULD BE HELD AS PART OF ANOTHER BR
SAID THAT... THEY WOULD APPRECIATE A BRIEFING ON O
THIS COUL... BE DONE. HE INSISTED THAT ADLESICK
HANDLE DI... DISCUSSION ON RESUMING LIAISON. HE POINT
ADLESICK... WELL KNOWN TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES IN TEH
SUGGESTED... AND THE SITES (SEE BELOW) AS THEY WOULD
ING IBEX... ANCE IN CRANKING UP IBEX AS THEY WOULD
OUR ASSI... ERMS OF A THREE OR TWO MAN TEAM, A BR
SPOKE IN... EXPERT. WE AGREED THAT ON THE LIAISON
TECHNICAL... WITH HIM THROUGH COS, STOCKHOLM. SDP/OD/1
MINICATE... HIM AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ANY
SHOULD WO... MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. HE PO
BY TEHRAN... OULD INTERFERE WITH TIMING OF MEETING.
TEHRAN TO... AMMAN SITES WERE DISCUSSED AS PART OF
ELECT TONS... ILITY. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT AT T

6. THE AMMAN SITES WERE DISCUSSED AS PART OF
ILITY. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT AT T

8 SEP 79 09 21

PAGE 4 LONDON 17443 S I E C R E T
THE DOWNFALL OF THE SHAH. WE WERE IN THE PROOF
TWO MILY VANS AT SITE ONE. ADDITIONALLY, THE
CONSIDERABLE INTELLIGENCE OF GREAT VALUE TO US
WITH REGARD TO SOVIET CAPABILITIES. ADLESICK
HE WOULD BE NAIVE INDEED NOT TO MENTION TO SDP
WE PLACED IN THE SITES AS INTELLIGENCE COLLECT
THAT HE KNEW THAT THE AIR GUARDING THE SITES
THEY HAD NOT LET ANYONE INTO THEM, PENDING A PR
WOULD BE DONE WITH THEM. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT IF
FRIEND HE WOULD BE WILLING TO FUNCTION AS A FR
GETTING REACTION ACCESS TO THE SITES. HE SUGGE
VIDE WITH WHATEVER BRIEFS ON THE SITES THAT
TO THE MEETINGS IN TEHRAN. HE SAID THAT AT THE
SPECULATE ON WHAT THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT
REGARD TO REACTION ACCESS TO THE SITES. KNOWN
OF SDP/OD/1'S BASED ON HIS ASSUMPTION SITES WOULD
MORE, SO THERE MIGHT BE SOME ROOM FOR NEGOTIATIO

7. MEETING BROKE UP ON FOND REMEMBRANCES OF
SEVERAL YEARS AGO. IT APPEARS THAT THE FACT THAT
TACTIC FIRM THEM IN CONFIDENCE HAS HELPED US AND
SOMETHING THAT THE SAZERGAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED
NATIVELY SET UP A MEETING FOR MORNING OF 11 SEPT.
NOTHING AN INTEREST IN HIM IN THE LOBBY OF HOTEL
DEVELOPED FROM FACT THAT SDP/OD/1 HAS AN IRANIAN
LDD/MGLARD. THEREFORE NO MEETING HELD.

8. FILE SDP/OD/1 201. RWV 06 SEP 29, DRV D
US COMMENT RELAYED INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM PER W
S I E C R E T

S I E C R E T 04 055Z SEP 29 DEFERRED TELEPOL/DH
CITE LONDON 17462 KSHIKLING (CAANG)
TO: WASHINGTON, INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM.
FOR: CHIEF, NE 2400 BENE/BAQ, NE/TEHRAN, COS,
COS, STOCKHOLM.

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT ALAJA - ADLESTOCK
MEETINGS WITH SDP/OD/1

1. RE MARKS WERE MOST IMPORTANT POINT TO BE
THE TWO MEETINGS BETWEEN SDP/OD/1 AND ADLESICK
OF RE ESTABLISHING CONTACT. IT IS QUITE CLEAR
ADLESICK WOULD REACTION IN HIGH REGARD. THE FACT
CONTACT WITH REACTION AND THIS NEVER GOO
ADLESICK HAS NO DOUBT HELPED. SDP/OD/1 EMPHASIZ
AGAIN THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEAL THROUGH REAC
TIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME
CORNERED ABOUT HOW WE ARE ASSESSING THE SITUATION
MARKED ABOUT REACTION'S ABILITY TO BRING EVERYTH
ADLESICK ASSURED HIM THAT IF THINGS CAME APART
SDP/OD/1 THEIR OWN MISTAKES NOT ANYTHING THAT WE

2. SDP/OD GAVE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF HOW NAIVE
INTRINSICALLY WEAK THE GOVERNMENT IS. SENIOR OF
TEHRAN FROM ROUND THE CLOCK. HE SPENT FIVE DAYS
THE LAST TIP AND OUTSIDE OF THE BRIEFING ONLY 3
FOLLOWED HOUR. THE POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE GOV
ADDED TO THE PERSONAL WEAKNESS OF THE GOV
SAID THAT HE HOPED WE'D PRAYED THAT NOTHING WOULD
SDP/OD/1 IS ID THAT THEY NOW CONCLUDED THAT KHOME
FOR AND REACT TO THE ISSUE IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM T
DATE. HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD STEP IN AND
SUPPORT FOR A BLENDED POLICY. HE SAID THE EXAMPL
AND ORDERED DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY. SDP/OD/1
KNOWING AS THE IMPACT IN EVERY INSTANCE WHERE HE
ALSO SHOWED IN FATHER REVERENT TERMS. WHO KNOWS,
YAHYI HAS TURNED.

PAGE 2 LONDON 17460 S E C R E T

3. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI HAS NO PARTY ADVISORS IN HQ. HE PRETTY MUCH KEEPS HIS OWN PROBLEM IS THAT HE IS EXPOSED TO CLERICS CONTIN THE WEEK AND IT DOES INFLUENCE HIS THINKING. HE SPEND A LOT OF TIME THINKING UP WAYS OF TRYING TO MOVE FROM QUM TO TEHRAN WHERE THEY CAN GET THE INFLUENCE OF THE CLERICS AND WHERE THE GOVERNMENT MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS NATIONAL POPULARITY.

4. AT ONE POINT WE DISCUSSED THE JUDEH PART A MARXIST MOVEMENT GROWING IN IRAN. SDPLOD/1 SAID AVERAGE IRANIAN WOULD BE HARD TO ATTRACT TO MARX PARTY. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY FELT THAT THEIR INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DEPT. B OF SOJANUS COM. SAID THAT THE JUDEH AND MARXISTS WERE ONLY IN A SILENT SOMETHING BEING DONE BY OTHERS. HE GAVE THE CASE OF KHOMEINI ORDERING THE WEARING OF THE DEMONSTRATION MOUNTED BY FEMALES AGAINST THE CHAIR ITSELF WAS NOT CONNECTED TO THE MARXIST OF THE JUDEH, BUT THEY HAD TRIED TO GET THE DEMONSTRATION TO GIVE IT A MARXIST CAST. SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE JUDEH AND MARXISTS OR THE SOVIETS ABILITY TO LOG ACTIVITIES, BUT RATHER THE FUTURE ABILITY OF THE SOVIETS IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE FUTURE ABILITY OF THE SOVIETS WILL BE HOSTILE TO THEM AND WORRIED ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ON THEIR BORDERS. THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SUCH ACTIVITIES IN IRAN.

5. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THERE WAS HOPE IN THE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE ISLAMIC GOVT. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD RECOGNIZED IT AND IT HAD NOT BEEN AN IMPEDENCE TO GOOD RELATIONS. ADLESICK APPEARS SOME CONCERN ON HIS PART THAT THE DELAY IN REASSASSORS SOMEHOW SIGNALS AMERICAN DISPLEASURE WITH THE PUBLIC. HE HOPED THAT AMBASSADORS COULD BE EXCHANGED IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

PAGE 3 LONDON 17460 S E C R E T

6. SDPUTTY/1 AND OTHERS CAME UP DURING THE QUESTIONS. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT HE HEARS OF ANY FIRM TRAVEL PLANS FOR SDPUTTY/1

7. OUR PARTING WAS VERY AMIABLE, AND WHAT THE FUTURE, SDPLOD/1 AGREED THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTACT UNTIL THE LIAISON IN TEHRAN IS WELL ESTABLISHED. SDPLOD/1 AGREED. WE WILL HAVE TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF A GOOD IDEA TO SEE HIM ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE. WE NOT HAVE TO CONTACT WITH HIS BODYGUARDS OR AT LEAST HIS IRANIAN BODYGUARD.

8. FILE: SDPLOD/1 201. R/VW 06 SEP 79 DAY
COMS COMMENT: RELMHD INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM, PEARL
S E C R E T

SECRET 130 52 SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPHONE
TELEPHONE WASHINGTON 512598
TEHRAN

OMF CVE/IVAN
SUBJECT: VINTIK RYBAT SDPLD

1. ALS BE SURE TO IDENTIFY FOR CHANGE ON CONTINUING BASIS
THOSE INTEL REPORTS ACQUIRED FROM SDPLD/1. YOU WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU
TO BRIEF AIM ON RESULTS OF ADLESICK'S RECENT MEETINGS WITH P/1
S THEY PERTAIN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEL RELATIONSHIP
WITH P/1.

2. ADLESICK RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AFTER LAINGEN LEFT FOR
TEHRAN. THE FORMER WOULD LIKE LAINGEN TO KNOW WE REGRET NOT
HAVING BEEN ABLE TO BRIEF HIM HERE ON THE STOCKHOLM MEETINGS.

3. NO FILE. RVW 12SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
SECRET

2 SEP 79

SECRET 21135 2 SEP 79 SHAFI
CITE STOCKHOLM 26 90
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INTO TEHRAN
VINTIK RYBAT P/1 AJAJA SDPLD
REF: LONDON 17443

1. SDPLD/1 (M. EDWARD) CALLED CO WHEN COS
RETURNED CALL. HE STATED HE LEAVING STOCKHOLM 3 OCTOBER FOR
TEHRAN AND RETURNING STOCKHOLM ON 21 OCT. BE ASKED WHETHER
TEHRAN DEPARTING (PARA 3 REF) COULD TAKE PLACE BEGINNING
6 OR 7 OCT.

2. COS REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED WORD ON TIMING BUT
WOULD INQUIRE. SDPLD/1 EXPECTING REPLY NEXT WEEK. PLEASE
ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-962 5. RVW 21 SEP 99 DR D9C.1.
SECRET
BT
#6199

23 SEP 79

SECRET 221719Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE STOCKHOLM 26199.

TO: PRIORITY STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD

REF: STOCKHOLM 26199

1. REQUEST COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AND INFORM HIM THAT WE WILL HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY MAKING DATES SUGGESTED/REF. WE WILL HAVE BRIEFINGS READY IN TIME FOR ADLESICK TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT 14 OCTOBER. PLEASE ASK SDPLOD/1 IF HE CAN LET ISS SCHEDULE SLIP ONE WEEK AND EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO MUCH BETTER GIVEN ADDITIONAL WEEK TO PREPARE.

2. FYI: IF SDPLOD/1 INSISTS ON 6-7 OCTOBER FOR BRIEFING WE PREPARED TO ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE, BUT POINT OUT TO HIM ALL MATERIALS NEEDED FOR BRIEFINGS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE/THAT SOON. ADDITIONALLY, ADLESICK AND OTHER BRIEFERS HAVE COMMITTED MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ON 5 OCTOBER.

3. PLEASE ADVISE SDPLOD/1 REPLY ON PRIORITY BASIS.

4. FILE: 201-962054. RW 22 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL

SECRET
BT
#5532

25 SEP 79

SECRET 220900Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 26210

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD

REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 26199
B. DIRECTOR 519293

1. AFTER SOME PERSUASION, SDPLOD/1 AGREES TO DELAY BRIEFING UNTIL 14 OCTOBER SO AS TO GET MORE COMPLETE AND THOROUGH PRESENTATION. COS TOLD HIM WE WOULD CONFIRM DATE.

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN DATE FIRM.


3. FILE: 201-962054. RW 25 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL
SECRET

OCT 28 1979
 STOCKHOLM 50284
 PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEAM
 AMMCEL 87847 AJAJI SDPLD
 REF: DIRECTOR 52447
 BY DIRECTOR 52019

1. SDPLD/1 SAID BRIBINGS STILL ON AND HE HAD NO INFO FROM
 TEHRAN WHICH WOULD CHANGE THIS CONCLUSION. AS USUAL, HE HAS
 ANY PEOPLE ON PHONE.
2. HE THOUGHT THERE NO PROBLEM GETTING VISAS IN WASHINGTON AND
 CROOKS WERE OBVIOUSLY PASSING HERE THROUGH HIM IN AEROSPACE AND MR.
 SMITH INTEND GET VISAS HERE. WE MUST KNOW BY OPENING OF BUSINESS
 FRIDAY, 5 OCTOBER BECAUSE SDPLD/1 DEPARTING STOCKHOLM FOR PARIS
 OCTOBER AND HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE INSTRUCTIONS RE VISAS. HE WILL
 NOT THINK IT NECESSARY FOR ADELSIC TO CONFER WITH HIM YET
 BEFORE TEHRAN MEETING.
3. SDPLD/1 TRAVELING BACK FOR STOCKHOLM ON 8 OR 9 OCTOBER.
 RE ARRIVAL TEHRAN MEETING TO BE HELD 10 OCTOBER AT
 11 AM TO AVOID WASTING HIS TIME IN TEHRAN.

RE: MATERIAL IN RM NO. 50785 (REF BY ARRIVES STOCKHOLM
 15 OCTOBER. SHOULD WE PASS INFO REFER TO HQS FOR SECURITY
 CONSIDERATIONS SINCE SDPLD/1 PRESUMABLY WILL EITHER LEAVE
 TEHRAN IN OFFICE OR CONTACT II WITH HIM TO PARIS. IF YOU PREFER
 SAGE, YOU COULD BE GIVE HIM ANY SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS RE WNDLYN

FILE: 201-982054. RWW 22OCT79 IRW DGC.1
 S E
 #628



Real Name: Bahram Bahramian.

Code Name: S. D. Arne/1.

According to the documents of the C. I. A., Bahramian was a member of the High Command of the Liberation Movement Organization and a friend of Bazargan. In June 1977 he was employed by the C. I. A. as a single channel of information for passing secrets about the so-called terrorist activities and about the opponents of the regime in Iran. In the beginning this co-operation with the C. I. A. was based on the understanding that he would pass word to the U. S. government about the views of his moderate political party through a certain channel with the hope that the U. S. government would do something for his party as a result of these contacts and for his support to the government of the Shah. He was of course prohibited from disclosing to his colleagues anything about his contacts with the C. I. A. After the Revolution, he desired to promote a perfectly open system in Iran and had the feeling that the U. S. government could play a significant role in this regard. For a long time he refused to accept any salary, but after Khurdad (June) he signed a memorandum of commitment and agreed to receive a salary, according to which the C. I. A. had to pay the instalments of his life insurance policy -- an amount equivalent to \$100000 and to deposit \$5000 annually in an indirect bank account. He was given the legal status of a permanent resident of America, and he was promised that he and his family would be given the above mentioned legal status as long as they stayed abroad.

Bahramian was given training in code-writing, code-telecommunication and security system. He possessed wireless transmitter Mx-350, through which the incharge of the C. I. A. station made contacts with him and asked for his help during the Bahman 58 (January 1979), seige of the embassy, after which he informed Yazdi about it. Afterwards the transmitter was taken from him by the C. I. A. and he was given lie-defection tests which he successfully passed.

His principal reports were about the leadership of the provisional

government, Revolutionary Council and the clergy, which were of extreme value to the C. I. A., and he often gained very high marks for his reports. He was the source of information for 67 reports from Dey 57 (December 1978) to Shahrivar 58 (September 1979).

In Bahramian's file, several documents are concerned with the determination of an operational address in England for his use. These documents also indicate that as conditions in Iran worsened the C. I. A. did not find any other means to contact Bahramian except personally receiving information from him in Iran. In order to retain this connection they assigned one of their agents to receive reports from Bahramian, which could be sent under confidential cover by ordinary mail. The name and address of the agent could be seen on the documents.

Afterwards some changes were made regarding the maintenance and care of those technical instruments of communication that were in Bahramian's charge. Subsequently there are certain documents at the end of the file regarding the plans of his possible secret flight from Iran and other such activities for which the C. I. A. had prepared the forged documents for Bahramian in advance.

It is worth mentioning here that the documents related to the Liberation Movement Organization (document 9; book 24.) give an account of the meeting that Muhammad Tawassuli of the Liberation Movement had in the company of one of the officials of the political section of the Espionage Den with this spy (Bahram Bahramian), that was held on Mehr 3, 57 (September 25, 1978). It was he who arranged this meeting on behalf of the Liberation Movement along with Muhammad Tawassuli.

