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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
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*Amscroll 2P*

XX

INDEXING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK

CAN PERFORM INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE *JWC*

SUBJECT

Operational TYPIC/AMSCROLL  
Termination of AMSCROLL Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: See paragraph 3.

1. The AMSCROLL activity was terminated 31 August 1967 and all operations ceased at that time.

2. The following AMSCROLL employees were terminated effective 31 August 1967 and were given a termination settlement of three months' salary.

- a. Fernando ALLOZA (radio script writer) 201-286580
- b. [redacted] (secretary) 201-753918
- c. Juan Manuel ESPINOSA-CONDE (clerk) 201-754327
- d. [redacted] (stock clerk) 201-754907
- e. Alfredo HERNANDEZ-LOVIO (messenger) 201-789623
- f. Dr. Manuel MARINAS, Carmona  
DPOB: 26 December 1920  
Manzanillo, Oriente  
(radio script writer) no 201
- g. Mrs. Ana Maria BARROSO, Gomez  
DPOB: 19 June 1938  
Cienfuegos, Las Villas, Cuba  
(typist) no 201
- h. Rene GALIS-MENENDEZ  
DPOB: 23 June 1923  
Matanzas, Cuba  
(clerk) no 201

MICROFILMED  
MAR 8 1968  
DOC MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED

Distribution:  
7 - WH/COG

CS COPY

FEB 27 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO  
201-286580  
201-754907  
201-789623  
201-754327-201-753918

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-29593

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DATE

23 February 1968

HQS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26

19-120-26/3

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
S E C R E T

DISPATCH NUMBER AND NUMBER  
UFGA-29593

All of the persons on this list have been with AMSCROLL in excess of three years except Alfredo HERNANDEZ-LOVIA who was terminated in October 1965. He was paid the full three months termination due to the unusually faithful service he has rendered for a very small salary. He worked full time for \$90.00 per month.

3. None of those listed in paragraph two has an MOC or an OA with the exception of HERNANDEZ-LOVIA who was granted an OA on 29 May 1967. The Station requests that this OA be cancelled.

4. All of the above AMSCROLL personnel were amicably terminated and the personnel have since been re-employed in the local community. So far as the Station is aware, there have been no security, personnel, or other problems of interest to the Station resulting from the termination of this activity.

5. There were four Station agents involved in this operation at the time of its termination. They were AMWORD-1, AMWORD-2, AMWORD-3, and AMFRAME-1. All but AMFRAME-1 were terminated and individual termination dispatches are being forwarded as appropriate.

*Roger E. Marchbank*  
Roger E. MARCHBANK

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division  
Administrative/TYPIC/Amendment of MCC's

REFERENCE A. UFGT 20355  
B. UFGA 48653  
C. UFGW 6778

1. Action on the Reference A (AMFRAME-1) and Reference B (AMSCROLL-3) requests for amendment of MCC's is being held in abeyance pending receipt of your comments on the AMFRAME activity as requested in Reference C.

2. In the meantime we would appreciate additional information explaining the increased compensation for AMSCROLL-3. Reference A adequately explained the increase for AMFRAME-1, but Reference B contained none of the comments normally submitted with this type of request.

George L. TRANGER

Distribution:  
3 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGS 10024

63 November 1967

SECRET

1 - WH/C/REG  
1 - Chrono  
1 - WH/6 (Admin)  
1 - AMFRAME-1      WH/Contracts  
1 - AMSCROLL-3  
1 - WH/Contracts

AMSCROLL 041

SECRET

Chief of Section, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFORMANT Approval of Modified CIA Program

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 2

1. On 8 September 1967 INFORMANT approved a status report on U. S. -based NOFACT-supported Anti-Castro Operations. The report contained the following specific proposals:

a. Termination of support to AMSCROLL by 31 December 1967 (with responsibility for production of economic data for distribution abroad to be assigned to another project).

b. Termination of support to AMICE prior to 31 December 1967 but with a proviso authorizing retention of "two or three" agents in order to maintain access to and influence among Latin American labor leaders and organizations.

c. Termination of support to AMIIM on or about 31 August 1967 but with a proviso for retention of contacts with two principal agents in order to maintain access to important sports officials and organizations.

d. Termination of support to AMRATIO on 30 September 1967.

e. Continuation of support to AMIIM for the production of Spanish language materials aimed exclusively at certain key outlets in the U.S. The following extract from the report contains a specific action requirement:

"The AMIIM is registered as a profit-making commercial enterprise and has a legitimate monthly income of about \$1,000; however, the Cuban makeup of its staff, the nature of its output, and its modest income from non-NOFACT sources would strongly

UFGW 0000

21 September 1967

SECRET

13-10-68

1 - RI

1 - Chrono

1 - WH/REG/C

1 - WH/COG/CA

(chrono)

C/WH/COG/CA

Paul E. Oberst

po

0790





# DISPATCH

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		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

TO **Chief of Station, Mexico City**  
 INFO **Chief, Western Hemisphere Division**  
 FROM **Chief of Station, JMWAVE**  
 SUBJECT **TYPIC/AMSCROLL**  
**0 Economic Intelligence Report Publication**

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: MEXICO CITY 2578

We forward under separate cover three copies of the Spanish Edition of the current AMSCROLL Economic Report and in the future will send one English and three Spanish copies as requested in the reference.

Roger E. MARCHEBANK

Attachment:

Spanish edition Economic Report, 3 copies, U/S/C

Distribution

- 2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, U/S/C
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- 2 - WH/COG, w/o att

2 info att | 3S COPY

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S E C R E T 242240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2578

24 Aug 67 IN 38580

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

IF AMSCROLL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT IS PUBLISHED IN SPANISH AS WELL AS ENGLISH PLEASE SEND ONE ENGLISH COPY AND THREE SPANISH COPIES OF EACH ISSUE TO MEXICO STATION IN FUTURE.

S E C R E T

BT

AN <u>19</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>WH/CIA</u>
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19-120-26  
24 Aug 67

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 TYPIC MHVIPER LIETHIC  
 REF MEXICO CITY 2549 (IN 36929)

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ES	SECRET	
ABSTRACT	X	SECRET

1. IN EVENT UPI DOES NOT PUBLISH REF STORY SUGGEST JMWAVE REWORK THIS AND OTHER SUGAR INFO AVAILABLE HERE INTO NEW STORY FOR SURFACING VIA AMSCROLL. WILL ATTRIBUTE TO AMSCROLL COMMERCIAL SOURCES.

2. IF UPI STORY PUBLISHED STATION WILL PICK UP IN AMHIM BULLETIN.

SECRET  
 BT

SECRET

19-120-26  
 24 Aug 67

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**S E C R E T** 242240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2578

*P20*  
24 Aug 67 IN 38580

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

*PP*

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*DW*

**S E C R E T**

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**SECRET**

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TO Chief of Station, Santiago		MARKED FOR INDEXING	ACTION COMPLETED
INFO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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SUBJECT LYVOUR/MILPAAVN O AMSCROLL Material for Passage to Chilean Foreign Office		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

References: A. SANTIAGO-4858  
B. DIRECTOR-29269  
C. JMWAVE-8917

1. Station JMWAVE forwards by separate cover material that we believe will be useful per paragraph 1.A. of reference A. We are forwarding only the basic material from which Santiago can make selections and can re-work into any desired format. Included is a collection of AMSCROLL economic studies which heavily emphasizes and documents Cuban mismanagement of its sugar industry--which of course is Cuba's principle source of foreign currency. In addition, there are analyses of other foreign trade problems such as the difficulties in obtaining adequate shipping, problems with products other than sugar sent to Canada and Europe for sale, as well as internal production and distribution difficulties. Also included are the texts of statements to the press given by senior defectors from the Cuban regime who were surfaced by the AMSCROLL organization. All of these statements discuss, often in considerable detail, the economic problems facing Cuba with which these individuals were personally knowledgeable. Also included is a folder concerning studies of Free World shipping with Cuba.

2. Though some of this material has been released to the press and all of it provided to AMSCROLL's mailing list of commercial, shipping, and financial firms that are interested in or are dealing with Cuban commercial organizations, it is accurate to say that this material has not received widespread publicity and therefore we believe that it should be helpful for your purposes. For the immediate future we will air mail additional information of this kind to Santiago's overt mailing address as such items come to our attention.

3. Santiago may or may not attribute these studies to AMSCROLL as it wishes.

Attachments: A/E/A, U/S/C

Distribution:  
2 - COS, Santiago, w/atts, U/S/C  
✓2 - C/WHD, w/o atts  
2 - WH/COG, w/o atts  
2 cts to WH/4/CH

Roger E. MARCHBANK

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"UNIDAD" MONTHLY, ISSUE No. 39, JULY, 1967.

FRONT PAGE:

- a) RUSSIA PENETRATES ARABS' OIL MARKETS: A complete re-print of our own news release on Soviet offers of oil to Spain, Great Britain, Switzerland, and other free-world countries. This is related to Soviet resales of Cuban sugar in the free world market, which provides the USSR with some hard currency at the expense of Cuba.

PAGE TWO:

- a) CUBA: FIRST TERRITORY OF THE AMERICAS THAT DEPENDS ON THE USSR:

The nerve of the Reds, who claim that Cuba is the first "free" territory of the Americas. Cuba is, in fact, the first territory of the Americas that depends almost completely on the Soviet Union, economically speaking. Economic dependency can be illustrated in terms of foreign trade, and Cuba's trade with the Soviet Bloc has increased as follows: Exports, from 2.2% in 1959 to 80% in 1966; Imports, from 0.1% in 1959 to 78.6% in 1966. Cuba has also mortgaged her sugar production to the Soviets, and, as a result from this dependency, has lost her trading power in the free-world market, thus becoming still more dependent of the Soviet Bloc. No wonder Kossygin travelled to Cuba to scold his bearded puppet.

- b) CARTOON: Sign reading "Arab boycott" is hung on Arab's oil pump, while the Russian happily collects from a free-world customer the price of the oil he has just sold him.

PAGE THREE:

- a) Continuation of front-page story on Soviet penetration of Arab oil market.
- b) A MESSAGE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE "ECUADOR" SUGAR MILL: We take the problems faced by the "Ecuador", as outlined in the EIR, and ask the management of the mill whether they have been able to solve each and everyone of those problems.
- c) Box: CUBAN: Cooperate with the struggle against the Red tyranny. Circulate this issue of UNIDAD after you have read it. Also send your comments and suggestions to

our P.O. Box.

d) **Boxed Slogan: DOWN WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME!**

DIOS  
PATRIA  
LIBERTAD

10 S.E. 9th. MIAMI

# UNIDAD

JULIO DE 1967 No. 39

Organo de  
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA  
Especial para el pueblo de  
Cuba

## PENETRA RUSIA EL MERCADO

### PETROLERO DE LOS ARABES

La URSS trata de captar compradores en dicho mercado. Ocurrirá lo mismo con los mercados cubanos?

Este *Buro de Investigaciones Económicas* ha podido conocer que la Unión Soviética no ha perdido tiempo en penetrar el vacío comercial dejado por la actual dislocación del mercado petrolero de las naciones árabes en Europa. Existen numerosos ejemplos.

Primero: La URSS ha convenido en enviar un millón de barriles adicionales de petróleo soviético a España, además de los 3.5 millones de barriles contratados con anterioridad a la crisis del Medio Oriente. Los soviéticos no sólo ofrecieron suministrar productos petroleros, sino también los buques-tanque para transportarlos. En más, hemos sido informados de que un buque-tanque italiano de 40,000 toneladas estaba ya en el puerto de Tuapse, URSS, en el Mar Negro, tomando a bordo el petróleo que conduciría a España.

Segundo: La Junta de Comercio británica anunció que varias firmas británicas han solicitado autorización para importar petróleo crudo sovié-

tico desde el inicio de la crisis del Medio Oriente. En el caso de la *Imperial Chemical Industries, Inc.*, de Londres, la solicitud recaba autorización específica para importar nafta rusa.

Tercero: Fuentes situadas en Suiza y Alemania Occidental informan que los consumidores de petróleo en ambos países han recibido ofertas de los vendedores soviéticos del producto. Como en el caso de España, los soviéticos están ofreciendo los productos del petróleo y los buques para transportarlos.

Mientras esto ocurría, y mientras el Premier Soviético acusaba a Israel de agresión ante la Asamblea General de la O.N.U., recabando que se condenara a la nación judía, la Unión Soviética seguía suministrando petróleo a Israel.

Es bien conocido que durante los últimos años las naciones de Europa Occidental han estado aumentando sus importaciones de petróleo soviético a costa de los países árabes. Los soviéticos, en cada caso, han intentado maniobrar para desplazar a sus "aliados" árabes mediante el expediente de vender el petróleo a precios más bajos. En épocas tan reciente como 1963, la Europa

Occidental no importaba petróleo alguno de la Unión Soviética. En 1965, el 7% del petróleo destinado a la Europa Occidental procedía de la URSS, y durante esos dos años (1963-1965) la pérdida de mercados por parte de los países árabes en Europa Occidental fue de un 4% (al 54%). Dicha tendencia continúa, ya que las exportaciones totales de petróleo soviético aumentaron de 838,000 barriles diarios en 1965 a 953,000 barriles diarios en 1966, calculándose que actualmente ascienden a 1,000,000 de barriles diarios. Además de España, Gran Bretaña, Suiza, y Alemania Occidental, la Unión Soviética cuenta entre sus principales clientes a Italia Francia y los países escandinavos.

Así, pues, como vemos, la Unión Soviética, durante los últimos tiempos, ha mostrado gran agresividad para robarles sus clientes en el mercado petrolero a sus aliados árabes, no obstante su apoyo político a esas naciones. Actualmente, la URSS tiene una nueva oportunidad de hacer nuevas penetraciones en el mercado árabe... y lo está aprovechando.

Pasa a la página No. 3

## CUBA: PRIMER TERRITORIO ECONOMICAMENTE DEPENDIENTE DE LA URSS EN AMERICA

Dicen los comunistas que Cuba es "el primer territorio libre de América", y que se ha "independizado" del poderío económico de los grandes potencias. La realidad, empero, es totalmente la contraria.

En efecto, Cuba depende hoy día de la Unión Soviética y de sus demás satélites comunistas como no dependió jamás de ningún otro país o grupo de países.

La dependencia económica de un país con respecto de otro se puede medir en función del comercio entre ambos, yz que dicho comercio indica hasta que punto el uno necesita del otro como mercado para sus exportaciones y como fuente de abastecimiento de sus importaciones.

Pues bien, en el caso de Cuba y el bloque soviético, las exportaciones de nuestra patria hacia Rusia y sus satélites han aumentado del 2.2% en 1959 al 80% en 1966. En parecida forma, las importaciones que recibe Cuba procedentes del bloque soviético han aumentado de un 0.1% en 1959 al 78.6% en 1966.

Los números no mienten. Y los números arrojan la verdad irrefutable de que, durante 8 años de dominación comunista, nuestra infortunada Isla se ha hecho cada vez más dependiente de la metrópoli rusa, estrechándose cada día más las ligaduras de dicha dependencia.

Por si todo esto fuera poco, Cuba le ha hipotecado a la URSS su producción azucarera.

Cuba, también, ha agotado sus reservas de divisas, calculándose que en 1964 apenas excedían estas de la irrisoria cifra de \$20 millones.


Como consecuencia de esta falta total de divisas, Cuba no puede comerciar más que con los países comunistas, ya que con éstos realiza trueques de azúcar y otros productos por chatarra procedente del campo socialista, sin que de

esos convenios comerciales reciba metálico alguno.

En el período comprendido entre los años 1963 y 1966, Cuba sufrió un déficit de \$1,132,000,000 en su comercio con los países comunistas. Y esta cifra no incluye la asistencia técnica comunista, ni los equipos militares, las becas, y demás.

Como resultado de esta relación de sujeción con el bloque rojo, Cuba ha perdido su vigencia comercial con los más ventajosos mercados del mundo libre, lo cual, a su vez ha aumentado dicha relación de dependencia, produciéndose el clásico círculo vicioso.

No en balde Kossygin se gasta el lujo de viajar a La Habana como un próconsul para regañar a Fidel Castro y darle instrucciones.



PENETRA... (Viene de la pág. 1)

**UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA**, durante un tiempo, ha tenido interés en intentar establecer una relación entre la acción política de la URSS y su acción económica, y aplicar las conclusiones al caso cubano, toda vez que Cuba, después de todo, depende de la Unión Soviética para su supervivencia política y económica.

Ya hemos visto y reportado, sobre la base de casos previos, las reventas en el mercado europeo de azúcar cubano exportado a la URSS al amparo del convenio comercial cubano-soviético. El resultado de estas reventas, desde luego, ha sido el de proveer de dólares a la URSS en perjuicio de Cuba. Cuba se ha beneficiado con esta maniobra sólo en la medida en que le ha sido posible utilizar los productos que se le han entregado al amparo del convenio, los cuales son, con frecuencia, de inferior calidad e imposibles de adaptar al clima tropical de nuestra patria. El yugo soviético sobre la economía cubana nunca se ha hecho más evidente que ahora que se le ve a la luz del trato económico que da Rusia a sus aliados árabes en el caso del petróleo.

**! ABAJO EL  
REGIMEN  
COMUNISTA !**

## Recados a la Administración del Central "Ecuador"

Hemos podido saber que en el Central "Ecuador", antiguo "Baraguá", se está confrontando una serie de dificultades que son típicas de las que hoy encara la industria azucarera cubana en general. Lo que no sabemos es en qué han parado las susodichas dificultades. Tal vez la administración nãngara del "Ecuador" nos pueda contestar estas preguntitas que hacemos sólo por saber, y sin ánimo de fastidiar.

¿Ya consiguieron en México o en Canadá las bandas de frenos para las centrifugas "Roberts"?

¿Qué hubo de las piezas para los "Caterpillar"? Hasta hace poco, no había ninguna en el ingenio.

¿Qué nos dicen de los repuestos para los motores de las diesel G.E.? ¿Por fin pudieron conseguirlos?

¿Ya "ligaron" las cajas de bolas que tan desesperada-

mente se necesitaban para las bombas de guarapo, las centrifugas y los motores de reducción?

Y de las tuberías de cobre que hacían falta, pero que no se conseguían en el bloque comunista, ¿qué?

¿Qué han podido hacer con el sistema de esteras transportadoras de la refinera? Había que renovarlo, pero no se sabía como...

¿En qué paró la nueva planta eléctrica auxiliar que iban a traer de Alemania Comunista? ¿Se "trabó" el negocio?

¿Cómo han resuelto el grave problema de los lubricantes ligeros? ¿Hay divisas para pagarle a Inglaterra por las bombas inyectoras "Allen" que se necesitan?

¿Por fin habrá que esperar hasta 1969 para que los soviéticos instalen las dos calderas que requiere el central?

### CUBANO:

*Coopera al derrocamiento de la tiranía. Circula este número de UNIDAD. Cuando lo hayas leído, dáselo a alguna persona de tu confianza, o envíalo por correo a algún amigo tuyo dentro de Cuba. Colabora también con su publicación. Reporta este número a cualquier nombre (por ejemplo, "Juana González"), P.O. Box 3940, Miami, Florida. Envíanos informes sobre sucesos de interés que ocurran dentro de Cuba. Tus críticas y sugerencias también son bienvenidas.*

ESCUCHA TODOS LOS PROGRAMAS DE U.R. Y REPORTALOS AL P.O. BOX 3940, MIAMI, FLA.

"HABLA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA", por Radio Américas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, de lunes a domingo a las 9:30 P.M.

Pepita Riera en "CONOZCA A LOS CHIVATOS", por Radio Américas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, los martes y jueves a las 11:00 P.M.

Cuba:

A ti nadie te suspensa con la propaganda que Fidel hace en Cuba de que no es caso de que tiene deberes de que los rusos lo apoyan y todos esas cuentas que te repiten todas las días en las periódicas, en el radio y en la televisión.

Fidel está mucho peor de lo que nadie se imagina no tiene divisas, no tiene créditos, las compañías del mundo libre se van retirando del comercio con Cuba comunista, los obreros de todo el Hemisferio no apoyan el boicot en contra de los países que

quieran seguir comerciando con Fidel y los rusos quieren exprimir al pueblo de Cuba para cobrarse lo que Fidel le debe.

así, pues, Cuba: permanece alerta distribuye y noticias o propaganda, envía informes de lo que pasa en tu centro de trabajo, de nombres de chivatos, etc. como ya lo hacen miles de cubanos como tú y el U-2 no los coge, ni los Comités se enteran, pues la fiesta es que miles de cubanos, soldados rebeldes y funcionarios del régimen esperan el momento de la liberación que te aseguramos llegará!

00000  
JUL 10

INDEX  YES  NO

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TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH-8, SB-8, DDP, NDP, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA-4, CE/OPS, CE/EC-2, FE-8, FE, NE-8, AF-7

SAGO

SECRET 282031Z CITE SANTIAGO 4743

20 JUL 57 2136

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, BOGOTA,

BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, JMWAVE

TYPIC REDCOAT AMSCROLL

ANPA	BF	
<del>AS</del>	<del>TF</del>	W/C/CA
ASSR	CT	X

1. PEC 28 JULY CENTER SPREAD CARRIES JMSCROLL STUDY

CUBAN TOTAL DEPENDENCE SOVIET UNION. SUBTITLES "FIDEL CASTRO HAS MADE COUNTRY OF MARTI COLONIAL NATION SUBJECTED SOVIET IMPERIALISM", "FOREIGN TRADE MONOPLIZED BY NATIONS SOVIET ORBIT". CLIPPING TO JMWAVE. HENCEFORTH POUCHING PEC JMWAVE REGULARLY.

2. SAME ISSUE HAS GOOD ITEMS OLAS, NASSER AND POISON GAS, ANTI-SEMITISM SOVIET UNION, BATTLE FOR POWER COMCHINA, HARRISON SALISBURY ARTICLE SOVIET CENSORSHIP.

SECRET

BT

19-120-26  
28 July 1967

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM

10 July 1967

TO : Chief of Station

WCA 1395

FROM : CA/Roger E. MARCHBANK *RM*

Distribution:

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMSCROLL Progress Report  
1 April - 30 June 1967

3 - COS  
1 - CA/MARCHBANK  
1 - CA Chrono  
1 - RI Chrono


A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the quarter under review AMSCROLL continued with its program to discredit the Cuban regime's economic management (or mismanagement) and to seek to discourage Free World trade with Cuba. To this end AMSCROLL continued publishing its serious economic studies and comment of the Cuban economic area. This material is made available to selected firms engaged in international trade and shipping, to commercial and technical journals, and to sugar brokers including certain banks and others interested in the sugar trade. AMSCROLL also continued with its radio program which is beamed to the Cuban audience and which is increasingly attempting to provide serious comment upon economic developments in Cuba or those areas of economic activity outside of Cuba which would have an interest among the Cuban listeners. During this quarter AMSCROLL received 15 letters from Cuba which compares with 18 received during the previous quarter. The monthly count was: April - 6, May - 5, June - 4.

2. On 30 April AMSCROLL ceased broadcasting over AMTHIGH. Effective 1 May the program was presented over JMHOPE. This change in station (and a consequent change in time) has perhaps effected the listenership in Cuba; however, we expect that any unfavorable developments will be overcome and that this program will at least re-gain its previous level of listeners. Typical themes included discussions of Cuba's housing problem, its actual sugar production measured against Castro's earlier claims of what the production would be, breakdowns and stoppages at the Cuban refineries, activities with the Soviet Union and the world sugar market, reporting the progress of the Venezuelan dock workers boycott of ships of those nations that also trade with Cuba, the fight against bureaucracy, and economic aspects of the Middle East crisis.

3. A main AMSCROLL effort continued to be an analysis of the current sugar crop. As early as 13 February AMSCROLL predicted a harvest within the range of 6,100,000 and 6,400,000. By 6 May AMSCROLL was able to refine the harvest estimate from 6,047,000 to 6,101,000 tons. This estimate was further pinpointed to 6,100,000 tons in a release dated 16 June. These studies received newspaper attention and AMSCROLL has received favorable comment from sugar brokers and other technicians engaged in this business. As events

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

are turning out, these estimates appear to have been sound indeed. The AMHIM bulletin continues to give good replay to those studies which results in their dissemination throughout Latin America.

4. AMSCROLL continued with its monthly release which lists the Free World ships that trade with Cuba. Both AP and AFP continued to file this information which results in its being published in the press and used on radio news broadcasts.

5. AMSCROLL continued its mailing program to Cuba, and during this quarter mailings approximated 5,000 which is the same level as the previous quarter.

**B. ADMINISTRATION**

6. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was \$33,500.00 of which \$13,332.45 was spent. This significant decline in expenses was in large part due to the savings caused by the cancellation of the AMTHIGH radio program and by continued attention to economies of operation within AMSCROLL itself.

**C. PROBLEMS**

7. The Station is not aware of any specific problems having to do with the AMSCROLL organization. Mention might be made in passing of the ever present morale problem (which is by no means limited to AMSCROLL) engendered by increasing economies and restrictions in operations.

**D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER**

8. A major effort is being made to revamp the AMSCROLL radio program to increase its effectiveness as a reporter of economic developments of interest to the Cuban listener. Too often these programs spill over into the field of political reporting or uninformed comment upon developments in economic areas of which the script writers are largely ignorant. Our aim is to devise a program of economic reporting that will conform to the new guidelines being developed by the Station for all its radio programs.

S E C R E T

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UNIDAD Monthly, ISSUE No. 38, June, 1967.-

FRONT PAGE:

- 1) EDITORIAL: "The Arab Teaching": Arab ~~proverbs~~ show that Arabs are wise. They were not too wise, however, when they took the Soviets as allies and protectors. For years, the Russians supplied the arsenal the Arabs were building up to wage holy war against the tiny Jewish enclave. Furthermore, they reiterated their unconditional support to the Arabs. But when the "hour of truth" came, the Israel- is made piecemeal of the Arabs and their Soviet Military hardware. The Russians failed to come to the assistance of their allies, and both were ridiculed to the fullest extent. This should be a lesson for Fidel Castro, who relies on the Soviets' military junk as much as on their support as "allies".
  
- 2) CASTRO HIMSELF PROPITIATES "BUREAUCRATISM": After a brief recess caused by the mobilization in the cane fields, the 'war of bureaucratism' was renewed with full vigor by the Havana régime. Two Ministers were fired, whole Ministries were "rationalized", and payrolls were trimmed to the core. However, the same régime that voiced threats of prison terms against those that failed to comply with anti-bureaucratic instructions, creates new sources of bureaucratism, such as, for example, the Book Institute and the National Institute for Forestry Development and Products.

PAGE TWO:

- 1) SUNSHINE, AIR, AND WATER.... BUT NO ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS: The MININDUS Vice-Ministry for Technical Development has several fantastic projects in hand, such as the harnessing of solar energy and of the force of the wind, the employment of energy from tides in southern Pinar del Río, and the desalinization of sea water. But, on top of their intrinsically fantastic character, these projects are paralyzed due to the lack of technicians and of technical handbooks. What great men Marx, Lenin and Castro! (Based on material by same title in E.I.R.).

- 2) CARTOON: Headline: BOYCOTT OF CUBA-TRADING SHIPS TO BE STEPPED UP: Castro faces  
a sinking vessel named "Maritime Trade With Cuba" and says: "It seems we have  
sprung a leak!"

PAGE THREE:

- 1) MOROCCO SEEN DRIFTING AWAY FROM CUBA: A brief story on the sale to Morocco of  
160,000 tons of Brazilian sugar. It seems, we point out, that Morocco is determined  
to quit Cuba as a ~~sugar~~ supplier. First she develops her own sugar industry, then  
buys from Cuba's competitors. (Based on a report carried by the E.I.R.).
- 2) CARTOON: Castro was carrying a bag (The Moroccan sugar market), but stumbled on  
his own "Ineptitude" and the bag "fell from his hands".

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Request for Reference Attachments

ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA 27811, 15 June 1967

Please forward Headquarters a copy of the attachment which went under separate cover to addressee only, on Reference dispatch.

*Otis C. Vignat*  
Otis C. VIGNANT

Distribution:  
3 - COS, JMWAVE

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION  
26 JUN 1983

ORIG REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>UFGS-9645</b>	DATE <b>28 JUN 1967</b>	
	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	HQS FILE NUMBER <b>19-120-26/3</b>	
21 June 1967 Distribution: 1 - WH/Reg/C 1 - WH/COG/MO ① - WH/COG/CA/EW	ORIGINATING		
	OFFICE <b>C/WH/COG/CA/EW/William Sturbitts: jll</b>	EXT <b>4163</b>	
	COORDINATING		
	OFFICE SYMBOL <b>WH/COG/MO</b>	DATE <b>28 June 67</b>	OFFICER'S NAME <i>[Signature]</i>
RELEASING			
OFFICE SYMBOL <b>AC/WH/COG</b>	DATE <b>28/6</b>	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	

DISPATCH

C1611

**S E C R E T**

Chief of Station, Santiago **XXI**

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE  
DYVOUR/AMSCROLL

○ Study of Cuba/USRR Commercial Relations

Reference: SANTIAGO 4468


Use : For use as determined by Santiago.

We forward under separate cover for station Santiago  
the AMSCROLL study in Spanish of economic relations between  
the USSR and Cuba as requested by the reference.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

Attachment:  
Study in Spanish, U/S/C

Distribution:  
✓ 3 - COS, Santiago, w/att, U/S/C - To OUT Pouch  
✓ 2 - C/WH, w/o att *2 to WH/COG*  
2 - WH/COG, w/o att



JUN 15 1967

Removed from Project *Subj. file*  
CS Classification: 19-120-26  
JOB #68-644/93  
Box: 19 Fold: 3

URCA 27811

14 June 1967

**S E C R E T**

CS COPY

19-120-26/3  
*19-120-26*  
*19-120-26/3*

DIOS  
PATRIA  
LIBERTAD

# UNIDAD

Organo de  
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA  
Especial para el pueblo de  
Cuba

10 S. E. 9th. MIAMI

Mayo de 1967 - No. 37

## LAS INTERIORIDADES DE CUFLET

### Editorial

### UNA VERDAD COMUNISTA

Victor Volsky, Jefe de la Delegación Observadora Soviética al XII periodo de sesiones de la Comisión Económica de la O.N.U. para America Latina, declaró recientemente en Caracas que "Cuba Comunista es la hija menor de la Unión Soviética, y a las hijas menores hasta se les miman".

Palabras son estas que tienen la virtud de enardecer al más indiferente de los cubanos, ya que las mismas reflejan el aire de superioridad con que estos arrogantes comunistas esclavos tratan a nuestra Patria. Sin embargo, no puede negarse que el insolente Volsky dijo una verdad en Caracas, al menos en cuanto se refiere a la primera parte de su aserto.

Ciertamente, las hijas menores dependen de sus padres. Son ellos quienes les proporcionan toda la necesaria para su subsistencia; son ellos quienes determinan, con la inapelabilidad que supone la patria potestad, el rumbo que han de tomar los pasos de su adorable retoño; y son ellos quienes se benefician del producto de sus labores.

Siendo así, no cabe duda de que Cuba es la hija menor de la Unión Soviética. La URSS y sus satélites, en efecto, venden a Cuba el 78.6% de sus importaciones; la URSS es quien determina la política que ha de seguir el régimen de La Habana, y es la URSS quien recibe, conjuntamente con sus títeres de Europa Oriental, el 80% de los productos que exporta nuestra Patria. Ante los datos de este brutal monopolio comercial, y ante la suprema autoridad que ejerce la metrópoli sobre su pseudo-colonia del Caribe, ¿quién puede negar que Cuba es, a todos los efectos prácticos, la hija menor de la Unión Soviética?

Hasta aquí la verdad. La mentira estriba en el aserto de que Cuba es la hija "mimada" de la URSS. Porque, como todo el mundo sabe, lo que es en realidad es una, hija oprimida, explotada, maltratada, y prostituida por esta "madre" desnaturalizada que es la Rusia Soviética.

Por I. Andres Collazo

**NOTA DE LA REDACCION:** El autor de este trabajo ocupó el cargo de representante en Londres de la Empresa Cubana de Fletes (CUFLET) hasta el pasado mes de Marzo de 1967, en que decidió abandonar al regimen comunista de Cuba y solicitar asilo político en el mundo libre.

---Mi misión en Londres era la de llevar naves del mundo libre para el comercio marítimo con Cuba, a fin de cubrir el déficit resultante de la escasez de buques cubanos y del bloque comunista que pudieran manipular el volumen comercial. Mi tarea no era nada fácil.

---El tráfico marítimo del mundo libre con Cuba ha disminuido en un 41.6% entre 1963 y 1966. Las razones de esta caída en el tráfico marítimo del mundo libre con Cuba son, a mi entender, las siguientes: la "Lista Negra" del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos; las prohibiciones decretadas por diversos Gobiernos, tales como el de Grecia, el del Líbano, y otros, y la acción del boicot emprendido por los trabajadores portuarios del hemisferio a través de la ORIT, a cuyo frente marchan los miembros de la Federación Portuaria de Venezuela.

---Tan pronto como se inició el boicot, algunas firmas navieras británicas que en aquel momento estaban considerando la entrada en el tráfico marítimo con Cuba, pero que también mantenían rutas regulares con América Latina, cancelaron sus planes respecto a Cuba. Otra razón es la de los informes referentes a la situación económica y al tráfico marítimo de Cuba que publican las Organizaciones de exiliados cubanos. Yo tuve, por ejemplo, la oportunidad de ver alguno de los boletines y

Continúa en la pág. 2

# Las Interioridades

(Continuación)

... Los buques de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA ESPECIALMENTE CONCERNIENTES AL TRAFICO MARITIMO

... Al igual que otros buques, durante el período de guerra, los buques armados han sido cobrados por el gobierno y que UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA ha mantenido un control sobre el puerto de Cienfuegos y el puerto de Matanzas. En esta industria, el gobierno tiene un control estricto. Los buques armados que están en el puerto de Cienfuegos se refieren al puerto de embarque a que pertenecen. La excepción a que pertenecen es la **ATHEL LINE**, que opera todas las líneas de buques armados que cubren la zona de los **UNITED MOLASSES**.

... En ese momento sigue siendo un negocio de varias buques de bandera cubana y que viajando a Cuba se refieren al puerto de Cienfuegos. Los buques armados que están en el puerto de Cienfuegos son las empresas que operan estos buques? La nave de él buque, ¿cómo pudieran decir todos a los que son los que podrían ser el puerto de piratas modernos que operan, tales como **TSAVLIRIS**, los cuales solicitan la nacionalización y el tener una terminal de buques.

... Al igual que el puerto de Cienfuegos, los buques que se encuentran en el puerto de Matanzas. Estos armados que operan son los siguientes: **FRANGISTAS** (Griego), **TSAVLIRIS** (Griego), **VLASSOPULOS** (Griego), **LIVANOS** (Griego), **PURVIS SHIPPING**, **WALTER RUNCIMAN**, y **D GROSS** (Ingles).

... Los buques de **ATHEL LINE** que operan en el puerto de Cienfuegos, los cuales solicitan la nacionalización y el tener una terminal de buques.

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... Comenzamos con el Sr. Aquiles FRANGISTAS. Este caballero, conjuntamente con Stenatis Manessis y Efthimos Athanasiou, opera la línea griega de **FRANCO SHIPPING CO.** Sus oficinas principales se encuentran en Atenas. A fin de evadir las responsabilidades, **FRANGISTAS** manipula sus negocios a través de **FRANCO SHIPPING COMPANY** y sus nuevas subsidiarias que son: **A. FRANGISTAS & S. MANESSIS, A. FRANGISTAS & PARTNERS, STAMBE COMPANIA NAVIERA, DALIA COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A., COMPANIA DE NAVEGACION SKIATHOS S.A., PURVIS SHIPPING Co.** Como firma principal que administra los asuntos de **FRANGISTAS** en Londres).

... **FRANGISTAS** ha estado haciendo negocios con los comunistas desde hace tiempo. A fin de corresponder a sus servicios, la URSS comenzó en 1965 a construir una flota de ciento cinco millones de dólares para **FRANGISTAS**. La flota se compone de diecisiete buques de carga de distintos tipos, cinco embarcaciones pesqueras y tres buques frigoríficos. **FRANGISTAS** esperaba utilizar sus cargueros para desplazar a **TSAVLIRIS, VLASSOPULOS** y **LIVANOS** del comercio marítimo con Cuba.

... Ya era quien manipulaba los negocios con **FRANGISTAS** a través de la oficina de **CUFLET** en Londres, debido a que a **FRANGISTAS, EN CIERTO MODO**, le heredó el gobierno cubano de la Unión Soviética. Antes de 1966, la mayor parte de los viajes a Cuba realizados por los buques de **FRANGISTAS** se hicieron bajo contratos de fletamento con el gobierno soviético y no con **CUFLET**. Pero **FRANGISTAS** quería ampliar sus negocios con Cuba de modo que viajó directamente a La Habana a fin de mejorar su situación respecto de los demás piratas y poder efectuar sus rotos directamente con la oficina principal de **CUFLET**.

... **FRANGISTAS** prometió que pondría los buques de carga que recibiría de la URSS a la disposición del comercio marítimo de Cuba, y, para comenzar fletó el **EFTYCHIA** a **CUFLET**.

... **FRANGISTAS** se jactaba que no tenía problemas con el gobierno griego ya que tenía amigos en altos puestos. Llegó inclusive al punto de decir que tenía sobornados a va-

rios funcionarios de ese gobierno. En noviembre de 1966 una delegación de **CUFLET** que había visitado Moscú viajó a Atenas a tratar de negociar con **FRANGISTAS**. La delegación se componía de Fernando Hernández, Gerente General de **CUFLET** y Salvador Forraguera, de la Oficina de **CUFLET** en La Habana. Estando en Atenas esta delegación, **FRANGISTAS** le dijo que no había podido poner sus nuevos buques a la disposición de **CUFLET** porque estaba teniendo problemas con el gobierno provisional, pero que él esperaba que en un futuro inmediato algunos de sus amigos volverían a ocupar puestos claves y las cosas podían volver a su estado anterior.

... Por lo visto, **FRANGISTAS** estaba equivocado. En estos momentos, los armadores y capitanes de los siguientes buques de **FRANGISTAS** están sometidos a un proceso judicial en Grecia: **IRENE, BARBARINO, ALICE, PANTANASSA, SOFIA, TINA, EFTYCHIA, ANDROMACHI, KIRA, HARIKLIA** y **NIKOLAS F.**

... Otro de los piratas que se aprovechan lucrativamente del comercio marítimo cubano al cobrar por los fletes un sobreprecio de un 20% a un 30% sobre la tarifa usual del mercado es **Giorgio TSAVLIRIS**.



... ¿Y ese quién es? ¿Algún gusano?  
... ¡No, hombre! ¡Es un comunista latinoamericano pro-soviético!

# Las Interiores

(Continuación)

Antes de penetrar en las operaciones de TSAVLIRIS, quisiera mencionar que el mismo se encuentra actualmente en desgracia con CUFLET, y él lo sabe.

....En 1963, TSAVLIRIS operaba dos o tres barcos solamente. Gracias a los sobrepagos que cobraba al gobierno cubano, pudo levantar una flota de 18 buques, número, empera, que ha disminuido debido a los roturas y naufragios. TSAVLIRIS utilizaba los contratos de fletamento con CUFLET para solicitar financiamientos de bancos británicos y adquirir así su flota de barcos de la segunda Guerra Mundial.

....Por supuesto, el gobierno cubano considera que TSAVLIRIS es un oportunista, y la oficina principal de CUFLET en La Habana se ha convertido en objeto de chistes debido a los numerosos enredos en que se han visto envueltos dicho armador y el régimen durante sus cuatro años de relaciones.

....Yo recuerdo un caso ocurrido durante el verano de 1964. TSAVLIRIS negoció un contrato en La Habana en virtud del cual sus buques debían transportar 120.000 toneladas de fertilizantes durante un periodo de doce meses que se vencía en diciembre de 1965. Poco después, el Gobierno cubano no pudo cerrar la negociación de los fertilizantes y entonces trataron de cancelar el contrato con TSAVLIRIS. Esta compañía se negó y viajó a La Habana donde el contrato se volvió a negociar y su terminación se prorrogó para diciembre de 1966. Además, se le permitió al gobierno cubano transportar carga general además de los fertilizantes. Pero ni aun así pudo el gobierno cubano conseguir la carga para los buques y lo que hizo fue dar largas a base de posponer la selección de los buques de esa compañía que iba a utilizar. Finalmente, TSAVLIRIS se vio precisada a efectuar una nueva negociación y en esta ocasión el vencimiento del contrato se pospuso para junio de 1967.

....Otro problema con TSAVLIRIS surgió mes a menos al mismo tiempo que los hechos anteriores con motivo del fletamento de otros dos de sus buques. CUFLET fletó el NEWHEATH y el NEWGLADE para transportar azúcar cubano al

Japón. Los viajes de retorno se harían bajo fletamento por tiempo. En otras palabras, a la ida, los buques estaban fletados por viajes, y a la vuelta, estaban bajo fletamento mensual. Cuando el NEWGLADE llegó al Japón con el primer cargamento de azúcar los japoneses protestaron, pues el azúcar estaba manchado de óxido y además contenía partículas de metal debido al pésimo estado de las bodegas del buque. CUFLET le presentó las quejas a TSAVLIRIS pero este alegó inmediatamente que los cubanos habían inspeccionado y aprobado los buques antes de cerrar el contrato. Después de numerosas correspondencias intercambiada entre ambas partes, CUFLET accedió a cancelar el contrato del NEWGLADE y utilizar solo el NEWHEATH para los viajes al Japón. Esto parecía ser el final del asunto, pero no fue así. Los cubanos recapacitaron y se dieron cuenta que con la pérdida del NEWGLADE las entregas demorarían prácticamente el doble así es que se dirigieron a TSAVLIRIS solicitando cancelar el contrato de todos modos. La reacción de TSAVLIRIS es de imaginar, pero tuvo que acceder a la solicitud de CUFLET, aunque puso como condición que en el futuro todo contrato tendría que ser confirmado de inmediato por escrito.

....Si detengo la narración aquí, puede parecer que a TSAVLIRIS le toca perder y que los cubanos se salieron con las suyas, sin embargo, estos dos casos que he relatado le costaron el puesto a Manuel Novoa, quien era a la sazón el Gerente de CUFLET.

....Abundando en el tema paso a citar otro ejemplo. En 1965, CUFLET fletó el buque MAGISTER (pabellón británico) operado por CAYMAN ISLANDS LTD de (Jamaica) con el objeto de que transportara frutas y vegetales al Canadá. Después de fletar el buque, los cubanos no pudieron obtener suficientes frutas y vegetales y cancelaron el contrato de fletamento.

....De acuerdo con mi experiencia, el gobierno cubano confronta dos graves problemas en el referente al mercado de fletes-mercado al cual viene que recurrir para cubrir el déficit en el transporte marítimo debido a la escasez de buques cubanos y del mundo comunista. Los datos y problemas son los siguientes:

primero encontrar buques que fletar, problema que resulta difícil de resolver como Uds habrán podido apreciar, pues hay que recurrir a los armadores piratas, quienes a su vez se aprovechan de la situación.

....El segundo problema es conseguir las divisas para pagar los fletes. El gobierno cubano confronta una crisis tremenda en relación con las divisas, pues desde 1965 la situación del mercado mundial acuñero en baja le ha limitado a un mínimo la entrada de divisas por concepto de las exportaciones de azúcar. Sin embargo el gobierno cubano tiene que buscar la moneda convertible para pagar puntualmente a los armadores piratas.

....CUFLET tiene arrendados o fletados por tiempo en estos momentos 5 buques británicos, 3 griegos y uno chipriota, por los que paga unos \$194.563,00 mensuales. CUFLET tiene arrendados además dos buques yugoeslavos y parte de los pagos son en divisas (en la lista anterior aparecen los buques fletados por viajes).

....Mi consejo para los armadores que aun se encuentran envelejados en tráfico marítimo con Cuba comunista es que se retiren de dicho comercio, pero aun para aquellos que se nieguen a seguir este consejo, creo tener algunas sabias palabras.

....Mi sugerencia es que hagan lo que hizo la CIE D'ARMENT MARITIME S.A. En abril de 1966 esta compañía le fletó por seis meses a CUFLET EL BUQUE TANQUE SENANQUE, para que transportara mieles cubanas a Japón. En cuanto el SENANQUE se hizo a la mar, CUFLET notificó al armador francés que en cuanto el buque llegara al Japón y fuera descargado, CUFLET rescindiría el contrato de fletamento. La CIE D'ARMENT MARITIME S.A. protestó de inmediato y le comunicó a CUFLET que si no depositaba en un plazo dado la suma de 100,000 francos en un banco francés se le darían órdenes al SENANQUE para que se dirigiera a un puerto europeo de donde se continuaría el cargamento de mieles y el producto de la venta de las mismas, la Compañía se cobraría lo estipulado en el contrato de fletamento por seis meses.

....En esta ocasión le toca perder a CUFLET. Los armadores tienen la palabra.

ESCUCHA TODOS LOS PROGRAMAS DE U.R. Y REPORTALOS AL P.O. BOX 3940, MIAMI, FLA.

"HABLA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA", por Radio Americas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, de lunes a domingo a las 9:30 P.M.

Pepita Riera en "CONOZCA A LOS CHIVATOS", por Radio Americas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, los martes y jueves a las 11:00 P.M.

Cuba:

U. ti. nadie te suspensa con la propaganda que Fidel hace en Cuba de que no es caso de que tiene deseos de que los rusos lo apoyen y tuvieras cuentas que se repiten todas los dias en las periodicas, en el radio y en la television.

Fidel esta mucho peor de lo que nadie se imagina no tiene divisas, no tiene creditos, las companias del mundo libre se van retirando del comercio con Cuba comunista, los obreros de todo el mundo no apoyan el boicot en contra de los paises que

quieren seguir comerciando con Fidel y los rusos quieren exprimir al pueblo de Cuba para cobrarse lo que Fidel se debe.

asi, pues, cubanos: Permanece alerta distribuye y noticias o propaganda, envia informes de lo que pasa en tu centro de trabajo, de nombres de chivatos, etc. como ya lo hacen miles de cubanos como tu. No te preocupes por el G-2 no los coges ni los comites se enteran, pues la fiesta es que milicianos, soldados rebeldes y funcionarios del regimen esperan el momento de la liberacion que te aseguramos llegara.

N. R. KINSMAN: fph  
WH/COG/CA/EW  
4163

REF: 1 JUNE 1967

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES 20

**SECRET**

ROUTING AND/OR RETURN	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 8 PER \_\_\_\_\_

CONF: WH/COG &  RID COPY INFO: FILE . VR . F1, WH 8

INDEX  DESTROY  RETURN TO CA/PP BRANCH  FILE RID

NO INDEX  FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-26

**SECRET**

CITE DIRECTOR 06662

2 14 31 'Z

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC ANSCROLL AMOT

REF: UFGA-27507 (4 MAY 1967)

AMOT	EP	WJL/PP
SECRET	X	SECRET

PLS RETRANSMIT COPY AMOT PROPOSAL FORWARDED BY TM-928258. HQS  
COPY INADVERTANTLY DESTROYED.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26  
1 June 67

WILLIAM V. BROE  
AC/WH/D

WH/COG/NO caution

EARL J. WILLIAMSON  
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS  
**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, WH; Chief, NE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Acting Chief of Station, Athens		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMSCROLL/THUNIFORM Revised Mailing List for Greece		

**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

**ACTION: FYI**

**REF : UFGA-26541, 8 December 1966**

1. Per Para two of Reference, we are forwarding under separate cover a revised mailing list for AMSCROLL's use. We have no additions or deletions to those addressees listed in Reference with the indicator "(bl.)"; they should continue receiving copies of the economic reports issued by AMSCROLL. The addressees forwarded with this dispatch should receive copies of economic reports, of releases concerned with maritime matters, and of any other newspaper clippings and editorials which are considered appropriate by AMSCROLL and/or Station JMWAVE; these addressees replace those listed in Reference with the indicators "(econ)" and "(mar.)".

2. We believe the above revision will ensure a more effective MHSPAWN use of AMSCROLL's materials during this period of press censorship imposed by the present Greek coup leadership.

ARNOLD B. TYMERILAVS

WALTER D. NEWBY

Attachment:  
As stated above USC (w/att)

Distribution:

- 2 - COS/JMWAVE w/att
- 2 - C/WH w/att
- 2 - C/NE w/att

*see file 19-120-26/3*

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EKAA-16273	12 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	19-120-26/3

1 att.

19-120-26

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: ECAA-16273

MAILING LIST

1. Mr. Athanasios Kanellopoulos  
Economikos Tachydromos  
3 Christou Lada Street  
Athens, Greece
2. Mr. Haralambos Klaras  
Editor, Vradyni  
9-11 Piraeus Street  
Athens, Greece
3. Mr. Christoforos Bitsides  
"Athens News Agency"  
Athens, Greece
4. Mr. Athanasios Paraschos  
Ethnikos Kyrix  
1 Christou Lada Street  
Athens, Greece
5. Mr. Leonidas Karapanayiotis  
To Vima/Ta Nea  
3 Christou Lada Street  
Athens, Greece
6. Mr. Andreas Dimakos  
To Vima/Ta Nea  
3 Christou Lada Street  
Athens, Greece
7. Mr. Savvas Konstantopoulos  
Eleftheros Kosmos  
8 Pezmatzoglou Street  
Athens, Greece
8. Mr. Kyros A. Kyrou  
Estia  
Athinou Gazi 7,  
Athens, Greece
9. Mr. Dimitrios Zannides  
23 Sisini  
Athens, Greece

CS COPY

Stc att. 1 ECAA-16273

19-120-26

- 10. Mr. Ioannis Vellidis  
Makodonia  
Thessaloniki, Greece
- 11. Mr. Solon Grigoriadis  
Akropolis  
12 Veldiou Street  
Athens, Greece
- 12. Naftilia Non  
Athens, Greece
- 13. Naftiki Hellas  
Athens, Greece
- 14. Naftemboriki  
Athens, Greece
- 15. Naftiliaki Naftergatiki  
13 Chalkokondyli Street  
Athens, Greece

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **F**

TOTAL COPIES **19**

R-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

**SECRET**

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5
2		6
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4		8

ACTION

WH/CRG &

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBES

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VE, WH &

**SECRET** 121508Z CITE SANTIAGO <sup>SALVO</sup> 4466 (THILLEN ACTING)

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

12 JUN 67 11 87649

TYPIC AMSCROLL

(12) 64432

REF: JMWAVE 7103, 10 MAY

SPANISH TRANSLATION REF STUDY, NEVER RECEIVED SANTIAGO.

PLS POUCH ANOTHER SET.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

BT

AN 19	FI	REC
RS	SECRET	
ABSTRACT	X	SECRET

19-120-26

12 June 67

UNIDAD MONTHLY, ISSUE, NO. 37, May, 1967

This issue has been almost entirely devoted to a reprint of I. Andrés Collazo's statement concerning his experience as a CUFLET representative in London. We have reprinted most of the contents of the statement in the form of a signed article entitled "INSIDE CUFLET".

As is known, Collazo tells of the "dog fights" that have risen between the privateers (such as FRANGISTAS) and CUFLET over violations of contracts, bad condition of the ships, etc.

He also discusses the decline in free-world shipping to Cuba and its causes, as well as the nature and background of the shippers that participate in the Cuban trade.

Besides the above, the following is included in this issue:

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EDITORIAL: "A COMMUNIST TRUTH": Volsky, the Chief of the Soviet observing delegation to the CEPAL meeting in Caracas, said that "Cuba is the minor daughter of the USSR, and minor daughters are pampered". The Russian's insolence has roused the anger of all well-born Cubans. Yet, there's a lot of truth in what the Russian said. Indeed, minor daughters depend on their parents, get everything they need from them, and are subject to their supreme authority. If the daughter works, she must also turn a good part of the fruits of her toil over to her parents.

This is what happens with Cuba and the USSR. The Soviets and their satellites sell Cuba 78.6% of her imports, dictate the policy of the Havana régime, and take 80% of her exports.

In view of this dependence, who can deny that the relation between Cuba and Russia is that of a minor daughter with respect to her parents?

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CARTOON: (By Luis R. Cáceres, Jr.): A shabby-looking character faces Castro and tells him: "You're a nosy liar and an adventurer!". A Cuban in the foreground asks a friend: "Who is that, a "gusano"?" "No", replies the friend. "That's a Latin American pro-Soviet Communist".

SECRET

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

XI

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE  
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/MNVIPER  
Material on Trading with Cuba

References: A. DIRECTOR 02837  
B. RIO DE JANEIRO 3756

Per reference A we forward by separate cover material produced and released by the ANSCROLL organization which we hope will be helpful in meeting your requirement to provide ALTEPID-1 with information on the negative aspects of commercial trading with Cuba.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

Attachments:

1. Maritime 5th Column press releases (U/S/C)
2. Defectors statements (U/S/C)
3. ANSCROLL Economic Reports (U/S/C)

Distribution

- 3 - CCS, Rio de Janeiro, w/atts, USC *out pouch*
- ✓ 2 - C/WH, w/o atts *see file 10-120-26*
- 2 - WH/COG, w/o atts

MAY 28 1967



26 May 67

UFGA 27672

CS COPY

SECRET

10-120-26/2

10-120-26

K. W. MURPHY: fph  
WH/COG/CA/EW  
4163  
23 MAY 1967

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES: 24 30

**SECRET**

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 21 PER 3

CONF. WH/COG  RID COPY

INDEX  DESTROY  RETURN TO 11 BRANCH  FILE BID

NO INDEX  FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-26 ✓

INFO FILE WH8 CA2 CA/PROP

*Call 217*

**SECRET**

(date and time filed)

(reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 04241

24 19 41 Z

TO SANTIAGO INFO JMWAVE

:TYPIC MHPAWN AMSCROLL

REFS: A UFGA-27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

P. SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58430)

AN 64	ES	WH/COG
ES	ES	
ABSTRACT	✓	

HQS DEFERS TO STATION JUDGEMENT AS TO VALUE PROP PLAY IN CHILE OF REF A PAPER. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT PAPER QUOTES FIGURES AND ARRIVES AT CONCLUSION ALREADY WELL KNOWN AND ACCEPTED BY INDIVIDUALS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF SUGAR INDUSTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26  
23 May 67

by *J. D. Steiner*  
WILLIAM V. BROE  
C/WHD

*dc/wh/...*  
EARL J. WILLIAMSON  
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS  
**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES **27**  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  ALT. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

<b>SECRET</b>		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		1	2
		3	4
		5	6
		7	8
		9	10

ACTION: WHICOR  RID COPY  ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO: FILE, VS, W/HB, ADOP, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INTZ,

SECRET 161509Z CITE JMWAVE 7202

DIRECTOR

TYPIC-MHVIPER

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 3756 (1167134)

16 MAY 67 116822Z

IN SELECTING INFO REQUESTED PARA 2 REF ON  
 NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TRADING WITH CUBA HQS MAY WISH  
 CONSIDER APSCROLL SERIES OF ECONOMIC REPORTS ESPECIALLY  
 VOL II NO. 2 OF 3 MARCH AND VOL II NO. 5 OF 19 DECEMBER  
 WHICH DISCUSS IN DETAIL SUGAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS.  
 ALSO STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY DEFECTORS SUCH AS AMRIVER-1,  
 AMRAIN-1 AND AMSNAKE-1 MAY BE HELOPUL. IF DESIRED  
 JMWAVE CAN POUCH THIS MATERIAL TO RIO.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. SECRET CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  TOTAL COPIES 23

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  REF. TO BRANCH

DISTRUB  SIG. SECRET

**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
1	3
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3	5
4	6

ACTION WHC-8  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, V.R., WH-8, CA-2, CA/Rep, FE

WAVE  
 S E C R E T 122151Z CITE JMWAVE 7155  
 DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO  
 TYPIC MACHAW. AIRROLL AMOT  
 REF JMWAVE 7155 (N65400)

12 MAY 67 IN 66356

AM/1	SP	
PS		6/2/66
15	X	

STORY BASED UPON STUDY DISCUSSED REF PUBLISHED  
 MIAMI HERALD 12 MAY ENTITLED "SUGAR HARVEST IN CUBA  
 MAY BE BEST SINCE '61. ALSO AP FILED STORY WITH  
 ITS NEW YORK OFFICE IDENTIFIED AS PUBLISHED MAY 11.  
 AIRMAILING ADDRESSEES BOTH ACCOUNTS.

S E C R E T  
 BT

**SECRET**

19-120-26  
 12 May 1967

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

*WH/COG*  
PROCESSING

TO  
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE *AIT*

SUBJECT  
TYPIC/Operational

Receipt of Information from Unidentified Source within Cuba

SEARCHED	INDEXED	FILED
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING BY ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
ABSTRACT		
MICROFILM		

*10485*

Action Required: FYI

Reference: None

1. On 27 March 1967, a letter from Cuba was received at the postal address given by the radio program of AMSCROLL. The letter had been mailed in Habana on 4 March 1967 and the contents included three photos of an unidentified individual and one photo each of individuals identified as Reynaldo IRSULA Broa and Antonio FERNANDEZ Fernandez. A note which was included stated that henceforth the sender would identify himself as "Pancrasio". He indicated that if it was desired receipt of his letter could be mentioned on the AMSCROLL radio program but that never should any mention of the contents be mentioned as this could reveal his identity to the DSE. Pancrasio stated his help would not be much but that his letters might contain information which could be of value. He wrote that he could not go into detail as he was unable to spend much time at the typewriter. Pancrasio concluded by saying the photos of Antonio and Reynaldo were in the hands of a security agent who had orders to find them. They had both been fugitives for a long time. The other photo (in triplicate) was of a Canadian citizen whose passport was retained by the DSE and was reported as lost for an unexplained motive.

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3. On 21 April 1967, a second letter from Pancrasio was received via Key West, Florida. The letter had been

Attachment-U/S/C *(out)*  
Copies of info received

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

Distribution:  
✓ - WH/COG

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 9 May 67	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 11 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27543	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>

*127*

UNIDAD MONTHLY, ISSUE, NO. 37, May, 1967

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SECRET

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

XI

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JEWAVE

DYVOUR/PBRUBEN/MHVIPER

Material on Trading with Cuba

References: A. DIRECTOR 02887  
B. RIO DE JANEIRO 3756

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3. AMSCROLL Economic Reports (U/S/C)

Distribution

- 3 - COS, Rio de Janeiro, w/atts, USC *out pouch.*
- ✓ 2 - C/WH, w/o atts *see file w/att*
- 2 - WH/COG, w/o atts

MAY 29 1967

28 May 67


UFGA 27672

CS COPY

SECRET

10-120-2872

19-120-26



MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES: 24 30

**S E C R E T**

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
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K. W. MURPHY: fph  
WH/COG/CA/EW  
4163  
DATE: 23 MAY 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 27 PER \_\_\_\_\_

CONF: WH/COG  RID COPY

INDEX  DESTROY  RETURN TO 2P BRANCH  FILE RID

NO INDEX  FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-261

INFO: FILE . VS WH8 CA2 CA/PROP

(classification) **S E C R E T** (date and time filed) 24 19 41 Z (initial) (picat) (reference number) 04241

TO SANTIAGO INFO JMWAVE  
:TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL  
REFS: A UFGA-27416 (20 APRIL 1967)  
B SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58430)

PP

AN 0	WH/CA
28	POST
ABSTRACT X	AS

HQS DEFERS TO STATION JUDGEMENT AS TO VALUE PROP PLAY IN CHILE  
OF REF A PAPER. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT PAPER QUOTES FIGURES  
AND ARRIVES AT CONCLUSION ALREADY WELL KNOWN AND ACCEPTED BY  
INDIVIDUALS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF SUGAR INDUSTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26  
23 May 67

by J. V. Broe  
WILLIAM V. BROE  
C/WH

dc/wh/...  
EARL J. WILLIAMSON  
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

**S E C R E T**

GROUP 1 Excluded From Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES **27**

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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**30**  
ACTION

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT

TIME

BY

**WH/CC:R**

RID COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

INFO

FILE, **VE, WHE, ADOP, C1/OPS, C1/IC2, C1/OA, F1, F1/INTZ,**

**SECRET** 161529Z CITE JMWAVE 7202

DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 3756

**167134**

**16 May 67 0822Z**

IN SELECTING INFO REQUESTED PARA 2 REF ON

NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TRADING WITH CUBA HQS MAY WISH

CONSIDER **AMSCROLL** SERIES OF ECONOMIC REPORTS ESPECIALLY

VOL II NO. 7 OF 3 MARCH AND VOL II NO. 5 OF 19 DECEMBER

WHICH DISCUSS IN DETAIL SUGAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS.

ALSO STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY DEFECTORS SUCH AS AMRIVER-1,

AMRAIN-1 AND AMSNAKE-1 MAY BE HELPFUL. IF DESIRED

JMWAVE CAN POUCH THIS MATERIAL TO RIO.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

BT

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **F**

TOTAL COPIES 23

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. 19-120-26

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM 24

ACTION

WHCoG-8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE, V/R, WH-8, CA-2, CA/Rep, FI

**SECRET** 122151Z CITE WAVE JMWAVE 7155

DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

TYPIC MHCPAW AMSCROLL AMOT

REF JMWAVE 7135 (W05400)

12 MAY 67 IN 6635E

AM	ST
DB	
12	W/REGG

STORY BASED UPON STUDY DISCUSSED REF PUBLISHED

MIAMI HERALD 12 MAY ENTITLED "SUGAR HARVEST IN CUBA

MAY BE BEST SINCE '61. ALSO AP FILED STORY WITH

ITS NEW YORK OFFICE IDENTIFIED AS PL759PFD MAY 11.

AIRMAILING ADDRESSEES BOTH ACCOUNTS.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

BT

19-120-26  
12 May 1967

**DISPATCH**

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

WH/COG  
PROCESSING

TO Chief, WH	PROPOSED X	ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL CAN JUDGE INDEXING	ACCUM PLISHED
INFO.			
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>att</i>		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational  
 0 Receipt of Information from Unidentified Source within Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: None

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Attachment *1/S/C (over)*  
 Copies of info received

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

Distribution:  
 ✓ - WH/COG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED 9 May 67	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 11 1967
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27543	
CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 17-123-26	

*att.*

S E C R E T

UFGA-27543

mailed from Habana on 13 March and was directed to Guillermo ALFONSO, 649 William Street, Key West. Typed on one of the two sheets of paper forwarded by Pancrasio was a note saying this was letter number four from Pancrasio and requesting Guillermo ALFONSO to forward the papers to the same postal address which he had previously utilized. Copies of the contents of this letter are attached under separate cover. The one paper, dated 27 September 1961, appears to be a list of Costa Ricans who visited Cuba under the auspices of ICAP. The second paper appears to be a list of Brazilians who visited Cuba, probably in mid 1960 when Janio QUADROS made a visit to Cuba as part of his presidential campaign in Brazil.

4. On 2 May 1967, a JMWAVE Officer visited Guillermo ALFONSO in an effort to identify Pancrasio and develop sufficient information to evaluate his information and determine the extent of his access. ALFONSO claimed he had no idea as to the identity of Pancrasio and was unable to suggest possible candidates from his relatives in Cuba, former work associates, classmates or neighbors. ALFONSO had retained the envelope from Cuba which contained Pancrasio's second message and a short message to ALFONSO. The note to ALFONSO stated that Pancrasio had received ALFONSO's name and address from some unidentified individual and that it was requested that ALFONSO forward the contents of the letter to the AMSCROLL address which was enclosed. ALFONSO was cautioned not to mention anything concerning the matter to anyone, especially to relatives in Cuba. Pancrasio stated this was his second letter (not fourth as indicated on the material which was forwarded on by ALFONSO) and that the first had been sent direct to the AMSCROLL address. It was stated this was the first letter by which ALFONSO would serve as intermediary and that other letters would come at infrequent intervals. Pancrasio had decided to use an intermediary address as the AMSCROLL address was too well known. Pancrasio concluded his note by saying that he preferred to remain anonymous and that he would be remaining in Cuba for two more years. In addition to the above cited message, the letter to ALFONSO contained a calling card with the name Dr Luc B. INNOCENT, President of the Haitian Revolutionary Movement. On the back of the card was typed in Spanish "without comment".

5. JMWAVE traces on FERNENDEZ, IRSULA and ALFONSO are negative. INNOCENT, according to HZPA-12507, dated 2 August 1962, is a Haitian terrorist, Fidelista, who was planning to enter Panama from Columbia.

6. ALFONSO was instructed to forward any mail received from Pancrasio in an expeditious manner and JMWAVE will follow any leads obtained which might help to identify Pancrasio in order to develop him into a more productive source of information.

*Stanley B. Jersawit*

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

S E C R E T

Sept. 27, 1961

FILIACION DE GRUPO DEL ICAP EN COSTA RICA

Maria E. Figueroa - Felicia Rojas	1920
Alicia Campos - Elida de la O. - Ivette Barrantes	1606
Julia Rodriguez - Ma. L. Garcia	1601
Luz M. Hernandez - Rosa Elena	1602
Elena Mora e Hijos	1603
Luis Acevedo - Ramon Blanco	1604
Misael Barrantes - Francisco Tolafos	1605
Edwin Calderon - Luis Campos	1607
Manuel Campos - Gustavo Cardenas	1608
Mariano Campos - Rigoberto Carrera	01609
Fernando Chavez - Gonzalo Sierra	1610
Luis Cordas - Luis Hernandez	1611
Cabino Fallas - Fernando Fonseca	1612
Rafael Grandes - Honorio Montero	1613
Wilfredo Johnson - Alfonso Rodriguez	1614
Mariano Kouje - Jorge Kouje	001615
Felix Masada - Palter Nivero	1615
Araaldo Mendota - Alfonso Santamaria	1617
Ingo Mora - Rodolfo Solano	1618
Mangel Romero - Sico Salas - Rigoberto Pravia	1619
Rigoberto Ruiz - Hector Herrera	1620
Anibal Parras - Manuel Solis	1621-1621
Manuel Sanchez - Perez Filbell	1622
Herman Marillo - Jorge Rodriguez	1623
Marco Julio Herrera - Jorge Coto	1624

Informes sin comentario

ATENCION UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Por favor Guillermo no me vaya a taller y no done la molestia.

Alfredo Jimenez  
Apartado Postal 3040  
Miami FLA

Carta no 7 de Panaraso, me llego que ahora ya recibido las  
anteriores, por favor remitir a la siguiente direccion:

ATENCION UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Sept 27, 1961

CS COPY

slcatt. UFGA - 27543

19-120-26

*Cuba 110040*


DELEGACION DEL BRASIL

Capt. Vicente Bicalo Palais	1509
Pr. Janio Quadros, D. Elca Quadros, Srta. Dirce Maria Quadros,	
Sra. Isenor Quadros	1510/11/12
Senador Alfonso Arinos e Senhora	1513/14
Deputado Paulo de Tarso e Senhora	1506
Deputado Adauto Lucio Cardoso	1520
Deputado Seixas Doria	1521
Deputado Francisco Juliao e Senhora	1503
Deputado Castilho Cabral	1516
Sr Augusto Marzagao	1508
Dr Joao Fontas	1507
Sr Helio Fernandez	1519
Sr Muniz Bandeira	1212
Sr Marile Melo Filho	1508
Sr Luis Antonio Villas Boas	1522
Sr Pinheiro Ramos	1722
Sr Rui Marcucci	1705
Sr Marcio Alves	1720
Sr Carlos Castelo Branco	1515
Sr Ruben Braga	1720
Sr Carlos Mesquita	1110
Sr Clodimir Norois	1706
Deputado Marilo Costa Rego e Senhora	1502
Sr Jesuino Antonio Dávila	1008
Sr Emir Norueira	1108
Sr Jose Passos	1008
Sr Elias Reid	1109
Sr Jose Costa	1213
Sr Saulo Ramos	1108
Sr Fernando Sabino	1501
Sr Jao Batista Costejon	1518
Dr Milton Fernandez	1109
Sr Milton Santos	1517
Deputado Juracy Magalhaes Jr	1517
Sr Oswaldo Pereira Legey	1001
Sr Carlos Ferr	1001
Sr Joao Manoel Conrado Ribeiro	1: 2
Sr Jose Carlos de Moraes	1: 6
Sr Walter Farbeza	1706

TRIPULACION

Sres Arthur Portefe e Heitor Tider	1719
Sres Antonio Jose Schittini Finto e Gilberto A Salemoni	1709
Srta Marly Moreira Peter	1721
Sres Paulino Lira e Jose Imperator	1208
Sres Leonardo Spitzer e Benjamin Bondarczuk	1220
Sres Lindolfo Montenegro e Aldo Rodriguez Neto	1223

*Dr. Luc. B. Innocent*  
PRESIDENT  
DU MOUVEMENT REVOLUTIONNAIRE HAÏTIEN



SIN COMENTARIO

E

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (2)

E-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

PRODUCT NON-CRITICATED

CA MO RR FI RS

CHOS

CLPT

FILED BY

SS

ESEC

ACTION 43 WH1coq 8  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBE

ADVANCE COPY

INFO FILE, JR WH8, CAZ, CA/PROP, 6

SECRET 112305Z CITE JMWAVE 7135  
 DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO  
 TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL AMOT  
 REFERENCE JMWAVE 6970 (59428)

ACTION

TIM 065400

1. STUDY DISCUSSED PARA 1 REF RELEASED 5 MAY. ONLY PICK UP SEEN BY STATION WAS STORY IN DIARIO LAS AMERICAS 9 MAY. CLIP AIRMAILED TO ADDRESSES. HOWEVER AFP FILED STORY WITH NEW YORK OFFICE 9 MAY. WILL FORWARD COPY TEXT WHEN AVAILABLE TO STATION, AMFRAME-1 ASSURED BY LOCAL AP OFFICE THAT STORY WRITTEN BUT AS OF 11 MAY NOT FILED.
2. COPIES AMSCROLL STUDY POUCHED HQS BY TM-928341 ON 10 MAY. AIRMAILING COPY TO INFO ADDRESSES.

