

3P

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	S-E-C-R-E-T	FOR ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
TO	Chief, Task Force W	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
INFO		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT	Operational/GYROSE KUCAGE/AMHINT/KUTAGE Debriefing of ANHINT Safehouse Owner	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES**

Action: FYI and files  
Ref : WAVE 3911

**RETURN TO CIA**  
Background Use Only  
Do Not Reproduce

1. On 24 May 1962, at about 1230 hours local, JMWAVE debriefed Heriberto LEON Rodriguez for general PW aspects and confirmation of the independent infiltration operation of AMHINT-53 and AMHINT-40 by the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) on 20 May 1962.

2. Subject was born 23 December 1905 in Jovellanos, Province of Matanzas, Cuba, son of Juan LEON and Mario RODRIGUEZ. His address in Cuba was Calle 36, Sur Varadero, Matanzas Province. In Miami, he is temporarily residing at 2238 SW 1st St., Miami. Subject does not plan to return to Cuba during the present Regime.

3. LEON is representative of the middle-class, small town Cuban official with moderate political interest and ultimately conservative and Pro-PBPRIME. He was mayor of Manguito, Matanzas Province from 1954 to 1958, a period during which the BATISTA regime both flourished and declined, although subject does not profess to be "Batistiano". He probably contributed very little to the opposition of BATISTA and by the same token contributed very little to the opposition of CASTRO. He is currently owner of the small dwelling at the above address and has loaned the shelter and facilities to AMHINT personnel but without

RECLASSIFIED

Distribution:  
3 - C/TFW AC

19-132-16/3

CS Classification: 19-132-16/3

Box 13 Fold: 1

RESTRICTED TO SAS/mcB/PA-PRCP

JUN 11 1962

19-134-26/3  
19-120-19-

INDEX

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE FILED	DATE DISPATCHED
CSC	30 May 1962	JUN 6 1962
CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
S-E-C-R-E-T	UFGA-4216	
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
	19-120-19/3	

712

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

participating in their operations. This was done more for reasons of family ties and sympathetic attitude toward student activities that is traditional in Cuba. Needless to say, however, this is a modest declaration on his part since the type of aid he had been lending without reservation is punishable by death or imprisonment for all or any members of his immediate family.

4. Subject related the events of 20 May in his small beach resort village as follows:

"At about 10:00 P.M. on Sunday, 20 May, he and his family had returned to their house, which is located about three blocks from the Parque Infantil INIT where the townfolk were dancing and celebrating this traditional date. Shortly after arriving, they heard gunfire in the general direction of the beach. This was described as mixed automatic fire and single shots. There was much shouting and confusion in the streets of the town near the park, and (LEON) was just about to venture out and learn the source of the disturbance when AMHINT-53<sup>04</sup> appeared in the doorway, dripping wet and panting. Behind him, was AMHINT-40."

"After recognition and exchange of explanations, (LEON)<sup>04</sup> unpacked one of the family suitcases for dry clothing and sent the two boys into their bathroom to change and remain concealed until the commotion died down. The (LEON) family were departing Cuba and had their home prepared for closure and processing with local militia post as required by revolutionary decree. After the two AMHINTs were settled, (LEON) left his house and went out to send the pre-arranged coded cable to Miami confirming their safe arrival. They slept in his house that night and departed early Monday morning for Havana."

"Although the (LEON)<sup>04</sup> family has a reputation for political indifference, precautions were made for travel in which the two-man team traveled half way to Havana in another vehicle and changed to the (LEON) car for the remainder of the trip and installation in a Havana safehouse."

"Prior to departure Varadero, however, (LEON)<sup>04</sup> had to visit the Militia Post to turn over the keys to his house and process his departure. During a forty-minute wait there, he overheard conversations among the officers. From these conversations, it was apparent that the Militia patrol encountering the beach operation reported the clash as "escapees": that two or more were killed and the bodies taken with the other escapees; that there were no militia casualties; that there was no inkling that an infiltration operation had taken place prior to the patrol encounter."

"When queried as to militia casualties since the DRE had reported that at least two had been "dropped" on the beach, subject commented that 'one does not shoot a militiaman down that easy. That they were just dropping to the ground at the slightest sign of action'. (LEON)<sup>04</sup> was certain that if as much as one man had been scratched the whole town would have known about it by morning."

5. (LEON)<sup>04</sup> was very vague and lacked details concerning his knowledge of propaganda in Cuba. He recalled that the radio program with Juan AMADOR Rodriguez on longwave at midday was popular and heard by many of the townfolk. He remarked that they listen to a 5:00 AM and 12:00 noon shortwave program coming from Key West, and finally, that the Voice of America shortwave broadcasts were very effective in his region. He never tuned in to Radio Las Americas and instantly associated it with the former "Radio Swan" repeating the usual hearsay that "it was discredited".

19-124-263

14-120-19

W/PJ

6. Although subject was obviously not a good source for military OB or other intelligence observations, he did provide some fragmentary information on his area. He described a place known as Lomas Finas, located between Cardenas and Coliseo (10 miles South) pointed out on the map to be about 2256N-8118W. There is a Militia Post there with about 500 and 600 stationed there for short periods. He observed some tank movement, about six to eight tanks traveling in and out of this area at a time, but could not describe them as to type or size. He described the militia personnel in this region as a "Very low type" of Cuban which was disgusting to the local country people and there was continuous friction. He commented that it was just such camps or post as this that turned the general population into oppositionists.

7. About 17 or 18 May, subject observed a large freighter unloading cargo in Matanzas harbor. The local people described it as Russian and subject could not confirm or deny this. The shipment was large, however, and in various size crates that were trucked out of the dock area in large convoys.

8. Near a village known as Palmillas (2238N-8045W) about 10 miles Southeast of Colon, Province of Matanzas, subject reports that there are two guerrilla bands of twelve to twenty men each. During 15 to 17 May, these bands attacked farms occupied by militia, killing one militiaman and running the others off the farm. They burned the house, barns and destroyed the farm equipment.

9. Again on the 18th of May, one of these bands attacked another militia post and killed one militia. This particular incident came from the doctor who treated the militiaman prior his death and who is a personal friend of (LEON.) 04

10. Subject concluded the interview with some of his opinions and observations concerning the state of public morale in Cuba today. He pointed out that much of the population, the "better people" of the country, understood the United States position on Cuba. (The implication being the reason for United States failure to take direct action or intervention in Cuba.) He said the people understand that CASTRO is their own doing and that the United States cannot be held responsible for his presence. He described the greater part of the populace as sick and tired, undernourished, disgusted with blatant propaganda lies, terrorized by repression but ultimately disposed to resist at all costs. That if arms were generally available among the populace, especially rifles and ammunition for them, CASTRO would have been overthrown by now, without a bit of outside help. That the farmers and some city folk, in desperation, leave their homes to join the guerrilla bands with no hope for supply and many times turned down by guerrilla leaders who cannot supply their own band as it is. Subject departed with the reminder that the "Cubans traditionally prefer to live good or not live at all."

END OF DISPATCH

19-124-26/3