S E C R E T 260716Z MAR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52508 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

1. SDURN/1 (U/1) PASSED US RIALS 500,000 ON 25 MARCH 79, WITH A REQUEST THAT THIS AMOUNT BE CONVERTED INTO US DOLLARS AND DEPOSITED IN HIS IDEN ACCOUNT.
 2. U/1 REQUIRES THE FUNDS AS HIS WIFE HAS BEEN ILL AND WILL TRAVEL TO THE U.S. FOR SURGERY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.
 3. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL CONVERT ABOVE SUM INTO DOLLARS, AND HQS ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING DEPOSIT DOLLARS INTO IDEN ACCOUNT. FYI, EMBASSY IS CONVERTING RIALS TO DOLLARS AT RATE OF RIALS 74.5 TO U.S. \$1. WHILE THIS IS A DIFFERENT RATE THAN MARKET IS BUYING AT, REQUEST THIS RATE BE USED. IF MARKET INCURS A LOSS IN MAKING THIS ACCOMODATION CONVERSION, SUGGEST LOSS, IF NECESSARY, BE RECOVERED FROM FUNDS WE ARE "PAYING" TO U/1.
 4. PLS ADVISE IF ACCOMODATION APPROVED, AND DATE CHECK MAILED TO IDEN SO THAT WE MAY INFORM SDURN/1 THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.
 5. FILE: DEFER. RVW 26MAR99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
- S E C R E T

S E C R E T 260716Z MAR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52509 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

REF: TEHRAN 52508

IDEN: ACCOUNT NO. 09-13301-7
FIRST NATIONAL BANK
TOWN AND COUNTRY OFFICE
FAR HILLS AVENUE
DAYTON
OHIO
45429
(SAVINGS ACCOUNT)

RVW 26MAR99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

1 Apr 79

SECRET 041704Z APR 79 STAFF
CITE LONDON 13151

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHTECH, DIRTECH.
WINTEL RYBAT PLSURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 405437

1. WE HAVE RECENTLY OFFERED AN A/A FOR USE FROM LIBYA BY
ANOTHER NEAR EAST ASSET (ACWIZARD/1) - SEE LONDON 12969 TO DIRTECH OR
AND DIRTECH.

2. ACWIZARD/1 WILL BE TESTING THE A/A IN COMING WEEKS AND
WE WILL HAVE CHANCE TO SEE HOW WELL IT WORKS. ACWIZARD/1 WILL
USING ADDRESS REGULARLY AND FREQUENTLY WHILE UNDERSTAND THAT
SDURN/1 WILL BE USING ONLY ON A WORST CASE BASIS. THEREFORE, IN
JUDGMENT IS THAT A/A SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE BOTH AGENTS UNDER
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. WE ARE CHECKING INTO POSSIBILITY OF GETTING POST OFFICE BOX
USE AS A/A, BUT THIS STILL NOT ACCOMPLISHED. SUGGEST THAT SAME
ADDRESS GIVEN ACWIZARD/1 BE GIVEN TO SDURN/1.

FILE: 201-949163, RVW 04 APR 79
SECRET

7 Apr 79 02 24Z

SECRET 062000Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 414499.

TO: LONDON INFO TEHRAN, ATHTECH, DIRTECH.

WINTEL RYBAT PLSURN TECHS

REF: LONDON 13151

1. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO UTILIZATION OF SAME A/A FOR SDURN
AND ACWIZARD/1. SUGGEST THAT NAME GIVEN SDURN/1 SHOULD BE
DIFFERENT FROM, OR VARIANT OF, NAME GIVEN ACWIZARD/1. PLEASE
ADVISE.

2. APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER.

3. FILE: 201-949163, RVW 04 APR 79
SECRET
BT
#2772

9 APR 79 17 19z

SECRET 091709Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 13295

TO: DIRECTOR, INFO TECH, ATITECH, DIRTECH.

MINTEL RYBAT PLSURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 414409

1. RECOGNIZING PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT WOULD NEVERTHELESS OPT FOR USING SAME NAME. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF DOING SO LIES ONLY IN HOPE THAT NAME WILL BECOME FAMILIAR TO POSTMAN, FURTHER SUPPORTING NORMAL LOCAL PRACTICE OF DELIVERING MAIL TO ADDRESS RATHER THAN TO NAME OF KNOWN OCCUPANT. WE WOULD HOPE THAT MAIL FROM IRAN WOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM ALL FROM LIBYA AND VICEVERSA. USE OF DIFFERENT NAMES COULD LEAD POSTMAN TO WONDER HOW MANY PEOPLE HE HASN'T SEEN ACTUALLY LIVE THERE. WE FORESEE NO PROBLEM WITH JUST ONE. (WE PLAN MAY PERIODIC MAILINGS OF LETTERS FROM PARTS OF U.K. AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AS CHANCES PRESENT THEMSELVES, TO FURTHER OBFUSCATE MATTER.)

2. UNLESS HQS THINKS POSSIBILITY OF ONE SOURCE'S BECOMING FLOW WITH PERULANT PUBLICITY INCLUDING NAME AND ADDRESS OF A/A, IS GREATER THAN WHAT WE SEE AS ADDED SECURITY AT THIS END, SUGGEST THAT NAME ISSUED TO SOURCE BE SAME SURNAME, BUT WITH FIRST NAME LIKE "JOHN" OR "JAMES" INSTEAD OF INITIAL ONLY USED BY AGWIZARD/1.

3. THIS IS TEHRAN HQS OF. DEFER FOR FINAL DECISION TO YOU. W
PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 201-949163. RW 9 APR 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

My action

12 APR 79 15 46z

SECRET 121353Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 13425

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO D TECH, ATITECH.

MINTEL RYBAT PLSURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 417068

1. SUGGEST INDICATOR OF PRESENCE OF SW MESSAGE WOULD BE USE OF INITIAL "S."

2. TEHRAN: ADDRESS WHICH MAY BE GIVEN SDURN IS IDENT.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RW 12 APR 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

W-7

2 Apr 79

SECRET 21442Z APR 79 STA

CITE LONDON 13426

TO: DIRECTOR TEHRAN INFO DIR H ADWTECH

WMINTEL RYBAT PLUSDURN TECHS

REF: LONDON 13425

1. IDEN: MR. JAMES S. RAFFERTY RPT RAFFERTY
35 RPT 38 WHITE LENSE RPT LEDGES
EALING W13 RPT W
LONDON 308 RPT W

2. RW 12 APR 79 DRV D9C 11

SECRET

4 APR 79 155z

SECRET 140421Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419488L SECTION 1 OF

REF: ROWE INFO TEHRAN

WMINTEL RYBAT AQAIA BQHAW

REF: TEHRAN 52643

1. PER REF ABOVE, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES
LAATSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

C. HAJIYARI (U/I), AGE 39, FORMER STUDENT ACTIVIST
AGAINST SHAH, PRA AND BUSINESSMAN. WAS RECRUITED IN JUNE
1977 AS UNILATERAL ASSET REPORTING ON TERRORIST AND DISSIDENT
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. SUBJECT WAS A MEMBER OF THE SENIOR
LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND IS A FRIEND OF
THE PRESENT PRA. U/I'S MOTIVATION IS TO OBTAIN A COMPLETELY FREE POLITICAL SYSTEM
U/I'S MOTIVATION IS TO OBTAIN A COMPLETELY FREE POLITICAL SYSTEM
EVOLVE IN IRAQ AND FEELS THE USG HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY
HE IS AVOIDING ANTI-COMMUNISM. U/I IS ALSO A PRA AND THAT PLAYS
A ROLE IN HIS MOTIVATION. U/I HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT A SALARY
BUT WE MAINTAIN HIS PRA STATUS AND LIFE INSURANCE HOLDINGS
FOR HIM SO HE CAN PRESERVE HIS PRA STATUS WHILE OUT OF THE COUNTRY
ALSO WE HAVE PROMISED AN ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE FOR HIM AND MAYBE
U/I HAS BEEN PROMISED THE PRA STATUS OF HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY
MEETING UNDER OLANDESTINE CONDITIONS WHILE HE HAS BEEN IN
TEHRAN. HE HAS ALSO BEEN TRAINED IN SW AND ASSIGNED AN AA
IN LONDON. A RECRUITING HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR USE OF CLANDESTINE
COMMO GEAR. U/I HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR USE OF CLANDESTINE
RADIO EQUIPMENT IN HIS POSSESSION. U/I DID NOT HAVE ANY

11 APR 79 16 32Z

SECRET 11 151Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 47068.

TO: LONDON INFO TEHRAN, AT THE DIRTECH

MINUTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: LONDON 11 225

WE AGREE WITH YOUR THINKING AND CONCUR IN SUGGESTION
THAT ALL ISSUES TO SDURN/1 BE SURNAMES, BUT WITH FIRST NAME
INITIALS WRITTEN OUT INSTEAD OF INITIAL "J" ONLY, WHICH USED BY
ACWIZARD/1. ONE THOUGHT HAS BEEN TO AVOID CONFUSION BETWEEN
MAIL SENT BY ACWIZARD/1 AND THAT SENT BY SDURN/1 IN EVENT POST
MARKS WERE OBTAINED, OR POST OFFICE HAPPENED MAIL LETTERS FROM
SAFE LOCALE, AS ACWIZARD/1 HAS NO SM INDICATORS OTHER THAN
ADDRESS, PERHAPS ADDITIONAL SM INDICATOR SHOULD BE GIVEN SDURN/1.

SECRET FILE# 201-949163. 10 APR 79 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET

MAY 79 12

SECRET 302158Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 47068.

TO: TEHRAN.

WMI TEL PLSDURN

REF TEHRAN 52718

1. NOTHING FURTHER DESIRED OF STATION OR SDURN/1 TO SEND THE
APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE FOR NATURALIZATION. WHEN
WE RECEIVE APPLICATION FORM, WILL FORWARD IT WITH MEMO TO HGS ALIEN
AFFAIRS OFFICE REQUESTING THEY TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM
INS TO PROVIDE SDURN/1 WITH APPROPRIATE BENEFITS. WILL ADVISE WHEN
INS APPROVAL RECEIVED.

SECRET FILE# 201-949163. 10 APR 1979 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET
52718
43233

SECRET 131056Z JUN 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 53436 (GLEBOROFF ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

WHINT/SDURN INTEL

REF: EM IRAN 53434 (NIT-10,643)

1. SDURN/I ACQUIRED INFO PARAS TWO-THREE REF FROM BAZARGAN,
AND IG MPARA FOUR FROM MUSTAFA CHAMRANA.

2. AT MEETING AT WHICH REF ACQUIRED, SDURN/I WAS MORE GLOOMY
THAN WE HAVE MET SEEN HIM ON THE FUTURE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION.
U/I APPEARS PERSONALLY VERY FATIGUED AND FRUSTRATED, WORKING LONG
HOURS TO COME UP WITH PROGRAMS AND COURSES OF ACTION WHICH HE
SEES AS PROPER AND REALISTIC, ONLY TO FIND SUCH HARD WORK UNDONE
(OR AT LEAST SET BACK) BY A SINGLE UTTERANCE FROM KHOMEINI AND/OR
THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. WE HAVE FOUND U/I INCREASINGLY CYNICAL.
ALL THAT HE HAS AFFECTED HIS PRODUCTION, SINCE HE HAS LESS TIME NOW
TO SPEND WITH US AND TENDS NOT TO BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF WHAT GOES
ON IS OF ANY REAL SIGNIFICANCE.

3. U/I IS A "BIG-PICTURE" MAN, AND IS MOST AT HOME WITH
SITUATIONS SUCH AS WERE OCCURRING LAST FALL AND WINTER WHEN HIS
COOPERATION WITH STATION WAS SIGNIFICANT IN A POLITICAL ACTION
CONTEXT. HE IS DEEPSEATED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE USG IS NOT
INCLUDING INTO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY
IRAN AND A IS ESPECIALLY DISTRESSED BY OUR RELUCTANCE TO SEND A
SPECIAL ENVOY TO KHOMEINI. HE NOW IS BEGINNING TO WONDER, WE
THINKING, IF USEFUL A ROLE HE IS PLAYING IN HIS COOPERATION WITH US.
HE IS NOTHING BUT A USELESS ACCEPTED CONTACT PLAN FOR MEETING NEW CASE OFFICER
EARLY IN JULY (SEE SEPARATE CABLE) AND GIVES NO INDICATION YET THAT
HE IS GOING TO BAIL OUT. U/I IS AN EXTREMELY BRIGHT MAN, BUT AS
ESSENTIALLY A VISIONARY HE IS BECOMING VERY IMPATIENT WITH THE
RIGIDITY OF SOME OF THE DOGMATICS HE MUST WORK WITH.

4. FILE: 201-949163. RW 13 JUN 99 DRV DSC.I. ALL SECRET.

SECRET 141041Z JUN 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 53449 (GLEBOROFF ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR,

WHINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

1. FOLLOWING IS RECONTACT PLAN FOR SDURN/I

A. DURING FIRST WEEK JULY, PARQUIN CAN CALL SDURN/I AT IDEM
OR IDEM B PHONE NUMBERS, IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS FRIEND OF MR.
WILLIAMS. HE CAN MENTION CONTRACTS FOR MOBILE RENTAL HOSPITALS,
AND SUGGEST MEETING, WHATEVER DAY AGREED UPON. PARQUIN SHOULD BE
WALKING NORTH ON STREET NEAR VENETTO PIZZA RESTAURANT PERPENDICULAR
MENR-E-SHAH STREET. MAP OF LOCATION IS IN SDURN/I FILE. U/I
WILL PICK PARQUIN UP IN LIGHT GREEN VAN COME OF THE VERY FEW OF
ITS KIND IN TOWN. TIME OF MEETING IS 2030.

B. IF U/I WISHES TO MAKE CONTACT FIRST, HE WILL CALL ZEMBASSY
EXTENSION 1186 OR 1185 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO TOM. HE WILL
IDENTIFY SELF AS "BRIAN". REMAINDER OF PARA 1A ARRANGEMENT IS
THE SAME.

2. FILE: 201-949163. RW 9 JUN 99 DRV DSC.I. ALL SECRET.



SECRET 141241Z JUN 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 53450 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: MIN. EL RYBAT PLSDURN
REF: TEHRAN 53449
1. IDEN A IS 247-214 RPT 247-214 (HOME PH)
IDEN B IS 841162 RPT 841162 (OFFICE PH)
2. FILE: 201-949163. RW 9 JUN 79 (DRM DS) ALL SECRET
SECRET

2 JUN 79 01 58z

S E C R E T 211953Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 52614

TO: TEHRAN INFO ATHT&CH DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AQUATIC EZRALLY EZGOODS

REF: TEHRAN 53277

RE PARA 3 REF, RECOMMEND THAT STATION RETAIN SV/A-6
S/N 619, SV-8 S/N 429 AND SV-8 S/N 341 ALL ON 170.030
RPT 170.330 MHZ FOR SDURN/1 CONTINGENCY. RETURN ALL
OTHER UNITS HQS FIA FASTACT CHANNELS. RVW 1 JUN 99
DRV C9C.1.8 BY 198-103
S E C R E T

✓
Bill-Jerry

S E C R E T 140753Z JUL 79 IELFOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53680

TO: WASHINGTON,

FOR: C/NE/IRAN INFO DC/WE/AD

SUBJECT: WNINTEL--CONTACT WITH SDURN/1

REF: TEHRAN 53670

1. REACHED SDURN/1 FROM PAY PHONE EARLY EVENING 13 JULY.
DESPITE ITS BEING HOLIDAY, TRAFFIC NOISE INTERFERED WITH COMMUNI-
CATIONS, BUT WE UNDERSTOOD U/I TO SAY THAT HE STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH
COMPLICATED BUSINESS TRANSACTION OF SOME SORT. HE CLAIMED THE MATTER
TOO COMPLICATED TO EXPLAIN, AND SAID HE WILL CALL US "NEXT WEEK."
WE SAID WE VERY INTERESTED IN SEEING HIM, AND GOT HIS ASSURANCE THAT
HE STILL HAS OUR PHONE NUMBER. U/I'S TONE WAS BUSINESSLIKE BUT
PLEASANT; IT GAVE NO CLUE AS TO REASON FOR HIS RECENT
UNAVAILABILITY, OR HIS INTENTIONS REGARDING FUTURE CONTACT.

2. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 14 JUL 99 DRV D9C.1. CL BY 015356.

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

SECRET 251245Z JUN 79

25 JUN 79

CITE DIRTECH 53662
TO: TEHRAN INFO ATHTECH, DIRECTOR, HEARAZING
UNINTEL AQUATIC EZZALLY SOURCE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 52303 (NOFAD)
B. DIRECTOR 396574 (NOFAD)

1. REF A INDICATED SDURN/1 IS UNABLE TO LOCATE REPLY TO REF B. QUERY WHETHER BATTERY CHARGER CONCEALED IN S. NYO STEREO STILLS.
2. IN VIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR SDURN/1, PLEASE ADVISE IF REF B CONCERNED JUN 09 09 09V C9C1.8 BY 1987 03.

SECRET 311426Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOGGE

CITE WASHINGTON 505692.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: ONE/IRAN

SUBJECT: UNINTEL DISBURS JECENT

REF: TEHRAN 54055

1. GLAD TO SEE FACE TO FACE CONTACT HAS BEEN REESTABLISHED WITH SDURN/1 (U/1) PER REF.
2. WE HAVE TWO ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY REQUIRE U/1'S SIGNATURE IN ORDER TO COMPLETE HIS INSURANCE AND TAX RECORDS:
 - A. A SIGNED CERTIFICATION (WHICH STATION MAY DRAW UP) STATING BRIEFLY THAT U/1 UNDERSTANDS THAT NO FEDERAL OR STATE OR SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES WILL BE WITHHELD FROM HIS REACTION COMPENSATION AND THAT HE WILL NOT ACCRUE ANY SOCIAL SECURITY CREDITS DURING THIS PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT. THIS CERTIFICATION SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO HQS FOR RETENTION SHOULD ANY QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THE IRS REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO HIS REACTION COMPENSATION.
 - B. SDURN/1'S INSURANCE POLICY BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION. THIS WILL REQUIRE BOTH HIS SIGNATURE AND NAMES OF HIS DESIGNATED PRIMARY AND CONTINGENCY BENEFICIARIES.
3. WE HAVE DEFERRED POUCHING STATION ITEM (B) IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING RISKS INVOLVED IN MESSING U/1 COMBINED WITH THE RATHER INCRIMINATING NATURE OF THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES. SOLICIT STATION VIEWS ON FEASIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE SIGNATURES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF RESPONSE POSITIVE, WILL POUCH ITEM (B), BUT IF ANY DOUBTS EXIST, WE CAN AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEFER THIS.