*Ken Murphy*  
 AP UFGA 2750

*AP FILE*

SECRET  
 T

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 20 *R. P. Sullivan*

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. png

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	8
2	8
3	7
4	8

ACTION

WA/COE P

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE, UR, WA P, CAT, CA/PROP

AN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ABSTRACT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**SECRET** 102137Z CITE WAVE 7103

10 May 67 IN 64432

SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

REFERENCE SANTIAGO 4230 (N 58340)

1. JMWAVE PROCEEDING PER PARA 3 REF. STUDY BEING DISTRIBUTED TO AMSCROLL LIST 10 MAY. WILL AIRMAIL SANTIAGO SPANISH TRANSLATION WITH CHARTS. WILL APPRECIATE CLIPS INCLUDING EDITORIALS YOU MAY BE ABLE ARRANGE.

2. REQUEST YOU DEFER PASSING MATERIAL UNTIL 17 MAY OR LATER IN ORDER ALLOW TIME FOR ARRIVAL OF AMSCROLL MAILING.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

BT

19-120-26  
10 May 67

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 100-21 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 41

REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. Yes

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

FORM

25/21

ACTION

WH/COG 8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE UR WHS, FI, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/4, FILINT, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 3, SB 8,

**SECRET** 032225Z CITE WAVE JMWAVE 6970

DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

TYPIC MHPAWN AMSCROLL AMOT

REF DIRECTOR 97866

50420

ANL	PE
PS	DEST
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

1. RE REQUEST PARA 2 REF CURRENT STATISTICAL AMSCROLL STUDY

COMPLETED 3 MAY INDICATE 1967 HARVEST TO BE MORE IN NEIGHBORHOOD 6.1 MILLION METRIC TONS WHICH IN LINE WITH RESPONSIBLE ANALYSES (CF. CZARNIKOW-RIONDA) AVAPLABLE TO AMSCROLL. HENCE PREFER USE THEIR CONCLUSIONS BUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION WILL REFER FAVORABLY TO SUMMARY SECTION OF UFG-8667. THIS WILL ALSO AVOID SECURITY FACTOR OF USING PRECISE AMOT CONSLUSIONS. THIS STUDY WILL BE RELEASED BY AMSCROLL 5 MAY. WILL ADVISE PER REF OF WIRE SERVICE AND OTHER PICKUP.

2. AMOT STUDY OF 25 APRIL OF RECENT RISE OF SUGAR PRICE AND THEIR PROPOSALS TO COUNTER ROLE OF SPECULATORS FORWARDED TM928256 ON 2 MAY. DRAFT OF AMSCROLL STUDY DISCUSSED ABOVE BEING FORWARDED PRIORITY POUCH 4 MAY. ALSO FORWARDING PERTINENT EXTRACTS OF SUGAR LETTERS FROM MERRILL LYNCH, CZARIKOW-RIONDA AND C. CZARNIKOW, LTD WHICH GERMAINE TO AMOT PROPOSALS.

3. AS THESE AND OTHER STUDIES REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS ON **SECRET**

19-120-26  
4 May 1967

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 6970 S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

SIZE OF SUGAR CROP AND DUE ABSENCE HERE OF RELIABLE INFO ON SUCH KEY  
FACTORS AS EXTENT, IF ANY, TO WHICH SOVIET UNION WILL RELEASE CUBA  
FROM ITS COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE USSR WITH 4,000,000 TONS THIS  
YEAR (JMWAVE IN NO POSITION TO EVALUATE MERITS OF EITHER CONCLUSION)  
WE DEFER TO HQS FOR EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTING AMOT PROPOSALS.  
IN ADDITION SUCH ASSETS AS AMSCROLL, AMHIM, ETC.  
AMRAIN-1 OR AMSNAKE-1 MIGHT PREPARE STUDIES ATTRIBUTING THEIR  
INFO TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEES.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

BT

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FCOT-13169

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - 3 MAY 1967

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - CHIEF, FE DIVISION CHIEF, WH DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, OKINAWA

SUBJECT - TRANSFER OF JMWAVE ADVANCE TO OKINAWA FOR ACCOUNTING

ACTION - SEE PARA 3

REFERENCE - UFGT-19178, DTD 12 APRIL 67

1. CONTENTS REF AND ATTACHMENTS NOTED AND REFERRED TO

REBHOLTZ WHOSE COMMENTS FOLLOW--

A. BOTH AMOUNTS ON VOUCHER 8511 PROBABLY PASSED AS ONE SUM TO AMBLEAK/I WHO MAY HAVE SIGNED SINGLE RECEIPT FOR \$1,500.00 RATHER THAN RECEIPTING \$1,000.00 AND \$500.00 SEPARATELY. RE-EXAMINATION APPROPRIATE FILES ON THIS ASSUMPTION MAY SOLVE MYSTERY.

B. ANY OUTSTANDING ADVANCES THIS MATTER WOULD HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO SUCCEEDING CASE OFFICER GORDON R. HAWLOTT THROUGH FORMAL MEMO WHICH JMWAVE FINANCE MUST HAVE HAD PRIOR REBHOLTZ' CLEARING STATION. EXTRA COPY MAY BE IN AMSCROLL FILES.

C. SINCE AMBLEAK/I WOLADY CITIZEN /ALTHOUGH THOUGHT BY SOME ASSOCIATES A PBRUMEN EXILE/, HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED DIRECTLY TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND DETAIL EXPENDITURES MADE WITH FUNDS IN QUESTION.

D. REBHOLTZ' RECOLLECTION PURPOSE OF ADVANCE, WHICH WAVE 1702 CITED ON VOUCHER AS AUTHORIZATION MAY CONFIRM, WAS DEPOSIT ON LEASE, RENOVATION AND REPAIRS HEIRLOOM COVER OFFICE IN FASHIONABLE AREA OF CITY. CLEARED WOLADY REALTOR WHO MADE ARRANGEMENTS, COPY OF LEASE IN JMWAVE FILES, PERSONAL OBSERVATION

1 TELEPOUCH FCOT-13169 PAGE TWO

DELLING IN PROCESS BY HAWLOTT AND REBHOLTZ /INCLUDING  
INSTALLATION AIR CONDITIONER THROUGH WALL/, AMBLEAK/ UTILIZATION  
OFFICE AND POSSIBLE VISITS BY CLEARED WOLADY ATTORNEY AS CONSULTANT  
ON HEIRLOOM ACTIVITY PLUS OTHER SUCH INDICATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE  
AMPLE EVIDENCE MONEY PASSED AND EXPENDED AS AUTHORIZED.

2. IF ABOVE LEADS CANNOT BE FOLLOWED UP EFFECTIVELY,  
SUGGEST REBHOLTZ' CERTIFICATION BE ACCEPTED THAT TO BEST HIS  
KNOWLEDGE FUNDS PASSED AMBLEAK/1 FOR APPROVED OPERATIONAL  
PURPOSE. NOTE ADVANCE MADE 11 MAY 65 FOR ACCOUNTING ON OR BEFORE  
11 JUNE 65, AND THAT REBHOLTZ ON ACTIVE DUTY AT JMWAVE UNTIL  
31 JULY/ ALTHOUGH REF STATES DEPARTURE APPROX 1 JUNE/. TIME  
FACTOR SUGGEST SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNTING RENDERED WITHIN NORMAL  
DATE LIMIT SINCE OVERDUE NOTICE EVIDENTLY NOT ISSUED EVEN 45 DAYS  
BEYOND DUE DATE /WHICH REBHOLTZ SAYS WAS FIRM SOP AT JMWAVE/.

3. PLS ADVISE ASAP SINCE REBHOLTZ ETA 8 JUNE PCS TOKYO  
STATION AND WISH TO CLEAR THIS ITEM RATHER THAN TRANSFER IT AGAIN.  
VICTOR J. SANDVOLD

END

DISTRIBUTION

- 2 - COS, JMWAVE/VIA TELEPOUCH/
- 1 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION/VIA TELEPOUCH/
- 1 - CHIEF, WH DIVISION/VIA TELEPOUCH/

SECRET TELEPOUCH FCOT-13169 PAGE TWO

BT

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-20-21 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 26

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. 21/2

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

FROM: 21/2

ACTION

WH/CoG-8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH-8, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4

AN

PI

PS

REF

ABSTRACT

**SECRET** 022125Z CITE SANTIAGO 4230 (HILLEN ACTING)

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

2 MAY 67 11:58340

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL

REF: UFGA 27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

1. REFERENCE IS AN EXCELLENT PAPER THAT SHOULD SERVE OUR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WELL IN CHILE ESPECIALLY SINCE THE GOC SEEMS TO DESIRE A SOFTENING OF ITS PREVIOUSLY HARD ANTI-CUBA LINE.

2. WE CAN REPLAY THE ARTICLE IN ITS ENTIRITY IN FUNERAL-1 OR PROBABLY PLACE A SUMMARY OF IT IN THE FUAMBER-1 SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT. (A MORNING TABLOID OF SOME 200,000 CIRCULATION ON SUNDAYS, VERY BIG FOR CHILE). IN EITHER CASE ATTRIBUTION IS NO PROBLEM SINCE EITHER OF THEM WILL PLACE IT WITH OR WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION.

3. THUS, IF IT SERVES YOUR PURPOSES WOULD SUGGEST THAT AMSCROLL PUBLISH IT FOR PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION AFTER WHICH YOU CAN SEND US THE SPANISH VERSION WITH THE CHARTS TOGETHER WITH A LIST OF CHILEAN FIRMS IT WAS SENT TO AND WE WILL ARRANGE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION AS NOTED ABOVE. MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE SPIN OFF SOME EDITORIALS BY OTHER ASSETS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER GIVING IT FULL TREATMENT.

**SECRET**


**SECRET**

BT

19-120-26  
2 May 67

C/WH

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED	ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere	XXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Station, Athens Chief, NE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>KNF</i>		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMSCROLL		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	Request from Greek and Spanish Embassies for AMSCROLL Publications on Shipping		
<p>Action Required: None, FYI</p> <p>1. We forward by separate cover a copy of a letter from the Royal Greek Embassy in Washington addressed to AMSCROLL together with a copy of the requested publication. AMSCROLL answered the request by return mail and took the opportunity to include more recent material published by AMSCROLL which discussed Greek ships and Cuba. All of this material had earlier been sent the addressees and, further, had been sent the list discussed in UFGA-26541 (8 December 1966). We are also including in the separate cover attachment an article based upon AMSCROLL material that appeared in the American Marine Engineer.</p> <p>2. On 27 April the Spanish Embassy in Washington telephoned AMSCROLL to request one copy each of the January and February 1967 AMSCROLL Studies of Free World Shipping with Cuba. The Embassy explained that its file of this publication was complete except for these two issues.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Rose E. Marchant</i> for MARK F. EFFIELD</p> <p>Attachment: As stated, usc <i>(att)</i></p> <p>Distribution 3-C/WH, w/att, usc 2-COS, Athens, w/att. usc - <i>To out pool</i> 2-WH/COG, w/att. usc 2-C/NE, w/o att. <i>See [unclear] w/att.</i></p>			
CS COPY		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
		28 April 67	MAY - 1 1967
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
		UFGA-27447	
CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
		19-120-26	
		19-120-26/3	



*1 att*

SEP. COU. AT:  
UFGA-27447  
26 Apr '67

ROYAL GREEK EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 17, 1967

Movimiento Unida Revolucionaria  
10 S.E. 9th Street  
Miami, Fla. 33131.

Dear Sirs,

Would you kindly send us 2 copies  
of your number 6 Political Notebook Series  
The Maritime Fifth Column (Supplement).

Thanking you in advance,

Truly yours,

*I. Kerasidis*

I. Kerasidis  
Secretary.

slc att. 1 UFGA-27447

CS COPY

19-120-26

SEP COU ATT: 27447  
UFGA-27447  
26 Apr '67

who have been employed 25 years or more be established at \$100.

### "Escalator Clause"

The AFL-CIO has proposed that an "escalator" clause be incorporated into Social Security so that a re-

I believe that the United States, now surpassed by 13 Western European nations in the field of social welfare, can and should provide its citizens with a realistic and sound Social Security system consistent with our resources."

## Greeks Discipline Cuba Traitors

Fourteen ship owners and merchant marine Captains were recently indicted by Greek authorities for sailing transports to Cuba in violation of existing regulations.

The Minister of the Merchant Marine has reportedly sent to the proper prosecution authorities the files against the owners and captains of S.S. Irene, S.S. Barbarino, S.S. Alice and S.S. Pantanazza. All the vessels are registered in Piraeus.

Charges for similar violations are to be brought soon against the owners and Captains of the S.S. Tina, S.S. Eitychia, S.S. Andromachi, S.S. Kyra Harikleia, S.S. Nikolas P., S.S. Nikolas M., S.S. Roulamaria and S.S. Sofia.

The courts and the Merchant Marine Disciplinary Board are reportedly investigating charges against other owners and captains.

The steamer LOUISE LNEES (Lykes Bros.) and the Yamashiro Maru recently collided during heavy weather at Keelung.

## Illness At Sea Rate Declines

Reported illnesses and injuries among seagoing personnel in 1966 in relation to the average number of seafaring jobs dipped to a new low for the last decade.

Recently announced figures stated that the combined percentage of illness and injuries, based on an average of 54,000 jobs last year, declined to 73.7 per cent from the 85.5 per cent reported on 46,000 jobs in 1955.

The respective percentages of injuries and illnesses also declined. The ratio of injuries last year dropped to 42.4 per cent from 45.5 per cent in 1955, and that of illnesses was down to 37.3 per cent from the first 40 percent registered the previous year.

The percentage of injuries is the lowest recorded since 1961, and that of illness is the lowest since 1957.

All told, in 1966 licensed and unlicensed U. S. merchant marine personnel were reported as injured or ill 43,045 times. Reported injuries totaled 22,923 and reported illnesses totaled 20,122.

icy which has led since the end of World War II to neglect and abuse of the American merchant marine by government agencies.

"President Johnson announced more than two years ago that he would offer a new maritime policy but this still has not been put forward. In the meantime, pressures have been increasing within government to abandon entirely the idea that our country needs a strong American merchant marine.

"It is against this background that we have examined the proposals advanced by Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd.

"We find many shortcomings in this program. Most of its goals are far from adequate to meet the nation's needs. It contains provisions which would damage rather than strengthen the effectiveness of our merchant marine. It leaves many questions unanswered.

"However, in view of the present desperate condition of the U. S. merchant marine, we must regard the fact that a program is being proposed and that it is positive even to the degree that this one

is, as a ho

"The F stands is a It should wards and make ever that the : guards are

"We be labor and the mari must abar manger at feating at its behind is practic obtainable "We bernment abandon w gerous sc the FDL are advar tutes for range m policy. It v to weaken sea-power. FDL prog lined appe separate from cor need. This unrealistic all lessons end result imical to terest, un defense an abilities.

"For th devices su ed "effectl ory which

*Anscomb*

"UNIDAD" MONTHLY, ISSUE No. 36, APRIL, 1967.-

FRONT PAGE:

(1) ANOTHER REGIME OFFICIAL DEFECTS IN GREAT BRITAIN: A brief story on the Collazo defection, followed by excerpts from his original statement. Excerpts include: reasons why free-world sea trade with Cuba is declining (U.S. Black List, Latin workers' boycott, etc.); Cuba-trading shipowners take advantage of Castro and overcharge him for charters; the personnel problem in "Mambisas"; the planned deception for Expo 67 (exhibiting console record players made up of foreign components and wood as Cuban-made); general conclusion: régime officials don't know where they are headed for.

(2) EDITORIAL: HATED BY FRIEND AND FOE: The Russians hate Castro because he has two-timed them in the Sino-Soviet rift; the Chinese loathe him because they regard him as a mercenary who has sold out to the Soviets. Latin American Reds hate him as well, because, as they say, he has promoted fractionalism in their ranks. Anti-Communists throughout the Americas hate him too, as there is not a country in the hemisphere where mothers and wives are not mourning the loss of a dear one to Castroite terrorists. And anti-Red Cubans would not touch Castro with a ten-foot pole. Hated by friend and foe alike, how could anyone think that Castro may eventually survive a chronic economic crisis that his own ineptitude has wrought on the nation?

PAGE TWO:

(1) MOROCCO BREAKS DEPENDENCE ON CUBAN SUGAR: From the EIR we take the story on the Moroccan plan to develop their own sugar industry at the expense of purchases from Cuba. This plan, we stress, is receiving Polish financial and technical aid, which shows to what extent Castro's Red comrades are concerned with his sugar interests.

(2) DO THE SOVIETS SEND 'REJECT' PARTS TO CUBA?: Also from the EIR, this is the story on the "coincidence" that poor-quality or defective parts began to arrive in Cuba, under Soviet-Cuban barter agreements, right after the price of sugar dropped.

(3) WHERE IS RAUL?: A humorous poem by Luis R. Cáceres, Jr. It goes like this

(it rhymes in Spanish, of course): Where would Raúl be? - Is he out cutting cane - or viciously murdering Cubans - or hiding inside a trunk? Where might he be? - what could have happened to Raulito? - maybe he's got the "shakes" - or was abducted by (eloped with) a Congolese? (This is a reference to the old Cuban joke about Raúl being a homosexual and having a preference for husky Congolese).

(4) Box: CUBAN! Help the fight against the tyranny. Pass this issue on to your friends and trusted acquaintances. Report to us any news that might be interesting (we give our P.O. Box No.). We welcome your criticisms, comments and suggestions.

PAGE THREE:

- (1) Continuation of front-page story on Collazo.
- (2) CASTRO TO BE ACCUSED BY REDS: a brief story on the announced plans of the Venezuelan Communists to charge Castro with meddling and promoting fractionalism, at a forthcoming Communist meeting in Prague.

*CHW P3*

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING		
		FILED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief of Station, Santiago	<del>XXXX</del>	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO	Chief, Western Hemisphere		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL'S DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	TYPIC/MISPAWN/AMSCROLL Study of Cuban/USSR Trade Relations		ABSTRACT	
			DISPATCH	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
ACTION: See paragraphs 3 and 4.				
REFERENCES: A. SANTIAGO-3885				
B. DIRECTOR-86882				
C. JMWAVE-6430				
<p>1. JMWAVE forwards herewith a study entitled <u>Economic Relations Between Cuba and the Soviet Union: How Much Dependency?</u> Both Santiago and Headquarters are being provided with an original and one copy of the study in English and an original and one copy in Spanish. Two sets of the one table and the six charts that support the study are also being forwarded each addressee. This is an AMSCROLL prepared study; the author is AMFRAME-1 in collaboration with AMSNAKE-1. It was prepared in response to references A and B.</p> <p>2. We have limited this study to an attempt to prove statistically the very rapid rise of Cuban economic dependency upon the Soviet Union. We have intentionally avoided editorializing as the facts speak for themselves; thus we have drawn no political conclusions, nor have we attempted to establish that this economic dependency carries with it an implicit policy control on the part of the Soviets (partly because policy control does not necessarily follow and, in any event, the reader is free to draw his own conclusions).</p> <p>3. If it does not run counter to Station Santiago's plans, we suggest that AMSCROLL - a JMWAVE asset that studies and comments upon the Cuban economic scene - reproduce this study under its name for <u>private</u> distribution to its list of sugar brokers, trading firms, and international organizations that deal</p>				
1 AT Attachments: As stated, h/w Distribution		CS COPY 19-120-26 <del>19-120-26/3</del>		
3 - COS, Santiago, w/atts., h/w ② - C/WH, w/atts., h/w <i>see file WH/A/CH</i> 2 - WH/COG w/o atts.		DATE TYPED: 20 APR 67 DATE DISPATCHED: DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA - 27416 HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26/3		
Removed from Project <i>Sub file</i> CS Classification: 19-120-26 JOB #68-644/93 Box 19 Folds 3		GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>		

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA - 27416
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with or are interested in following the Cuban economic picture. We would particularly like to bring this presentation to the attention of European firms and organizations with which AMSCROLL is in contact and which are a factor in Cuban trade. We believe that this will also give a basis for attribution to Santiago should the Station desire it; if not, the facts and figures could be used by Station Santiago without attribution and without sourcing, for that matter, as we believe that the figures will stand.

4. JMWAVE will appreciate comments on the value of this paper from Headquarters and Santiago. We also request a cabled response from Santiago to the suggestion in paragraph 3 that AMSCROLL reproduce this study.

Mark F. EFFIELD

*Comments  
Cabled 23 May 67.  
Rto*

19-120-26

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN  
CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION: HOW MUCH DEPENDENCY?

Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union is known. The question is: how much dependency? In order to arrive at some conclusion we have chosen Cuba's foreign trade statistics for the 1959-1966 period.

We will work under the following economic assumption: Economic dependency of one country on the other can be indicated to a considerable extent by their trade as this indicates the need one country has of the other as a market for its exports and as a supplier for its imports.

What we will do is to analyze the Cuban Trade Balance for the 1959-1966 period. \*

1) According to the assumption we established regarding trade dependency, we can say that during 1959 Cuba was dependent upon the Free World for its markets as total trade value for that year amounted to \$ 1,305,700,000 and trade value with the Free World represented \$ 1,289,000,000 (or 98.8% of the total trade).

Broken down into exports and imports we see that in 1959 Cuban exports totaled \$ 637,700,000 while total imports were \$ 688,000,000. Thus, the trade balance showed a \$ 26,500,000 deficit, which was a reflection of the trend started in 1958 due to

\* Every figure in this paper will be given in U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. The sources for the figures used throughout the analysis, the table, and charts were: "The Economist", "The New York Times", UN's Economic Reports on Latin America, "Cuba Comercio Exterior" magazine, "Visión" magazine, "US News & World Report", and The Economist Intelligence Unit's "Quarterly Economic Review".

It should be remembered that the figures refer only to the Cuban Trade Balance; i.e., imports and exports, and not to the Cuban Balance of Payments which would reflect loans and financial arrangements, plus the Soviet military and technical assistance; figures which do not appear in the balance of trade and which are not available to us with sufficient authenticity to warrant their use.

Removed from ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ *July file*  
CS Classification/num. 19-120-26  
JOB #68-644/93  
Box: 19      Pold: 3

20 April 1967  
Att. #1 to UFGA - 27416

19-120-26

the unstable political situation under the Batista regime and the economic insecurity of the new Castro regime.

Of the above mentioned exports, 97.8% were to Free World countries and only 2.2% to Communist countries. Import-wise, 99.9%<sup>of the imports</sup> were made from Free World countries, while 0.1% were made from Communist countries.

Thus, we can conclude that Cuba was still very much dependent upon the Free World <sup>as a trading partner</sup> - trade wise - during 1959, <sup>but</sup> Further, at least \$ 623,800,000 (97.8% of total exports) was collected in hard currency.

2) In 1960, Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba and the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement was signed. The effect of this agreement is immediately apparent when viewed through Cuba's foreign trade figures.

Total trade value <sup>decreased</sup> in 1960 to \$ 1,168,000,000 from \$ 1,305,700,000. Free World participation decreased more than proportionately, as the value of Cuban trade with the Free World was \$ 897,000,000, while trade with Communist countries increased to \$ 271,000,000 (or 23.3% of total trade) versus \$ 1,289,900,000 and \$ 15,800,000 <sup>(or 2.2% of total trade)</sup> respectively in 1959.

The trade balance was in favor of Cuba in the amount of \$ 68,000,000 as control of imports, especially from the Free World, established in 1959 was having its effect.

3) In 1961 the whole foreign trade picture was transformed. It was almost the reverse of 1960. Total trade amounted to \$ 1,253,600,000, of which Free World participation represented \$ 348,600,000 (or 27.8%) and Communist trade \$ 905,000,000 (or 72.2%).

We can look at this another way. In 1960, Cuban exports earned \$ 467,000,000 in hard currency. In 1961, the hard currency earnings amounted to \$ 166,800,000 since the \$ 458,100,000 value of Cuban exports to the Communist countries represented "agreement value" or "nominal hard currency value" as the trade was conducted under barter agreements, with the Soviet Union providing about 10% to 20% of the total Cuban export value in convertible currency.

Cuba was now dependent, economically, upon the Communist World, especially the Soviet Union. (The fact that little hard currency was obtained from its new trade partners further committed Cuba's economy to the Communist Bloc.)

4) In 1962, the trend continued. Total trade was \$ 1,257,000,000, of which \$ 1,031,000,000 (82.1%) was with the Communist Bloc and only \$ 226,000,000 (17.9%) with Free World countries.

Another phenomenon appeared during 1962. The Soviets, who had been careful not to press Cuba during 1960 with regards to their trade balance (which was favorable to Cuba by \$ 31,000,000), were shrewd enough to close the gap during 1961. The balance was favorable to Cuba by \$ 11,200,000.

Clearly, the Soviet pressure was on. In 1962, Cuba faced a \$ 227,000,000 deficit with the Communist countries. Compounding this is the fact that by 1962 Cuba had spent 30.6% of its hard currency reserves in Free World markets.

Dependency upon the Soviet Union arrived to stay as trade with the Communist World represented 82.1% of total trade and imports from the Communist area had, for the first time, surpassed Cuban exports to the Bloc.

5) Two interesting developments occurred in 1963. First of all, total trade with the Communist countries maintained the 1962 level (\$ 1,031,000,000 in 1962 and \$ 1,054,900,000 in 1963). But, the Soviet Union tightened the grip by increasing its exports to Cuba to \$ 688,900,000 (in 1962 they represented \$ 629,000,000), while Cuban exports to the Communist Bloc decreased to \$ 366,000,000 (in 1962 they represented \$ 402,000,000). Thus, the imbalance for Cuba increased to \$ 322,900,000 (in 1962 it was \$ 227,000,000).

At the same time, Cuba attempted <sup>To recoup in</sup> an approach to the Free World markets by taking advantage of an increase in the price of sugar in the world market (sugar averaged 8.48 cts. per pound during this period). Cuba's total trade with the Free World increased to \$ 354,300,000 (in 1962 it had been \$ 226,000,000).

Nevertheless, the 1963 <sup>Cuban</sup> trade balance worsened for Cuba as it showed a \$ 323,200,000 deficit. ~~The Free World countries were able to turn the tables on Cuba (as in 1962~~

00000

*The Free World*

they had a \$ 12,000,000 deficit on the trade balance with Cuba and now Cuba <sup>had</sup> was a  
\$ 300,000 ~~short~~ <sup>deficit</sup> with the Free World.

6) For 1964, a favorable world sugar market (average price of 5.86 cts. per pound) encouraged Cuba to continue its flirtation with the Free World. The Cuban treasury was able to handle some hard currency for the first time in the Castro era and Cuban commercial missions were sent to Europe and Japan to purchase items no longer available in Cuba.

Total trade increased to \$ 1,722,000,000 and the Free World participation increased from \$ 354,300,000 (25.2%) in 1963 to \$ 612,000,000 (35.6%). The Free World spending spree took its toll as the trade balance with the Free World showed a \$ 30,000,000 deficit for Cuba. And here, we are speaking of a hard currency loss.

Not even in the midst of Cuba's affair with the Free World did the Soviet Union <sup>lose</sup> ~~lose~~ control of the situation. On January 20, 1964, Cuba was signing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union by which it was committing about half of its planned future sugar production to the Soviet Union for the next six years. The amounts Cuba agreed to deliver to the Soviet Union were: 2,100,000 metric tons in 1965; 3,000,000 in 1966; 4,000,000 in 1967; 4,000,000 in 1968; 5,000,000 in 1969; and 5,000,000 in 1970. The Soviet Union did agree to fix the price of Cuba's sugar at 6 cts. per pound, which perhaps seems generous in 1967, but hardly a good offer on January 20, 1964, as the price of sugar on January 19, 1964 was 9.50 cts. per pound. Adding insult to injury the Soviet Union did not include in the 1964 trade agreement its previous commitment to provide Cuba with 10% or 20% of the payments in hard currency as it had done in the 1960 agreement.

7) By 1965 Cuba was sending few trade missions abroad, ~~virtually ceased its hard~~ <sup>because it had</sup> ~~currency purchases, and found itself with almost no hard currency~~ (the average price of sugar had dropped to 2.12 cts. per pound), <sup>and</sup> During 1965 Cuba faced the Soviet Union more empty handed than before and the general trade situation returned to 1963 level, except that by now the Communist countries had more participation and the Free World

had less. Total trade amounted to \$ 1,551,000,000 (compared to \$ 1,410,200,000 in 1963), but trade with Communist countries reached \$ 1,195,000,000 (compared to \$ 1,054,900,000 in 1963). Trade with the Free World remained at the same level - \$ 354,300,000 in 1963 and \$ 356,000,000 in 1965, but with a difference - the Cuban deficit in its trade balance with the Free World rose from \$ 300,000 in 1963 to \$ 60,000,000 in 1965.

So, the Soviets continued in control as trade with the Communist countries represented more than three quarters of Cuba's total trade for that year. The sugar production had already been mortgaged, the sugar market was depressed, and Cuba was more and more dependent upon the Soviet Union.

8) Then came 1966. Sugar prices decreased to an average of 1.86 cts. per pound. Total trade decreased to \$ 1,465,000,000 as compared with \$ 1,551,000,000 in 1965. Trade with Communist countries also decreased (from \$ 1,195,000,000 in 1965 to \$ 1,160,000,000 in 1966) and the Soviets were able to push a little further and increased Cuba's deficit in the trade balance from \$ 119,000,000 in 1965 to \$ 200,000,000 in 1966.

Free World countries also gained. Total Free World trade decreased to \$ 305,000,000 (from \$ 356,000,000 in 1965), but the Cuban deficit increased from \$ 60,000,000 in 1965 to \$ 65,000,000 in 1966.

Our conclusions follow:

FIRST: Cuba is economically dependent upon the Soviet Union.

SECOND: This dependency is increasing. It has risen from 1.2% in 1959 to 79.2% by 1966.

To buttress this conclusion we point out that:

- A) Cuba has mortgaged its sugar production to the Soviet Union.
- B) Cuba has exhausted its hard currency reserves. While an exact figure is not available we estimated it to be about \$ 20,000,000 in December 1964.
- C) Cuba does not receive hard currency from its trade with the Communist countries under the present barter agreements.


- 6 -

D) Cuba has a \$ 1,132,000,000 trade deficit with the Communist countries for the 1963 - 1966 period. Nor does this figure include Communist technical assistance, military equipment, scholarships, and the like.

THIRD: Cuba has lost its position as a meaningful trader in the Free World, which in turn has increased its dependency upon the Soviet Union.


Note.- For a statistical summary on Cuban Foreign Trade for the 1959 - 1966 period and for a graphic presentation of the above analysis see attached Table No. 1 and Charts Nos. 1 to 6.-

CHART NO.1  
 CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE  
 1959-1966  
 Expressed in Million US Dollars



SOURCE: TABLE NO.1

CHART NO. 6  
 CUBAN TRADE WITH  
 COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AS  
 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1959-1966




SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1

TABLE NO. 1  
 CUBA: FOREIGN TRADE  
 1959 - 1966  
 (Expressed in million US\$)


	YEAR	EXPORTS	%	IMPORTS	%	TOTALS	%	BALANCE
Communist countries	1959	13,9	2,2	1,9	0,1	15,8	1,2	15,8
Non-Communist countries	1959	623,8	97,8	666,1	99,9	1289,9	98,9	- 42,3
<b>Total</b>	1959	637,7	100,0	668,0	100,0	1305,7	100,0	- 26,5
Communist countries	1960	151,0	24,4	120,0	21,8	271,0	23,3	31,0
Non-Communist countries	1960	467,0	75,6	430,0	78,2	897,0	76,7	37,0
<b>Total</b>	1960	618,0	100,0	550,0	100,0	1168,0	100,0	68,0
Communist countries	1961	458,1	73,4	446,9	70,0	905,0	72,2	11,2
Non-Communist countries	1961	166,8	26,6	181,8	30,0	348,6	27,8	- 15,0
<b>Total</b>	1961	624,9	100,0	628,7	100,0	1253,6	100,0	- 3,8
Communist countries	1962	402,0	77,1	629,0	85,5	1031,0	82,1	-227,0
Non-Communist countries	1962	119,0	22,9	107,0	14,5	226,0	17,9	12,0
<b>Total</b>	1962	521,0	100,0	736,0	100,0	1257,0	100,0	-215,0
Communist countries	1963	366,0	67,4	688,9	79,5	1054,9	74,8	-322,9
Non-Communist countries	1963	177,0	32,6	177,3	22,5	354,3	25,2	- 0,3
<b>Total</b>	1963	543,0	100,0	866,2	100,0	1410,2	100,0	-323,2
Communist countries	1964	423,0	59,2	687,0	68,6	1110,0	64,5	-264,0
Non-Communist countries	1964	291,0	40,8	321,0	31,4	612,0	35,5	- 30,0
<b>Total</b>	1964	714,0	100,0	1008,0	100,0	1722,0	100,0	-294,0
Communist countries	1965	538,0	78,4	657,0	75,0	1195,0	77,1	-119,0
Non-Communist countries	1965	148,0	21,6	208,0	24,1	356,0	22,9	- 60,0
<b>Total</b>	1965	686,0	100,0	865,0	100,0	1551,0	100,0	-179,0
Communist countries	1966	480,0	80,0	650,0	78,6	1160,0	79,2	-270,0
Non-Communist countries	1966	120,0	20,0	185,0	21,4	305,0	20,8	- 65,0
<b>Total</b>	1966	600,0	100,0	835,0	100,0	1465,0	100,0	-235,0
<b>Totals</b>	--	4,344,6	--	6,166,9	--	11,172,5	--	-1,231,9

### CHART NO. 5 CUBAN TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1959-1966

EXPRESSED IN MILLION AGREEMENT US DOLLARS




EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES, TRADE VALUE = 100%



EXPORTS —  
IMPORTS - - -


SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1

CHART NO.4  
CUBAN IMPORTS  
1959-1966



SOURCE: TABLE NO.1


### CHART NO. 3 CUBAN EXPORTS 1959-1966



SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1

### CHART NO. 2 CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE 1959-1966

TRADE WITH SELECTED AREAS EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES. TOTAL TRADE = 100.0%



SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1

19-100-26

100  
90  
80  
70  
60  
50  
40  
30  
20  
10  
0

SECRET

*Amscroll D+P*

MEMORANDUM

4 April 1967

TO : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMSCROLL Progress Report  
1 January - 31 March 1967

WPW-1333

Distribution  
3 - COS  
1 - PW/MARCHBANK  
1 - PW/Chrono  
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the quarter under review AMSCROLL continued its campaign to discredit the Cuban regime's economic management. As before, the campaign was conducted by the AMSCROLL radio program and by serious economic studies and comment that were provided its mailing list of sugar brokers, selected firms engaged in international trade and shipping, and commercial and technical journals. The Station continues to be encouraged by evidence of increased acceptance of the AMSCROLL efforts. For example, AMSCROLL received eighteen letters from Cuba during this quarter, all of which were in direct response to the radio program. Of these, twelve were received in March which represents the highest monthly total since initiating the program. This compares with eleven the previous quarter and only three in the corresponding quarter of 1966. In January, the Vice President of the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico called upon the AMSCROLL offices to request AMSCROLL's assistance in preparing a chapter on Cuban sugar production problems to be included in a book this person is writing. AMSCROLL received requests from four universities or colleges requesting written material, from a graduate student preparing a thesis on the lot of the Cuban peasant, from the U.S. Army Special Warfare School Library, and others. The wire services, particularly Associated Press and Agence France Presse, continued to file stories based upon AMSCROLL releases.

2. The AMSCROLL radio program continued as reported for the last quarter--daily except Sunday for ten minutes over AMTHIGH. In addition, on 1 January AMSCROLL began a thirteen minute program each Sunday on AMTHIGH. These programs are in large part confined to subjects of an economic nature with the time on Sunday devoted to an in-depth analysis of what has occurred in this area since the previous Sunday. Typical themes hit throughout this quarter were: Economic and sociological aspects of Castro's "San Andres" speech of 28 January, an unfavorable balance of trade with Spain of \$30,000,000, significance of Soviet trade with Chile as compared with Cuba, an analysis of a UN economic study of Cuba which shows that rice production in Cuba has declined 50% since 1960, the Royal British Institute's finding that Cuba's economy makes her a poor trading risk, and a report that Greek ship owners that persist in trading with

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Cuba are being brought to trial. Throughout this period and whenever possible a particular effort was made to relate developments in China to present or possible developments in Cuba. The difficulties of the Chinese economy provided examples to which a Cuban "twist" could be put; e.g., the Chinese and Cuban economic failures demonstrate the failure of applied communism in the economic area.

3. AMSCROLL is continuing its analysis of the current sugar crop. Its releases on this subject continue to generate interest and the Station has seen coverage in The Miami Herald, El Universal (of Caracas), The Times of The Americas, and Diario Las Americas. The AMSCROLL releases on Free World shipping to Cuba were picked up by both AP and AFP and were published in the newspapers listed in the previous sentence as well as The Montreal Star. The AMHIM Bulletin also carries the bulk of these releases and we can therefore presume coverage of at least some of this information in Latin America. An interesting study was an analysis of British/Cuban trade which demonstrates that Great Britain is now getting the better part of the bargain; this story was filed by AFP as was a story of the poor quality of molasses being sold by the Cubans to British firms. Finally, AMSCROLL continued to get mileage from the Damlier-Benz story by reporting that this German firm has finally refused to sell spare parts to Cuba; the story was filed by AFP and published at least by Diario Las Americas.

4. AMSCROLL continued its mailing program to Cuba, but on a further reduced scale. During the quarter about 5,000 were mailed versus 5,800 during the previous quarter. We count a distribution during this quarter of 7,127 press releases and economic studies to places other than Cuba.

5. A recent development which may have an interesting operational potential was a telephone call to AMSCROLL from Czarnikow-Rionda, the New York sugar brokers, which was triggered by an AMSCROLL "case study" of the problems being faced by a Cuban sugar mill. The firm told AMSCROLL that it has for some time suspected Cuban sugar production figures and wondered if AMSCROLL had any such suspicions. AMSCROLL (through AMFRAME-1) has written to say it would be most interested in following any leads from Czarnikow-Rionda that could support a conclusion that Cuban production figures are false, which is where this matter now lies. The officials of Czarnikow-Rionda are well known to AMSCROLL and we shall be interested in seeing what the firm develops for AMSCROLL.

SECRET

-3-

**B. ADMINISTRATION**

6. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was \$36,750 of which \$33,700.72 was spent. Of this amount, \$9,728 was for salaries and \$23,972.72 for operations and office expenses.

7. Funding is handled as follows: AMSCROLL operational and administrative expenses are reimbursed monthly by the case officer to the treasurer after submission of an accounting of funds spent. Funds for salaries are also given the treasurer by the case officer which for tax purposes are paid by a local cover company.

**C. PROBLEMS**

8. The Station is not aware of any problems during this quarter worthy of comment.

**D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER**

9. AMSCROLL broadcasting via ANTHIGH will cease 20 April and ANTHIGH has been so informed by letter dated 13 March. The AMSCROLL programs will thereafter be carried by JMHOPE. The Station expects that this move will result in a substantial saving.

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IV QUARTER

PART 3

ACTIVITY ~~AMSCROLL~~  
PROGRAM Press & Publications

1. What contribution or progress did activity make during quarter toward established objectives?

The AMSCROLL organization continued to make progress to establish itself as a reputable analyst of Cuban economic developments. Once again it has accurately forecast the final sugar harvest weeks in advance of other authorities of which AMSCROLL is aware.

2. What progress is the activity expected to make during the forthcoming quarter toward its objectives?

A revamping of the AMSCROLL radio program to make it more objective will be a major effort of the forthcoming quarter.

3. Has the activity produced intelligence? Cite quantity and quality.

No. This activity is not designed to produce intelligence.

4. Is continuation recommended?

YES

5. Funds budgeted for FY 67 \$ 134,000

Expended (estimate) during IV Quarter \$ 23,120

Total expenditures (estimate) for FY 67 \$ 123,038.41

SECRET

# First Work Scheduled On Capital

British Honduras  
Plans Inland City

Compiled by Our Latin America Staff

**BELIZE**, British Honduras — Construction on a long-awaited new capital in the interior for this British Central American possession is expected to begin within six weeks.

Total cost is estimated at \$14 million. It will include roads, drainage, water supply, electricity, sewage disposal, public buildings and 740 houses of various types.

The public buildings will include a legislative assembly building, two multistory government office buildings,



a post office, magistrate's court, 42-bed hospital, two primary schools and one comprehensive secondary school.

The new capital site is about 30 miles inland from the hurricane-susceptible coastal city of Belize where about one third of the territory's 110,000 population lives.

★ ★ ★

## Grenade Injures 12 In Costa Rica Crowd

**SAN JOSE**, Costa Rica — A fragmentation grenade thrown into a crowd paying tribute to defeated presidential candidate Daniel Oduber injured 12 persons, including a six-year-old child, police reported Saturday.

Police said three people had been arrested in connection with the grenade blast.

★ ★ ★

## Argentina Students Lose School Role

**BUENOS AIRES** — The Argentine military government of Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía has banned students from ruling bodies of the nine state universities and warned students and professors to stay out of politics.

★ ★ ★

## One-Day Halt OKd In Refugee Flights

U.S. OFFICIALS Saturday announced that two Cuban refugee flights for Monday, May 1, will be suspended at the request of the Cuban government. Communist May Day activities are scheduled on the island that day.

The U.S. financed flights, which have brought more than 60,000 refugees to this country since they were initiated 17 months ago, will be resumed May 2 on a twice-a-day, five-day-a-week basis.

\* \* \*

### ***Venezuelan Reds 'Condemn Terrorism'***

CARACAS — Venezuela's outlawed Communist Party made an about face at its latest secret meeting, rejecting the thesis of armed insurrection and favoring participation in elections, a Communist informant said here.

The Eighth Plenum of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), "held somewhere in Venezuela, agreed to do without armed insurrection, condemn terrorism and participate in the next election," the Communist source reported.

The PCV was outlawed by former President Romulo Betancourt in 1962 and if the government does not permit legalization now, the party will negotiate its voting strength with leftist parties that operate legally in the country.

\* \* \*

### ***19 Western Ships Call at Cuban Ports***

NINETEEN vessels from Western countries, including 10 flying the British flag, called at Cuban ports in March, a Cuban exile group in Miami reported Saturday.

The exile Revolutionary Unity (UR) organization, which keeps tabs on western world shipping to Cuba, said the 19 ships also included two each from Lebanon, Cyprus and Italy; and one each from Greece, Finland and Panama. The Panamanian vessel was the first flying that country's flag to call on a Cuban port since April 1963.

\* \* \*

### ***Colombia Denies Using U.S. Troops***

BOGOTA — Colombian Army Commander Gen. Guillermo Pinzon Saturday denied charges from Havana that U.S. troops are aiding the Colombian Army in its anti-guerrilla campaign.

He said armed subversive activities in the country are "in a process of disintegration" due to action of Colombian Army units.

C/WH/COG

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	<b>SECRET</b>	PROPOSED	ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief of Station, Kingston	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, WH		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMSCROLL/Operational Letter from Rev. Henry Muir		ABSTRACT
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	<p>Action Required: FYI</p> <p>Reference: KINGSTON-2818</p> <p>We forward for your information a copy of a letter dated 15 January from Rev. Henry Muir in which he requests "a million different coppies" (sic) of AMSCROLL publications that he had previously seen. In view of the reference JMWAVE will instruct AMSCROLL to ignore this letter.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Philip G. ELMARD</p>		
<p>Attachment: copy of letter, USC <i>(att)</i></p> <p>Distribution</p> <p>3 - COS, Kingston, w/att., USC</p> <p>2 - C/WH, w/att., USC <i>see forward w/att. w/SCA</i></p> <p>2 - WH/COG, w/att., USC</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>19-120-26</i></p>			
<p>GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</p> <p>CS COPY</p>		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
CROSS REFERENCE TO		24 JAN 67	25 1967
		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
		UFGA - 26840	
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
CLASSIFICATION		19-120-26/3	
<b>SECRET</b>			

*1 att*

14-00000

UNITED LIBERAL PARTY

Founder & President:  
REV. HENRY MUIR

SECRET

742 Spanish Town Road  
Kingston 13 P.O. Box 9  
Jamaica W.I.

15<sup>th</sup> Jan 1967

Mario Sciglis  
Secretary General  
Unidad Revolucionaria (U.R.)  
105 E 9th Street  
Miami Fla.

Dear Sir

I wish you a prosperous 1967.  
Give my respect to all your men for me.  
I have return to Jamaica on the 16th Dec 1966.  
You have promise to send me those leaflet  
for me to give them out in Jamaica & that  
people can read how wicked Communism  
is and you have not send them Why?  
Please what ever you are sending for me dont  
put your address on them only put the United  
Liberal Party on to it. I dont want them to know  
where they came from. Please let me have  
even a million different copies. We are now  
getting ready for the election soon.  
I wish you all success in your undertaking

Yours very truly  
Rev. Henry Muir President United Liberal Party.

CS COPY  
SECRET

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

**S E C R E T**

PROCESSING

PROPOSED

ACTION

ACCOMPLISHED

TO

**Chief, WH Division**

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

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HEADQUARTERS DESK  
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM

**Chief of Station, JMWAVE**

ABSTRACT

MICROFILM

SUBJECT

**TYPIC/Operational****Quarterly Progress Reports Concerning Political Action Programs**

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith are seven progress reports, listed below, for the second quarter of FY 67 concerning the Political Action programs of the Station.

AMENOT  
AMSCROLL  
ANCROW  
AMBASAL  
AMLIRA  
AMSTRUT  
AMHOP

- filed 19-120-26

**Philip G. Elward**

**Attachments H/W  
7 Progress Reports**

**Distribution:  
2 - WH/C W/Atts.**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

DATE TYPED

**6 Jan. 67**

DATE DISPATCHED

**JAN - 9 1967**

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

**UFGA-26713**

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

**S E C R E T**

MEMORANDUM

29 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : PW/MONESTIER

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMMOP - Progress Report  
1 October - 31 December 1966

WPW - 1269

Distribution

4 - COS  
1 - PW/MONESTIER  
1 - PW/Chrono  
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS


1. AMMOP maintained contact with party leaders throughout the hemisphere during the quarter. The majority of the correspondence was handled by ANCRIB/1, the leader of the youth wing, who was informed by the JUDCA secretary-general, both during his October visit and in subsequent correspondence, that the AMMOP youth wing was performing effective work and that a JUDCA study on AMMOP activities would be forthcoming. The JUDCA secretary-general favors the incorporation of the AMMOP youth sector into his organization.

2. AMMOP youth published two bulletins on their activities along with an interesting summary on the activities of their counterparts in other countries, which was mailed to a list of contacts and correspondents. Several party officials in other countries have requested to be placed on the AMMOP mailing lists, an indication that AMMOP is becoming more widely recognized as a representative political movement.

3. The AMMOP youth group has also organized a series of seminars which attracted from 30-35 participants during the quarter. The purpose, in addition to offering discussions on such subjects as politics, labor and agriculture, was to promote more group unity and to draw new sources of talent.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

4. During the quarter, expenses totaled \$2,075.77. This sum included monthly support to AMMOP, and salary and operational expenses of ANCRIB/1. This compares with a budget allocation of \$3,750 for the reporting period.



SECRET

- 2 -

**C. PROBLEMS**

5. The difficulties in the operation of the AMMOP project are due largely to the lack of effective leadership and initiative. The AMMOP youth wing is operating with reasonable effectiveness within its sphere but is hampered by the lack of active JUDCA membership.

**D. FUTURE PLANS**

6. Additional seminars are projected for the next quarter. Both AMMOP and its youth sector will maintain active correspondence to gain recognition as knowledgeable and active groups. In addition, future AMMOP activities will be aimed at creating a more cohesive organizational structure, attracting responsible leadership talent to the organization, and gaining greater recognition and possible financial support and guidance from the Parent International Movement.

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

23 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station

WPW - 1265

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

Distribution

SUBJECT : TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMKNOT - Progress Report  
1 October - 31 December 1966

4 - COS  
1 - PW/MARCHBANK  
1 - PW/Chrono  
1 - RI Chrono

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. The AMKNOT organization continued during the quarter under review with its program of assisting Cuban merchant mariners who have defected from their service. Fifteen different cases were handled during this period which included five resettlement cases in areas other than JMWAVE. Billets at sea were found for two more--one as a first mate and one as a third mate. The remaining eight received assistance in obtaining employment or what might be called administrative aid--assistance in obtaining social security numbers, etc.

2. Processing continued for those interested in employment by the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). Progress in obtaining the necessary U.S. Coast Guard certification is slow and of the four that applied for this during the previous quarter only two had received the certification by the end of the current quarter. During this quarter two more former Cuban merchant officers sought through AMKNOT this certification as they expressed interest in MSTS employment. The current status is: In process--6; Coast Guard certifications received--2; physical examinations given (and passed)--4. In addition, applications for employment together with the Coast Guard certifications and completed physical examination forms were forwarded 28 December to the cover company in Baltimore for 2. The remainder will be forwarded as the Coast Guard certifications are received.

3. The activities of the AMKNOT organization continue to receive publicity. The Station has four clips from different papers including one from El Universal of Caracas. AMKNOT issued one press release during this quarter which was an "eyewitness" account of the attempt of four Cuban sailors to obtain political asylum in the Canary Islands. In fact, this was a letter mailed to AMKNOT by GUSPOT-2 and signed in pseudonym. The story was picked up by Diario Las Americas in its 15 December issue.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET

- 2 -

## B. ADMINISTRATION

4. The AMKNOT organization remains constituted as reported in the previous Quarterly Report. However, in December AMASK-1 was offered a permanent position as personnel director of a local shoe company that employs some four hundred people. His starting salary will be \$475.00 per month which will be increased after the first three months and increased again after the second three months. The Station concurred with AMASK-1 that he accept for these reasons: (1) The AMKNOT position is not permanent, (2) it appears that AMASK-1 will be terminated when AMKNOT is closed, (3) this position should solve AMASK-1's personal financial problems, and (4) AMASK-1 has agreed to remain as chairman of AMKNOT without salary and to continue to lend his name to the organization. The Station expects to replace AMASK-1 with AMPOLISH-1 who appears qualified to handle the hand-holding and housekeeping aspects of AMKNOT. AMPOLISH-1 is presently employed by a local automobile dealer and is able to take the necessary time off to handle the AMKNOT matters. We see three advantages to this development: (1) The Station will be spared a possible disposal situation when AMKNOT is closed (it has been made clear to AMPOLISH-1 that this is a temporary assignment that at the most will last for a few months), (2) We have offered AMPOLISH-1 \$200.00 per month versus \$390.00 for AMASK-1, and (3) AMASK-1 should be in an excellent position to offer at least temporary employment in the shoe factory to mariners to come.

5. An estimated total of \$2,505.00 was spent during this quarter. This amount represents AMASK-1's salary and allowances, office expenses, and English instruction for those seeking MSTTS employment. Expenses by month were: October, \$855.00; November, \$825.00; and December (estimated), \$825.00. The allotment for this activity for the quarter was \$3,000.00.

## C. PROBLEMS

6. The chief problem of the period was caused by the antics of Raul QUINTANA Ruiz who jumped ship in New Orleans after a run-in with the ship's captain and after difficulties with the Immigration and Naturalization Service over the lack of proper documentation to re-enter the country. QUINTANA has been resettled in California, though we may not have heard the last from him; AMASK-1 recently received a letter from QUINTANA which said that QUINTANA was about to sue the shipping line that had employed him for back salary and loss of personal effects that QUINTANA claims the captain had locked up. AMASK-1 was advised to ignore the letter in view of the difficulties already caused and in view of his potential for further trouble (see paragraphs 2 and 3 of JMWAVE-3990).

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- 3 -

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

7. The Station currently plans that AMPOLISH-1 will assume his duties with AMKNOT on 2 January 1967 as this is the date AMASK-1 will join the shoe company. AMKNOT will continue processing applications of those interested in MSTIS employment and will encourage additional applications from those that appear qualified and interested. Also, AMKNOT, of course, will receive all defecting mariners that appear in the area and will continue to encourage, where it can, additional defections.

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MEMORANDUM

19 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station  
FROM : PW/MARCHBANK  
SUBJECT : TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMCROW - Progress Report  
1 October-31 December 1966

WPW-1261

Distribution  
4-COS  
1-PW/MARCHBANK  
1-PW/Chrono  
1-REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. As reported in the previous Progress Report the AMCROW offices were closed and all personnel were terminated except for AMCROW-14. Thus there were no operational activities. However, the Station requested AMCROW-14 to send President Leoni of Venezuela a cable congratulating him upon the action the Venezuelan Government took against the leftists operating from the Central University of Caracas. The cable was sent 15 December and was signed by AMCROW-14 in his capacity as a former PBRUMEN cabinet officer. This was in response to paragraph 2 of Caracas 5482.

B. ADMINISTRATION

2. AMCROW-14 continued to receive his termination pay of \$425 per month. The final payment will be made 31 December.

3. A total of \$1,349.25 was spent by AMCROW for the quarter ending 31 December which represents salary for AMCROW-14 @ \$425.00 per month plus a payment of \$74.25 to the state unemployment fund.

C. PROBLEMS

4. There were no problems during this quarter. AMCROW-14 has apparently accepted the fact that he will be terminated 31 December.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

5. There are no plans for the next quarter as this activity will cease with the final payment to AMCROW-14 on 31 December 1966.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

30 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : PW/FABSIX

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMBASAL - Progress Report  
1 October - 31 December 1966

WPW - 1273

Distribution  
4 - COS  
1 - PW/FABSIX  
1 - PW/Chrono  
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. Printed Propaganda - During the period under review this operation produced a total of 4,513 pieces of written propaganda for distribution as follows:

- a. Cuba : 500 copies of the AMBASAL newsletter;
- b. Latin America : 4,000 copies of the AMBASAL bulletin;
- c. Press Releases: 13 releases dealing with such subjects as the treatment of political prisoners, executions, violations of legal and human rights, etc. These releases were the bases for reports that appeared in Diario Las Americas and in the AMHIM bulletin.

2. Correspondence with International Organizations - Correspondence was maintained and exchanged with the International Commission of Jurists, the American Fund for Free Jurists, and the UN and OAS International Commissions of Human Rights. The subject matter of this correspondence was identical with the subjects mentioned in paragraph 1c above.

3. Impact - In an effort to focus attention on the Cuban political prisoners issue, AMBASAL/1 prepared a 15 page document on this subject which he presented in person in October 1966 to the Human Rights Commission of the OAS. The president of the commission told AMBASAL/1 that this document was the best he had seen on the subject and the commission, after discussion, agreed to continue efforts to get permission to travel to Cuba to investigate the charges contained in the document. AMBASAL/1 also visited the UN Human Rights Commission, the Interamerican Federation of Lawyers, the American Fund for Free Jurists, and the president of the International Red Cross. All in all, the effort to focus attention on the political prisoners issue was successful and resulted in wire service, radio, and press coverage. A total of 23 clippings, dealing with AMBASAL/1's activities in this regard, was sent to Headquarters.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET

- 2 -

4. Radio - The weekly AMBASAL radio programs were carried by JMHOPF and tapes of each program were sent to SWBULL/1 for re-broadcast. The content of these programs was in line with the juridical nature of the AMBASAL organization, although editorial comment was frequently made on current themes not specifically related to the legal field.

**B. ADMINISTRATION**

5. The 1967 fiscal year budget for AMBASAL is \$43,000.00. On a quarterly basis the allotted figure is \$10,750.00. During this quarter AMBASAL expenses amounted to \$11,760.72, a total of \$1,010.72 in excess of the allotted figure. Of the overall quarterly expenses of \$11,760.72, agent salaries accounted for \$7,000.00, radio expenses amounted to \$1,901.72 and \$2,859.00 was spent on printed propaganda, operational travel, and miscellaneous office expenses. Total operational expenses for the first six months of FY 1967 were \$23,987.28, an excess of \$2,487.28 over the \$21,500.00 allocated for the first half of the fiscal year.

**C. PROBLEMS**

6. Termination of the principal agent may be difficult. Consideration is being given to the possible future use of AMBASAL/1 as a singleton agent. The alternative is to assist him in finding suitable employment; a difficult task given his age (42), complete lack of English, and aspects of his personality and character.

7. We do not anticipate any other problems relative to the termination of this operation. The AMBASAL newsletters sent to Cuba were stopped with the October issue and the monthly bulletin with the November issue. Four of the AMBASAL personnel were terminated 31 December and the radio programs were stopped in December.

**D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER**

8. Three AMBASAL employees will be terminated effective 31 January 1967 and the AMBASAL office will be closed during that month. It is planned to permit AMBASAL/1 to retain some of the equipment now in his office to encourage him in his plans to continue to operate on a scaled-down, independent basis. We will continue to pay a monthly salary to AMBASAL/1 through March 1967 while attempting to solve his personal situation discussed in the preceding section.

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MEMORANDUM

27 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : PW/RUBASH

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMLIRA - Progress Report  
1 October - 31 December 1966

WPW - 1266

Distribution  
4 - COS  
1 - PW/RUBASH  
1 - PW/Chrono  
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the second quarter of FY 1967 the AMLIRA group compiled a file of newspaper clippings concerning the political occurrences involving the Cuban delegation during the tenth Central American and Caribbean games held in Puerto Rico during June 1966. This file was sent in October to Mr. Avery BRUNDAGE, president of the International Olympic Committee, with the request that the file be brought to the attention of the IOC at the next meeting of that body for whatever action might be deemed appropriate.

2. Significant AMLIRA correspondence included the following:


a. A letter to each member of the Special Consultation Committee on Security of the OAS pointing out the use made by Communist governments, specifically Cuba, of sports for propaganda and political ends.

b. A letter from the Argentine representative on the IOC in which he acknowledges receipt of a tape with recorded inflammatory remarks by Jose LLANUSA, the head of the Cuban delegation at the CA and Caribbean games in Puerto Rico. In the letter the Argentine representative deplores such action as a violation of Olympic principles. This ties in with the action taken as indicated in paragraph (1) above.

c. A letter to the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior protesting the visit of Venezuelan athletes to Cuba at the same time as Cuba is inciting terrorists to action inside Venezuela.

3. Approximately 5000 copies of the AMLIRA magazine were printed each month during the period under review. They were distributed by news stand sale in Miami, New York and Puerto Rico; through various sports organizations in Latin America and Spain and by distribution as reading material on several Latin American airlines. The AMLIRA magazine provides international sports editorials of MRSPAWN value which are of specific interest to Latin American readership. Articles of propaganda significance which

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- 2 -

appeared during this past quarter included: A story on Negro athletes in the U.S. refuting a Cuban claim that there was discrimination in the selection of the U.S. Olympic team; an article on the disqualification of a Cuban woman athlete because "she did not conform to the revolutionary principles of the sports movement in Communist Cuba" and an article which refutes the Cuban claim that Cuba won the tenth Central American and Caribbean games.

4. During the quarter the AMLIRA group issued several press releases concerning sports-newsworthy events involving Cuba and continued the regular five minute radio programs which are heard thirty times each week on Radio Americas beamed to Cuba and on WHIE in Miami. In addition the AMLIRA organization provided recorded tapes of sports interviews and commentary to 58 independent radio stations in Puerto Rico and 14 countries in Central and South America.

#### B. ADMINISTRATIVE

5. During the second quarter of FY 67 the AMLIRA organization expended \$17,300 and had income of some \$600 from news stand sales and advertising. Both these figures are approximate projections because the final December figures are not recorded at this writing. The net figure for expenditures during the quarter (some \$16,700) exceeds the budgeted amount by approximately \$400. However, this overage will be absorbed in further budgetary cutbacks during the next reporting period.

6. The AMLIRA activity expenditures also exceeded the budget allowance during the last quarter. To remedy this situation the following specific economy measures will go into effect beginning 1 January 1967:

- a. One salaried employee will be dropped.  
Monthly saving....\$250
- b. Publication of monthly pamphlets with selected offprints from the AMLIRA magazine will be discontinued.... Approx. monthly saving....\$400  
\$650

It is expected that there will be other savings which will bring the total quarterly reduction in spending to about \$2500.

#### C. PROBLEMS

7. There are no major unresolved problems involving the AMLIRA activity.

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SECRET

- 3 -

**D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER**

8. It is probable that the next World Baseball Championships sponsored by the International Baseball Federation will be held in Colombia. An effort will be made by the AMLIRA group to mount an operation aimed at assuring the denial of an invitation to participate in these championships to the Cuban team.

9. The AMLIRA group is preparing propaganda materials for use in a campaign to try to influence the sports authorities in the Caribbean and Central American countries not to allow their national teams to attend the Weight Lifting Championships to be held during 1967 in Cuba.

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MEMORANDUM

3 January 1966

TO : Chief of Station

WPW - 1276

FROM : PW/RUBASH

Distribution

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL ✓  
AMSTRUT-2 - Progress Report  
1 October - 31 December 1966

4 - COS  
1 - PW/RUBASH  
1 - PW/Chrono  
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS


1. On 9 October 1966 AMSTRUT-2 spoke in New York before an audience of approximately 2600 persons on the occasion of the anniversary of Cuban Independence (Grito de Yara). The gathering was sponsored by AMICK. The audience response was enthusiastic and the press services (AP, UPI, AFP) issued wire releases on the AMSTRUT-2 statements which included a denunciation of Fidel CASTRO as a "hangman of his own people" and a "lackey of international Communism".

2. During October AMSTRUT-2 was interviewed by Henry GOETHALS of the Copley News Service. The article resulting from the interview was a sympathetic recounting of the AMSTRUT-2 activities on behalf of the cause of a free Cuba with specific mention of the AMSTRUT-2 book which is in preparation and the constant readiness of AMSTRUT-2 to travel, speak and work for the cause.

3. During November the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation made a contribution of \$464 for visa and medical costs involved in the travel of a group of Cuban exiles from Jamaica to the United States.

4. The AMSTRUT-2 weekly radio spot on AMTHIGH continued without schedule change during the quarter. Significant themes included: comments on the degraded role of women in the Communist state compared with that in the free world; reference to the myth of Communist unity as revealed by the split between the ChiComs and the USSR; mention of the possibility that Cubans will be sent to North Viet Nam to fight and die; comment on the treatment of prisoners in Cuba and the UMAP and editorial comment on the visit of Paul CASTRO and President DORTICOS to Moscow with the statement that Fidel CASTRO did not go because he did not dare leave the island. This latter comment inspired considerable press play locally as well as by the wire services.

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- 2 -

## B. ADMINISTRATION

5. During the second quarter of FY-67 there were expenditures of approximately \$19,000 by the AMSTRUT-2 activity. This figure includes an estimate for the month of December because the final figures have not been received at this writing. The budgeted amount for AMSTRUT-2 for the quarter is \$24,000 and there is an excess of budget authorization over expenditures of approximately \$5000. This figure, however, gives an unreal budgetary picture of the AMSTRUT-2 activity. This \$5000 will remain as a part of the budget allotment and may well be expended in a flurry of AMSTRUT-2 travel, publication activity and/or promotion during the next quarter. In other words the excess does not represent budget "fat" since the bulk of the AMSTRUT-2 expenses are not figured as month to month constants but obligated as the operational situation demands.

6. During December AMSTRUT-2 moved into a smaller house with a lower rent which will mean a saving of \$100 per month. In addition, it is anticipated that a further saving will be realized in maintenance and upkeep costs.

## C. PROBLEMS

7. The basic agent-handling problem presented by AMSTRUT-2's mercurial disposition, excessive generosity and understandable emotional approach to the role which must be played before the public still exists. However, it seems to have lessened somewhat as AMSTRUT-2 gains confidence in the language and in dealings with the public. There is little question that a contributing factor to the lessening of this problem is the reliance placed by AMSTRUT-2 on AMLYRIC-1 who serves as business advisor, buffer and hand-holder.

8. The problem of projecting the image of the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation as an independent charitable organization remains. The application for tax exempt status to the state of registry is in the works and when this application is approved it is likely that there will be an increase of private donations which, because of the new status, will be tax deductible. The problem lies in the dilatory behavior of the state authorities.

9. AMSTRUT-2 continues to be attractive to certain extremist political groups whose patriotic claims of objectives would often appear to parallel those of AMSTRUT-2 and the Cuban exile community as a whole. AMSTRUT-2 has not always been able to sort out the "good guys" from the "bad guys" and the problem lies in fending off these extremist groups and preventing them from exploiting AMSTRUT-2 for partisan political ends.

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- 3 -

**D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER**

10. AMLYRIC-1 has been in negotiation with a group of organizations at Harvard University which wish to sponsor an AMSTRUT-2 appearance there. The tentative plan at this writing is for AMSTRUT-2 to appear during the first part of calendar 1967.

11. The ghost-written AMSTRUT-2 book on AMTHUG-1 should be ready for first reading at least sometime during the next quarter.

12. It is planned to have AMSTRUT-2 prepare a rebuttal (probably to be ghost-written by AMLYRIC-1) to the interview with Fidel CASTRO which appeared in the January issue of Playboy magazine.

13. Further speaking engagements and tours by AMSTRUT-2 are being planned for the next reporting period. It is also planned that, with the official approval of the tax-exempt status of the Foundation, an extensive fund raising campaign will be launched to provide working capital and funding cover for operational activities as well as humanitarian and social welfare programs in consonance with the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation charter.

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**SECRET**

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSCROLL  
Possible Defection Lead

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We enclose herewith a reproduction of a letter dated Havana, 29 November 1966 that was received by AMSCROLL. We believe that the letter, signed "Carlos", was written by [redacted] <sup>11-201</sup> *at Cuba* Manager of the International Department of the National Bank of Cuba. We say this *potential def* as in early November AMSCROLL mailed a copy of its newsletter *defector* to [redacted] using as a return address the one used by the writer of this letter; this combination of name and return address was not used by AMSCROLL in its other mailings. The Station had obtained [redacted] name and position in the National Bank from a refugee debriefing report.

2. There are no Station traces [redacted] However, the tone of the letter is friendly and it might therefore be useful to index this information in the event that [redacted] should travel abroad.

3. The Station examined the envelope for evidence of tampering. None was found, though this is not conclusive.

MICROFILMED  
JAN 13 1967  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

for *Rose & Mancham*  
Philip G. Elvard

Attachment:  
As stated, hw

Distribution:  
3-WH/C, w/att, hw

*19-120-26*  
*19-119/3*  
*19-120-26*

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DATE TYPED 4 JAN 66  
DATE DISPATCHED JAN - 9 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-26689

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

1 att.

*28*

MICROFILMED  
JAN 13 1967  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRANSLATION

Havana, November 29, 1966.

Mr. Rafael Brevil  
P.O. Box 3940  
Miami, Fla.

Dear friend:

Several days ago I received the book which you were so kind as to send me, something I am thankful for.

Although finding it interesting, I would appreciate that you stop sending me this type of literature to the Bank, since it might be harmful to me.

Accept appreciation from your friend,

"Carlos."

CS COPY

-1-

att. to UFGA-26689

*19-120-26*  
~~*19-6-11913*~~  
*19-120-26*

*copy  
check*

La Habana, Noviembre 29, 1966

Sr. Rafael Brevil  
P.O. Box 3940  
Miami, Fla.

Estimado amigo:

Hace unos días recibí el libro que tuviste la  
gentileza de remitirme, por lo que te doy las  
gracias.

No obstante lo interesante que lo encontré, te  
agradeceré no me envíes más ese tipo de lite-  
ratura al Banco, pues puede perjudicarme.