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 525892 S E C R E T
A. FILE: 201-949153. RVW 30AUG99 DRV D9C.3 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T
BT
#7482

6 Sep 79 04 06Z

S E C R E T 051331Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FRANKFURT 72861
TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.
WNINTEL LOGS TECHS 3 DURN

- REFS: A. TEHRAN 51290
B. TEHRAN 51625
C. TEHRAN 51120

REF C RAPIDOPR NT ACTIVATOR WAS ORDERED BY YOUR STATION
VIA REF A ON 25 JAN 79. BECAUSE OF EARLIER DIFFICULTIES IN
DELIVERING MATERIAL TO YOUR AREA, IT WAS NOT SHIPPED UNTIL ONLY
RECENTLY. PER REF B, THE ACTIVATOR IS FOR USE WITH YOUR SOTORI
RAPID PROCESSOR MBL 1494D. WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER BACK-
GROUND. RVW 24SEP99, DRV D9C.3.

S E C R E T
BT
#2361

6 Use
SPURN/1 1976
Contact Arrangement
meeting to be arranged on phone. U/I will call
ask for Tom. Date and time agreed on phone will each be
Site is Subayeh St. above Asadara St. and vertical to it.
I walk north, U/I DDMV North will pick him up.

15 SEP 79
SECRET
CITE AND/OR NUMBER
TO: DEBRAN.
FROM: WET/DM
SUBJECT: UNINTEL - SPURN/1 USAF

FOLLOWING IS OUR SUGGESTED REAR FOR SPURN/1 FOR REPORTING PERIOD APR 79 - OCT 79. PLEASE MAKE ANY COMMENT OR CORRECTIONS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE AND PLEASE SUPPLY LINES RE: SO FEAR CAN BE COMPLETED.

- REPORTING PERIOD: 1 APRIL 79 - 1 OCTOBER 79
1. IDENTIFICATION:
 - A. SPURN
 - B. W/SPURN - FILE: 7201-0549173
 2. NAME: 20404
 3. OBJECTIVE: S
 4. OPERATIONAL ORNA:

OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT AND AUTHORIZATIONS/CLEARANCES: SPURN/1 IS AN IRANIAN CITIZEN RESIDENT IN DEBRAN WHO HOLDS U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE IS A COMRADE OF MODERATE LEADERS WHO WERE LONG TERM OPPONENTS OF THE SPAH AND ARE NOW SENIOR FIGURES IN THE EGOI. AND HE REPORTS ON THEIR VIEWS AND ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS GENERALLY. FOI WAS GRANTED 12 JUNE 77 AND ON 27 MARCH 79.

RE: W/1'S ACCESS TO THE CURRENT LEADERS OF THE EGOI IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN WORKING AGAINST THIS TARGET.

RE: CONTACT AND COMMITMENTS: U/I ORIGINALLY COOPERATED WITH REACTION IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A CHANNEL FOR HIS MODERATE POLITICAL GROUP'S VIEWS TO THE USG, WITH THE HOPE THAT US WOULD EVENTUALLY MOVE TO OPEN CONTACT AND SUPPORT FOR THIS

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO MERGE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AUTHORITY IN A NEW PROVISIONAL REGIME (DOI: LATE AUGUST 1979)

SOURCE : A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR MEMBER OF AN IRANIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHO HAS BEEN INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WHO HAS HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.

1. A NON-GOVERNMENT GROUP HAS BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE PRIME MINISTER MEHDI B A Z A R G A N TO ENDORSE A PLAN WHICH WOULD COMBINE THE SECULAR AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AS PERSONIFIED BY AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I. THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, WHO INCLUDE S A D R, AND EZZED S A H A B I, BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF PARALLEL LINES OF AUTHORITY IS INCAPABLE OF DEALING WITH URGENT PROBLEMS, THAT BAZARGAN IS UNWILLING EVEN TO CONFRONT THESE INTO UNIFIED PROVISIONAL GOVERNING STRUCTURE. BAZARGAN, WHO PERCEIVES HIS ROLE AS LIMITED TO PRESIDING OVER THE TRANSFER OF THE PROPOSAL, DESPITE HIS CLOSE PERSONAL LINKS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPONSORING GROUP, HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO SUPPORT THE WEEK OF 26 AUGUST, AND THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT HE WILL. TALEGHANI WILL VISIT QOM OVER THE WEEKEND TO SOLICIT KHOMEINI'S AGREEMENT.

2. THE PROVISIONAL STRUCTURE ENVISIONED BY THE SPONSORING GROUP WOULD HAVE KHOMEINI AS CHAIRMAN OF A GOVERNING "BOARD". BAZARGAN WOULD BE A MEMBER, WHILE SERVING AS THE NEW STRUCTURE'S "SECRETARY GENERAL." ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT CABINET WOULD BE DISMISSED, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DISSOLVED, AND OFFICIALS, SUBORDINATE TO THE GOVERNING BOARD, WOULD BE ASSIGNED FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES SUCH AS DEFENSE, AGRICULTURE, HOUSING

160616Z SEP 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

54222

WASHINGTON

IRAN

CT: WNINTEL--SDURM/AFSAF

WASHINGTON 512306

1. FOLLOWING DATA KEYED TO RE:

A.D. W/IN IS MET FOR CAR PICKUP, USING EITHER HIS CAR

THAT OF C/O, AS PRE-ARRANGED. SIGNAL FOR MEETINGS CAN BE

ELIATED BY PHONE BY EITHER PARTY.

4.E. NO SECURITY CONFIDENTIALS HAVE ARISEN SINCE RE-

ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACT IN AUGUST.

4.F. THERE ARE NO PRESENT PLANS FOR FURTHER TRAINING.

2. STATION PLANS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF W/IN REFLECT THE

TENDENCY OF THE TWO PARALLEL POWER STRUCTURES TO MERGE; WE WILL

EMPHASIZE REPORTING ON THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND HIS ROLE IN

DETERMINING THE ORIENTATION OF THE REGIM AND OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

6.4. OPR EXPENSES USED

6.6. ONE TENTH.

2. FILE# 201-2449168.

16 SEP 78 DIV DSC.1. ALL SECRET

27 SEP 79 04 19z

SECRET 262220Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521568.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO; NE/INTEL; DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR AUGUST:
NIT'S 10,700; 10,701; 10,704; 10,707; 10,708 AND 10,709,
REVIEWED 25 SEPTEMBER 1979. REMAINING AUGUST NIT'S ARE OIL
REPORTS WHICH NE/ECON WILL GRADE SEPARATELY.

OBJ: S.I.B.

NIT-10,704	SDURN	TDFIRDB-315/15168-79	RATING: 5
		29 AUGUST 1979	
UNILATERAL	SDURN/1	FULL	

SUBJECT: EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO MERGE
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AUTHORITY IN A NEW PROVISIONAL
REGIME.

COMMENT: REPORT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT SUBSTANTIATED IN
THE PRESS. LATER REPORTING INDICATED THIS GROUP'S PROPOSALS HAD
BEEN TURNED DOWN. ANALYSTS REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN MOVES BY
THE CLERGY TOWARD A MORE ACTIVE GOVERNING ROLE. THERE IS GREAT
INTEREST IN ANY REPORTING ON THE VIEWS OF THE IRANIAN CLERGY -
ANY OF THEM. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-235-323

SECRET 271828Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 34326

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

WNINTEL PL SDURN

IT WILL NOT HAVE ESCAPED YOU THAT SDURN/1 HAS NOT
MADE ANY RECENT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF
GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS, INCLUDING THE NAZIN AFFAIR. AT
LAST MEETING WE CONSENTED TO U/1 REQUEST THAT NEXT MEETING
BE INITIATED BY HIS PHONE CALL. HAVE NOT HEARD FROM HIM,
AND OVER LAST THREE DAYS HAVE LEFT MESSAGES AT BOTH HOME
AND OFFICE ASKING HIM TO GET IN TOUCH. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

FILE: 281-349163. RMV 27 SEP 95 DRV DSC.1. ALL

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET 04130Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54488

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WINTEL RYBAT (PLSDURN)

REF: TEHRAN 54326

1. REACHED SHURN/I (U/I) FROM P... IN EVENING 3 O... HE SAID:

A. HE CLOSING HIS BUSINESS AND... S RELATIONSHIP... THE PGOI. ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INFO ON... (REPLY NEGATIVE)

B. HIS HOUSE WAS ACQUIRED AN... GUARD WHOSE SPONSORSHIP UNKNOWN. THIS DEVELOPMENT... SIBLE FOR U/I'S FAILURE TO CONTACT THE STATION

C. HE MUST TRAVEL TO BALUCHI... UP AN UNSPEC BUSINESS TRANSACTION. WILL TRY TO CL... FROM AIRPORT RETURN LATE NEXT WEEK.

2. IN VIEW OF SITUATION... G, WE WERE R... TANT TO PROLONG CONVERSATION OR ASK TO... C. BEST UNDERSTANDING IS THAT DECISION TO PULL UP... GENERATED BY SDPUTTY/I AFFAIR, AND PRECEDED THE AP... OF THE GUARD AT HIS GATE. U/I SOUNDED DEPRESSED AND A... RIGHTEENED.

3. IN RECENT CALLS TO U/I HOUSE... E HEARD VOICES SON AND FEMALE WHO IS PRESUMABLY WIFE... DAUGHTER. FAC THAT FAMILY STILL HERE MAY IN DESE... THIS WILL NOT ANOTHER SDEAGLE/I CASE. NEVER... REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE DOES NOT SEEM TO INCLUDE... ANST FAMILIES THOSE JUDGED DELINQUENT, AND IT... AD WILL COME TO CONCLUSION HE MUST ATTEMPT SOLO SURVE... SPARTAN. RE HQS ADVISE AS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD... SUCH A DEPART AND IF SO WHAT CONTINGENCY PREPARATIO... MAKE.

136

SECRET 042315Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 526974

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

WINTEL RYBAT (PLSDURN)

REF DIRECTOR 526986

1. IDENT IS:

BAHRAM BAHRAMIAN SEX: MALE
DPOB: 22 APRIL 1940, IRAN. S A U...
CITIZEN: IRAN. BAHRAMIAN...
ALI N (PHA). OCC: BUSINESSMAN.
DESCRIPTION: HEIGHT: 70 (I...
COMPLEXION: OLIVE; FACIAL CHA...
FACE WITH LARGE NOSE. WEARS GLASS...
BLACK; COLOR OF EYES: BROWN; TEETH: R...
HAIR: POSTURE: UPRIGHT.
LANGUAGES: NATIVE PERSIAN, GOOD ENGLISH

2. FILE: 201-949163. RWV 04 CT99

SECRET #2888

SECRET 05084

CITE TEHRAN 54412

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

VNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA PLSDURN FJ

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 526966
B. DIRECTOR 526974

1. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION IS CORRECT,
AS DARK BROWN RATHER THAN BLACK. GLASSES
"FORCE" TYPE.

2. FILE: 201-949163. PVW 05OCT99 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

5 OCT 79 05 47z

SECRET 052025Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 54895

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANTECH, DIRECTOR.

RYBAT ILPGAMIN AJAJA PLSDURN FJ
RUBAT ILPGAMIN AJAJA PLSDURN FJ

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 526966
B. TEHRAN 54412

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED SINCE THE IS POSSIBLE
ALIAS DOCUMENTS MAY BE REQUIRED FOR EXPILTRATION OF SOURCE/1.
2. REVIEW OF OTS PASSPORT ISSUANCE CAPABILITIES IN SEARCH OF
NATIONALITY THAT WOULD BE PLAUSIBLE FOR SOURCE/1. CONCERNING IRAN AND
FEATURES, LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE, VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING IRAN AND
FOR ONWARD TRAVEL. MAKES PORTUGUESE PASSPORT ISSUANCE IN MACAO SEEM
MOST DESIRABLE. ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES' PASSPORTS REQUIRE VISA.
SOME COUNTRIES' PPTS AVAILABLE WOULD REQUIRE IRANIAN VISA, EXCEPT
TUNISIA, WHICH NOT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE SUBJECT DOES NOT
SPEAK FRENCH. MUHATT PPT CONSIDERED, BUT VISA REQUIREMENT AND CHOICE
POSSIBLE ONWARD TRAVEL FROM IRAN TO MUHATT MAY MAKE THIS PORT
3. PROPOSE COVER LEGEND OF PORTUGUESE BUSINESS MAN RESIDING IN
MACAO WHO HAS MADE PREVIOUS TRIPS TO HONG KONG AND WESTERN EUROPE.
TRAVEL WOULD SHOW IN PPT. SUBJECT IS NOW ON RETURN LEG OF TRIP AT WHICH
ROUND-TRIP FRANKFURT-MACAO-FRANKFURT WHEN HE LANDS IN TEHRAN PERMIT USE
POINT ACTUAL USE OF ALIAS PPT BEGINS. THIS ITINERARY WOULD BE
OF AIRLINE TICKET WHICH MAY BE "OPEN".
4. HAVE CAPABILITY TO ISSUE FOLLOWING SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:
A. SMALLPOX AND CHOLERA VACCINATION CERTIFICATE FROM HONG KONG
B. MACAO RESIDENT'S ID CARD, WHICH OBTAINED IN MACAO COULD BE ISSUED
ISSUED A FEW YEARS BACK, DEPENDING ON AVAILABILITY OF OLD
PHOTOS OF SUBJECT.
5. ITEMS NEEDED FROM TEHRAN FOR DOCUMENT ISSUANCE ARE:

PAGE 2 DIRTECH 54895 S E C R E T

- A. OLD AND RECENT PHOTOS OF SUBJECT, AS AVAILABLE. NEGATIVES ARE PREFERRED. HQS CAN MAKE FIRST GENERATION PRINT OF SUBJECT'S PHOTO IN LNYUMA FILES.
- B. ALIAS WITH TWO GIVEN NAMES AND TWO FAMILY NAMES CAN BE PROVIDED BY OTS AND CABLED TO TEHRAN FOR USE IN OBTAINING SIX SIGNATURE SPECIMENS OF SAME MADE PERSONALLY BY SUBJECT.
6. REQUEST STATION'S VIEWS RE SUITABILITY OF PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUED IN MACAO. IF ALIAS DOCUMENTATION IS USED, ADVISE WHETHER STATION BELIEVES ALSO DISGUISE WILL BE USED.
7. FRANTECH: COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS INVITED. OTS RECORD DO NOT REFLECT EZNOVA PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUANCE CAPABILITY. WILL FORWARD IF NEEDED. PLS ADVISE.
8. ABOVE PROPOSAL INTENDED MERELY AS INITIAL THINKING ON EXFILTRATION IF IT ARISES.
9. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 050C 99 DRV D9C1.1A BY 063803.

S E C R E T

7 OCT 79 013 43Z

S E C R E T 061044Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE FRANTECH 39945

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRTECH INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR
WINDREEL RYBAT TECHS AJAJA PLSDURN FJRASTIME

REF: A. DIRECTOR 526866
B. DIRTECH 57885
C. FRANTECH 39926 (NOTAL)

REF B SCENARIO FOR POSSIBLE SDURN EXFILTRATION FROM IRAN WITH PORTUGUESE DOCUMENTATION WORTH CONSIDERATION. WE FEEL HOWEVER THAT REQUIREMENT FOR ENTRY VISA IN ITSELF SHOULD NOT ELIMINATE CONSIDERATION OF LATIN AMERICAN OR OTHER NATIONALITY PASSPORT REQUIRING VISA. OUR LATEST INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO IRAN IS IN THIS VISA-REQUIRED STATUS (RUTHERFORD REPORTED THAT HE RECEIVED ENTRY VISA IN ATHENS WITHOUT DELAY OR PROBLEM). OUR INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO IRAN IN NON-VISA STATUS IS INCOMPLETE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES ON BOTTOM OF DEBARKATION CARD REQUIRED FOR DEPARTURE. EXFILTRATION IN THIS STATUS WOULD REQUIRE COLLECTION EFFORT TO FILL IN THIS GAP.

2. WE FEEL THAT IF IRAN ENTRY VISAS ARE NOW MORE READILY AVAILABLE THAN IN PAST, IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE VISA LEGITIMATELY PLACED IN SUBJECT'S PASSPORT. IF NOT, EXEMPLARS FOR REPRODUCTION WOULD BE AVAILABLE. USE OF LATIN AMERICAN OR OTHER NATIONALITY PASSPORT REQUIRING ENTRY VISA SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. WE DO NOT HAVE BLANK PORTUGUESE

3. RUTHERFORD REPORTED THAT ON ARRIVAL IN IRAN, HE WAS QUESTIONED SEVERAL TIMES AT DIFFERENT POINTS DURING THE PASSPORT CONTROL/CUSTOMS EXAMINATION PROCEDURE ON HIS REASONS FOR TRAVEL TO IRAN AND HIS INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY. HE NOTICED NO EXTRAORDINARY CONTROL MEASURES ON DEPARTURE.

4. FOR TEHRAN: WE REALIZE THAT DOCUMENTATION EXFILTRATION IS ONLY POSSIBILITY AT THIS POINT; HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO EXAMINE PASSPORTS/DEBARKATION CARDS OF RECENT VISITORS IN BOTH VISA AND NON-VISA CATEGORIES.

5. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 6 OCT 99 DRV D9C1.1

S E C R E T
HI
#9945

SECRET 181515Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 54980

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

RYBAT LPG AMIN AJAJA ALSUDAN F. PASTIN TECHS

REFS: A. DIRTECH 54985
B. FRANTECH 39945

1. OTS IS POUCHING TO EZNOVA VIA NO 4791 0
FOLLOWING ITEMS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN DOCUMENTING SUBJECTS. TURN-1 HI
A. SET OF FOUR NEGATIVES MADE IN ID PHOTO O
WIFE, SON AND DAUGHTER. CONTACT PRINTS FROM NE A I ES INCLUD
ORIGINAL PHOTOS WERE BORROWED FROM LMA FILES AND HAD TO BE
RETURNED. THESE PHOTOS WERE TAKEN SOME TIME BETWEEN 1977-1979
PRESENT PLANNING IS FOR SUBJECTS FAMILY MEMBERS TO BE COVERED
IF POSSIBLE. MAY HAVE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO FAMILY MEMBER
B. COPIES OF EXEMPLARS OF MACAO ID CARDS.

2. OTS IS ASSEMBLING ISSUANCE KIT OF PORTUGUESE PASSPORTS
AND MACAO ID, WHICH WILL BE POUCHED TO EZNOVA'S OFFICE.

3. OTS PREFERS USE OF PORTUGUESE IN EVENT SUBJECTS REQUIRE
ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. CONSIDER BRAZILIAN PASSPORT BEING T L IN AMERI
OPTION BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY ONE IN PORTUGUESE SPANISH E-LAN NG
DOCUMENTATION MAY BE GREATER RISK FOR SUBJECT BECAUSE IT WERE I
GREATER LIKELIHOOD OF CHALLENGE BY IRANIAN OFFICIALS IN SPANISH
THAN PORTUGUESE.

4. WISH EMPHASIZE TO TEHRAN THAT NEGATIVE BEING SENT TO EZ NOVA
WILL PRODUCE SECOND GENERATION PHOTO PRINTS, INFERIOR TO ORIGINAL
PHOTOS. ABOVE NEGATIVES BEING PROVIDED ONLY IN CASE TEHRAN USES
TO OBTAIN BETTER NEGATIVES/PRINTS OR FOR USE WITH MACAO ID.

5. ABOVE COMMENTS AND ITEMS BEING SENT TO EZNOVA ARE FOR
IN CASE ALIAS TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION PROGRAM MATERIALIZES

6. FITZ: 221-949163. RWV 11OCT 89V C9C1 14 BT 0 3203.

SECRET
BT
#4980

13 Oct 79 10 25z
SECRET 181515Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
CITE WASHINGTON 54980 SECTION 1 OF 2.

out Intel
Rec'd
7/10

TO: TEHRAN
FROM: NE/IRAN/2 INFO DCNE/SID, NE/INTEL, DPDS/EG/DBO/CS

SUBJECT: VALMERE. GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER
MITS 10,716 THROUGH 10,720 REVIEWED 10 OCTOBER 1979.

OBJECTIVE: S.I.E. RATING: 5
FIELD NO: MIA-10,716 OPACI SOURCE
DISSEM NO: TDFFDR-315/15600-79, 8 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL SOURCE (DBDR/1) FULL CONTROLS
SUBJECT: 1. STRUCTURE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL;
2. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG IRANIAN POLITICAL AND GOVERN-
MENT FIGURES
COMMENT: THERE IS ALSO CONTINUING INTEREST IN
IDENTIFYING SIGNIFICANT FIGURES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THOSE
POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES. HEAD CONTINUES TO WANT
REPORTING ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, ITS MEMBERS, AND ITS ROLE
IN THE REGIME.

22 Oct 79 14 51z

SECRET 221414Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 55158

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TERRAN, DIRECTOR.

WMINTEL RYBAT LRGAMIN AJAJK PLSOURN PJPASTIME TECKE

REFS: A. DIRTECH 54899
B. DIRTECH 54980
C. DIRTECH 55004

1. ITEMS LISTED BELOW BEING POUCHED VIA TIR NLR 510964, AS PROMISED IN REFS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN DOCUMENTING SOURN IS

A. NOTIONAL DRY SEAL FOR BEARER'S PHOTO IN PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUED IN MACAO. FICHES SHOWING MACAO ISSUED PPT DISPLAY NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF SEAL. HOWEVER, PORTUGUESE PPTS ISSUED ELSEWHERE APPEAR TO HAVE SEAL OR CACHET. ALSO PHRASE "CACHET DRY SEAL" IS PRINTED IN PORTUGUESE BETWEEN TWO PHOTO BLOCKS IN PORTUGUESE PPT NOTIONAL SEAL BASED ON CACHET OF PORTUGUESE CONSULATE GENERAL, PARIS, 1975.

B. NEGATIVES AND COLOR ANNOTATED XEROX COPIES OF TWO PPT PAGE SPREADS SHOWING 1979 MACAO AND HONG KONG CACHETS.

2. PPT FROM WHICH ITEM B COPIES WERE MADE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED OUTLINELY FOR INCLUSION IN ITD SYSTEM.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RWV 19OCT89 DRV C&CI. 14 BY 063803.
SECRET

SOURN/I. MR. BAHRAMIAN. SELF-EMPLOYED CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR. MARRIED, WITH AT LEAST ONE CHILD, A SON AGED ABOUT 12. U/I AGED ABOUT 40.

U/I, AS OF AUGUST 79, WAS A MEMBER OF AN INFORMAL GROUP ADVISING AND CONSULTING WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. (IT IS RECALLED THAT HE MENTIONED TWO OR PERHAPS THREE NAMES OF OTHER MEMBERS; IT IS BELIEVED THAT ENTEZIM AND A MR. SAHABI WERE AMONG THEM.) IN THIS CAPACITY, HE REPORTED ON THE PLANS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

BETWEEN LATE JUNE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE EMBASSY, THERE WERE THREE OR FOUR MEETINGS WITH U/I, ALL OF THEM IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. HIS INFORMATION REPORTING DURING THAT PERIOD CONCERNED A RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROPOSING THE MOBILIZATION OF UNEMPLOYED TECHNICIANS AND THE ~~THESE~~ RESOURCES OF MINISTRIES SUCH AS ROADS AND HEALTH. (U/I WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO STATION QUERIES ABOUT SUCH MATTERS AS THE SUBSTANCE OF BAZARGAN'S MEETINGS WITH THE IMAM.)

IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, AFTER U/I HAD MISSED TWO PRE-ARRANGED MEETINGS, SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS WERE MADE TO CONTACT HIM BY PHONE. HE WAS FINALLY REACHED AT HOME. HE SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS SAFETY, AS A 'GUARD' (PERHAPS A SURVEILLANT) HAD RECENTLY APPEARED OUTSIDE HIS HOME. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT ORGANIZATION THIS GUARD BELONGED, BUT THAT IN VIEW OF MR NAZIH'S DIFFICULTIES, HE WAS AFRAID HE MIGHT BE ARRESTED. U/I SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO ~~END~~ TERMINATE HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, CLOSE HIS BUSINESS, AND LEAVE THE COUNTRY. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO LEAVE IRAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER A TRIP TO BALUCHISTAN (AS RECALLED) TO CONCLUDE SOME BUSINESS THERE. HE WAS ASKED TO MAKE PHONE CONTACT UPON HIS RETURN. HE DID NOT DO SO, AND THERE WAS NO SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH HIM.

THE STATION REPORTED THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND HAS INSTRUCTED WOLOCK, EZNOVA, AND EZVIND TO BEGIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CASE U/I NEEDED HELP TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. DETAILS OF SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ARE NOT RECALLED, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACAO AND LEBANESE PASSPORTS WERE BEING CONSIDERED. AS THERE WAS NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH, NO ASSISTANCE WAS EVER ASKED OR OFFERED.

Real Name: Khusrow Qashqai.

Code Name: S. D. Rater/4.

In this section the documents concerned with Qashqai are contained, a part of which is related to the documents of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and another part is concerned with the documents of the C. I. A. (those belonging to the period between 1330-1343 Shamsi-Hijri (1951-1964) are related with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the rest are related with the C. I. A.).

A little attention to the dates and the contents of the documents related with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Qashqai's meetings with the officials of the embassy (during 1952) is sufficient to reveal the extent of his association with the U. S. administration and the nature of his activities. In spite of his anti-Shah tendencies he was favourably inclined towards America and the West, and in this regard he never hesitated to express his urge to help them.

The C. I. A. documents concerned with Khusrow Qashqai are mostly composed of his reports, his meetings with the C. I. A. officials and his

stand vis-a-vis the then current course of events in Iran. There is nothing available regarding his past record with the C. I. A.

Though he did not receive any salary from the C. I. A. , his co-operation with America may have been on account of his intention to gain support from America in fulfilling his future ambitions concerning the Islamic Republic.

The principal reports and opinions of Khusrow Qashqai revolve around certain specific aims:

-By weakening the provisional government and secretly opposing the Islamic Republic, while outwardly, supporting it, he was planning to incite different political and military leaders into starting a series of operations to overthrow the government. In this connection he made contacts with Madani and asked him to supervise a military coup against the Imam and the Bazargan government. According to his own claims, Qashqai contemplated certain preventive, and strategic measures necessary for opposing the government and launching an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. Contacts were also made with him from the side of Bakhtiyar and he was even offered payment for organizing a coup. During one of his meetings he speaks about his contacts with the Arab dissidents and that they will act as the suppliers of arms to the non-Arab tribes of the south every now and then.

- Qashqai was planning to bring out a publication in association with Madani, and he had informed the C. I. A. about this plan. The C. I. A. , too, was thinking about the possibilities of bringing out a publication which would serve as their organ against the anti-American atmosphere prevailing in Iran and would counter the attacks against America. The C. I. A. was secretly planning to not only encourage Khusrow Qashqai in this regard but also to give him the material aid that he was asking for to aid in the printing and distribution of this publication. They advised him to take steps to select the material desired to be published.

Through these meetings and visits the C. I. A. wanted to attain the following aims:

- Obtain information about the Qashqai tribe and the possibilities of this tribe in confronting the Islamic Republic and the chances of exploiting it in emergency conditions, since they believed that the Qashqais were the only tribe besides the Kurds, who were in a position to put up active resistance.
- Obtain information about the security conditions in Khuzistan and Fars Provinces.
- To reach a political understanding with Madani, because Qashqai had a close relationship with him.
- To watch Qashqai in his anti-government activities. The appoint-

ment of Qashqai was meant for fulfilling different purposes such as influencing the National Front for promoting the pro-America moderate forces and supplying them with information and reports; arranging meetings with the Interior Minister Haj Sayed Jawwadi with the view of getting information about the future programmes of the provisional government concerning the elections; arranging meetings with Shariat Madari and Khaqani in order to establish a possible future programme; and meeting with brigadier general Jam with the hope of fulfilling, a certain function in a specified period of time. On the whole, the aim of using Qashqai as an intermediary and a catalyst agent was bringing together all the pro-American moderate forces throughout the various classes of society. (The document about this part can be seen with the documents concerning Shariat Madari).

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See in file 100-26615
See in file 100-26615
Khosro QASHQAI was a Deputy to the 16th and 17th Majlises and a close advisor to Mossadeq on tribal affairs. He, along with several of his brothers, is in official exile from Iran and now lives in Geneva, although he is in the US at the moment. He is extremely active and vocal in opposition to the Shah's government, but is probably out of contact with most of the groups within Iran, except through his brother Mohammad Hosein, who is permitted to live in Tehran. He is reportedly addicted to drugs.

—Le gouvernement a décidé de saisir les biens de certains chefs de tribus du sud qui sont restés en Iran. Le célèbre parc Eran, à Shiraz, propriété de Khosrow Kachai, a déjà été saisi. (Setareh Salam du 4) Feb. 57

KHOSROW QASHQAI is a brother of MOSSADEQ. Khosrow Qashqa'i, now in Europe, has written a letter to Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq, the former Prime Minister. He expresses his unhappiness in this letter about the state of the National Front. In his reply, Dr. Mossadeq wrote that he too is dissatisfied with the leaders of the National Front. Khosrow Qashqa'i has released both letters to the European press. (Diplomat 12/19/62)

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Tehran 186 Enclosure 1

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Encl #7

GASH-AI, Khosro

Personal data:

Born 1921, Firuzabad; youngest son of Sevid-eh Doleh; unmarried.

Education:

Albora College, Tehran.

Languages:

Turkish, Persian, English.

Career:

1941

Assumed duties as one of four brothers responsible to their mother for conduct of Qashqai tribal affairs.

Nov. 1942

Conference at Shiraz with British Consul re general tribal policy.

July 1944

Supplied with arms and ammunition by government; pursued and subdued his fugitive cousin Chenghis Khan.

1947-49

Deputy from Firuzabad to 15th Majlis.

Nov. 1947

Traveled in Switzerland and America.

April 1948

Returned to Iran.

1950

Deputy from Firuzabad to 16th Majlis; member of Agricultural Commission of Majlis.

Remarks:

Shortly after leaving the American College of Tehran in 1939, Khosro Khan assumed his tribal duties and since that time has spent most of his time in the provinces as compared with his brothers who spent most of their time in Tehran. Until his election to the 15th Majlis, he paid only periodic visits to Tehran and was the least publicized of the four brothers. In 1943 he was appointed Governor of Firuzabad, his duties consisting for the most part of keeping belligerent sub-tribal leaders in line and conferring from time to time with high-ranking officers of the Iranian Army. At that time the Qashqa'is were not in favor with the Central Government because of their previous pro-German sympathies and their refusal to disarm their tribesmen.

In August of 1944 Khosro was supplied with Government arms and ammunition and, with fifty followers, pursued and subdued his fugitive cousin Chenghis Khan.

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Tehran 185 Enclosure 1 2

In February, 1942, Khosro was involved in the "Semiran" incident. The Qashqai tribe led by him attacked the Semiran garrison, killing about 100 soldiers and executing the Commanding Officer. In 1946 during the Fars National Movement he participated in the fighting against the Government.

In October, 1947, after a series of disputes over disarming the tribesmen, he was granted a visa to the U.S. and Switzerland. Local comment concerning the trip attributed it to an effort on the part of the Qashqais to soothe the Shah's feelings.

In the present Majlis, Khosro is one of the four secretaries of the Majlis.

He is of medium height, stocky, an athlete, with heavy Turkish features, heavy black hair and a pleasant smile.

Precocious, consistently pro-American, anti-Russians and distrustful of the British.

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SECRET
Security Information
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Office of the Army Attache

Tehran, Iran
26 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Cuomo, American Embassy

Khosrow's remarks include the following:

Prince Ali Reza was in the disturbances Monday and personally shot and killed two Iranians.

The Committee of Inquiry will determine who was responsible for the civilian killings Monday and they will all hang.


I hate the Shah.

All of Army G-2 are guilty and will come before the Committee.

Use of the Army against Iranians is unconstitutional.

I just paid General Garzan 10,000 tomans last week (rest of sentence undistinguishable).

I am pro-American.


JOHN I. HINCKE
Colonel, GS
Army Attache

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM RESTRICTED

July 24, 1952

TO: Mr. Cuomo
FROM: Mr. Norden
SUB: Conversation with Khosro Quashquai

Last night at Mr. Melbourne's cocktail party I joined a conversation between Col. Hincke and Khosro Quashquai, which may be of interest to you.

Quashquai was holding forth about popular feelings against the Shah, and maintained that we would not find a single picture of the Shah in a public place today as the crowds will have ripped them all down. He added that he himself had a score to settle with the Shah because the Shah's father had killed his father, but added that the Shah was still useful. An argument also developed as to whether the Shah was Commander-in-Chief of the Army: Quashquai had maintained that American Military Aid was given to the Shah and not to Iran.

Some of Quashquai's assertions were so close to the Tudeh line that I felt constrained to ask him if he was a member of the National Front, which he said he was. No doubt Col. Hincke can give you further details, as the discussion was well advanced when I joined it.

CDW

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SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

October 4, 1952

QASHQAI, Khosro Khan

Supplementing Embassy's undated CBD.

Career:

1950 - February 1952: Deputy to 16th Majlis from Firuzabad. Vice-President of Majlis.

April 27, 1952: Deputy to 17th Majlis from Firuzabad.

Remarks:

Qashqai's election went unchallenged, based as it was on the votes of his tribesmen. While critical of some of Dr. Mosadeq's policies, furthermore, he has consistently and openly supported the government and is one of the National Front's most valuable assets.

Recently Qashqai delivered a bitter speech in the Majlis, attacking Americans for their alleged "sabotage" of the Mosadeq government during the brief premiership of Qavam. His friendship for various members of the American Embassy has, however, continued, and he has explained his outburst as an attempt to open American eyes to their mistake in failing to support the National Front government strenuously. He has further explained his objection to the U.S. military missions by insisting that the resulting equipment and trained men will be used against the interests of Iran. He appears to have chosen to stick with Mosadeq in the ever-widening split between Kashani and the Prime Minister, but his tendency toward intrigue on a master scale makes any such conclusion tenuous at best.

MRParrish/mrp

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Tehran, Iran, October 28, 1954.

My dear Mr. Buckingham:

I am enclosing an office memorandum to you on a visit of Khoero Khan to Shiraz while I was there. I thought it might be of interest to you. I am giving Mr. Koren a carbon copy also.

My visit to Fars was most enjoyable. I flew to Shiraz on Saturday morning. I went out to Persepolis Sunday and on Monday and Tuesday day remained in Shiraz. I returned to Tehran by air on Tuesday afternoon.

I hope you and Mrs. Buckingham had an interesting trip. Mr. Gilfillen mentioned that he hoped you would visit Shiraz again.

I enjoyed meeting you and hope to have the pleasure of being with you and Mrs. Buckingham again.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Funseth
American Vice Consul

Enclosure:
Office Memo

Bryant Buckingham, Esquire,
American Consul,
Isfahan.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bryant Buckingham, American Consul, Isfahan

October 28, 1954

Robert L. Funseth, American Vice Consul, Tabriz

Khoero KHAN, Recent Visit to Shiraz

While discussing informally and unofficially the general subject of the tribes with Mr. BAHMANBEGUI, Chief of Tribal Education Program of Point Four in Shiraz, I learned that Khoero KHAN had visited General AZIZI on Sunday, October 24. According to Bahmanbegui, Khoero Khan is presently living at Firuzabad.

Subsequently Mr. Donald Gilfillen, Provincial Director of Point Four in Shiraz told me that General Azisi was calling on him that afternoon (October 25). I suggested to Mr. Gilfillen that he casually mention the Khoero visit to the General. The following information was related to me by Mr. Gilfillen after his talk with General Azisi.

According to General Azisi a messenger from Khoero Khan called on him Sunday advising that Khoero was outside of the city and would like safe passage in order to talk with the General. The General said he promptly sent an escort and had Khoero Khan brought to his office. The General told Mr. Gilfillen that Khoero appeared very nervous. Azisi said he told Khoero he had no reason to feel insecure. Further that Khoero could travel freely anywhere without fear. However, the General said he told him that the Government still insisted that Khoero leave before a certain date or be subject to arrest. He said he told Khoero the Government in general and his command in Fars in particular were desirous of good relations with the tribes. The General said he told him there was to be no trouble with the tribes. However he said he told Khoero because of his activities last year in stirring up trouble it was absolutely mandatory that he leave. The General implied, according to Mr. Gilfillen, that if Khoero didn't get out upon this date (the General did not mention the date) the Army would come and get him out.

This ends information I received concerning the Gilfillen-Azisi conversation. In my earlier conversation, Bahmanbegui said that he believed Khoero Khan no longer had much support amongst the tribes. According to Bahmanbegui the support Khoero still enjoys is based solely on his wealth.

Background on Bahmanbegui: About 40 years old. Is a member of the Amaleh tribe. His father is in the mountains with his sub-tribe. Bahmanbegui is a graduate of the University of Tehran Law school. He directs the Point Four tribal education program which appears to be an excellent operation. He seems sincerely interested in his work.

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-2-

He visited the United States in 1952 for six months on a private visit. This trip was mostly financed by Khosro Khan. He speaks good English. He told me that because he opposed Khosro in his abortive act of last year he has lost favor with him. He implied that he was active in forming an opposition to the Khan's acts.

cc: Mr. Koren
AsConsulate, Tabris

CONFIDENTIAL

July 1952

Mr. Cuomo

Last night at Mr. Melbournes I joined Khosro Quashqai and Commander Pollard for a few moments. Quashqai was saying that the US had supplied the arms that killed innocent people and was therefore guilty of their murder. Pollard pointed out that all Military aid had been turned over to the Iranian Government. Quashqai replied that there had been no real Iranian Government for forty years but an Intelligence Service Govt. A Govt of Major Jackson, Dr. Zenner and Middleton. The point was wld the US now aid the real Iranian Govt. The arms had been given to the Shah in the past. At this point he said "I have a score to settle with the Shah and one day I will settle it". He said what Iran needs is a democratic Shah. At this point I left the group.

JBC

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Handwritten: **Carded 1-15-68**

20 DEC 1967

"This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy of 1 received. Series SY-A"

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Fapich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Khosrow Khan QASHGAI

1. A reliable and sensitive source has reported that Khosrow Khan QASHGAI has received an invitation to visit the United States from his nephew, Amir Abdollah QASHGAI, a doctor residing at No. 1 Main Street, Chisholm, Maine.

2. Khosrow Khan QASHGAI, an Iranian citizen was born circa 1920 in Shiraz, Iran. He is one of the exiled leaders of the Qashgai tribe in Iran. The Qashgai leaders were forced to flee Iran about 1954 due to their continued opposition which at times led to armed revolt against the present regime of Iran. Subject presently resides in Munich, Germany where he maintains contact with all of the anti-regime elements residing abroad.

3. Should Subject accept his nephew's invitation to visit the United States, this Agency would appreciate having Subject's activities monitored and kept informed of his contacts.

4. In order to protect our source you are requested not to reveal the source of the above information in any conversations you have with Subject.

CSCI#316/05542-67

cc: Immigration & Naturalization Service
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 8 1968

Intelligence Liaison Section

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 3 1968
OFFICE OF SECURITY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Vertical stamp: SECURITY, Executive Order

Vertical stamp: PROSECUTION DIVISION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1968
54

Vertical stamp: This document consists of 1 page, Series SY-A, Serial 206

Vertical stamp: Re-transmission of copies, Serial 206, authorized by [signature] on 1/11/68

Handwritten: EMBASSY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	
1. COUNTRY: Iran		8. REPORT NUMBER: 2846045763	
2. SUBJECT: (C) Insurrection - Plan of Khosrow Khan Qashgai		9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 June 1963	
3. ISC NUMBER:		10. NO. OF PAGES: 2	
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 Jun 63		11. ORIGINATOR: GUBARMA, Iran	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Tehran, 15 Jun 63		12. PREPARED BY: Col. G.M. POSTON	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3		13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: U.S. Army Attache	
7. SOURCE: Highly Competent U.S. Observer			
14. SUMMARY: Report contains information on the current status and projected plans of Khosrow Khan Qashgai.		(Leave Blank)	
15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: Embassy, Tehran OR, Tehran		16. DOWNGRADING DATA: DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DDJ DIR 5200.10	
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION		SECRET	
DD FORM 1396		REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 60; GPO FORM 508 (REV 5-61); AF FORM 111, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62.	

Handwritten: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
21 JUN 1963
1 COPY
TEHRAN
1710

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
CONTINUATION SHEET	SECRET	REPORT NO. 2846047763
	NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES ORIGINATOR OUSARMA, Iran
<small>(Class/Emission and Control Markings)</small>		
<p>students in Europe. He intends to use the money for the purchase of arms. He is interested in obtaining .45 caliber grease guns (M-3 S&W), S&W, 3.5 inch rocket launchers and plastic explosives. These he hopes to be able to get into Iran in order to conduct terrorist attacks on lines of communication.</p> <p>5. He estimates that the next groups of tribes to join in resistance against the government are the Bakhtiari with the Kurds, with the exception of the Javanrudi following.</p> <p>6. If he can obtain the necessary propaganda means, radios, loud-speakers, and broadcasting equipment, he intends to carry out a propaganda campaign against the government concurrently with his raids on communication lines.</p> <p>7. His information is that the tribes to date have taken 2,500 rifles from the IIA and IIS in Fars.</p> <p>8. He states that the British 10-shot rifle which is reportedly in Fars is a British WWII type rifle.</p> <p>9. M-1 ammunition is now 3 rounds (appr .66s) per round in Fars.</p> <p>10. Kheer Khan claims he is in close contact with Teimur Bakhtiar and they hope to use the latter's influence among the IIA officers in order to undermine the present regime.</p> <p>COMMENT: The source describes Kheer Khan to be motivated by only one objective: i.e. the overthrow of MDM. Source states that as a means to this end, Kheer Khan has become an avid student of guerrilla operations. Source, who recently visited with many Gahgahis, believes Kheer Khan has more acceptance with the Gahgahis' than is generally accepted. Source believes that Kheer Khan has relative good information on the events which occur in Iran. While the estimates of the number of arms seized from the IIA and IIS may be high, they are not beyond the realm of possibility. Reliable foreign military sources estimate loss of arms by the IIA may be at least this high; they state losses include 3-4 4.2 mortars and at least two thousands of .30 caliber machine guns (estimated 30 to 40). In addition, the tribes through deceptive camp layouts have been the recipients of one complete drop of food and ammunition.</p> <p>COMMENT: (Of Preparing Officer) Even in Europe with discounts, \$25,000 will not go far in purchasing automatic weapons, bazookas and communication equipment. About all Kheer Khan could obtain would be enough material to fool some of the people some of the time as to his degree of outside backing.</p> <p>FIELD COORDINATION: CAS, STATE/POL</p>		
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION		
SECRET		
<small>(Class/Emission and Control Markings)</small>		

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 60 AND DA FORM 408, 1 AUG 60 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62.

QASHQAI, Khosrow

CONFIDENTIAL

FF

Residing in Germany.

Foreign Ministry requested he not be granted a visa for US during Shah's visit. Past record of making trouble during visits of Shah.

Tehran Telegram 1114
June 3, 1964

FORM PB-438
4-23-57

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--NOINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: GASHGAI POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS (OOI: EARLY JULY 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE GASHGAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR GASHGAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ALTHOUGH KHOSROW GASHGAI STILL SUPPORTS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER HEJATI BAZARGAN, HE SEES ITS AUTHORITY AS LIMITED AND STILL DECLINING, AND BELIEVES THAT WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS WIDESPREAD AND VIOLENT CIVIL DISORDER IS LIKELY TO BESET IRAN. HE IS THEREFORE PROCEEDING TO CONSOLIDATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN SOUTHERN IRAN AND IN TEHRAN IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE GASHGAI PEOPLE AND THEIR ALLIES FROM THE EFFECTS OF FURTHER EVAPORATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. GASHGAI ESTIMATES THAT HE IS SUPPORTED BY NINETY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN AREAS WHERE THE GASHGAI PEOPLE ARE NUMEROUS, AND THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT ALSO IN ADJACENT PORTIONS OF SOUTHWEST IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT HIS SUPPORTERS NOW NUMBER SOME FIVE MILLION. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE IS IN FULL SYMPATHY WITH KHOSROW GASHGAI'S OBJECTIVES, AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO CORRECT ANY EXAGGERATION IN THE LATTER'S ESTIMATES OF GASHGAI NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE.)

2. THE GASHGAI'S ARE DEVELOPING CONTACTS WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS BOTH LOCALLY AND IN TEHRAN. THERE ARE CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE COMMANDERS OF ARMORED AND INFANTRY UNITS IN SHIRAZ AND SFAHAN, AND THERE IS CONTACT ALSO IN TEHRAN WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL ALI FALAKI, A HIGH COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE DID NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONTACTS.) ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO DEVELOP SIMILAR CONTACTS IN THE AIR FORCE, BUT THESE HAVE NOT BEEN FRUITFUL, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE DISRUPTION OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITY AND ORGANIZATION BY THE TECHNICIANS KNOWN AS MOJAFIS.

3. GASHGAI TRIBESMEN ARE ACQUIRING NEW WEAPONS. THE LATEST INCREMENT IS A SHIPMENT OF 1400 KALASHNIKOV RIFLES. MOST GASHGAI WEAPONS ARE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, BUT THERE ARE SOME MACHINE GUNS AND FEW MORTARS.

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (9 JULY 1979). FIELD REPORT NO. NI 0657.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JEDDAH, KABUL, KARACHI, MAHARAJGARH, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV. REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. (DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.) JULY 9 1979 DRD D9C.1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICE. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.

REPORT CLASSIFIED C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF QASHQAI LEADER ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

ROLE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN EARLY JULY 1979, QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW QASHQAI GAVE CLOSE ASSOCIATES THE FOLLOWING INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN.

A. AYA OLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI IS THE MOST INTELLIGENT AND LEAST REACTIONARY OF THE IMPORTANT MULLAHS, BUT HIS RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM INHIBITS HIM FROM DELEGATING REAL POWER TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI). EVEN IF HE WERE DESIGNED TO DO SO, THE REST OF THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WOULD EVENTUALLY ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF PERHAPS 70 PERCENT OF IRANIANS, BUT THIS SUPPORT IS ERODING AT A RATE WHICH COULD CUT IT IN HALF IN THE NEXT FIVE MONTHS. (FIELD COMMENT: ASKED WHETHER QASHQAI CONSIDERS CLAIMS SUCH AS HAREZ S H A R I A T M A D I A R I TO BE MORE FUNDAMENTALIST THAN KHOMEINI, SOURCE SAID THAT QASHQAI REGARDS A I A T M A D A R I AS A POLITICIAN, NOT A RELIGIOUS FIGURE.)

B. THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT'S WEAKNESS DERIVES ONLY PARTLY FROM ITS DEPENDENCE ON KHOMEINI. TWO OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS ARE THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF POLITICAL EXPERTISE AND ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS, THE RESULT OF WHICH IS THAT THE PGOI DOES NOT EXERCISE FULL POWER IT IS READY HAS. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI DID NOT DESCRIBE THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS OR IDENTIFY AREAS IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS MISSING OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE ITS AUTHORITY FELT.)

C. TWO FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO COMBINE TO PRODUCE RENEWED MASSIVE CIVIL DISORDER. ONE IS THE GROWING TENSION AMONG POLITICAL GROUPS, EACH OF WHICH, MORE OR LESS REGARDLESS OF IDEOLOGY, AIMS

ACQUIRING A MONOPOLY OF POWER. SECOND IS THE PROSPECT OF SEVERE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SUSPEND FUNDING OF PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WHILE IT LOOKS FOR EVIDENCE OF PAST FINANCIAL ABUSES, WITH A RESULTING INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH IS COMPOUNDED BY THE DISTORTION OF THE RURAL ECONOMY, WHERE IT BECOMES COMPLICATED TO SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPORTED FROZEN MEATS BEING SOLD IN VILLAGES. THESE IMPORTS ARE NOW SUSPENDED, AND THE RURAL ECONOMY IS PREPARED NEITHER TO SUPPLY THE CITIES NOR TO MEET ALL ITS OWN NEEDS.

2. ACP IRAN, TEHRAN (9 JULY 1979) FIELD REPORT NO: NIT-699.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.
REPORT CLASSIFIED--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
NO JULY 99 DRV DSC. 1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

10 JUL 79 11 51z

SECRET 10995Z JUL 79 INTEL

DIR: DIRECTOR
TO: DIRECTOR, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAM ABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, SWAT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

UNINTEL INTEL DROTTER

SUPDATA: DROTTER/4 ON 5 JULY. NO LIAISON. NO INDEX. PAGIN
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FIELD NO. NIT-10,629. CL BY 015356. NO FILE.

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SECRET 011905Z AUG 79 STAFF

DIR: DIRECTOR 486833.

TOP: TO HAN.

/MINTEL S DROTTER PSYCH

IT HAS NOW BEEN SIX MONTHS SINCE THE PRESENT REGIME
TAKEN POWER IN IRAN. IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT IF THE IRANIS
WERE LEFT MORE OR LESS ALONE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME A STABLE,
ORDERLY, AND RELATIVELY PRO-UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT
EMERGE. SUCH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE, AND WE ARE FACED WITH CON-
TINUING INSTABILITY IN IRAN, GROWING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT NEAR
OUR NEIGHBORHOOD IN AFGHANISTAN, AND A WORLD ENERGY CRISIS. BASED ON THIS
SITUATION WE WISH TO HAVE COVERT ACTION MECHANISMS
IN PLACE TO SUPPLEMENT OVERT POLICY IF WE ARE CALLED UPON TO DO

2. TO BEGIN, WE WANT TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF
DEVELOPING AN ANSWER TO A NEWSPAPER WHICH WE CAN EITHER DIRECTLY
CONTROL OR WHICH AT LEAST WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO AN EDITORIAL
POLICY WHICH WE WOULD DICTATE. INITIALLY WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE
THE NEWSPAPER AVAILABLE TO EXPOSE AND COUNTER SOVIET INTERFERENCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE HQS HAS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY
AND THE NEWSPAPER CAPABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. IT SHOULD BE
RELATIVELY SIMPLE MATTER TO SHIFT ITS DIRECTION TO LOCAL
POLITICAL GOALS. SHOULD SUCH A REQUIREMENT BE LEVIED ON FIATON.

3. AS TO HOW TO BEGIN THE SEARCH FOR SUCH A NEWSPAPER,
DIR: TEHRAN COMES IMMEDIATELY TO MIND. BACK IN FEBRUARY R/4 HAD
TOLD US THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING SETTING UP A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER
AND WOULD WELCOME COVERT AMERICAN SUPPORT. HQS RESPONDED BY AD-
VISING THAT WHILE WE DOUBTED THAT SUCH AN IDEA WOULD HAVE MUCH
APPEAL IN ITSELF, WE SHOULD HEAR R/4 OUT ON THE DETAILS OF HIS
PROPOSAL. THIS MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO R/4 WHO SAID HE WOULD
PROVIDE THE DETAILS AT A FUTURE MEETING. IN APRIL R/4 SAID THAT
HE AND SADEGH RAH MADANI WERE PLANNING TO START SEVERAL WEEKLY
REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS AND HAD GOTTEN 25 MILLION RIALS TOGETHER FOR
THE PURPOSE. IN MAY STATION REPORTED THAT R/4 SAID THAT HE AND

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E C R E T 180446Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUNCH
TIE WASHINGTON 497711 SECTION 1 OF 2.

0: TEHRAN

ROM: NE IRAN/R INFO ADCNE, NE/INTEL, D PDS/EG/DDO/CB

UBJECT: WMINTEL - REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR JULY REPORTS
LISTED BELOW/REVIEWED 15 AUGUST 1979.

S. I. B.

NIT-10, 698 NO OPACT I (FIRDB-315/12271-79) RATING: 5
(UNILATERAL) SDROTTER/4 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS
DISSEMINATED 12 JULY 1979
* GASHGAI POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY
PREPARATIONS *
COMMENT: WHILE WE AGREE WITH FIELD COMMENT PARA ONE
THAT SD ROTTER/4'S ESTIMATES OF GASHGAI NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND
POLITICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE EXAGGERATED, HIS REPORTING ON THE
GASHGAI TRIBE ITSELF IS UNIQUE. REPORT WAS USED IN ARMY'S ACS
BRIEF.