Recibe afectos de tu amigo,

*Carlos*

C/NE

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	SECRET	PROPOSED	ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief of Station, Athens	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MARKEE FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, NE; Chief, WH	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	<input type="checkbox"/>	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	TYPIC MHVIPER/AMSCROLL	<input type="checkbox"/>	ABSTRACT
	<input type="radio"/> Letters Regarding Greek Shipping and Cuba	<input type="checkbox"/>	MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
Action: FYI			
<p>The economic research unit of AMSCROLL has throughout the past year received seven anonymous letters from Athens. These letters describe in detail Greek and Lebanese shipping with Cuba and appear to have been written by someone knowledgeable of his subject. The author apparently has access to AMSCROLL publications as he makes reference to "your circulars". We forward a set of these letters by separate cover as they may be of interest and of possible use. The AMSCROLL shipping studies have made a veiled acknowledgment of receipt of this material by referring to information received from friends in Greece; however, AMSCROLL has used only those facts that we can check out here. As indicated on certain of the letters, copies of various ones have been sent to the "Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington"; the U.S. Ambassador, London; or the U.S. Ambassador, Athens. A copy of the last letter received by AMSCROLL was sent all three.</p>			
Philip G. ELMARD			
<u>Distribution</u> 3 - COS/Athens w/att USC ✓ 2 - C/NE w/o att 1 cc w/att f.d. to NEAR/L & 1 cc w/att f.d. to NEGTL/G 2 - WH/C w/att USC att'd RI/AN			
<u>Attachment</u> Letters			
1 att.		19-120-26	
CS COPY!		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
		5 Jan 1967	JAN - 6 1967
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
		UFGA-26699	
CLASSIFICATION		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
SECRET		19-120-26/3	

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bu. 1,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
10 S.E. 9th Street,  
MIAMI, Fla. USA

Last week we wrote you few notes regarding illegal Cuban trading also that the Greek Authorities, no doubt through USA pressure (AT LAST), are now investigating... names of ships and Owners who have been trading with Cuba illegally since 1963. There is now quite a lot of propaganda going on that these investigations will be expedited through the Harbour Masters in Greece, and Consular Authorities in ports outside Greece. This news is of course to please USA, and to send to sleep those who know nothing about the business, ordinary public opinion. As we said before nothing much will be done, except some isolated, probably, cases, mostly of small Owners, to just please USA etc., In fact, nothing will be done, because the Greek Authorities will firstly have to punish THEMSELVES before they can punish the Owners, Captains etc., mainly for the following reasons:

1. The Greek Authorities know at all times where Greek ships are trading, through their special Departments. They knew and know where the ships were and are, and have never done anything about it.
2. If in any special cases they did not know themselves, they knew it through your circulars, also through the Black lists issued by the USA Authorities.
- 3 Many ships arrived or sailed, or called for bunkers and supplies through Greek ports (or ports abroad with Greek Consular Authorities attending), and obtained clearance papers for Cuba or cleared having arrived from Cuba. Not a word was said about it.
4. AND MOST IMPORTANT.

Greek ships, by special law, pay Income Tax, nothing on profits as other industries, but on each charter party voyage, whether ordinary voyage or timecharter. They pay a percentage ranging from 1 1/2 to 4 1/2 on the gross freight or hire, depending on the age of the ship (excluding new ships up to five years old paying nothing. Tax is payable in six monthly periods. When the Income Tax Return is submitted to the Inland Revenue, Collector of Taxes (under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, the following Documents are submitted and attached to the Returns.

- A/. The CHARTER PARTY (properly certified).
- B/. Freight Statement showing exact details of freight rate, tons of cargo carried under that charter party, and the total freight (gross) earned and upon which the tax percentage is payable.
- C/ Sworn deposition of the Owners that all documents submitted are correct and true, again confirming the gross earnings of the voyage, which voyage must be explained in detail, port loaded, port discharged, dates, duration etc.,
- D/ MASTERS LOG BOOK, duly certified by the Harbour Master or Greek Consular Authority, if vessel abroad at the time, (this under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine)

s/c att. to UFGA-26699

CS COPY

19-120-26

It will be observed that in addition to all other sources of information, the Ministry of Finance (Inland Revenue), and the Ministry of

Mercantile Marine, were specifically advised, on each occasion, upon each voyage, by the Owners themselves, for the purpose of paying tax, the Authorities having been, and being very strict, in ensuring that no delay took place in submitting the Returns, and paying Tax. Anyone can, therefore, see who is the first and biggest lawbreaker. Obviously, the Greek Authorities first, and the Owners second. As we said previously, fabulous profits have been made by the lawbreakers—the Owners (mostly the friends of officials, and mainly Frangitas clique) but such profits were partly shared by the Government, through higher tax percentage. If there was no illegal Cuban trading really permitted, these Greek ships would be employed in other trades, with small profits, and less tax to pay. We really feel that the USA is to blame because they were warned a very long time ago, almost soon after the law breaking had commenced, and several times afterwards, and through you, but nothing was done about it and allowed the comedy to continue. Officials almost openly say here that the USA did not really think that trading ~~was~~ stop because the prohibitive law was passed in 1963 and that they knew that the law was passed only for politics and not to be enforced. Whether this is true or not, only the USA know. It is also said now, the Greek Authorities do not mind NOT starting enforcing the law, since Cuban trade has been restricted through the low price obtainable for sugar (about \$14 per ton), and the economic difficulties of Cuba, thus also restricting imports into Cuba. Meantime of course millions and millions of dollars have been made from past trading, and for partly present trading, which enabled their chief partner and collaborators FRANGITAS clique to build a vast empire of ships, so not much harm can be done even if they stop it now. There is no doubt, the USA have been very unfair and unjust to law abiding citizens. The USA should either have demanded that both Greece and Lebanon (who made the laws in return no doubt of USA help to these countries) comply with their Agreement with the USA and enforce the prohibitive laws of their respective countries, or relieve them of the obligation and cancelling the laws, so that all Greek and Lebanon Owners had the same chance of trading. USA's attitude in doing nothing about it, really makes them as guilty as the other two countries. You will find, we are sure, that all the information we gave you in our previous and several reports, was correct and substantiated. All we have to say now is that any charters which allegedly are still valid because they were made before the prohibitive laws are as fake, as the investigations and punishments the Greek Officials are supposed to be making against the law breakers. You will see how true also these will prove to be, unless the USA, if they want to, really investigate themselves the investigators, with all the precise details we have given you in past reports, and the present. We repeat, if nothing else, the USA owe it to the law abiding Owners, to investigate the matter themselves, with their officials, and top men (including the examination of all Income Tax Returns as we said above), and see to it that law breakers, all of them small and big, are punished, and flags withdrawn, and all further trading is stopped immediately. It will, generally, do the USA good, if they were to prove to the World, people and Governments, even their friends and Allies, that the USA sees to it that agreements made with them must be kept and that they allow no doublecrossing and deceit.

cc Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington.

U.S.A. Embassy, London.

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bureau,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
10 S.E. 9th Street,  
Miami, Fla. Usa.

Last year we gave you information and full details of vessels under GREEK and LEBANON flags which continued, and still CONTINUE trading with Cuba, the biggest and most influential of them being FRANGISTAS, trading under both flags. We told you last year that we did not think Frangistas would stop trading. He has not. Only recently when a group of loyal and lawful Greek Owners took the matter to Greek Parliament, the U.S.A. Authorities appeared to wake up and demanded that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should ask the Minister of Mercantile Marine to produce a list of Owners still trading with Cuba. How come that a Greek Minister of Mercantile Marine should have a list, a very long list, of Greek ships still trading with Cuba, and yet he had done nothing about to stop the illegal trading, in contravention of his laws. Few months ago, few small Owners, the small fish of course, were asked to show where their ships had been trading, knowing of course they had been trading with Cuba. The local Courts were still "making enquiries". Nothing was done naturally about Frangistas, whoeh is responsible for about 90% of the whole movements. How can he be prosecuted, by his partners, since it is more than obvious and clear that whatever he does has the blessing of the Authorities, both in Greece and in Lebanon. Frangistas has been openly boasting, and he has proved his point, that the laws of Greece and Lebanon, only apply to ordinary individuals, not to HIM. We do not know what the Minister's list is, but we shall not be surprised if that list contains only a fraction of his movements, and he will no doubt say that he has not fixed any ship at all since the law was passed in 1963 but that his contract was signed before the law. Of course he will. Any contract can be faked and back-dated, with the connivance of the Charterers. The only contract Frangistas had was with the Russians and the Russians never make contracts for more than one year. He has signed several contracts with the Russians since 1963. But let us forget about the Russians for a moment. Did he also have MANY years contracts with the Poles, with the Hungarians, the Czechoslovakians, Bulgarians, the Germans, the Chinese, the Syrians, the French, the Dutch, all Scandinavians, etc., All the sugar in the World, and hundreds of ships would not be enough to cover these, had there been contracts. No, all his cargoes to Cuba and from Cuba (with possibly few cargoes with the Russians carried latest few months after the law) were contracted after the law, and were fixed in the open markets a cargo or two or three at a time, either direct with the countries concerned or via London, and his ships have appeared in Freight lists on the day they were fixed, in competition with other Owners and flags. If you or the USA Authorities were to appoint a reputable Chartering Broker in London, he would tell you exactly upon which date, what quantity, what destination, what rate of freight, each cargo was contracted. Why do not you ask the Greek and Lebanon Authorities to demand that he produces a list of his 36 vessels with all their logbooks, the charter parties, the timesheets, the freight statements, and banking receipts and let all these be examined by the London Broker, not the Greek or Lebanon Authorities who cover his illegal trading. And what about the Cubans. Did Frangistas also have very long contracts with the Cubans, signed before the law in 1963, and are still valid and unexpired? Is this why Frangistas was in Havana at at end of last year, and again beginning of this year, when he fixed six liberties on timecharter for 9) 12 ~~XXXXXX~~ months, commencing early in 1966, and did he also fix the EPHYCHIA for three years timecharter with the Cubans, during his visit in Havana as stated above, before the law was passed in 1963, bearing in mind that the vessel was built by the Russians at the end of 1965? Do you know that Frangistas is still negotiating with the Cubans, and Russians for the fixing of the 35 further ships the Russians will be building for him. Do you know that next January, the new sugar season starts, and that he already is in touch

with private Charterers, not the Russians or Cubans, for the fixing of his older tonnage, the Liberties? This takes place at a time that Greek and possibly Lebanon Authorities are supposed to be prosecuting him for his past sins. This is how much notice he takes of the Authorities. Dozens of Masters, Officers etc., including Frangistas are supposed to be in prison, to have paid huge fines, and to have lost their flags, in accordance with the provisions of the law. To our knowledge no one has been imprisoned, no one has paid fines, no flag has been withdrawn, and any time you want Frangistas do not look for him in his office. He will not be there. He has no time for office, he is too busy with the Authorities in Athens or Lebanon. Well, no one could ever imagine that the USA Authorities would continue to be taken for a ride, and to continue giving their aid to countries which use it against them. May be this is the American Policy, who knows. The USA did in fact say recently that unless Cuban trading is stopped, they would stop their aid. Firstly, is this enough, does it mean they do not mind for trading so far, so long as further trading is stopped, which will clear up and justify all Frangistas past sins? And secondly, we are certain, Frangistas, will find the way, to continue trading. Who is to stop him. The Americans obviously cannot, the Greeks and Lebanese will not, therefore the Show goes on. Which means CRIME DOES PAY, and stupid those who think otherwise. As before, it is regretted that we have to write to you again anonymously, and hope you forgive us. May be in your usual very informative circulars you can make your comments.

Economic Research Bureau,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
10 S.E. 9th Street,  
Miami, Fla. U.S.A.

### CUBAN TRADING

We expected by now some action from your end or from the American Authorities to whom we had sent our previous copied communication to you (Washington, Foreign Ministry, and U.S.A. Embassy, London), but regret that, at least to our knowledge, no action has been taken yet, and we assume this by virtue of the fact that the ships we mentioned previously just carry on the voyages for which have been fixed, and their Owners openly negotiate further similar business from Cuba, as most of the trade to Cuba is presently done by Red flag ships. However, we supplement our previous letter by giving you some additional information.

- A. Some Merchants in Cuban Trading, but mainly D. Enree, of Paris and Genes fix vessels or large contracts, with a long list of options as to where the cargo will be discharged, as often cargoes are shipped and not sold until after shipment and sailing of the vessel from loading port. These options start from Casablanca/Continent and continue into all Mediterranean/Red Sea/P.Gulf/India/Colombo/Malaya ports, sometimes as far as Japan, freight rate depending at which port cargo is discharged, and final orders are usually given seven days after sailing from Cuba. As stated, the Lebanon Authorities ostensibly allow Lebanon flag ships to carry these cargoes to Arab Countries only, always subject to license. Owners apply for such license for Arab countries, and then if the Merchant orders the ship to say Italy or Germany or Japan, the ship just carries the cargo. Some Owners just do not apply for a license at all, and the Lebanon Authorities know what goes on, but turns the other way.
- B. Greek and Lebanon flag ships just carry on trade in Cuba, and if you say they do not, then either you do not know about it, or they must camouflage their flags, or must fake (as regards eventual destination) their documents, such as charter parties, Bills of Lading, manifests etc., Even the number of ships trading in Cuba, given in your circulars, is not correct, it is much larger, maybe you do this intentionally for political reasons or maybe because you do not know.
- C. Both the Greek and Lebanon Governments are in a position, in accordance with their famous laws, to stop immediately any ship, to take the flag away, and to impose upon the Owners very heavy fines and if the Owners do not pay the fines, then the ship will be immobilised since the Government will refuse cancellation of registry certificate, meaning that the ship cannot be put in another flag, and therefore, become virtually non-existent. They can do lots of things, these Governments, but only if they want to and only if they want to apply their laws. To our knowledge, and we can assure you, we are very well informed, no such thing has taken place, no ship has been stopped and no one has been fined, and maybe, and mostly likely, will never be.
- D. Whilst Owners we mentioned in our previous letter continue business as usual, and others, we notice with some surprise, that you are continuously complaining and mentioning the name of Tsavlis firm. Whereas we naturally condemn and deplore this firm's continuation of this trade, let us also be just and fair. This firm at least continues in a lawful manner, since they are sending only ships with flags whose Governments permit such trading in an unrestricted manner. So this firm are not law breakers, whatever else they can be accused of. On the contrary, you do not mention names of other Owners, who among other things are also law breakers and amongst them the biggest and most influential.

is Frangistas, of Lisbon and Athens, represented by Purvis, London, having at his disposal some 35 Greek and Lebanon flag ships, trading mostly in Cuba. Frangistas is also the sole importer of Russian timber into Greece, a huge trade. Also this same firm made an agreement with the Soviet Union a few months ago and by virtue of this Agreement, the Soviet Union has commenced building for his fleet cargo ships, bulk carriers, tankers, and deepsea fishing Trawlers, at present worth \$ 150.000.000, against Greek products, and some of these ships ( Greek flag) will find their way to Cuba, we are almost sure.

E. Meantime some of the existing Greek and Lebanon flag Cuban traders were purchased with loans, through their Governments, and these Governments in turn received and receive help from the U.S.A., so in a vicious circle, some of the American money has gone for the purchase of ships to help trade with Castro's Cuba, whilst millions of American money is spent to stop this trade. What a world we live in.

F. It must be very obvious to you that many people, watchful people, intelligent and influential, know what goes on, and will continue to watch things until, it is hoped, this mockery is stopped. It is also obvious that somewhere in one or more places, bribery and corruption are taking place, otherwise this state of affairs could not have started and cannot continue. We do not wish to believe that the American Authorities do not know what goes. If Greek and Lebanon officials are bribed to close their eyes, O.K. but who stops the American Authorities to "box the ears" of the Greek and Lebanon Authorities for allowing this situation to continue, and in so doing, they breaking firstly the laws of their respective Countries, and breaking whatever agreement they have with the U.S.A. Government, and, what is more, with the American Taxpayers money.

G. We do not intend continuing these letters, we think we have said enough and that we have given you and American Authorities sufficient information which can be checked and verified. What we now want is results, namely, complete and instant stoppage of all Greek and Lebanon flag ships trading with Cuba, otherwise you will find that one after another many other Owners, small and large companies will re-enter, or enter Cuban trading with Greek and Lebanon flag ships, and no one should dare to condemn them. Also, do not forget that there are plenty of Companies which do not trade with U.S.A. anyway, therefore blacklisting is not of any importance.

Apologies again for the anonymity of this letter, and trust our reasons for it will be appreciated, especially when our facts are checked and found correct.

C.S.P

Ministry Foreign Affairs, Washington.

U.S.A. Embassy, London.

American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.

919 18th Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20006

ALVIN SHAPIRO  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT



296-4450

EARLE C. CLEMENTS  
WASHINGTON CONSULTANT

December 1, 1965

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vasquez  
Secretary for Economic and  
Professional Affairs  
Movimiento Unidad Revolucionaria  
10 SE 9 Street  
Miami, Florida

Dear Dr. Rivas-Vasquez:

In response to your letter of November 19th, concerning Greek and Lebanese shipping to Red Cuba ports, I am enclosing some information I have obtained which should fulfill your requirements. In the case of the Lebanese Directives, you will note that no specific reference is made to shipping to Cuba.

Despite the fact that the enclosed information is not classified or restricted, it was obtained from a sensitive source and I would appreciate it if you would handle this matter discreetly.

We have been very pleased with the information your organization has been providing us concerning shipments to Cuba.

I hope that the data provided will be helpful to you.

Very sincerely yours,

*Chester J. Szychlinski*  
Chester J. Szychlinski  
Director of Research

Attachment

S No.

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bureau,  
United Revolutionaries,  
10 , S. E. 9th Street,  
Miami , Fla. USA.

We wrote you few days ago about the illegal Cuban trading and we now enclose herewith cutting from today's, 5th November 1966, Piraeus Newspaper "NAUTILIA EXPRESS" from which you will observe that action is now being taken (three years too late and after millions of tons of cargo has been carried to and from Cuba) against Owners, Captains etc., of Greek ships. The Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine are also instructing port Authorities to enquire and investigate which ships traded with Cuba since 1963. You see, until now, or even now, the Ministry did not know... and now they will try to find out. No doubt owing to some half hearted pressure by the USA Authorities, the Greek Authorities are at last compelled to at least show that they are trying to find out, now, which ships traded, also no doubt they will find some ships which traded and will prosecute the Captains and the Owners, and perhaps carry out some sort of punishment and naturally it will be the small and unimportant Owners they will trace. The big and influential will not even be traced. If one has to be traced, like Frangistas, they will find all necessary excuses and reasons for not prosecuting. The job for enquiring, prosecuting, and punishing the offenders is left with those with whose connivance and knowledge trading continued since 1963, and still continues, so anyone can imagine, what kind of a job they will do. We wonder why no enquiries were made during 1963, 1964, 1965. Simply because enquiries were not necessary. You do not enquire about something you already know. The latest excuse of Frangistas, as we think you already know, comes through his brother, who is a Professor in Salonica University, that the law prohibiting Cuban trading was Unconstitutional. This joke was as good as any, even better than the one about his false or fake contracts and charter parties. His other brother who is the real influence with the Russians and is a timber merchant having the monopoly of small Russian timber imports into Greece and some fruits from Greece to Russia, is the one who helped to secure the building in Russia of some 35 large liners and bulk carriers plus a huge fish trawling fleet, in exchange for Greek products, and part payment in cash from the vast profits they made out of their 35 second hand liberty vessels in Cuban trading. Even in this respect, do not forget that this privilege of building these fleets (and we understand further building contracts are cooking) was only given to the Frangistas clique by the Greek and Russian Authorities, and not to any other Greek Owner. Do the USA Authorities really think that the Greek Authorities (and in a smaller degree the Lebanon Authorities) will prosecute Frangistas, and even if they do, for eyewash, they will find him guilty? You will see that nothing will happen. What we now have to say, as the only solution, may seem unpatriotic, but it is the only way to stop this rot. This is that the USA should discontinue immediately, and without any notice, all Military and Financial Aid to Greece and Lebanon, with intimation to them, that they will consider renewing same, as soon as firstly ALL trading with Cuba is stopped immediately disregarding any so called old contracts, and secondly AFTER they have prosecuted and punished properly all lawbreakers, small and big ones alike, and after all flags have been cancelled. This second action is a big debt the USA Authorities owe to all the Greek and Lebanon Owners who complied with the laws of their countries and executed the wishes of the USA. It is a moral debt. These people will gain nothing because they do not ask for any money for all fortunes they lost in not trading with Cuba, but the USA, as a country known as just and democratic, will have failed in their duty if they are content to just see discontinuation of further trading with Cuba, and no punishment for the past sinners. And talking of sins, we think that the Greek and Lebanon Authorities committed and still commit a bigger sin than the Owners, since the Owners are simply out for high profits, but it is the Authorities who broke their word and

their agreement with the USA. Really it is the Authorities which deserve a bigger punishment. If the USA takes the suggested action, it will serve two purposes. One is that the question of Cuba will be settled, and the other, and probably more important, is that other Countries which also receive aid from USA will take notice and appreciate that same thing may happen to them, if they, some way or another, play the same games as Greece and Lebanon. The USA - if it is results that they want and not talk and excuses - must ACT first, and TALK afterwards. When this is done, the Authorities will trace in no time at all all the lawbreakers, will prosecute and punish them, and will stop at once all further trading. Simply because they already know all lawbreakers, and they have all the powers to punish them, but will not do so until it hurts, and it is going to hurt, a lot, if the Aids were stopped.

c.c. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington.  
U.S.A. Embassy, London.

ΝΑΥΤΙΛΙΑ EXPRESS

Σάββατο 5-11-66

ΠΡΟΣΟΧΗ

# Παραπέμπονται εις την δικαιοσύνη οι συναλλασσόμενοι μετά της Κούβας ΑΙ ΑΝΑΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΠΕΥΔΟΝΤΑΙ ΗΔΗ

**Π**ΑΡΑΠΕΜΠΟΝΤΑΙ εις την Εισαγγελίαν Πειραιώς οι πλοιοκτήται και οι πλοίαρχοι των ελληνικών πλοίων τα ό-

ποία προσεγγίζουν εις Κούβαν. Επιπροσθέτως, οι πλοίαρχοι παραπέμπονται και εις τό Πειθαρχικόν Συμβούλιον. παραπέμψη άπάσας τας υποθέσεις ενώπιον του Τριμελούς Πλημμελειοδικείου.

Τό ΓΕΝ. πρός συμπερογγησίαν, ή άρρωστα δύο μη φυλάσσον, προς πλ

Αι προβλεπόμεναι ποινάί είναι φυλάκις μέχρις 6 μηνών, δι' εκάστη παράβαση και χρηματική ποινή διά δι τούς πλοίαρχους και στέμματα της επαγγελματικής άδειας μέχρι 2 ετών.

Η σύνδεσις  
Καλαμάτας

## Ο ΟΛΠ παρέδωσε τήν περιοχήν

ΕΟΤ

Αθήρ  
409 επ  
μελών  
ρυμουλ

Επραγμ.  
χίαν χθές +  
άπεργία τών  
κών του λιμ.  
412 μελών τ  
γησαν τά 40.

Τό ΓΕΝ. πρό  
συμπερογγησίαν,  
ή άρρωστα δύο μη  
φυλάσσον, προς πλ  
... Διά τήν παρ  
ή "Ενώσις Πλημ  
κόν διακατοχή  
... "Κυβερνητική"  
... αλλόλων.

Εν τώ μετ.  
... αλλόλων και  
... αλλόλων.

ΕΚΛΟ"

Economic Research Bureau,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
10 S.E. 9th Street,  
Miami, Fla. U.S.A.

Recd 18 Nov. 65

### CUBAN TRADING

Your circulars regarding Cuban affairs and trading contain useful information but it seems that neither you nor the American Authorities are well informed. You know that, through American pressure, the Greek Government banned, several years ago, all trading with Cuba for Greek flag vessels, except few which were on time charter and were allowed to run their charters, which finished a very long time ago. Similarly, the Lebanon Government banned all trading with Cuba for Lebanon vessels, few months ago, and only allow, subject special licence, their ships to carry goods from and to countries of the Arab League. Both countries passed laws to this effect, and both state that infringement of the law carries very heavy fines against the Owners and Masters, and withdrawal of the flag. That is what the laws say, but what is actually happening is another matter. Greek and Lebanon flag vessels have continued, since banning, to be fixed, have carried and are carrying cargoes, through a number of Owners, such as Frankistas (Franco Shipping Co. of Lisbon and Athens, per Purvis Shipping Co. London, their U.K. Agents), ~~being~~ owning about 35 Greek and Lebanon flag Liberties and similar vessels, also Vlassopoulos, Livanos, etc., also owning a great number of ships with these flags. They simply say they do not care a damn about the ban, and continue to making fortunes in the Cuban trading, the reason being that as most other law abiding Owners with these flags do not go to Cuba, the market remains wide open for these people. They do not even try to hide, they just fix their ships, mostly in the Baltic Exchange, London, and Athens, but also direct with Charterers in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, etc. and with Paris, and Geneva. The Governments of Greece and Lebanon, who made the laws, just look on, doing nothing about it, and this means that the laws were made, for paper value only. Some of these Owners fix their ships by name and flag, others just fix a contract to be carried by ships, to be nominated later, and later they nominate Greek and Lebanon ships. Only the last few days, the following were fixed on the London market: Frankistas, 50,000 tons sugar from Cuba to England for sugar Merchants Tate and Lyle, London, to be carried in 2 or 3 months, and Frankistas has already nominated the NICOLAOS F. (Greek flag) and San Spyridon (Lebanon flag), for 20,000 tons and the remaining 30,000 tons are being nominated also for Greek and Lebanon flag ships. The same Owner just also fixed one cargo for Malmo (Sweden), and one to Gdynia, Poland. He is presently negotiating several other cargoes, for his large Greek and Lebanon flag ships, with the aforementioned concerns, including another contract with D'Enree of Paris, via Geneva. The AIS GIANNIS (Lebanon) was fixed with Dreyfus, London, few days ago, to carry a cargo of beans from Vera Cruz and Tampico to Cuba, and after for sugar to Europe. Another concern trading with Cuba is Tsavlis of London and Athens, but this firm is not trading with Greek Lebanon flag ships.

The World thinks that you and American Authorities know all that goes on in Cuba. If so, it means that neither you nor American Authorities know and do not mind such trading with Greek and Lebanon ships if they know. We have given you some details of the latest fixtures. You and American Authorities can check up without any trouble and when they verify the correctness, they will no doubt protest immediately to the respective Governments, ask them to stop immediately the carriage of these cargoes and punish their Owners etc., as per their laws, and demand log books, freight accounts, etc. to verify all past trading, a tremendous one. If they ~~ask~~ or you, do not do anything about it, it will mean that both you and American Government knew and know about this illegal trading and do not mind, in which case, we can more than assure you, that within the

next few weeks, the so far law abiding Owners of Greek and Lebanon flag vessels, will also re-commence or start trading to Cuba, for the simple reason that they will feel that they are breaking no laws, since they who asked the Governments of Greece and Lebanon to pass the laws, do not mind if they are not complied with. It remains, however, a great mystery, because we cannot believe that the American Authorities do not know about this trading and why they have not protested to the Lebanon and Greek Governments, and if they do not know, then there is something very drastically wrong with their Intelligence.

Anonymous letters are not good things, in fact quite deplorable, but we trust you will understand the reason for anonymity in this case, and since you will no doubt like to know who wrote it, we can tell you is written on behalf of some people who are very bitter and disappointed that their compliance with the law puts them in disadvantage, especially if it is proved that to comply with the law does not pay. We have given you sufficient information to check facts immediately and stop all the wrong doers. If they are not stopped, then your circulars will have to increase, in the very near future; the number of Greek and Lebanon ships trading with Cuba.

CUBAN TRADING

18th Nov. 1966

The Economic Research Bureau,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
10, S.E. 9th Street,  
Miami, Fla. USA

On the 16th instant we wrote you about the Castro Delegation which arrived in Athens recently to conclude new chartering contracts. We can now report that, the Delegation consisted of,

Mr. Hernandez, Chief General Manager of CUFLET, Havana.  
Mr. Fornaguera, Chartering Dept. Cuflet, Havana, and that these two gentlemen arrived here at the invitation, and as guests of FRANGISTAS with whom they remained during their Athens stay. Faking of previous contracts discussed, new contracts negotiated and concluded, both for cargoes to Cuba, and sugar from Cuba for not only next year, but for longer periods, covering liberties and ships being built in Russia, and to be built, all new ships are and will be under Greek flag, older vessels are either Greek or Lebanon. After Athens they went to Moscow where they covered that side of the business, and now they are in London, having further talks with Frangistas London partners PURVIS SHIPPING CO.

Mr. Fornaguera, was until early this year, the Manager of CUFLET, London (for three years) and is now again in Havana's Office. Both men are returning to Havana shortly.

When the Delegation asked Frangistas about the steps presently taken by the Greek Government in investigating (???) ships which have been trading with Cuba since 1963, and prohibition of further trading, Frangistas assured them they have nothing to worry about, the prohibition is a fake, so are the investigations and threatened punishment. He also reminded them that these investigations took place before, but all their cargoes were carried just the same, and numerous charters were fixed at various intervals by Frangistas through them, through Russia, and through many private charterers. He also assured them that whatever he does is done with the full knowledge of the Ministries, and particularly his special partners, high officials.

Most of previous information in our reports, and the information contained in this report obtained direct, confidentially, from Frangistas own Athens Office. If you, or USA Government have any wish to check up, it is very easy, and simple. If you or USA do not care to check now, then you will see the accuracy of the report as time goes on. We are more than certain you are satisfied that all our previous reports proved accurate and were substantiated. We have to confess that we are now beginning to believe that even you and USA authorities know all facts and truth and either do not care or cannot do anything about it. There is no other logical explanation, except that USA who are fighting Communists and Dictators in the name of Democracy and freedom, it is this same USA who are creating a Dictator in the name of Frangistas, whom it is the USA who help him create vast fleets (rumours have it that shortly Frangistas is going to Moscow to place further building contracts), at the expense of democratic Greek Owners, who were compelled to either scrap and lay up their ships (many have done this) rather than go to Cuba, at the request

CUBAN TRADING

2nd December 1966

The Economic Research Bureau,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
10, S.E., 9th Street,  
Miami, Fla. USA.

Enclosed you will find cutting from yesterday's  
NAFTIKA CHRONIKA, which is the most influential and largest  
Magazine in Greece, on maritime affairs. We trust you will  
find some interesting.

FRANGISTAS clique meantime carry on the illegal Cuban  
trading, and negotiate further contracts, which the Greek  
Authorities are all out to punish Frangistas for his past sins.  
AND the U.S.A. just looks on. It is becoming obvious both  
USA, and Greece do not want Greek ships to carry on trade with  
Cuba, unless same is done by Frangistas, their hero.

c.c. U.S.A, Ambassador, Athens,  
U.S. Ambassador, London.  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>UFGA-26348</b>
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reporting and its wealth of data and figures. AMFOUND-1 added that he is quite certain that these reports had been forwarded to the home office in PBRUMEN, although he could not personally vouch for this. The Station is happy to have this indication that AMFOUND-1's former office continues to receive this publication; AMSNAKE-1 had reported shortly after his arrival here that he had read the first issue of this series prior to his defection.

*Philip G. Elward*  
 PHILIP G. ELWARD



# economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

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VOL. II

## SPECIAL REPORT ON HURRICANE INEZ' EFFECTS ON CUBAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION,

### SUGAR

#### Evaluation:

The ERB estimates that Cuba will lose a total of 307,000 metric tons of sugar in its 1967 harvest as a result of hurricane Inez.

Greatest damage was done to the caña quedada, the uncut cane left over from the previous year. When Inez struck the ERB estimates that there were about four million tons of caña quedada which should produce about 500,000 tons of raw sugar assuming a saccharose yield of 12.6%. The ERB arrives at this loss figure due the fact that fully 80%, or 3,200,000 tons., of the caña quedada was in the southern and central parts of Las Villas Province and the southern part of Oriente Province which is where Inez hit Cuba with its greatest force. In Cuba any hurricane usually destroys about 85% of the caña quedada that is hit. Thus the ERB estimates that Inez destroyed 1,360,000 tons. This will amount to a sugar loss of 171,000 tons. using the 12.6 saccharose yield figure.

The balance of the sugar loss will come from the damage to the ratoon cane, the cane that sprouts again after having been cut. The ERB estimates a total of 16,400,000 tons. of ratoon in Las Villas and Oriente provinces. The ERB's studies show that Inez struck 33% of this cane, or 5,400,000 tons. Historically, a conservative estimate of past damage to ratoon cane that is struck by hurricanes in Cuba would be 20%. Using this, Cuba's loss would be about 1,080,000 tons. Again, using the 12.6% saccharose yield figure, the raw sugar loss from the ratoon cane amounts to about 136,000 tons.

#### Available Information:

**Pinar del Río Province:** In 'Regional' Artemisa, 42 'caballerías' (state-owned) of sugar cane were damaged and 900,000 'arobas' (\*) of sugar cane, were also damaged. 200 sugar bags of "Eduardo García Lavandero" sugar mill, were damaged, specially from the rains. 50% of sugar cane areas, went down on account of the winds. In 'Regional' Costa Norte, they reported serious damage in the sugar canes.

(\*) 'arroba' equals to 25 pounds.

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Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: Sugar cane in Roque was heavily damaged. About 50% of the sugar cane was leveled, part of this will have a yield while other will dry up from root damage.

Las Villas Province: Sugar cane in Valle de Trinidad, crop damaged. 'Regional' Sancti-Spiritus: Serious damages to the sugar crop. Tunas de Zaza: gap in a sugar warehouse, but it was empty. El Végano: 90% of the sugar cane was damaged (800 'caballerías' (\*) crushed).

Camagüey Province: In Baraguá, Venezuela, San Dimas, Majagua, 'Regional' Ciego de Avila, the sugar cane suffered damage from the winds.

Oriente Province: Sugar cane suffered serious damages in the vicinity of Santiago. Near Yara, sugar cane fields were observed with two feet of water. In Boquerón 900 sugar bags were destroyed. In Caibariena, Boquerón, Guantánamo, the sugar plantations suffered serious damages. In 'Regional' Guantánamo 7 cane shelters were destroyed and 39 were affected. In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 500 'caballerías' of sugar cane were destroyed.

The roofs were blown off from sugar warehouses #4 and #5 in Guantánamo and the 2,500 bags of raw sugar stored therein became wet.

#### TOBACCO

##### Commentary:

Strong winds and heavy rains affect the quality of this plant, as long as they damage the tobacco leaves. Besides this, the leaves get stained and some rot as a result of being in contact with the wet soil, thus affecting the quality in one case, and becoming a total loss in the other. If the area is flooded, most tobacco leaves will rot.

Pinar del Río Province: In 'Julían Alemany' farm in Consolación del Sur and in "Hnos. Saiz" in San Juan y Martínez, the 10% of the tobacco seeds were damaged.

Havana Province: None.

(\*) A 'caballería' is a Cuban surface measure equal to: 33.162 acres.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: Tobacco production was destroyed. Almost total loss of the tobacco crop. 5,000 houses of "curar tabaco" were destroyed in the following localities: Cabaiguán, Zaza del Medio, Placetas, Camajuaní, and Sancti-Spiritus. 93 houses full of tobacco (casas de tabaco), were destroyed, and 350 were partially destroyed. 7 houses of "curar tabaco" were partially destroyed in El Mógano and 9 were completely destroyed, another 31 houses suffered minor damages.

Camagüey Province: None.

Oriente Province: None.

#### COFFEE

#### Commentary:

The hurricanes during September and October cause considerable damage to the coffee crop, because it is precisely during these two months when the coffee is harvested. Besides the damage to the coffee plants, the hurricane scatters the coffee beans which rot quickly in contact with the wet soil.

Pinar del Río Province: None.

Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: Coffee production was destroyed. Almost total loss of coffee crop.

Camagüey Province: None.

Oriente Province: The ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers) called all the members of this association to pick up all the coffee crop that was seriously damaged. Until October 1st., in Buey Arriba and Guisa, 472,000 full-cans of coffee were collected, that represents a 27% of the actual crop, that was calculated in 1,740,000 full-cans. They are sending workers of Jiguani, Santa Rita and Cauto Cristo to Buey Arriba coffee plantation. In 'Regional' Baracoa the hurricane Ines ripped the coffee crop. In 'Regional' Quantánamo 13,000 full-cans suffered serious damages. In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 122,000 full-cans went to the ground.

In the Yara region the coffee crop was 50% destroyed; the coffee beans had been ready for harvest and therefore easily shaken off by wind. In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguani, 500 women picked up about 10,000 full-cans of coffee.

#### F R U I T

**Pinar del Río Province:** In 'Cuane-Mantua' 1,000 banana plants were damaged. In 'Regional' Pinar del Río 5,700 banana stubs were destroyed. In 'Regional' PR-2 the guava plantations were damaged by the winds.

**Havana Province:** None.

**Matanzas Province:** None.

**Las Villas Province:** In Valle de Trinidad, the banana plantations and the fruit crop were completely destroyed. In El Mégano 120,000 banana stubs were destroyed.

**Camagüey Province:** None.

**Oriente Province:** Between the 80 and 90% of the fruit crop was destroyed. In 'Regional' Baracoa 40,000 banana stubs were destroyed. In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 14 'caballerías' of banana were damaged. In "Josué País" farm 30% of the 80 'caballerías' of banana were destroyed. In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguani, 300 'caballerías' of bananas were damaged, only 70 were destroyed. All fruit in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba suffered serious damage. Near Holguín banana plants were leveled by wind. Near Yara, banana plants had been broken. In 'Regional' Guantánamo 35 'caballerías' of cocoy nut were destroyed.

#### VEGETABLES & "VIANDS"

**Pinar del Río Province:** None.

**Havana Province:** In 'Regional' Ariguanabo, lots in the agriculture; specially vegetables seed beds.

Matanzas Province: Malanga fields were covered with water which will rot most of the plant root. Complete loss of corn crops were observed in the Malanga area.

Las Villas Province: 'Viands' crops were destroyed.

Camaguey Province: 2% of the plantain, yucca and sweet potatoes crops were destroyed.

Oriente Province: In 'Mabay' 1,400 bags of sweet potatoes and 160 quintals of yucca were collected. All vegetable crops in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba suffered serious damage.

#### BEANS AND RICE

Pinar del Río Province: 15 'caballerías' of rice were damaged from the wind and the heavy rains in 'Patricio Lumumba' farm.

Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: In the zone of Jatibonico to Sancti-Spiritus, serious damages in rice plantations. In El Mégano, 8 'caballerías' of beans were destroyed.

Camaguey Province: 20% of beans crop were damaged.

Oriente Province: Rice fields near Yara had been leveled to the ground.

#### CATTLE, POULTRY AND DAIRY

Pinar del Río Province: 56 calves dead.

Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: Numerous animals were drowned. In El Mégano, 7 dairies were destroyed, and 19 suffered minor damages, and one was partially damaged.

Camaguey Province: None.

Oriente Province: 30 poultry shelters were destroyed, and 9 were af-

ected.  
22 dairies were partially affected, and 9 were destroyed.  
Several goat-barns were damaged.  
2 poultry yards were damaged.  
In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguani  
30,000 steers were seriously affected.

#### TRANSPORTATION

**Pinar del Río Province:** None.  
**Havana Province:** Several portions of the highways running parallel to the railway had been washed away.  
**Matanzas Province:** None.  
**Las Villas Province:** None.  
**Camaguey Province:** None.  
**Oriente Province:** In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis, 3 bridges were damaged.  
The railway bridge at Central Los Reinaldo, Alto Songo is unpassable.  
From Santiago de Cuba to Camaguey, railways were damaged.

#### NON-SPECIFIED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

**Pinar del Río Province:** None.  
**Havana Province:** The "Fico López" refinery (former Esso-Belot), was seriously affected when the line of 110,000 volts went down.  
Outside of the Capital there was a two day power failure.  
**Matanzas Province:** None.  
**Las Villas Province:** In El Mégano, 6 workshops were damaged.  
**Camaguey Province:** None.  
**Oriente Province:** In 'Regional' Quantánamo 1 food store was destroyed.  
In 'Regional' Quantánamo, 7 workshops were damaged.

#### OTHERS

**Pinar del Río Province:** In 'Regional' Pinar del Río, 14,800 houses were

damaged, 3 warehouses were damaged in 'Regional' PR-2.

Havana Province: Many houses were completely under water, crops and farm land were flooded.

Matanzas Province: None.


Las Villas Province: 2 warehouses of fertilizers were damaged in El Mégano.

Camagüey Province: Júcaro, Quince y Medio and Central Venezuela, 'Regional' Ciego de Avila, inundations and damages in Venezuela sugar mill.

Oriente Province: In 'Regional' Guantánamo 77 kms. of fences were destroyed, and 8 pastures were damaged. Other damages caused by the rains were: 200 tons of hay and several pigpens, plus 3 warehouses, 260 bags of fertilizer, and 115 'quintales' (\*) of cotton seeds. In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 60 houses were destroyed and 10 farm houses were also destroyed. Heavy rains affected 67 tons of fertilizer.

(\*) One "quintal" equals 100 lbs., or 4 'arrobas'.

Note: All other crops suffered the regular damage caused by a hurricane, i.e., broken branches, scattered fruits, plants destroyed, and the known damage caused by heavy rains, strong winds, and flooding.



**AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND HOW  
 THEY WERE AFFECTED BY HURRICANE "INEZ"**  
**PRODUCTOS AGRICOLAS DE CUBA Y  
 COMO LES AFECTO EL CICLON "INES"**  
**ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU**  
 OFFICE  
 10 S.E. 9th  
 Miami, Florida

**EXPLANATION OF MAP - EXPLICACION DEL MAPA**

X Sugar cane - Caña de azúcar.	▲ Pine groves - Pinares.
♣ Produce - Frutas Menores.	☿ Henequen fiber - Henequén.
☉ Coffee - Café.	🍍 Pineapple - Piña.
🐄 Cattle - Ganado.	🌽 Corn - Maíz.
🍃 Tobacco - Tabaco.	🌱 Beans - Frijoles.
🍌 Bananas - Plátanos.	🥔 Potatoes - Papas.
🍚 Rice - Arroz.	🍫 Cocoa - Cacao.
🍌 Citric & other fruits - Cítricos y otras frutas.	🪵 Charcoal - Carbón vegetal.
	🐷 Pork - Ganado Porcino.

### BULGARIA REJECTS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPMENT

Last month the Economic Research Bureau (ERB) reported the establishment of a Soviet-Cuban quality control organization to undertake steps to maintain the quality of Cuban sugar. This organization, which incidentally has been patterned along the administrative guidelines and regulations of the Soviet Union, has been made necessary by the increasing difficulties the Soviet refineries are having with Cuban raws. The phenomenon of declining quality of Cuban sugar is further pointed up by Bulgaria's rejection of the first Cuban sugar shipment to that country from the 1966 harvest. This rejection, which occurred last August, was due to the high moisture content of the Cuban sugar. The source of this information is the Cuban Institute for Sugar Research.

### CUBAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER RECOGNIZES MISTAKES

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, one of the key figures of the Partido Socialista Popular (name under which the Cuban Communist Party operated from 1939 to 1962), former Head of INRA (Castro's National Agrarian Reform Institute), and presently a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, was interviewed by Josef Timmer, correspondent for Budapest's NEPSZAVA, on September 16, 1966. The Economic Research Bureau has considered Timmer's statements a sound explanation of the real economic situation existing in Cuba. Therefore, we believe our readers will be interested in excerpts from NEPSZAVA's story of its interview with Timmer:

#### Sugar:

"We exert our greatest efforts in the sugar industry. Despite this --unfortunately-- we failed to attain our objectives this year and did not even come close to the 1965 results, primarily because of natural disasters, particularly a great drought. We would like to harvest 6.5 million tons of sugar cane next year and attain a record output by 1968." (\*)

#### Industrial and agricultural productivity:

"Industrial and agricultural productivity diminished after the revolution. Many people think that one must work less under socialism than under capitalism and, consequently, do not fulfill the legal working time. It is also true that this is partly due to the fact that work is not organized with sufficient care, particularly in agriculture. Moreover, serious problems are caused by the fact that the working people are not paid according to their output. Remuneration according to output, is, nevertheless, applied in agriculture, but we have not managed to introduce it in industry yet."

#### Skilled personnel:

"The shortage of experts is a very great problem. Imagine what tremendous

(\*) ERB note: This constitutes a contradiction of Castro's stated goals. The Perspective Sugar Plan called for a 7.5 million-ton mark for 1967 and Castro has stressed this figure in his speeches over and over again.

difficulties we must overcome in this respect when, for example, an aptitude test carried out in over 2,000 state farms two years ago revealed that 60 percent of the heads of farms and 80 percent of the heads of work brigades did not even have three years of elementary schooling."

#### Textile Industry:

"Cuba is a country badly off in raw materials, which are also very difficult to procure. The position of industry is closely linked to the disengagement of the United States. The Americans established factories and also provided raw materials before the revolution in Cuba. The factories belong to us today, but we must fend for ourselves with respect to raw materials. What this means is faithfully reflected by the fact that raw materials constitute 50 percent of our overall imports. Not even in this way can we meet our requirements, and, therefore, 40 to 60 of the capacity of our factories and plants lie idle."

#### Agrarian reform:

"We have not distributed land among the peasants but we have established state farms, so-called people's farms."

The ERB's comment is that a Cuban Communist talks more honestly to a Communist Hungarian correspondent than the régime talks to the world.

#### FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO CUBA DOWN 65.8%

A total of fourteen Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the month of August.

The August 1966 total represents a drop of 41.5% in Western shipping to Red Cuba when compared with the August 1963 total, and a drop of 65.8% when compared with the August 1964 total (\*).

In August's list, Great Britain continued to lead the maritime fifth columnists with eight vessels, followed by Greece with three, and Lebanon, France and Italy with one vessel each.

August 1963:	24 vessels
August 1964:	41 vessels
August 1965:	22 vessels
August 1966:	14 vessels (all time low for August)

#### 878 FREE WORLD VESSELS PLEDGED OUT OF CUBA SEA TRADE

The Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce said on October 5, 1966, that ninety-six ships have been removed from MA's "Cuba Blacklist" on promises by controlling parties to keep out of the Cuba sea trade a total of 878 vessels, which are either owned or operated by these parties.

There are presently 254 ships in the MA's "Cuba Blacklist", representing 1,813,855 gross tons.

FRANCO SHIPPING CONTINUES IN THE CUBA SEA TRADE

Franco Shipping Company has been responsible for 18.1% of the total Free-World sea trade with Communist Cuba for the January-September 1966 period.

The ERB denounced the operations of Franco Shipping Co. and its nine subsidiaries in Greece and Great Britain in August 1966 (\*) and now it wants to stress that FRANCO SHIPPING has continued engaged in the Cuba trade as ERB's statistics show:

January-September 1966

	<u>Number of Trips</u>	<u>%</u>
Free World vessels	177	100.0%
Franco Shipping vessels	32	18.1%

Note: Breakdown of Franco Shipping Co.'s vessels by registry:

a) Greek:	17
b) Lebanese:	9
c) 11,749 GRT Tanker Sword under Italian and Finnish flags:	5
d) ARETI under Cypriot flag:	1
Total:	<u>32</u>

(\*) For full details see: Economic Intelligence Report Vol. II No. 1-A, Miami, Fla., August 26, 1966.

BRAND NEW 9,500 TON CUBAN FREIGHTER GOES AGROUND

The brand new 9,500-ton Cuban freighter MAFFO went aground on September 26th 1966 half-an-hour out of Casilda port in Cuba while en route to the south eastern Cuban port of Guayabal where she was scheduled to have loaded sugar for Japan. This was the first commercial voyage of the M/V MAFFO as she had made only one trip prior to this voyage which trip had been to deliver her to Cuba after her construction in Cadiz, Spain, on February 9, 1966.

Hurricane Inez, which hit this area with full force, probably contributed to the accident. By October 18, 1966, it was reported that the M/V MAFFO had been refloated.

During the last months, the Cuban government has had difficulty in keeping its vessels afloat. The M/V ARACELIO IGLESIAS suffered severe damages after crashing into the Norwegian M/V NIDAREID in the Panama Canal last June 11, 1965.

On April 8, 1966, the M/V ORIENTE was sunk after colliding with the Norwegian M/V ESTARFORT off the coast of Holland. And, on April 27, 1966, another newly-built Spanish vessel, the M/V LA PLATA, while on a trip to Japan, was involved in an accident, also in the Panama Canal, with the M/V HONG KONG AMBER of Liberian registry.

The ERB might comment that comrade Rodríguez's remarks to the Hungarian correspondent of problems affecting Cuban industry and agriculture might well have been applied to Cuban shipping as well.

Sources:

The above information has been obtained from reliable sources, both from Cuba and the Free World. For additional details address yourself to:

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UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA  
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Miami, Fla. 33131, U.S.A.

Miami, Fla., October 27, 1966.-

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(200)

OCT 28 1966

MIAMI, FLA., OCT. 28 (AP)—CUBA'S VITAL, DOLLAR-PRODUCING SUGAR CROP WAS REDUCED BY SOME 300,000 METRIC TONS BY HURRICANE INEZ, SAYS A REPORT RELEASED TODAY BY EXILE ECONOMISTS.

THE ESTIMATE WAS CONTAINED IN AN "ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT" BY REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (UR), WHICH KEEPS AN EYE ON CUBA'S ECONOMY.

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ANNOUNCED HURRICANE DAMAGE FIGURES. IT HAD SET A 1967 SUGAR PRODUCTION GOAL OF 7.5 MILLION METRIC TONS. THIS YEAR'S HARVEST YIELDED 4.5 MILLION. A METRIC TON IS 2,200 POUNDS.

THE SURVEY, WHICH UR SAID WAS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM INSIDE CUBA, ESTIMATED INEZ DESTROYED 1,360,000 TONS OF RATOON, THAT IS CANE THAT SPROUTS AGAIN AFTER HAVING BEEN CUT. THIS DAMAGE REPRESENTS A 136,000-TON RAW SUGAR LOSS, THE REPORT SAID.

IN ADDITION, IT ESTIMATED, THE HURRICANE DESTROYED 1,360,000 TONS OF LEFTOVER, UNCUT CANE, KNOWN IN CUBA AS "CANA QUEBADA." THIS MEANS A LOSS OF 171,000 TONS OF SUGAR, UR CALCULATED.

INEZ SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THE QUALITY OF TOBACCO, CUBA'S NO. 2 CROP, THE REPORT SAID. IN ONE PROVINCE, LAS VILLAS, CENTRAL CUBA, MOST GROWING TOBACCO WAS DESTROYED, UR REPORTED. IN ADDITION, IT SAID, MORE THAN 5,000 TOBACCO CURING HOUSES WERE DEMOLISHED.

COFFEE CROP DAMAGE WAS EXTENSIVE, THE REPORT SAID, WITHOUT MAKING AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE. THE HURRICANE HIT DURING THE HARVEST SEASON, AND MUCH COFFEE BLOWN OFF RECEIVED ROT DAMAGE BEFORE BEING RECOVERED, IT SAID.

ZRSJAE

19-130-26

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S/COR. 2 UFGA-26348

SC Att. #2 UFGA-26348



# economic intelligence

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Att. #3 UFGA-26348

MAILING ADDRESS  
Box 3940  
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373-8033

VOL. II No. 3-A

## SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

### LOBSTER EXPORTS CONTINUE TO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR CUBA

Commercial sources in Canada and confirmed by information obtained in New York report that the Canadian and French authorities have launched investigations into the receipt of bad lobster in both Canada and France. The ERB has now learned that a shipment of more than eight thousand cans of Cuban lobster arrived in France on October 6th aboard the S.S. KATHERINA. This shipment was consigned to "Fourchtein et Cie." and was impounded in its entirety by the French customs authorities who observed that this shipment contained swollen tins. Upon investigation, impurities were discovered, the lobster was found to have been overcooked, and in some cases gray spots were observed.

"World Seafood Distributors", a Montreal firm that imports Cuban lobsters for sale in Canada and for transshipment to Europe, continues to have its difficulties with CUBAEXPORT. ERB Cuban commercial sources in Europe report that Sam Beiner, an officer of "World Seafood", is complaining to CUBAEXPORT that CUBAEXPORT is undercutting Beiner's prices quoted to the Antwerp firm of "Hallewyck". "Hallewyck" appears to be a major European account for "World Seafood" and in order to protect this business Beiner was forced to tell CUBAEXPORT that "World Seafood" may be forced to quote "Hallewyck" cost prices for direct shipment of lobsters from Brazil unless CUBAEXPORT and Cuban commercial representatives in Paris and The Hague cease these antics. This dispute involves more than two thousand cartons of lobster.

"World Seafood" maintains a stock of Cuban lobsters in Antwerp. The ERB has learned that Cuban commercial authorities in Europe have issued written instructions that in effect claim that more than one thousand cartons of lobster in this stock are under the control of CUBAEXPORT. Upon learning this "World Seafood" informed CUBAEXPORT in Havana that it will cause the arrest of any person removing these lobsters without pre-payment. The person concerned with attempted removal of these lobsters is a Mr. J. M. Schwarz who appears to be releasing "World Seafood"'s lobsters by giving promissory notes which are not guaranteed by any bank or other institution. "World Seafood" is understandably seeking pre-payment or at least a guaranteed note of payment. By late September this dispute reached the point where "World Seafood" refused to assume responsibility for a sale of more than a thousand cartons of lobster made by Schwarz acting on CUBAEXPORT instructions. CUBAEXPORT counter-claims that Schwarz is "World Seafood"'s agent in these sales which, of course, "World Seafood" denies.

As if these were not enough problems, "World Seafood" realizes that it can buy similar lobster in New York at lower prices and is therefore insisting upon an additional discount from CUBAEXPORT in order to compensate for this difference.

5/c att. 3 UFGA-26348

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19-120-26

One of the trade names being used in Europe is "Caribbean Queen". This particular label is for canned Cuban lobster and is being marketed by the firm of Jacques Fourchstein which is also having its difficulties in this business.

The ERB has looked into the background of Mr. Sam Beiner and of his company, "World Seafood Distributors". Regarding the company, little can be found other than the fact that its office is in Beiner's home in Montreal. The address is 890 Frazer Avenue, Montreal, QC, Canada. Trade directories of Canadian firms and similar sources available here and in New York do not list this firm. Regarding Beiner, the ERB can state that Beiner has been engaged, at least since 1962, in commercial activities involving Cuba. Over the years his interests have been purchasing frogs' legs, lobster, shrimp, fruits, candies, and vegetables. He is known to think favorably of the Cuban regime and in late September 1962 Beiner was openly discussing economic and social progress being made in Cuba while on a visit to Miami. Beiner is characterized by people now in Miami and who have known him in the past in Cuba as being an opportunist who was active in the Havana black market.

Note: For additional information on this matter see: Economic Intelligence Report, Vol. II, No. 2, dated September 26, 1966.

U.R. Economic Research Bureau.  
Miami, Fla., October 31, 1966.-



# press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM  
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:  
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373 - 8033

ALL-TIME-LOW

Att. #4 UFGA-26348

## THE MARITIME FIFTH COLUMN

October 1966 total down 73.1%

A total of seven (7) Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the past month of October, U.R. learned from its underground and international maritime sources.

The October 1966 total (7) represents an all-time-low for the November 1962-October 1966 period. The previous all-time-low was the February 1965 total, when eleven (11) Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports.

The October 1966 total also represents a drop of 73.1% in Western shipping to Red Cuba when compared with the October 1963 total, a drop of 69.6% compared with the October 1964 total, and a drop of 66.7% when compared with the October 1965 total. (\*)

In October's list, Cyprus continued to lead the maritime fifth columnists with three (3) vessels, followed by Great Britain and Greece with two (2) vessels each.

The following is the complete list for October:

<u>NAME OF VESSEL</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>PORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
FREE NAVIGATOR	Cypriot	Cárdenas	October 9
RUTHY ANN	British	Havana	October 12
EL TORO	Cypriot	Havana	October 21
VENICE	British	Stgo. de Cuba	October 22
ROULA MARIA	Greek	Isabela de Sagua	October 27
IRENA	Greek	Havana	October 30
NEWFOREST	Cypriot	Cárdenas	October 31

(\*) October 1963: 26 vessels  
 October 1964: 23 vessels  
 October 1965: 21 vessels  
 October 1966: 7 vessels (all-time-low for this month and for the whole period).

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, November 18, 1966

REF.: 216

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5/10/66 4 UFGA-26348

19-120-26



# boletín informativo

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Miami, Florida

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## BAJA RECORD

### QUINTA COLUMNA MARITIMA

Total de Octubre de 1966 representa  
baja de un 73.1%.

Un total de siete (7) buques del Mundo Occidental tocaron en puertos cubanos durante el pasado mes de octubre, UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA supo hoy por sus fuentes en la clandestinidad cubana y en círculos marítimos internacionales.

El total de Octubre de 1966 (7) representa una baja record para el período Noviembre 1962 - Octubre 1966. La anterior baja record fue la correspondiente a Febrero de 1965, cuando sólo 11 buques del Mundo Occidental tocaron en puertos cubanos.

El total de Octubre de 1966 también representa una disminución de un 73.1% en buques del Mundo Occidental que atracaron en puertos de Cuba Roja, cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1963; un 69.6% cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1964, y un 66.7% cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1965. (\*)

En la lista de Octubre, Chipre encabeza los quinta columnistas marítimos con tres (3) buques, seguida de Gran Bretaña con sólo dos (2) buques y Grecia también con dos (2) buques.

A continuación la lista completa del mes de Octubre:

<u>NOMBRE DEL BUQUE</u>	<u>BANDERA</u>	<u>PUERTO</u>	<u>FECHA</u>
FREE NAVIGATOR	Chipriota	Cárdenas	9 Octubre
RUTHY ANN	Británica	Habana	12 Octubre
EL TORO	Chipriota	Habana	21 Octubre
VENICE	Británica	Stgo. de Cuba	22 Octubre
ROULA MARIA	Griega	Isabela de Sagua	27 Octubre
IRENA	Griega	Habana	30 Octubre
NEWFREST	Chipriota	Cárdenas	31 Octubre

(\*) Octubre 1963: 26 buques  
Octubre 1964: 23 buques  
Octubre 1965: 21 buques  
Octubre 1966: 7 buques (baja record para este mes y para todo el período).

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, 18 de Noviembre de 1966  
REF.: 221

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# WESTERN UNION PRESS MESSAGE

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W. P. MARSHALL PRESIDENT

1966 NOV 18 PM 4 00  
MIAMI, NOV. 18/66

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK

DAYLETTER COLLECT

**61600** SCLANENTE SIETE BUQUES ABANDERAS MUNDO OCCIDENTAL VISITARON  
CUBA DURANTE PASADO ~~PERIODO~~ <sup>OCTUBRE</sup> SIENDO ESTA CIFRA MAS BAJA REGISTRADA DESDE  
INICIOSE BOICOT MARITIMO REGIMEN CASTRO STOP ORGANIZACION ANTICASTRISTA  
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA QUE MENSUALMENTE OFRECE NOMBRES BARCOS  
VISITAN ISLA OBTENIENDO INFORMACIONES DE CIRCULOS MARITIMO INTERNACIONALES  
AND FUENTES CLANDESTINAS CUBA DICE ESTA CIFRA ES MENOR REGISTRADA DESDE  
ELLOS LLEVAN ESTADISTICA 1962 STOP TAMBIEN SIDO ~~EN~~ OCTUBRE PRIMERA VEZ  
GRAN BRETAÑA NO FIGURA CABEZA TRAFICO MARITIMO CON CASTRO STOP SIETE BUQUES  
TOCARON CUBA ESE MES TRES ~~BUQUES~~ ERAN CHIPRIOTAS DOS BRITANICOS  
AND DOS GRIEGOS STOP COMPARANDO LO IGUAL ~~EN~~ MES ANTERIORES ALOS  
DISTRIBUCION REPRESENTA 73%


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FR 9-8261

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# WESTERN UNION PRESS MESSAGE

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1966 10-31-921

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MIAMI, NOV. 25/66 1966 NOV 25 PM 5 03

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK

DAYLETTER COLLECT

61700

AIRADA PROTESTA OCASIONADO EXILIO CUBANO NEGATIVA AUTORIDADES  
 ESPAÑOLAS CONCEDER ASILO POLITICO ESPAÑA CUATRO CUBANOS LLEGARON LAS PALMAS  
 COMO POLIZONES ABORDO BARCO GRIEGO FREE NAVIGATOR ~~REEMBARKAR~~ STOP  
 CUATRO CUBANOS FUERON OBLIGADOS ~~REEMBARKAR~~ REEMBARKAR NAVE GRIEGA ENCUENTRASE  
 ACTUALMENTE NAVEGANDO HUBO ALEJANDRIA EGIPTO STOP PRINCIPALES ORGANIZACIONES  
 CUBANOS ANTICASTELISTAS DIRIGIDOSE AUTORIDADES ~~NO~~ NOIGEAMERICANAS ~~REEMBARKAR~~  
 PIDIENDOLE INTERPONGA BUENOS OFICIOS EVITAR CUBANOS POLIZONES SEAN DESSEMBARCADOS  
 ALGUN PUERTO COMUNISTA ~~REEMBARKAR~~ ALEGANDO ESTO OCURRIERA QUOTE ~~REEMBARKAR~~ SERIAN  
 DEVUELTOS CUBA DONDE CONDERNARIASELES TREINTA AÑOS CARCEL OR FUSILAMIENTO ANTE  
 PAREDO: UNQUOTE STOP ~~REEMBARKAR~~ UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA REPORTA MENSUALMENTE  
 MOVIMIENTO BARCOS TOCAN PUERTOS CUBANOS ASEGURA FREE NAVIGATOR ENARBOLANDO  
 BANDERA CHIPRIOTA ESTUVO PUERTO CARDENAS COSTA NORTE CUBA PASADO 9 OCTUBRE  
 STOP NAVIGATOR 8181 TONELADAS OPERALO PANCRISTO CHIPING COMPANY  
 SUBSIDIARIA TSAVILIRIS PSA RADICA GRECIA, AND LONDRES AGOSTO PASADO AÑO  
~~REEMBARKAR~~ ENARBOLABA BANDERA ~~REEMBARKAR~~ HAITIANA CUANDO FUE DENUNCIADO TRATAR  
 CARGAR TRIGO ARGENTINO PARA LLEVARLO CUBA  
 ARROYO

21 NW 9na Ave.

FR 9-8261

120

CAIO

(110)

NOV 19 1966

MIAMI, FLA., NOV. 19 (AP)—A SHARP DECLINE IN SHIPPING FROM NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO CUBA WAS REPORTED TODAY.

ONLY SEVEN VESSELS FROM THESE AREAS TOUCHED CUBAN PORTS LAST MONTH, SAID REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (UR), AN EXILE ORGANIZATION WHICH WATCHES SUCH MOVEMENTS. UR ADDED THIS IS THE SMALLEST NUMBER SINCE IT BEGAN KEEPING COUNT FOUR YEARS AGO.

LISTED AS VISITING CUBA IN OCTOBER WERE THREE SHIPS FROM CYPRUS, TWO FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND TWO FROM GREECE.

THIS COMPARES WITH 17 SHIPS THE PREVIOUS MONTH. OTHER OCTOBER TOTALS: 21 IN 1965, 23 IN 1964, AND 26 IN 1963.

UR SAID IT DID NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE DROP.

PL139AES

# DIARIO LAS AMERICAS

FUNDADO EL 4 DE JULIO DE 1953

(Por la Libertad, la Cultura y la Solidaridad Hemisférica)

MIAMI, FLA., MARTES 22 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1966

PAGINA 14

## Micronoticias

Por SALOMON

Mirdino Jr.

\*\*\*

El total de siete buques del mundo occidental incaron en puertos cubanos en el pasado mes de octubre, según informa Unidad Revolucionaria, que lleva la estadística de ese movimiento marítimo.

El total de octubre representa una nueva record, desde el año 1962 a la fecha, pues la otra caída más cercana se produjo cuando 11 barcos llegaron a Cuba en febrero del año pasado.

Esto representa una disminución del 78.1 por ciento en buques del mundo occidental que atracaron en puertos de Cuba Roja, comparado con octubre de 1962: un 69 por ciento con 1964 y un 66.7 por ciento con 1965.

Chipre aparece la lista de los países que permiten a sus buques comerciar con Cuba, seguida por Gran Bretaña y Grecia.

En cualquier caso, restricción creciente del tráfico marítimo del mundo libre con Cuba resultante de las medidas tomadas por el Gobierno de E.E.U.U. y de la acción libre de los trabajadores portuarios de varios países, está afectada en gran parte por la continua construcción de barcos en España para la flota mercante de Castro. . .

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C13 (E)

MIAMI, FLA., NOV. 23 (AP)—A CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO REFLECTS SAYS  
"CUBA'S ECONOMY IS WELL ON THE ROAD TO REACHING A CLIMAX AFTER  
SUFFERING ONE SETBACK AFTER ANOTHER."

RAUL VOLTA, WHO LEFT HIS POST AS TRADE COUNSELOR IN THE CUBAN  
EMBASSY IN LONDON AND CAME TO THE UNITED STATES FOR A CYCLE, TOLD  
NEWSMEN LAST NIGHT THAT GENERAL DISCONTENT REIGNED IN CUBA BECAUSE  
OF SCARCITIES AND ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT.

WHEN HE LAST WAS IN CUBA, IN JULY, VOLTA SAID, IT MUST HIM TO  
WITNESS THE "ECONOMIC CHAOS" THERE.

VOLTA, 36, WAS THE FOURTH PERSON TO DEPART FROM THE CUBAN  
EMBASSY IN LONDON SINCE FIDEL CASTRO'S TAKEOVER IN 1959.

BAES

H

1177

BY THEODORE A. EDICER  
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

NOV 24 1966

M IZI, FLA., NOV. 24 (AP)—THE PRAGMATIC SUCCESSION OF THE HIGHLY PRIZED  
HAVANA CIGAR IS SILENTLY FADING INTO OBSOLETE IN THE ECONOMICALLY-CLOUDED  
COMMUNIST STATES, WITH A FORMER OFFICIAL OF CUBA'S TOBACCO INDUSTRY.

RAUL VOLTA, A DEFEATED ECONOMIST, LAMES HIS FORMER BOSS, FIDEL  
CASTRO, HIMSELF ONE OF THE MOST VIOLENT FOSTERS OF CUBA'S FORMER NO.  
2 PRODUCT.

"THE INDUSTRY APPEARS DOOMED TO TOTAL DESTRUCTION BECAUSE OF COMMU-  
NIST MISMANAGEMENT," VOLTA, FORMER ASSISTANT MANAGER OF CIGARRASCO,  
THE STATE TOBACCO EXPORTING COMPANY, TOLD NEWSMEN YESTERDAY.

CUBAN CIGARS ARE SCARCE IN CUBA AND SCARCER ABROAD, VOLTA SAID AFTER  
ARRIVING FROM LONDON, WHERE HE GAVE UP HIS POST AS TRADE COUNSELOR  
IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

THE QUALITY, ELECTIVE AND PRODUCTION VALUE OF CUBAN CIGARS, VOLTA  
SAID, HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO THINGS SUCH AS:

- USE OF LEAF TOBACCO WITHOUT PROPER SOILING.
- SCARCITY OF MATERIALS SUCH AS ALUMINUM FOIL, RINGS AND CEDAR  
BOXES USED IN PACKAGING.
- A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF WORN CIGARS.
- ALTERING OF THE TRADITIONAL BLENDS THAT GAVE CHARACTER TO CIGARS.
- "USE OF INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL IN HANDICRAFTING TOP QUALITY  
CIGARS, RESULTING IN PRODUCTION OF UNDERSIZED, OVERSIZED OR TOO HEAVY  
CIGARS."

VOLTA REPORTED LEAF PRODUCTION HAS DECLINED FROM THE PRE-CASTRO  
AVERAGE OF 45,000 TONS ANNUALLY TO 32,000 TONS IN 1965.

HE ADDED THAT TOBACCO IN THE VIEJAS REGION, FAMED FOR SHAGBERRY,  
"HAS DECLINED MORE THAN 70 PER CENT IN YIELD AND QUALITY DUE TO LACK  
OF FERTILIZER AND CARE."

HE SAID WORKERS TRAINED IN TOBACCO GROWING HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO  
CUBA'S NO. 1 CROP, SUGAR, NEEDED TO PROMOTE COUNTRIES TO BOLSTER WHAT  
HE CALLED CASTRO'S SHARKY ECONOMY.

THE EXILE ADDED THAT DUE TO LOW PRICES PAID TOBACCO GROWERS BY THE  
STATE, "MANY OF THE MOST EFFICIENT PRODUCERS HAVE DIVERTED THEIR LANDS  
TO OTHER CROPS."

IN ADDITION, THE EXILE ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION, REVOLUTIONARY  
UNITY, REPORTED AFTER A SURVEY THAT HARVEST OF 1966 SERIOUSLY DAMAGED  
THIS SEASON'S TOBACCO CROP.