S. I. B.

NIT-10, 09 NO OPACT I (FIRDB-315/12267-79) RATING: 5
(UNILATERAL) SDROTTER/4 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS
DISSEMINATED 10 JULY 1979
* VIEWS OF GASHGAI LEADER ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL
SITUATION *
COMMENT: WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT SDROTTER/4 TRIED
TO PRESENT A BALANCED PICTURE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN IRAN,
AND WE CONTINUE TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 486833 S E C R E T
MADANI SHOULD START A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER IN TEHRAN IN A MONTH OR
SO.

REQUEST STATION QUESTION R/4 AS TO THE STATUS OF HIS
NEWSPAPER SHOULD ASK NEXT MEETING. AS R/4 IS ASTUTE PERSON BELIEVE WE
SHOULD FRANK WITH HIM AS TO OUR REASON FOR RAISING MATTER.
WE WOULD LIKE TO ENGAGE IN PROPAGANDA IN IRAN HAS
DECIDED UPON. WE WANT TO FULLY INVESTIGATE MATTER SO
WE CAN BE MADE ON WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN.
WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING ON ANY PAPER R/4 IS PUBLISHING
OR PLANNING TO PUBLISH. CIRCULATION, TARGET GROUP, MEANS OF
SHIP, METHOD OF FUNDING, TYPE AND DEGREE OF GOVT CENSOR-
SHIP, EDITORIAL DIRECTION, SHOULD R/4 RAISE MATTER OF FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FROM US, PLEASE OBTAIN ESTIMATES OF WHAT HIS NEEDS WILL
BE AND RETURN HIS WILLINGNESS PERMIT OUR PARTICIPATION IN
SELECTED CONTENT.

IN ADDITION QUERYING R/4 RE HIS OWN NEWSPAPER, ALSO
REQUEST TO ASK HIM IF HE AWARE OF OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN IRAN
THAT MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO COVERT SUPPORT FROM US. REGARDS IRAN,
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SUCH PUBLICATIONS IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE
COURTESY AMONG IRANIANS THERE.
6. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS.

7. FILE: 201-263327. RW 31JUL99 DRW D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
E C R E T
BT
#079

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF KHUZESTAN GOVERNOR MADANI (DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. AS OF EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979, AYATOLLAHS MOHAMED HOSSEIN BEHESHTI AND HASSAN LAHOUTI WERE ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMENI THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI) CAN BEST BE REMEDIED BY REPLACING PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGANI WITH ADMIRAL AHMAD MADANI, CURRENTLY GOVERNOR OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: KHOMENI'S DECISION, IS NOT YET KNOWN, BUT THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT KHOMENI IS PLEASED WITH MADANI'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING ARAB DISSIDENCE IN KHUZESTAN UNDER CONTROL.) (FIELD COMMENT: A RELIABLE SOURCE SAID ON 6 SEPTEMBER THAT BEHESHTI IS GENERALLY THOUGHT TO BE PERSONALLY HOSTILE TO MADANI.)

2. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW QASHQAI HAS RECOMMENDED TO ADMIRAL MADANI THAT THE LATTER LEAD A MILITARY COUP AGAINST KHOMENI AND THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. MADANI RESPONDED THAT SUCH A MOVE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PREMATURE; IN THIS CONTEXT HE ALLUDED TO THE CONTINUED WEAKNESS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

3. MADANI IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. ALTHOUGH ARAB DISSIDENT ACTIVITY HAS DECLINED IN PAST WEEKS, MADANI HAS INFORMATION INDICATING THAT ORGANIZING ACTIVITY AMONG THE ARABS HAS GREATLY ACCELERATED (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE HAD NO DETAILS ON THIS SUBJECT.)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (5 SEPTEMBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO NIT-10,715.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE (DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ACCORDING TO QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW QASHQAI THE TRIBE AND ITS ALLIES IN FARIS AND ADJACENT PROVINCES HAVE A TOTAL OF 20,000 LIGHT WEAPONS. THESE ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY INDIVIDUAL ARMS, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALSO A FEW MORTARS AND LIGHT MACHINE GUNS. (FIELD COMMENT: IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE CLAIMED NUMBER OF LIGHT WEAPONS IS EXAGGERATED. SEE NIT-10,658, TDFIRDB-315,12271-79, FOR EARLIER INFORMATION FROM THE SAME SOURCE ON QASHQAI ACTIVITY.) ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES IS WELL ADVANCED, AND KHOSROW QASHQAI BELIEVES THAT HE COULD MOVE AS MANY AS 20,000 QASHQAI AND ALLIED TRIBESMEN TO TEHRAN WITHIN THREE DAYS. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION ASPECTS OF SUCH A MOVE IS BEING CONDUCTED UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT THE QASHQAI MIGHT HAVE TO REACT AGAINST A THREAT TO AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMENI. IN FACT, QASHQAI WANTS TO BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE MILITARY FORCE TO KHOMENI'S OVERTHROW WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT.

2. THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE QASHQAI FORCES LOYAL TO KHOSROW QASHQAI CALLS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF CONTACTS IN THE IRANIAN MILITARY; THEY SEEK ALSO TO ESTABLISH AN ALLIANCE WITH SECULAR POLITICIANS SUCH AS THE YOUNGER GENERATION IN THE NATIONAL FRONT. (SOURCE COMMENT: KHOSROW QASHQAI IS HIGHLY IMPRESSED BY SEYED JAVAD I, REGARDING HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS COMPATIBLE WITH THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE TRIBESMEN AND THE IRANIAN NATION ENVISAGES A REGIME SIMILAR IN POLICY LINE TO THAT OF PRIME MINISTER MOSSADEG.) FORMER PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR HAS RECENTLY INDICATED CONTACT WITH THE LATTER BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO

WHIT BAKHTIAR

3. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE IS A PARTISAN OF KHOSROW QASHQAI... IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF HIS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY THE ENTIRE QASHQAI TRIBE IS LOYAL ... KHOSROW.)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (5 SEPTEMBER 1979) FIELD REPORT

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN (CHARGE ONLY) SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV. (CHIEFS OF MISSION ONLY) REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW ... SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
S E C R E T

13 OCT 1979 25z

SECRET 121714Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 531280. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAC, NE/INTEL, DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: WMINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER
NIT'S 18,718 THROUGH 18,728 REVIEWED 17 OCTOBER 1979.

Out. Intels
Redd
Fix

OBJECTIVE: S.1.B RATING: 5

FIELD NO NIT-18,713 OPACT SDROTTER
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15614-79, 6 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDROTTER/4, FULL CONTROLS
SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL
ACTIVITY OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE

COMMENT: THERE IS CONTINUING INTEREST IN REPORTING
ON THE QASHQAI, THEIR ORGANIZATION, FACTIONS, LEADERS, LOYALTIES,
ARMS ACQUISITION, AND ACTIVITY. ACCORDING TO SDROTTER/1, THE
QASHQAI ARE THE ONLY TRIBE WHICH CAN MOUNT SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION
ACTIVITY (ASIDE FROM THE KURDS); HE DISCOUNTS THE KASHGARI.
REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

OBJECTIVE: S.1.B RATING: 5

FIELD NO NIT-18,715 NO OPACT
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15596-79, 6 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDROTTER/4, FULL CONTROLS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECURITY CONCERNS
OF KHUZESTAN GOVERNOR MADANI

COMMENT: THERE IS CONTINUING INTEREST IN REPORTING
ON MADANI AND ATTITUDES OF KEY FIGURES TOWARD HIM. HE WOULD BE
INTERESTED IN FOLLOWUP REPORTING ON MADANI'S INFORMATION INDICATING
THAT ORGANIZING ACTIVITY AMONG THE ARABS HAS GREATLY INCREASED.
REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

REPORT CLASS SECRET - UNINTEL - NOFORM - NOCONTRACT - DRCON
COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: BAKHTIAR EFFORTS TO GENERATE SUPPORT IN IRAN
(OO: SEPTEMBER-21 OCTOBER 1979)
SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF
A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBE LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS
IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING
RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KACROW QASQAI HAS RECEIVED
A SERIES OF MESSAGES, TRANSMITTED IN WRITTEN NOTES AND BY WORD
OF MOUTH, FROM SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR. THE PURPOSE OF
THESE MESSAGES IS TO SOLICIT QASHQAI SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR'S
EFFORT TO BUILD AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ISLAMIC REGIME DOMINATED
BY AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMAYNI. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI
QASHQAI SAID THE LAST NOTE FROM BAKHTIAR ARRIVED DURING THE
FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER.)

2. BAKHTIAR'S COMMUNICATIONS TO QASHQAI CLAIM THAT
SUPPORT HAS BEEN PROMISED BY MODERATE CLERGY INCLUDING AYATOLLAH
KAZEM SHARIFI ABAD AND BY ELEMENTS IN THE
MILITARY AT ALL LEVELS WITH OFFICER CORPS.
BAKHTIAR ALSO CLAIMED SUPPORT FROM THE ETHNIC MINORITIES,
EXPLICITLY INCLUDING THE IRAQIAN ARABS. (SOURCE COMMENT:
QASHQAI SAID HE REGARDS SHARIF ABAD AS POLITICALLY TOO ASTUTE
TO HAVE MADE ANY COMMITMENT TO THE BAKHTIAR PROGRAM. HE
SAID HE DOUBTS THE ACCURACY OF BAKHTIAR'S CLAIMS TO SUPPORT
IN IRAN AND THAT HE BELIEVES BAKHTIAR IS INDULGING THE NORMAL
EMIGRE TENDENCY TO OVERESTIMATE RESIDUAL SUPPORT INSIDE THE
COUNTRY.)

3. BAKHTIAR HAS OFFERED THE QASHQAI TRIBE "UNLIMITED"
FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HE HAS GUARANTEED THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY
OF UP TO 20 MILLION RIALS (APPROXIMATELY U.S. DOLLARS 4.5 MILLION
AT THE FREE MARKET RATE). (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI HAS SAID
HE IS AS SCEPTICAL OF THE OFFER OF FINANCIAL AID AS HE IS OF
BAKHTIAR'S CLAIMS TO SUPPORT INSIDE IRAN. IN GENERAL HE THINKS

SDROTTER INTEL

REF: A. TEHRAN 54473 (NIT-10,767)
B. TEHRAN 54472 (NIT-10,768)
TEHRAN 54144

AT 13 OCTOBER MEETING, SDROTTER/4 (R/4) SAID HIS PEOPLE ARE IN TOUCH WITH ARAB DISSIDENTS WHO ALSO SERVE AT LEAST OCCASIONALLY AS WEAPONS PURVEYORS TO THE NON-ARAB TRIBES IN THE SOUTH. HE SAID HE WANTS TO HELP US BUT THAT HE NOT IN POSITION TO BROKER OF THESE CONTACTS. WE SAID WE WOULD SEE AND ASKED HIM ALSO FOR LOCATIONS, ORGANIZATION AND AS MUCH OF AN ASSESSMENT AS HE CAN THAT THEY WOULD BE AMENABLE TO OUR SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE WILL ASSESS

R/4 ALSO EXPECTS TO SEE MUSTAFA CHAMRAN THIS WEEK (HIS PROSPECTS DEPEND ON TIMING OF CHAMRAN'S RETURN FROM KURDISTAN). HE LEVIED REQUIREMENTS DEALING WITH MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND WITH PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.

4. R/4 ASKED, AS HE USUALLY DOES, WHAT HE AND HIS PEOPLE SHOULD DO. WE REPLIED, AS USUAL, THAT WHATEVER MAY BE THE DEFECTS OF LIFE UNDER KHOMEINI, WE ARE NOT GOING TO ENCOURAGE ANY ACTIVITY WHOSE END RESULT MIGHT VERY WELL MAKE THINGS

ION, SOUNDING AS USUAL
THE NARROWER CONTEXT
HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD DO
ING THE TRIBE. WE SAID
MUCH IF THE TRIBE HAD
NOT SUCH A MOVE; R/4 SETTLED

FILE: 201-063527. RVW 14 OCT 99 DRV D7C.1. ALL SECRET.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E --WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF KHOSROW QASHGAI ON SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND ON QASHGAI TRIBE POLITICAL ACTIVITY (OOB: MID-OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHGAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHGAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. QASHGAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW QASHGAI SAID IN MID-OCTOBER 1979 THAT, OF THE FIVE MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMEN IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI), HE REGARDS ONLY ONE AS BEING A CONVINCED REVOLUTIONARY. THIS IS MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHGAI SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN CHAMRAN IN ABOUT TEN YEARS AND COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT HIS IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR HAD SURVIVED THROUGH THIS PERIOD.) QASHGAI SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SADEGH TABATABA'I AND NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION DIRECTOR SADEGH QOTBZADEH ARE ESSENTIALLY OPPORUNISTS, MORE CONCERNED WITH THE ACQUISITION AND EXERCISE OF POWER THAN WITH THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRANIAN SOCIETY ON THE BASIS OF SOME COHERENT POLITICAL PROGRAM. QASHGAI EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONTEMPT FOR QOTBZADEH, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS FOR SALE TO ANYONE WHO PROVIDES HIM THE LUXURIES AND PERQUISITES HE

2. OF YAZDI, QASHGAI SAID THAT HE IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN QOTBZADEH, VERY AMBITIOUS AND DEFINITELY NOT A REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUE. KHOSROW SAID THAT HE REGARDS TABATABA'I AS ACTIVATED BY SELF-INTEREST AS MUCH AS THE OTHERS; HE SAID THAT HE REGARDS INTERIOR MINISTER HAJI ABOLGHAJIAN AS THE OTHER MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMAN IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE DOES NOT THINK HIM TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, SADEGH QOTBZADEH. KHOSROW ADDED THAT HE REGARDS ALL FIVE OF THESE OFFICIALS AS BEING TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON AYATOLLAH RUMOLLAH KHOMENI FOR THEIR POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE, SAYING THAT, AS LONG-TIME EXILES,

THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL CONSTITUTIONS INSIDE IRAN.

3. QASHGAI SAID THAT HE CONTINUES TO DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR THE QASHGAI TRIBE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. HE CLAIMED THAT NEW CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE AMONG BOTH ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS. HE SAID THAT CONTACT CONTINUES WITH FRONT FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF SAJJAD M. H. I. AND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP IS TO PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES SUCH AS THE DEATH OR DISABILITY OF KHOMEINI. QASHGAI SAID THAT FALLAHI HAS NEVER EXPLICITLY INDICATED HOSTILITY TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC STYLE OF GOVERNMENT.

4. QASHGAI SAID THAT THE GOV. HAS CHIEFLY BUT FORMALLY CANCELLED ORDERS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE QASHGAI TRIBE HE SAID THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO COM AFTER THE ORDER WAS PUBLISHED, ARGUING THAT THE SECURITY OF THE QASHGAI AREA IS BEST SERVED BY ALLOWING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ARMS. ACCORDING TO QASHGAI, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ORDERED THE GOVERNMENT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER NOT TO PURSUE ITS ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO TRY TO DISARM THE QASHGAI. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHGAI ESTIMATED THAT MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE QASHGAI WOULD HAVE CONSENTED TO GIVE UP THEIR ARMS WITHOUT A FIGHT.) (FIELD COMMENT: QASHGAI HAS BEEN PERSISTING IN THE CAMPAIGN TO RECOVER UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS ANNOUNCED BY THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AFTER THE VIOLENCE WHICH FOLLOWED THE CLOSING OF THE LIBERAL NEWSPAPER "AYANDEGAN" IN MID-AUGUST.)

5. ACC: IRAN, TEHRAN (25 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NII-10,788.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JEDDAH, KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF CONTINGENT/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION OF THE EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. (RAN 04 OCT 89 DPM DSG-1. CLASSIFIED BY REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.)
SECRET

UNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTACT--ORCON

OF QASHGAI LEADER ON HIS MEETING WITH KHOMEINI CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (OOI) LATE OCTOBER

MEMBER OF THE QASHGAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY

1. QASHGAI SAID HE HAD PRIVATE MEETING AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE WITH MOHAMMAD RUMOLAH M. H. D. M. I. N. I. ON 29 OCTOBER. HE SAID HE HAD PRESENTED QASHGAI TO KHOMEINI, AND WAS CURIAL THROUGHOUT THE MEETING. HE SAID KHOMEINI LISTENED, AND WAS CURIAL HE HAD PRESENTED QASHGAI TO KHOMEINI, AND WAS CURIAL IN KHUZESTAN, PRAISING GOVERNOR ANBAR M. D. M. I. FOR HIS WORK TO HELP MADANI CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: MADANI HAD SEEN KHOMEINI ON 24 OCTOBER.)

2. ACCORDING TO QASHGAI, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (PASDARAN) FROM BANDAR ANZALI AFTER THE RECENT DISTURBANCES INTENSIFIED THE PASDARAN LEADERSHIP'S REGIMENT OF MADANI WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED FIRM CONTROLS ON PASDARAN ACTIVITY IN KHUZESTAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHGAI SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT DEFENSE MINISTER MUSTAFSA M. H. M. R. A. H. IS ALSO HOSTILE TO MADANI BUT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS BELIEF.) (FIELD COMMENT: QASHGAI SAID THAT QASHGAI WAS PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF BANDAR ANZALI, FORMERLY BANDAR PAKHLEVI, WAS PLACED UNDER REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PASDARAN WAS REPORTED IN THE PRESS.)



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/4: KHOSROW QASHQAI.
QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER. RESIDES
SHIRAZ. MARITAL STATUS UNKNOWN.
AGE 50-55. RESIDED W. GERMANY AND
U.S. BEFORE REVOLUTION.