NOV 24 1966

16  
CLASSIFIED

# WESTERN UNION PRESS MESSAGE

1966 10-11-921  
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W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1966 NOV 22 PM 3 20

MIAMI, NOV. 22/66

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK

DAYLETTER COLLECT

**31520** SEGUNDO ULTIMO REGIMEN CASTRO STOP VOLTA 35 FUE PRESENTADO POR ORGANIZACION ANTICASTRISTA MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA REGULARMENTE PRESENTADO TODOS DIPLOMATICOS DEFECCIONADO CASTRISMO STOP ADEMAS DE SEÑALAR PRACASO INDUSTRIA AZUCARERA VOLTA ASEGURO IGUAL CAMINO PARA INDUSTRIA TABACALERA CUBANA SEGUNDA IMPORTANCIA ISLA REVELANDO PASADO AÑO REGIMEN QUOTE APERAS LOGRO COLOCAR EUROPA OCCIDENTAL DOSHIL TONELEDAS METRICAS TABACO CON INGRESO APROXIMADO MILLON MEDIO DOLARES STOP IGUALMENTE SEÑALO DIFICULTADES SUPRIDAS POR CASTRO SUS EXPORTACIONES LANGOSTA ENCLUYENDO GRAN BRETANA ENTRE PAISES COMO CANADA FRANCIA AND POLONIA QUE HABIAN DEVUELTO MERCANCIA POR ESTAR MAL ESTADO STOP QUOTE SIN EMBARCO DIJO VOLTA ESA MERCANCIA DEVUELTA FUE PUESTA LUEGO VENTA MERCADO DOMESTICO CUBANO PRACTICA ESTA SEGUIDOSE INSALO CON LANGOSTA SINO CON TODOS PRODUCTOS EXPORTACION ~~RECHAZADOS~~ RECHAZADOS DESTINADOSE CONSUMO PUEBLO CUBANO UNQUOTE STOP EXDIPLOMATICO CUBANO FINALIZO ENTREVISTA ASECURANDO QUOTE POLITICA AGRESIVA CASTRO IDO AUMENTO AND SEGUERA POR ESE CAMINO HASTA ESTE SEA ELIMINADO UNQUOTE

ARROYO

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FR 9-8261

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WESTERN UNION  
PRESS MESSAGE

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

WESTERN UNION  
PRESS MESSAGE

1958 (9-11-57)  
UNION  
TIME FILED

1966 NOV 22 22 PM 3 20  
MIAMI, NOV. 22/66

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK

DAYLETTER COLLECT

31511

REGIMEN CASTRO UTILIZA POCOS ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES DONDE  
TIENE REPRESENTACION PARA SUS DELEGADOS LLEVEN POLITICA SUBVERSIVA ESTABLECIENDO  
MEJORES RELACIONES POSIBLES CON DELEGADOS OTROS PAISES ESPECIALMENTE CON  
LATINOAMERICANOS STOP ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES FUERON IMPARTIDAS DELEGACION PARTICIPO  
CONFERENCIA CAFE CELEBRADA ELSALVADOR DONDE CUBA PODIA CONCURRIR POR MANTENER ELLE  
ASIGNADA UNA CUOTA 194,000 SACOS CAFE PESAR HACER AÑOS CUBA CARECE ESE PRODUCTO  
PARA EXPORTACION REVELO HOY RAUL VOLTA LANDA QUIEN HASTA HACE POCOS DIAS ERA  
CONSEJERO COMERCIAL EMBAJADA CUBA LONDRES AND REPRESENTANTE GOBIERNO CASTRO ANTE  
ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES AZUCAR CAFE AND TRIGO AND DELEGADO OBSERVADOR ANTE  
GRUPO INTERNACIONAL DELA LANA STOP CONFERENCIA PRENSA CELEBRADA AQUI VOLTA  
ASEGURO QUOTE ECONOMICAMENTE REGIMEN COMUNISTA CASTRO ESTA LLEGANDO CLIMAX  
DESPUES SUPLEN UN FRACASO ECONOMICO TRAS OTRO UNQUOTE VATICINANDO PARA  
AÑO VENIDERO NUEVO FRACASO EN PRODUCCION AZUCAR QUE REGIMEN CUBANO DEJO  
INDICO HOY AL ANUNCIAR INICIO ZAPRA  
ESTA ALCANZARIA SIETE MILLONES TONELADAS STOP SIGUE ARROYO

21 NW 9na ave.

FR 9-8261

100



# economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

MAILING ADDRESS

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Miami, Florida

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373 - 8033

VOL. II No. 4

On November 22, 1966, Mr. Raúl VOLT Landa met with representatives of the press in Miami in order to discuss Cuban trade problems abroad and Cuban economic problems within. The ERB has felt that Mr. Volta's information will be of interest to all our readers, so therefore this issue of the Economic Intelligence Report contains the verbatim account of Mr. Volta's words.

## STATEMENT

My name is Raúl VOLT Landa, and until a few days ago I held the posts of Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in London, Representative to the International Sugar Council, Representative to the International Coffee Organization, to the International Wheat Council, and Observer-Delegate to the International Wool Group.

On November 14th my wife and I were interviewed by the press in New York at which time we discussed the reasons that prompted our defection. The results of this conference have appeared in the press and therefore today I would like to discuss in some detail economic problems confronting Cuba today with which I am personally familiar and which, I hope, will be of interest to you gentlemen. In an effort to be brief and not take too much of your time, my friends here have been kind enough to reproduce some technical and detailed information on the following subjects: sugar, tobacco, the problem of convertible currency, problems with the lobster exports, and usurpation of registered trade marks. There is also attached a resume of positions held since 1955.

From the economic point of view Castro's communist régime is well on the road to reaching a climax after having suffered one economic set-back after another. Today Cuba's leading cash crop, sugar, can be termed a failure in the sense that due to a number of factors and particularly mismanagement in Cuba plus the low world price, it is unable to support the Cuban economy. The second most important cash crop, tobacco, similarly has been so mismanaged that today it is an unimportant earner of critically needed foreign exchange.

This economic chaos has forced the Cuban régime to increasingly desperate measures in order merely to survive. For example, meat, tobacco, eggs, fruit, vegetables, coffee, preserves, and shoes are some of the products that today are exported from Cuba in an attempt to earn the hard currency to purchase heavy machinery, locomotives, fishing boats, and all the rest necessary to maintain any semblance of an economy. An unfortunate result of this is that today there is a serious shortage of the proper foods throughout all of Cuba. There is rationing. The people have insufficient rice. Even citrus fruits have had to be rationed. Milk is in critically short supply. There are not enough shoes to go around. Coffee, long considered a necessity by the people, is sometimes unobtainable and is always in short supply. Our beer, famous for years, is now hardly drinkable when it is available. These problems, which before the communist régime were totally unknown to Cuba, were brought painfully home to me each time I returned to Havana from my post in London.

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For example, I was in Havana in July after hurricane Irma hit Western Cuba last June, a number of buildings and houses had to be repaired all over the city of Havana. Debris from demolitions and subsequent constructions was piled on the streets. Time passed, but the streets were still full of debris that gave the city the looks of a bomber target. This caused considerable disgust among the population of Havana.

Another example is that the food quota on the ration book is largely a "paper" reality. What I mean is that the food on the book is rarely available, and whole months pass without any meat, lard, oil, rice, beans, being distributed. At this precise time, in Havana, there are no seasoning ingredients available to the consumer. When the product is available again, the meager book quota is what each one gets, without any compensation for the time during which he could not even get that.

As a result of this, queues are longer every day, with people standing in line since the early morning hours to make sure that they won't be left out. There are often fights and even minor riots at the queues on account of the irritation that this situation causes.

Also I have seen that the régime is opening many new restaurants, allegedly to make recreation facilities available to the people. In reality, however, what they seek is to extract money from circulation, as the prices at these new places are extraordinarily high. Hence, only the members of the ruling "new class" may enjoy the new spots, as the working people could never afford them.

I will be happy to attempt to answer any questions that you may have regarding those areas of life or of events in Cuba today with which I am familiar.

Thank you.

## SUGAR

As the Cuban representative to the International Sugar Council I was able to observe at first hand some of the problems facing the Cuban sugar industry. Some observations follow:

### International Aspect:

It is well known that all countries that import or produce sugar are making efforts towards reaching a long-term Sugar Agreement that would stabilize and solve the critical situation in the world market of over-supply and low price. Castro's stand to that respect has been to boycott and undermine such efforts.

This has been clearly reflected in Castro's refusal to participate in the various work groups that have been created for that purpose under the sponsorship of the Secretary General of UNCTAD, Dr. Raúl Prebisch.

Castro believes that by not participating in efforts to reach a Sugar Agreement he can cause the collapse of the sugar industries in the less efficient producer countries in order to bring economic hardship to those countries in Latin America to which sugar exports are important. Castro's ultimate end, of course, is to cause internal disturbances in these countries and thus to ripen them for Castro-communist subversion. This has been a boomerang to Cuba. The hoped-for economic disaster in the Latin American nations has not occurred. Instead, it is occurring in Cuba. The régime is unable to meet its announced goals (the goal for the sugar year 1966 was 6,500,000 tons whereas 4,455,255 were actually harvested). To move its sugar, Cuba has been forced to grant special discounts, for example to Japan, and to Great Britain. This further compounds the chaotic economic situation in Cuba as the country obtains even less per pound than the current low price of .014¢.

### Internal Aspect:

The blows received by Cuba's sugar economy from the hurricanes and droughts are nothing compared to the damage caused by the improvisation and incompetency of those who today mismanage our country's affairs. The shortage of manpower for cutting the cane, the enlistment of inexperienced "volunteer" cane cutters, the failure of combine machines from the USSR, and the deteriorating situation in the transportation of the cane crown the existing economic anarchy.

The régime has been committed by Castro to produce 10,000,000 tons of sugar in 1970, which figure sugar economists in and out of Cuba agree is most unlikely. However, the attempt to reach this goal is resulting in activities that amount to economic suicide. Cuba is buying generators in England costing more than one million dollars which will be used to provide power for the "Centros de Acopio" (reception centers). The concept of these centers was tried many years ago in Cuba and discarded as both inefficient and uneconomical. There is no reason to believe that anything has happened that will change this. So, what to do with the generators?

One might conclude a discussion of Cuba's sugar problems with the observation that never before in Cuba's economic history has so much discussion, so many speeches, and so much activity resulted in such a loss of effectiveness.

## TOBACCO

I was associated with the tobacco exporting enterprise (Empresa CUBATABACO) for four years including three years as Assistant Manager. I am happy to make my first hand knowledge available.

### Agricultural Aspect.-

This industry is another example of the administrative clumsiness of the Communists. Once the second industry of Cuba, and the source of great prestige for our country, it seems to be doomed to total destruction since the Communist régime took control of it.

Leaf tobacco production has declined by over 30% comparing the 1965 figure (32,000 M.T.) with the traditional production of over 45,000 M.T. yearly. The best tobacco fields of the famed Vuelta Abajo zone, which gave the best wrapper in the world, have experienced a sharp decline of over 70% in yield and quality, due to lack of fertilizers and the necessary care.

About 20% of the plantations are affected by the bug, as the fields and curing sheds are not sprayed. The INRA policy of very low prices paid and lack of incentives given to the most efficient producers has forced the producers to divert their lands to less risky and more profitable crops. This is particularly true of the Remedios and Cabaiguán zones. Peasants trained in tobacco growing have been absorbed by cane growing areas in order to remedy the critical manpower situation in the latter, but at the expense of inflicting grave damage to the tobacco economy. This has brought the incorporation of "volunteer" workers to the cropping of the leaf, which workers, due to their inexperience in such a specialized work, break the leaf, with the resulting damage to its quality.

### Industrial Aspect.-

The industrial phase of the tobacco industry has not been better off, and in our opinion it has been the one that has suffered most from the incompetency of the régime. The quality, presentation, and production volume of Cuban cigars has been seriously affected, not only as far as production for national consumption is concerned, but also as regards the portion designed for export. It would be endless to list the wrongs that have been done, but they may be outlined thus:

- 1) Loss of quality due to the use of raw leaf tobacco and without the necessary aging.
- 2) Failure to deliver to foreign customers due to the lack of intermediate materials to finish the product, such as: aluminum tubes for packaging these cigars, aluminum cases, holders, rings, cedar boxes, etc.
- 3) Continuous complaints are received from foreign importers, due to the detection of high percentage of wormed cigars.
- 4) The traditional blends that gave character to each of the traditional brands have been changed and altered, which has resulted in the imaginable loss of quality and prestige.

5) Incorporation of inexperienced personnel to the preparation of "Alta Regalia", (top-quality, hand made) cigars, which affects the finish of the hand-crafting cigars with the result that undersized, oversized, or too heavy cigars are produced.

These and many other irregularities take place today in our industry, without failing to mention that the climax of all this situation is caused by the lack of cigars for national consumption, something definitely unprecedented in the history of our country.

#### Trade Aspects.-

The Cuban Communist régime faces great difficulties in its efforts to make dollars through tobacco exports, and some of them have been pointed out already.

Nevertheless, I believe that the chief trouble is represented by the market limitations suffered by Cuban tobacco today. Castro has been unable to convince his Iron Curtain "friends" to purchase the volume that was formerly absorbed by the U.S.. He has only persuaded the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to buy a total of approximately 5,000 M.T. The truth, however, is that these exports have been made with distrust, as there have been reports that Cuba's "friends", after buying this tobacco, re-export it to hard-currency countries at lower prices than those established by the "Empresa CUBATABACO" for the free world market.

I may cite a specific instance of this. Late in 1962, the Polish enterprise ROLIMPEX bought approximately 600 tons of tobacco. The contract specifically prohibited re-exportation by the Poles, and provided that any legal difficulties that might arise would be submitted for arbitration. After the deliveries were made to ROLIMPEX, reports began to arrive from the Free European market that Cuban tobacco leaf was being offered at a much lower price than that established by the Cuban exporting enterprise in its sale of tobacco to Free Europe. At first, it was thought that this was only a maneuver for lower prices by the European importers, but, as time passed and CUBATABACO could not place any sales, the reports, which were still coming in, were given more credence. As a result of this, I was sent to conduct an on-the-spot investigation in Europe, and, sure enough, I discovered that the Poles were indeed re-exporting our tobacco, with complete disregard of their signed agreement with Cuba. The violation was reported to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade, which instructed CUBATABACO to institute proceedings to recover damages from the Poles. Cuba sued for \$1 million and the Poles, having being caught red-handed, offered a settlement of \$50,000 which was accepted. The payment was made in dollars, out of the Polish-Cuban clearing.

This "international solidarity" practiced by Communist countries kept Cuba for a long time (1962-1963) from entering Western European markets.

Dumping as practiced by these countries, the lack of adequate stocks for the Europeans' taste, difficulties and delays in deliveries (due to shortage of ships) have made the Europeans shy away from buying larger quantities of Cuban leaf, and, many European importers have learned that Cuba is not a reliable source of supply.

Due to the above stated reasons, the Communist régime can barely place 2,000 M.T. in Western Europe, for an annual revenue of about US\$1,500,000.

PROBLEMS WITH THE LOBSTER EXPORTS

Upon my arrival here I was surprised to learn the extent of the detailed information possessed by UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA and its Economic Research Bureau. This information is accurate and I am able to add more information to that known by the U.R.

Cuba had been exporting lobster through Sam Beiner, of the Montreal firm "World Seafood Distributors". These exports were made by the Cuban concern ALIMPEX to "World Seafood", and the latter re-exported the lobster to European firms such as the Belgian "Hallewick" and the British "Young Seafood".

When ALIMPEX was replaced by CUBAEXPORT, the new Cuban concern tried to grab the European lobster market from Beiner and his Canadian firm. This was the objective for which CUBAEXPORT Director Rodolfo Shoning was working during a recent European tour, and, to this end, he made contact with the British firm "Young Seafood", the French firm "Jacques Fourcstein et Cie.", and others in Western Europe. CUBAEXPORT was to a large extent successful in this effort to out out Beiner.

The troubles of CUBAEXPORT and of all other Cuban foreign trade enterprises with free-world firms are due to the fact that Cuban concerns have no respect for international trade ethics. They take recourse to all sorts of maneuvers, as selling is their only concern; this in the long run alienates customers. In the case of the lobster exports lack of quality has been apparent. Through my office in London I learned of complaints of improper cooking, packing, and even crating of lobster exported to France, Poland, and England. Hundreds of cases have been rejected by health and customs authorities and by the importers themselves. The problems Beiner has encountered in Canada have been duplicated in Europe.

Naturally, the poor quality of the lobster has been the cause of probes by Canadian, French and British health authorities. Even the authorities of Communist countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia have been forced to look into the matter. These countries have returned lobster to Cuba as "unfit for human consumption". This merchandise, however, was subsequently placed in the Cuban domestic market, a practice that has been followed not only with the lobster, but also with all other exports that have been turned down by Cuba's customers abroad.

Perhaps less serious cases, but which also illustrate the régime's contempt for the Cuban people, are good instances of this policy. I refer to products which, although not quite unfit for human consumption, do not meet foreign quality standards, such as fruit preserves that have been turned down abroad because of their excessively high contents of sugar, and rum that was returned because of impurities. These items were retailed to the Cuban people after being rejected abroad.

There also are complaints about the presentation of the product and the packing, all of which has caused stern protests by the affected free-world firms, such as "Jacques Fourcstein et Cie.", which complained to ALIMPEX last year and to CUBAEXPORT this year.

USURPATION OF REGISTERED TRADE MARKS

As is known, the Castro régime, after monopolizing foreign trade and seizing private industries, arbitrarily decreed that all Cuban trade-marks had become the property of the government. However, with the lawful owners of these trade-marks scattered as exiles over the free world, Castro has met considerable legal difficulties in using the stolen brand names for his exports. Abroad, Castro has been unsuccessful, in most cases, in assigning these trade-marks to the régime's export enterprises, as, in most countries, the brands are registered in the names of their lawful owners.

Thus Castro violates international trade-mark regulations. This situation is particularly true with respect to the world-famous trade-marks of Cuban cigars. One of the best-known cases is the continued exportation of cigars bearing the "La Corona" and "Henry Clay" brands, which are the property of the American Tobacco Company. This firm was forced to take direct action in England, France, and Switzerland, countries to which Castro has had to halt exports.

Another example is the much-debated case of the "BACARDI" brand, which is now being contested and which will be brought before the courts of Great Britain by February or March next year.

In 1963, British authorities seized a shipment of Bacardi rum which was recently returned to Cuba, and, therefore, the régime has been unable to export this brand to England. The régime faces similar problems with Canada and Japan.

The first complications arising from this case took place right in Cuba, where there were even dismissals in juridical Direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade early this year. Presently, Cuba is facing the following difficulties in this case:

- 1) Legal contradictions due to Cuba's very laws of expropriations and to the perennial "reorganizations" and "creations" of Cuban foreign trade concerns.
- 2) Restricted opportunities for the Cuban régime to present witnesses, as it fears that such witnesses will take the chance to defect.
- 3) Troubles between the Cuban régime and the very solicitor of the London "Seifert and Seddeley" case.
- 4) Financial limitations, as the Cuban régime has only US\$ 42,000 to finance the expenses of the case through the London law firm "Clark Russel".

NAME: Raul VOLTA Landa

Married, three children

Age: 35

Professional Information

- 1.- 1966: Cuban Representative in the International Sugar Council, International Wheat Council, International Coffee Organization; Observer-Delegate to the International Wool Group.
- 2.- 1965-1966: Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in London. August-December 1965: Cuban Chargé D'Affaires in London.
- 3.- 1964: Member of the Trade Delegation to Spain. Tobacco Advisor.
- 4.- 1962: Member of the Trade Delegation to Spain. Tobacco Advisor.
- 5.- 1962-1965: Operative Assistant Manager, "Empresa CUBATABACO".
- 6.- 1961: Chief of the Leaf Tobacco Section of the "Empresa Cubana de Exportaciones".
- 7.- 1958-1960: Sales Manager "Minemar Televisión Co." and "Fedders".
- 8.- 1956: Sales Manager, Electronic Dept., "Electro Sales Co." (Sylvania)

U.R. Economic Research Bureau  
10 S.E. 9th Street,  
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

Miami, Fla., November 25, 1966.-

C/WH

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

### PROCESSING

TO  
Chief of Station, Bogota.

PRO-POSTED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN MAKE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	INDEXABLE	

INFO  
Chief, WH; Chief, FE; COS, Tokyo

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT **TYPIC AMSCROLL**  
Letter from Jose R. Mercado

ACTION REQUIRED: **FYI**

*2/11/66*  
*not d.*

On 15 October Jose R. Mercado, President of the Colombian Confederation of Workers (CTC), discussed with AMWORD-3, the Secretary General of AMSCROLL, the CTC's plans to do what it can to discourage Japan-Cuba trade by bringing influence to bear on the trade seminar in Tokyo that was to have begun on 19 October. Upon his return to Bogota, Sr. Mercado wrote a letter to the Japanese Ambassador to Colombia, a copy of which we forward together with a translation.

**PHILIP G. ELMARD**

- Attachments: h/w
1. Letter (copy) as stated
  2. Translation of letter

- Distribution:
- 3- COS/Bogota, w/atts. h/w
  - 2- C/FE, w/atts. h/w *see the file re Watt.*
  - 2- COS/Tokyo, w/atts. h/w
  - 2- C/WH, w/atts. h/w
  - 2- WH/C, w/atts.

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DATE TYPED <b>26 Oct 66</b>	DATE DISPATCHED <b>04 28 1966</b>
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>UFGA-26277</b>	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER <b>19-120-26</b>	
<b>19-120-26/3</b>	



CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA

PERSONERIA JURIDICA NO. 271 DE 1957

FILIAL DE C. I. O. S. L. - O. N. T.

Bogotá, D. C. Octubre 17/66

Señor  
EMBAJADOR DEL JAPÓN  
EN COLOMBIA  
E. S. D.

Excelentísimo señor Embajador:

Con ocasión a que durante los días 19 y 21 del presente mes se realizará un seminario de Comercio en la ciudad de Tokio, con la participación de algunos países de América Latina, la CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA C.T.C., quiere reiterar por su conducto al Gobierno Democrático del Japón la solicitud que en otras ocasiones hemos formulado referente a que en lo más pronto posible el permanente comercio con su país, el Japón, tiene establecido con el régimen Comunista de Cuba, al considerar que las divisas con el Gobierno de Cuba lo que la venta de sus productos, es utilizada para financiar la subversión y el terrorismo de la América Latina.

Nuestra solicitud la formulamos con miras a salvaguardar los intereses del Sindicalismo Libre y Democrático y la integridad institucional de nuestro país, ya que Colombia como otros países de América está comprendida dentro del programa de infiltraciones que desde Cuba ha planificado el Gobierno Internacional, como lo confirmó el Periódico "EL TIEMPO" en uno de sus editoriales del 12 de Octubre.

Insistimos en hacer esta petición porque consideramos que al continuar el Japón comerciando con Cuba Comunista, es tanto como contribuir a sostener un régimen en América que ha terminado con las libertades democráticas, ha fomentado el asesinato en masa y el secuestro de millares de Dirigentes y Trabajadores de las Américas. Al continuar esta situación nos veremos en la obligación de organizar con otros países de América el boicoteo a todos los productos japoneses como lo hemos hecho con los barcos de los países que están negociando con Cuba.

En espera de sus gratas noticias los suscribimos de Ud. atentamente.

CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA C.T.C.

*[Signature]*  
SECRETARIO GENERAL

*[Signature]*  
SECRETARIO GENERAL

AVANZADO ABRIL 1964 - TELEGRAFOS Y CARLES (CETEC) BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

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all. # 2 - C.F.G.A. - 26277

Bogotá, D.E., October 17, 1966

Excmo. Sr.  
Embajador del Japon  
En Colombia  
E. S. D.

Excellence:

On account of the forthcoming Trade Seminar that will take place from the 19 to the 21st of this month in the City of Tokyo, with the participation of some Latin American countries, the CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF COLOMBIA, CFC, wishes to reiterate through you, to the Democratic Government of Japan, the request we have formulated in other occasions, referent to the curbing of the permanent trade that Japan has established with the Cuban Communist regime, considering that the currency obtained from the selling of Japanese products is used by the Government of Cuba to finance the subversive terrorism in Latin America.

We formulate our request in the hope of saving the interests of the Free and Democratic workers and the institutional integrity of our country, since Colombia, the same as other American countries, form part of the infidelization program that has been planned from Cuba by the International Government, as was confirmed in the newspaper "El Tiempo" in one of its editorial articles of October 12.

We insist in this petition because we consider that if Japan continues its trade with Communist Cuba, it would be the same as to contribute to the support of a regime in America which has put an end to the democratic freedom, has promoted the mass murder and the imprisonment of thousands of democratic leaders and workers. If this situation persists, we would be forced to organize, together with other countries of America, the boycott to all Japanese products as we have done with the ships of those countries that are holding trade with Cuba.

Hoping to hear from you soon, we remain,

Sincerely yours,

JOSE B. MERCADO  
PRESIDENT

EUGENIO MOLINA BARRIOS  
SECRETARY GENERAL IN CHARGE

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TO  
Chief, WH Division

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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
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INFO.

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT  
TYPIC/Operational  
Quarterly Progress Reports Concerning Political Action Programs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith are Progress Reports for the First Quarter of FY 67 concerning eight Political Action programs of the Station; these programs are listed under the Covert Action sector of the FY 67 budget:

- AMSCROLL
- AMCROW
- AMBASAL
- AMLIRA
- AMSTRUT
- AMWASP
- AMKNOT
- AMMOP

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2. The first quarter of FY 67 was a period of readjustment in the political action field, all of the above programs having been reduced in size and cost in the last quarter of FY 66. That the PW Branch has succeeded in reaching the initial projected goals with respect to economy of political action operations in FY 67 is demonstrated by the following tabulation of expenses:

Program	Projected 1st Quarter Cost	Actual 1st Quarter Cost
AMSCROLL	36,750	33,873
AMCROW	3,750	6,077
AMBASAL	11,500	12,226
AMLIRA	16,250	16,434
AMSTRUT	24,000	16,185
AMWASP	6,000	4,228
AMKNOT	3,000	1,986
AMMOP	3,750	2,225
<b>Total</b>	<b>105,000</b>	<b>93,234</b>

Attachment: h/w  
Progress Reports, w/IDENS U/S/C (copy)

Distribution:  
2 -WH/C, w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO  
ID-19-126-4213  
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ID-19-126-4213

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
27 OCT 66	27 OCT 66

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER  
**UFGA-26303**

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3. In the second quarter the Station will continue its cost reduction action aimed at achieving a substantial reduction in Covert Action costs prior to the spring of 1967, and at reaching by the beginning of FY 68 a level of expenditure much below that projected for FY 67.

*Philip G. Elward*  
**Philip G. ELWARD**

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**S E C R E T**

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

2

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20P

MEMORANDUM

19 October 1966

TO : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
AMSCROLL Progress Report,  
1 July - 30 September 1966

WPW-1207

Distribution  
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1-PW/MARCHBANK  
1-PW/Chrono  
1-REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS


1. This quarter opened with an internal reorganization of AMSCROLL becoming effective. The reorganization had been undertaken in the interests of efficiency and economy. The Departments of Labor, Women, Foreign Affairs, Coordination, and Youth were abolished. This action got rid of largely ineffective people who had been receiving salaries and will prevent dissipation of AMSCROLL funds and energies. The new, stream-lined organization is better able to concentrate upon the field it knows best: economic action. With its present staff it is also able to undertake action in political, youth, and the other fields should this be desirable.

2. The major activities of AMSCROLL during this quarter fell into four categories. They are economic activities, Free World shipping to Cuba, dissemination of propaganda, and the AMSCROLL radio program.

a. In the economic field AMSCROLL continued its analysis of the 1966 sugar harvest that officially ended at 11:00 p.m. of 27 June-- though wind-up activities continued into this quarter. The point of the post-mortem was to publicize why Cuba fell so far short (2,044,745 tons) of its announced goal of 6,500,000 tons, which goal was set by Castro in his May Day, 1965 speech. Sources of information were the daily production figures of Radio Havana; analyses conducted by other experts such as F. O. Licht, Czarnikow-Klonda, the Merrill Lynch Weekly Sugar Letter, etc.; information the Station was able to pass; and the background of such experts as AMSNAKE-1, AMRAIN-1, and AMWASP-1. The Station has seen stories based upon these releases in the Miami Herald; the Miami News; the Economic Intelligence Unit, a London publication; Alerta, a publication in Guatemala; the American Marine Engineer; the Times of America; and Diario Las Americas. In addition appropriate Station assets such as AMHIM replay much of this information. The point of this was to demonstrate to Free World commercial circles and to the Cuban radio audience that Cuban economic promises are not reliable and hence that Cuba is an unreliable nation with which to trade. In support of this theme this quarter also marked the beginning of the campaign

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against Cuban lobsters that are being sold in Canada and Europe. The first public surfacing known to the Station of this study was a story that appeared in the Miami News on 29 September. This story was prepared from an AMSCROLL press release that was mailed to the AMSCROLL list of business people, bankers, and traders in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. In addition, the local AFP correspondent filed a story based upon this release.

Also during this quarter AMSCROLL released other studies of an economic nature on such subjects as Cuban trade with Spain, the status of the Cuban oil industry, and the failure of mechanization of the Cuban sugar industry. The bases of these studies were provided by the Station, often from information provided by qualified refugees arriving via the air lift. In other cases, AMSCROLL personnel--particularly AMFRAME-1--would interview some of these refugees.

b. A continuing effort was made during the quarter to publicize Free World shipping with Cuba. Each month a list is compiled by the Station of those ships from the Free World that visited Cuba during the previous month which is passed to AMSCROLL for release to the press. In addition, a special study was made regarding the Greek firm Franco Shipping Company. The wire services regularly carry this information and 27 published stories on this subject in U.S., Canadian, and English publications came to the Station's attention during this period.

c. During this period 16,000 pieces of printed material were mailed to Cuba. This included 7,500 copies of AMSCROLL's miniature newspaper which contained condensed stories of such items as Castro's 26th of July Speech, quotations from earlier Castro speeches making promises that were not kept, the sugar deficit, and defections of Cuban seamen. Also, 7,500 copies were mailed to Cuba of a notice that publicizes the AMSCROLL radio program and which requests readers of the miniature newspaper to leave it in public places for others to read. AMSCROLL still has a supply of the soap sheets which carries an imprinted message for the recipients not to lose hope. One thousand of these were mailed to Cuba and we anticipate continuing mailings until the supply of these soap sheets is exhausted. About 4,350 copies of the economic studies described in 2.a. above were mailed to a carefully compiled list of banks, business firms, etc. in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. About 1,600 copies of these releases translated into Spanish were also distributed.

d. The AMSCROLL radio program is on the air over AMTHIGH for ten minutes each day of the week except Sunday. This program is increasingly addressing itself to the economic failure of communism in Cuba, the economic failure of Cuba abroad, and to the increasing political and economic isolation of Cuba from both the

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S E C R E T

-3-

Free and Communist worlds. To these ends, prominence was given to problems with the sugar crop, statements prepared especially for AMSCROLL by such defectors as AMBRAY-1, AMBINGO-1, and selected defectors from the Cuban merchant marine. The program ran a series of quotations from earlier Castro speeches that were pitted against official government statistics of a current nature that gave the lie to Castro's earlier promises. Also, the program sought to exploit such specific items as selling Cuban beef to Spain which increased the shortage in Cuba, sending medical equipment and drugs to the Congo though these are desperately needed in Cuba, etc.. During this period the program received 11 letters from Cuban listeners as follows: July, 2; August, 4; and September, 5. With one exception these letters were favorable in their response. As in the past AMSCROLL continued to front for AMSHADY-1's radio program over JMHOPE and ANTUMOR. Also, AMSCROLL continued to front for a musical program which it does not produce.

**B. ADMINISTRATION**

3. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was \$36,750.00; whereas, \$33,873.00 was spent. Of this amount \$11,217.00 was for salaries and \$22,656.00 for operational expenses which included office maintenance. A determined and successful effort has been made to keep actual expenses under the budgeted amount. Important to this was the reorganization described in A.1. above which in salaries alone amounted to a monthly reduction of \$1,200.00. Operational and housekeeping expenses have also been reduced over previous months with, the Station believes, an improved operational result.

**C. PROBLEMS**

4. The Station believes that it has overcome a source of potential trouble by pressing the reorganization of AMSCROLL that became effective 1 July in that persons who in the past had been trouble makers were eased out. The only remaining problem is the ever-present one of AMFRAME-1 who is capable of earning considerably more than the Station is paying. As an intelligent, aggressive person with a growing family he will sooner or later have to face up to this personal problem of his. He prefers to remain in the work he is now doing for WOFACT which, coupled with a recent salary increase to \$450.00 a month should combine to retain him at least for the near future. His wife has recently received an impressive monetary prize of an academic nature and AMFRAME-1's family in Venezuela is currently supplementing his WOFACT pay, which factors also help.

**D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER**

5. Administratively we expect AMSCROLL to continue as reorganized and we are hopeful that we can effect additional

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-4-

economies. Operationally the Station has these specific projects in mind which are in addition to the normal activities:

a. AMSCROLL will attempt to push further the Station-developed story of the spoiled Cuban lobster with the goal in mind of having it branded of dubious quality in Canada, France, and other countries.

b. The Station has begun its utilization of AMSCROLL to analyze the 1967 sugar harvest. As for the 1966 harvest, AMSCROLL's final projection of the results of the harvest was made on 23 May, some five weeks in advance of the 29 June official Cuban announcement. AMSCROLL predicted a harvest of 4,496,400 tons, only 41,145 tons over the actual figure. We know of no one who came this close. We have observed with interest how such forecasters as Merrill Lynch offered figures that came even closer to the AMSCROLL projections as the final harvest date approached. We hope to repeat this performance for the coming year.

c. At the close of this reporting period the Station began a campaign to discourage Japan-Cuban trade in favor of expanded Japanese trade with other Latin American nations. This campaign has the concurrence of Headquarters and Station Tokyo (DIRECTOR-36498 and TOKYO-9962). AMFRAME-1 and AMSNAKE-1 are being utilized to implement this campaign insofar as Latin American business organizations are concerned.

**S E C R E T**

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 50  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  SET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED  
*K. L. Amscroll*

1		8
2		8
3		7
4		8

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: *Dissem of 25A*

ACTION: *WHIC 2*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBES

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO: *FILE UR, WMB, BITAN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2*

SECRET 251807Z CITE JMWAVE 3815  
 KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR  
 TYPIC AMSCROLL

26 OCT 68 20061

1. ON 24 OCTOBER REV. HENRY MUIR, WHO SAID HE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED LIBERAL PARTY, CALLED UPON IDEN A WHO SECRETARY GENERAL OF AMSCROLL (IDEN B). MUIR ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FOR HIS PARTY'S FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES IN JAMAICA. MUIR SAID HE FRIENDLY WITH CHIEF LINGOLD IN JAMAICA AND EXPLAINED HE HAS INSUFFICIENT "MEANS" FOR HIS PARTY. IDEN A RESPONDED THAT SMCROLL HARDLY HAS MEANS FOR ITS OWN EFFORTS AND THAT IT UNABLE RENDER SUPPORT OTHER GROUPS. IDEN A SHOWED MUIR AROUND AMSCROLL PREMISES AND GAVE HIM SAMPLES AMSCROLL PUBLICATIONS. MUIR EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AT LEAST ONE PUBLICATION AND SAID IN FUTURE HE WOULD LIKE ADDITIONAL COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA.

2. ON 25 OCTOBER MUIR TELEPHONED IDEN A TO ASK FOR "A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS" TO FINANCE TRIP TO CALIFORNIA WHERE MUIR SAYS HE HAS JAMAICAN CONTACTS WHO WILL PROVIDE FUNDS IF MUIR CAN ONLY GET THERE. IDEN A DECLINED., MUIR SAID HE UNSUCCESSFUL RAISING FUNDS THUS FAR IN JMWAVE AREA AND

**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3815 S E C R E T

UNLESS HE HAS IMMEDIATE SUCCESS HE WILL RETURN JAMAICA

27 OCTOBER.

3. STATION PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION MUIR'S REQUESTS

UNLESS ADDEES REQUEST OTHERWISE.

4. INDEX MUIR. NO JMWAVE TRACES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE R.D.  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE <sup>E</sup> TOTAL COPIES <sup>29</sup>

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED			
1	FP	5	NO
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	C
4	OS	8	D

ACTION: WN/CB  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO: FILE, 18, WHB, C/C/OPS, C/C/2, CA2, CA/PROP, FI, EI/INT2

**SECRET** 261809Z CITE JMWAVE 3815

KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCRLL

26 OCT 68 2606E

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3815 (IN 2606 D)

IDENTITY A. DR. MARIO SEIGLIE

IDENTITY B. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

**SECRET**

BT

**SECRET**

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0

TOTAL COPIES 3

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE REC  REV. TO BRANCH

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**SECRET**

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP	5	MO
2		6	F1
3	CS	7	C
4	OS	8	D

Dissem BY 25/A

ACTION

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RD COPY

ADVANCE COPY

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SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE UR, WMB, RIAA, CI, CI/OPS, CILIC 2, CA2, CA/PROP, F1, F1/INT 2

SECRET 261807Z CITE JMWAVE 3815

KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

**ACTUAL**  
2600 2306

1. ON 24 OCTOBER REV. HENRY MUIR, WHO SAID HE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED LIBERAL PARTY, CALLED UPON IDEN A WHO SECRETARY GENERAL OF AMSCROLL (IDEN B). MUIR ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FOR HIS PARTY'S FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES IN JAMAICA. MUIR SAID HE FRIENDLY WITH CHIEF LNGOLD IN JAMAICA AND EXPLAINED HE HAS INSUFFICIENT "MEANS" FOR HIS PARTY. IDEN A RESPONDED THAT SMCROLL HARDLY HAS MEANS FOR ITS OWN EFFORTS AND THAT IT UNABLE RENDER SUPPORT OTHER GROUPS. IDEN A SHOWED MUIR AROUND AMSCROLL PREMISES AND GAVE HIM SAMPLES AMSCROLL PUBLICATIONS. MUIR EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AT LEAST ONE PUBLICATION AND SAID IN FUTURE HE WOULD LIKE ADDITIONAL COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA.

*W*  
*Mu*

2. ON 25 OCTOBER MUIR TELEPHONED IDEN A TO ASK FOR "A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS" TO FINANCE TRIP TO CALIFORNIA WHERE MUIR SAYS HE HAS JAMAICAN CONTACTS WHO WILL PROVIDE FUNDS IF MUIR CAN ONLY GET THERE. IDEN A DECLINED. MUIR SAID HE UNSUCCESSFUL RAISING FUNDS THUS FAR IN JMWAVE AREA AND

**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3815 S E C R E T

UNLESS HE HAS IMMEDIATE SUCCESS HE WILL RETURN JAMAICA

27 OCTOBER.

3. STATION PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION MUIR'S REQUESTS

UNLESS ADDEES REQUEST OTHERWISE.

4. INDEX MUIR. NO JMWAVE TRACES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET



CIWlt

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	<b>SECRET</b>	FOR INDEXING	ACTION
TO	Chief of Station, Paris	<b>XX</b>	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO	Chief, WH Chief, WE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	TYPIC/MH/TPER/AMSCROLL C Cuban Lobster Sales		ABSTRACT
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 2.  REFERENCE: JMWAVE-3309  1. As indicated in the reference the AMSCROLL study on Cuban problems in marketing its lobsters in France and Canada as well as a clip of local press play were airmailed to the Paris Station on 29 September. The AFP account which was filed with its New York office is a much shorter and less complete version than the clip already airmailed you.  2. We are planning a follow-up story per Paragraph 3 of the reference and will very much appreciate being informed of any French reaction that may grow out of the AFP story or Station efforts. It would be particularly helpful if we could indicate that the French health authorities have found it necessary to inspect these shipments due to the inferior quality and improper cooking of the lobsters.		
	PHILIP G. ELMARD		
Distribution:	19-120-26		
3- COS/Paris	DATE TYPED		
(2) C/WH	3 Oct 66		
2- C/WE 2cc for. E/F	DATE DISPATCHED		
2- WH/C	OCT 5 1966		
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		
	UFGA-26099		
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER		
	♦ 19-120-26/3		
	CROSS REFERENCE TO		
	CLASSIFICATION		
	<b>SECRET</b>		

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CS COPY

C/WH

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED	ACTION

TO Chief of Station, Ottawa

INFO Chief, WH

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/MIVIPER/AMSCROLL  
C Cuban Lobster

ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: For COS, Ottawa to determine**

**REFERENCE: JMWAVE-3309**

1. We forward by separate cover the AMSCROLL report, page 4 of which contains the study on Cuban-Canadian lobster trade discussed in the reference as well as a clip of the AMTAPPY-1 treatment of this study. It may be of interest to report that the mailing list routinely used for this and similar studies of this nature contains the following Canadian firms:

[Redacted area]

2. As part of the follow-up play Station of course would appreciate any reaction from the Canadian press or other sources. We will particularly appreciate being informed if it comes to the attention of Station Ottawa that the health authorities inspect, condemn, or otherwise take any action on these shipments.

**PHILIP G. ELWARD**

Attachments: USC  
1. Report  
2. Clip

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declassification

Distribution:  
3- COS/Ottawa, w/atts. usc  
2- C/WH, w/o atts.  
2- WH/C, w/o atts.

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19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	30-Sep 66	OC. 5 1966
CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
	UFGA-26091	
<b>S E C R E T</b>	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
	19-120-26/3	

INDEX  YES  NO

*File in small*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES *33*

R-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  REF. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

**SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP-	5	RD
2		6	MD
3	CA	7	CI
4	OS	8	FI-TR

ACTION

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INFO

*FILE (R, EUR 8, 204, 20/H3, CAZ, CA/PROP, C/ICZ, ADDP*

SECRET 031958Z CITE JMWAVE 3352

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE-3309

*(IN 064119)*  
*(IN 07355)*

B. JMWAVE-3332

C. UFGA-28091 (30 SEPT)

Swider *SA*  
Cohen *29*  
Forsythe *WB*  
Conrad

Always  
30 Oct 66 # 08755

1. NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE (NANA) WISHES DISTRIBUTE FEATURE ARTICLE BASED UPON AMIAFFY-1 STORY DESCRIBED REF A. PRIOR RELEASING ARTICLE NANA HAS ASKED AMIAFFY-1 CHECK FURTHER FOR MORE FACTS. IN ATTEMPTING THIS AMIAFFY-1 UNABLE REACH SAN BEINER THOUGH HAS SPOKEN TO MRS. BEINER AT REF B NUMBER WHO CONFIRMS BEINER HOME ALSO WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS' OFFICE. SHE SAYS BEINER NOT AVAILABLE. AS CONSEQUENCE BOTH NANA AND AMIAFFY-1 BELIEVE THEY ON TO BIG STORY AND NANA HAS DECIDED SIT ON MATERIAL IT NOW HAS UNTIL MORE BACKGROUND INFO ON BEINER, WORLD SEAFOOD, AND THEIR METHODS OF OPERATION CAN BE DEVELOPED.

2. REQUEST HQS AND OTTAWA TRACES BEINER AND WORLD SEAFOOD WITH INDICATION WHAT CAN BE PASSED AMIAFFY-1. FROM OTTAWA ALSO REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON THIS SUBJECT,

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3352 S E C R E T **SECRET**

ESPECIALLY ANY OBSERVED LOCAL REACTION (REF C LISTS SEVEN CANADIAN FIRMS AND AGENCIES THAT RECEIVED ORIGINAL-AMSCROLL RELEASE ABOUT 23 SEPT WHICH MAY HAVE GENERATED CANADIAN PUBLICITY). THIS INFO WILL BE INCLUDED IN FOLLOW-UP STORY MENTIONED PARA 3 REF A. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS PLEASE DO NOT CHECK WITH LIAISON.

3. FOR PARIS: WILL BE HAPPY INCLUDE ANY ANGLE YOU PROVIDE RE JACQUES FOURCHTEIN & CIE, OR OTHERS THAT MAY BE DEALING IN CUBAN LOBSTERS.

S E C R E T

BT

**SECRET**

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **C** TOTAL COPIES \_\_\_\_\_

R-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED			
1	PA -	5	NO
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3	CA	7	
4	EW	0	

SECTION **DEC 14 1966**

**UW/C 8**

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INFO FILE **OR EUR 8, ADDP, CAZ, CA/PROP, DEY, DO/M3**

**30 SEP 66 11:07286**

**SECRET** 302025Z CITE OTTAWA 3739

<sup>JM</sup>  
IMMEDIATE WAVE INFO DIRECTOR 3739

TYPIC MHV IPER AMSCROLL

REF JMWAVE 3320 **(1N07023)\***

CHECK OF CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL REGISTERS, FRASERS TRADE DIRECTORY,  
DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS COMPANY LISTINGS, FOOD PROCESSORS,  
SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS, PACKERS 1965-1966 AS WELL AS TELEPHONE  
DIRECTORIES INDICATE NO LISTING WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS. CHECK  
INCLUDED ALL ONTARIO AND QUEBEC.

**SECRET** \*REQUEST ADDRESS  
WORLD SEAFOOD DIST.

BT

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **R** TOTAL COPIES **02**

REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

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DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP -	3	MO
2		6	EMK
3	CA	7	S
4	EW	8	D

*10/14/66 3-1M*

ACTION

*WAVE*

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TIME

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INFO

FILE *UK EUR 8, ADDR*

**SECRET** 302212Z CITE JMWAVE 3332

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC NHVIPER AMSCROLL

30 SEP 66 07355

REFERENCE: OTTAWA 3735 (1207986)

WORLD SEAFOOD OFFICE LOCATED IN MONTREAL HOME OF  
SAM BEINER WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF FIRM. TELEPHONE 748-7014.

**SECRET**

BT

**SECRET**

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

R-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY:  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE: **C** TOTAL COPIES **30**

*ngp-A*

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP-	5	EWS
2		6	MD
3	CA	7	FIVE
4	(OL)	8	S

ACTION

*By 15*

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ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY *D*

INFO

FILE, UR, ADDP, EUR 8, CA2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DC/H3

**SECRET 301600Z CITE JMWAVE 3320**

**IMMEDIATE OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR**

**30 SEP 66 11.07023**

**TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL**

**REFERENCE: WAVE-3309 (POS:119)\***

REQUEST BY IMMEDIATE CABLE EXACT BUSINESS ADDRESS WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE IN MONTREAL AREA OR POSSIBLY TORONTO. FYI MONTREAL TELEPHONE OPERATOR HAS INFORMED LOCAL NEWSPAPER ATTEMPTING TO CHECK REF STORY THAT THERE NO FIRM WITH THAT NAME IN MONTREAL.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**BT ARE CUBAN SELLING OF LOBSTERS.**

19-120-26

INDEX  YES  NO *Full on roll*

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **B** TOTAL COPIES **32**

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP	5	RZ
2		6	TL
3	CA	7	MO
4	EW	8	FI

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY **J**

INFO **FILE, B, ADDP, EUR 8, CAZ, CA/PROP, C/IC 2, DO4, DO/H 3**

SECRET 292027Z GITE UNWAVE 3309

DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA, **PARIS**

TYPIC BRVIPER ANSCROLL

29 Sept 66

IN 06479

Forster    

Comen    

Forsythe    

Gonzalez    

1. USING DISGUISED SENSITIVE SOURCE INFO AND OVERT DATA STATION PREPARED STUDY OF CUBAN MISADVENTURES IN SELLING TINNED AND FROZEN LOBSTERS TO WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS OF MONTREAL AND JACQUES FOURCHTEIN & CIE OF FRANCE. ARTICLE STRESSED LATE DELIVERIES, SHODDY CUBAN BUSINESS PRACTICES, IMPROPERLY COOKED MEAT, AND ENDED ON NOTE THAT LATEST SHIPMENT OF FROZEN LOBSTER TO WORLD SEAFOOD CONTAINED QUANTITY ROTTEN LOBSTER WHICH DISCOVERED ONLY AFTER SIX OR SEVEN HUNDRED CARTONS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT CANADA.
2. STUDY RELEASED BY ANSCROLL 26 SEPT. AFP FILED STORY 26 SEPT AND ANTAFY-1 PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVERAGE 29 SEPT. BELIEVE ADDITIONAL PUBLICITY THESE FACTS ESPECIALLY ABROAD WILL FURTHER EXACERBATE AT LEAST CUBA/CANADA TRADE. RELEASE AND CLIP FORWARDED HQS. ALSO AIRMAILING PARIS, POUCHING OTTAWA.
3. FOLLOW-UP STORY IN PREPARATION.

SECRET

BT

**SECRET**

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 31

REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

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DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP -	3	RR
2		6	ICE
3	CA	7	MO
4	RW	8	FI

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ACTION

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RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

PM

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INFO

FILE, VR, EVR 8, CAZ, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, CILICZ.

**SECRET** 292114Z CITE JMWAVE 3301 - M

DIRECTOR

TYPIC WHSPAWN

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 37778

Swider \_\_\_\_\_

Cohen \_\_\_\_\_

Forsythe W \_\_\_\_\_

Gonzalez \_\_\_\_\_

29 SEP 66 11:06358

1. AMSCROLL RADIO ON 21 SEPTEMBER <sup>Alameda</sup> REPORTED CUBAEXPORT

WAS NEGOTIATING TO SELL CUBAN BEEF TO COMISARIA GENERAL IN TWO UNITS OF ONE THOUSAND TONS EACH. BROADCAST RECALLED DECEMBER SALE BEEF TO SPAIN WHICH UPON ARRIVAL WAS FOUND TO BE SHORT BY 135 PIECES. BROADCAST FOR 29 SEPTEMBER WILL UPDATE THIS REPORT USING INFO CONTAINED REF.

2. JMHOPE AND OTHER RADIO ASSETS WILL HIT THEME OF GOC EXPORTS OF MEAT WHILE CUBAN PEOPLE SUFFERING SEVERE SHORTAGE. WILL POINT OUT THAT HARD CURRENCY OBTAINED BY GOC IN TRADE WITH SPAIN AND OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS USED BY GOC TO EXPORT SUBVERSION AND VIOLENCE ABROAD AND TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL POLICE STATE MECHANISMS. THUS <sup>C</sup>UBANS LOSE BEEF AND GAIN MORE CONTROLS.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

RT

4-00 FORM

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  REV. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **C** TOTAL COPIES **31**

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
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DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

*File Amersoll*

1	<i>EW</i>	3	<i>AR</i>
2		6	<i>AR</i>
3	<i>CA</i>	7	<i>CI</i>
4	<i>PR-</i>	8	<i>CI</i>

*DISSEM BY J.P.*

ACTION

*WH/C P*

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

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SLOTTED

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UNIT

TIME

BY *S*

INFO

*FILE, KR, FER, CARZ, CA/PROP, CA/04, ADDP, CI/OA, CI/PS, CI/02*

*19 Sep 66 9910Z*

SECRET 192151Z CITE JMWAVE 3106 (INGHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO

TYPIC MHVIPER

REFERENCE: TOKYO 9840 (*IN 97101*)

*lit*  
*mj*

SUGGEST AMSCROLL THROUGH IDEN WRITE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH IDEN IN CONTACT IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, MEXICO, AND PERU SUGGESTING THEY BRING PRESSURE THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO INCLUDE JAPAN-CUBA TRADE ITEM ON GROUNDS THIS TRADE PROVIDES CUBA WITH FUNDS FINANCE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES THESE COUNTRIES. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

**SECRET**

BT

NNNN

4-65 JUM

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **B** TOTAL COPIES **51**

X-REF. TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  REV. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EW	3	RM
2		6	ED
3	CA	7	ELTC
4	PP-	8	CI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

*DISSEM BY DS*

ACTION: *W/K 8*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLIPPED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY *S*

INFO: *FILE, VA, FE8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/4, ADD, O/A, C/OPS, C/IC2*

SECRET 192151Z CITE JMWAVE 3107 (INGHURST ACTING) 19 SEP 65 89092

DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO

TYPIC MHVIPER

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3106 (IN 99102)

IDENTITY: MANAGEMENT BOYCOTT COMMITTEE.

SECRET

BT

**SECRET**

NNNN

**DISPATCH**

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

PROCESSING

*C/WHC*

TO  
Chief of Station, Kingston

INFO  
Chief, WH

F. OM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT  
C TYPIC/MIVIPER/AMSCROLL/Economic Intelligence Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES  
ACTION REQUIRED: For Kingston to determine.

1. Per COS, Kingston's recent request we forward by separate cover twenty-five copies of the publication, Economic Intelligence Report. This is issued monthly in English and until we are informed otherwise we shall in the future forward twenty-five copies under a transmittal manifest. This publication is issued infrequently in Spanish; we shall forward five copies of these as they appear.

2. Station JMWAVE will appreciate any local reaction to this publication as well as suggestions for the inclusion of material that might be useful to a Kingston audience. As indicated by the edition being forwarded we attempt to keep the items in each Report factual on the grounds that in a publication of this nature facts constitute the best propaganda.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachment: use  
25 copies Report

Distribution:  
3- COS/Kingston, w/atts. use  
2- C/WH, w/o atts.  
2- WH/C, w/o atts.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

DATE TYPED 7 Sep 66	DATE DISPATCHED SEP 8 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-25925	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26	
19-120-26	

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE

DDO Chief, European Division  
Deputy Chief, WH/C

FROM Chief of Station, Madrid

**IX**

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK  
CAN MAKE ENTRIES

INDEXED

**SUBJECT** KEYWAY/PBRUMEN/MHVIPER - AMSCROLL Articles for Republication

**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

Act: For your information  
 Ref: UFGA-25559, 21 July 1966

1. Madrid Station appreciates the excellent support which JMWAVE Station has provided in referenced operation. It may be of interest that the publication of the articles cited in reference cost approximately \$200.00
2. Through QUSPOT-2 Madrid Station made contact with Identity in an effort to establish an outlet for the publication of economic reports concerning Spain and PBRUMEN. It was agreed with the directors of Identity that the articles would be paid for at the same rate as paid advertisements; however they would appear as exclusive reports of Identity and bear no resemblance to a paid advertisement. Because of various legal ramifications, Identity agreed to publish only those articles which were signed.
3. QUSPOT-2's approach to Identity was made ostensibly under the auspices of a PBRUMEN exile group with whom he said he was affiliated, the headquarters of which are ostensibly in the JMWAVE area. It was agreed that the JMWAVE exile group would furnish the material directly to Identity, with a copy to QUSPOT-2, who, after receipt of the article, would then approach the directors of Identity to ascertain the price of the article and push for its publication. In this regard Madrid would appreciate continuing with this practice for the mailing of articles intended for publication (with a copy pouched to Madrid) as was established.

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER  
Identity

(continued)

Distribution:  
 2-COS, JMWAVE, w/att, USC  
 2-C/EUR, w/att, USC  
 1-LC/WH/C, w/att, USC

S/O ATT'D BY RI/AN  
 Dated 18-8-66

Group I - Excluded  
 from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>OSMA-21648</b>	DATE <b>10 August 1966</b>
<i>int</i>	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b> <i>CS COPY</i>	MCS FILE NUMBER <b>19-120-26/3</b>

4. With a view toward economy it should be noted that Madrid Station took the liberty of excluding some of the material which was included in the first report. We suggest that the reports be limited to one or two pages if feasible. In this manner we feel we will have a better chance at publication.

5. In the last several issues Identity has published various articles of a favorable nature towards the PBRUMEN economy. Station has reason to believe the primary purpose of the favorable articles is that the director of Identity is attempting to ingratiate himself with the PBRUMEN Government so that he will be well received by PBRUMEN officials if the Spanish Government nominates him as the Spanish commercial representative to PBRUMEN.

**Leslie H. HENDRIQUE**

S E C R E T

UNDER SEPARATE COVER to  
OBMA-21648, 10 Aug 66

Identity - "3E, Economia Espanola y Exterior"

S E C R E T

3/c at CSMA-21648

CS COPY:

19-120-26





# economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

SC 461. H1  
UFGA 25559

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373 - 8033

VOL. I No. 11-A (Suplemento Especial)

EXCLUSIVO PARA EL BURO DE INVESTIGACIONES  
ECONOMICAS DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

## LA CALIDAD ACTUAL DEL AZÚCAR CUBANO

Por el Ingeniero Raúl Esparza Tabares  
ex-Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas del Ministerio del Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba Comunista

Este breve análisis de la calidad actual del azúcar cubano va dirigido tanto al perito en azúcares (como paso inicial de lo que podría convertirse en un estudio más técnico y exhaustivo) como al lector ordinario, toda vez que, en Cuba, el azúcar es casi sinónimo de prosperidad económica, y así, la calidad del azúcar desempeña un papel de gran importancia en la situación económica global del país (1).

Sin más comentarios o notas de introducción, ofrecemos a continuación el análisis de la calidad actual del azúcar cubano:

### 1.- Materias Extrañas:

a) Azúcar crudo: La industria azucarera cubana se caracterizaba por recibir para su procesamiento, la mejor calidad de caña de azúcar en cuanto a su contenido de materias extrañas (menor del 3%). Actualmente y por causa de los trabajadores "voluntarios" por un lado y por otro a la mecanización de la cosecha de la caña, las materias extrañas que acompañan a la caña al llegar al Central para su procesamiento - ha aumentado al 8% en el caso de los voluntarios y al 19% en el caso de las máquinas de cortar caña soviéticas. Es de señalarse que dentro de la composición de estas materias extrañas está incluida la tierra, y como quiera que las tierras de Cuba tienen en su composición un alto contenido de arcillas, estas son muy difíciles de eliminar en el proceso tecnológico de purificación y afectan grandemente la calidad del azúcar crudo.

b) Azúcar Refino: Las materias extrañas, principalmente arcillas de las tierras llegan hasta el azúcar refino dándole color al mismo y dejando residuos insolubles al ser disueltas este azúcar. Esto disminuye la calidad del azúcar refino no solamente para el consumo humano directo; sino que ocasiona graves perjuicios en las industrias de alimentos que utilizan el azúcar refino. Lo mismo sucede con las industrias de refrescos.

(1) No es necesario ensalzar la calidad del azúcar cubano que producía antes de Castro, ya que su prestigio en el mercado mundial es un hecho de sobra conocido. Lo mismo puede decirse de los técnicos cubanos en azúcar, con quienes los expertos internacionales han tenido amplia oportunidad de discutir los asuntos azucareros e intercambiar ideas y sugerencias libremente. Esta situación ya no existe.

CS COPY.

SLC at. 1 UFGA-25559

19-120-26

## 2.- Polarización:

a) Azúcar crudo: En épocas anteriores al régimen comunista, Cuba no producía azúcares crudos con polarizaciones menores de 97.0 a 97.5 %, y para muchos mercados extranjeros se producían azúcares crudos con polarizaciones superiores a 98.0%. En la actualidad un porcentaje significativo de la producción no alcanza esos valores, dándose casos de azúcares crudos con polarizaciones de 96.0 y 95.0 %.

b) Azúcar Refino: Las calidades mejores de azúcares refinados o blancos se miden en los mercados internacionales principalmente por su grado de polarización, la cual deberá ser como mínimo 99.9%. Los azúcares refinados en la actualidad bajo el régimen comunista no alcanzan esa cifra, manteniéndose entre 99.70 y 99.80 %.

## 3.- Humedad:

a) Azúcar Crudo: Los azúcares crudos cubanos siempre se caracterizaban por su bajo contenido de humedad, lo cual los hacía de magníficas condiciones para resistir al macenamiento prolongado y manipulación segura a estos azúcares. Actualmente el contenido de humedad ha aumentado hasta un 200%, debido a varios factores como son, contenido de coloides producidos por las arcillas de las tierras, condiciones deficientes de las centrifugas de azúcar, mayor contenido de mieles en el azúcar, etc. Además, en muchas ocasiones, azúcares producidos en buenas condiciones se deterioran debido a la humedad existente a causa de deficiencias en el almacenaje en centrales y puertos de embarque.

b) Azúcar Refino: La deficiente tecnología y el mal estado de los equipos apropiados han dado como resultado un aumento del contenido de humedad en el azúcar refinado de casi un 70%. Además azúcares producidos con bajo contenido de humedad en las refinerías, son alterados por el mal estado de los almacenes.

## 4.- Materias Insolubles:

a) Azúcar Crudo: El contenido de materias insolubles en el azúcar crudo ha aumentado aproximadamente en un 250% debido a la mala purificación de los jugos de caña durante el proceso tecnológico, y a la introducción de materias extrañas conjuntamente con la caña que van a parar hasta el azúcar.

b) Azúcar Refino: El uso de azúcares crudos de baja calidad, la deficiente calidad del Ácido Fosfórico, la Tierra de Infusorios, y el Carbón Activado, productos éstos enviados por los países comunistas, han tenido como consecuencia un aumento del porcentaje de materias insolubles en los azúcares refinados de aproximadamente el 200%, reduciendo considerablemente la calidad de estos azúcares refinados.

## 5.- Color:

a) Azúcar Crudo: El índice de color de los azúcares crudos ha aumentado casi en un 300%, lo que reduce proporcionalmente la calidad de estos crudos como materia prima en las refinerías.

b) Azúcar Refino: Este es uno de los factores importantes en la calidad de los azúcares refinados o blancos, y en los años recientes, debido a deficiencias tecnológicas, a la ausencia casi total de técnicos con experiencia, y a la baja calidad de los materiales decolorantes tales como el Carbón Activado suministrado por Polonia y la Unión Soviética, el índice de color, medido en Unidades ICUMSA, ha aumentado en un 200%. Es de señalar que ninguna refinería del país cumple las especificaciones en cuanto al índice de color establecidas por los Métodos Internacionales de Control de Calidad.

## 6.- Problemas Específicos del Azúcar Crudo:

a) Filtrabilidad: El índice de filtrabilidad que mide las propiedades precisamente de refinación del azúcar crudo, ha bajado en un 250% en los años recientes, afectando seriamente los costos de producción de las refinerías que emplean este azúcar crudo como materia prima.

b) Uniformidad del grano de Azúcar: Como consecuencia de la total ausencia de equipos automáticos para controlar la cristalización del azúcar, ya que la gran mayoría ha sido destruido y no reparado, la uniformidad de los cristales o granos del azúcar crudo ha disminuido a líderes inverosímiles. Es casi imposible observar azúcares crudos actuales que no tengan un alto índice de "conglomerados", "gemelos", y "Falso grano", lo que hace que la uniformidad de los cristales no se mantenga, ocasionando perjuicios a las refinerías que emplean este azúcar como materia prima por la cantidad de mieles e impurezas que conllevan. Esto reduce la capacidad de las refinerías y aumenta considerablemente su costo de producción.

c) Aspecto Sanitario: La falta de cuidado en cuanto a la higiene con que debe ser producida el azúcar, así como las calidades de las aguas que se emplean para el lavado de los azúcares en las centrifugas, el poco cuidado y esmero con que son tratadas en los almacenes, han producido un descenso en cuanto al aspecto sanitario de los azúcares acusándose un aumento considerable en el contenido de hongos, bacterias, y levaduras. Todos estos elementos extraños afectan la calidad y producen fermentaciones secundarias en el azúcar destruyéndose parte de la sacarosa de las mismas, lo cual reduce los rendimientos en las refinerías de azúcar y aumenta considerablemente el costo de producción.

d) Envases: Los envases que viene utilizando el régimen comunista en los azúcares crudos, son en parte elaborados en la Unión Soviética. Estos envases de yute son de ínfima calidad y además como no tienen las medidas standards, el azúcar se compacta dentro de los sacos, produciéndose muchas roturas de los mismos.

e) Azúcar Endurecida: Como consecuencia de la deficiencia en la tecnología de producción, las materias extrañas, y las malas condiciones de los almacenes, el índice de azúcares endurecidos en almacenamiento ha aumentado casi un 200%. Esto trae como consecuencia grandes dificultades en las refinerías al disolver el azúcar y sacarla de los sacos. Además al aumentar el costo de manipulación, se aumenta el costo de producción.

## 7.- Problemas Específicos del Azúcar Refinado:

a) Azúcares invertidos: Debido a la deficiencia tecnológica y a la baja calidad de los azúcares crudos utilizados, el contenido de azúcares invertidos ha aumentado en un 150% en los últimos años con el resultado de la baja de calidad de este tipo de azúcar.

b) Cenizas: Como consecuencia de la gran cantidad de materias extrañas y la baja calidad de los azúcares crudos, así como la deficiente calidad de los Carbones Activados empleados en las refinerías, el contenido de cenizas ha aumentado en los últimos años en un 50%, afectando la calidad de estos azúcares.

c) Contenido de Azufre (SO<sub>2</sub>): El contenido de azufre en los azúcares refinados debe ser extramadadamente bajo ya que afecta la salud del consumidor y crea grandes dificultades en las industrias que usan el azúcar. Como consecuencia de la baja calidad del Acido Fosfórico Soviético que tiene un alto contenido de Azufre, los azúcares en los últimos años han sufrido un aumento del 100% en su contenido de azufre lo que afecta la calidad de los mismos.

d) Contenido de Arsénico: El Arsénico es una de las contaminaciones que mas afectan la calidad de cualquier producto alimenticio, y mucho mas significativo es en el azúcar. Los productos auxiliares usados en la refinación del azúcar tales como Acido Fosfórico suministrados por países comunistas, tiene un alto porcentaje de Arsénico - los que contaminan el azúcar, habiéndose elevado esta cifra en un 70% sobre los valores normales.

e) Contenido de Plomo: La presencia de Plomo en los azúcares refinados debe ser significativo, pero en los últimos años el empleo de Tierras de Infusorios y Acido Fosfórico de países comunistas que tienen baja calidad y están contaminados con este elemento, ha producido un aumento del contenido de plomo en los azúcares refinados de un 50% sobre los valores normales.

f) Contenido de Cobre: Los azúcares de Cuba se caracterizaban por su ausencia de Cobre, sin embargo al usarse los productos contaminados y de baja calidad suministrados por los países comunistas, y por otro lado el mal estado de los equipos que tienen partes de Cobre, han dado como resultado un aumento en el contenido de Cobre llegando a obtener valores de 2 a 3 % de Cobre en el azúcar refinado.


**CONCLUSIONES:**

1.- Bajo el presente régimen, la calidad del azúcar cubano ha sufrido un tremendo deterioro.

2.- La industria azucarera cubana no ha sido una excepción al principio de que "el Comunismo es sinónimo de baja calidad".

3.- Los gobiernos, los pueblos y las firmas de los países que aún adquieren azúcar de Cuba deben tomar nota de este breve análisis.

Por el Buró de Investigaciones Económicas de U.R.

  
Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Director

Miami, 7 de Julio de 1966

SECRET

SC

Attach. #2  
UFGA-25559**IDENTITY LIST**

- A. "3-5" ECONOMIA ESPANOLA Y EXTERIOR.
- B. Jose Ramon Aparicio Ramon  
Director, "3-5"  
Paseo Orosimo Rodondo 22  
Madrid, Spain

SECRET

S/c aa. 2UFGA-25557

CS COPY

17-120-26

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

PROCESSING

TO  
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE *BPV*

SUBJECT  
TYPIC/MHVIPER/Cable from Professor Torsten Gardlund

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: Response from Headquarters to Reference Requested.**

**REFERENCE: UFGA-25367**

We forward by separate cover a copy of a cable received by AMRAIN-1 from Professor Torsten Gardlund. This is in response to the interim reply sent the Professor by AMRAIN-1 after receipt of the questionnaire. We request a reply to the reference as soon as feasible in view of the considerable interest expressed in this cable.

*for* Roger E. Merveland  
PHILIP G. ELMARD

*reclassified Aug 21, 1967*  
File  
AMSCROLL  
19-120-26/3  
e PROF

IN	FI	
ABSTRACT		

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Attachment: USC  
Cable as stated.

Distribution:  
3- WH/C, w/att. usc

1 ATT.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

**CS COPY**

CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

FOUCH SECURITY VIOLATION  
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE TYPED  
5 July 66

DATE DISPATCHED  
JUL 6 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-25445

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

19-120-26/3

**CLASS OF SERVICE**  
This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

# WESTERN UNION

## TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

W. W. MARSHALL  
PRESIDENT


The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination.

1026P EST JUN 30 66 AA010 1966 JUN 30 PM 6 30  
A CDUB03 WUT0245 RMB3806 SWN0702 M014454 31 PD INTL CD MALMOE  
VIA RRCA 30 1300

LT INC

290 VAPP 3 CORALGABLES (FLO)  
MANY THANKS YOUR KIND LETTER OF JUNE 14 STOP WE ARE LOOKING  
FORWARD TO YOUR  
REPORT WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS SINCERELY  
TORSTEN GAARDLUND

CFM 290 3 14  
(10)

LOCAL SECURITY VIOLATION  
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

871201 (RS-66)

ATT # 1 TO UFGA 25445

CS COPY

19-120-2 <sup>per</sup> ~~19-120-56~~  
~~200-120-58~~

**COMITE PRO BOICOT EMPRESARIAL  
Management Boycott Committee**

P. O. BOX 3900  
MIAMI, FLA. - 33101 - U. S. A.

**CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE OFFICIALS, OFFICERS AND CREWMEMBERS WHO HAVE ABANDONED  
THEIR POSTS DURING RECENT MONTHS**

The "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" releases the "score" of Cuban merchant marine officials, officers, and crewmembers who have abandoned their posts during recent months, thus increasing the lack of qualified personnel in the merchant fleet, another problem presently faced by the Castro-Communist regime.

The "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" has up-date the "score" since the first one it released the "score" contains full names of merchant fleet officials, officers, and crewmen, ranks, names of vessels, port where the defections occurred and dates.

**I. - S C O R E. -**

NUMBER OF VESSELS: 16  
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 29

Captain: 5  
Chief Engineer: 9  
First Officer: 2  
Second Engineer: 1  
Helmsman: 2  
Radio Operator: 1  
Others: 6  
Supervisor: 3

\* Attached is the statement of Raul de la Rúa Castro, former Chief Engineer of the MV SIERRA MAESTRA, who jumped ship in Muroran, Japan, on March 20, 1966.-

**INTERRUPCION DEL INTERCAMBIO COMERCIAL Y TODO TRANSPORTE MARITIMO CON CUBA COMUNISTA.  
(ACUERDO DE LA CAMARA DE COMERCIO DE LAS AMERICAS, XV CONVENCION ANUAL, JUNIO 16, 1965)**

**INTERRUPT COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE AND ALL MARITIME TRAFFIC WITH COMMUNIST CUBA.  
(RESOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE AMERICAS, XV ANNUAL CONVENTION, JUNE 16, 1965)**

14-00000

II.- LIST.-

<u>N A M E</u>	<u>P O S T</u>	<u>V E S S E L</u>	<u>P L A C E</u>	<u>D A T E</u>
RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO	Chief Engineer	SIERRA MAESTRA	Muroran, Japan	March 20, 1966
ARNALDO GIL LOPEZ	Ass. Supervisor	1	Bilbao, Spain	March 14, 1966
DANIEL SMOZA	First Official	MATANZAS	Barcelona, Spain	March 10, 1966
JOSE OYARZABAL J.	Chief Supervisor	1	Madrid, Spain	March 5, 1966
RUBEN HERRERA MARTINEZ	Steward	COMBATE DE PALMA MOCHA	St. John, Canada	March 4, 1966
MIGUEL FERNANDEZ GARCIA	Second Engineer	JIGUE	Tokyo, Japan	Feb. 4, 1966
SALVADOR VENEITO VAZQUEZ	Electrical Technician	PINO DEL AGUA	Bilbao, Spain	Feb. 4, 1966
ANTONIO DURAN GONZALEZ	Seaman	BAHIA DE TANAMO	Cadiz, Spain	Feb. 4, 1966
JOSE ANGEL SEARA RIVAS	Helmsman	13 DE MARZO	Madrid, Spain	February, 1966
ALCIDES LOYOLA MARQUEZ	Cook	FRUCUBA	St. John, Canada	Jan. 31, 1966
FRANCISCO DALTAUIT	Captain	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, Spain	Jan. 20, 1966
MANUEL FERNANDEZ	Helmsman	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, Spain	Jan. 20, 1966
MARCOS ESTRUCH	Radio Operator	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, Spain	Jan. 4, 1966
JESUS CRESPO	Steward	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, Spain	Jan. 4, 1966
HUGO LEY ACHON	Chief Engineer	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, Spain	Jan. 4, 1966
FRANCISCO FDEZ. SAN ROMAN	Chief Engineer	SIERRA MAESTRA	Antwerp, Belgium	Dec. 31, 1965
FRANCISCO COBAS OSES	Captain	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
ANTONIO ARIAS	First Officer	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
MARIO PEREZ GIRON	Chief Engineer	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
HUMBERTO E. FERNANDEZ	Purser	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
A. CESAR LOREDO GARCIA	Captain	CAMILO CIENFUEGOS	Madrid, Spain	Dec. 20, 1965
AUGUSTO GONZALEZ DUQUE	Captain	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylon	Dec. 18, 1965
F. ROBERTO SURROCA	Chief Engineer	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylon	Dec. 18, 1965
ALBERTO TORRES GOMEZ	Chief Gen. Inspector	2	Madrid, Spain	November, 1965
FELIX GONZALEZ ALPI	Chief Engineer	BAHIA DE TANAMO	St. John, Canada	Oct. 25, 1965
JORGE I. SALCEDO	Chief Engineer	HABANA	Barcelona, Spain	October, 1965
EMILIO LEAL VALDES	Captain	13 DE MARZO	Bilbao, Spain	Aug. 23, 1965
LUIS CASAS CAMPA	Chief Engineer	13 DE MARZO	Rotterdam, Holland	August, 1965
RAUL GONZALEZ	Chief Engineer	MATANZAS	Barcelona, Spain	March, 1965

(1) Naval construction supervisors stationed at Spanish shipyards.-

(2) Chief General Inspector for Mambisas (Official Cuban shipping enterprise) stationed in Spain.-

STATEMENT OF RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO.-

My name is Raul de la Rúa Castro, and I was the Chief Engineer aboard the Cuban MV SIERRA MESTRA until March 20, 1946, when I jumped ship in Muroran, Japan.

Working conditions in the Cuban Merchant Fleet also influenced my decision. I could not stand the intensified espionage on board by members of the G-2. It is worth mentioning that the plan to indoctrinate Cuban merchant crews was a complete failure. The regime has abandoned the project altogether, and is now trying to place loyal Communists as officers and crewmembers, even if they are not qualified for their jobs.

As a matter of fact, the lack of qualified personnel is an increasing problem, and another source of trouble aboard Cuban vessels. During the last months a total of twenty nine officials, officers and crewmembers of the Cuban Merchant Marine have defected (data of up-to-date merchant marine score). After I quit the SIERRA MESTRA, for instance, there was not a single certified engineer on board, although there were several young fellows getting on the job training. This is a fact that should be taken into consideration by the insurance firms that underwrite Cuban vessels.

Most of the vessels are faced with all sorts of mechanical difficulties, due to lack of spare parts and a very faulty maintenance, situation that gets worse when consider the scarcity of qualified personnel just mentioned.

I am very happy to have joined those of my fellow Cuban officers who preceded me in this decision. I wish to thank the "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" for all the attentions accorded me, and I hope to rejoin our merchant fleet soon, when our vessels again sail under the flag of a free country.

FREE CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE COMMITTEE  
830 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE  
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Miami, April 1st, 1966.-

COMITE PRO BOICOT EMPRESARIAL

Management-Boycott Committee

P. O. BOX 3900  
MIAMI, FLA. - 33101 - U. S. A.

MIEMBROS DE DOTACIONES DE LA MARINA MERCANTE CUBANA QUIENES HAN ABANDONADO SUS  
BUQUES RECIENTEMENTE

El "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" da a conocer el total de funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la Marina Mercante Cubana que han abandonado sus cargos durante los últimos meses, aumentando con ello la falta de personal calificado en la flota mercante, otro problema que el régimen Castro-Comunista afronta en el presente.

El "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" ha puesto al día el total de funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la flota mercante desde la primera que se dió a conocer. Este total contiene los nombres completos, el rango, nombre del buque, puerto en el cual lo abandonó y fechas.

I.- SCORE.-

Número de buques: 16  
Miembros de las dotaciones: 29

Capitán:	5
Jefe de Máquinas:	9
Primer Oficial:	2
Segundo Maquinista:	1
Timonel:	2
Radio Telegrafista:	1
Otros:	6
Supervisor:	3
Total:	<u>29</u>

NOTA:

Adjunto se encuentran las declaraciones de Raul de la Rúa Castro, ex-Jefe de Máquinas de la Motonave SIERRA-MAESTRA, quién abandonó el barco en Murorán, Japón en Marzo 20 de 1966.

INTERRUPCION DEL INTERCAMBIO COMERCIAL Y TODA TRANSPORTA MARITIMO CON CUBA COMUNISTA.  
(ACUERDO DE LA CAMARA DE COMERCIO DE LAS AMERICAS, XV CONVENCION ANUAL, JUNIO 16, 1965)  
INTERRUPT COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE AND ALL MARITIME TRAFFIC WITH COMMUNIST CUBA.  
(RESOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE AMERICAS, XV ANNUAL CONVENTION, JUNE 16, 1965)

II.- RELACION.-

<u>NOMBRE</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>BUQUE</u>	<u>LUGAR</u>	<u>FECHA</u>
RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO	Jefe de Máquinas	SIERRA MAESTRA	Muroran, Japón	Marzo 20, 1966
ARNALDO GIL LOPEZ	Supervisor Asistente	1	Bilbao, España	Marzo 14, 1966
DANIEL SOMOZA	Primer Oficial	MATANZAS	Barcelona, España	Marzo 10, 1966
JOSE OYARZABAL J.	Supervisor-Jefe	1	Madrid, España	Marzo 5, 1966
RUBEN HERRERA MARTINEZ	Camarero	COMBATE DE PALMA MOCHA	St. John, Canadá	Marzo 4, 1966
MIGUEL FERNANDEZ GARCIA	Segundo Maquinista	JIGUE	Tokyo, Japón	Feb. 4, 1966
SALVADOR VENEITO VAZQUEZ	Electricista	PINO DEL AGUA	Bilbao, España	Feb. 4, 1966
ANTONIO DURAN GONZALEZ	Marinero	BAHIA DE TANAMO	Cádiz, España	Feb. 4, 1966
JOSE ANGEL BEARA RIVAS	Timonel	13 DE MARZO	Madrid, España	Febrero, 1966
ALCIDES LOYOLA MARQUEZ	Cocinero	FRUCUBA	St. John, Canadá	Enero 31, 1966
FRANCISCO DALTABUIT	Capitán	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, España	Enero 20, 1966
MANUEL FERNANDEZ	Timonel	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, España	Enero 20, 1966
MARCOS ESTRUCH	Radio Telegrafista	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, España	Enero 4, 1966
JESUS CRESPO	Camarero	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, España	Enero 4, 1966
HUGO LEY ACHON	Jefe de Máquinas	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, España	Enero 4, 1966
FRANCISCO FDEZ. SAN ROMAN	Jefe de Máquinas	SIERRA MAESTRA	Antwerp, Bélgica	Dic. 31, 1965
FRANCISCO COBAS OSES	Capitán	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
ANTONIO ARIAS	Primer Oficial	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
MARIO PEREZ GIRON	Jefe de Máquinas	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
HUMBERTO E. FERNANDEZ	Sobrecargo	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
A. CESAR LOREDO GARCIA	Capitán	CAMILO CIEINFUECOS	Madrid, España	Dic. 20, 1965
AUGUSTO GONZALEZ DUQUE	Capitán	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylán	Dic. 18, 1965
F. ROBERTO SURROCA	Jefe de Máquinas	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylán	Dic. 18, 1965
ALBERTO TORRES GOMEZ	Inspector General	2	Madrid, España	Nov. 1965
FELIA GONZALEZ ALPI	Jefe de Máquinas	BAHIA DE TANAMO	St. John, Canadá	Oct. 25, 1965
JORGE I. SALCEDO	Jefe de Máquinas	HABANA	Barcelona, España	Octubre, 1965
EMILIO LEAL VALDES	Capitán	13 DE MARZO	Bilbao, España	Ag. 23, 1965
LUIS CASAS CAMPA	Jefe de Máquinas	13 DE MARZO	Rotterdam, Holanda	Agosto, 1965
RAUL GONZALEZ	Jefe de Máquinas	MATANZAS	Barcelona, España	Marzo, 1965

- (1) Supervisor de construcciones navales, prestando servicios en España.-  
 (2) Inspector General de la Empresa de Navegación Mambisa.-

DECLARACIONES DE RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO.-

Mi nombre es Raul de la Rúa Castro y hasta el 20 de marzo de 1966 desempeñé el cargo de Jefe de Máquinas de la Motonave SIERRA MAESTRA, cargo este que abandoné en Maracán, Japón.

Las condiciones de trabajo en la Marina Mercante Cubana fueron uno de los motivos que me llevaron a tomar mi decisión. Tampoco podía continuar soportando el espionaje y la vigilancia a bordo por miembros del G-2. Vale la pena mencionar que el plan de adoctrinamiento para los miembros de las dotaciones de la flota mercante cubana ha fracasado completamente. El régimen ha abandonado dicho plan y lo único que hace ahora es sustituir a los que abandonamos los buques por personal "políticamente apto", pero carente de capacidad técnica para desempeñar los cargos.

De hecho, el régimen enfrenta un serio problema ante la escasez de personal técnico capacitado y titulado, y esto constituye otra fuente de problemas a bordo de los buques cubanos. Durante los últimos meses un total de veinte y nueve funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la flota mercante cubana han abandonado sus cargos. Para que se tenga una idea sobre la gravedad de este problema resulta necesario señalar que después que yo abandoné el SIERRA MAESTRA no quedó a bordo un solo maquinista con título, a pesar de que varios muchachos jóvenes se encontraban allí recibiendo entronamiento, pero por supuesto, aún sin el debido título. Esta es una realidad que debe ser considerada seriamente por las firmas aseguradoras de buques cubanos.

La mayoría de los buques confrontan dificultades en lo referente al funcionamiento debido principalmente a la falta de piezas de repuesto y al mantenimiento defectuoso y poco eficiente y como es natural este problema se acentúa con la escasez de personal técnico capacitado en las dotaciones.

Deseo manifestar que estoy contento de encontrarme junto a tantos otros compañeros de la Marina Mercante que me han precedido y quiero agradecer públicamente al "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" las atenciones que ha tenido conmigo, así como la ayuda que me están prestando, y sinceramente espero poder volver a la Marina Mercante en un futuro próximo; cuando una vez más podamos navegar bajo el pabellón de una Patria libre.

COMITE MARINA MERCANTE CUBANA LIBRE  
830 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE  
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Miami, Iro. de Abril de 1966.

CONFERENCIA DE PRENSA DE RAÚL ESPARZA TABARES

MI nombre es Raúl Esparza Tabares y hasta hace escasamente un mes me encontraba presidiendo la Delegación Cubana a la Conferencia Internacional de Expertos en Azúcares de la FAO (Food & Agriculture Organization de las Naciones Unidas) que se celebró en Londres del 1ro. al 3 de Marzo de 1966, al mismo tiempo que ocupaba el cargo de Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas Azucareras del MINAZ y formaba parte de la "Comisión de Estudios del Plan Perspectivo Azucarero".

A mi lado se encuentra mi señora Josefa Reus y nuestros hijos Roberto, de 21 años y Raúl, de 22 años, ambos estudiantes de ingeniería de la Universidad de La Habana.

Antes de hacer un breve relato de la odisea de mi familia para abandonar el país, deseo agradecer a los compañeros de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA las atenciones que han tenido para con nosotros y al mismo tiempo por darme esta oportunidad de hacer estas declaraciones a los periodistas del mundo libre.

Desde hace dos años todos nos encontramos tratando de abandonar el país pero nos había sido imposible a mi no se me permitía salir debido al cargo que ocupaba y ni siquiera se le daba esta oportunidad al resto de mi familia. Cuando lo de Camarioca nos fué a recoger un barco y las autoridades cubanas ni nos avisaron de que dicha embarcación se encontraba allí. La única salida era abandonar el país en bote por la vía clandestina. La oportunidad se presentó durante mi estancia en Londres. Yo había salido de Cuba el 23 de febrero de 1966 dejando atrás a mi señora y a mis dos hijos, uno de los cuales, Raúl, se encontraba enfermo de hepatitis en La Habana.

Mi señora tuvo que tomar la decisión sin encontrarme yo a su lado, pero había que aprovechar la oportunidad que se presentaba y salir por la vía clandestina del país. De la odisea pueden dar detalles ellos mucho mejor que yo y posiblemente los miembros de la prensa desearán hacerles algunas preguntas al final de mis palabras.

Muy brevemente les diré que ellos se sometieron al mismo proceso que tantos otros cubanos se han sometido, es decir, lanzarse en bote a cruzar el "corredor de la muerte" con la confianza que Dios los ayudaría a arribar a tierras de libertad. Dos intentos fallaron pero por fin, el tercer intento fué un éxito y al menos el grupo completo, unas veinte personas, se montaron en el bote y pusieron proa a los Estados Unidos; el motor se rompió y la travesía fué la mayor parte del tiempo a vela al cabo de casi dos días el agua y la escasa comida se habían agotado y en

tonces apareció un buque griego que después de facilitarles agua y algunos alimentos lo comunicó al Servicio de Guardacostas de los Estados Unidos y poco después un avión Catalina volaba sobre el lugar y marcaba el sitio para facilitarle la tarea a una de sus unidades navales que ya se encontraba en camino.

La llegada del buque del Servicio de Guardacostas Norteamericano fué realmente providencial, pues mi familia y los otros tripulantes del bote observaban aterrizados como por la popa se acercaba velozmente una lancha patrullera cubana, que al ver el buque norteamericano viró en redondo y regresó a Cuba.

Yo me encontraba en el hotel en Londres y una llamada de larga distancia me puso al corriente de la situación. Ellos se encontraban a salvo y ahora me tocaba el turno a mí.

Llamada informándome del arribo de mi familia a los EE.UU. llegó precisamente cuando me encontraba reunido con el resto de los miembros de la Delegación. Estos me observaban atentamente, como queriendo adivinar lo que se me decía desde el otro lado de la línea. Por tanto, tuve que desplegar mis escasas dotes de actor teatral y simular que la llamada era oficial desde Cuba.

Ante esta situación, opté por informar, falsamente, a los restantes delegados que el gobierno cubano me había encargado el cuidado de otros asuntos, por lo que tendría que demorarme algunos días mas de los previstos en Madrid.

Los dije también que me reservaran pasaje a bordo del vuelo de la semana siguiente y les entregué una carta para mi familia. Llegué a Madrid el 4 de Marzo. Las autoridades españolas me brindaron toda clase de facilidades, incluso posteriormente la de ofrecermé hasta protección personal, puesto que cuando en el MINAZ se conoció mi desaparición, el gobierno notificó a las embajadas cubanas en Londres y Madrid que me encontraran y que me llevaran de regreso para La Habana aunque tuviera que ser a bordo de un buque cubano y por supuesto, en contra de mi voluntad.

No deseo tomar mas tiempo para anécdotas personales y si lo he hecho ha sido porque estimo que ayudan a comprender la verdadera situación que se vive en Cuba. La situación de los funcionarios que como en mi caso, desean la libertad de nuestra Patria, y que nos encontramos sujetos a vigilancia, a represión, mis hijos expulsados de la Universidad y sujetos a las mismas privaciones que el resto de nuestro Pueblo.

Pasemos ahora al tema principal de esta conferencia, que es a la vez la espina dorsal de la economía cubana y por tanto el factor determinante de la estabilidad o de la caída del régimen de Fidel Castro: el AZÚCAR.

En relación con el estado de la industria azucarera en la actualidad es necesario comenzar por esbozar la situación en la que se encuentran los ingenios. Debido a la escasez de piezas de repuesto, la falta de materiales y la baja calidad del trabajo, los ingenios confrontan una situación que es necesario calificar de "caótica". La falta de personal técnico capacitado y de obreros especializados hacen que la operación de producción de los ingenios sea altamente deficiente. Por otra parte, la falta de abastecimiento de caña no permite que los ingenios funcionen a su capacidad normal, trayendo como consecuencia poca eficiencia en el trabajo y un alto consumo de combustible adicional, que ocasiona un aumento considerable en los costos de producción del azúcar. En relación con los medios de transporte, principalmente los ferrocarriles azucareros, deseamos aclarar que se encuentran también en pésimas condiciones, a pesar de la adquisición de locomotoras soviéticas, inglesas y francesas, pues las vías férreas no permiten el aprovechamiento de este material rodante. Por ejemplo, durante 1965 se debían de haber cambiado seis millones de traviesas en las vías férreas, mas sin embargo sólo había disponibles ochenta mil. El resultado es el incremento de los descarrilamientos que durante la zafra de 1965 alcanzaron un promedio de tres descarrilamientos diarios, produciéndose diez accidentes mortales.

Muchos me preguntan cual será la producción final de la zafra de 1966 y sobre este punto debo hacer los comentarios siguientes: Fidel Castro anunció que la meta azucarera de este año serían 6.5 millones de toneladas y ese anuncio no sólo fue hecho durante su discurso del 1ro. de mayo de 1965, sino que lo repitió durante su discurso del 7 de junio del mismo año. Sin embargo, se admite que dicha meta no será alcanzada. Ahora bien el estimado actual no excede de 5.1 millones de toneladas. ¿Por qué?

Primeramente se debe mencionar la falta de abono. Este año la aplicación de abono fue insignificante, pues el gobierno no tenía las divisas necesarias para adquirirlo, principalmente en Italia. El año pasado, sin embargo, se aplica-

ron aproximadamente 450,000 toneladas.

En segundo lugar, resulta necesario hacer referencia a las siembras de caña. Las nuevas áreas sembradas de caña lo han sido de forma deficiente y además se han utilizado áreas destinadas con anterioridad a la siembra de otras cosechas para sembrar caña, como lo constituye, por sólo citar un ejemplo, el caso de la zona situada en los alrededores de Manzanillo y Bayamo, las cuales eran zonas arroceras y ahora han intentado convertirlas en zonas cañeras resultando todo esto en un fracaso pues la caña es de baja calidad al no ser adecuado el suelo. Otro factor menos importante pero digno de darse a conocer es la falta de cuidado en las tareas de cultivo y atención de los cañaverales debido a la escasez de mano de obra.

Con estos antecedentes es que hay que analizar el monto de la presente zafra. Durante 1965 el día 7 de abril se alcanzó el cuarto millón, pero este año el tercer millón se alcanzó el día 3 de abril lo cual ya significa un atraso de cerca de 900,000 toneladas. Creo que hay caña para llegar a 5.1 millones de toneladas ahora bien, lo que hay que preguntarse es si dicha meta, que ya está bastante por debajo de los 6.5 millones anunciados por Fidel Castro será alcanzada o no. El Partido está realizando una movilización masiva record hacia los cañaverales con el propósito de intentar cortar toda la caña pero eso hay que ver si en definitiva lo logran hacer.

Cabe hacer referencia en este momento a lo que se conoce en Cuba por el nombre de "Plan Perspectivo Azucarero", que es el único plan económico que tiene en estos momentos el gobierno de Cuba.

¿Qué es el "Plan Perspectivo Azucarero"? comprende tres puntos básicos que son los siguientes: primero, la "rehabilitación" de la capacidad industrial a niveles pre-Castro; segundo, la "ampliación" de la capacidad industrial; y tercero, la "concentración" de la industria azucarera en 70 modernos centrales.

Vamos a revisar brevemente los tres puntos a la luz de la presente situación. En relación con el primero, o sea, la "rehabilitación" de la capacidad industrial instalada, es necesario destacar que en 1952 la capacidad de producción de la industria azucarera era de siete millones de toneladas, pero debido a la escasez de piezas de repuesto, falta de materiales para las reparaciones, baja calidad de las reparaciones y la eliminación de seis ingenios - que fueron precisamente demantelados para utilizar las piezas como repuestos lo cual se ha comprobado ha sido un error más - la capacidad industrial se ha reducido a sólo seis millones de toneladas, es decir, que la actual política ha resultado en la presente merma de la producción ¡qué progreso! Fidel Castro no ha podido ni alcanzar la capaci -

dad de producción azucarera que Cuba tenía hace quince años.

El segundo punto, que en cierto sentido debe atemperarse al primero, es ampliar la capacidad industrial instalada y además construir un nuevo ingenio. Esto significaría, o sea, para alcanzar esto sería necesario la importación de un número considerable de equipos para los ingenios, cosa totalmente imposible de llevarse a cabo debido a la escasez de divisas -de por sí escasas para la adquisición de piezas de repuesto- y la falta de técnicos para hacerse cargo de supervisar y ejecutar dicha ampliación - también se debe decir que tampoco son suficientes los técnicos para realizar de por sí las labores ordinarias de la zafra con la actual capacidad. Este parte del plan supone una coordinación entre el INRA - que siembra la caña - y el MINAZ, pero lo que sucede en la realidad es que no están en coordinación ambos organismos y por consiguiente el INRA manda a sembrar caña en donde no existe capacidad industrial y por su parte el MINAZ está "rehabilitando" ingenios en donde a lo mejor ya no hay suficiente caña. Esto es sólo una muestra de la desorganización reinante, desorganización que unida a los factores mencionados imposibilitan el éxito del "Plan Perspectivo". Esto es una prueba más de la incapacidad de la planificación económica de las altas esferas en dicho gobierno.

(Por cierto que la construcción del nuevo ingenio es vital para el éxito del "Plan" y hasta el momento presente sólo una firma francesa ha hecho ofertas para dicha construcción, dicha firma es nada menos que la FIVES-LILLE, bien conocida en los círculos azucareros).

La tercera fase del "Plan", es decir, la "concentración" de la capacidad industrial azucarera en setenta ingenios después de 1970 es sólo un sueño en la mente de los planificadores. La regresión constante de la industria azucarera no puede permitir, económicamente hablando, el modernizar y automatizar plantas y equipos, hasta que los problemas económicos básicos de la producción no estén resueltos.

Los equipos soviéticos no son aptos para realizar estas tareas agrícolas en Cuba y su diseño y difícil operación impiden que cumplan su cometido. Además estas "cortadoras" introducen un 19% de materias extrañas en el ingenio, lo cual ocasiona gran desgaste a las máquinas y equipos del ingenio. Y es precisamente con estos equipos soviéticos con los cuales se contaba para cosechar 83 millones de toneladas de caña que serían necesarias para producir los 10 millones de toneladas de azúcar anunciados por Fidel Castro como los "10 megatonnes de azúcar" con los que iba a derrotar al "imperialismo" en 1970.

Las metas de producción del "Plan" son las siguientes: Para 1965: 6 millones de toneladas; para 1966: 6.5 millones; para 1967: 7.5 millones; para 1968: 8 millones; para 1969: 9 millones; y finalmente, para 1970: 10 millones de toneladas

de azúcar. Estimo que el único en Cuba que aún cree en el "Plan" y en sus metas es Fidel Castro.

Me gustaría hacer una breve referencia en relación con otro problema básico - la baja calidad del azúcar cubano, tanto crudo como refino, actualmente en proceso de empeorarse. Esto no ha sucedido de casualidad sino como consecuencia de la falta y mala calidad de las piezas de repuesto, la ineficiencia en la operación de los ingenios, la falta de eficiencia de los trabajadores, y la baja calidad de los productos químicos auxiliares procedentes de países socialistas. Estos problemas están resultando en una decreciente polarización del azúcar, el envase deficiente del azúcar de exportación, el aumento de impurezas en el azúcar embarcada a granel, y las dificultades en cumplir los compromisos de entregas de azúcares.

Otro tema de interés lo constituye la presencia de los "técnicos azucareros" soviéticos en Cuba. El régimen cuenta en la actualidad con unos 300 técnicos azucareros soviéticos quienes se supone que sean los sustitutos de los técnicos cubanos que han abandonado el país. Los técnicos soviéticos tienen muy poca experiencia en azúcar de caña y la forma en que dicha industria opera en Cuba. Además muy pocos hablan español y esto les hace aún más difícil su labor. Por lo tanto ni los técnicos soviéticos ni los equipos soviéticos constituyen una solución para el quebradero de cabeza azucarero de Fidel Castro.

Con esto deseo dar por terminada estas declaraciones. Dejo ahora la palabra a los miembros de la prensa para contestarles cualquier pregunta en relación, no sólo a mis palabras, sino a la situación política interna que es un interesante fenómeno de desintegración, la odisea de mi familia, el problema de la Universidad en donde desempeñaba una cátedra, así como cualquier otro tema que resulte de interés.

Muchas gracias.

Miami, 5 de Abril de 1966.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Nombre: RAUL ESPARZA TABARES

Casado

Edad: 46 años

Información Profesional:

- \* Químico Industrial (1938).
- \* Ingeniero Químico Azucarero (1943)
- \* Ingeniero Agrónomo (1943)
- \* Jefe de la Delegación Cubana a la Conferencia Internacional de Expertos Azucareros de la FAO (Naciones Unidas) celebrada en Londres, Inglaterra del 1ro. al 3 de marzo de 1966.
- \* Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas del Ministerio de Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba (1964-1966).
- \* Miembro de la "Comisión del Plan Perspectivo Azucarero" de Cuba (1963-1966)
- \* Jefe Nacional de Producción del Ministerio de Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba (1961-1963).
- \* Auxiliar Ingeniero Asesor Alfred L. Webro (1950-1960).
- \* Superintendente de Fabricación del Central "Santa Lucía", Oriente, Cuba, (1949-1961).
- \* Jefe de Laboratorio del Central "Narcisa", Las Villas, Cuba (1943-1947).
- \* Jefe del Departamento Químico de la Estación Experimental de Santiago de las Vegas, Habana, Cuba, (1948-1949).
- \* Miembro del "International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists (1963).
- \* Vice-Presidente de la "Asociación de Técnicos Azucareros Cubanos" (1966).
- \* Ex-Presidente del "Rotary Club" de Santa Lucía, Oriente, Cuba.
- \* Profesor de la Facultad de Tecnología de la Universidad de La Habana, Cuba (1964-1966).
- \* Asesor Técnico de la Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba (1963-1966).
- \* Autor de varios artículos técnicos azucareros publicados en revistas azucareras cubanas e internacionales.

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

### PROCESSING

TO  
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE BPV

SUBJECT TYPIC/MHIVIPER/AMRAIN/Answer to questionnaire from  
Professor Torsten Gardlund

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED:** Headquarters' Approval Requested per Paragraph 2.

**REFERENCES:** A. DIRECTOR-05058  
B. STOCKHOLM-7068

192515

1. Per reference A we forward by separate cover the draft of the proposed AMRAIN-1/AMFRAME-1 answer to the questionnaire sent AMRAIN-1 by Professor Torsten Gardlund requesting information on the Cuban sugar industry. The time was taken to prepare these answers carefully and to provide additional information of Cuban sugar export commitments in order to point up the problems facing the regime in reaching its 1970 goal. In addition, we hope that an exchange of correspondence will ensue as Professor Gardlund could be a useful European contact for AMSCROLL.

2. Please cable Headquarters comments. The station is retaining the originals which need only to be dated and signed prior to mailing. We shall pouch COS, Stockholm a copy of what we mail Professor Gardlund.

AM	FI	
ABSTRACT		

Roy E. Marshall  
for Philip G. ELMARD

19-120-26/3 AMSCROLL  
PROP

19-120-26 <sup>per abstract</sup>  
(~~copy~~)

Attachments: usc (aas)

1. Letter from AMRAIN-1
2. Answer to Questionnaire with Appendix I
3. Letter from AMFRAME-1

Distribution:

3- WH/C, w/atts. usc

3000

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO **CS COPY**

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

DATE TYPED 21 June 66	DATE DISPATCHED JUN 24 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-25367	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3	

Miami, June 10, 1966

Profesor Torsten Gardlund  
Svenska Sockerfabriks Aktiebolaget  
Huvudkontoret  
Post Box 17050  
Malmo  
Sweden.

Dear Prof. Gardlund:

I am pleased to enclose the information that you requested in your kind letter of 5/5/66, which I hope will be useful to you in your studies of price and cost trends in the cane sugar industry.

As you probably know, the Cuban sugar industry ranked first place as a producer of cane sugar, not only with regards to large production volumes, but also as concerns high technical efficiency and low production costs.

Before 1959, the maximum production cost was of 3.5 cents a pound, excepting, of course, the smaller and more inefficient sugar mills that had not developed any technological advances since World War II. However, in 1965 the cost of production was as high as 5.25 cents a pound, even though, of course, this latter figure is carefully concealed by the Communist regime that rules my country.

I would like to acquaint you with the Economic Research Bureau of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA Movement. This organization is made up of true Cuban economists in exile. I am sure that you will find this a very valuable source of information concerning Cuba's economy.

I thank you very much for the kind and humane phrases that you have had for my family and for myself. Thank Heaven, after three long years we were able to escape, even if at the risk of our own lives, from the Communist hell. We have come to this free land in the hope that we can start our lives all over again under the kind hospitality of this great Nation, the free and democratic United States of America.

Please be assured, my dear Professor, that I am pleased to place myself at your service. Should you desire any information concerning the Cuban sugar industry, I will be more than glad to furnish it to you. I also hope that, very soon, a regime of liberty, justice and democratic economic development will prevail in my suffering Fatherland.

Sincerely yours,

Ing. Raul Esparza Sr.

CS COPY

19-120-26 <sup>per</sup> <sub>about</sub>

~~2-120-58~~

SLC at. I UFGA-25367

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROFESSOR TORSTEN GARLUND

SVENSKA SÖKRENSKAPS AKTIEBOLAGET

1.- TECHNICIANS IN CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES:

Before Castro: 400  
In 1966: 50

2.- TRAINING OF CUBAN SUGAR TECHNICIANS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA:

Before Castro: Agricultural Engineer (4 years)  
Sugar Chemical Engineer (5 years)  
Sugar Chemist (3 years)

In 1966: Agricultural Engineer (5 years)

QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO A POSSIBLE SWEDISH-CUBAN LONGTERM SUGAR AGREEMENT

A.- Present Cuban export arrangements:

I.- Total Exports: 4,880,000 MT (1966 sugar commitments)

II.- Thereof under long-term agreements: (\*)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>Number of Years</u>
Eastern Europe	600,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	On a yearly basis
Spain	130,000.0 MT	2.5 cts. lb.	1966
Morocco	270,000.0 MT	L.D.P.	1966
Egypt	100,000.0 MT (est.)	Free Mkt.	1966
Syria	30,000.0 MT (est.)	Free Mkt.	1966

(\*).- Breakdown of Eastern Europe and additional information enclosed in Appendix I.

B.- Facts about the Cuban sugar production:

I.- Production:

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1970</u> (planned)
a.- Acreage under cane acre, cab.	3,979,440 acres	4,642,680 acres
b.- Expected cane crops in ton/ acre arr/cab.	994,860 acres	1,989,720 acres
c.- Expected cane crop in tons	37,500,000.0 MT	83,000,000.0 MT
d.- Expected sugar production in tons	4,500,000.0 MT(*)	10,000,000.0 MT
e.- Average sugar content in cane %	14.00%	17 - 120 <sup>14.50%</sup> <sub>26</sub> <sup>for</sup> <sub>abstract</sub>
f.- Yield sugar in bag/ton cane %	12.00%	12.50-12.60%

S/C 2 UFGA-25367

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	<u>1966</u>	<u>1970</u>
g.- Number of factories operating, raw sugar	152	153
h.- Totally installed milling ca- pacity, arrobas cane/day (24 hrs)	47,730,000 as	52,100,000 as
one arroba = 25,3525 lbs.		

(\*) 1966 production will range from 4,450,000.0 MT to 4,500,000.0 MT. Original goal set by Cuban government was 6,500,000.0 MT.

II.- Methods to reach the goal for 1970:

a.- Increase in acreage:            acre, ha, cab.

i.- Increasing present acreage in:            663,240 acres

ii.- By replacing with newly planted cane the present fields maintain-  
ing an average age of five years for the cane. This means that  
each year 20% of the total cane area must be replaced which stated  
in figures means that from 1964 to 1969, a total of 829,050 acres  
of new cane will have to be planted a year.

The new plantations up to date have been:

1963	298,458 acres
1964	464,268 acres
1965	563,754 acres

b.- Increase in yield ton. of cane/acre  
arr. of cane/cab; %

The project has taken into consideration an increase in the yield of  
metric tons per hectare from 24.924 MT in 1966 to 49.848 MT in 1970.  
This represents a 200% yield increase in only four years.

c.- Increase in yield sugar in bag/ton of cane %:

The project calls for an increase from the 12.0% in 1966 to 12.50 -  
12.60% in 1970.

d.- Increase of installed milling capacity in factories,  
ton/24 hrs.

An increase of 50,300.0 MT of cane/24 hrs., equivalent to 6,300.0 MT  
of sugar/24 hrs. is planned.

e.- Increase in days of safra:

The days of safra (harvest) will increase from 120 to 140 days.

f.- Number of new factories:

A new sugar mill is programmed for 1970. This new mill will have a capacity of 13,800.0 MT of sugar cane per 24 hours and a total production of 200,000.0 MT of sugar in 120 effective days of safra.

III.- Fertilizers:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u> (planned)
a.- Import of fertilizers:	450,000.0 MT	400,000.0 MT

The plan calls for the use of 400,000.0 - 450,000.0 MT of fertilizers for the following years: 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970.

b.- Domestic production of fertilizers:	50,000.0 MT	100,000.0 MT
---	-------------	--------------

IV.- Cost of production:

	<u>1965</u> pesos per ton sugar	<u>1970</u> (planned)
a.- Raw sugar:		
Raw materials incl. cane	45.00	?
Cost of production ex factory <u>excl. of depreciation and interest</u> (excl. raw materials and cane)	51.00	?
Depreciation - interest	21.00	?
- by-products	2.00	?
= price ex factory	115.00	?

b.- Refined sugar:

	<u>1965</u> pesos per lbs.
Price ex factory	0.0625
+ marketing costs and profits	0.0175
= retail price	0.0800

c.- Cane:

Average price of cane at factory: 6.00 pesos per 1.15 MT of sugar cane.

d.- Labour:

Average working minutes per ton sugar produced  
 (or per ton cane crushed) 30.00 metric tons of sugar per  
 minute.

Average labour wage per 8 hrs. 6.50 pesos per man.

e.- Methods of depreciation:

	% for <u>buildings</u> (average)	% for <u>machinery</u> (average)
On original value	20	10
On recovery value	--	--

APPENDIX I

BREAKDOWN OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS  
AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CUBAN SUGAR  
EXPORT COMMITMENTS, CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>Number of years</u>
<b>Eastern Europe</b>			
Bulgaria	180,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (1)
Czechoslovakia	200,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (2)
East Germany	220,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (3)
U.S.S.R.	3,000,000.0 MT	5 cts. lb.	1966 (4)
Communist China	600,000.0 MT	?	1966 (5)
North Korea and North Viet Nam	30,000.0 MT	?	1966 (6)
Spain	130,000.0 MT	2.5 cts. lb.	1966 (7)
Morocco	270,000.0 MT	L.D.P.	1966 (8)
Egypt	100,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (9)
Syria	30,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966(10)
Other free world commitments	120,000.0 MT		
<u>Total Export Commitments:</u>	4,880,000.0 MT		
<u>Domestic Consumption:</u>	450,000.0 MT		
<u>Total 1966 Commitments:</u>	5,330,000.0 MT		
<u>1966 Sugar Production:</u>		4,500,000.0 MT	
<u>Possible 1965 standover:</u>		500,000.0 MT	
<u>Sugar available for 1966:</u>		5,000,000.0 MT	
<u>Deficit:</u>	-----		330,000.0 MT

- (1) Bulgaria: 180,000.0 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreements in exchange for Bulgarian electrical and industrial equipments and plants. A 1967-1970 agreement calls for an increase in deliveries to 200,000.0 MT.
- (2) Czechoslovakia: 200,000 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreement originally signed in June 1960 and revised during 1965.
- (3) East Germany: 220,000.0 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreement signed early in 1965 which calls for an increase in Cuban sugar deliveries on a yearly basis until 1970.
- (4) U.S.S.R.: 3,000,000.0 MT for 1966 at an original price of 6 cts. per lb. which is considered to be at the present time of 5 cts. per lb. under the January 20, 1964 barter agreement. Cuban sugar deliveries will increase as follows:

1967:	4,000,000.0 MT
1968:	4,000,000.0 MT
1969:	5,000,000.0 MT
1970:	5,000,000.0 MT
- (5) Communist China: 600,000.0 MT under barter agreement in exchange for rice, foodstuffs, and machinery.
- (6) North Korea and North Viet Nam: Estimates.
- (7) Spain: 130,000.0 MT for 1966 at a new price of 2.5 cts. per lb. under the new trade agreement for 1966-1969 compared to 6.0 cts. per lb. paid by Spain under the previous agreement. Cuban sugar and tobacco will be exchange for Spanish vessels, vehicles, electrical equipment and industrial plants, foodstuffs (wine, brandy, peanut, oil), and textiles. Cuban sugar deliveries for the period -- (1966-1969) will be:

1966:	130,000.0 MT
1967:	140,000.0 MT
1968:	150,000.0 MT
1969:	160,000.0 MT
- (8) Morocco: 270,000.0 MT for 1966 at L.D.P. 35% of 1966 deliveries will be paid in convertible currencies. Cuban sugar deliveries will increase to 295,000.0 MT in 1967.
- (9) Egypt: 100,000.0 MT for 1966 at free market prices. Agreement originally signed in October 1959 for an indefinite period of time.
- (10) Syria: 30,000.0 MT for 1966 at free market prices. No other details available.

LETTERHEAD ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

Miami, June , 1966

Prof. Torsten Gärland  
SVENSKA SOCKERFABRIKS AKTIENLAGET  
Huvudkontoret  
Box 17050  
Malmo 17, Sweden.

Dear Prof. Gärland:

We had the opportunity of cooperating with Ing. Raul Esparza in filling out the questionnaire you enclosed with your May 5, 1966 letter. The "Economic Research Bureau" is a branch of UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, which is an exile Cuban organization born in the underground and presently fighting to free our Homeland, both inside Cuba and in exile.

One of our weapons in this effort is what we have labeled as an economic offensive to deny the Castro regime the hard currency it so desperately needs. For this reason the "Economic Research Bureau" was organized. It puts a monthly economic newsletter, the "Economic Intelligence Report", and whatever other information we feel will aid our cause and at the same time provide accurate and reliable data to Free World countries and firms that still consider trading with the present Cuban regime.

Enclosed you will find some of our past newsletters which we expect will be of interest to you. At the same time, they will serve you as an example of the type of research work we have undertaken, its objectivity, and its accuracy.

It was our pleasure to cooperate with Ing. Esparza in filling out the questionnaire you sent and we avail ourselves for any additional information you could desire in the future, besides placing you in our regular mailing list.

Very sincerely yours,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Director UR's  
Economic Research Bureau

RRV/EM.

s/c att. 3 UFGA-28367

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# DISPATCH

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### PROCESSING

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TO Chief, WH		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO Chief of Station, Bogota	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>BPV</i>		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

SUBJECT  
**TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL**

#### ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI**

**REFERENCE: UFGW-6034**

1. Station JMWAVE appreciates the reference and in implementation thereof AMFRAME-1 has written Jaime Lozano of the Colombian National Association of Sugar Cane Growers as suggested in paragraph 1 of the reference. AMFRAME-1 also enclosed certain statistics developed by AMSCROLL which we hope will be of use to Lozano. Copies of the letter and of the translation are forwarded by separate cover.

2. We shall keep the addressees informed of any developments.

*Philip G. Elward*  
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: usc *(3/1/66)*

- 1-Letter
- 2-Memo of Statistics

#### Distribution:

- 3- WH/C, w/atts. usc
- 2- COS/Bogota, w/atts. *at Paul*
- 2- C/WH, w/o atts. *200-120-58*

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**UFGA-25349**

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

**19-120-26/3**

200-120-58

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**SECRET**

*2 atts*

Miami, 13 de Junio de 1966

Sr. Jaime Lozano  
Presidente,  
Asociación Nacional de  
Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar  
Edificio Suramericana de Seguros  
Calle 12, Carrera 3a, 10o piso,  
Cali, Colombia.

Estimado Sr. Lozano:

Nos dirigimos a Ud. en esta oportunidad con motivo del fracaso de la presente zafra azucarera cubana, fracaso del cual Ud. ya debe tener noticias, no sólo a través de nuestra hoja de información económica ("Economic Intelligence Report") sino a través de fuentes propias.

Por ejemplo, el boletín de la casa Merrill-Lynch de fecha 10 de junio de 1966 fija el monto de la presente zafra cubana en 4,450,000 TM, es decir, mas de dos millones de toneladas métricas por debajo de la meta anunciada por Fidel Castro (6,500,000 TM). Esto se traducirá en una escasez que hará muy difícil que el presente régimen pueda cumplir sus compromisos azucareros con países del mundo libre tales como España y Marruecos y al mismo tiempo pueda copar un por ciento considerable del mercado azucarero del Japón. El memorandum adjunto contiene datos que le resultarán de interés.

La reciente operación en la cual el Brasil vendió 530,000 TM es una prueba palpable de la oportunidad existente para los países libres de la América en los actuales momentos debido al fracaso de la zafra cubana.

Sería sumamente eficaz para Colombia el explorar las posibilidades existentes en esos tres mercados de inmediato pues seguramente se podrían realizar algunas operaciones que redundarían en beneficio para su país al mismo tiempo - que bloquearían operaciones del régimen Castro-Comunista de por sí difíciles en vista de la escasez producida por el fracaso de la zafra de 1966.

Es muy posible que nosotros pudiésemos cooperar en este empeño de Colombia, tanto a través de informaciones que pudiésemos obtener de la situación de dichos mercados (España, Marruecos y Japón), así como a través de alguna gestión personal si se nos presentara la oportunidad.

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Así mismo agradeceríamos que si Uds. tienen alguna publicación de su Asociación que nos pudieran enviar con regularidad nos la hicieran llegar y si logró utilizar las declaraciones del Ing. Esparza y del Dr. Tarrab en algún artículo nos interesaría obtener alguna copia.

Esperando tener noticias suyas y seguros que cualquier gestión suya representará una victoria tanto para Colombia como para los cubanos libres, que damos de Ud.,

Muy atentamente,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Secretario de Sectores  
Económicos y Profesionales

P.D. Díganos si está recibiendo con regularidad nuestras informaciones.

RRV/amb

MEMORANDUM

AL : Sr. Jaime Lozano  
Presidente,  
Asociación Nacional de  
Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar,  
Cali, Colombia.

DEL: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Secretario de los Sectores  
Económicos y Profesionales,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
Miami, Florida.

REF.: Análisis Estadístico de los compromisos  
azucareros de Cuba para 1966. La pro-  
ducción y los mercados de España, Marro-  
cos y Japón.-

CUADRO NO. 1

COMPROMISOS AZUCAREROS DE CUBA PARA 1966

1.- En base de acuerdos existentes:

A) Países Comunistas:

U.R.S.S.:	3,000,000 TM	
Bloque Comunista:	690,000	
China Roja:	600,000	
Corea del Norte y Viet Nam del Norte:	30,000	
		4,320,000 TM

B) Países del Mundo Libre\*: 650,000 650,000 TM

2.- Consumo Doméstico: 450,000 450,000 TM

TOTAL: 5,420,000 TM

(\*) Estimado conservador de compromisos con países tales como España, Marruecos, Ceilón, la República Árabe Unida y otros.-

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CUADRO NO. 2

DEFICIT AZICARERO CUBANO PARA 1966

1.- Azúcar necesaria para cubrir compromisos de acuerdo con Cuadro No. 1:	<u>5,420,000 TM</u>
2.- Azúcar disponible para 1966:	
A) Producción de 1966 (estimado):	4,450,000 TM
B) Sobrante de 1965 (estimado):	<u>500,000 TM</u>
TOTAL:	<u>4,950,000 TM</u>
3.- Déficit: (5,420,000 TM - 4,950,000 TM):	<u>-470,000 TM</u>

CUADRO NO. 3

EXPORTACIONES DE AZÚCAR DE CUBA A MERCADOS  
SELECCIONADOS, ESPAÑA, MARRUECOS Y JAPÓN

(1961 - 1966)

	<u>ESPAÑA</u>	<u>MARRUECOS</u>	<u>JAPÓN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1961	53,208	157,287	325,000	535,495 TM
1962	58,312	265,124	522,727	846,163 TM
1963	102,737	285,028	163,662	551,427 TM
1964	275,704	323,259	328,609	927,572 TM
1965	<u>115,542</u>	<u>300,000</u>	<u>380,000</u>	<u>795,542 TM</u>
TOTAL	<u>605,503 TM</u>	<u>1,230,698 TM</u>	<u>1,719,998 TM</u>	<u>3,656,199 TM</u>
1966 (*)	130,000 TM	270,000 TM	(hasta el momento no se ha cerrado negociación alguna)	

(\*) España y Marruecos son compromisos de convenio.  
Japón de acuerdo con negociaciones anuales.

Fuentes: "Sugar Year Book" de 1964, Convenios Comerciales de Cuba Comunista y estimados por el "Buro de Investigaciones Económicas" de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.-

Miami, 14 de Junio de 1966.

Miami, June 13, 1966

Mr. Jaime Lozano  
President,  
National Association of Sugar  
Cane Growers  
Edificio Suramericana de Seguros  
Calle 12, Carrera 5a  
Call, Colombia.

Dear Mr. Lozano:

We address you now on account of the failure of the current Cuban sugar harvest, of which failure you must have heard not only through our "Economic Intelligence Report", but also from your own sources.

For example, the June 10, 1966 Merrill-Lynch bulletin, sets the amount of the current Cuban sugar harvest at 4,450,000 MT, that is, over 2 million metric tons below the goal announced by Fidel Castro (6,500,000 MT). This will result in a scarcity of Cuban sugar, which scarcity will make it very difficult for the regime to fulfill its sugar commitments to free-world countries, such as Spain and Morocco, and at the same time to cope with a significant percentage of the Japanese sugar market. The enclosed Memo contains data that may be of interest to you.

The recent transactions whereby Brazil sold 530,000 MT is tangible evidence of the opportunity that exists for free countries in the Americas at this time, thanks to the failure of the Cuban sugar harvest.

It would be extremely rewarding for Colombia to explore the immediate possibilities that exist in these three markets, as surely some transactions could be made that would benefit your country, and which, at the same time, would block some of the Castro-Communists' own transactions. The latter are in themselves difficult because of the scarcity brought about by the failure of the 1966 sugar harvest.

It is quite possible that we could cooperate with this Colombian endeavor, by informing you of facts we learn concerning the situation in such markets (Spain, Morocco and Japan), markets as well as by any personal undertaking, which we could be capable of.

Likewise, if you have any publication issued by your Association that you could mail to us regularly, we would appreciate your doing so, and if you were able to use the statements by Eng. Esperza and Dr. Tarrab in some article, we would like to obtain a copy of it.

Hoping to hear from you soon, and with the certainty that any action on your part will mean a victory for Colombia as well as for the free Cubans, we are,

Yours very sincerely,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Secretary for Economic  
and Professional Affairs

P.S.: Please tell us whether you are regularly receiving our publications.

Encl.

RRV/amb

MEMORANDUM

TO: Sr. Jaime Lozano  
President,  
National Association of  
Sugar Cane Growers  
Cali, Colombia.

FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Secretary for Economic  
and Professional Affairs  
Unidad Revolucionaria  
Miami, Florida.

REF.: Statistical Analysis of Cuban Sugar  
Commitments, Production, and the  
Spanish, Moroccan and Japanese Mar-  
kets.

TABLE NO. 1

CUBAN SUGAR COMMITMENTS FOR 1966

1.- Commitments under existing agreements:

A) Communist Countries:

U.S.S.R.:	3,000,000 MT	
Communist Bloc:	690,000	
Red China:	600,000	
North Korea and North Viet Nam:	<u>30,000</u>	4,320,000 MT

B) Free World Countries*:	<u>650,000</u>	650,000 MT
---------------------------	----------------	------------

2.- National Consumption:	<u>450,000</u>	450,000 MT
---------------------------	----------------	------------

TOTAL: 5,420,000 MT

(\* ) Conservative estimate with countries such as Spain,  
Morocco, Ceylon, U.A.R., and others.-

TABLE NO. 2

CUBAN SUGAR DEFICIT  
(1966)

- 1.- Sugar needed to keep commitment according to Table No. 1: 5,420,000 MT
- 2.- Available sugar for 1966:
  - A) 1966 Sugar Production (estimate): 4,450,000 MT
  - B) Carry over from the 1965 harvest (estimate): 500,000 MT
- TOTAL: 4,950,000 MT
- 3.- Deficit: (5,420,000 MT - 4,950,000 MT); - 470,000 MT

TABLE NO. 3

CUBAN SUGAR EXPORTS TO SELECTED  
MARKETS, SPAIN, MOROCCO, AND JAPAN  
(1961 - 1966)

	<u>SPAIN</u>	<u>MOROCCO</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1961	53,208	157,287	325,000	535,495 MT
1962	58,312	265,124	522,727	846,163 MT
1963	102,737	285,028	163,662	551,427 MT
1964	275,704	323,259	328,609	927,572 MT
1965	<u>115,542</u>	<u>300,000</u>	<u>380,000</u>	<u>795,542 MT</u>
TOTAL	<u>605,503 MT</u>	<u>1,330,698 MT</u>	<u>1,719,998 MT</u>	<u>3,656,199 MT</u>

1966 (\*) Spain and Morocco are commitments under existing agreements. Japanese market subject to yearly negotiations.

Sources: "Sugar Year Book of 1964", Communist Cuba's Trade Agreements, and estimates by U.R.'s "Economic Research Bureau".-

Miami, June 14, 1966.

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TO

CHIEF, WH

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INFO.

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK  
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM

CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

MICROFILM

SUBJECT

TYPIC/MHSPAWN  
STATUS REPORT RE JMWAVE PSYCH PROJECTS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

- REFERENCES - A. DIRECTOR 11606  
— B. UFGT-15216  
C. JMWAVE 1420

1. PER REFERENCE A REQUEST PARAGRAPHS BELOW GIVE BRIEF STATUS REPORT STATION'S MHSPAWN PROJECTS. REFERENCE B SHOULD BE USED AS SUPPLEMENTAL PAPER IN HEADQUARTERS REVIEW. BASIC PROPAGANDA LINES HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT CHANGE, BUT WITH INCREASED EMPHASIS ON PERSONAL DENIGRATION AND HARASSMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO AND ON PROPAGANDA DESIGNED ENCOURAGE MILITARY AND OTHER POWER CENTERS IN CUBA TO CARRY OUT COUP D'ETAT AGAINST CASTRO. EMPHASIS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN ON CLOSER SCRUTINY AND CONTROL IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY OF OPERATION. ONE MARGINAL PROJECT /AMRUSTY/ HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND TWO PROJECTS /AMSPELL AND AMCROW/ ARE BEING SHARPLY CURTAILED DUE TO MARGINAL PERFORMANCE. THERE HAS BEEN OVERALL CUTBACK IN DISTRIBUTION PRINTED PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY TO LATIN AMERICA. PROPAGANDA MAILED TO CUBA HAS PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TARGET IN PLACE OF MORE GENERAL PROPAGANDA THEMES TREATED. AMTHIGH RADIO PROGRAMMING HAS BEEN CUT FROM TWO HOURS DAILY TO ONE AND ONE HALF /THIS SHOULD ACHIEVE REDUCTION OF \$60,000 - \$70,000 PER YEAR IN OUR RADIO BUDGET/. HOWEVER RADIO CONTINUES TO BE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT MEDIUM FOR HITTING CUBAN TARGET.

2. AMSCROLL. PROJECT CONTINUES BE STATION'S MAIN PROPAGANDA MECHANISM IN MHVIPER AND DEFECTOR-SURFACING OPERATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE B. PROJECT PUBLISHES MONTHLY ECONOMIC BULLETIN IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH AND UNDERTAKES SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO DISCOURAGE TRADE WITH CUBA, E.G., IT IS CURRENTLY CORRESPONDING WITH COLOMBIAN SUGAR GROWERS GROUP IN ATTEMPT ENCOURAGE SALE OF

DISTRIBUTION  
BY TAPE  
3 - WH/C

/CONTINUED/

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

ORIG REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

UFGT-16628

20 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION

MOS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

COLOMBIAN SUGAR TO JAPAN, MOROCCO AND SPAIN IN COMPETITION WITH COMMUNIST CUBA. PRODUCES TEN-MINUTE DAILY PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH SIX DAYS PER WEEK. PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES SUCH AS EXTENSIVE MAILINGS TO CUBA HAVE BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED AND AMSCROLL EXECUTIVE BOARD HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 13 TO 3 PERSONS AND PAID EMPLOYEES FROM 21 TO 16 AS OF 1 JULY 1966.

3. AMWASP-1. SEE REFERENCE B. HE IS A VALUABLE ELEMENT OF THE AMSCROLL PROJECT AND IS USED IN CONNECTION WITH APPROACHES TO DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT TARGETS. WE EXPECT TO TERMINATE HIM 31 DECEMBER 1966.

4. AMFRAME-1. SINGLETON AGENT WHO IS MAIN DRIVING FORCE BEHIND AMSCROLL OPERATION AND TOGETHER WITH AMASK-1 RUNS AMKNOT ACTIVITY.

5. AMKNOT. A NEW COMMITTEE FORMED AT HEADQUARTERS REQUEST TO HIT ZRWAGON DEFECTION TARGET. AMFRAME-1 AND AMASK-1 ARE WORKING VERY EFFECTIVELY AS PRINCIPAL AGENTS FOR THIS PROJECT AND LATTER HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN SECURING JOBS FOR ZRWAGON DEFECTORS.

6. AMCROW. PROJECT IS BEING SHARPLY CURTAILED. WE EXPECT TO REDUCE BUDGET TO APPROXIMATELY \$1,000-1,500 MONTHLY IN FY 67. PROJECT LACKS AGGRESSIVE PRINCIPAL AGENT, AND THE COMBINATION OF INTERNAL PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN AMCROW GROUP AND ITS MARGINAL PERFORMANCE HAVE LED TO DECISION TO CURTAIL. RADIO PROGRAM ON JMHOPE WAS TERMINATED 31 MARCH AND AFTER 31 JULY WE EXPECT TO REDUCE AMCROW PAID STAFF TO THREE PERSONS. WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE USEFUL TO PRESERVE AMCROW NAME AND CERTAIN AMCROW CONTACTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND TO CONTINUE AMCROW MAILING OPERATIONS ON MORE LIMITED BASIS.

7. AMMOP. NO MAJOR CHANGES. OPERATION IS VIEWED AS DEVICE FOR MONITORING AND INFLUENCING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND IS OF LONG-TERM INTEREST FOR ITS POTENTIAL AS A POLITICAL FORCE IN CUBA. HOWEVER PRINCIPAL AGENT LACKS MANY QUALITIES NEEDED TO MAKE HIM EFFECTIVE POLITICAL LEADER OR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER AND WE ARE ASSESSING OTHER AMMOP MEMBERS AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT. AMMOP YOUTH SECTOR HEADED BY AMCRIB-1 MAINTAINS EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE AND HAS BEEN USEFUL AS PRESS PLACEMENT MECHANISM.

8. AMSTRUT-2. NO CHANGES. SEE REFERENCE B FOR PROJECT DESCRIPTION.

9. AMLIRA. NO CHANGE, SEE REFERENCE B FOR DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES. MONTHLY MAGAZINE STARTED JANUARY 66 WELL RECEIVED BY READERS AND EFFORTS TO MAKE MAGAZINE SELF-SUSTAINING HAVE RESULTED IN PAID ADVERTISEMENTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS MAGAZINE BECOMES MORE WIDELY KNOWN. AMLIRA GROUP PREPARED TARGET STUDIES ON CUBAN ATHLETES ATTENDING REGIONAL OLYMPIC GAMES IN PUERTO RICO IN JUNE 1966 AND AMLIRA AGENTS ARE CURRENTLY WORKING WITH KUBARK TASK FORCE AT PUERTO RICAN GAMES.

10. AMBASAL-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES FROM REFERENCE B. AMBASAL-1 "CARTA CIRCULAR" NOW SENT ONLY TO CUBA AND MONTHLY BULLETIN SENT ONLY TO INTERNATIONAL ADDRESSEES - IN PAST BOTH PUBLICATIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO CUBA AND TO LATIN AMERICA. AMBASAL-1 PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH HAS BEEN DROPPED AS OF 1 JUNE BUT CONTINUES ON JMHOPE ONCE WEEKLY /SUNDAYS/.

11. YOYARD/JMHOPE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON NEWS PROGRAMS AS RESULT OF REFUGEE DEBRIEFINGS INDICATING DESIRE FOR MORE NEWS. JMHOPE NOW GIVES FIVE MINUTE NEWS SUMMARIES EVERY HALF HOUR AS COMPARED PREVIOUS HOURLY REPORTS. MANAGERIAL CONTROL OVER PHILCO TECHREPS AT JMHOPE SITE HAS BEEN IMPROVED, AND PLANS ARE NOW UNDER WAY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NEW UNITS TO REPLACE SUBSTANDARD HOUSING AT SITE. /CONTINUED/

12. AMCORE-2. EMPHASIS IN THIS PROJECT IN PAST HAS BEEN CHIEFLY ON AMCORE-2 DAILY HALF-HOUR PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH AND JMHOPE. THESE PROGRAMS CONTINUE, ALTHOUGH REDUCED TO 23 MINUTES DAILY FOR TECHNICAL PROGRAMMING REASONS. WE ARE EXAMINING POSSIBILITY OF ADDING MORNING PROGRAM ON JMHOPE TO EXPLOIT HIS HIGH AUDIENCE RATING AS REFLECTED IN REFUGEE AND JMHOPE REPORTS. WE ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT MORE FULLY AMCORE-2'S AGGRESSIVE PERSONALITY AND HIS LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL IN EXILE COMMUNITY AND TO EXPAND HIS PROPAGANDA EFFORTS BEYOND THE RADIO PROGRAMS NOTED ABOVE. ONE RESULT OF THIS WAS HIS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE DISPARATE REBEL ARMY ELEMENTS IN A UNIFIED APPEAL TO REBEL ARMY IN CUBA, AS REPORTED IN JMWAVE 1397. HE HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR FREE AIR TIME FOR A TWELVE MINUTE DAILY PROGRAM ON STATIONS IN VENEZUELA, PERU AND PANAMA - AND HAS OBTAINED SPACE IN D I A R I O L A S A M E R I C A S TO PUBLICIZE LETTERS HE RECEIVES FROM LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS IN SUPPORT OF THE ANTI-CASTRO CAUSE.

13. AMRAPT/AMPALM-4. AMPALM-4 ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS ON JMHOPE HAVE BEEN CUT TO ONE HOUR DAILY. DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA TO LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN TERMINATED. SELECTIVE MAILINGS ARE MADE TO CUBA, WITH EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TARGET. SPECIAL STUDIES BY AMPALM-4 ARE NOW BEING PUBLISHED BY AMHIM IN PLACE OF TERMINATED AMPALM-4 BULLETIN. AS OF 1 MAY DIRECTION OF AMTWIST PROGRAM HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER AMPALM-4.

14. AMTWIST. AS NOTED REFERENCE B, THIS PROJECT WAS A MARGINAL EFFORT DUE LARGELY TO LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE PRINCIPAL AGENT. THE TWO AMTWIST AGENTS HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER AMPALM-4'S DIRECTION AS OF 1 MAY AND ACTIVITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATION. AMTWIST RADIO PROGRAM IS CARRIED ON AMTHIGH /TEN MINUTES DAILY/ AND ON JMHOPE /15 MINUTES DAILY/.

15. AMSHADY-1. UNTIL MID-FEBRUARY 66 AMSHADY PROJECT CONSISTED OF RADIO PROGRAM ON AMTUMOR AND JMHOPE AIMED AT EXPOSURE AND DENUNCIATION OF CUIS AGENTS INSIDE CUBA. IN FEBRUARY SCOPE OF RADIO PROGRAM WAS BROADENED TO INCLUDE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CUIS ACTIVITIES AND AGENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, AND OCCASIONAL DISCUSSION OF OTHER POLITICAL TOPICS NOT SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO CUIS TARGET. AMSHADY BOOK ON CUIS HAS RESULTED IN WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, PRESS INTERVIEWS, AND INCREASED PRESS COVERAGE AND LETTERS FROM AMSHADY AUDIENCE. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN MADE FOR SALE OF BOOK IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH LEGITIMATE COMMERCIAL CHANNELS.

16. AMRAZOR-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B FOR DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACITIVITES. AMRAZOR HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE OUTLET FOR OUR INCREASED ACTIVITY AGAINST MILITARY TARGET AND SEVERAL AMRAZOR ARTICLES ON THIS TARGET HAVE BEEN PUT IN LEAFLET FORM AND MAILED INTO CUBA.

17. AMLYRIC-1. NO CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B.

18. AMSCREAM-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. AMTHIGH PROGRAMMING, HANDLED THROUGH AMSCREAM-1, HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM TWO HOURS DAILY TO ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS DAILY PER REFERENCE C.

19. AMRUSTY. TERMINATED 31 DECEMBER 1965. SEE REFERENCE B.

20. AMBASE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. MONTHLY AVERAGE OF MAILINGS INTO CUBA HAVE BEEN REDUCED. SEPARATE REPORT ON AMBASE STATISTICS WILL BE FORWARDED.

21. AMHIM. SEE REFERENCE B. STATION IS PLACING INCREASING EMPHASIS ON AMHIM AS MAIN MECHANISM FOR PRESS PLACEMENT AND MASS DISSEMINATION OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA. AMHIM BULLETIN NOW INCORPORATES MATERIAL FORMERLY PRODUCED AND DISTRIBUTED BY OTHER STATION ASSETS SUCH AS AMPALM-4 AND AMBASAL-1.

S E C R E T

UFGT-16628 PAGE 4

22. AMRUBY. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. PROJECT CONTINUES TO PRODUCE AVERAGE OF ONE PONY EDITION /30,000 COPIES/ EVERY THREE MONTHS FOR MAILING INTO CUBA. AS OF 1 JUNE TWO OF FOUR AMRUBY-SPONSORED SATIRE PROGRAMS ON AMTHIGH HAVE BEEN DROPPED.

23. AMICE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. AMICE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE BOYCOTT PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS AND SERVED AS A VEHICLE FOR LAUNCHING THE QUMALT-1 "DOLCE VITA" SERIES. REVIEW OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES RESULTED IN ECONOMIES ACHIEVED BY MODEST PERSONNEL CUTS, USE OF A MORE SELECTIVE MAILING LIST AND ELIMINATION OF TWO FOREIGN-LANGUAGE EDITIONS OF THE MONTHLY AMICE BULLETIN.

24. AMSPELL. AS REPORTED IN REFERENCE B FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO AMSPELL HAS BEEN CUT SHARPLY AND IS NOW LIMITED TO \$1,000 MONTHLY. THIS PROVIDES FUNDS FOR BI-MONTHLY BULLETIN, PRESS RELEASES AND SPECIAL PRINTED PROPAGANDA. AMSPELL HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN STATION CAMPAIGNS REGARDING POLITICAL PRISONERS AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDENT MOVEMENT /CLAE/ AND PRINCIPAL AGENT HAS CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO STATION GUIDANCE.

25. AMNON. NO MAJOR CHANGES IN PROJECT ACTIVITY. AMNON CARRIED OUT SPECIAL RADIO AND PRESS CAMPAIGN IN CONNECTION WITH FORTHCOMING CLAE MEETING IN HAVANA. SPECIAL PAMPHLET ON THIS SUBJECT IS BEING PREPARED BY AMNON FOR PUBLICATION BY AMHIM. AMNON IS ALSO STATION'S MAIN ASSET FOR AMBASE PROGRAM AND HAS TAKEN OVER AMBASE PERSONNEL FROM TERMINATED AMRUSTY PROJECT.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE  
INFO Chief, Far East Division  
FROM Chief of Station, Manila

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK  
CAN ASSESS INDEXING

MICROFILM

SUBJECT **TYPIC MFSHAWM/Information on Honorio Viray**

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE 1092

Action Required: See Below

*File  
Amscroll*

1. The information which Honorio Viray\* supplied AMSCROLL about himself is substantially correct. He has been in PBPRIME for nearly a year on a World Press Institute grant, undergoing practical training in different periodicals. Prior to this grant, he was provincial news editor of the Manila Times. He will probably rejoin the Times on his return to the Philippines in July, 1966. He was a director of the National Press Club, but he was defeated when he ran for reelection in February 1966.

2. Viray is a native of Tarlac and is about 39 years old. He is a graduate of the University of Santo Tomas. He studied for one year in Australia, working with a paper in Brisbane while going to school. He is a bachelor. He has no known leftist sympathies, and he appears to be popular with his fellow newspapermen.

3. Manila Station may be interested in contacting Viray once he returns to Manila and his job status is certain. Assuming that AMSCROLL will correspond with Viray, as suggested in reference, we would like to reserve for future determination a means whereby AMSCROLL could assist in arranging a contact with a Station officer. The Station anticipates the assignment here of an officer (Raymond E. ONOFREY) within the next ninety days when we should want to place in contact with Viray. We will forward a dispatch suggesting a contact proposal, when this becomes appropriate.

Caroline R. KOCERHAN

Distribution:

2 - COS, JMWAVE  
1 - C/YE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

18451

JUN 7 1966

FPRE-

6 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HC'S FILE NUMBER

**SECRET**

52-174-38

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET

PROCESSING

W4/C

TO Chief of Station, Manila

INFO Chief, FE  
Chief, WH

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL  
Forwarding of Economic Intelligence Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES  
ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCE: JMWAVE-1092

1. We forward by separate cover the latest edition of the AMSCROLL economic report that paragraph 3 of the reference indicated would be pouched. Copies of this and prior issues as well as supporting statistical material were given Honorio J. Viray during the visit described in the reference.

2. This Station will appreciate receiving Manila's overt mailing address for direct mailing of material similar to this in the future. JMWAVE's address is Identity.