Met in Tehran approximately every three to four weeks, either in his hotel room or picked up by car. Used Sheraton and Inter-Continental hotels.

Purpose of Contact: 1) To advise sources of information on Khuzestani Arabs, including organization, leadership, and any involvement with or support from Iraq; 2) Information on the security situation in Fars and Khuzestan Provinces; 3) Political plans of Admiral Madani.

Re 1): In October, Mr. Q said he had been informed about two Khuzestani Arabs, smugglers by trade, who might be able to provide the desired information. Mr. Q was to provide names and other pertinent data in November. Re 2): Mr. Q provided information on his efforts both to guard against threats to the Revolution and to avoid the stationing of Pasdaran and Komitehs among the Qashqai people. Described efforts to acquire friends for the Qashqai tribe among military officers and in the person of Adm. Madani. Re 3) Mr. Q described Madani's interest in seeking the Presidency of the Republic under the new constitution.

Mr. Q described the weekly newspaper he wanted to sponsor in cooperation with Admiral Madani. Most of the information involved the reasons for continued postponement of publication, primarily the absence from Iran of the proposed editor (name not known). Paper was to be published in Tehran in about 70,000 copies per edition. We were interested, in principle, in



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/L.

supporting a publication which would seek to broaden the Revolution's base of support and, if possible, promote reconciliation between Iran and the US, ~~EM~~ but as of 4 November no support for this venture had been offered or requested.

Payment: None. A U.S. visa was obtained for Mr. Q's sister.

Kareem Sanjabi:

The documents indicate that the C. I. A. was interested in talking to Sanjabi on the condition that he would not subsequently insist on meeting the Security Council or the White House. With the approval of the U. S. State Department, the C. I. A. intended to send one of their agents in the guise of a high ranking official from the State Department's special desk dealing with Iranian affairs to meet him, but due to his ill-health this meeting did not materialize until Shahrivar 20 (September 11). The subsequent telegram about Sanjabi is dated Aban 8 (October 30), and as the documents referred to in the above-mentioned document could not be traced materialization or non-materialization of this meeting is not known. The documents in this section indicate that Sam Sanjabi, the son of Karim, was working as a contact for the C. I. A. and his father himself had a very close association with the C. I. A.

SECRET 012001Z JUL 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 465014

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25077

1. HQS IS INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH SANJABI PRO-
VIDING SANJABI IS NOT MAKING SEPARATE OVERTURES TO SEN SECURITY
COUNCIL/WHITE HOUSE, WHICH WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE DUPLICATING.
HAVE INFORMED STATE DEPARTMENT OF SANJABI'S ARRIVAL AND LEFTGETE
PRELIMINARY COORDINATION RE MEETING HIM. STATE WAS UNAWARE OF
SANJABI'S PLANS TO TRAVEL U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.

2. WILL ADVISE RE IDENTITY OF HQS OFFICER TO PARTICIPATE
WOULD BE SENIOR U.S. GOVERNMENT INT INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST
ON IRAN. AGREE RE VENUE AND TIMING PROPOSED PARA TWO REF.

3. FILE: 201-961440. RVW 31 JUL 79 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
#7956

AUG 04 382

SECRET 09101.Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53879

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25..2

1. AGREE SANJABI WOULD PROBABLY USE INFO ON YAZDI
CITIZENSHIP TO DISCREDIT HIM. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO STATION
AND MISSION UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE WITH
RESPECT TO PGOI, AND WE THINK IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE
TO PROVIDE ANY SUCH INFO, REGARDLESS OF ITS PROVENANCE.

2. FILE: 201-096... RVW 9 AUG 79 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET

SECRET

1 Aug 79

SECRET 102132Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 492926.

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO IWFO TEHRAN.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53879
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140

1. CONCUR REF A REGARDING INAPPROPRIATENESS OF REACTION
FULFILLING SANJABI REQUEST. PASS SHOULD NOT PUT ITSELF IN
POSITION OF AIDING SANJABI ON THIS.

2. FILE: 201-961440. RW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#1853

P

2 Sep 79

SECRET 112355Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140
B. TEHRAN 53879

1. KARIM SANJABI IS RECOVERING AT THE HOME OF HIS SON, SAM
SANJABI, IN CHICO, CALIFORNIA. UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS AN UNDIAGNOSED
INFECTION WITH HIGH FEVER WHICH HAS NOT YET RESPONDED TO ANTIBIOTICS
AND IS IN NO CONDITION FOR AN INTERVIEW. SAM ESTIMATES AT LEAST A
WEEK MORE OF TREATMENT AND REST WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE KARIM IS
FIT TO TALK. WILL ADVISE.

2. SAM PERSISTS IN REQUEST FOR INFO ON YAZDI'S NATURALIZATION.
WE TOLD HIM DOCUMENTS SUCH AS HE REQUESTED WERE PROTECTED BY THE
PRIVACY ACT. SAM SAID HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION, ONLY THE BASIC
FACTS OF DATE AND PLACE OF YAZDI'S NATURALIZATION, WHICH HE ARGUES
SHOULD BE MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD. IF THIS IS PUBLIC RECORD
INFORMATION, SUGGEST HCS OBTAIN IT THROUGH HIS OFFICER.
EASE INTRODUCTION TO HCS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-961440. RW 11SEP99 DRV D9C BY 033151. ALL

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SECRET
BT
#9827

31 Oct 79 09 05z

SECRET 301700Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25591

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTPL AJAJA

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25330
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25450 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. ACCORDING TO HIS SON, SAM, DR. KAPIM SANJABI RECEIVED A CALL FROM ALI ARDALAN (A RELATIVE, A KURD, AND PRESENT MINISTER OF FINANCE) SEVERAL DAYS AGO INVITING HIS EARLY RETURN TO IRAN. DR. SANJABI LEFT CALIFORNIA 28 OCTOBER *FOR A BRIEF STOP WITH HIS OTHER SON IN ILLINOIS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO EUROPE TO SEE IRANIAN EXILE CONTACTS THERE. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT 7 NOVEMBER.

2. SAM, ON BASIS OF TALKS WITH HIS FATHER, SPECULATES REASONS FOR SUMMONS MAY BE:

A. TO AID THE GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE KURDISH PROBLEM THROUGH HIS AUTHORITY WITH THE SANJABI TRIBE.

B. TO ASSIST THE FALTERING BAZARGAN GOVT OR ITS SUCCESSOR IN A POSITION SUCH AS CHIEF OF THE CABINET. KARIM SANJABI SAID HE WOULD REFUSE ANY CABINET POST UNLESS HE WERE GUARANTEED THE AUTHORITY TO GO WITH THE TITLE. HE WANTS NO REPEAT OF HIS SHORT TERM AS FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. DR. SANJABI'S HEALTH IS MUCH IMPROVED AND HE GAINED A LITTLE WEIGHT WHILE RESTING IN CHICO.

4. SAM PROMISED TO INFORM US OF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

5. FILE: 201-09S1442. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C1 BY 033151.

ALL SECRET.
SECRET
BT
#2349

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WHINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--DRCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: DARIOUSH FOROUHAR'S REMARKS ON IRANIAN CABINET SHUFFLE
(OOI: 29 SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: A GENERALLY RELIABLE IRANIAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVE.

1. ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1979, DARIOUSH FOROUHAR SAID THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO POSITION IN THE NEW IRANIAN CABINET BECAUSE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WANTED THE BENEFIT OF HIS PRESTIGE IN THE CABINET. FOR HIS PART, FOROUHAR DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE AT THE HEAD OF ANY SPECIFIC MINISTRY FOR FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED AND INVESTIGATED AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, LIKE HASSAN NAZAH, FORMER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. (FIELD COMMENT: PRIOR TO THE CABINET SHAKEUP, FOROUHAR WAS MINISTER OF LABOR.)

2. FOROUHAR SAID THAT THE FORMER MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATION, DR. ALI SHARIATI-MADARI, WAS NOT ON THE LIST OF MINISTERS TO BE CHANGED ORIGINALLY, BUT SHARIATI-MADARI HAD SUBMITTED HIS OWN RESIGNATION ON 27 SEPTEMBER IN PROTEST AGAINST THE OTHER CABINET CHANGES. (SOURCE COMMENT: DR. ALI SHARIATI-MADARI IS A DISTANT RELATIVE OF THE WELL-KNOWN AYATOLLAH MAZEM SHARIATI-MADARI.)

3. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (1 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. WIT-10,753.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN, SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JUDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 1 OCT 99 DRV D9C 1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
SECRET

TEHRAN 54368 (MIT-10,753)

1. SDVALID/I (V/I) OBTAINED REF DIRECTLY FROM DARIOUSH FOROUHAR ON 29 SEPTEMBER, WHEN HE MET HIM AT HOME OF HIS FRIEND JAVAD VATANI. VATANI AND FOROUHAR ARE OLD FRIENDS BECAUSE THEY WERE IN PRISON TOGETHER IN THE SHAH'S ERA.

2. FOROUHAR ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WILL RECEIVE DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS:

SARAF YAZI -- CHARGE IN BANGLADESH

ALI RASOULI -- CHARGE IN SENEGAL

NADER SHAHSAD -- CHARGE IN ROME *✓ already confirmed*

GHASEM EFTEXARI -- CHARGE IN BRASILIA

AHMAD HOSSAINI FARD -- PRESS OFFICER IN EAST BERLIN

3. ACCORDING TO FOROUHAR, THE FOLLOWING PERSONS ARE ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: BANI-SADR, GHOTBZADEH, AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI AND AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI. SDVALID/I WAS NOT CERTAIN FROM FOROUHAR'S REMARKS WHETHER HE MEANT THAT THESE ARE THE ONLY PERSONS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

Real Name: Ali Saifpur Fatemi.

Code Name: S. D. Market.

S. D. Market (Ali Saifpur Fatemi) was a professor of economics at an American university and was employed as source of information on the political matters of Iran in Azar 58 (November 1979). His secret motive in working for the C. I. A. was that America should continue to support the Iranian moderates, so that through them a solution to the political problems of Iran could be found. He was residing in America as a permanent resident and had visited Iran several times in connection with his work at the International Training Centre of Iran.

In view of the information given by another spy about S. D. Market to the C. I. A. official to the effect that in all probability the charges of embezzlement, misappropriation and corruption against Ardshir Zahidi are also directed towards him (S. D. Market), the C. I. A. considered the probable dangers threatening him and did not intend to exert more pressure on him by making further contact.

4 APR 79 1455z

SECRET 140421Z APR 79 STAFF
SITE DIRECTOR 419488 SECTION 1 OF 2
TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.
MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA BCHAAM.
REF: TEHRAN 52649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES
LAATSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

B. SDMARKET/1 (M/I); AGE 43. PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS
AT U.S. UNIVERSITY TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY TO TEHRAN TO WORK
WITH IRAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION (CIE). AN
IRANIAN INTELLECTUAL WHO WAS ACTIVE IN NON-COMMUNIST ANTI-SHAH
GROUPS OUTSIDE IRAN UNTIL LATE 1960'S. WAS RECRUITED DEC 7
AS SOURCE OF INFO ON IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION. HAS
IMPRESSIVE RANGE OF CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL FRONT
AND MODERATE CIRCLES WHO HE SEES TO OBTAIN INFO ON LOCAL
DEVELOPMENTS. MOTIVATION IS STRONG BELIEF THAT USG MUST CONTINUE
TO SUPPORT IRAN WHILE MODERATES TRY TO FIND SOLUTION TO SITUATION.
AN UNPAID AGENT THROUGH APPROVAL GRANTED JAN 79 FOR ACCOMMODATION
EXCHANGE OR LOAN OF FUNDS TO PAY LOCAL CIE STAFF.
MEETINGS INVOLVE CAR OR CAR PICKUPS, RESTAURANT MEETINGS, ETC.
USE OF COMMO GEAR AUTHORIZED. HOWEVER UNIT NO LONGER IN HIS
POSSESSION (STATUS RETRIEVED IT AS OF 12 MARCH 79 DUE LOCAL
SECURITY SITUATION). SDMARKET/1 IS INTELLIGENT AND ARTICULATE
MAN WHOSE PREVIOUS REPROBING HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. SINCE
MANY OF HIS FRIENDS HAVE BEEN JAILED, AND IN SOME CASES EXECUTED,
SDMARKET/1, A PRA, PLANS TO DEPART TEHRAN AS SOON AS GOVERNMENT
ALLOWS IRANIAN MILES TO LEAVE. HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH RTACTIO
IN U.S.

2. NO FILE. RWV 13 APR 79 DRV DSG.1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET

SECRET SVLOSZ MAR 79 STAFF
RWV 5221A (PLANTINGA ACTING)
PRIORITY DIRECTOR

1. SDMARKET/1 (M/I) CONTINUES TO PLAN TO LEAVE IRAN
AS SOON AS HE IS ABLE - HE HOPES BY EARLY APRIL 79.
M/I WILL EXPECT A CALL FROM GLEGOROFF IF M/I STILL HERE
AFTER GLEGOROFF'S ARRIVAL. IF M/I ABLE LEAVE IN NEAR FUTURE
WE HAVE ARRANGED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM IN THE U.S.
THROUGH HIS WIFE. WE HAVE TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT M/I WILL TRAVEL
TO WASHINGTON FOR A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL
IN THE U.S.
3. FOR THE RECORD, M/I HAS CHANGED HIS OFFICE LOCATION.
NEW OFFICE TELEPHONE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE AS IDENT.
A. FILE: DEFER. RWV 26 MAR 79. DRV DSG.1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET

261106Z MAR 79 STAFF
TEHRAN 532513 (PLANTING NOTING)

SECURITY DIRECTOR.

TEHRAN 532514

TEHRAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION.

PHONE S: 623-043
623-734

OFFICE LOCATED AT NORTHEAST CORNER, INTERSECTION OF
TAKHT-E-VAJUS AND SHAH ABBAS, BUILDING HAS 5 FLOORS.
SIGNS ON FRONT ENTRANCE. (A BANK OCCUPIES GROUND FL.)

RUW 26 MAR 79 DRU DGC A SECRET
SECRET

84817 h

TEHRAN 5314 (GLESOROFF ACTION)

DIRECTOR.

NYNTEL (S) MARKET (S) SDRIGHT

1. NEARLOTTE ELICITED FROM SDRIGHT/1 THAT SDRIGHT/1
IS LYING VERY LOW IN TEHRAN PRIMARILY BECAUSE HE FEARS LOCAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF HIS PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH ARDESHIR ZAHEDI.
R/1 CLAIMS M/1 HAD BEEN GIVEN MONEY BY ZAHEDI FOR CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL
PROJECTS WHICH NEVER GOT OFF GROUND. THERE ARE SUSPICIONS REGARDING WHAT
HAPPENED TO THE MONEY. R/1 IS OF OPINION THAT M/1 WANTS TO ESCAPE TO UK.

2. AS DESIRABLE AS IT WOULD BE TO TRY TO GET M/1 BACK IN
REPORTING RELATIONSHIP, STATION CAN SYMPATHIZE WITH M/1'S WORRY
AND IS RELUCTANT TO PRESS HIM. CRIMES OF ALLEGED "CORRUPTION"
AND SERVICE TO THE LUMINARIES OF FORMER REGIME ARE UNDEENED
SERIOUS, SOMETIMES TERMINAL. UNLESS HQS BELIEVES WE SHOULD
LEAN HARD ON M/1 TO RESUME RELATIONSHIP, WE INCLINED TO HONOR
M/1'S JUDGMENT THAT CONTACTS TOO RISKY FOR HIM NOW.

3. FILE: 20
SECRET
SECRET

RUW 17 MAY 79 DRU DGC A ALL

CLASSIFIED - CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

20 faw OUTGOING Embassy TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL

AMB DDC Chrgo: Classification Control: 9/589

ECOM ACTION: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 517 Date: SEPT. 28, 1963

OR REF.: (a) Deptel 843 and Subtel 957 of May 15, 1962
UNCLAS (b) Subtel 506 and Deptel 221, Sept., 1963
LAST (c) Para. 5 Dept. CMY 2, Sept. 6, 1963.

FILES-2 Believe time has come press once more for deportation Iranian students Ali Seifpur FARMAN and Sadeq GOYBANDER on ground that they are

FOUCH in United States without valid Iranian passports. As Department aware these students are deeply involved in political activities against Iranian Government and there appears to be good legal case against them.


When this matter last discussed as per reference (a), the Department asked Embassy obtain assurance from Prime Minister that in case they returned to Iran they would not be prosecuted for any acts committed up to that time. Subsequently Embassy as per Embtel 957 did obtain such assurance from Shah himself. We have no reason to doubt continued validity these assurances and could if necessary remind Government of them.

Timeliness of renewed action with Justice Department is suggested by recent incident with student agitators involving Iranian Foreign Minister as per Ref (b). Although Embassy has received no evidence that they were personally involved in this latest disturbance, we strongly feel that action on Farnan and Goybandah would have salutary effect on other Iranian students

in US.	INT.	INT.
	✓	Ther
	✓	
	✓	
	✓	

GP-4 CONFIDENTIAL Classification

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service
United States of America

OUTGOING

Charge:

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Classification

Control: 9/389

-2-

Date:

Timeliness is further suggested by recent information on IHS position contained ref (a) notably sentence that "Department has been informally told by the (Immigration and Naturalization) Service that it probably would not grant a further extension of stay to a student in such circumstances", i.e., when his Iranian passport has not been extended.

HOLMES

FOL:JFHern/est
Sept. 28, 1963

Clearance
CONS: JFLoans (Draft)

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service
United States of America

10/

INCOMING

AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

ACTION:
COM-
L.FO:
CHARR:
AMB
POL-3
CidJ-2
CR

CONFIDENTIAL OP-4

Classification

Control: 12/399

	Action	Infor.	IN Read
DAL			
LCA			
AMB			
JL			
LF			
FK			

Dec. 26, 1963
06:00 A.M.

FROM: DEPARTMENT

NO: 157, DECEMBER 26, 5PM

Re EBHTEL 317

Fatemeh and Gotzadeh were called in today to advise on Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization who issued them strong warning to cease troublesome activities or face legal action to enforce departure as is normal in the case of aliens without valid passports. Warning issued in name of Attorney General, whom Commissioner described as "disappointed" that past leniency shown at his instance had not resulted in more behavior on the part of the Iranian students' Association. Fatemeh and Gotzadeh were told that they are expected to use their influence in that association to prevent others from engaging in troublesome activities and to spread the word that any student without valid passport must control behavior or face appropriate legal action.

Indicated activities were specified as: harassment and insulting of visiting Iranian dignitaries; forced entry into Iranian diplomatic premises; and distribution of Communist literature.

Above procedure was worked out as result of letter from Secretary to Attorney General. Today's warning was issued in presence of CIA representative, who was invited to reinforce points made by Commissioner.

Unclassified cleared memo of conversation of today's session will be pouched as soon as possible. Have informed Forough of meeting, as he has frequently inquired, at Aran's behest, as to action we were taking to curb student activities.

FTI. The two Iranian women, Fatemeh and Gotzadeh, and justifying political activities on their behalf, nevertheless appeared shaken by American and Iranian with evidence that there has been a change in United States Government stance toward them. They probed for any signs of differences between State and Justice positions. Fatemeh has advised that she has applied for change of status to permanent resident, on basis wife is naturalized U.S. citizen. She did not press this case today; we hope/.....

FORM 8-60
2-71-60

0730/PP

CONFIDENTIAL OP-4

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July 12, 1966

Martin F. Kern, Esquire
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear Martin:

Yesterday Ali Fatemi's attorney called to say the Immigration Service had granted Fatemi's request to change his status to that of permanent resident. This was later confirmed by I/SCA, which maintains liaison with the INS. When I mentioned our interest, for political reasons, in knowing in advance about decisions of this kind, I was told that no doubt the Special Inquiry Officer, acting in a quasi-judicial manner, simply informs the applicant once the decision is made. Fortunately, the decision was not based on a claim that Fatemi would be persecuted if he were deported to Iran. Most probably the decision, as in similar cases, was because Fatemi has an American citizen wife and child, on whom Fatemi's deportation might work a hardship.

The Department continued throughout the proceedings to maintain its position, originally stated in 1964, that a change of status would have an adverse effect on our relations with Iran. We were overruled by the INS which has the responsibility under the law for making decisions like this.

While this is certainly unfortunate in terms of our foreign relations, Don Sawyer and I believe that the Department employed every legitimate administrative resource at its command, short of claiming overriding national interest, to see to it that the responsible agency was fully aware of the foreign policy aspects of the case. We would of course be interested in learning of any reaction in Tehran.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

by I/SCA

s/ Franklin J. Crawford
Iranian Affairs

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File 1001

SECRET

The Ambassador

July 19, 1966

FOU - Martin Kern

Card

INS Action on Ali FATEMI

Ali Mohammad Saif Far FATEMI, the subject of the attached letter, has been President of Iranian student organizations in the U.S. and the power behind the two nationalist oriented Iranian student publications Iran Shahr and Daneshku. He has been involved in numerous anti-engine activities, notably the anti-Spahn sit-in at the Iranian Embassy in Washington in January 1963 and demonstrations at the United Nations in September and October of the same year. The Iranian Embassy, which in 1961 had refused to reissue Fatemi's passport because of his anti-Spahn political activities in the U.S., in 1963 refused to reissue his student permit.

Fatemi was born on 15 May 1935 in Isfahan and is the nephew of Prime Minister Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hossein Fatemi, who was executed on 10 November 1954. The Fatemi family, motivated in large measure by a desire for revenge following the execution of their kinsman, are perhaps the hardest core group of anti-Spahn Iranians. Ali, a "student", is married to the former Jalal Amir Tahmasobi (an Iranian national who became a naturalized U.S. citizen) and is resident in New Jersey.

In September 1964 the New Jersey District Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization turned down his application for a change of status to permanent resident and advised him that if he did not depart the U.S. voluntarily before October 11, 1964, his departure would be enforced. Upon receipt of the INS note, Ali Fatemi accompanied by his uncle Masrullah Fatemi, a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University at Madison, New Jersey, requested the assistance of New Jersey's Senator Case to stay the INS deportation order on the grounds that Fatemi would be subjected to persecution if returned to Iran. Ali Fatemi, who is also acquainted with and enjoys the friendship of Justice William Douglas and Senator Robert Kennedy, apparently was able to block the 1964 deportation efforts of the INS.

There are reports that Ali Fatemi met Ahmed Ben Bella at the United Nations in 1963 and favorably impressed the former Algerian President who invited

GROUP 1
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

SECRET

FATEMI, Ali Mohammad Saif Far

SECRET

his to visit Algeria. Following this meeting, the Algerian Embassy in Washington reportedly issued an Algerian passport to Ali who then went to Algeria where he reportedly underwent paramilitary training. Ali is also reported to have made several trips to Europe during 1964 and 1965 contacting various National Front and other opposition elements, but the documentation he used to travel from and re-enter the US is not known.

POL:US/Secretariat/Jan 17/79/66

DISTRIBUTION:

1. POL - Mr. Tamm
2. US
3. POL - [unclear]
4. POL - [unclear]
5. POL - [unclear]
6. POL - [unclear]

SECRET

Real Name: Touraj Nasser.

Code Name: S. D. Paquin.

Touraj Nasser was a professor at the Sahrif Technical University and had contacts with the C. I. A. before the Revolution and had sent three reports to the C. I. A. till the fall of Bakhtiyar. Following the Revolution due to the security problems a time gap appeared in his relationship with the C. I. A., but after the Revolution the C. I. A. decided to reestablish contacts with him. During his telephone contact with Ganjian (code name of one of the C. I. A. agents at Tehran Station) he told him that he was a member of the purging committee of the Sharif Technical University and could not visit him in person for security reasons but would like to continue telephone contacts.

In the documents collected from the political section of the Espionage Den concerning the moderates, there is a document dated February 12/78, mentioning the meeting of Dr. Touraj Nasser with John Stempel, one of the officials of the political section.

Touraj Nasser was responsible for introducing his brother Faridun (S. D. Paquin/1) to Ganjian (a C. I. A. agent). In Mordad 1357 (July 1978) Faridun was an assistant to the Interior Minister and was his deputy in the Budget and Planning Organization. In Shahrivar 1357 (August 1978) he became an official employee of the C. I. A., and it was decided that \$750 would be deposited in his bank account every month. He supplied information about the plans and aims of the Iranian government, proceedings of the Cabinet and gave political reports. He also used to receive information from his friends in the army and other military and intelligence agencies.

MAY 15 7 34Z

SECRET 302189Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 429018.

TO: TEHRAN.

UNINTEL SDCARAWAY

1. STATION MAY WANT TO CONSIDER RECONTACT WITH SDCARAWAY/1 (C/I) (IDEN A) WHO IS PROFESSOR AT (IDEN B). C/I IS BROTHER OF SDCPCAW/1 (P/1) AND FIRST INTRODUCED P/1 TO GANJIAN. C/I WAS AWARE THAT P/1 HAD CONTACTS WITH GANJIAN, BUT WAS PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF EXTENT OF P/1'S COOPERATION WITH RTACTION.

2. C/I WAS SOURCE OF THREE REPORTS ON "INDEPENDENT" (NON-NATIONAL FRONT, NON-RELIGIOUS) OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH PRIOR TO DOWNFALL OF BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. HE WAS AWARE OF GANJIAN'S RTACTION AFFILIATION, HAD AGREED TO KEEP RELATIONSHIP CONFIDENTIAL AND HIS KEEP AND ACCEPTED RECONTACT PLAN (SEE PARA THREE). LAST CONTACT WITH C/I WAS BY TELEPHONE JUST PRIOR TO GANJIAN'S DEPARTURE. C/I SAID THAT HE WAS MEMBER OF "COMMITTEE" AT IDEN B, AND THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING HONOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAD HAD CONNECTION WITH IDEN B. C/I DECLINED PERSONAL MEETING BECAUSE OF SECURITY SITUATION, BUT EXPRESSED INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CONTACT BY TELEPHONE. C/I HAD INTELLECTUAL TENDENCY TO DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL TIME TO GENERAL TRENDS AND FACTS OF IRANIAN POLITICS, BUT AT SAME TIME HE DID PROVIDE FACTUAL INFO OF INTL VALUE. C/I IN ANY CASE IMPRESSED AS BRIGHT, ARTICULATE INDIVIDUAL WITH LONG-RANGE POLITICAL INTERESTS. DEPENDING ON HIS PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, HE MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT CONTACT WITH RTACTION OFFICER.

3. SUBJECT REF AGREED TO RESPOND TO ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO USES KEY PHRASE "BRITISH GYPSUM". IF HE HAS FORGOTTEN PAROLE, HE SHOULD RESPOND TO ANYONE WHO IDENTIFIES SELF AS FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE OF GANJIAN (TRUE NAME). MEETING SITE SHOULD BE ARRANGED ON INITIAL CONTACT.

4. FILE: 201-0852854. RNM 30 APRIL 1979 DRV DGC.1 ALL

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BT
#3258

Handwritten:
L. Lindtke
which is per
Phase

MAY 15 7 40Z

SECRET 302216Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 429028.

TO: TEHRAN.

UNINTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 429018

1. HEREWITH REF IDENTITIES:
IDEN A - DR. TOURAJ N A E S H R I
IDEN B - ARTAMERH TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, PLOT 307, PHASE
IDEN C - HOME ADDRESS: SHAHRA GRAB, PLOT 307, PHASE
HOME TELEPHONE: 689228 RPT 689228
OFFICE TELEPHONE: 818511 RPT 818511.

2. FILE: 201-0852854. RNM 28 APRIL 79 DRV DGC.1 ALL

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BT
#3072

Handwritten:
L. Lindtke

BIO
POL
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P. 15
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6001

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Faridoun Nasser, former Senior Deputy Minister of Labor and Welfare
Matthew P. Ward, United States-Iran Joint Commission Officer, American Embassy Tehran

DATE & PLACE: 12:00 p.m., June 21, 1977; Chez Maurice, Hilton Hotel

SUBJECTS : Dr. Nasser's Future Plans; the Status of the United States-Iran Joint Commission; and Manpower in Iran.

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM EB
ECON/Agatt OES/NET
POL OES/ENP
NEA Department of Commerce
NEA/IRN Department of Agriculture
Joint Commission Officers: Department of Labor
AmEmbassy Cairo Department of Transportation
AmEmbassy Jidda
AmEmbassy New Delhi
AmEmbassy Amman
AmEmbassy Tel Aviv

After initial pleasantries, Ward asked Nasser why he choose to leave the Ministry of Labor and if he planned to continue a government career. Nasser emphasized his respect for the new Minister of Labor, Manuchehr Azmoun, repeating several times that he was well qualified for the position. He pointed out however, as he has for nearly six months, that he and Dr. Azmoun disagree on some fundamental questions concerning the organization of the Ministry and that, as far as their two personalities were concerned, there is a basic "difference de gout." Thus, his departure from the Ministry was inescapable. Moreover, Nasser pointed out he has been a Senior Deputy Minister for over three years and he is interested in something better (namely a ministry of his own). The question of whether he continues in the government or finds employment elsewhere has not been settled. Nasser wishes Prime Minister Hoveyda's "blessings" before leaving government service altogether. He explained to Ward that he did not wish to leave the public with the impression that he was leaving government service because in the last round of appointments of cabinet ministers he was not named. Nasser claims to believe that high ranking government officials should regularly be transferred to positions in the private sector and successful executives in the private sector be brought into the Iranian Government, thus, constantly renewing the pool of management expertise available to both sectors. Nasser would prefer a job in the

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Nasser, Faridoun

4 Apr 79 14:55z

SECRET 140421Z APR 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 419486, SECTION 1 OF 2
TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.
INFO: TEL RYBAT AJAJA BOHAMM.
INFO: TEHRAN 52649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES LAATSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

B. SUPPECANYU, AGE 44. IN AUG 1976 WAS UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE AND RANKING DEPUTY MINISTER, IRB, FOR BUDGET AFFAIRS. HIS PRESENT STATUS IN THE IRB IS STILL UNCERTAIN. HE HAS RESIGNED HIS POSITION AND MUST FACE INVESTIGATION BY THE NEW REGIME; BECAUSE OF THIS HE WAS REQUESTED NO MEETINGS UNTIL LATE APRIL 1979. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED 27 APRIL. HE WISHES TO RETAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH STATION, THOUGH HE WOULD PREFER TO NOT HAVE TO MEET CLANDESTINELY. HE WAS SPOTTED AND RECRUITED IN SEPTEMBER 1976. SINCE RECRUITMENT HE HAS PROVIDED INFO ON GOI PLANS AND INTENTIONS, CABINET ACTIVITIES, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. HE HAS ALSO OBTAINED USEFUL INFO FROM HIS CONTACTS IN MILITARY AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. HE IS INTELLIGENT AND A GOOD REPORTER. WHILE HE HAS NOT RECEIVED FORMAL TRADECRAFT TRAINING, THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEHRAN HAVE CAUSED HIM TO QUICKLY GET INTO THE HABIT OF CLANDESTINE MEETINGS. HE HAS RECENTLY FOLLOWED A RECONTACT PLAN AND HAS CONDUCTED CAR MEETINGS WITH HIS NEW CASE OFFICER. HE HAS BEEN TOLD THAT OVERT RELATIONSHIP NOT POSSIBLE JUST NOW. SUPPECANYU IS COVERED UNDER AN MOC AND IS PAID US\$700 PER MONTH IN CASH. HE DOES NOT LOOK UPON THIS AS A SALARY BUT RATHER A CONTINGENCY FUND TO HELP HIM OR HIS FAMILY IN TIME OF NEED. HIS FAMILY IS CURRENTLY IN LONDON. HE ALSO HAS A BROTHER IN THE UNITED STATES. IN FEB 79 HE REQUESTED AN ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE OF KIALS 1,500,000 WITH RESULTING DOLLARS TO BE DEPOSITED TO HIS BROTHER'S US BANK ACCOUNT. THIS ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE WAS APPROVED AT THE RATE OF 97.5/1 (PREVAILING RATE ON 27 FEB). MOC RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT SUPPECANYU WAS ADVISED OF THE APPROVAL, OR OF THE RATE AT WHICH THE EXCHANGE

private sector but will remain in government service if the Prime Minister insists.

Nasseri confided in Ward that he has been offered the Governor Generalship of either Isfahan or Shiraz, whichever he would prefer. Though he is not interested in living in the "provinces." As Nasseri explains it, the logistics of maintaining a fully staffed residence in a provincial capitol, in Tehran, and in London is too much of a headache. Nasseri has also been asked by his old friend Dr. Shojaedin Sheikholeslamzadeh, Minister of Health, to assume the responsibilities as manager of Iran's billion dollar a year Social Services Fund. This Fund is the largest single investment fund in Iran and the position of Director brings with it several fringe benefits including a \$3,000 a month salary, twice the salary which Nasseri earned as Deputy Minister of Labor. Nevertheless, Nasseri said he would prefer to leave government service altogether and work in the private sector. He claims he has been offered the position of consultant to a large multi-national firm, which he would not name, at a salary of \$10,000 a month.

Government Operations in Iran

Ward asked of Nasseri if he had noticed in the past three years any changes, good or bad, in the organization and operation of the Iranian Government. Nasseri began his reply by stating that there were certain things in Persia that would never change and that there are certain things about governments that would never change. Ministries still tended to be private fiefs of ministers, and there was little or no coordination between ministries at the working level since no good Persian would try to "interfere" with the running of his colleague's domain. Nasseri felt, however, that there was stronger and better coordination at the top levels of government than when he entered government service. While dishonesty and inefficiency still existed in the Iranian Government, Nasseri pointed out that they exist in any government and he felt there were fewer instances today than there had been in the past. Working level personnel are generally better educated now than in the past and most Iranian ministries are beginning "to operate like European ministries." In general, Nasseri felt that there was less wastage than in the past. Ward asked him to compare general operating efficiencies of the Persian bureaucracy with those of other nationalities. Nasseri admitted he was not familiar with working level operations in other ministries but felt that the Ministry of Labor operated as efficient as its British counterpart, but perhaps somewhat less efficient than its West German, French and U.S. counterparts.

FereyduN NASERI
(Phonetic: nahsahREE)

IRAN

Under Secretary for
Planning and Research,
Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs

Addressed as:
Mr. Naseri

FereyduN Naseri, about 39, became Under Secretary for Planning and Research in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on 22 May 1974. He had previously served in the Ministry as director general of employment. As such, he was mainly concerned with manpower planning matters and was active in promoting the idea of the creation of a separate and independent employment service.

Naseri has a master's degree in law, political science and economics from Tehran University and a doctorate in the same subjects from Toulouse University in France, and he came to the United States for a specialized training program in sociopolitical problems. He has taught law at Tehran University and has worked as an attorney in the Ministry of Justice and as an expert in the Plan and Budget Organization. After serving as a consultant to the Embassy in Washington, he returned to Iran to become director of the Bureau of Socio-Economic Studies and Research and Manpower in the Ministry of Labor.

Naseri has traveled in Western Europe. He speaks fluent English and French.

26 February 1975

FereyduN NASERI