Philip G. ELMARD

- Attachments: usc(202)
1. VOL I; No. 10: Economic Intelligence Report
  2. Identity(202)

- Distribution:
- 3- COS/Manila, w/atts. usc
  - ② WH/C, w/att.2 usc
  - 2- C/FE, w/atts. usc

GROUP 1  
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declassification

19-120-26

DATE TYPED 26 May 66	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 26 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-25198	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26	

CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET

107

UFGA-25198

I D E N T I T Y



GROUP 1  
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S/C ATT. 1 UFGA-25198

19-120-26

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **B** TOTAL COPIES **3**

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED  
*File (Comms) P.R.*

FROM  
*DISSEM by 25/3*

ACTION  
*WN/C 8*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME *C* BY *D*

INFO  
*FILE VR, RIAN, FE8, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/04, CI/OPS, CI/A*

SECRET 240313Z CITE JMWAVE 1092 20 MAY 1963 2383

MANILA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHSPAWN

**ASTORIA**

1. ON 19 MAY MR. HONORIO I. VIRAY CALLED UPON KURARK CONTROLLED ANSCROLL (IDEN A) SEEKING INFORMATION ON CUBA REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING CUBA. SAID HE EMPLOYED BY MANILA TIMES AND CURRENTLY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL PRESS CLUS OF PHILIPPINES, IN STATES WITH GROUP 15 OTHER NEWSMEN STUDYING WAR ON POVERTY AND THAT HE BECAME INTERESTED IN REFUGEES WHILE PASSING THROUGH MIAMI. SAID WOULD USE INFORMATION ON REFUGEES IN ARTICLES. HE WILL PREPARE FOR TIMES AFTER RETURN MANILA IN JULY.

2. ANSCROLL BRIEFED VIRAY 20 AND 21 MAY ON CASTRO'S SUGAR DIFFICULTIES INCLUDING PROBLEMS JAPAN HAVING IN DEALING WITH CUBA. AMWASP-1 (IDEN B) MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW 20 MAY WHO MADE POINT JAPAN IS NATURAL MARKET FOR PHILLIPPINE SUGAR. VIRAY TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES AND ACCEPTED DOCUMENTATION OF STATEMENTS. HE ALSO BRIEFED ON RASH OF CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE DEFECTIONS AND MEANING OF THIS TO CASTRO AND ANSCROLL ARRANGED FOR HIM TO MEET A FORMER SHIP CAPTAIN WHO DEFECTED (QUASAILOR 13).

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 1093 S E C R E T

**SECRET**

3. VIRAY SAID HE WISHED STAY IN TOUCH WITH AMSCROLL AND RECEIVE THEIR PUBLICATIONS. NEXT STEP WILL BE FOR AMSCROLL TO WRITE VIRAY AFTER HIS RETURN MANILA. REQUEST BY POUCH TRACES AND ANY SUGGESTIONS MANILA MAY HAVE SINCE OUTLET FOR AMSCROLL ECONOMIC INFORMATION IN MANILA WOULD BE USEFUL. POUCHING COPY LATEST AMSCROLL ECONOMIC REPORT FOR INFO STATION.

4. INDEX VIRAY.

**SECRET**

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CL B FIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 3

R-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE #10  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

FROM \_\_\_\_\_

DISSEM by 25/

ACTION WH/C 8  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

ADVANCE COPY \_\_\_\_\_

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO FILE VR RI/AN, FEB, DOY, DO/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET

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3	7
4	8

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET 242313Z CITE JMWAVE 1023

25 NOV 68 23843

MANILA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC NHSPAWN

REF WAVE 0192 (IN 23837)

IDENS:

- A. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
- B. GILBERTO R. ALEMANY, CUBAN TRADE COUNSELLOR, TOKYO, WHO DEFECTED AUGUST 1965.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

**DISPATCH**

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

PROCESSING

*WAVE/P*

TO	Chief, WH	THIS FILED	XX	ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING	ACCOM PLISHED
INFO.	Chief of Station, Bogota				NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>BPV</i>				ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
					ABSTRACT	
					MICROFILM	

SUBJECT **TYPIC/AMSCROLL**  
**Letter from the National Association of Sugar Cane Growers, Cali, Colombia**

ACTION REQUIRED: For addressees to determine.

REFERENCE: DIR-03229 *cit. Colombia*

1. We forward by separate cover a copy of a letter (with translation) from Jaime *11/25/61* LOZANO, *Regarding letter from subject, who is the* President of the National Association of Sugar Cane Growers of Cali, Colombia, that was recently received by AMSCROLL which was in response to AMSCROLL's mailing the Association the text of public statement made by AMRAIN-1 and AMSNAKE-1. Needless to say, AMSCROLL will continue the Association on its mailing list and has responded to this letter with its own letter of appreciation.

2. It occurs to WAVE that this organization might be useful in implementing the reference, particularly in view of the fact that Colombia might have as much as 200,000 tons of sugar available for export this year (per paragraph 4 of the reference). WAVE will be happy to undertake any action requested of it by the addressees if this should be an exploitable lead.

3. There are no WAVE traces for either LOZANO or his organization.

*for* Philip G. ELMARD

MAY 20 1966

Attachment: USC *Att'd RIDAN*  
 Letter and translation

Distribution:  
 (3- WH/C, w/att. usc  
 2- COS/Bogota, w/att. usc - *To cut piece*  
 2- C/WH, w/o att.

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

**CS COPY**

19-120-26  
 DATE TYPED 16 May 66  
 DATE DISPATCHED MAY 18 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER  
**UFGA-25153**

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER  
**19-120-26/3**

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

*1 Att.*

ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE CULTIVADORES DE CAÑA DE AZUCAR

EDIFICIO SURAMERICANA  
DE SEGUROS  
CALLE DE BARRERA No.  
100. PISO

CALI - COLOMBIA

TELEGRAFOS "ASOCAÑA"

*2P*

APARTADO:  
AEREO 44.40  
NACIONAL 840

TELEFONO 98.9-99

Calí, Mayo 2 de 1.966

Señor  
Director del Economic Research Bureau  
Box 3940  
Miami (Florida).

MAY 23 1966  
U.S. AIR MAIL

Muy estimado amigo:

Por intermedio del Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales que funciona en Cali, tuvimos la oportunidad de recibir los Boletines Nos. 9 y 9-A de ustedes que contienen las declaraciones de los señores Esparza Tabares y Tarrab Miranda sobre los problemas económicos de Cuba.

Estas declaraciones las hemos considerado de la mayor significación y las estamos dando amplia publicidad por medio de uno de los Boletines de nuestra Asociación que circula tanto entre la industria azucarera y medios económicos de este país, como en la prensa y radio nacionales.

Esperamos que esta publicidad cuente con el agrado de su organización y mucho apreciaríamos si incluyen el nombre nuestro para que nos sean enviados los Boletines o publicaciones de ustedes que tengan especial relación con las actividades cubanas en materia de azúcar. Nosotros representamos en Colombia la industria azucarera y somos la organización que integra las actividades de tan importante sector de nuestra economía.

Les damos nuestras gracias anticipadas por la atención que estas líneas les merezcan y los saludamos de la manera más cordial.

Atentos amigos,

ASOCIACION NAL. DE CULTIVADORES DE CAÑA DE AZUCAR

*Jaime Lozano*  
Jaime Lozano  
Presidente.

S/c ATT #1 TO UFGA 25153. CS COPY  
JL/nc.

19-120-26

Translation;

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SUGAR GROWERS - CALI, COLOMBIA

Cali, May 2, 1966

Director  
Economic Research Bureau  
Box 3940,  
Miami (Florida).

My very dear friend;

Through the Center for Economic and Social Research that operates in Cali, we had the opportunity to receive your Bulletins Nos. 9 and 9-A, which contain the statements made by Messrs. Esparza Sabares and Tarrab Miranda regarding the economic problems of Cuba.

We have considered these statements of the utmost significance, and we are giving them wide publicity through one of the Bulletins of our Association that circulates among the sugar industry and the economic circles of this country as well as among the national press and radio.

We hope that this publicity will be to the liking of your Organization and we would appreciate it very much if you would include our name so that we are sent those of your Bulletins or publications that are especially related to Cuban activities in matters of sugar. In Colombia, we represent the sugar industry and we are the organization that integrates the activities of such an important sector of our economy.

We thank you in advance for your kind attention to these lines and convey to you our most cordial greetings.

Your friends,

NATIONAL ASSN. OF SUGAR CANE GROWERS

(sgd.) Jaime Lozano, President

**DISPATCH**

CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

PROCESS

TO  
Chief, WH

PPH INDEXED	ACTION
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	BY FILM

INFO.

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational/AMSCROLL/AMRAIN  
Tapes of AMRAIN Press Conference Held 5 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: FYI**

Under separate cover we are forwarding the tapes of the Press Conference held by AMRAIN on 5 April 1966 under the auspices of AMSCROLL.

*for Philip G. Elward*  
Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: USC (att)  
3 tapes

Distribution:  
3- WH/C, w/atts. usc

19-120-26

CS COPY

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Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

DATE TYPED 12 April 66	DATE DISPATCHED APR 12 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-24955	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-132-49/3	

100

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

N-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  10.

FROM: Jim WAVE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

TOTAL COPIES

28  
21  
**SECRET**

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DECLASSIFICATION

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3	7
4	0

ACTION

WH/C 8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

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TIME

BY

INFO

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**SECRET** 161800Z

DIR OTTA CITE WAVE 9650

TYPIC AMSCROLL MHVIPER

MICROFILMED COPIES

MAR 9 11 300  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

28

16 MAR 66 76425

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

1. ON 15 MARCH WAVE ASSET AMSCROLL (IDEN) RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS JOHN WIES, AN OFFICIAL OF DELHI EXPORT AND SERVICE, LTD., DELHI, ONTARIO. SAID THAT DELHI HAD TRADED FOR TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS WITH CUBA UNTIL DECEMBER 64 WHEN TRADING SUSPENDED AS UNABLE COLLECT AMOUNTS DUE. WIES SAID HE THEN WENT CUBA IN ATTEMPT COLLECT. INSTEAD JAILED UNTIL FEB 65. AMONG CHARGES WAS HE KUBARK AGENT. UPON RETURN CANADA HE UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT TO INTEREST CANADIAN GOVT HIS CASE. THEREAFTER RETAINED LAWYER AND NOW PREPARING SUIT. SAID HIS LAWYER ALSO REPRESENTS OTHER CANADIAN FIRMS WITH OUTSTANDING CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA AND HIS SUIT BEING PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION OTHERS. OBJECT IS TO IMPOUND CUBAN ASSETS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION CLAIMS.

2. WIES SAID HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING APPROACHING KUBARK OR OTHER ODOYKE AGENCY OFFICE IN CANADA TO FILE THIS CASE BUT DID NOT KNOW WHERE TO TURN. HE DECIDED INSTEAD TO CALL AMSCROLL AS HIS FIRM IS RECIPIENT ITS ECONOMIC BULLETIN.

**SECRET**

14-120-20  
16 March 1966

PAGE 2 WAVE 9650

SECRET

1N 76425 2/2

ADDED THAT AS ANTI-CASTRO<sup>ORG</sup> AMSCROLL WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH INFO HIS<sup>EXPERIENCES</sup>. OFFERED<sup>TO</sup> GIVE FACTS TO AMSCROLL IF REP WOULD COME HIS OFFICE OR HE WOULD COME AMSCROLL OFFICE IF EXPENSES PAID. AMSCROLL CHIEF NON-COMMITTAL AND SAID WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH COLLEAGUES AND TELEPHONE WIES.

3. DELHI FIRM IS ON AMSCROLL MAILING LIST FOR ITS BULLETIN. SUGGEST WIES CLAIMS WORTH EXPLORING FURTHER. REQUEST TRACES AND ADDEES REACTIONS BY 18 MARCH IF POSSIBLE DUE FACT WIES EXPECTING CALL FROM AMSCROLL.

4. WAVE TRACES INDICATE WIES CANADIAN WHO MADE TRIPS HAVANA IN FEB, MARCH, APRIL, MAY AND APPARENTLY NOV 63 (AMLIST-1 AND AMCOVE REPORTS). IN FEB 64 SIGNED CONTRACT TO PROVIDE TWENTY FIVE MILLIONS DOLLARS WORTH OF CHEMICALS TO CUBA. <sup>(IN 50337)</sup> OITA 2207 OF 24 DEC 64 REPORTED WIES ATTEMPTING OBTAIN LETTER FROM GOVT OFFICIALS EXONERATING HIM FROM BLACKMAIL CHARGES.

5. INDEX WIES.

SECRET

CFN 9650 15 MARCH AMSCROLL JOHN WIES DELHI EXPORT AND SERVICE LTD DELHI ONTARIO CUBA DECEMBER 64 FEB 65 CANADA NOT KNOW AMSCROLL 18 MARCH NOV 63 AMLIST-1 AMCOVE FEB 64 2207 24 DEC 64

BT

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **P** TOTAL COPIES **36**  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. **1.1**  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  REV. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. **John Martin**  
 FROM **JMWAVE**  
 ACTION **UW/E8**  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED  
 INFO: **FILE, UR, WE8, ADDP, CIJOPS, CIK2, RIJAN, CAA, CA/PROP**  
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**TYPIC AMSCROLL MHVIPER**  
**REF WAVE 9650 C 14 76425**

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**16 MAR 66 76430**  
**MATCHED NR**

**IDEN: MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA**  
**S E C R E T**  
**CFN 9651 9650 MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONACA**  
**BT**

**19-120-26**  
**16 March 1966**

**DISPATCH**CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

PROCESSING

TO  
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM  
Chief of Station, JMWAVE *LPV*SUBJECT  
TYPIC/Soviet Agricultural Problems

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: Please provide Radio Free Europe study.**

The Station has read the attached article from The Wall Street Journal with considerable interest. If readily available we will appreciate a copy of the RFE report on this subject which is mentioned in this article. Material of this nature is most useful in the AMSCROLL effort (via radio and written analysis) to support its thesis that if after forty-two years the Soviets have not solved their industrial and agricultural problems how can the Cubans hope to do so in less?

*Philip G. Elward*  
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: h/w  
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## Commodities

# Soviet Grain Imports Expected to Continue Despite Big Plans to Boost Farm Output

By RAY VANCE  
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A drastic revision of the Soviet Union's agriculture is getting under way aimed at lifting farm production by improving the lot of the peasant. For 1966, Russian leaders are deliberately slowing industrial growth to the smallest increase in the postwar period, while they count on a sharp upsurge in agriculture to propel their economy forward.

Between 1966 and 1973 the Russians plan to pour an average of \$13.5 billion a year in investments into agriculture, up from \$11 billion in 1964 and slightly more last year. They're encouraging free marketing of fruits and vegetables from small private plots held by peasants. Farm pay is being increased. In summer or fall, the first Farmers' Congress since 1925 will be held to plan fresh ways of stimulating production.

Evidence indicates the Soviets have a tough job on their hands. The likelihood is that the Communist world will continue as a major importer of grains over the next few years.

The scope of the Russian agricultural overhaul is being analyzed in Munich by Soviet specialists of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam anti-Communist programs into Soviet bloc countries, and by authorities in foreign ministries in Western Europe and by American Government officials.

### May Have Important Side Effects

The success or failure of the Soviet campaign may have an important bearing on world grain trade, American farm programs, the cold war and Soviet political attitudes toward the U.S.

Agriculture is the Achilles' heel of the Communist world. The Soviet government reported last week that grain output dropped 21% last year to 120.5 million metric tons from 152.1 million in 1964. The result is a continuing need for big grain imports. In the crop year ending June 30, more than 35% of the world's commercial movement of wheat—about 19 million metric tons—is expected to go into Communist lands. A metric ton is 2,200 pounds.


The U.S. has only a small portion of that trade. Canada, Australia, Argentina and France are major Communist bloc suppliers. But those bloc sales deplete their export stocks, reducing competition elsewhere for the U.S. Wheat stocks of major exporters may be under 20 million tons at the end of the current crop year, just over half the 1959-63 average. So the anticipated continuation of Communist grain purchases could lift world export prices. It also may result in an increase of production goals in U.S. farm programs.

How does the Soviet farm-uplift campaign fit into the future world trade picture for grain? Only Romania will have surpluses. The Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and possibly Bulgaria, will need imports, predicts Carl R. Everb, Radio Free Europe's top agricultural economist. A U.S. Department of Agriculture official says: "It should come as no great surprise if the Communist countries remained in the grain market, perhaps up and down, but in, for some years to come."

### Outlook for 1966 Cloudy

Even as the new drive starts, the outlook for the 1966 crop is cloudy. Not long ago, I. Khrushchev, a member of the collective of

## Markets at a Glance



### COMMODITY INDEXES

Dow-Jones Futures, Friday—133.11, up 0.70; last year, 126.53.

Dow-Jones Spot—143.91, up 0.36; last year, 143.42.

Reuters United Kingdom—474.1, off 1.5; last year, 449.5. (1931 equals 100.)

### FUTURES PRICES

Higher—Wheat, oats, soybeans, soybean meal, soybean oil, cottonseed oil, potatoes, cattle, coffee, copper, lead, zinc, silver, wool, cotton, hides, Chicago rye and New York rubber.

Irregular—World sugar, corn and frozen pork bellies.

Lower—Cocoa, domestic sugar, eggs, platinum, flaxseed, Winnipeg rye, London and Singapore rubber.

average \$32 a month for the collective farmer, as against \$91 a month for the industrial worker. So peasants try by every means to leave the collective farm, he says.

In this situation, some analysts of the Communist world warn against being misled by grandiose plans of the Soviets. They note that former Premier Nikita Khrushchev launched equally impressive farm programs, raising farm investments from \$6.6 billion in 1959 to \$11 billion in 1964. Yet gross farm output rose only 10%.

V. Zhulin, a senior agronomist on a state farm in the Altai territory of Southern Siberia, put his finger on a key problem in one recent report. He said, "We must consider just how and what is necessary to make the peasant feel responsible for the harvest daily, hourly and for the whole year. No agronomic or social control can compensate for this lack of responsibility." So far the Russians are skirting this problem. Party bureaucrats aren't yet willing to surrender their power over the land to decision-making peasants.

the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, warned that winter wheat seedlings throughout the country were endangered as a result of the dry fall.

Says one Radio Free Europe report: "Thus it seems conservative to submit that only if optimum weather conditions prevail throughout the Soviet Union could the ambitious 1968 farm plan be achieved, which is highly unlikely."

At the Institute for the Study of Soviet Russia, where revolutionary technological innovations are being studied, there is no possibility of the Soviets meeting their main targets. Targets call for a rise in total farm output of nearly 10% this year alone. Yet Party secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev himself admitted that gross farm output increased by only 10% in the last six years.

Such a degree of stagnation is even greater than many Western observers had projected, says one Radio Free Europe report.

#### Evidence of Stagnation

Stagnation is evident. Peasants on 37,000 collective and 10,000 state farms lack incentives, since they receive only the residue of crops after state collections. Weather is grim. Distribution is outdated. Decisions are made by distant bureaucrats.

On the wide plains of the Ukraine, rutted wagon tracks connect isolated collectives, where the horse still is common. In Siberia, farm plots carved from scrub evergreens lie under snow most of the year. In Kazakhstan, where land stretches to far horizons like the sage brush country of the American West, brisk winds blow topsoil from "virgin lands" agricultural plots.

Statistics for 1960 show the Soviets harvested only 11.4 bushels of wheat an acre compared with the U.S. average of 26 bushels an acre. Yields haven't changed much since, and similar yield gaps exist for corn, sugar beets, oats, barley and other products. Farming still employs a third of Russian families. Crop land totals about 600 million acres, some 50% more than in the U.S., yet Russia must import grain.

This is prompting considerable soul searching in the USSR. Blasts from hinterland officials are surprisingly candid.

In Volgograd, one official complains: "On the farms in the region there exists an acute shortage of field tractors and grain combines. For every 2,500 acres of cropland we have two crawler-type tractors, and for every 2,500 acres of grain crops, only three combines."

From Bashkirtia, a productive farm republic in the Urals, comes another complaint: Of 620 collective farms in the republic, only 150 are fully electrified. Of the inhabited centers in the republic, which has a population of more than 3 million, 60% don't use electricity at all.

Vasily F. Garbuzov, Soviet minister of finance, recently reported in a confidential document: Agricultural capital in the Soviet Union averages \$2,200 a man, whereas in the U.S. it averages \$11,000 a man, or five times larger.

#### Flight From the Land

A flight from the land currently is accentuating problems. From all parts of the country come reports of peasants abandoning farm life for the supposedly gay life of cities, even though the cities may be only Novosibirsk or Baku.

In the Pskov region, I. S. Gustov, party secretary, complains that in the last seven years the number of able-bodied farmers in his area has been halved from 200,000. Says he: "If the loss continues at the same rate, in 10 years there will be no able-bodied farmers left." He complains that in his area, wages

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SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSCROLL Summary of Radio Broadcasts for the Period 19 October to 20 January 1966, inclusive		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

**ACTION REQUIRED: FYI**

1. Beginning with the broadcast for 19 October 1965 the Station at its request began receiving a summary of each AMSCROLL AMTHIGH program. We forward by separate cover these summaries through the evening of 20 January 1966 (with the exception of the periods of 28-30 November and 2-4 January for which no summary was prepared). Henceforth these summaries will be forwarded on an at least bi-weekly basis.
2. The Station is attempting to improve both the punch and the quality of these programs. We believe, for example, that more emphasis should be placed upon regime failures and upon the needless economic mess. Further, we are trying to refine the "irritability" factor so far as Castro and the regime are concerned due to the sensitivity of Castro to this type of attack. Calling Castro (on 19 January) the "Soviets' barking hound dog" is a sally in this direction.
3. As usual with programs of this nature the size and reaction of the audience is most difficult to ascertain. It is some comfort to be able to record that during this period 10 letters have been received by AMSCROLL that have been inspired by this program. The President's uncle, Carlos Dorticos, told AMSCROLL-3 that he had been a frequent listener to this program and that he had listened to this program at his home the night before he left Cuba.

*Philip G. Elward*  
Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: USC (att 1)  
Broadcast summaries

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
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"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 1, 1965: "There will be no changes in the Blockade of Red Cuba".- A comment on the rumors that U.S. policy on Cuba will "soften". It is indicated that Washington, for humanitarian reasons, accepted Castro's parley to evacuate the spiritually wounded. We also comment on the statement of a Washington official who said that "the fear that the U.S. may alter its relations with Cuba is unfounded (and) there is no prospect for a change in our relations". We arrive at the conclusion that U.S. policy on the subject will not vary: Castro will be economically strangled and there is no future for Communism in this Continent.

"What About Political Prisoners?".- Fidel Castro has taken a series of steps that limit, by several means, the offer he made to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the Island. Even though no public statements have been made about the political prisoners, it may be expected that this matter has been considered in the negotiations, and that Fidel Castro must be forced to play fairly in order that he may not trade with the agony and the hope of 70,000 political prisoners and with the hope and the anguish of their relatives.

November 2, 1965: "Bureaucracy and Red Tape can be done away with".- A comment on the 20-year term given the "Responsible" of "Collective" 17, of Regional 2-33 of the Cuban Consolidated Enterprise of Grocery Stores, one Roberto Montes de Oca Ramos, and on the creation of the Ministry of Food Industries, as the typically Stalinist system to imprison officials in times of famine, and to create more bureaucratic agencies in an attempt to solve the problem. Cuba's administrative apparatus is a complicated spider-web: the Ministry for the Sugar Industry, the Industrial Dept. of the INRA, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the National Bank, the Ministry for Agricultural and Cattle Affairs, the Consolidated Enterprise of Grocery Stores, the "Collectives", the Regionals, and now the Ministry of Food Industry. Lots of bureaucrats. Tons of paper. Miles of Red tape. But, still, no food!

"Intrigues about the Tri-Continental Conference".- Ben Barka, the mastermind of the Tri-Continental Conference scheduled for Havana, mysteriously disappeared in Paris. We remember that, when it was thought that this conference would be held in Algeria under Chinese sponsorship, its masterminds, Che Guevara and Ben Bella, disappeared. The character who took up Che's role in this Conference, Ben Barka, now vanishes in Paris. Could it be that what happened to Ben Bella is about to happen to Fidel?

November 3, 1965: "How Abject Can Castro Be!".- In his recent statement to three American and one Spanish journalists, Castro appears arrogant and acts as though he didn't care for an "aggiornamento" with the U.S. However, from the context of his statements it is quite obvious that he would like nothing better than being re-admitted to the Latin American community and getting the blessing of the U.S.

His attitude must have been a terrible disappointment to his followers, who must necessarily see it as evidence that the U.S.S.R. is in full retreat in its economic war with the U.S. over Cuba.

"Reticence That Reveals Insincerity, Caution and Fear".- At last, the Old Guard has spoken out through Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, following the devastating "purge" that it underwent in the hands of Fidel Castro. But fear of a second, bloody phase of the purge has kept Carlos Rafael Rodriguez from openly attacking Fidel Castro. Instead, he has taken recourse to veiled reticence and references to Fidel Castro's "petty-bourgeois" past, mixed with insincere praises, in order to make it known that the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism still distrust Fidel. If their differences with the "new wave" are really a thing of the past, why does Old-Guard man Carlos Rafael now bring up the fact that Fidel was not one of them at the beginning, and that he was not a true Marxist-Leninist?

November 4, 1965: "The Reaction to Camarioca: Castro's Resentment and Bitterness".- Castro's vow to let dissatisfied Cubans out was his own error of appreciation. President Johnson took the challenge and then Castro tried to sound out the U.S. for co-existentialist overtures. Hence his rejection of the Red Cross to mediate in the matter. His bitter reaction forbidding the departure from Camarioca shows the extent

of his frustration. All these developments allow us to predict that Castro is in such bad shape that radical changes may soon be expected in Cuba.

"More on Carlos R. Rodriguez' Statements".- In his statements, Carlos R. Rodriguez has uncovered that Fidel Castro has created the objective conditions for fractional work within the Party with the exclusion of the Old Guard and of the Students Directorate from the executive bodies of the Party. This reveals a state of internal rift and decomposition, and such revelation, coming from a significant Old Guard source such as Rodriguez, foretells rather unpredictable consequences.

November 5, 1965: "Sitting Bull (Carlos Rafael) Has Spoken!" Emphasis on Carlos Rafael Rodriguez' personal features, on his ambition to become the Cuban Revolution's "Lenin", all of which dreams have been torn to pieces by Castro. Likewise, Carlos Rafael, strengthened by Moscow's backing, has pointed out, though in a rather subtle manner, the action of the unknown men of the Party in the struggle against Castroism. This he did when he indirectly charged that Castro was a petty-bourgeois.

"Castro Caught his Fingers on the Door and the Door Slammed on his Nose".- Because his situation is more difficult every day, Castro hinted that his conversations on the Cuban exodus meant the beginning of deeper negotiations with the U.S. This is false. Cuban Communism is not negotiable. When President Johnson opened the doors of the U.S. to all Cubans, he left it well established that this was done because of humanitarian reasons, and that Cubans would be welcomed here until they could "return to their homeland and find it free from fear".

November 6, 1965: "Stop this Nonsense... Where is Che Guevara?"- Where is Che Guevara? This is a question that constantly hammers on Fidel's ears, whenever journalists, diplomats, etc., ask it to him. Besieged by this question, Castro one day told a correspondent for the Madrid daily "Pueblo": "I think that Guevara may never return to Cuba. He may be somewhere in Argentina". Castro, like Stalin did before him, begins by stating that Guevara will not return to Cuba. Such a question may only be answered by the murderer when he speaks of his victim. On the other hand, he is pro-

paring the setting for the "discovery" of Guevara's corpse: it will be said that asthma killed him, or the imperialists, or the head-hunters of South America.

"The Second Chapter of Marcos Rodriguez' Trial."- In his statements to American Journalists, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez has dug out the issue of the trial against an informer, which trial was regarded as one against the "Old Guard". This trial has something more to it: the "dossier" on Joaquin Ordoqui, which Fidel keeps hidden in his sleeve in order to produce it whenever it may suit his purposes. Perhaps Carlos Rafael has deflected this issue to signify that internal rifts are more acute than ever before.

x November 8, 1965: "The Red Tyrant is Beyond Himself with Rage."- Comments on Castro's TV appearance yesterday. Castro is furious over the Cubans' rush to get out of the Island, and over the fact that technicians and doctors are about to desert him. He reacts by pretending to dismiss the doctors: "the grapes are sour". We remember Hatuoy, the Indian chieftain who rejected conversion because he said that if his Spanish tormentors were going to Heaven, then he didn't want to go to Heaven. Similarly, if Heaven is Castro's Red paradise, the doctors and technicians want out of it.

"What About the Tri-Continental Conference?"- The abduction and disappearance of Ben Barka seems to have suspended preparations for the Tri-Continental Conference that the Reds had scheduled for January in Havana. Judging by the kidnapping of the chief organizer, this Conference, which is rejected by China, is given the same treatment that forced the suspension of the Algiers' Conference that the Chinese sponsored. Let's wait for the second chapter and we will see whether the Conference is held after all or not.

x November 9, 1965: "What Goes From One Nov. 7th to the Other."- We recall that on Nov. 7, last year, Castro was interviewed by a correspondent for the New York Times. At the same time, he said that he would down whatever American U-2 planes he could with this surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. He also said that he would use Soviet troops in the defense of his Communist regime, and that he would welcome a

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military alliance with the U.S.S.R.. Now, a year later; his heart bleeding over his parting with Red China, and under brutal Soviet pressure, Castro's Nov. 7 speech inaugurating a hospital sounds like that of a "constructive" ruler whose concern is for the welfare of the people, and who asks that same people "to march up the (socialist) path". He is no longer arrogant. He belatedly begs for the people's support.

"What About Latin American Communist Parties?".- Castro dismissed the fact that China did not greet the reorganization and change of the Cuban Communist Party, but spite and concern were obvious in the tone of his voice. Castro knows that he has betrayed China. On the other hand, the Communist Parties of Latin America have not addressed Castro any congratulatory messages either, which indicates that they are beginning to turn their backs on him on account of his "purging" of the old guard. Under such conditions, Castro's subservience to Moscow is greater every day. Castro has entered the most unsurmountable phase of his crisis.

x November 10, 1965: "The Reason and Nature of the Economic Blockade".- From Castro's Nov. 7th speech it may be deduced that the U.S.S.R. has only been able to supply him with weapons, bullets and cannons. We state the reasons why the U.S.S.R. will not be able to invest more in Cuba, and that, at the same time, the nations of this Hemisphere will continue their economic boycott of Castro's Cuba. There can be no economic coexistence between Red Cuba and the rest of the Continent.

"Continental Resistance to Aggression".- Even though the Lima meeting of military chiefs from 17 American countries did not take up the question of the Inter-American Army, the assembled chiefs unquestionably took a step towards its establishment, which will be ultimately decided on by the O.A.S. Aggression to the Dominican Republic, and persistence in Cuba-drafted subversive plans against the rest of the Hemisphere, urgently demand that adequate continental security plans be adopted in order to face up to the threat and put an end to aggression.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 11, 1965: "Coexistence Dream Come Tumbling Down".- Thesis: There can be no coexistence between Castro and the U.S. After Castro returned from Moscow in 1963, and under pressure from Khrushchev, he began his first conciliatory overtures with the United States. Nikita had pleaded geographical and economic impossibility to maintain his commitments with the Castro tyranny. Result: The Soviet Union cannot continually support Castro and the U.S., on their part, reject Castro-Communism. In face of this situation, the men in the Cuban armed forces and in the government have only one dignified course of action: to remove the despot from power in order that Cuba may emerge from chaos and tragedy.

"The O.A.S. Should Not Postpone Its Meeting".- The same Castroite aggression that earlier forced the postponement of the O.A.S. Conference now warrants that the Conference no longer be postponed. The said aggression has created a situation that demands new instruments and agencies to put the O.A.S. in shape to face up to the subversive threat planned and executed in Cuba. The process that started at Punta del Este must be brought to a successful end: the re-establishment of democracy in Cuba so that the Pearl of the Antilles may rejoin the Inter-American system.

November 12, 1965: This program was entirely devoted to reading Dr. Sciglie's article entitled "There Will Never Be Coexistence Or 'Making Up' between Castro-Communism and the Free Peoples of the Hemisphere".

November 13, 1965: "Cuba's Internal Economic Front is Disastrous".- Castro, seeing that he'll never accomplish "coexistence" with the U.S., and that the USSR is gradually withdrawing its assistance to his regime, seeks refuge in the internal economic front, and tries to increase the agricultural production of the peasants. The open failure of said purposes became evident ever since Castro took 150,000 men from the countryside and

turned them into soldiers, militiamen, informers, etc. There is no way to replace this rural labor force. If these men were returned to the country, they would plot against Castro. If they are not returned, they cannot work.

"The Fate of Communist Puppets".- The fate of Ben Bella in Algeria and of Sukarno in Indonesia show what Communist puppets can expect. Both men were intimate friends of Fidel Castro, both visited Cuba, and both served the same Red master whom Fidel Castro serves. The outcome in their cases constitute a writing on the wall for the bearded tyrant.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 15, 1965: "Fidel Castro's Grave Sugar Problem".- Following Moscow's promises and instructions, Car'ro plunged deep into overproduction of sugar in the hope that he would be able to sell the whole crop. Last year he turned out over 6,000,000 tons of sugar and about half of it is still in the warehouses. The Russians never purchased it. This year Castro is blowing his top in face of his dilemma: If he turns out 6.5 million tons, the USSR will not buy it. If he cuts production down, the cane crop will be lost. In face of such a dilemma, he escapes to the Sierra Maestra with the doctors and, from there, he puts the blame for all his woes on the U.S.

"Storm Airc Blowing on the Turquino".- The rally atop Mt. Turquino became a kind of a requiem for the tyrant's aspirations. He had hoped that the negotiations aimed at evacuating dissatisfied Cubans to the U.S. would pave the way for an 'aggiornamento' with the Americans, but his maneuver has turned on him like a boomerang. So, besides himself with rage, he lashed at the U.S. On top of all this, Cuban patriots showed that they are still active, and that the Malecón Drive is vulnerable to successful commando action.

"HABIA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (S.R.U.L.)

November 16, 1965: "The Rio Meeting of Foreign Ministers".- A comment on the II Extraordinary Meeting of Inter-American Foreign Ministers, which will convene tomorrow, Nov. 17, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. The main points in the agenda: economic development, the Alliance for Progress, the strengthening of the Inter-American system, the improvement of instruments for the peaceful solution of controversies, and the strengthening of representative democracy. Lastly, and even though this is not a concrete point in the agenda, special attention will be devoted to the struggle against communism throughout the Americas. To this respect, the VI Meeting of American Armies has just taken place in Lima, Perú, and in it concrete decisions, plans and formulas were adopted.

"Another O.A.S. Step".- The subject of subversion is unavoidable to the Rio meeting. The Punta del Este declaration, the diplomatic isolation and the July, 1964, trade blockade sanctioning the aggression against Venezuela, put the Communist regime on the verge of collective military intervention. Subversion has continued, and sustained Castro-Communist interference in the Dominican Republic will force the O.A.S. to take further steps in sanctioning the aggressor.

"HABLA... UNIDAS REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 17, 1965: "War Drums on the Sino-Soviet Border".- On the basis of long-time difference between Red China and Russia, we agree with Vice-President Humphrey who, during a recent TV appearance, disclosed that Soviet and Chinese border garrisons were being beefed up lately. The motto "more cannons and less butter" is becoming fashionable again, with the consequent decrease of production and increase of military budget appropriations, as well as with a decrease of foreign aid to countries such as Cuba. From this, we may conclude that Castro's situation worsens day by day. Cuba's only solution is to get rid of Castro in order that it may once again enjoy peace and prosperity.

"Aspects of an Unresolved Rift".- The Communist Parties of the Americas are worried over the situation of their old Cuban comrades who live under a Damocles' sword in the hands of Fidel Castro. They have been unable to keep the trial of Marcos Rodriguez from having a second part in Ordoqui's case-file, which is also the second part of the "trial" against Cuba's old Comrades. Latin Communists are having a clash with Fidel and with the Castroites of their respective countries, and they are engaged in fractional work to undermine Castro's designs and put their old comrades back in the leadership of the Cuban Party.

"HABIA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (N.R.U.L.)

November 18, 1965: "What Can Castro Get From The Russians?".- An analysis of Fidel's new stand, whereby he abandons neutrality between the USSR and Red China. In return for his "pledge of allegiance", the Kremlin has offered Castro an increase in economic and military aid. Perhaps the Russians will in fact give him guns, tanks and rockets once again in exchange for Cuban sugar. But as far as economic aid is concerned, Castro should know that Soviet-Bloc countries are firm about halting further investments in the Cuban failure. What is more, they are talking of demanding political, financial and economic reforms from the bearded despot that would permit minute inspection and guidance of Cuban affairs by his sponsors overseas. Will Castro tolerate such intervention? No one knows.

"The O.A.S. IN RIO".- The O.A.S., which convened yesterday in Rio, faces a continent-wide situation whose gravest problem is still Communist Cuban subversion and aggression. The process that began in Punta del Este and continued with the July 1962, meeting, must be brought to a successful end by taking more severe steps against the focal point of subversion and aggression: Communist Cuba.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (M.R.U.L.)

November 19, 1955: "How the Anti-Communist Fight Goes".- A summary is made of the anti-Communist struggle in Asia, which is synthesized in the Indonesian events. There, anti-Communism is gaining force day by day. And in South Viet Nam, where the U.S. Army has just gained a great victory, reiterating the principle of defending the integrity of South Viet Nam. In the Americas, we can quote from the brave speech delivered by Brazilian President Marshall Castello Branco, who called for a revision of the old concepts of political intervention and creating that of counter-intervention against Communism. Lastly, we point out that the voice of arms rang out in Cuba with an attack against the Cuban coast line, which evidenced the Cubans' fighting spirit against Communism.

"Back to Popular-Front Tactics".- It is announced that the Kremlin is returning to its policy of popular fronts, which was in vogue back in the 30s. Some of the results of this policy were Stalin's 'entente' with Hitler and Mussolini to put an end to the Spanish Republic. In France, after undermining its institutions and demoralizing the French People by means of the Popular Front, the Kremlin concocted the Nazi-Soviet agreement that unleashed the Second World War. This time, the whole thing is aimed at the Americas and the change is announced in Havana. This is the new wrapping of continent-wide subversion and the purpose is to create an atmosphere of confidence and, eventually, to betray the (Communist's) democratic and Catholic allies, as well and everyone else who is naive enough to join the Popular Fronts.

November 20, 1955: "A Tribute to Cuban Heroes".- A political, moral, military and revolutionary evaluation of the Cuban patriots' attack against the Eighth Police Precinct, the Riviera Hotel and the house of puppet President Portico. In the article, it is indicated how Castro, even though he spends hundreds of millions of dollars to accomplish invulnerability, found out overnight that he is far from invulnerable to a naval attack perpetrated by a group of Cubans who wielded nearly inefficient weapons. Castro's wrath over the failure of his espionage network knew no limits. We pay homage to the heroes who, with their action on Cuba, saluted the other heroes: the ones that

shed their blood in Viet Nam.

"Counter-Intervention is Equivalent to Legitimate Self-Defense".- The stubborn, unwarranted interpretation of the doctrine of non-intervention has made it possible for the Communists to intervene themselves in the affairs of other countries, even militarily and on a large scale, as did the Castro forces in the Dominican Republic. The concept that hangs around the halls where O.A.S. meetings are held is that which allows for counter-intervention as a means of legitimate self-defense. This is equivalent to preventive action against subversion originated in Communist Cuba.

November 22, 1965: "Castro Lied About His Spanish Trade".- On the 21, Radio Havana told the Cuban people how beneficial trading with Spain was being. The bunch of Castroite lies must be exposed with facts and statistics in order to show that Spain's trade with Cuba, during the first eight months of 1965, has dwindled by 31% as compared with 1964. On the other hand, Spain has withdrawn its ships from the Cuban run, and does not seem very interested in Cuban orders for tuna fishing boats, since the productive capacity of its shipyards is already committed in advance till 1967. With false data, Castro tries to show that he has flouted the blockade, but the truth is that the blockade is flouting his own designs.

"Counter-Intervention: a Supplement to the Johnson Doctrine".- In Rio, Dean Rusk has proposed that the O.A.S. adopt what measures may be necessary to prevent another Communist regime from being established in this Hemisphere. This, essentially, was the doctrine that President Johnson stated when the aggression started against the Dominican Republic. Besides, among the Foreign Ministers, the concept of counter-intervention is gaining momentum as a way counter-attacking the aggressive forces. This means that the blockade and isolation imposed by the O.A.S. against the Communist regime, and the newly-issued Johnson Doctrine, are being supplemented in a manner that may be definitive towards ending the subversive threat that emanates from the focal point

of aggression: Communist Cuba.

November 23, 1960: "New Shadow Over Cuba".- Dean Rusk's statements in Rio have superlative importance when he states the American stand regarding the defense of the Hemisphere from Communist aggression, whether with the concurrence of the other countries of the Continent, or unilaterally. On the other hand, we are informed of an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in Ukraine and European Russia which is affecting most of the Soviets' cattle production. All this indicates that the future holds no future in Cuba, if we may play with words, and that responsible men in the Castro Govt. and armed forces have only one possible course of action left: to remove Castro and return Cuba to democracy and welbeing.

"The Great Maneuver of the Tri-Continental Conference".- The Kremlin leaders that boast the Tri-Continental Conference as a triumph over China, are using it at the same time for a far more dangerous maneuver against the American Continent. Subversive plans have failed, and now they are planning a tactical about-face to continue their subversive tasks through other means, i.e., the Latin American Popular Fronts. But the memories of that political epoch back in the 30s. and of its European consequences, are very much alive in the memory of the people for the new tactic to yield any fruits in the Americas.

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Radio SUMMARIES

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (H.R.U.L.)

December 1, 1965: "The Soviets Order The Sugar Harvest To Start".- While Radl sought military and economic aid in the USSR, Fidel Castro defiantly warned that the sugar harvest would begin as late as Jan. 7. But back came Radl from Moscow, not with a pledge of substantial aid, but with instructions to have the harvest begin immediately. That is why Castro changed his strategy and launched the harvest right away.

"What Is The Tri-Continental Conference?".- In the first place, the Tri-Continental Conference does not represent the countries of three continents, as its organizers claim, but rather the Communists and terrorists from the so-called "movements of national liberation" in those countries. In the second place, the Conference is a setting for the Sino-Soviet struggle for the leadership of the African and Asian Communist Parties, and the struggle goes on amidst intrigue, maneuvers, abductions and murders.

December 2, 1965: "Cuba Cannot Return To The Latin American World".- Once more Dean Rusk has clearly stated that, in order to be admitted back into the Inter-American community, Cuba must first sever its ties with the USSR and quit subversion and infiltration in this Continent. Castro's friends inside the O.A.S., who harboured hopes of bringing Cuba back into the Organization, should abandon them. Those "holier-than-thou" characters who pretend to defend self-determination and non-intervention in public, privately charge Castro-Communism and its aggressions.

"A Double-Play Against Peking And Castro".- By means of the Tri-Continental Conference, which summarizes a phase of maneuvering and counter-maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet rift, the Kremlin has managed to out-wit the Chinese, take control of African, Asian and Latin American Communist Parties, and deal a death blow to Castro's dream of becoming the sole leader of the Latin American Comrades.

December 3, 1965: "France and Castroism".- Misfortunes never come alone, specially for Castro. Now, in view of his horrible financial crisis, his relations with France are obviously deteriorating. As evidence, we point out the French cancellation of a f. 75 million contract to build a quicklime, insecticide and fertilizer plant in Cuba.

"Castro Raises His Volume Again".- Castro's failure in his attempt to get the U.S. to change policy of extreme agitation, and he is promising arms to the subversive forces throughout the Americas. But there is one more reason: the Tri-Continental Conference, of which Castro wanted to be the center. However, he has been displaced to a secondary role. That is why his approach to subversion is closer to that of the Chinese than to that of the organizers of the Conference.

December 4, 1965: "Latin America Excludes Cuba From Its Plans".- As has been said, some characters in Latin America publicly encourage Castro's Cuba, but privately despise it and exclude it from their plans. An example is the Spanish plan to help in Latin America's industrialization, and its exclusion of Cuba. The 19 Latin American nations also banned Cuba from their U.N. plans for industrialization.

"Castro Is Moved By Dispair".- Rather than strength, Castro's speech of Dec. 2 denotes weakness and dispair. His bragging about arsenals with which he counts to help subversive forces throughout the Continent is a desperate provocation. There are three key points which corner Fidel Castro: One is the doctrine that subversion is aggression; the other one is the Johnson Doctrine, which became effective in the Dominican Republic, followed by Dean Rusk's Rio de Janeiro statement that the U.S., whether alone or accompanied, will intervene wherever aggression occurs.

December 6, 1965: "Castro's Economic Woes Grow: Now It's Mexico and Russia".- Recently, we talked of Cuba's difficulties in its relations with France. Now, we echo a report that Cuba's trade with Mexico is steadily dwindling. On the other hand, Russia's huge sales of gold to the world market in order to be able to pay for the wheat it has

tought, brings the USSR's foreign exchange reserves down low, and this will mean further trouble for Castro.

"The Working Masses Against The Communist Regime".- With the dock workers of the U.S., Canada and Puerto Rico joining up, the labor boycott action is completed. Ships flying the flags of countries that trade with Castro will have a tough time at American ports, and the noose around Castro's neck is tightening.

December 7, 1965: "Death of Antonio Maceo".- This article was devoted to the glorification and remembrance of Gen. Antonio Maceo, the Supreme Commander of the Cuban Army of Liberation in the 1895 War of Independence, who was shot and killed in action on Dec. 7, 1896, near Punta Brava, Pinar del Rio. The Communists have attempted to erase the memory of this hero because Maceo was a half-breed, of humble origin, and, nevertheless, Cuba's No. 1 soldier. Hence, to sustain their theories on class struggle, the Communists had to destroy the memory of the working-class hero of a bourgeois nation.

"The Tri-Continental Challenge".- Aside from the meaning of the Tri-Continental Conference within the Sino-Soviet rift, the said meeting is a challenge to Inter-American law and security which comes from gangsters and Communist agents from three continents. Cuba, a satellite and the focal point of subversion and aggression to American countries, will be the setting.

December 8, 1965: "American Victory, Soviet Defeat".- We comment on America's great feat with the Gemini 7, while Russia's space thrust has suffered a severe set-back with its Luna-8.

"Castro Charged With Che Guevara's Murder".- Felipe Alvahuante, in the Mexican daily "El Universal", charges that Castro murdered Che Guevara on Soviet orders. Of course, the cheap novel concocted by Castro on Guevara can convince no one, and, in 9 months, no evidence has been produced that point to its truthfulness. Alvahuante's charge, therefore, is more acceptable than Fidel Castro's version.

December 9, 1964: "Sinkiang: Russians and Chinese on the Warpath".- Chinese-Soviet skirmishes near Sinkiang, while disguised as territorial differences, really respond to the ideological rift. The USSR increased its military budget by 5% at the expense of education, foreign aid and agricultural and industrial development, on the grounds that "American aggressiveness" force her to do so, but the truth is that it is the Chinese threat that prompts such a move. On the other hand, we can expect larger shipments of Soviet arms to Cuba, but a cut in economic aid.

"The Gemini 7".- The Gemini 7 flight and its scheduled meeting with the Gemini 6 will break all space flight records. The Soviet total of flying hours is tripled, and a similar advance is reached over Soviet launchings. This is the exponent of the degree of development achieved by the West towards goals which the Communist world is not even approaching. Besides, it is a warning to Soviet leaders who seek to destroy the accomplishments of the West. If they were to attempt such destruction, they would be destroyed instead.

December 10, 1965: "A New Collapse of the Commie World".- The Marxist maxim that history is "irreversible" has collapsed once again, this time, in the Congo, Algeria, Indonesia and, more recently, in the Sudan. The African peoples are being reborn to political life, rapidly waking up from the Communist spell and taking an anti-Communist stand. The last country to do so is the Sudan, which has just outlawed the Sudanese Communist Party and warned all other parties having connections with the Reds that they may suffer the same fate.

"What's In and Behind the Agenda of the Tri-Continental Perley".- In the Tri-Continental Conference, the USSR will show off its triumph over the Chinese with respect to "liberation movements" in Africa. Taking advantage of Castro and Che Guevara, the Soviets managed to penetrate and divide several Parties in Latin America. There are several phases in the Kremlin's counter-maneuver: the 'coup' against Ben Bella, the suspension of the Algiers Conference, the vanishing of Che Guevara, the total submis-

cion of Castro and the change in Indonesia. Castro and Mao have been defeated by the Kremlin.

December 11, 1965: "We Forecast The Failure of the Forthcoming Sugar Harvest".- We go back to the subject of the Cuban "zafra" on the basis of Castro's June 28th statements, when he pledged the reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry, the erection of a modern new sugar mill in the Cauto River valley, and a 6.5 million ton sugar harvest. What has been accomplished? The Cuban sugar industry is still in shambles, there is no new mill in the Cauto valley, and Castro, with pretexts and lies, is already attempting to justify that there will be no 6.5 million tons of sugar.

"The Bankruptcy of Cuba's Foreign Credit and the Boycott".- Coinciding with the news issued by French fertilizer company was cancelling its Cuban contract due to Cuba's failure to pay for over \$3 million's worth of merchandise, it was reported that the boycott would be extended. The dockworkers of Canada, the U.S. and Puerto Rico have joined the Latin American workers' boycott of vessels flying the flags of countries that trade with Red Cuba.

December 13, 1965: "A Explosive Power Struggle in Russia".- We analyze how the power struggle between Kozygin and Brezhnev is known through the stands taken by the Russian papers "Izvestia" and "Pravda", respectively the organs of the government and of the Communist Party. The Prime Minister's stand consists of pointing at the economic debacle and at the need to maintain the current level of military expenditure, while Brezhnev's position is one of advocating a strong-armed Red Army by increasing the military budget. The Army, in turn, has rewarded Brezhnev's support by causing the retirement of Mikoyan, so that 2nd Party Secretary Nikolai Podgorny could be kicked upstairs to the Presidency of the USSR. More changes are to come within the framework of this rift.

"Subversion in Uruguay and Monstrous terror in Venezuela".- The blueprint for violence in Uruguay is part of the general plan for Latin American subversion drafted in Cuba. The steps taken by the Uruguayan Government have checked the early dangers of Castro-Communist subversion, but it is significant that the Communists should have moved their target more to the south in order to provoke a Dominican-style civil strife. The abominable character taken by Venezuelan Red terror is also meaningful: a young housewife murdered by a bomb placed inside a Christmas present consisting of an image of the Virgin Mary.

December 14, 1965: "President Johnson: The Will of Freedom".- A comment on the statements made by President Johnson, who has reasserted U.S. determination to defend the freedom of South Viet Nam regardless of all possible consequences. We stress the sacrifice, in terms of wealth from the earth and human lives to which Red China forces North Viet Nam, while the Chinese themselves laugh at peace efforts. This case is presented as an example to all other peoples, and what is bound to happen to Fidel Castro is also pointed out.

"They Talk Peace But Practice War".- Peace is a favorite subject of Communist propaganda. It is also one of the most deceitful ones, since, while the Commies talk of peace, they systematically reject all bona fide proposals to accomplish peace, such as in the case of Viet Nam. The Tri-Continental Conference scheduled for Jan. 3 bears the germ of violent conflict to create new Viet Nams in America and Africa.

## Radio Scripts Summaries

### "MILIA... MILIA... INQUENTARIAS" (N.P.U.L)

December 15, 1965: "WHY THE CUBAN LEAVE THEIR BELOVED COUNTRY".- We rebuff an editorial published by the Havana newspaper "El Mundo" whereby the communists editorialists attack those Cuban whose leave for exile. We point at the real cause of the Cuban exodus, which we confirmed with the words of MAJ. Sergio del Valle, a prominent Castro officer, who in Ciudad Libertad, on Dec. 13 spoke of the harsh life of the peasants.

"TERRORIST TRAINING SCHOOLS AND ITS RESULTS".- It has been announced in Cuba that the number of graduates from the terrorists training schools of Minas del Frio will be increased to 8,000. This is the school where the Castros trained Latin-American future guerrilla and terrorists in order to use them later in their respective countries. In Venezuela, one of Castro's favorite targets, a monstrous deed has just been perpetrated by the Communists, in the murder of M. S. Pangel, who received a bomb mailed by some of the graduates from these Cuban schools.

December 16, 1965:

NEWS.- 1) U.S. bombers destroy huge power-plant in North Viet Nam.

2) Castro steps-up marihuana harvests for export.

"THE COMMUNISTS HAVE LOST THE CUBAN YOUTH".- In this article, we analyze how Cuban youth, because of its natural thirst for knowledge, at first became interested in the scientific principles of Communism, thinking of the possibility of finding the answer to man's quest for happiness there. However, young Cubans are now disillusioned with the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism, and they are obviously dissociating themselves from Castro-Communism. That is precisely why, a few days ago, the regime thought it convenient to call a national meeting of the Communist Youth. In this Red event, those leaders that failed in their task to indoctrinate the young were urged, and it was agreed that brain-washing would be a prerogative of the political police of the state. Castro has lost the young. The young are fighting Castro. They must be helped.

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"GENINI 7 AND 6".- New records and goals have been accomplished by the U.S. with the rendez-vous of the Gemini 7 and 6 space capsules, specially as regards accuracy. We are inclined to think that there is no limit to scientific development in the conquest of space. The clean cut clarity of American reports on the space flight, contrasts with the obscure and somber secret surrounding Soviet experiments.

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UR.-WRUL Radio Scripts Summaries.

"HOLA... WITEL D'YORKINIA" (U.R.U.L.)

December 17, 1965:

NEWS.-

- 1) 11 Cubans sail to exile; 6 were conscripts, 4 draft-aged.
- 2) U.S. to bomb more industrial centers in North Viet Nam.

"Why Mr. Apol Killed Himself".- The story of Mr. Apol's suicide on account of the Soviet-East German Trade Agreement.

"The Bug in His Ear".- Carlos Rafael's new trip to Moscow, which has no official justification whatever, following a new article published in London, has put bug in Fidel's ear. Through articles and statements made abroad, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez seems to have been charged with the task of turning Communist Parties against Fidel and for the 'Old Guard'.

December 18, 1965:

NEWS.-

- 1) Melliarva Outlines Effects of U.S. Raid on North Viet Nam Power Plant.
- 2) Ecuadorian Youth Congress Condemns Communism.

"Why Mr. Apol Killed Himself".- Continuation of above editorial. This part deals with similar difficulties confronted by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Cuba.

"Precautions on the Eve of the 'Tri-Continental' Parley".- The Cuban regime has ordered a number of preventive arrests in order to head off the possibility of assassination attempts or kidnappings among the foreign delegates to the Tri-Continental parley. These steps are taken mostly against the pro-Chinese military. Castro, for his part fears that something may happen to him, as "something" happened to Ben Bella two days before the Algiers Conference, which then had to be called-off.

December 20, 1965:

NEWS.-

- 1) 28 New Refugees Sneak Out Of Cuba Aboard Small Vessel.
- 2) Spain To Send Medical Corps As Token Of Support to Viet Nam War.

EDITORIALS:

"Communist Must Fail In Cuba".- We echo reports by recent refugee arrivals concerning Castro's purchase of defective farming equipment. These purchases indicate why Castro-Communism is failing in Cuba thanks to the attitude of crooked merchants that still trade with Fidel, to the regime's own stupidity and to the resistance of the Cuban people.

"The Reds Want No Peace".- North Viet Nam has rejected all peace offers and made mockery of every approach attempted to put an end to the war. Moscow as well as Peking keep their puppet from signing any truce and force him to maintain a war for which they give him no aid. Communism would have several more Viet Nams in other continents, in order to extend the conflict at the expense of the peoples.

December 21, 1965:

NEWS.-

- 1) Four More Cubans Slip Away To Freedom: Three Draft-Aged Youths And The Father Of One.
- 2) Juanita Castro And Dr. Carlos Dorticos, Relative of Cuban President, Talk About Cuban Situation In Miami.

EDITORIALS:

"Not Even Castro's And Dorticos' Relatives Want To Stay In Cuba".- Castro's efforts to prevent the Cuban exodus are in vain. Not even the close relatives of the Cuban President and Premier want to stay on the Red Island. Carlos Dorticos, an uncle to Pres. Osvaldo, has echoed the failure of the regime's backbone: economic planning. We stress his words that Cuban foreign-exchange reserves are low because sugar production uses more dollars than it will yield.

"The Unsolved Conflict And The Tri-Continental Parley".- The still unsolved crisis of the Dominican Republic has bounced back in so grave a manner as to have caused 40 dead in Santiago, and Castroite violence continues because the forces of subversion want to have a banner for agitation in the Tri-Continental Conference. The masterminds of subversion in Cuba provoke these acts of violence in the Dominican for this purpose.

December 22, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) Russia Suffers as International Students' Union Parley Must Be Moved From Sudan to Czechoslovakia.
- 2) U.S. Troops Authorized To Pursue The Enemy In Cambodian Territory.

EDITORIALS:

"The Struggle Within The Communist Regime".- A continuation of the preceding article on Dr. Carlos Dorticos' statements concerning internal rifts among the Cuban Communists. According to Dr. Dorticos, the "Old Guard" is persecuted and the Army is growingly dissatisfied.

"How The Soviet Grip On Cuba Grows Tighter All The Time".- With the arrival in Cuba of 227 Soviet technicians to be assigned directly to the sugar mills, Russia gets direct control of Cuba's sugar production. The same thing happens with the minerals and the exploitation of the mines, whose products go directly to Russia since the mines came under the control of Soviet technicians. Politically, Russia has chosen Havana as the setting for its anti-Chinese "Tri-Continental Conference" in order to show off its triumph over Mao from the Cuban capital.

December 23, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) Venezuelan Police Capture Gang of Reds Who Raised Funds Through Blackmail.
- 2) Skipper of Cuban Freighter "Camilo Cienfuegos" Makes Statement After Defecting; Ship Was Japan-Bound With A Cargo of Sugar.

EDITORIALS:

"New Steps By The U.S. Against North Viet Nam".- A comment on the activities of the U.S. in North Viet Nam, and on China's perfidy and Hanoi's inability to draw its own course, which has forced the U.S. to take one further step in the war by destroying North Viet Nam economic complex.

"Fidel's Star Rapidly Declining".- Castro's about to enter his seventh year in power under bad omens. Dictators Machado and Batista fell precisely on their seventh year, and Castro's situation shows that his star is rapidly declining and that he's heading straight for the abyss.

December 24, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) Wave Of Defections Continues In Castro's Merchant Fleet: Skipper and Chief Engineer of the Freighter "Uvero" Defect In Ceylon.
- 2) Britain, U.S. Approve \$400 million Sale of Anti-Aircraft Artillery To Saudi Arabia to Deter Red Aggression.

Editorials:

"Russia Intervenes! The Cuban Sugar Industry".- Under the guise of "technical assistance", the USSR will send 227 "sugar technicians" to the one country whose own technicians know all there is to know about sugar. The real purpose is clear; the Soviets want to take complete and final control of the Cuban sugar industry, as a new limitation to Castro's power.

"There Will Be No Merry Christmas For Cubans".- With its crimes and with the desperate situation to which it has taken the people, Communism has made it impossible for the Cubans to enjoy any happiness this Christmas. But amidst an environment of sadness, there will be faith and hope these days. Communism has been unable to kill either of those blessings, and there lies one of the weaknesses of Communist materialism.

December 25, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) Venezuela Moves To Prevent Entry of Dollars To Pay For Subversion.
- 2) Inter-American Bank President Felipe Herrera Proposes Development Plan for Latin America; Cuba is Excluded.

Editorials:

"The Effects of the Maritime Blockade of Cuba".- A comment on the maritime blockade against Red Cuba, which is now reinforced by the dockworkers of Canada, the U.S. and

Puerto Rico. As a result of the choking effect of the blockade, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had to meet in Brestok in order to discuss means of helping Red Cuba survive said effects.

Algeria, Indonesia and Cuba.-- China's main strongholds in Asia and Africa were Sukarno's Indonesia and Ben Bella's Algeria. The Afro-Asian conferences were an important point of Sino-Soviet clashes. Two days before the Algiers Conference was inaugurated, Ben Bella was ousted. Then, as a result of another 'coup', Sukarno staged an about face. China thus lost her two main points of support in the two Continents. Now Russia is masterminding the "Tri-Continental" and we wonder what Red China will do about it.

December 27, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) The U.S. Has Not Considered Using Nuclear Weapons Against North Viet Nam, Says Ambassador Goldberg at the UN.
- 2) Soviet Artists Demand Freedom of Thought and Expression Through Art Critic Alexei Fidorov.

Editorials:

"Wave of Defections Greets Tri-Continental Conference".-- The Cuban Communists have sent hundreds of thousands of self-addressed telegrams in which they congratulate themselves for the Tri-Continental Conference of Red punks that will convene in Havana. Yet, the Cuban people have not been told of a more democratic and manly greeting: the wave of defections by officers of the Cuban merchant fleet, such as Cesar Loredó Garcia, from the SS "Camilo Cienfuegos"; Gonzalo González Duque de Estrada and Francisco López Surroa, from the SS "Uvero"; and, lastly, today, four officers, among them the skipper of the SS "Aracelio Iglesias", in Osaka, Japan.

"Cardinal Spellman In Viet Nam".-- The Christmas visit to Viet Nam by Cardinal Spellman gives American catholicism a militant sense in defense of democracy and of the spiritual values of the Western World. Cardinal Spellman's words before the combatants put the

Viet Nam struggle in its proper place: one made necessary by Communist aggression that has the same characteristics as it has elsewhere, in Asia and the Americas and wherever Red subversion takes place.

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December 28, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) U.S. Grants Political Asylum to Four Defecting Officers From The Cuban Freighter "Aracelio Iglesias".
- 2) Defecting Skipper and Three Officers Explain Their Decision.

EDITORIALS:

"Moscow Griever Over Indonesian Failure".- A comment on Pravda's recent editorial threatening Indonesia over its proscription of the Communist Party. Those Pravda threats show how Moscow violates the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Of course, Moscow's disney is understandable, as it has lost the platform it used for aggression in S.E. Asia.

"Gangsters From Three Continents".- Gangsters and agents for International Communism who extend violence and terror throughout three continents are beginning to arrive in Havana, Cuba, the focal point of subversion for Latin America, will provide the setting for that meeting. The Sino-Soviet rift is being ventilated as part of this meeting, and Fidel Castro will be the losing party. The Chinese won't forget that Castro betrayed them.

December 29, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) Havana Reds Shaky Over Tricontinental Parley, Take Steps To Prevent Physical Attacks Between Delegations.
- 2) "Cuban Foreign Trade Kept Pinching In '65", Says U.S. Dept. Of Commerce.

EDITORIALS:

"Czechoslovakian Communism".- This article is based on newspaper reports on a document released by the Czech Communist Party, whereby the misery and disaster wrought over the Czech nation by Communist are admitted. Communist leaders would like to take recourse to the "Capitalist" world in order to emerge from such a dead-end alley.

"Viet Nam, Congo and the Dominican Republic".- There are the topics of world-wide Communist agitation. In all three countries, the plans of the Communists met failure, and China and Russia may be seen licking the wounds of their failures. In the Congo, 2,000 lives were saved from Communist savagery. In Viet Nam, plans for aggression and dominance of South Eastern Asia have been held in check. And in the Dominican Republic, Inter-American forces guarantee the security of the Hemisphere.

December 30, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) "Price of Sugar To Stay Down In '66", Says Brokerage Firm B.W. Dyer.
- 2) Red China to Boycott Tricontinental Parley; Violent Clashes Expected During Conference.

Editorials:

"Cuban Seamen Who Walked Out Of SS "Aracelio Iglesias" Speak In Miami".- We run the highlights of the statement made by Cpt. Francisco Cobas and comment thereon.

"The Year That Ends".- During the year that ends, all the woes of the Communist regime have been increased. Russia has tightened the screws of exploitation of its Caribbean colony. And Fidel Castro has stressed his terrorist methods and concentrated on his personal despotic power by "purging" the Party.

December 31, 1965:

NEWS:

- 1) Cuba Refused Credit By Non-Communist Countries.
- 2) Cuban Refugee Peasant Charges That Reds Forced Him Out Of The Country To Seize His Little Farm.

Editorials:

"Cuban Women Forced to Hard Labor In Farms".- Reports reaching U.S. indicate that the Cuban tyranny is secretly scheming to create women's auxiliary corps similar to U.S. "WACS", but with a compulsory character and for the purpose of forcing Cuban women to perform hard labor in State farms. We call on Cuban decency to do something to prevent

this outrage from taking place.

"Questions To The Tricontinental Conference".- The Chinese delegation could be asked the whereabouts of Ben Barko. The Russians might be questioned as to Che Guevara's. They could all be asked about the Algerian "coup" and why it took place two days before the date set for the opening of the Algiers Conference. They could be asked what they think of the Indonesian about-face, and about Sukarno's fate, and about Chinese support, since the Bandung Conference, in Peking's Afro-Asian Policy.

January 1, 1966:

EDITORIALS:

"Synthesis of The Down-Hill Course of Communism in Cuba".- A summary of the most important developments that took place during the past year and that marked it as an awful one for the Comies.

"The Year That Begins".- The year that begins holds little hope that anything good will happen to Fidel Castro and his thugs. Caught in the web of the Sino-Soviet rift, he will be the great loser in the game. On the other hand, the internal situation, discontent in the armed forces and the total collapse of his economy depict a horizon that is as somber to Fidel Castro as it is promising to the Cuban people.

## RADIO SCRIPTS SUMMARIES

U.R. - WRUL.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

JANUARY 5, 1966:

### NEWSCAST:

- 1) VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR ASKS STRONG MEASURES AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION.
- 2) COMMUNIST CHINA ADVISES CITIZENS TO GO TO BED ON EMPTY STOMACH.

### EDITORIALES:

"Somber Signs Over the Tri-Continental".- The secret character of the Tricontinental Conference constitutes evidence of the rift and troubles within the parley structure. On the other hand, Castro's and Dorticos' speeches calling for unity and quoting the example of North Viet Nam as to need for such unity, are further proof of the above assertion. We forecast the failure of the Tricontinental parley as a means to unify Communism in its projections for international struggle. We further forecast that the Sino-Soviet rift will become all the more violent.

"The Workers of the Americas and the Tricontinental".- The workers of this Continent have announced that the boycott against Red Cuba will be intensified as a reply to plans for Hemispheric subversion being drafted at the Tricontinental parley in Havana. The sensibility of the workers of the Americas is hurt by the fact that the Red terrorists of the Congo, the murderers of women and children from three continents, meet in the heart of the Americas to plot more bloodshed and destruction. The workers of the Americas are against Communist totalitarianism, as is the people of Cuba, by whose side they stand.

JANUARY 6, 1966:

### NEWSCAST:

- 1) NEWLY ARRIVED EXILES TALK OF EXPANDING FLUME IN CUBAN CITIES.
- 2) UNDISTURBED U.S. STEP UP PEACE OFFENSIVE.

### EDITORIALES:

"What's Behind the Sino-Cuban Crisis".- Upon practically severing its economic rel-

ations with Cuba, Red China has shown up at the Tricontinental Parley for a three-fold purpose: a) to frustrate all attempts at unity around the USSR; b) to charge the USSR with "treason" to Marxism-Leninism; and, c) to initiate the Chinese's revenge against Fidel Castro. On this basis, we forecast a tough offensive against Fidel by pro-Chinese Communists in the Americas. First, they will seek to destroy the image that they had built up of Castro, or what's left of it.

"The Venezuelan Govt. on the Alert".- Through the Minister of the Interior, the Venezuelan govt. has issued a timely and accurate statement on the significance of the Tricontinental Conference in terms of serious threats to continental security. The Venezuelan govt. points out that it is time to take resource to force to counter aggression and subversion. It is indeed time to reactivate the 5th Resolution of the O.A.S. meeting of 1964, whereby intervention is authorized in self-defense against aggression and to guarantee the security of the Hemisphere.

JANUARY 7, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) RED CHINA BLASTS SOVIETS AT TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.
- 2) REFUGEE TOTS CELEBRATE ADORATION OF MAGI IN MIAMI.

EDITORIALS:

"China's Stand: A Threatening War-Monger".- Recent press reports tell us of movements of Chinese troops near the Soviet border, and of probable skirmishes between the Red Armies of Moscow and Peiping. This new sort of 'cold war' with occasional ringing of firearms forces the USSR to increase its military expenditures, to slow down its agricultural and industrial production, and to cut its foreign aid. Cuba will be one of the big losers.

"The Tricontinental and the Sino-Soviet Dispute".- All efforts to prevent the Sino-Soviet rift from coming out to the surface at the Tricontinental Conference have been to no avail: the Chinese delegate blasted the Soviets mercilessly. These, on the

other hand, availed themselves of their Cuban puppet to present to the delegates a view of the breach of Cuban-Chinese trade relations. The Chinese were made to appear as the "villain" who wants to starve the Cuban people of their rice rations.

JANUARY 8, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) CHE'S FATHER REPORTED CLAIMING SON'S BODY.
- 2) RED GUERRILLA CHIEFF CAPTURED IN PERU.

EDITORIALS:

"We'll Tell the Reds What They Want To Know".- Cubans seeking to leave the country are subject to veritable "third degrees" by the G-2. They are asked whether or not they sympathize with the gvt., why they want to leave, wheter or not they approve of State control of all education, etc. The unfortunate applicants manage to give answers that will not jeopardize their chances of leaving. Yet, their interrogators are apparently satisfied with the outcome of the questioning. The reason for this is that Castro feels the need to give some explanation to the Communist world for the growing exodus of Cubans. However, if the Communists are really interested in knowing why the Cubans want to go, we will be glad to oblige... They are just running away from hunger, terror, oppression, and from the execution wall.

"A Strange Soviet Mission in Viet Nam".- After the British proposal for peace in Viet Nam was welcomed with seeming interest by Kremlin leaders, these have sent a strange mission to Viet Nam whose purpose is not known. Maybe they have gone to vouch for peace, or maybe, on the contrary, they have gone to Hanoi to pledge further Soviet aid to the puppet Ho Chi Minh. At any rate, the terms of the conflict remain unchanged. Rusk has stated that everything may be subject to negotiations except withdrawal of American forces from S. Viet Nam. And the Communist powers, on the other hand, far from accepting the peace overtures, step up their campaign of aggression, totalitarianism, etc.

JANUARY 10, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) RED CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICAN CAPITAL BOMBED.
- 2) THREE MORE CUBAN SEAMEN DEFECT IN SPAIN.

EDITORIALS:

"Sino-Soviet Differences Over N. Viet Nam".- Sino-Soviet differences over North Viet Nam have become evident lately. Nowadays, Russia is just as much interested in China's loss of prestige in Viet Nam as China is interested in Russia's loss of prestige in Cuba. Hence the "rice" economic aggression. We wonder whether the Soviet mission to Viet Nam, rather than pledge unlimited aid to Ho, may have gone there to tighten the screws of their Vietnamese puppet. This is indicated by recent Yugoslavian statements --which is tantamount to speaking of Russian statements-- charging China with keeping North Viet Nam from considering peace offers.

"The Tricontinental Conference: Action and Reaction".- The actions: to coordinate plans for subversion, aggression and terror in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The reactions: particularly in Latin America, and as recommended by the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior: the use of force against Communist aggressors; the use of force against the focal point of aggression in Communist Cuba.

JANUARY 11, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) CHINA SCOLDS FIDEL OVER RICE ISSUE, CALLS HIM "LIAR".
- 2) PERUVIAN GVT. RAPS SOVIET AGGRESSION FOLLOWING RUSSIAN STATEMENT AT TRI-CONTINENTAL PARLEY.

EDITORIALS:

"Castro Goes Berserk, Helps Aggression Against South Viet Nam".- We comment on Castro's shameless intervention in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam by lending his transport vessels to transport war supplies for the Viet Cong. By doing this, he is trying

to pose as a powerful warlord before the peoples of Latin America. He would like to be asked to take part in peace negotiations. Therefore, he is after a naval catastrophe that would put him in the headlines throughout the world as a victim of an "imperialism" that has attacked one of poor little Red Cuba's ships. So, he risks the lives of Cuban crews for this purpose. This wickedness explains the wave of defections by Cuban seamen.

"Soviet Aggression".- The Govt. and press of Peru have labelled the statements made by the Soviet delegate to the Tricontinental Conference as aggression. Likewise, the Venezuelan Govt. advised the use of force against Communist aggression. The aggressions are not just against Peru or Venezuela, but against the Continent as a whole. Therefore, the whole Continent should mobilize by declaring all Communist Parties illegal and by applying the ultimate sanctions foreseen by the Inter-American system of self-defense against the Cuban Communist regime.

JANUARY 12, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) WASHINGTON, HANOI IN DIRECT CONTACT.
- 2) YUGOSLAVIAN PAPER BLAST TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.

EDITORIALS:

"Chinese Reds Call Castro "A Liar".- On the eve of the Tricontinental Parley, Fidel Castro sought to strike a hard blow at the Chinese Communists. On Moscow's orders, he charged Red China with "economic aggression" against Cuba. With characteristic Asian phlegm, the Chinese have replied to Castro's perfidious attacks by calling him a liar. They claim that they never agreed to a long-term barter of rice for Cuban sugar. They only agreed, they say, to exchange these products in 1965. For once, we must agree with the Chinese Reds: Castro is indeed the biggest liar the world has known. Trade agreements are written, clarified and specified. We are inclined to believe the Chinese and to reject Fidel's candid explanation of a "misunderstanding".

"Sorcerer's Apprentice Ain't Nothin' But a Hound Dog".- From his dream role as the Lenin of the Americas rising high over the Andes, Castro has fallen down a long way. Today, he is nothing but the Soviet's barking, yelping hound dog in the Sino-Soviet rift. His opium dreams, which were once encouraged by a Peking-oriented Ché, led him to act as a sorcerer's apprentice in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The result: the Chinese regard him as a traitor and to the Soviets he ain't nothin' but a hound dog.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

January 13, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) SOVIET IRI INSTRUCTOR DEFECTS IN SWEDEN.
- 2) U.S. SEES CHANCES FOR WAR WITH CHINA, SAYS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT.

EDITORIALS:

"Words of Hope for a Suffering Cuba".- In his State of the Union message, L.B.J. said that the U.S. is committed not to abandon Viet Nam because doing this would be tantamount to unleashing war in S.E. Asia. L.B.J. is obviously committed to defend democracy in general, and this includes the American Continent and, of course, Cuba. The President's speech is, therefore, a warm New Year's greeting to the struggling people of Cuba.

"Timely Restatements By L.B.J.".- After carrying his peace offensive to every corner of the world, to no avail because of the Communists' insistence in prolonging the war, L.B.J. has made a timely restatement of U.S. policy in Viet Nam: before Congress, the President repeated that the U.S. will not abandon Viet Nam, and he also reminded the legislators that the U.S. are committed to defend freedom in Cuba.

January 14, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) LUNAR NEW YEAR MAY BRING VIET NAM CEASE-FIRE.
- 2) CASTRO TURNS DOWN GUYANA RICE, HAS NO DOLLARS TO PAY IT.

EDITORIALS:

"Deep-Sea Drafts in the Tricontinental".- The Tricontinental was planned to have ended Jan. 12 and accomplish a common, united line of revolutionary policy, with common direction and funds. The Conference, however, has been extended, because things have not come out the way the Reds expected.

"Turmoil in the Armed Forces".- Castro is worried over the obvious discontent that is rampant in the Armed Forces, where a document that criticizes the regime and calls for open rebellion has been secretly but widely circulated. Fidel Castro is doubling his precautions and shifting officers and units, but he is doing so somewhat blindly, as he does not know exactly where the focal point of discontent may be, nor what effects it may eventually have.

January 15, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) 50,000 NEW MEN TO BE ADMITTED BY ARMY.
- 2) VIII LATIN COUNCIL OF WORKMEN BLASTS TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE.

EDITORIALS:

"Cuban Reds Moan Over Bitter Rice".- Pressed by the USSR, Castro denounced the Chinese Jan. 2 over the rice issue. The megalomaniac Castro went beyond all limits when he said that he would give up rice from the Cuban diet. But the Soviet advisors were frightened, and they forced the Cuban press to back out and apologize to China. In brief: the rice issue has been another Castroite failure in the propaganda field, as well as in the economic one.

"The Tricontinental Conference charged with 'Divisionism'".- Tito, by means of his organ "Borba", said that the Tricontinental marked a new division of World Communism, as Yugoslav and Western European Parties had been excluded. A result of maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet rift, the Havana parley has provoked a new clash, that between Tito and the fool Fidel Castro, the clown who gets all the punches at the circus arena: he is punished by China, despised by Russia and ignored by the Communists' "Third Front".

January 17, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) MEXICAN MEETS CUBAN COMMUNISM, RETURNS HOME DISAPPOINTED.
- 2) CUBANS SNEAK OUT OF ISLAND, COAST GUARD PICKS THEM UP IN CAY SAL.

EDITORIALS:

"A summary of Castro's speech at the Tricontinental".- Castro's speech revealed the deepening of the division between the Chinese and the Russians, whom he called on to unite. He violently charged the C.P. of Latin America with getting lost in a "sea of theories", interpretations and tactics, and with unwillingness to go out into the battlefield to face the dangers of open war. He attempted to answer charges that he had abandoned the revolutionists of Santo Domingo after exciting them to revolt, and justified himself with the fact that Cuba "is a small nation", lacking in nuclear weapons. Lastly, he acknowledged the deep effect of anti-Communist propaganda in Cuba and in Latin America, which propaganda he charges of slandering his regime.

"Fidel Castro at the closing of the Tricontinental".- Fidel Castro's desperate tone had defeatist overtones when he admitted what he had never admitted before: the possibility that he may lose all or part of Cuba's territory. This was a defeatist warning, perhaps made to insure a retreat without personal risks. As to Che, he added further confusion to the issue. He was not really replying to the "imperialists", as he said but to some of the delegates to the Tricontinental, who demanded a clarification of Guevara's mysterious disappearance.

January 18, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) British Catholic Cardinal Blasts Polish Reds.
- 2) Latin Christian unionists denounce Castro Regime.

EDITORIALS:

"It's Not Propaganda, Fidel, It's The Truth".- We answer Castro's complaints against democratic propaganda, pointing out that it consists not merely of propaganda, but of the whole infamous truth about his regime. We avail ourselves of the circumstances to connect the above with the statements made in Miami by Capt. Augusto M. Gonzalez, the skipper of the Cuban merchant flagship "Uvero", and the Chief Engineer, Roberto Surroca, who defected in Ceylon because of the circumstances that prevail in Cuba.

"A Rival Within The Politburo".- Sergio del Valle, a Major of his Army and a member of the Politburo, delivered a speech on Dec. 26th before the Provincial Committee of the Party in Matanzas, and he openly contradicted what Castro constantly affirms. He criticized extensively and enumerated the many failures of the regime. He took a role as a national "guidance counselor" and pointed at that which he said should be the political guiding principle of the Party, thereby overlooking Secretary General Castro, who was hardly even mentioned. Few reports on this speech were carried by the Cuban press, as del Valle seems to be becoming a rival to Fidel Castro.

January 19, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) RED CUBA, TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY CRITICIZED BY PEIPING.
- 2) TWO MORE INTELLECTUALS TO BE PUNISHED IN THE USSR.

EDITORIALS:

"Rusk Answers the Threats of the Tricontinental".- In his speech last Saturday, Castro summarized the "accomplishments" of the Tricontinental, stressing the unanimity of the Communists in their will to conquer South Viet Nam. In the Philippines, Dean Rusk then said that if the U.S. peace offensive failed, the Americans would find themselves in the need to "crush North Viet Nam". This statement duly replied the Tricontinental threats. Fidel might do well to reconsider his offers of arms and "vol-

unteers" to Viet Nam, as he might get in the way of American determination and suffer the consequences.

"The Daggers Hidden Behind the Tricontinental".- The sessions of the Tricontinental had hardly come to an end when the intrigues and rifts between the Communists came out to the surface. In their official press, the Chinese have charged the Soviets with having turned the Conference into an anti-Chinese plot. Castro, two days earlier, had taken the dagger out of his sleeve and acted as the Soviets' barking hound dog.

January 20, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

- 1) RED PLOT AGAINST COSTA RICA UNVEILED.
- 2) RED CHINESE ARMY POLITICAL BOSSES CALL FOR WAR READINESS.

EDITORIALS:

"The Americas Answer The Tricontinental Threats".- At the Tricontinental Conference, Castro challenged the stability of the Americas and took an open war path by arousing the Communists in a manner which he thought would go unchallenged. Yet, representatives of Latin govts., such as Cabinet Minister Barrios, of Venezuela, have shown the way to counter Castroite aggression. Precisely yesterday, it was Mr. Lincoln Gordon, the new Asst. Secy. of State for Latin American Affairs who said that Cuba constitutes a great threat to all American countries. This pronouncement may be said to represent American thought in the struggle against Communism.

"A Great Threat".- When Ambassador Gordon took office as Asst. Secy. of State for Latin American Affairs, he reiterated that Cuba under Red domination means a grave menace to the countries South of the border, and that this is a primary concern for the U.S. This is still more the case after the Tricontinental Conference, and the peoples of Latin America are determined to shake off this menace once and for all, in order to put an end to aggression, terror, subversion, etc., all of which are planned and financed by Red Cuba.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

October 19: "The Indonesian People Against the Communists".- This article breaks Cuban deadly silence concerning Indonesian events, and summarizes and comments such events, emphasizing that the people and the armed forces have performed the miracle of recovering democracy for Indonesia. HISTORIC DETERMINISM turns against Communism, first in the Dominican Republic, next in Algeria, now in Indonesia, and tomorrow in Cuba.

"Why Doesn't Fidel Talk of the Party's Reorganization?".- Right after the news on the reorganization of the Party were confirmed, Castro offered to let all dissatisfied Cubans out of the country. Among other things, this offer served as a smoke screen to cover the purge which he had carried out. Then, complete silence on the subject, so that no one would realize that the Party has been placed under his absolute personal control. He fears the reaction of the purged old Commies.

October 20: "Latin America Against Communism".- The Venezuelan Dockworkers' Convention in Caracas, which had an international character, put out Resolutions in which the workers of the Americas confirm their determination to fight communism.

"The Arrival of the Pro-Consul".- Gromyko's trip to Cuba is more than just a visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister: it is an unannounced inspection tour by the Pro-Consul to his Caribben colony. Of course, this trip can bring nothing good for Fidel.

October 21: "Why is Gromyko in Havana?".- Gromyko, breaking all rules of democracy, showed up in Havana. What for? Among the other problems faced by Cuba, he showed up to solve the crisis undergone by the Cuban Communist "Old Guard", who have been politically executed by Castro.

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"The Fuzzled Cheat".- Castro's "open-door" offer, which was just a bluff which he hoped would not be accepted, has caught Fidel in a series of traps which he has laid himself. He has had to take resource to a thousand gimmicks and butts in order to keep Cuba from losing its entire population, but he has been unable to keep Camarioca from becoming a plebiscite of hostility against his regime.

October 22: "Fidel Castro's Despair".- After he was abandoned by the officers and soldiers of the Rebel Army, by the militia and by the people of Cuba in general, Castro tries to seek refuge in the support of the youth, which he flatters constantly to that end. If it is true that Cuba's young people support Castro, we challenge him to allow draft-age youths to leave the country if they wish.

"Che's Letter in Cuban Schools".- Castro has ordered that Che's letter be read and re-read in Cuban schools. The letter, which seems to have been dictated by Fidel while his victim stood with a foot in the grave, is a carbon copy of Stalin's procedures. Stalin also demanded that the "purged" leave letters which he himself dictated, in order to instill the cult to his personality in the minds of children and form the myth of his own genius. Castro forgets that such Stalinist methods are still too recent and much discredited.

October 23: "Gromyko and Castro's Woes".- This article emphasizes Castro's deep concern over Gromyko's sudden appearance in Cuba, which indicates that the Soviet Pro-Consul dropped in to tighten Castro-Communist screws economically as well as politically.

"Corvalan is Still Castro's Top Foe Within Pan-American Communism".- Traditionally, the Chilean Communist Party has been the center of op-

position to Castro's brand of Communism among the old-line Parties in this Continent. While Castro has invested millions in subversion, Corvalan has patiently waited to capitalize on such investments and on Fidel's own activities. Today more than ever, the old-line Communist Parties throughout the Americas are in a hurry to displace Castro completely, and stage a counter-coup right in Cuba, where Fidel has made a devastating purge of the Old Guard.

October 25: "Castro's Memo to the Soviet Union".- A comment on the memo presented by Castro to Gromyko concerning Cuba's needs with respect to economy, oil, currency, sugar, transportation equipment, industrial units, etc., in order that Cuba's economy may get rolling again. Gromyko's crisp, cold reply was that he would forward the demands to the soviet government.

"Mikoyan-Gromyko".- Soon it'll be three years since Mikoyan, in his capacity as the Kremlin's Pro-Consul, travelled to Cuba to impose Soviet decisions on the notorious "missile crisis". Three years later, another Pro-Consul, Gromyko, shows up in Havana, also to impose Soviet decisions on the puppet. The Kremlin is making it plain for Fidel to understand that he can't last a week longer unless he fully abides by Moscow's orders.

October 26: "Not Even the Soviet Union Can Save Castro".- This article comments the internal situation of Cuba and Castro-Communism at the time of Gromyko's departure from the Island. Mention is made of growing discontent, of restlessness and dissatisfaction among Cubans, plus the destruction of Cuba's light industry and agriculture. Other woes of the Castroites are elaborated on, and, in the end, we call on those who form part of the Castro government, but who nevertheless love Cuba, to help put an end to the Red monster and to the anguish of the people.

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"When the Present is Unbearable..."- In view of the unbearable, desperate reality faced by the people of Cuba under the Castro regime, the tyrant promises paradise in 20 years. In such vertigo, he goes as far as to promise laurel crowns for Cuban sportsmen in the 1972 Olympic Games. He has annihilated all the sports in Cuba and the country has been eliminated from all international competitions because it makes a means for subversion out of sports. Fortunately, by 1972 Fidel Castro will be mean no more to the Cubans than the bitter memory of a tyrant who no longer exists.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

October 30, 1965: "Oil Worries the Havana Communist Regime".- A comment on the statement by Engineer Alberto Queralt, who just arrived from Cuba, who, in his capacity as a technician who held a high post in the Petroleum Consolidated, deduces the possibility that Soviet deliveries of oil to Cuba may decrease. These statements are confirmed by the interpretation of President Dorticos' own words, and by the presence of a Cuban mission in Great Britain.

"A Concentration of Gorillas, Thugs and Informers".- In the reorganization of the Party, Fidel Castro has undertaken the biggest concentration of gorillas, ever to have taken the political leadership of any country in the world. Besides, he has raised a good number of thugs and gorillas to leadership positions. Such are the men that Castro has found to lead the Party which he has made in his own likeness in order to exert absolute, despotic, personal power over a nation.

November 1st, 1965: "There Will Be No Changes in the Blockade of Red Cuba".- A comment on the rumors that U.S. policy on Cuba will "soften". It is indicated that Washington, for humanitarian reasons, accepted Castro's parley to evacuate the spiritually wounded. We also comment on the statement of a Washington official who said that "the fear that the U.S. may alter its relations with Cuba is unfounded (and) there is no prospect for a change in our relations". We arrive at the conclusion that U.S. policy on the subject will no vary: Castro will be economically strangled and there's no future for Communism in this Continent. (DIARIO DE LAS R. - OCT-31.)

"What About Political Prisoners?".- Fidel Castro has taken a series of steps that limit, by several means, the offer he made to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the Island. Even though no public statements have been made about the political prisoners, it may be expected that this matter has been considered in the negotiations, and that Fidel Castro must be forced to play fairly in order that he may not trade with the agony and the hope of 70,000 political prisoners and with the hope and the anguish of their relatives.-

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (V.R.U.L.)

October 29, 1965: "Russia Rebuffs Castro".- A comment on the news that Cuba and the USSR have signed an agreement to send 7 engineers and 50 technicians to the Caribbean Island. It is pointed out that, substantially, such is the Soviet Union's reply to the request for technical and financial assistance for Cuba's reconstruction and for the sugar crop.

"Brazil and the Dominican Republic".- The situation in Brazil and the Dominican Republic shows that it is not enough to face up to Communist aggressions, but that energetic, precautionary measures must be taken as well to neutralize the subversive threat and guarantee democratic stability. On the other hand, the Hemisphere's problems must be focused in their entirety, and action must be taken against the source of subversion in Communist Cuba.

Friday, Dec. 31, 1965

# Cuba Aid Given to N. Viets

## Ship Weapons, Defector Says

By CARLOS MARTINEZ  
Of Our Latin America Staff

A Cuban sea captain who walked off his ship with three of his officers at a Japanese port four days ago charged Thursday in Miami that Cuban vessels take weapons to North Viet Nam "three or four" times every six months.

The captain, Francisco Cobas Oses, 46, told a press conference called by Cuban exiles that "all Cuban ships have orders to carry war materiel to North Viet Nam to help the North Vietnamese effort."

The Cuban Embassy in Japan, said Cobas, is acting as coordinator for all Viet Nam-bound shipments taken at Communist ports in Asia.

The four Cuban defectors of the 7,000-ton freighter Aracelio Iglesias were flown to San Francisco last Tuesday. There they gave U.S. agents their account of how Fidel Castro's ships carry Red Chinese arms to the Viet Cong. They arrived in Miami Wednesday.

Shortly before Cobas' press conference, the Aracelio Iglesias sailed three days behind schedule for Communist China, reportedly to pick up military hardware for the North Vietnamese. It was being skippered by the second mate, on orders from Cuba.

The Cuban Embassy in Tokyo had secretly arranged for the Aracelio Iglesias to take a shipment of war materiel from North Korea to North Viet Nam," charged Cobas.

Nevertheless he said plans were changed at the last minute and he was "hastily ordered" to pick up the shipment of weapons in Shanghai instead. It was then when the four decided to defect.

"The ships that sail from Cuba with sugar are ordered to pick up the weapons after unloading the sugar at Japan," said Cobas, adding that the pickups take place only at North Korean and Red Chinese ports "because of their geographical situation."

The short, articulate seaman also charged that the Cuban government keeps a small intelligence detail on each of its merchant ships. They are members of the G-2, Castro's dreaded secret police.

"For some reason, the G-2 man on board is usually the radio and telegraph operator. In the Aracelio Iglesias we had a second G-2 man disguised as the fourth engineer, even though he had no training or ability to perform his duty."



# press release

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## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

### DEFECTING CUBAN SEAMEN EXPLAIN THEIR DECISION HERE.

Skipper, three officers left Cuban freighter in Japan. Cuban logistical support of Viet Reds denounced. Crewmen reluctant to transport war materials to North Viet. Role of Castro's Embassy in Tokyo. Cuban Reds withhold ship's itinerary to deceive the Japanese. Spying on board. Bureaucratic chaos results in damage to Cuba's foreign supplies.

A Cuban skipper who left his ship in Japan Dec. 26 confirmed today in Miami that - Castro's logistical support of Viet Nam Reds was the main reason for his defection. In a press conference held at the Biscayne Room of the Hotel McAllister, Francisco Cobas, the defecting captain of the Cuban freighter "Aracelio Iglesias", told news- men why he and three of his fellow officers decided to seek asylum in the United -- States.

The press conference was arranged by UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, a Miami-based Cuban -- group whom Cobas approached upon his arrival from Japan. Cobas said that he had -- asked the U.R. to help him get in touch with the press so that he and his shipmates could denounce Cuban maneuvers to help the Viet Cong.

During the conference, Cobas was flanked by Antonio Arias, Mario Pérez and Humberto Fernández, the three other defecting officers of the "Aracelio Iglesias". Cobas, - introduced by U.R. Secretary General Mario Seiglic, spoke for the group. Said Co-- bas that he and his shipmates had refused to run the risks of transporting war mate- rials to North Viet Nam, particularly since they were convinced that such transpor- tation was wrong. Cobas added that all Cuban vessels have been ordered to take mil- itary supplies to North Viet Nam from other Asian Communist ports, and that the Cub- an Embassy in Tokyo serves as coordinator for all such shipments.

Referring to his former ship, Capt. Cobas explained that the Embassy had ordered -- the "Aracelio Iglesias" to sail to a North Korean port and to await further instrug- tions there. The Cuban diplomats withheld the ship's itinerary and declared that - the "Aracelio" would return to the Japanese port of Yahata before proceeding to -- North Viet Nam. By pretending that the ship would come back to Japan, they hoped - to deceive the crew and reassure the Japanese as to the cargo and the use to which - the ship was being put. The truth was, however, that, while in North Korea, the -- "Aracelio" was to receive orders to load a cargo of war supplies and sail directly from there to North Viet Nam.

According to Cobas, this could not be done in the end because the Tokyo Embassy was warned at the last moment that the North Korean port of Chinnampo was blocked by -- ice. The "Aracelio" was now ordered to pick up another military shipment at Shan-- ghai and take it to North Viet Nam. It was then that Cobas and his shipmates dec-- ided to walk out.

Cobas went on to explain that logistical support to the North Vietnamese was one of the two tasks assigned to the new Cuban envoy in Tokyo, a fanatically loyal Commu--

nist named Manuel Jorge Cusvo Menéndez, whose previous job was to run concentration camps in the Isle of Pines.

The Cuban skipper referred to ill-treatment of Cuban seamen by the Castro regime, mentioning among other instances the constant spying on board by G-2 men; preferential Customs treatment given Communist-Bloc sailors; and the ridiculously low local-currency allowance of \$5 per week given to the Cubans while in foreign ports. Elaborating on the issue of espionage, Capt. Cobas revealed that the radio and telegraph operator is usually the G-2 man on board. As captain of the "Aracelio", Cobas himself was forced to surrender the mail of supposedly "disloyal" crewmen to one of the spies assigned to his ship.

As regards operation conditions of the Cuban merchant fleet, Cobas told newsmen -- that the two basic problems confronted by Cuban shipping are the obsolete Soviet -- equipment installed in most boats and the excessive bureaucratic red tape and disorganization. As example of the latter, he mentioned the fact that the Cuban buying agency seldom informs the shipping coordinating office of the dates on which -- the merchandise is to be picked up at a foreign port. Last-minute notices and subsequent efforts to find ships usually meet failure, with the result that the seller must pay higher warehouse costs. This has caused many foreign firms to either refuse to trade with Castro or to impose extremely harsh terms to protect themselves from the costly effects of the Communists' unreliability.

Capt. Francisco Cobas then revealed that he understood that a vast "reorganization" of the Cuban Navy was undertaken early this fall. Most officers, he said, were discharged on the grounds of suspected "disloyalty" to the government. Incidentally, added Cobas, some retired Army officers who have had no naval experience, have also been assigned to the merchant marine. Cobas assured his audience that their decision to quit was made of their own free will and that no one had pressured them -- into it. He denounced Communist oppression of his homeland and said that he and his three shipmates refused to keep serving under it.

Following Capt. Cobas' statement, the newsmen asked him numerous questions. Most -- of these referred to the issue of Cuban boats being used to carry war supplies to -- Viet Nam, which was quoted by the Cuban seamen as the chief reason for their defection. All journalists present showed great interest in this matter, as such Cuban assistance to Viet Nam Reds more or less directly results in the loss of American -- lives in that Asian country.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Ref.: 205

Miami, December 30, 1965.



# boletín informativo

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## MARINOS CUBANOS QUE DESERTARON EXPLICAN SU DECISION EN MIAMI

El capitán y tres oficiales abandonaron un carguero cubano en Japón.- Denuncian apoyo logístico de Cuba Roja a los Viet Cong.- Renuente la tripulación a transportar material bélico a Viet Nam.- El papel de la Embajada castrista en Tokyo. Ocultaron los rojos cubanos el itinerario para engañar a los japoneses.- Espionaje a bordo.- El desorden burocrático perjudica a los suministradores de Castro en el extranjero.

Un capitán cubano que abandonó su nave en Japón el 26 de diciembre confirmó hoy en Miami que el apoyo logístico de Castro a los rojos de Viet Nam había sido el principal motivo de su desertión. En una conferencia de prensa celebrada en un céntrico hotel de esta ciudad, Francisco Cobas, capitán del carguero cubano "Aracelio Iglesias" explicó a los periodistas por qué él y sus compañeros de oficialidad decidieron solicitar asilo en los EE.UU.

La conferencia de prensa fue convocada por UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, organización cubana radicada aquí a la que se dirigió Cobas a su llegada del Japón. Cobas dijo que había solicitado la ayuda de U.R. a fin de ponerse en contacto con los periodistas y denunciar las maniobras de Cuba Roja en favor de los rojos vietnamitas.

Durante la conferencia, se encontraban junto a Cobas los otros tres oficiales aislados, nombrados Antonio Ruiz Arias (Primer Oficial), Mario Julio Pérez Girón (Jefe de Máquinas), y Humberto R. Fernández (Sobrecargo). El capitán Cobas fue presentado por el Dr. Mario Seiglie, Secretario General de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

Dijo Cobas que tanto él como sus compañeros de tripulación se negaban a correr el riesgo que supone transportar material bélico a Viet Nam del Norte, máxime cuando a brigaban la convicción de que dicha actitud del gobierno cubano es altamente condenable. Añadió Cobas que todos los buques cubanos tienen órdenes de llevar suministros de guerra a Viet Nam del Norte desde otros puertos comunistas del Asia, y que la Embajada cubana en Tokyo funge como coordinadora de tales embarques.

Refiriéndose al "Aracelio Iglesias", que capitaneaba, Cobas reveló que la Embajada cubana en Japón había dispuesto que el "Aracelio" zarpara rumbo a un puerto norcoreano y aguardara allí nuevas órdenes. Los diplomáticos castristas retuvieron el itinerario del buque y declararon que el mismo volvería al puerto japonés de Yahata antes de seguir rumbo a Viet Nam del Norte. Al hacer ver que el buque regresaría al Japón, los comunistas se proponían engañar a la tripulación y tranquilizar a las autoridades japonesas respecto del cargamento del buque y del uso que se iba a dar al mismo. La realidad, empero, era que, durante la estancia del "Aracelio" en Corea del Norte, el mismo habría de recibir la orden de cargar un embarque de material bélico y zarpar

directamente hacia Viet Nam del Norte.

Según Cobas, esto no pudo hacerse debido a que, a última hora, la Embajada recibió el aviso de que el puerto norcoreano de Chinnampo estaba bloqueado por el hielo. En vista de ello, se ordenó al "Aracelio" levar anclas rumbo a Shanghai para recoger allí otro cargamento de material de guerra y conducirlo al Viet Nam. Fue entonces que Cobas y sus compañeros decidieron abandonar el buque.

A continuación, Cobas pasó a explicar que el apoyo logístico a los Viet Cong constituye una de las tareas encomendadas al nuevo embajador cubano en Tokyo, un comunista fanático nombrado Manuel Jorge Cuervo Menéndez que tuvo a su cargo la administración de varios campos de concentración en Isla de Pinos.

Refiriéndose a los malos tratos que reciben los marinos cubanos, Cobas mencionó la constante vigilancia a que están sometidos a bordo por el G-2 comunista, así como a las consideraciones especiales de aduana que se dan a los tripulantes de buques de otros países comunistas y a la ridícula cantidad (\$5 semanales) en moneda local que se da a los marinos cubanos para sus gastos en puertos extranjeros. Detallando la cuestión de la vigilancia, reveló el capitán Cobas que en la mayoría de los buques cubanos el G-2 de a bordo suele ser el radiotelegrafista. Como capitán del "Aracelio Iglesias", el propio Cobas se vio obligado a entregarlo a otro agente policíaco destacado a bordo toda la correspondencia de ciertos tripulantes supuestamente desleales al régimen.

También dijo Cobas a los periodistas que los principales problemas que enfrenta la navegación cubana los constituyen los equipos soviéticos anticuados instalados en muchos buques y las complicaciones y confusiones burocráticas. Como ejemplo de esto último, señaló Cobas que la agencia oficial de compras del régimen cubano casi nunca comunica a la coordinadora de fletes (CUFLET) la fecha en que deberá cargarse alguna mercancía en puerto extranjero. Dicha fecha no se avisa hasta última hora, fracasando así los intentos de CUFLET para conseguir buque. Como consecuencia de esto, el vendedor extranjero ve notablemente aumentados sus costos de almacén, y esto ha hecho que muchas firmas extranjeras bien se abstengan de comerciar con la tiranía roja o impongan términos leoninos de venta para precaverse de los costosos efectos de la irresponsabilidad comunista.

El capitán Cobas reveló que, según tenía entendido, la Marina de Guerra de Cuba Roja sufrió una amplia "reorganización" a principios del otoño. Según dijo, muchos oficiales fueron licenciados por su supuesta "deslealtad" al régimen. Los más afortunados fueron transferidos a la marina mercante, a la que también se ha incorporado a muchos oficiales retirados del Ejército que carecen por completo de experiencia naval. Los restantes oficiales licenciados de la Marina de Guerra han sido fusilados o recluidos en prisión.

El Capitán Cobas aseguró a los presentes que su decisión y la de sus compañeros era el producto de su libérrima voluntad, no habiéndose ejercido sobre ellos la menor presión. Cobas denunció la opresión comunista en su patria y añadió que ni él ni sus tres compañeros podían seguir sirviendo a la causa roja.

Luego de estas declaraciones, los periodistas presentes formularon al Capitán Cobas numerosas preguntas, la mayoría de las cuales se referían al uso de las naves de Cuba Roja para llevar suministros a los comunistas del Viet Cong. Todos los reporteros asistentes se mostraron vivamente interesados en este asunto, por cuanto dicha ayuda cubana se traduce más o menos directamente en la pérdida de vidas norteamericanas en ese país del Sudeste asiático.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, Diciembre 31, 1965

Ref: 210

My shipmate and I have requested political asylum from the United States because we are convinced that Cuban support of the Communist war in Vietnam is wrong and we refuse to run the risks of transporting war material to North Vietnam.

All Cuban ships have orders to carry cargo to North Vietnam to help the North Vietnamese war effort. The Cuban Embassy in Japan is acting as the coordinator for all shipments of war material to North Vietnam via Cuban ships from Communist ports in Asia. The Cuban Embassy in Tokyo had secretly arranged for the Aracelio Iglosias to take a shipment of war materials from North Korea to North Vietnam. In order to hide their intentions, the Embassy arranged that the Aracelio itinerary be kept up in the air until the last possible moment; then to fool the crew and the Japanese they gave the story the ship would return to Japan to load tin cargo at Yahata and then proceed on route to North Vietnam. In reality, we were to receive instructions on itinerary while in North Korea telling us to proceed directly to North Vietnam after loading the war supplies.

At the last moment, however, the Embassy was informed that the port of Chinnampo was blocked by ice. The Cuban Embassy then hastily arranged for us to pick up a shipment of arms in Shanghai previously scheduled for another Cuban boat about the end of January.

Logistical support to the North Vietnamese is one of the two tasks assigned to Mr. Manuel Jorge Cuervo, the new Cuban Ambassador to Japan. His other function is to erase the bad effects on Japanese-Cuban trade caused by the defection of the former trade Counselor to Japan, Gilberto Alemany. The Cuban government is very concerned about the prospect of declining trade since already some companies that formerly traded with Cuba, will no longer do so openly.

In general, I may say that members of the Cuban merchant marine live under unbearable conditions. The treatment we receive is so bad that no one feels like cooperating with the marine purposes of the regime, even in the few cases where there might be no ideological incompatibility involved.

As examples of this treatment I may mention the constant spying on board by members of the "G-2". For some reason, the "G-2" man on board is usually the radio and telegraph operator. In the "Aracelio" we had one by the name of Eduard de Sánchez who was a notorious spy. Aboard we had another man called Manuel Rda Rodriguez who was imposed as the Fourth Engineer, even though he had no training or ability to perform such duties. As Captain of the "Aracelio", I was ordered

by the government shipping concern "Vazticas" to give Rúa all possible cooperation in the fulfillment of his functions. Rúa then came to see me and asked, among other things, that I surrender to him the incoming and outgoing mail of certain specific crewmen who were suspected of being against the government.

Another instance of ill-treatment which Cuban seamen resent is the discrimination to which we are subject by the Cuban Customs as compared to the preferential treatment they accord to foreign sailors, particularly those from behind the iron curtain. Most everything we bring from abroad to alleviate the scarcity suffered by our families is confiscated at the Customs House.

Still other reasons for disgust are the many cuts and discounts made from our already low pay and, very especially, the ridiculously low amount of foreign currency that we are allowed when we sail abroad. For spending money in foreign ports, all we get in local currency is the equivalent of \$5 per week which, of course, are deducted from our basic salaries. In applying this restriction, no distinction is made between the crewmen or the various officer ranks. It is \$5 for everyone.

Because of all this, and because of the terrible conditions under which Communism keeps our homeland, most Cuban sailors and officers are staunch anti-Communists. The Government knows this, but nevertheless they must employ what they call "the reactionaries" because of the scarcity of other trained personnel to man Cuban boats. Their only choice is to spy on us constantly, as I have just explained.

As to the operating conditions of the Cuban merchant fleet, it is worth mentioning that Polish ships, which make up a sizable proportion of Cuban shipping, are supplied with Soviet-made equipment which the Russians have long discarded as obsolete. Again, my own ship is an example. The "Aracelio" was completed as recently as 1963 in a Polish shipyard. Yet, its radar equipment is so obsolete that it is simply not used, since we could never find the parts to repair it when it broke. A German technician told my Chief Mate here that it must have been a World-War II unit.

Excessive bureaucratic red tape and disorganization is another serious problem confronted by Cuban shipping and which often results in considerable damage to those firms that trade with the Castro tyranny. I will illustrate this. The Cuban government agency responsible for arranging maritime transportation for merchandise bought abroad is the "Empresa Cubana de Fletes" (CUFLET).

The government purchasing organization buys merchandise from foreign companies, but fails to inform CUFLET of the date on which the cargo is to be loaded. All attempts to establish this are to no avail. Then one day the buying agency serves last-minute notice that the merchandise will be ready for loading. CUFLET takes pains to find a vessel in time but, more often than not, its hasty efforts are in vain. In the meantime, the seller abroad grows impatient, as he has long fulfilled his part of the deal and must continue to pay warehouse costs because of a delay that is no fault of his.

This happens all the time, to the extent that many foreign firms refuse to deal with such an undependable customer as the Cuban government, or, foreseeing the damages they may come to them because of such inefficiency they impose the harshest selling terms.

The unrest and chaos that I have described is not peculiar to the merchant fleet. I do not know many details about this because I have been out at sea most of the time since I first heard of it, but I understand that the Cuban Navy was also in such turmoil that practically all its officers were discharged early this fall. It is said that some of the dismissed naval officers were assigned to the merchant marine, and my men and I know a few instances. It is even true that Army officers with no naval experience are being appointed to high naval positions. However, it is most likely that many of the purged officers will have been shot or imprisoned. Such is the Cuba of today.

Lastly, we wish to emphasize that our decision to seek asylum in the United States has been made of our own free will. We have been pressured into this decision by no one. Our consciences no longer permit us to serve the cause of a Communist Cuba. Like hundreds of Cubans before us, we who love Cuba deeply cannot longer endure the tyranny with which she is afflicted.

We appreciate with all our heart the help received from UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA and we also wish to thank the gentlemen of the Press assembled here, for the attention given us.

Francisco Cobas.

Miami, 30 de Diciembre de 1965.

INDEX:  YES  NO **19-120-26** ✓

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES **35**

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. **19-120-26**

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. **for 31 Dec 65**

FROM **WAVE**

ACTION **WAVE 8**

ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT **CS/DO** TIME **2010** BY **D**

INFO **FILE, VR, CS/DO, FE 8, SOWA 2, CT, CT/OPS, FT, FT/D, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/4**

31 **SECRET** REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

**SECRET 382349Z**

PRIORITY DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 8166

NO NIACT

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 8122.

**SECRET**

WH/ES

ABSTRACT X

**31 Dec 65 24377**

PRESS CONFERENCE PER PARA 1 REF HELD AS SCHEDULED

WITH THUS FAR FAVORABLE RESULTS. APPROX TWENTY REPS ALL MEDIA PRESENT INCLUDING AP, UPI, ABC AND TWO LOCAL TV STATIONS, VOA, AFP AND APPROPRIATE STATION ASSETS. TONE OF CONFERENCE FRIENDLY. WITHIN TWO HOURS STORY ON LOCAL RADIO WHICH STRESSED THREE POINTS: OFFICERS BROUGHT TO POINT OF DEFECTION DUE FACT IGLESIAS CARRYING MILITARY CARGOS TO NORTH VIET NAM, PRESENT MORALE AND CONDITION CUBAN NAVY VERY POOR DUE IN PART TO WHOLESALE OFFICER PURGE AND REPLACEMENT THESE OFFICERS BY "LAND-LUBBER" ARMY OFFICERS, MERCHANT MARINE IN SAME STATE DUE G-2 HARASSMENT OF CREWS AND POOR CONDITION OF SHIPS. THESE (AND OTHER POINTS INCLUDING PARA 2 REED) INCLUDED IN PREPARED STATEMENT WHICH HANDED PRESS REPS. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CONFERENCE OFFICERS MET IN PRIVATE WITH VOA REP TO TAPE AN

**SECRET**

**19-120-26**  
**31 Dec 65**

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
INTERVIEW.

**SECRET**

IN 24377 PAGE 2052

RID/MIS

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED IN AMSCROLL PRESS  
RELEASE BEING ISSUED THIS DATE AND WHICH WILL BE AIR  
MAILED ITS LIST. VIA AMLYRIC-1, PRESS INTERVIEW AND  
EDITORIAL COMMENT ARRANGED FOR RADIO COVERAGE VIA AMTHIGH,  
AMSPOTH, AMTUMOR EVENING 30 DEC. AMHIM PREPARING SPECIAL  
PRESS RELEASE FOR 31 DEC. AMSTRUT-2 WILL PREPARE TAPED

INTERVIEW FOR 2 JAN PROGRAM.

3. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE SHOULD APPEAR  
31 DEC AS AFP, UPI AND AP HAVE FILED STORIES. WILL FORWARD  
CLIPS AVAILABLE HERE FOR REPLAY.

**SECRET**

CFN 8166 8122 1 AP UPI ABC TV VOA AFP IGLESIAS NORTH VIET NAM CUBAN  
NAVY G-2 2VOA AMSCROLL VIA AMLYRIC-1 VIA AMTHIGH AMBROTH AMTUMOR  
30 AMHIM 31 AMSTRUT-2 2 31 AFP UPI AP

BT

NNNN

**SECRET**

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: WH/c

FROM: InWAVE

ACTION: 4/c 8

ADVANCE COPY:  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT: TIME: 1540 BY: J

INFO: FILE, VR, CS/DO, FE 8, SAVA 2, CI, CI/ORG, FE, FE/04, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/04

SECRET 291931Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 8122

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: DIR 63111

29 DEC 66 23377

1. RE PARA 1 REF BELIEVE AMSCROLL SPONSORSHIP MORE SUITABLE AND LOGICAL IN VIEW ITS DAILY EMPHASIS UPON MNVIPER ACTIONS, ITS BEING KNOWN TO DEFECTING OFFICERS, AND ITS EXPERIENCE WITH PRESS CONFERENCES AND PUBLIC EYE. AMSCROLL PARTICIPATION TO BE LIMITED TO ORGANIZING CONFERENCE AND PRESENTING OFFICERS. IT WILL NOT TAKE CREDIT FOR DEFECTIONS. AMWORD-1, -2 AND -3 HAVE BEEN BRIEFED RE AMSCROLL ROLE IN SURFACING AND HAVE ARRANGED FOR SPACE FOR PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1130 HOURS 30 DEC. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS, RADIO AND TV (INCLUDING WAVE MEDIA ASSETS SUCH AS AMHIM, AMICE, AMLYRIC-1)

TO BE ALERTED EVENING 29 DEC A HIGH LEVEL DEFECTOR TO BE AVAILABLE. IDENTITIES WILL BE WITHHELD UNTIL CONFERENCE.

2. RE PARA 2 REF PRESENT PLAN CALLS FOR AMSCROLL REPS TO MEET WITH QUSAILOR-42 TO WORK OUT DETAILS STATEMENT TO BE READ AND GIVEN PRESS WHICH TO SOME EXTENT WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW STATEMENT ISSUED JAPAN. WILL USE MILITARY CARGOS RATHER THAN ARMS WHICH CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE THUS FAR. ASSUMING QUSAILOR-42 CONCURRENCE WILL

SECRET

19-120-26  
29 Dec 66

**SECRET**  
RECEIVED  
RID/MIS

PAGE 2087  
IN 23377

AL  
980 INCLUDE POINTS PARA 3 REF. ALSO WISH TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC STATEMENT

FEB 14 3 16 PM '66

FROM QUSAILOR-42 REGARDING UNRELIABILITY CUBAN SHIPPING DUE POOR  
MECHANICAL CONDITION, INADEQUATELY TRAINED CREWS AND INCOMPETENT  
DIRECCION FROM HAVANA.

S E C R E T

CFN: 8122 68111 1 AMSCROLL MHVIPER NOT TAKE AMWORD-1 -2 -3

1103 30 DEC TV AMHIM AMICE ANLYRIC-1 29 DEC A 2 QUSAILOR-42

JAPAN -42 3 A -42 CUBAN HAVANA

**SECRET**

BT

NNNN

RID/MIS

FEB 16 1 36 PM '66

INDEX:  YES  NO 19-120 26 ✓  
 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30  
 N-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. Copy  
 FROM JMWAVE  
 ACTION WHIC8  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED  
 INFO FILE, UR, WH8, CAZ, CA/PROP, CILIC2, NELG

SECRET		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
1	2	3	4

SECRET 291934Z  
 DIR INFO RIOD CITE WAVE 8123  
 TYPIC MHSPAWN  
 REFS: A. DIR 67579 \*

*Handwritten:* WHIC8  
*Stamp:* X

29 Dec 65 H. 23371

- B. TM 772926
- C. UFGA 24163

PER PARA TWO REF A REQUEST, JMWAVE POUCHED REF B BULKY MATERIALS TO Hqs FOR FORWARDING TO RIOD. SPECIAL AMSCROLL STUDY AND OTHER SELECTED MATERIALS POUCHED RIOD REF C.

SECRET X REQUESTED WAVE CABLE MATERIAL  
 CFN: 8123 67579 772926 24163 A JMWAVE B Hqs AMSCROLL C

BT

**SECRET**

19-120-26

29 Dec 65

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES *43*

*132-49/3*  
*19-12*

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	<i>EW</i>	5	<i>MO</i>
2		6	<i>FI</i>
3	<i>CA</i>	7	<i>TL</i>
4	<i>-PP</i>	8	<i>PP</i>

FROM

*UNWAVE*

ACTION

*WH/C 8*

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

TELETYPE

TELETYPE

TUBES

UNIT

*CSDG*

TIME

*2200*

BY

*CI*

INFO

*FILE, VR, FE 8, CI, CI/PS, CI/TZ, CI/PA, FI, FI/D4, CDE, CAZ, CI/PS,  
-1/04, 204, 20143, CS/D 0*

*21994*

SECRET 272355Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY TOKY CITE WAVE-3797

NO NIACT

TYPIC 3RWACON

REF A. TOKY 5937 *(IN 21434)*

B. TOKY 5941 *(IN 21678)*

1. WAVE PLANS MEET SUBJECTS REF A UPON ARRIVAL WAVE AREA AND REMOVE TO SAFEHOUSE FOR APPROX ONE DAY PRIOR SURFACING. PURPOSE TO GIVE TIME ORGANIZE PROPER SURFACING AND DETERMINE SUITABILITY AND WILLINGNESS MEET WITH PRESS, TV, ETC UNDER AEGIS ANSCROLL. DEPENDING ON NATURE PRESS COVERAGE IN SAN FRANCISCO, PLAN HAVE ANSCROLL SPONSOR SURFACING IN MANNER GIVE IMPRESSION IGLESIAS SUCCESS PART OF OVERALL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE. WILL TIE IN WITH OTHER RECENT MARITIME DEFECTIONS AND WILL INDICATE OTHERS TO FOLLOW. NET-  
MOD OF SURFACING WILL FOLLOW ANWASP-1 PATTERN.

2. FOR TOKY. PLEASE ADVISE IF REF OFFICERS AWARE OF ANSCROLL ACTIVITY THIS OP. DID THEY MEET ANFRAME-1 AND IF SO IN WHAT ROLE AND UNDER WHAT NAME? ARE THEY AWARE OF THE ANSCROLL PAMPHLETS? ALSO REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE THEIR WILLINGNESS COOPERATE IN PROP PLAY.

**SECRET**

S E C R E T

SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2  
#12994

CFN 8097 5937 5941 WAVE A TV ETC AEGIS AMSCROLL SAN FRANCISCO

IGLESIAS CUBAN AMWASP-1 CP AMFRAME-1

BT

SECRET

N  
NNN

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES *PP*

**SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	<i>Ew</i>	5	<i>Mo</i>
2		0	<i>FL</i>
3	<i>CA</i>	7	<i>TC</i>
4	<i>PP-</i>	0	<i>RR</i>

FROM *Tokyo*

ACTION *WH/C8*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED *05/00 01/25 SA*

INFO *FILE, UR, CB/DD, FEB, CA2, CA/PROB, CA/04, C/OPS, C/IC2, FI, FID4, C.D.C., SAVAR*

**S E C R E T** 280710Z

PRIORITY WAVE DIR CITE TOKY 5955

200000 2209C

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 2097 (*IN 21994*)

1. BELIEVE REF SUGGESTION GIVE IMPRESSION ARACELIO IGLESIAS (AI) OP PART OF OVER ALL OPERATION AGAINST CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE VIEW GIST PSYCH PLAY HERE. WE ATTEMPTING PUBLICIZE FACT AI CREW MEMBERS DEFECTED DUE OPPOSITION ORDERS CARRY MATERIAL NORTH VIETNAM AND CUBAN EMBASSY TOKYO IS FAR EAST COORDINATOR ALL SHIPMENTS WAR MATERIAL ON CUBAN VESSELS, THUS ACTING TO IMPLEMENT CASTRO PROMISE AID NORTH VIETNAM WAR EFFORT. BELIEVE ANY INDICATION THEY PREVIOUSLY IN TOUCH AMSCROLL OR OTHER GROUP WOULD CAUSE DOUBTS VERACITY THEIR PRESS STATEMENT. REQUEST THEREFORE YOU NOT IMPLEMENT REF.

2. SUBJECTS AWARE AMSCROLL ACTIVITY BUT HAVE NOT MET AMFRAME 1. AMSCROLL PAMPHLETS NOT USED. BELIEVE SUBJECTS WILL COOPERATE FULLY IN ANY TYPE PROP PLAY DESIRED. PLEASE ADHERE LINE TOKY 5949.

**S E C R E T**

CFN 5955 2097 ARACELIO IGLESIAS AI OP CUBAN AI NORTH VIETNAM CUBAN FAR EAST CUBAN CASTRO NORTH AMSCROLL NOT IMPLEMENT AMSCROLL NOT MET

**SECRET**

MESSAGE FORM 36  
TOTAL COPIES: 36

JOY  RETURN TO BRANCH  FILE RID

ORIG : D. Ronis/bh  
UNIT : DC/WH/C/CA  
EXT : 4148 (R-1464)  
DATE : 28 Dec 65

INDEX  
 NO INDEX  
 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

**SECRET**

ROUTING			
1	CA	5	FI
2		6	TC
3	EW	7	RD
4		8	Q

TO : JMWAVE TOKYO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VA, FILE  RID COPY, FE 8, CI, CI/DCS, FI, FI/D 4

INFO: CDC, CA/D 4, CA 2, CA/ALCP, SAYA 2

TO PRITY WAVE INFO TOKYO CITE DIR

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REFS: A. WAVE 8097 (IN 21994)  
B. TOKY 5955 (IN 22090)

68111

1. HQS CONCURS TOKY REQUEST THAT IGLESIAS DEFECTIONS CONTINUE APPEAR SPONTANEOUS AND WAVE NOT GIVE IMPRESSION DEF ECTIONS PART OF OVERALL EXILE ORGANIZATION OP AGAINST MERCHANT MARINE. SINCE AMSCROLL WIDELY KNOWN ASSOCIATION WITH MHVIPER ACTIVITIES, SUGGEST WAVE RECONSIDER USE AMSCROLL. AMICE MIGHT BE MORE SUITABLE GROUP TO SPONSOR WAVE SURFACING. SINCE WE NOW HAVE AT LEAST SEVEN RECENT MARITIME DEFECTIONERS, PULLING ALL TOGETHER IN NEAR FUTURE FOR FURTHER PSYCH ACTIONS WHEN CURRENT PSYCH EXPLOITATIONS COMPLETED MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISHED UNDER AEGIS AMICE. ALL SURFACINGS SHOULD CONVEY IMPRESSION WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION IN MERCHANT MARINE.

2. ODACID EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN OVER DEFECTIONERS' STATEMENTS RE "ARMS" SHIPMENTS TO NORTH VIETNAM AND DESIRES ASSURANCE STATEMENTS CAN BE SUPPORTED AT LEAST BY LOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS, IF NOT OUTRIGHT FACT. OTHERWISE FEAR ENTIRE EFFORT, WHICH THEY FEEL IS MOST DESIRABLE, MAY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. WAVE SHOULD REVIEW STATEMENTS CAREFULLY WITH SUBJECTS AND BE CERTAIN THEY CONSISTENT AND CONVINCING SINCE IT ANTICIPATED THIS WILL BE SUBJECT TO SEARCHING QUESTIONS IN FORTHCOMING

RELEASING OFFICER

28-3

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.



INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES *162*

R-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

FROM *JMWAVE*

ACTION *WHL/8*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO *FILE IN CA 2 RA/CRAP C/12 - ERL 588 FB8*

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
<i>Full direct</i>		1	MO
		2	C
		3	CA
		4	FF
		5	X

SECRET 231784Z  
 DIA CITE 4442 806-2  
 TYPIC USDPANN

**ACTION** 23 DEC 1954

AP STORY FILED VIENNA AND PRINTED MIAMI HERALD 23 DEC REPORTING  
 CZECH ADMISSION OF DISASTROUS ECONOMIC ERRORS BEING USED BY  
 AMSCROLL RADIO AS ONE MORE EXAMPLE INHERENT WEAKNESSES COMMUNIST  
 ECONOMIC THEORIES. COMBINING WITH RECENT RUMANIAN AND SOVIET ADMISSIONS  
 AS PART OF BASIC THEME TO AMSCROLL AUDIENCE THAT FUTURE CUBAN ECONOMY  
 BLEAK INDEED IF AFTER ALL THESE YEARS SOVIETS, SATELLITES AND  
 CHINESE UNABLE SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IF AVAILABLE WILL APPRECIATE  
PRECIS OF CZECH DOCUMENT.

SECRET

CFM

3562 AP VIENNA MIAMI HERALD 23 CZECH AMSCROLL RUMANIAN CHINESE  
 PRECIS  
 BT

**SECRET**

*Howard Bowman - 9321  
 Czech reports of  
 will call within  
 copy of newspaper  
 article or received*

*Sent under FHM  
 date: 7 Jan 66  
 TM Smith  
 6158*

INDEX:  YES  NO **19-120-**

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. **19-120-** CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES **20**

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. **19-120-**

FROM **JMWAVE**

**23/30 SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

REPRODUCTION PROMI.	
1	5
2	0
3	7
4	0

ACTION **WHICB**  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

ADVANCE COPY \_\_\_\_\_ UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO **FILE UR, EFG, WEB, CAZ, CA/PROP**

SECRET 232153Z

PRIORITY ATHE INFO DIR MADR CITE **WAVE 8975**

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

23 DEC 65 2101C

- REF: A. ATHE 8031 **(IN 17131)**
- B. WAVE 7921 **(IN 16238)**

1. MEETING WITH ECONOMIDES DID NOT RESULT ANY QUOTABLE MATERIAL. WHILE MEETING NOT EXPLICITLY STIPULATED CONFIDENTIAL IT WAS PRIVATE IN NATURE AND PURPOSE WAS TO RECEIVE "CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS" FOR

19-120-26  
23 Dec 65

PA

IN 21010 PAGE 2 of 2

MESSAGE TSIRIMOKOS. THUS WE RELUCTANT RELEASE FULL ACCOUNT AND  
THEREBY NEGATE WHAT APPEARS BE PROMISING CONTACT.

RID/MIS

2. HOWEVER AMSCROLL WILL RELEASE AN ACCOUNT 24 DEC SAYING  
AMSCROLL HAS PRESENTED ITS STUDY OF SHIPPING AND GALBE CASES TO  
GREEK DIPLOMATS WHO MEMBERS TSIRIMOKOS UN ENTOURAGE. WILL REPORT  
DIPLOMATS STATEMENT GREEK GOVT IS AWARE SHIPPING PROBLEM BUT BELIEVES  
THIS WILL DECLINE AND DISAPPEAR IN FUTURE. RE GALBE, WILL SAY  
DIPLOMATS ACKNOWLEDGED GALBE BEHAVIOR AND STATED THIS A MATTER BEING  
CAREFULLY EXAMINED BY GREEK GOVT. THIS RELEASE WILL BE SEPARATE FROM  
THAT DESCRIBED PARA 7 REF B AND WILL BE AIRMAILED ADDRESSES PROVIDED  
BY ATHE.

FEB 7 9 39 AM '66

3. FOR DIR AND MADE. RE PARA 6 REF B, RECHECK INDICATES  
ALABART WAS SPEAKING OF MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES LOPEZ BRAVO RATHER  
THAN COMMERCE MINISTER DEL BRAVO IN THIS CONTEXT.

S E C R E T

CFN: 8075 8031 7921 ECONOMIDES NOT RESULT NOT EXPLICITLY TSIRIMOKOS  
AMSCROLL 24 DEC GALBE GREEK A 7 B 6 B ALABART LOPEZ BRAVO DEL BRAVO

BT

NNNN

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

19-132 49/5

**SECRET**  
 PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

GROUP 1  
 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DOWNGRADING AND  
 DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP -	9	MO
2		6	
3	CR	7	D
4	FI	8	Y

FROM *JMWAVE*

ACTION  WH/C  RID COPY  ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE IR, WEF, EEG, CAZ, SA/PRIP, C/IC 2

**ACTION**  
 18 DEC 59 11 365

SECRET 101613Z  
 ATHE INFO MADR DIR CITE WAVE 7819  
 TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF A. ATHE 7960 (IN 10615)  
 B. WAVE 7793 (IN 10801)\*

*XO SC*

RE PARA 5 REF A AMSCROLL WILL WRITE LETTER SUGGESTED PARA 4  
 UPON RECEIPT CLIPS. <sup>R</sup> PARA 6: SEE REF B.

SECRET  
 CFN 7819 7960 7793 RE 5 A AMSCROLL 4 CLIPS RE 6 B  
 BT

**SECRET**

\* LETTER AIRMAILED 8 DEC

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 36

RETURN TO BRANCH FILE RID  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG: S. CHACONAS/nea  
UNIT: WH/C/CA/PP  
EXT: 5518/9138  
DATE: 17 DEC 65

INDEX  
 NO INDEX  
 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

6 S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	PP-	5	EL
2		6	TC
3	CA	7	C
4			

TO: JMWAVE MADRID ATHENS

FROM: DIRECTOR

19-120-56/3  
SIG GEN

CONF: WH/C INFO: VR FILE  RID COPY, EE, WE, CA, CALPROP, CILIC 2,

DO 4, DO 14.3

WAVE INFO MADR ATHE CITE DIR

66092

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: WAVE 7921 (IN 16238)\*

1. CONCUR PROP PROPOSAL PARAS 6 AND 7 REF. CONSIDER ALABART RESPONSE HIGHLY REVEALING AND UNDERScores PROPOSAL GIVE SPANISH/CUBAN TRADE THEME WIDEST AND CONTINUING PLAY L.A. PRESS AND RADIO AND ALSO EUROPEAN AREA. SUGGEST AMHIM CABLE SUMMARY AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE PER PARA 7 REF TO SEVERAL OF ITS MORE RESPONSIVE OUTLETS INCLUDING ATHE, IN ORDER ASSURE FULLEST COVERAGE.

2. FOR MADR: REQUEST STATION CABLE HQS WAVE ANY GOS REACTION RESULT PROP PLAY ABOVE ALSO ANY STATION SUGGESTIONS FOR AMSCROLL USE IN PREPARATION PRESS RELEASE AND PAPER TO BE FORWARDED DEL BARRIO

END OF MESSAGE

\* Concerns interview with Spanish Consul-General in N.Y.

*W. Brok*  
WILLIAM V. BROK  
C/WH

DC/WH/C/CA *A. Re...*  
WH/C/MO *F. ...*  
WE/C Les Raty (Phone)  
WE/5 Les Raty (Phone)  
EE/K Bob Stevens

*J. Hart*  
JOHN L. HART  
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 17-5  
COORDINATING OFFICERS  
S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-100000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 30

PAGE 1

R-REF TO FILE NO. 1

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

FROM H. Alvarado

ATHENS

26 <b>SECRET</b>	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		3	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

WH/c8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR, EEG, WEB, CAZ, CA/PROP, DO4, DOLH3,

**SECRET** 171551Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR MADR CITE ATHE 3031 (BACHMAN ACTING)

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: A. ATHE 3021 (N16297)

B. WAVE 7921 (N16238)

\* PLS ADVISE OUTCOME WAVE 7952.  
(IN 12973).

17 DEC 65 IN 17131

1. REF B DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER MARCOS ECONOMIDES DISCUSSED PARA 2 REF B SUBJECTS IN QUOTABLE, OFF-THE-CUFF, OR BXFICIAL STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MANNER.

AMX PS	WH/c8
ABSTRACT	

2. IF CONOMIDES DID NOT STIPULATE REF B DISCUSSION A "CONFIDENTIAL" ONE, THEN SUGGEST PARA 7 REF B AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE ALSO INCLUDE STATEMENT FROM "OFFICIAL GREEK GOVT (GOG) REPRESENTATIVE OF TSIRIMOKOS' UN ENTOURAGE INDICATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE AND LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO AMSCROLL PRESENTATION". ALSO, GOG OPPOSED TO GREEK SHIPPING TO CUBA.

3. WE HAVE CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY TSIRIMOKOS REACTION TO ABOVE. ALTHO TSIRIMOKOS MAY DENY PERSON IN HIS ENTOURAGE MADE STATEMENT IT UNLIKELY HE WILL DENY GOG DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE CONDUCT. FURTHERMORE, IN EVENT A DENIAL IS ACTUALLY ISSUED, THIS WOULD SERVE AS USEFUL PEG KEEP STORY ALIVE AND ALLOW FURTHER EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF GOG INACTION IN

**SECRET**

19-120-26

17 Dec 65

**SECRET**

IN 17131 Page 2

DECLARING GALBE AS PERSONA NON GRATA. 1955  
JAN 17 11 1 1956

4. NO INDEX.

**S E C R E T**

CFN 8031 8021 7921 B NOT INDICATE MARKOS ECONOMIDES 2 B  
ECONOMIDES NOT B A ONE 7 B AMSCROLL GOG TSIRIMOKOS' UN GALBE  
AMSCROLL GOG GREEK CUBA TSIRIMOKOS TSIRIMIKOS GOG GALBE A  
PEG GOG GALDE PERSONA NON GRATA NO INDEX

BT

**SECRET**

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2-1

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

*INMIA'S*

ACTION

*Dec 17/65*

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

*FILE IN ADDL class sheet 6, etc*

1	PP-	8	EF
2		8	RR
3	CA-FW	7	CCS
4	MO	8	E

**ACTION**  
17 DEC 65 IN 17112

SECRET 171819Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7938

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

R F WAVE 7892 (IN 14727) +

AMFRAME-1, VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTATION COMPLETED. ARRIVING  
TOKY ALITALIA 772 AT 2240 ON 19 DEC TOKYO TIME.

*AL: ESCAPED ALITALIA FLT 772, DEPART TIME  
CARA 19 TO ARRIVE TOKYO 2200/19 DEC.*

SECRET

VFN: 7938 7892 AMFRAME-1 VENEZUELAN ALITALIA 772 2240 19

BT

**SECRET**

4-00000

INITIALS W NO \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14-120-26

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ACTO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	KL
2		6	FD
3	CA	7	FI
4	EW	8	TS

FROM Amv

ACTION WAVE

ADVANCE COPY  RID COPY  TUBED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

INFO FILE VR EE 6, WE 2, CR 7, CR/PEG, CR/PROP, CR/4, CR/AS, CR/2, EE, EE/2, EE/3

204 Dec 13

SECRET 161828Z

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7921

16 DEC 65 16238

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF WAVE 7852 (IN 12973)

1. REF DELEGATION UNABLE SEE TSIRIMOKOS DUE PRESS UN BUSINESS. HOWEVER RECEIVED FOR HOUR AND HALF 12 DEC BY MARKOS ECONOMIDES WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS GREEK DIPLOMAT WHO AIDE TO AND TRAVELING WITH TSIRIMOKOS.
2. DELEGATION RAISED TWO SUBJECTS;
  - A. GALBE
  - B. GREEK SHIPPING TO CUBA
3. RE 2A ECONOMIDES INDICATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE AND LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO AMSCROLL ARGUMENTS. MADE NO PROMISES BUT SAID WOULD GIVE AMSCROLL PREPARED PRESENTATION OF CASE TO TSIRIMOKOS. (THIS INCLUDED LATEST AMSCROLL LETTER DESCRIBED WAVE 7793.) ECONOMIDES DID NOT INDICATE ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN TO P.N.G. GALBE.
4. RE 2B SAID HE AND GREEK GOVT WELL AWARE PROBLEM AND OPPOSED TO THIS SHIPPING. EXPLAINED CONTINUATION DUE GREEK SHIP OWNERS

SECRET

SECRET

WEALTHY AND POWERFUL. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR AND COMMENTED ON THOROUGHNESS OF AMSCROLL FILE THIS SUBJECT PREPARED FOR TSIRIMOKOS AND LEFT WITH ECONOMIDES.

5. IN CONCLUSION ECONOMIDES SAID HE MOST SYMPATHETIC WITH AIMS AMSCROLL AND ADDED THAT PREVIOUS LETTERS TO TSIRIMOKOS ON GALBE HAD BEEN HELPFUL. URGED THAT AMSCROLL KEEP HIM AND TSIRIMOKOS INFORMED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS PARA 2 SUBJECTS. WILL POUCH AMWORD-3 REPORT THIS MEETING WHEN PREPARED.

6. FOR MADR. WHILE IN NEW YORK AMSCROLL DELEGATION CALLED UPON SPANISH CONSUL-GENERAL MANUEL ALABART (WHO RELATED TO AMBLEAK-1) SEEKING ENTREE TO TSIRIMOKOS. CONVERSATION LED TO SHIPS BEING BUILT IN SPAIN FOR CUBA. POINT WAS MADE TO ALABART THIS ACTIVITY COULD BACKFIRE ON SPAIN PARTICULARLY IN VIEW RECENT INTERNATIONAL LONG-SHOREMEN ASSOC (ILA) RESOLUTION TO BOYCOTT FREE WORLD SHIPS THAT TRADE WITH CUBA. ALABART RESPONDED THIS SUBJECT OF GREAT INTEREST TO SPANISH MINISTER COMMERCE LOPEZ DEL BARRIO ESPECIALLY IF TRADE WITH CUBA WOULD REFLECT UNFAVORABLY UPON SPAIN'S ANNOUNCED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR BALANCE LATIN AMERICA. SAID DEL BARRIO HAD LEFT NEW YORK FOR MADRID TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY AND HAD DISCUSSED WITH ALABART PROBLEM OF CUBAN TRADE AS IT RELATES TO PLANS FOR REST

SECRET

14-00000

**SECRET**

OF CONTINENT. IN CONCLUSION ASKED FOR AMSCROLL STUDY THIS MATTER PLUS INFO ON SHIPPING BOYCOTT AND COPIES ILA RESOLUTIONS IN ORDER FORWARD THEM TO DEL BARRIO. IDEN C OF REF NOW GATHERING MATERIAL TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST.

7. WAVE SUGGESTS AMSCROLL PREPARE PRESS RELEASE ON STUDY OF SPAIN/CUBA TRADE AND ITS POTENTIALLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON SPANISH HOPES FOR REST OF LA. COULD ARRANGE PICKUP BY AMHIM AND POSSIBLY WIRE SERVICES FOR SUBSEQUENT REPLAY BY OTHER STATIONS. PURPOSE TO NEEDLE SPAIN TO DISCOURAGE ITS TRADE WITH CUBA. REQUEST DIR, MADR COMMENTS.

**S E C R E T**

CFN 7921 7852 TSIRIMOKOS 12 MARKOS ECONOMIDES GALBE 2A EMSCROLL NO PROMISES 7993 NOT INDICATE P N G 2B 2 AMWORD-3 MANUEL ALABART AMBLEAK-, ILA LOPEZ DEL BARRIO ILA C LA AMHIM

BT

**SECRET**

9-170-76

INDEX  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 38  
 N-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIR. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

1	PP-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FI	8	X

FROM ATHENS

ACTION WHICZ  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  USED

ADVANCE COPY UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WEE, EEG, Do4, Do/H3, CAZ, CA/prop, eilic2

**SECRET** 161500Z

WAVE MADR INFO DIR CITE ATHE 8018, (BACHMAN ACTING)

THUWIFORM

REF A. WAVE 7S19 (W12365)

B. ATHE 6219, 28 MAY 65

ACTION

1. ATHE AFTERNOON PAPER VRADYNI IN FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE 16 DEC 65 IN 16143

15 DEC HEADLINED AMSCROLL REF A REQUEST TO FOMMIN TSIRIMOKOS FOR DEPORTATION GALBE. PRINTED GIST AMSCROLL LETTER.

2. THUPRISE/12 (T/12) WILL NOW APPROACH TSIRIMOKOS UPON LATTER'S RETURN FROM U.S. AND CALL ATTENTION TO T/12'S 27 MAY INTSPPELLATION IN PARLIAMENT PER REF B. T/12 WILL ASK WHAT ACTION TSIRIMOKOS INTENDS TAKE. IF TSIRIMOKOS ANSWER UNSATISFACTORY. T/12 WILL ADVISE HIM OF INTENT RE-RAISE ISSUE FROM FLOOR PARLIAMENT. WILL KEEP ADDEES ADVISED OF T/12 PROGRESS.

3. AIRMAILING CLIPS AND TRANSLATION TO WAVE AND HQS.

4. NO INDEX.

**SECRET**

CFN

8018 7S19 6219 28 65 VRADYNI 15 DEC REF A TSIRIMOKOS GALBE  
 THUPRISE/12 (T/12) U S T/12'S 27 MAY T/12 T/12 T/12 HQS NO INDEX

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

19-120-36

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES  
 21  
 31  
**SECRET**  
 PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
1	PD
2	MD
3	CA
4	EW

FROM  
 M. WADE

ACTION  
 W. W. H. C. S.

ADVANCE COPY  
 RID COPY  
 ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO  
 FILE, UR, ADDP, C/FE8, C/WH6, C/PS, C/CI, C/PIZ, C/PI/D4, CDC

**S E C R E T** 142340Z

TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7892

15 DEC 1972

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

\* AMFRAME-1 DEPARTING FOR CARACAS 11 DEC.

REF WAVE 7843 (NOT SENT CAPA) (IN 12663)\*

1. AMFRAME-1 (IDEN) BOOKED ALITALIA FLIGHT 772 DEPARTING CARACAS 18 DEC TO ARRIVE TOKY 2200 ON 19 DEC. DELAY DUE JAPANESE EMBASSY REFUSAL ACCEPT PRESENT DOCUMENTATION THUS NECESSITATING HIS OBTAINING VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

2. AMFRAME-1 IS CHIEF ECONOMIC WARFARE SECTION AMSCROLL AND HAS COLLABORATED WITH STATION AND AMWASP-1 ON JAPAN/CUBA TRADE OPS. HE PREPARED DISCUSS WITH OSCAR OR OTHER C/O HOW AMSCROLL MIGHT BETTER SUPPORT EFFORT REDUCE THIS TRADE.

3. FOR DIR: WAVE WILL T.A. CHARGES THIS OP TO YOPOLL/41.

4. FOR CARA: AMFRAME-1 ENROUTE TOKY ON SENSITIVE OP. ORIGINATING TRIP CARACAS TO HIDE WAVE AREA ORIGIN. AS NOTED ABOVE IT NECESSARY FOR HIM OBTAIN VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTATION WHICH HE ARRANGING THROUGH FATHER AND UNCLE WHO VENEZUELAN CITIZENS AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

**SECRET**

**S E C R E T**

CFN

SECRET

11V 14727 Page 2 of 2

7892 7843 NOT SENT AMFRAME-1 ALITALIA 772 CARACAS 18 TOKY 2200 19  
JAPANESE AMFRAME-1 AMSCROLL AMWASP-1 JAPAN/CUBA OPS OSCAR C/O  
AMSCROLL T.A. OP YOPOLL/41 -1 OP VENEZUELAN

BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE      TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	OP	MO
2		ET
3	CA	TC
4	EW	CICS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: **JMWAVE**

ACTION: **DET/WH/C5**       RID COPY       ISSUED       SLOTTED       TUBED

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_      TIME: **12:00**

INFO: **FILE, VR, ADPP, C/FES, C/WH, C/PG, C/CI, C/FIL, C/FID4, CDC**

**SECRET 142340Z**  
 TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7893  
 RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON  
 REF WAVE 7892 (N)4727  
 IDEN: RAFAEL RIVAS VAZQUEZ

*GL*

14 Dec 65 14707

**SECRET**  
 CFN 7893 7892 RAFAEL RIVAS VAZQUEZ  
 BT

**SECRET**

N  
 NNN

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

X-REF TO FILE NO. 22 **SECRET** REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH  PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

FROM JANAVE

1	PP-	5	CA
2		0	C
3	NO	7	0
4	PI	0	X

ACTION WH/C8  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

ADVANCE COPY \_\_\_\_\_ UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO FILE VA EES WES GAZ GA/04 WH/C8 GZ/04/01, WH/C8

**SECRET 111831Z**

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7853

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: WAVE 7852 (IN/2973)

IDEN A. DR. MARIO SEIGLIE MONTORO, UR SECRETARY GENERAL.

IDEN B. DR. FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CAVADA, UR SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IDEN C. DR. JOSE R ALVAREZ DIAZ, RECOGNIZED ECONOMIST, FORMER CUBAN CABINET MINISTER (OF HACIENDA).

**SECRET**

CFN 7853 7852 A DR MARIO SEIGLIE MONTORO UR B DR FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CAVADA UR DR JOSE R ALVAREZ DIAZ HACIENDA

BT

NNN

**SECRET**

11 DEC 65 11 29 80

INDEX  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-126-35 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 48 *WH/C/PAPD*

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. *Destroy*  
 FROM *IMWAVE*

**SECRET** REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

ACTION *IMWAVE* ADVANCE COPY  UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  INDEXED

INFO *FILE, VB, FEB, WH, W, CAZ, CA/PROP, CIVIL, 204, 20/43*

SECRET 112005Z

11 Dec 65 11 2999

DIR INFO TOKY MADR CARA CITE WAVE 7859

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF: A. WAVE 7625 *(N07753)*  
 B. WAVE 7631 *(N05886)* (NOT SENT TOKY)

AN	WT
ABSTRACT	X

*WH/C/25*

1. HEADLINE STORY 11 DEC DIARIO LAS AMERICAS FEATURED FRONT PAGE WAVE-INSPIRED AFP ARTICLE STATING JAPAN AND SPAIN TO BE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF CONTINENT-WIDE BOYCOTT. ARTICLE REFERS TO BOYCOTT AGREEMENT BY PORTWORKERS OF US, CANADA AND PUERTO RICO AND TO EXPECTED INCREASE IN EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO ILA AND GLEASON SUPPORT.

2 IN ARTICLE, SPAIN CHARACTERIZED AS ONE OF MAJOR SUPPLIERS AND JAPAN AS PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF CUBAN FUNDS WHICH USED TO PROMOTE HEMISPHERIC SUBVERSION. FIGURES RE JAPAN/CUBAN TRADE PROVIDED BY UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR). ARTICLE ALSO PROMINENTLY MENTIONS COPREA AND FORDC.

3. AIRMAILING CLIPS TO ADDEES.

*19-126-35/3*

SECRET

CFN 7859 7625 7631 NOT SENT 11 DIARIO LAS AMERICAS AFP US CANADA

**SECRET**

*11 Dec 65*

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20 19-120-26

43 **SECRET** (GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
1	PP —
2	
3	CA
4	FI-TC
5	CFCS
6	MO
7	D
8	X

FROM \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION TOKYO oc/walk 5  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

ADVANCE COPY \_\_\_\_\_

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO: FILE VR: AMDP, C/EE8, C/CI, C/CI2, C/CI/04, C/CI

**S E C R E T** 100921Z

10 DEC 65 IN 11951

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5725

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: DIR 63721 ✓

- PLEASE HAVE AMFRAME ONE COME TOKY TO ARRIVE 15 DECEMBER. PLEASE ADVISE AIRLINE AND FLIGHT. ASK AIRLINE RESERVE ROOM TOKYO HILTON HOTEL. HE WILL BE CONTACTED AT AIRPORT BY PERSON USING NAME OSCAR.
- IF AIRPORT CONTACT ABORTS AMFRAME ONE SHOULD GO TO LOBBY OF TOKYO HILTON HOTEL AT 10 AM OR 10 PM WHERE HE WILL BE CONTACTED BY OSCAR.
- PLEASE CABLE DESCRIPTION AMFRAME ONE.
- ABOVE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS REPLACE  CONTACT CITED TOKY 5684.

**S E C R E T**

CFN: 5725 63721 15 OSCAR 10 AM 10 PM  5684 ✓

BT ✓ HAS CONCURRED USING AMFRAME-1 TO ASSIST IN  
DEFECTION OPS

**SECRET**

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37 7-127-26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	HO
2		6	C
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	PL	8	X

FROM: ATHENS

ACTION:  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT: CS/DO TIME: C157 BY: A

INFO: FILE VR, CS/DO, WE8, FE 6, CA2, CALPROP, DO4, DO/H3, CILIC2

SECRET 291459Z

PRIORITY DIR WAVE INFO MADR CITE ATHE 7970

TYPIC UNSPAWN TERNIFORM

REFS: A. WAVE 7102 (IN 88125)  
 B. WAVE 7103 (IN 10901) y  
 C. WAVE 7104 (IN 10615)

1. REFS B AND C CROSSED IN TRANSMISSION.

2. RE PARA 4 REF C, BELIEVE IT MAY BE HIGHLY

PROMPTABLE FROM FOYCH STANDPOINT TO HAVE WAVE SEND  
 DELEGATION FROM ANSCROLL OR OTHER SUITABLE KIBARK  
 GUIDED GROUP, POSSIBLY FROM NEW YORK, TO SEE DEPUTY  
 PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ILIAS TSIRIMOKOS  
 WHO NOW IS KEY FOR UN CYPRUS DEBATE. GROUP CAN USE PARA 3A  
 REF C ARGUMENT AND OTHERS AGAINST GALBE TO DEMAND GALBE'S  
 EXPULSION FROM GREECE, BREAKING CUBA-GREEK DIPLOMATIC  
 RELATIONS, ETC. ALTHO WE HIGHLY DOUBT TSIRIMOKOS WILL  
 ACCEPT THEIR DEMANDS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE HIS FEAR OF  
 ALIENATING UN COMEX VOTE ON CYPRUS ISSUES, WE CAN EXPLOIT  
 ISSUE THRU UNSPAWN ASSETS. ALSO, TSIRIMOKOS, KNOWN FOR

SECRET

**SECRET**

IN 11828 PAGE 2

HIS PERSONAL WIT AND SARCASTIC, MAY MAKE RELEASE <sup>FL</sup> 3 STATEMENT  
SIMILAR TO PARA 1 REF A. FYI: TSIRIMOKOS  
SCHEDULED DEPART US O/A 12 DEC. PLS ADVISE IF  
ACTION TAKEN.

3. NO INDEX.

**S E C R E T**

CFN 7970 7662 7793 7960 B C RE 4 C PSYCH AMSCROLL KUBARK NEW YORK  
ILIAS TSIRIMOKOS NY UN CYPRUS SA REF C GALBE GALBE'S GREECE  
CUBA-GREEK ETC TSIRIMOKOS UN COMMIE CYPRUS MHSPAWN TSIRIMOKOS  
IREF A FYI TSIRIMOKOS US O/A 12 DEC ADVISE NO INDEX

BT

~~SECRET~~

\* LETTERS

MENTIONS PARA 2 ATHE 7662 (IN 85125)<sup>NY</sup>

REMAILED 8 DEC.

**SECRET**

NNNN

V V RYBAT

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES **25 19-120 26**

N-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM **JMWAVE**

1	PP	5	FE
2		6	TC
3	CA	7	MO
4	EW	8	D

ACTION **DJWH/C/S**  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO **FILE 10, ADDP, C/FE 8, C/12, C/11/D4, CDC**

SECRET 102330Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO ROUTINE DIR CITE WAVE 7843

**N** NO NIGHT ACTION

RYHAI TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: TOKY 5725 (IN 11951)\*

1. AMFRAME-1 DEPARTING FOR CARACAS 11 DEC. BRIEFED PER REF. WILL CABLE ETA WHEN CONFIRMED.

2. PER PARA 3 REF AMFRAME-1 APPROX FIVE FEET EIGHT AND HEAVY SET. COMPLEXION FAIR. THOUGH FLUENT IN ENGLISH, ACCENT DISCERNABLE. AT AIRPORT WILL BE CARRYING UNDER ARM CURRENT ISSUE NEW YORKER OR READING SAME IF CONTACT ATTEMPTED IN HOTEL LOBBY.

SECRET

CFN 7843 5725 CAFACAS 11 DEC ETA 3 AMFRAME-1 ENGLISH NEW YORKER

BT \* REQUESTED AMFRAME/1 COME TOKY 15 DEC.

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  EXT. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASS. MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES. 31

120-26

48

SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TC-	8	RIC
2		8	CI
3	FI	7	CI
4	HO	8	CI

FROM

Tokyo

ACTION

WHC-8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

D

X

INFO

FILE, VR, FEB, WH 8, C/10A, C/10PS, C/10C 2, CAD, CA/04

SECRET 080909Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5634

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: WAVE 7755 (M 09426)

**ACTION**

8 Dec 65 10108

1. HOTEL RESERVATION WILL BE MADE FOR AMFRAME/1 AT

ROYAL HOTEL,  JAPAN. AMFRAME/1 WILL BE CONTACTED

AT HOTEL AFTER ARRIVAL BY PERSON USING NAME OSCAR.

2. ADVISE AMFRAME 1'S ETA OSAKA.

SECRET

CFN: 5634 7755 AMFRAME/1  OSCAR 1'S ETA

BT

SECRET

\* Requested contact instruction plus  
Hotel by return cable in order  
PASS AMFRAME-1 PRIOR departure to  
CARACAS.

NNNN

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES: 37 9-120-26

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH  **DI SECRET** REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: T. WAVE

1	TC	5	CA
2		0	PP
3	FI	7	EW
4	HO	8	RR

ACTION: WA/CB  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

INFO: FILE WR, FER, WAF, C/OA, C/OAS, C/OCS, CAZ  
CA/04

SECRET 080047Z

**SECRET**

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7755

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC ZRWAGON

080047Z 09926

REF: A. TOKY 5663

(IN 090901)

B. WAVE 7714

(IN 08803)

1. AMFRAME-1 IS AMSCROLL (IDEN) OFFICIAL IN CHARGE THEIR ECONOMIC WARFARE PROGRAM. MEETS REF A REQUIREMENTS.

2. SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY VISA AMFRAME-1 WILL BE PREPARED DEPART FOR JAPAN 13 DEC OR OTHER DATE AS DESIRED BY TOKY. IF ADDRES CONCUR PRESENT PLAN IS FOR AMFRAME-1 DEPART WAVE AREA FOR CARACAS 9 OR 10 DEC WHERE HE WILL OBTAIN JAPANESE VISA, TICKETS, AND DOCUMENTATION ATTESTING TO VENEZUELAN BUSINESS CONNECTIONS. WILL NOT DEPART CARACAS FOR TOKY UNTIL WAVE SO INSTRUCTS.

3. REQUEST CONTACT INSTRUCTION PLUS HOTEL BY RETURN CABLE IN ORDER PASS AMFRAME-1 PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR CARACAS.

SECRET & CONCUR AMFRAME-1 IS HE CAN LEGITIMATELY REPRESENT SELF AS VENEZUELAN ORG  
GNS: 7755 5663 7714 AMFRAME-1 AMSCROLL A AMFRAME-1 JAPAN 13 DEC

AMFRAME-1 CARACAS 9 10 DEC JAPANESE VENEZUELAN NOT DEPART AMFRAME-1

**SECRET**

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 37

19-12-76

N-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM

T. WAVE

ACTION

WAVE

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

PP

INFO

FILE IN FER, WNR, C/FA, C/OPS, C/IC2, CA2  
C/N/04

SECRET 030247Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7756

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: WAVE 7755

(1N09926)

IDEN: MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

SECRET

CFN: 7756 7755 MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA UR

BT

**ACTION**

8 DEC 65 11:09921

SECRET

Chavez SL  
att

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

R-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

19-120-26/3

**SECRET**

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ATHENS

ACTION

WAVE

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

INFO

FILE, WAVE, ETC, CIA, ... DOY, DOHIS,

8 DEC 65 11:10 615

**SECRET** 091530Z

WAVE INFO MADR DIR CITE ATHE 7960

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF WAVE 7226 (074157)

**SECRET**

1. 1 DEC GREEK DAILY VRADYMI IN FRONT PAGE ARTICLE ENTITLED "GREEK COMPANIES JOIN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REDS" PUBLISHES LETTER FROM "DR. RAF. RIVAS VAZQUEZ OF ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION MOVIMENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR)" (SIC). LETTER PRAISES AND THANKS UNIDENTIFIED GREEK FIRMS, SHIPPING COMPANIES, AND PEOPLE WHO TRADITIONALLY DEFEND DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-COMMIE CAUSES FOR PROVIDING VALUABLE INFO TO MUR ECONOMIC RESEARCH OFFICE." ALSO, "VERY FEW", SUCH AS ISAVLIRIS SHIPPING CO., DISHONOR GREEK FLAG AND PEOPLES RE ACTIVITIES TOWARDS CUBA.

2. 3 DEC COMMIE FRONT DAILY AVGI IN FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL "SPIES PRAISED IN PUBLIC" ANSWERS ABOVE VRADYMI ARTICLE. ACCUSES "COOPEATING"

**SECRET**

SECRET

12 10615 P11652

GREEK FIRMS OF SPYING AGAINST CUBA, CALLS MUP  
"INTEL SPY RING SERVING IMPERIALISTS PLANS  
AGAINST CUBA," CHASTIZES PIVAS FOR NOT NAMING  
GREEK FIRMS, ETC. SPYING AGAINST CUBA, AND STATES  
CIA'S CUBAN AGENTS DOING THEIR WORK. EDITORIAL  
ENDS AS FOLLOWS: "SPYING AGAINST THOSE WHO OPEN  
THEIR COUNTRY AND PORTS TO GREEK SHIPS IS COMPLETELY  
IN CONTRAST WITH MORALS OF GREEK MERCHANT MARINE  
AND OPPOSED TO GREEK NATIONAL TRADITIONS."

3. PARA 1 ABOVE PLAYED BY OUR UNILATERAL  
MHSPOW AGENT TRUNTFORM/15 WHO WILL ANSWER AVGI  
EDITORIAL IN FULL VEIN:

A. INTEL COMMIE ORGAN AVGI DEFENDS  
COMMIE CUBA ETC BECAUSE OF INTEL COMMUNISM'S  
DESIRE MAINTAIN MINORITY DICTATORSHIP (WITNESS  
RECENT EXODUS FROM CUBA). HOWEVER, AVGI HAS  
FAILED MISERABLY IN DEFENDING GREEK HONOR,  
TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACY ETC BY FAILING TO ASK FOR  
RECALL GALBE WHO VIOLATED MOST ELEMENTARY BASES  
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN DIGNITY, FREE SPEECH, ETC.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

IN 10615 PAGES

B. AVGI HAS CRITICIZED "IMPERIALISTS PLANS AGAINST CUBA" SINCE BEGINNING CASTRO REGIME, ESPECIALLY DURING ~~THE~~ PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TENURE IN OFFICE. YET, ON 21 NOV 65 AVGI PRAISED KENNEDY, STATED WARREN COMMISSION REPORT UNTRUE USING OBVIOUSLY FALSE PICTURES AND STATEMENTS, AND CLAIMED KENNEDY KILLED BY "UNDEMOCRATIC DARK FORCES." HOW CAN AVGI TAKE THIS STAND UNLESS IT IS ACTING ON ORDERS FROM MOSCOW OR POSSIBLY PEKING TO DISCREDIT U.S.?

4. HAVE NO OBJECTION REPLAY PARA 1 AND 2 ITEMS BUT SUGGEST WAVE, THROUGH AMSCROLL OR OTHER SUITABLE ASSETS, REPLY TO AVGI EDITORIAL VIA LETTER TO ENTIRE GREEK PRESS (PER EKAA 13086) USING PARA 3 ABOVE ARGUMENTS PLUS ANY OTHER DEROG INFO PERTAINING TO THIS THEME, PARTICULARLY USE OF CASTRO BY INTL COMMUNISM TO SPREAD GERM OF TOTALITARIAN COMMUNISM TO OTHER DEMOCRATIC LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ETC.

5. AIRMAILING ABOVE CLIPS WITH TRANSLATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

7110615 21664

PLS ADVISE WHETHER PARA 4 ACTION AGREEABLE TO ALL.

IF SO, REQUEST DIR FORWARD 21 NOV AVGI MATERIALS

TO WAVE AND MADR ASAP.

6. TOP WAVE: HAS REF ACTION OCCURRED?

7. NO INDEX.

SECRET WAVE PREPARING PAPER  
WILL FORWARD TO TSIKIMOKOS  
CFN 7507 7225 1 VRADYNI DR. RAF. RIVAS VAZQUEZ ANTI-CASTRO

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR) SIC MUR ISAVLIRIS RE CUBA

3 DEC AVGI VRADYNI MUR NOT NAMING ETC CIA'S 1 MHSPAWN THUNIFORM/15

AVGI AVGI ~~TOP~~ AVGI ETC GALBE ETC AVGI CASTRO KENNEDY'S 21 65

AVGI WARREN AVGI MOSCOW PEKING U.S. NO OBJECTION 1 2 AMSCROLL

AVGI EKKA 10386 3 LATIN AMERICAN 4 21 AVGI NO INDEX

BT

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CL \_\_\_\_\_ ED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3 *17-120-26*  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH  **53/53 SECRET**  
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_  
 FROM **TOKYO**  
 ACTION **WH/C 8**  RID COPY  ISSUED  SIGHTED  TUBED  
 INFO FILE **NR, FE 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/K2, FI, FI/D4, CDC, CAZ**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED			
1	TC-	5	RR
2		6	CI
3	FI	7	CA
4	170	8	C

**S E C R E T** 70654Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5663

REFS: A. TOKY 5639 (IN 07142)

B. WAVE 7714 (208803)\*

CONCERN AMFRAME ONE IF HE CUBAN AND CAN LEGITIMATELY REPRESENT  
 SELF AS OFFICIAL CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION. IF POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER  
 REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE. IF AMFRAME ONE MEETS THESE NEEDS SUGGEST  
 HE MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS DEPART FOR JAPAN 13 DEC. PLS  
 AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM US HOWEVER BEFORE DISPATCHING HIM.

**S E C R E T**

CFN: 5663 5639 7714 AMFRAME 13 DEC PLS

BT

NNNN

**SECRET**

**ACTION** 7 DEC 63 P. C. 90

\*stated A/I is  
 station agent  
 responsive to  
 Kibark directions.

TT/nea  
C/CA/PP  
18/9138  
7 DEC 65

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES: 26

INDEX  
 NO INDEX  
 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

**7 S-E-C-R-E-T**

DESTROY  RETURN TO BRANCH  FILE RID

ROUTING			
1	NP	5	CTCS
2		6	MO
3	CA	7	2
4	FE-TC	8	X

TO : JMWAVE TOKYO

8 Dec 65 17 49 g

FROM: DIRECTOR

19-120-26

CONF DC/WH/C 5 INFO: VR . FILE  RID COPY ADD P C/FE 9

SIG GEN

AVE TOKY

C/SI INFO C/FE 2 C/PDY CITE DIR cdc C/CA 2

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

63721

REF WAVE 7714 (IN 08803)\*

1. HQS CONCURS USE AMFRAME-1.
2. FOR TOKY;STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER USE ADDITIONAL CASE OFFICER WITH PERUMEN BACKGROUND SUCH AS HENRY P. REBHÖTZ.

END OF MESSAGE

\* WAVE proposes sending AMFRAME-1 to assist TOKY in defection ops of Cuban seamen.

*J. J. Gualandri*  
C/FE

*W. J. ...*  
C/WH/C/CA  
C/WH/C/MO  
FE/JKO/

*GC*

*William V. Broe*  
WILLIAM V. BROE  
C/WH

*John L. Hart*  
JOHN L. HART  
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

6-19

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Miami, December 7, 1965

F.E. Elias Tsirinkos  
Foreign Minister  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Athens, Greece

Excellency:

In the past, we have addressed several letters to Greek Government officials concerning the case of José Luis Galbe, the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Athens. We have informed the representatives of the Greek people of Galbe's notorious background as a gangster and Communist agitator, a background to which he lived up recently when he shot at a Greek bus driver at Thessopoli over a trivial traffic argument and, instead, shot his wife.

We are, and proudly so, relentless enemies of the régime that Galbe represents in Greece. However, when we regret the indignity wrought over the Greek nation by its Government's failure to expel him, we are not acting out of political passion. Surely, you will agree that when the head of a diplomatic mission publicly fires his gun on the citizens of the country where he is accredited, he is acting with utmost disrespect for the laws of that country and, hence, for the country as a whole. The least he deserves is to be declared 'persona non grata', and that only if the offended government is so benevolent as to overlook the fact that the insult is really coming from the régime that selects the criminally insane as its representatives abroad.

We, as Westerners of Mediterranean origin, have always felt somewhat akin to the Greek people, whom we also admire as the direct descendants of the ancient fathers of Civilization. Therefore, we were honestly saddened to see that the past government of your country placed the personal friendship of two gangsters — Galbe and Andreas Papandreu — above the age-old dignity of the Hellenic nation. And we are saddened even more when those actions are described in detail in the press.

On the other hand, our insistence on the subject, somewhat unorthodox as it may be from the protocol standpoint, is definitely inspired by the friendliest of sentiments, while Galbe's failure to observe the most elementary diplomatic rules has been evidenced in a most hostile — and dangerous — manner.

Therefore, we are confident that you will excuse us if we provide further evidence of the Castro régime's and Galbe's personal contempt for free nations such as Greece. Immediately following is a summary of the 'dossier' that we have compiled on José Luis Galbe:

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

H.E. Elias Tzirinkos  
Page 2  
December 7, 1965

He is a naturalised Cuban of Spanish origin. He left Spain because of the Spanish Civil War where he was organizer and Prosecutor of the Red Popular Tribunals.

He moved to Havana, Cuba in 1941 and worked on several newspapers and radio stations. He has always been outstanding for his violence and political scandals in favor of the Communists and lost several jobs due to his explosive, violent nature. He was named Professor of Penal Law in the University of Oriente in 1949, and became associated with a group known as "The Communist professors of the Santiago University".

The Castro brothers, Fidel and Raul, began the final phase of their revolt in 1957 from the Sierra Maestra mountains. During this time, and from his home in Santiago de Cuba, Galbe was in clandestine contact with the revolt. His home was an essential link in the communication channel with the low-lands. During this period Vilma Espin (Raul Castro's fanatically communist wife) and even Raul himself were secret visitors to Galbe's home. And what was Galbe's reward for all of this support? Immediately after Castro occupied Havana (January 1, 1959) Galbe was named Havana's Director of Prisons -- an old training ground for the future diplomats. Next, Galbe was named Agregado Cultural (Cultural Attaché) in the Cuban Embassy to Rome and from there to his present position in Athens.

Galbe is a known schizophrenic and there is a history of mental disorder in his family. His brother, Pascual, committed suicide. His mother, who died in Cuba in 1954, was insane. Her brother, a former Canon of the Cathedral de La Seo de Zaragoza, also was insane.

On the point that concerns Galbe's role in the organization and functioning of the Communist "Popular" Courts during the Spanish Civil War, it is interesting to note that his name is listed in the "Causa General" (General Cause), the Spanish Government's mass indictment of the most outstanding Red perpetrators of atrocities during the conflict. For the same reason, Galbe is among the few Spanish exiles who have been forever banned from his homeland by the authorities.

Yet, in a characteristic display of nerve, the Castro government last February issued a special diplomatic passport to Galbe so that this former undesirable Spanish citizen could enter the country that had banned him and attend a conference of Cuban Heads of Diplomatic Missions that met in Madrid.

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

F. E. Elias Tadrinos  
Page 3  
December 7, 1963

Another Castroite affront to a Western European nation in which Calbe was instrumental!

Lastly, we wish to call your attention on the fact that the more decent and stable of Cuba's diplomatic representatives have shown that they cannot stand Castro's rookery of diplomacy and international law.

As examples, we can cite the very recent defections of Messrs. Luis R. Alonso Román, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain; Gilberto Alemany Vilar, Economic Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Japan; Odón Alvarez de la Campa, Economic Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Spain; and Alberto Cabrera Infante, Economic Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Spain.

Individually and collectively, the decent peoples of the world are disassociating themselves from the infamy of Castroism. Just now, the cream of Cuba's own population — professional men, businessmen, intellectuals, etc. — is about to join the second part of the greatest mass exodus recorded by History since World War II.

Let us assume that the fact that a given régime is murderous and totalitarian were not reason enough for the nation with the oldest democratic tradition to break all ties with it. By any standard, Calbe's preposterous behaviour at Thermopylae is more than reason enough. And his continuing affronts to the Greek people give even more reason.

Confident that this time, our advice, which is the advice of reason and affection, will not go unheeded.

Sincerely yours,

  
Mario Scialoja  
Secretary General

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

23 19-120-26

REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

7 SECRET

GROUP 1  
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DECLASSIFICATION

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PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TC	5	CICS
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	EW
4	MO	8	D

FROM  
JAWAVE

ACTION  
5

ADVANCE COPY

RID COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TYPED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE PR ADDP 2/FE 8 C/C 4/FI 2 C/FID 4 CDC

SECRET 061R00Z

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7714

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF TOKY 5639

(1N07192)\*

**ACTION**

6 DEC 65 11 08 803

1. WAVE PROPOSES AMFRAME-1 FOR REF OP IN VIEW ABILITY, JUDGMENT, FLUENCY ENGLISH AND IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY. HE HAS PARTICIPATED IN PREPARATION LEAFLETS SENT TOKY. DUE IMPORTANT FAMILY CONNECTIONS IN CARACAS (FATHER AND UNCLE ARE SENIOR VENEZUELAN GOVT EMPLOYEES) IT POSSIBLE AMFRAME-1 COULD OBTAIN VENEZUELAN PASSPORT AND AS MINIMUM SHOULD BE ABLE EASILY OBTAIN

5075

~~SECRET~~

P-2  
IN 08103

JAPANESE VISA IN CARACAS THUS ON SURFACE ORIGINATING TRIP THERE,  
WOULD TRAVEL AS TOURIST/BUSINESSMAN. THIS WOULD ADD TO  
PLAUSIBILITY DENIAL REQUIREMENT DESCRIBED REF. IF ADDEES CONCUR WILL  
NEED NAME HOTEL IN TOKY PLUS CONTACT PLAN.

2. FOR TOKY: AMFRAME-1 (IDEN) IS STATION AGENT REPSONSIVE  
TO KUBARK DIRECTION.

SECRET

CFN 7714 5639 AMFRAME-1 OP CARACAS -1 JAPANESE -1 KUBARK

BT

~~SECRET~~

\* REQUESTED APPROPRIATE EXECUTIVE OF CUBAN EMISE  
ORIGIN READY FOR PROMPT DISPATCH TO JAPAN TO HANDLE  
CONTACTS WITH DEFECTORS FROM SHIP.

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

N-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

25-19-120 26

7 SECRET  
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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2		6	CA
3	FI	7	EW
4	MO	8	D

FROM  
JAWAVE

ACTION

*delivered*

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ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

X

INFO

FILE KR ADDP C/FE 8 C/FI 1 C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4 C/S

SECRET 061800Z

6 DEC 65 11:08781

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7715

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 7714

(1108803)

**ACTION**

IDEN: RAFAEL VIVAS-VAZQUEZ (201-278758)

SECRET

CFN 7715 7714 RAFAEL VIVAS-VAZQUEZ 201-278758

BT

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19-120-26  
 CLA FILE NO. 26/30  
 X-REF TO FILE NO. SECRET  
 FILE NO.  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY:  SIG.  
 FROM JMWAVE  
 ACTION  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED  
 INFO FILE VR, CAZ, CA/PROP, d/ps  
 REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED  

1	PP-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MD	7	D
4	FI	8	X

ALERT

SECRET 012209Z  
 DIR CITE WAVE 7627  
 TYPIC MHSPAWN AMWASP  
 REF: DIR 60778\*

1 Dec 65 11:05849

PREFER JOURNAL REQUEST INTERVIEW THROUGH AMSCROLL IN VIEW AMWASP-1  
 OVERT CONNECTION. LETTER SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO AMWASP-1 CARE OF  
 IDEN. AMWASP-1 AVAILABLE GO NEW YORK ANY TIME.

SECRET  
 CFN 7627 60778 AMSCROLL AMWASP-1 -1 -1 NEW YORK

SECRET

\* STATE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE HAS NO REPRESENTATIVE  
 WAVE NEED AMWASP/1 MUST TRAVEL NEW YORK

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFIED FILE NO.

R-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

26 *2* SECRET

GROUP 1  
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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM  
JMWAVE

1	PP-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	NO	7	D
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INFO

FILE VR, CAZ, CALPROP, C198

**ACTION**

1 Dec 65 11.05843

SECRET 012209Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7628

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMWASP

REF: WAVE 7627 (IN 05849)

IDEN: C/O DR. MARIO SIEGLIE MONTORO, SECRETARY GENERAL,  
 UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA  
 10 SE 9 ST  
 MIAMI, FLORIDA

SECRET

OPN 7628 7627 C/O DR. MARIO SIEGLIE MONTORO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

10 SE 9 ST MIAMI FLORIDA

BT

**SECRET**

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FROM \_\_\_\_\_

*WAVE*

*WAVE*

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SECRET 262125Z

DIR INFO TOKY  CITE WAVE 25 05

TYPIC MHVIPER ZRWAGON

PEPS: A. DIR 60144

B. TOKY 5502 (IN 99160)

C. DIR 37871

**ACTION**

26 NOV 65 02688

1. PER REF A WAVE DECIDED AMSCROLL MOST LOGICAL ORG. IT NOW PREPARING 200 SMALL MIMEOGRAPHED FOLDED HANDOUT UNDER ITS NAME (BUT NOT ADDRESS). FRONT SAYS "MESSAGE TO OUR COMPATRIOTS ABOARD IGLESIAS." INSIDE TWO PAGES SAY "YOUR SHIP WHEN REPAIRED WILL SAIL FOR FRIGID AND inhospitable WATERS OF NORTH KOREA FOR MILITARY CARGO TO CARRY TO NORTH VIETNAM. THESE ARE DANGEROUS AND UNFRIENDLY WATERS AND NO MAN'S SAFETY CAN BE GUARANTEED HERE (WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF YOUR SHIP RAN A GROUND IN NORTH KOREA? OR HIT A MINE IN NORTH VIETNAM?) WHAT TO DO? FOLLOW PATH YOUR COUNTRYMEN. LEAVE WHILE YOU HAVE CHANCE. HOW TO DO THIS?".

~~BACK PAGE FOLLOWS LINE PARA~~ 2 A REF B AND ENDS "IN THIS WAY YOU WILL AVOID CERTAIN AND UNNECESSARY DANGER".

2. WILL CABLE WHEN HANDOUTS POUCHED. LETTERS (IN ENGLISH) REQUESTED PARA 2 B, REF B WILL BE READY FOR MAILING WEEK 29 NOV. WILL NOT MAIL UNTIL ADVISED BY TOKY TO DO SO. HOWEVER, WILL POUCH

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

*Page 2 of 2*  
*W 02688*

<sup>CO</sup>  
COPIES WHEN IN FINAL FORM.

**S E C R E T**

CFN: 7506 50144 5502 5797: A AMSCROLL ORG 200 NOT ADDRESS

IGLESIAS NORTH KOREA NORTH VIETNAM NO MAN'S A 2 A B ENGLISH

2 B B 29 NOV NOT MAIL TOKY

ET

**SECRET**

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 FROM Ryder Belmont  
JMWAVE  
 PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED Amscroll  
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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

16 Nov 65 14 95100

SECRET 152323Z

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7263 (INGHURST ACTING)

MHV<sup>1</sup>PER AMSCROLL

REF: TOKY 5400 <sup>(N)</sup> (93257) \*

AMWASP-1 NOW WORKING WITH AMSCROLL TO PREPARE REF MATERIAL WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED ON AMSCROLL LETTERHEAD TO REACH TOKY BY 15 DEC. ANY ADDITIONAL INFO HQS MAY HAVE SHOULD BE POUCHED FOR INCLUSION THIS PAPER.

SECRET \* RE: MATERIAL ON JAP.-CUBA TRADE

CFN 7263 INGHURST-5400 AMWASP-1 AMSCROLL 15 DEC

BT

SECRET

# DI PATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**S E C R E T**

PROCESSING

TO

Chief, WH

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

TYPIC/MHSPAWN/Operational  
O Luiz GOMEZ Wanguemert Commentary

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : FYI

REF: DIR-53981, 28 October 65

As Headquarters is aware, JMWAVE is refuting on a continuing basis and via all appropriate assets commentaries similar to that discussed in the reference. As for this particular GOMEZ broadcast the Station prepared a guidance for AMSCROLL use, primarily its radio, the point of which was that GOMEZ had become eligible for the "Foot 'n Mouth Club" due his admission on 21 October that Camarioca was a plebiscite and his statement on 22 October, no doubt as a result of a prod from his Communist superiors that "I think I made excessive concessions ..." explaining that the people are really leaving due to economic reasons. We agree and say that the economic reasons are to obtain three meals a day, to be able to walk into a market and buy eggs and milk. The guidance ends with this: "You may take your foot out of your mouth now, GOMEZ".

*Roy E. Linnell*  
for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:  
3 - WH/C

CS COPY

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downgrading and  
declassification

DATE TYPED

10 Nov 65

DATE DISPATCHED

NOV 15 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-23825

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

◆ 19-132-49/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

**S E C R E T**

19-120-26 *Abstract*

INDEX:  YES  NO  
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19-130-76

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FROM JMWAVE

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INFO FILE, VA, ADDP, C/EE3, C/WE3, C/CAR, C/CI, C/RS3, C/FIR

SECRET 032029Z

**ACTION** 3 Nov 65 11 36558

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 732A  
 RYDAR TYPIC MHEPANN THUNIFORM  
 REF A WAVE 6792 (NOT SENT MADR)  
 3 ATHE 7529 (NOT SENT MADR)

(79235)\*  
 (76639)

1. RE PARA 2 REF A AMBLEAK-1 HAS DEVELOPED FOLLOWING INFO FROM IDENTITY A WHO RADIO SCRIPT WRITER FOR AMSCROLL AND WHO FORMERLY WORKED IN SPAIN ON SAME PAPER AS GALBE: GALBE BORN ZARAGOZA, SPAIN OF PROMINENT AND WEALTHY PARENTS. MOTHER WAS INSANE AT TIME OF HER DEATH IN 1954 IN CUBA. HER BROTHER WHO AT ONE TIME CANONIGO (CANON) OF THE CATHEDRAL DE LA SEO DE ZARAGOZA ALSO INSANE AT TIME MOTHER'S DEATH. GALBE IS KNOWN TO HAVE INHERITED INSANITY TRAITS FROM MATERNAL SIDE AND IS SCHIZOPHRENIC.

2. GALBE EDUCATED AS LAWYER. DURING SPANISH CIVIL WAR HE ACTIVE IN CREATING "POPULAR COURTS" AND WAS PROSECUTOR (FISCAL DE LOS TRIBUNALES POPULARES) OF THOSE OPPOSED TO SPANISH REPUBLIC. BECAME FAMOUS DUE FEROCITY OF ATTACKS AGAINST DEFENDANTS. DUE THIS AND HIS COMMIE ACTIVITIES AT THAT TIME NOW LISTED IN THE CAUSA GENERAL REPEAT CAUSA GENERAL AND THEREFORE NOT PERMITTED RETURN TO SPAIN.

SECRET

IN 863-0

3. AFTER CIVIL WAR GALBE WENT FRANCE AND MARRIED FRENCHWOMAN. BOTH MOVED MADRID WHERE SHE PROSPERED OWNING A BEAUTY SHOP. HE LIVED OFF FAMILY WEALTH AND HELD JOBS ON A NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS. NEVER STAYED LONG ANY ONE JOB DUE EXPLOSIVE NATURE AND ACTUALLY FIRED FROM INFORMACION REPEAT INFORMACION. IN EARLY FORTIES TURNED TO RADIO WORK AND IN 1944 FIRED FROM RADIO STATION OF CUBAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DUE VIOLENT ATTACK POPE PIUS XII. CIRCA 1952 GALBE OBTAINED JOB AS PROFESSOR OF PENAL LAW AT UNIVERSITY OF ORIENTE (IN SANTIAGO) WHERE HE ASSOCIATED WITH LEFTISTS. BEGAN INDOCTRINATING STUDENTS IN COMMUNISM. AMONG ATTENDEES WAS VILMA ESPIN (RAUL ROA'S WIFE). GALBE'S SANTIAGO HOME WAS RELAY CENTER FOR MESSAGES TO AND FROM FIDEL CASTRO THEN FIGHTING IN THE SIERRA MAESTRA.

4. IN JAN 59 NAMED PRISON DIRECTOR AND THEREAFTER CULTURAL ATTACHE TO ROME.

5. IDENTITY B, A CUBAN NATIONAL WHO KNEW GALBE DURING CUZA PERIOD CONFIRMED PARA 2 STATEMENTS AND TOLD AMBLEAK-1 THAT GALBE PARTICIPATED IN FAKE TRIALS OF ANTICOMMUNISTS AND AS PROSECUTOR ALWAYS DEMANDED DEATH PENALTY. IDENTITY B IS AN INFORMANT OF AM-

SECRET

IN 8655 13-3

ELI... AND IS BROTHER OF SUBJ OF 201-352552 (FOR ADDITIONAL INFO SEE UFGA 21862 OF 23 MAY 63).

6. STATION CANNOT JUDGE ACCURACY ABOVE REPORTS ON GALBE BACKGROUND. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CONFIRMATION OR ADDITIONAL INFO HQS AND MADR CAN PROVIDE. IF REPORTS ESSENTIALLY TRUE, COULD BE USED IN LETTERS TO GALBE THREATENING EXPOSURE OR SENT BY AMSCROLL TO GALBE AND PUBLICIZED PER PARA 2 REF B. PLS ADVISE.

7. INDEX GALBE.

SECRET

CFM 7022 6792 7529 2 A AMBLEAK-1 A AMSCROLL SPAIN GALBE ZARAGOZA SPAIN 1954 CUBA CANONIGO (CANON) CATHEDRAL DE LA SEO DE ZARAGOZA SCHIZOPHRENIC SPANISH FISCAL DE LOS TRIBUNALES POPULARES CAUSA GENERAL NOT PERMITTED FRA CE HAVANA INFORMACION 1944 PIUS XII 1930 ORIENTE SANTIAGO VILMA ESPIN SAUL ROA'S FIDEL CASTRO SIERRA MAESTRA JAN 59 ROME B 2 AMBLEAK-1 B AMBLEAK-1'S 201-352552 UFGA 21862 23 MAY 63 2 B

BT

X AMSCROLL SHMLD WRITE LETTER.

SECRET

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# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
S E C R E T

## PROCESSING

TO	Chief, WH	DDI POSTED	ACTN	APPROX. NO. COPIES
INFO.		XX	WARNED FOR INDEXING	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

SUBJECT  
C AMSCROLL/Publication on Cuban Sugar Problems

### ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: FYI**

1. We forward under separate cover subject publication which was recently sent to AMSCROLL mail recipients interested in economic material. In producing this study a particular effort was made to keep it objective and factual on the theory that in the case of sugar the facts speak for themselves and need only to be pulled together. We also believe that objective material similar to the attached should over a period of time enhance the reputation of the AMSCROLL economic section as a serious and objective outfit that seeks to discredit the Castro regime by publicizing the truth.

2. The Station would appreciate Headquarters' reaction to this publication. Additional copies are available should distribution via KMFORGET or other means be desired.

3. It may be of interest to report that a copy of the attached report has been mailed to Identity, currently in Geneva where he is representing his company at the sugar conference. This was done directly under the AMSCROLL economic section letterhead and via AMWORD-1's brother, an employee in the research department of Identity's company.

*Rosa E. Marchbanks*  
for Philip G. ELMARD

19-120-26 *Post*

### Attachments:

- 1. Publication, USC (orig)
- 2. Identity, USC

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

### Distribution:

3- WH/C, w/att., USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
8 Oct 65	OCT 12 1965
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-23469	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-132-49/4	

*2 atts*

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

Separate Cover Attachment #2; UFGA 23469

IDENTITY: ARTURO MANAS,



CS COPY

S/c. att #2

UFGA 23469

19-120-26

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

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CONTINUED

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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: MHVIPER/Exploitation Cuban Trade Practices

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED:** For use as Headquarters determines

**REFERENCES:**

- A. WAVE-5942.
- B. DIR-45158

1. We forward by separate cover the article described in the references. It is the first item in the AMSCROLL economic report which can and should be attributed to AMSCROLL research. It may be of interest to record that the first paragraph of this item was developed from O/27839-65 of 17 September as authorized by reference B. The second paragraph was developed from a lead obtained from O/27842-65 of 22 September which sent us to two publications by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith. The last sentence of paragraph 3 was developed from information in the Wall Street Journal of 22 and 28 September.

2. The Station of course will be interested in any replay generated by Headquarters via AMPATRIN-1 or other asset.

*Philip G. Elward*  
for Philip G. ELMARD

MICROFILMED  
OCT 20 1965  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:  
AMSCROLL Economic Intel Report, USC (att'd)

*19-120-26*

Distribution:  
3-WH/C, w/att., USC

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declassification

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DATE TYPED 7 Oct	DATE DISPATCHED OCT 12 1965
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HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-132-49/3	

*lat*



# economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:  
10 S.E. 9 St.

MAILING ADDRESS  
Box 3940  
Miami, Florida

PHONE:  
373-8033

3P

VOL. I No. 4

1.- Cuba continues desperate attempts sell sugar.- The Cuban sugar monopoly, CUBA-ZUCAR, on September 6 concluded a sale of 5,000 tons of raw sugar for October 1965 delivery to the Iranian sugar organization. The origin of this sugar was hidden in that it was declared to have originated in the Caribbean, including Peru, excluding Brazil. Market reports were correct in stating that the country of origin was in fact Cuba. The price agreed to was 18 pounds sterling per ton (C and F) less 5 shillings per ton to cover the expenses of the tender. This deal was engineered by Westzucker of Dortmund, an organization also selling Cuban sugar to Jordan and which wishes to keep its name out of these sales.

Another interesting development in Cuba's sugar selling activities during the month of September was quoting sugar for future delivery at or under the London spot price on the day the offer was made. In other words, Cuba is offering sugar under the world market value.

Example of this were:

MICROFILMED  
OCT 20 1965  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Country	Date of Sale	Amount	Selling Price Per Ton (in Sterling)	Market Price	Delivery
Iraq/Ceylon	Sept 9	10,000	16	22.50	Nov '65
Jordan	Sept 11	3,000	15-15-0	22.95	Nov
Scandinavia	Sept 7	10,000	18-2-0	24	Jan '66
Scandinavia	Sept 13	2,500	18	21.10	Oct
Sweden	Sept 9	10,000	16-16-0	22.50	Dec
Switzerland	Sept 9	10,000	18-10-0	24	Jan '66
United Kingdom	--	10,000	18-15-0	21.55	Sept

It is difficult to explain this curious behavior in terms other than Cuba's desperate need for foreign exchange. These sales at these prices can only result in a net loss to Cuba due to Cuba's inefficient sugar production. This loss will be compounded should the present upward trend of world sugar futures continue (the New York price for world sugar on Caribbean port basis has gone from \$1.60 on September 1 to \$2.10 on September 27).

2.- Free World Shipping drops 51%.- Twenty Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the past month of August. The trend continues downward; the August 1963 total was 24, and the one for August 1964 was 11, which means a decrease of 51%, when August 1965 (20 vessels) is compared to August 1964. Great Britain led the "maritime fifth columnists" with 11 vessels, followed by Lebanon, Greece, France, and Italy with 2 vessels each, and Cyprus with one.

Already 852 vessels are being kept out of the Red Cuba trade by its owners or operators. The most recent example is "Rederiaktiebolaget Saly" of Mariehamn, Finland,

S/C 0001  
UFGA 23449

CS CC.Y

19-130-26

which firm withdrew 11,691-ton tanker, VALNY, and the other vessels it owns and/or operates.

3.- "Tsaviris" privateers exposed.- TSAVLIRIS shipping firm, operating out of London and Piraeus, under the names of "Tsaviris Shipping", "Tsaviris Hellas Maritime", "Pancristo Shipping", "Waterloo Shipping", and "Trafalgar Shipping" is very active in business with the Castro-Communist regime.

From a total of 17 vessels, TSAVLIRIS has been using 12 in the Red Cuba trade. The 12 vessels are: FREE ENTERPRISE, FREE MERCHANT, NEW FOREST, NEW GATE, NEW GROVE, - NEW GLADE, NEW HEATH, NEW HILL, NEW LANE, NEW MEADOW, MUSWELL HILL, CLAIRE, FREE - TRADER, and FREE NAVIGATOR. TSAVLIRIS operates its vessels under British, Lebanese or Haitian flags, this last action being illegal according to a July 6, 1965 Haitian law. The FREE NAVIGATOR has changed its name seven times. The NEW HEATH has delivered two shipments of Cuban sugar to Japan, which have not been accepted by Japanese refineries, because stain and rust from vessel's hold has spoiled cargo. In mid-August the Lebanese 7,260 ton SAN SPYRIDON had arrived in the United Kingdom with 1,600 tons of Cuban sugar spoiled by sea water.

TSAVLIRIS' vessels have made 50 trips to Red Cuba during the last two years.

4.- Cuban Management Boycott Committee receives support.- Reports reaching this bureau indicate that the Cuban Management Boycott Committee has already received several letters support from Free World Chambers of Commerce. Details are expected to be known shortly.

5.- Free World dockworkers' boycott to receive boost.- The announcement of a Continental Dockworkers Congress to be held in Venezuela during the first two weeks of October confirm last month's report that an increase in boycott activities against vessels flying the flags of countries still trading with Communist Cuba.

6.- Japanese Trade Mission gets "chilly" reception in Latin America due to Red Cuba deals.- A Japanese Trade Mission, headed by Mr. Kazuo Kitagawa, President of "Sumitomo Electrical Industries" came under fire while touring Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Peru. Latin Americans brought up matter that Japan was indirectly financing subversion by providing Castro with an average of \$1 million dollars a month for the last 4 years. Japanese were told to choose between the Red Cuban market and the Latin American market.

Some examples follow: article by L. Rojas Ospina in "Excelsior", Mexico, Sep. 4, - 1965; in Brazil, a speech by Congressman Flaviano Riberiro dated Sep. 4, 1965, and an article by Gustavo Corcao published in "Diario da Noticias", Rio de Janeiro, Sep. 2, 1965 issue, made the headlines. In Lima, Peru, a speech by Congressman Ricardo Temoche made the local Japanese embassy respond with a vague statement of justification. In Chile, an editorial of "El Mercurio" stressed this point to Japanese visitors.

7.- Cuban exiles block Castro's attempt to sell "treasure".- Cuban exile Committee for the Recovery of the Artistic and Cultural Heritage of their country was able to block Castro's attempt to sell art works and raise \$2 million dollars. Cuban exiles

inspected 104 cases containing art treasures during August 23, 24, and 25, in Milan, Italy, identifying 45 pieces as their own.

Although 103 cases were only worth US\$16,000, the contents of case #107 were said to be worth US\$600,000. The first 103 cases delivered to Castro's "partner" Mahmood Mowlazadeh, contained religious and funeral pieces, but case #107, forwarded from Switzerland, contained solid gold and silver objects.

Italian Customs have impounded Castro's "treasure".

8.- Castro's missions abroad "shaky" while rumors plague Island.- After the "defections" of Luis Ricardo Alonso - Ambassador to England -, Gilberto R. Alemany - Trade Councillor in Japan-, and several members of the Cuban "Music Hall" playing in Paris, the regime recalled its Ambassador to Prague, Armando Flores Ibarra, and the following members of the Cuban Embassy in London: Maria Fernandez, Osmani Martinez Vazquez, Moises Dias, Mario Garcia, and Armando Lobeto.

Meanwhile, different rumors plagued Cuba (many of them stemming from official statements): attempts on Castro's life, internal dissention resulting from the "ultimatum" given to militiamen to return weapons; new boatloads of Cuban refugees arriving to Floridian shores; and Security Police Chief Valdes' statements zeroing-in against "terrorism, sabotage, and resistance".

Econ. Int. Rep. recommends: "A Depression in Russia?" published by US NEWS & WORLD REPORT in its September 13, 1965 issue. "Red Buying Snarled by Red Tape" by Miami Herald-Los Angeles Time Wire, published in "THE MIAMI HERALD", September 17, 1965, p.18-A.

Sources: The above information has been obtained from reliable sources, both from Cuba and the Free World. For further details related to the above items please address your correspondence to:

Economic Research Bureau  
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA  
10 S.E. 9th Street  
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

Miami, October 1st., 1965.-

# DISPATCH

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TO Chief, WH

INFO. Chief of Station, Caracas

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE *EL*

SUBJECT  
o AMSCROLL/European Shipping Organization

#### ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED:** Request comment

We attach herewith a reproduction of an article from the Caracas newspaper El Universal of 10 September describing the organization of a committee of European shippers to fight the discrimination these shippers fancy they suffer in Latin America. We are curious why such a group should be organized and to what purpose. Could this, for example, be a reaction to the efforts to boycott ships that trade with Cuba? The Station will appreciate Headquarters' comment if it appears that this group may become important and if it is or will be concerned with attempts to influence shipping to Cuba.

*Robert E. Marchbanks*  
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:  
Newspaper article, USC *(att 1)*

Distribution:  
3- WH/C, w/att., USC  
2- COS, Caracas, w/att., USC  
2- C/WH, w/o/att.

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*1 att*

7 Oct 65

### Armadores Europeos Constituyen Comité Contra Discriminaciones que les Hacen en Latinoamérica

LONDRES, septiembre 3 (AFP). Los representantes de los armadores marítimos de las compañías europeas han formado un Comité de acción contra la discriminación racialista practicada cada vez más suelta en el terreno de los transportes marítimos.

El Comité está compuesto por representantes de las compañías marítimas cuyos servicios regulares sirven la América del Sur. Se trata de compañías domiciliadas en Bélgica, Francia, Alemania, Grecia, Italia, Países Bajos, Noruega, Suecia y Reino Unido.

El comunicado agrega que "los ritmos del Reino Unido precisó en un comunicado que este Comité, cuya sede se encuentra en Londres, tendrá por objeto facilitar las consultas entre los armadores europeos y coordinar su acción a este respecto. El comité pondrá a disposición de los servicios consultivos a disposición de los países interesados".

EL UNIVERSAL Sep 10/65

*Shipbuilders*

5/c att #1  
UFGA 23448

CS COPY

19-120-28

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Andrew C. McLellan  
Inter-American Representative  
AFL-CIO  
Washington, D.C.

FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
Secretary for Economic and  
Professional Affairs,  
Unidad Revolucionaria,  
Miami, Fla., U.F.A.

REF.: CONSIDERATIONS OF THE JAPAN-  
CUBA TRADE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES  
THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. \*

I.- INTRODUCTION.

The Japanese People, its businessmen, and its government have been able to --  
make Japan occupy a leading place among the industrial countries of the Free World.  
In 1964, Japan was the leader in Free World shipbuilding, contributing 40% of the  
tonnage; in the electronic field, Japan came in second; in steel production and --  
chemicals, Japan was able to occupy third place; and in automobile production, Ja-  
pan was fourth, with 1.7 million vehicles produced.

The free-loving and democratic-oriented Cuban People are sympathetic with this  
effort the Japanese People are making; an effort which is well known and admired --  
throughout the whole world. At the same time, the free-loving and democratic-ori-  
ented Cuban People -the ones within Cuba, and the ones living in exile- are aston-  
ished to watch Japan very much involved in trade relations with Communist Cuba, al-  
though Japan is aware that by so doing it is directly aiding a tyranny, and at the  
same time, providing this regime with the necessary funds to subvert its neighbors  
throughout Latin America.

It should be pointed out that Japan, based on its concern for human rights --  
could very well consider that its present trade relations with Communist Cuba are  
completely negative, but this is not the only reason. Japan must be aware, that --  
its trade relations with Communist Cuba will eventually, in a very near future, --  
jeopardize Japan's trade relations with Latin America, and this is already begin-  
ning to happen.

II.- JAPAN-COMMUNIST CUBA TRADE RELATIONS.

A.- Trade Balance.

Japan has always had a deficit in its trade balance with Cuba, i.e., not  
only in its present trade relations, but also during its trade prior to the estab-  
lishment of the Castro-Communist regime.

B.- Japan provides Castro of hard currency.

It is estimated that Japan provides Castro with 30% of its hard currency, due to the previously mentioned fact of a deficit in its trade balance with Cuba. The hard currency has averaged during the last four years the amount of US\$1 million a month, in the following manner (estimates):

1962:	US\$ 14 million
1963:	12 million
1964:	8 million
1965:	14 million

Total: US\$ 48 million.

The hard currency is used by Castro for two things:

- 1.- Finance subversive activities throughout Latin America.
- 2.- Pay short term credits in European markets, thus remaining in business with countries other than Japan.

C.- Japan is leading buyer of Cuban sugar.-

Japan, together with Spain and Morocco, is one of the three leading Free World buyers of Cuban sugar, although Japan is the country that has become Castro's main source of foreign exchange.

1.- Cuban sugar purchased.

1959:	397,047 Ton.	
1960:	210,272	
1961:	325,539	2,699 Ton. (refined)
1962:	522,727	15,148 " "
1963:	163,662	
1964:	328,609	
1965:	300,000 (estimate)	

2.- Japanese firms involved:

The leading buyers of Cuban sugar are:

Iwai & Co., Ltd.  
Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd.  
Kanematsu & Co., Ltd.  
Meiji Trading Co., Ltd.  
Okura Trading Co., Ltd.  
Nozaki & Co., Ltd.  
Sumitomo  
Nishimen Co., Ltd.

D.- Other trade operations.

Besides the said sugar purchases, Japan is very active in its trade relations with Communist Cuba; trade relations that totaled US\$ 87 million for 1964, - which represented an increase of 240% over 1963.

Just to mention a few examples, the names of some of the other Japanese firms actively involved in trade operations with Communist Cuba follow:

Mitsui: through its "dummy", the Toho Bussan Kaisha.  
C. Itoh: through its "dummy" the Kyodo Trading Co., Ltd.  
Oki Electric: until recently through Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha's "dummy", the Moira Trading.  
Toyo Rayon  
Hitachi  
Yawata Iron  
Toyo Monka Kaisha: through the "dummy" Abe Trading Co., Ltd.

III.- JAPAN-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS.-

A.- Japan's economic and trade interests in Latin America.

1.- Japan has 77% of its foreign investment placed in Latin America.

2.- Proof of Japan's increasing interest in Latin America has been the visit of two Japanese Trade Missions to this Hemisphere in less than one year (March and September 1965).

3.- Japan has a deficit in its trade balance with Latin America, and although the trade volume with Latin America amounted to US\$ 433.4 million for the period January-July 1964, Japan lost US\$ 174.8 million for mentioned period due to the deficit in its trade balance:

Jan-Jul. 1964: Japan exports: US\$ 179.3 million  
Jan-Jul. 1964: Japan imports: US\$ 354.1 million  
Jan-Jul. 1964: Deficit for Japan in its trade balance: US\$ 174.8 million

4.- Breaking down Japan's trade balance with each Latin American country the results are the following:

a.- Favorable trade balances: 8

Bolivia  
Brazil  
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Dominican Republic  
Honduras  
Panama  
Venezuela

b.- Unfavorable trade balances: 11

Argentina  
Chile  
Ecuador  
El Salvador  
Guatemala  
Haiti  
Mexico  
Nicaragua  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Uruguay

5.- The economic analyst has to conclude that the deficit in its overall trade balance plus the importance of Latin America with regards to Japan's foreign investment will make Japan increase its interest in this Hemisphere.

B.- Consequences of the Japan-Communist Cuba trade throughout Latin America.

The consequences of the Japan-Communist Cuba trade are beginning to be felt throughout Latin America, due to maintained "agit-prop" and subversive activities by the Castro regime, financed, partially, with foreign exchange resulting from its trade with Japan.

A highly illustrative example is the case of Venezuela.

1.- Venezuela: Trade Relations with Japan and Communist attacks.

a.- Japan was able to obtain US\$ 133.5 million for the period 1958-1963 from its favorable trade balance with Venezuela. The favorable result in the trade balance for the Jan-Jul 1964 period totaled US\$ 12.4 million.

Recently, C. ITOH and HITACHI closed important agreements with the Venezuelan Phone Co., and C. ITOH was able to get an important contract with "Corporation Venezolana de Petróleo".

b.- On the other hand, Venezuela is considered by all experts as a prime target of Communism. The important arms cache discovered in Paraguará towards the end of 1963, prompt the Venezuelan government to accuse the Castro-Communist regime during the IX Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Americas, on July 26, 1964. Since this incident, numerous subversive activities have caused great losses to both the People and the government of Venezuela, and to foreign firms as well.

Less than a month ago, another important arms cache was discovered in Los Teques, Miranda State; and once more the hand of Castro-Communism was traced and found.

c.- Then, when the situation is fully analyzed, it is a fact that -- Venezuelan hard currency goes to Japan, and from there it goes to Castro, in order

to aid terrorism against the Venezuelan People, the democratic government, its businessmen, and even Japanese interests in that country. Isn't this a complete illogic operation?

2.- The Organization of American States (OAS).

On July 26, 1964, the OAS, during the IX Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Americas, held in Washington, D.C., condemned the Castro-Communist regime and requested from its member-countries, and from all free world countries outside the Hemisphere, to cease diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.

3.- The Inter-American Workers Organization (ORIT).

During its VI Continental Congress, held in Mexico City, on February 6, 1965, recommended the maritime boycott which was already in progress under the leadership of the Venezuelan dockworkers.

Recently, after 17 vessels have suffered the boycott, a statement, made by international labor leaders during the IV Congress of Venezuelan Dockworkers, held in Caracas from October 9 to October 13, 1965, reaffirmed the boycott. Japanese vessels have been boycotted due to this defensive measure of the workers of this Hemisphere.

4.- The Management Boycott.

The Chamber of Commerce of the Americas, during its XV Annual Convention held in Miami, Fla., U.S.A., adopted a resolution on June 16, 1965, along the same lines of the OAS and ORIT recommendations. Since then, a Management Boycott Committee has been formed, and already about three dozens of Latin American Chambers of commerce support this campaign.

5.- Public Opinion.

The Japanese Trade Mission that toured Latin America left behind the following reaction:

a.- Mexico: Article "América Latina, Japón y Castro" by doctor Leopoldo Rojas Ospina, published by "Excelsior" on September 4, 1965.

b.- Brazil: Article "Japan Helps Fidel Castro" by Gustavo Corcao, published by "Diario de Noticias", on September 2, 1965.

Article "Japan and Latin America" by Mircea Buescu, published by "Diario de Noticias", on September 9, 1965.

c.- Peru: Congressman Ricardo Temeche Benitez pointed out Japan's attitude, due to its trade relations with Communist Cuba during a speech made in Congress on September 1st., 1965. Congressman Temeche's statements received ample coverage in the local press and were object of an "Agence France Presse" wire.

d.- Chile: The leading "El Mercurio" newspaper devoted one of its editorial articles during September 1965 to point out the same thing.

c.- Colombia: Mr. José R. Mercado, President of the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) delivered a memorandum to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador to Colombia, dated October 29, 1965 on the same subject.

An increase of this reaction may be expected.

IV.- CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.-

A.- Conclusions:

- 1.- Japan is presently aiding Castro-Communism.
- 2.- Japan is highly dependent of Latin America in order to achieve further economic prosperity.
- 3.- The Japan-Communist Cuba trade and the Japan-Latin America trade are in contradiction.
- 4.- Japan may suffer considerable losses in its Latin American markets if trade relations with Communist Cuba continue.

B.- Suggestions:

- 1.- The benefits derived from Cuban sugar purchases are no longer available to Japan, because, due to the drop of prices in the World Sugar Market, Castro cannot continue to give firms privileges that resulted of high prices, with enough margin to maneuver and still receive benefits. After prices hitting a post-World War II low, Castro has no margin for those operations.
- 2.- Japan could very well substitute its purchases of Cuban sugar by increasing its purchases to Taiwan and Australia, and even better, to Latin American countries like Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Peru, as it used to do previous to the concentration of dealings with Castro-Communism. Purchasing more sugar from democratic Latin American would improve Japan's image and at the same time it would eliminate its present trade dangers due to its dealings with Cuba.

Miami, Fla., U.S.A., November 10, 1965.

\* Copy of Memorandum sent to all Japanese Ambassadors to Latin America attending November-meeting in Tokyo.-

MESSAGE FORM

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*to FP*

1. NO OBJECTION PLANS OUTLINED PARA 2A REF..
2. AS BACKGROUND, RNLEPTOME (R) IN DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS CORREA SINCE R UNABLE BROADEN U.S. BOYCOTT ON SHOPS IN CUBAN TRADE DUE CAVEATS IMPOSED ON AFL-CIO BY ODACID. ADDITIONALLY, LACK OF FUNDING FROM AFL-CIO AND CONFLICT OF SCHEDULE WILL PRECLUDE R ATTENDANCE AT REF CONVENTION.

END OF MESSAGE

*UR 19-120-26*

WH/C Comment: \*Request approval send AMSCROLL and AMICE reps to boycott convention.

DC/WH/C/CA *[Signature]*

WH/C/MO *[Signature]*

WH/S *[Signature]*

*[Signature]*  
WILLIAM V. BROE  
C/WHD

*[Signature]*  
JOHN L. HART  
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

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INFO	Chief, WH Chief, EE	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING		
FROM	Chief of Station, JWAVE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
SUBJECT	ANSCROLL/Press Release and Jose Luis Galbe				
			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
			ABSTRACT		
			MEMORANDUM		

**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

**ACTION REQUIRED:** For Athens to determine

**REFERENCE:** WAVE-5789 (15 September 1965)

1. We attach under separate cover a copy of the press release on Jose Luis Galbe that the reference indicated would be forthcoming. Also attached is a list of the newspapers and other organizations and individuals that were mailed a copy of the release. The so-called "Black List Firms" are those Greek firms that according to ANSCROLL have had or do have commercial contacts with Cuba. The letters that were mailed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Home Minister were, of course, originals and these two gentlemen were not provided with a copy of the press release itself.

2. WAVE is anxious to keep the Galbe pot boiling and we welcome any further suggestions to this end.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

**Attachments:**  
1. Press Release  
2. List

**Distribution:**  
3 - COS/Athens, w/atts, USC  
2 - C/EE, w/atts, USC  
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# press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:  
105 E. 9 St.  
MAILING ADDRESS:  
Box 1740  
Miami, Florida  
PHONE:  
373-8033

## U.R. LETTER TO GREEK GOVERNMENT URGES GALBE OUSTER

Cases of real diplomats Alemany and Alonso cited as contrast to preposterous behaviour of the gangster Galbe.-

Here is text of letter sent to the Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministers of Greece:

Excellency:

"You may recall that, in mid-May this year, the Communist Cuban -- Charge d'Affaires in Athens, Jose Luis Galbe, was the object of world attention after he shot a Greek bus driver over a trivial traffic argument near the town of Thermopylae. Newspapers throughout the world carried the story and it would not be exaggerated to label the incident as an international scandal -- one which may be said to have damaged Hellenic dignity to the same extent to which the Castro regime ignores it by accrediting gangsters such as Galbe as its diplomatic representatives -- before the Greek people."

"On that occasion, we wrote the Greek government calling their attention to the need to save the honor of Greece by severing all ties -- diplomatic and commercial -- with the Red government of Cuba. At that time, we warned that the gangster Galbe was typical of the new promotion of Red Cuban "diplomats" -- mostly undesirable Communists trained to perform tasks of espionage and agitation -- and substantiated our assertion with a quote from Odon Alvarez de la Campa, a defecting Cuban diplomat who had charged Galbe by name during a press conference in Madrid."

"Today, two new defections from the Cuban Foreign Service prompt us to re-open the Galbe case. We refer to those of Messrs. Gilberto R. Alemany Vilar, until recently, Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, and Luis Ricardo Alonso Fernandez, until recently, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain."

"Both former diplomats had always been regarded as competent, serious men even by us, the relentless opposers of the Castro-Communist tyranny. Before he took office as Cuban Ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1963, Luis R. Alonso Fernandez had also performed ambassadorial duties in Peru and Norway. A scholarly, well-mannered man, he is well remembered by all who knew him in his diplomatic office, even if they may have disapproved of the totalitarian regime that he represented. Eventually, he became disenchanted with Communism and publicly resigned his post in London only a few days ago. (In connection with Mr. Alonso's resignation, the Greek newspaper "Vradyni", in its September 6 issue, wonders precisely why Red Cuban Ambassador Galbe has not been ousted yet)."

"Gilberto R. Alemany, an equally able and well-bred trade specialist, held his Counselor's position for three years in Tokyo. His recognition of the true nature of the Red Cuban government led him to defect secretly and become our own secret agent in Japan. Late last month, after fulfilling his dangerous mission, he made his feelings public in Miami."

"As you can see, those decent people, who are still active in Castro's diplomatic corps cannot stand it for a long time. These new defections show that the few that remain are abandoning the sinking ship to the "new wave" of Castroite diplomats -- gangsters, spies and agitators in Galbe's fashion."

"But there is more: shortly after his defection, in an interview with a leading Miami newspaper, Mr. Alemany made statements that confirm our assertions to this respect. The following are quotes from this interview:

"The Fidel Castro government chooses unemployed, uneducated young men to be trained and assigned to Cuban embassies abroad as spies. The

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young spies are given a two-year course at a special Ministry of the Interior school to get them ready. The Minister of the Interior goes so far as to favor young boys from low social levels to work as agents in embassies. He dresses them up, teaches them a few things, gives them a gun and sends them overseas. The system is diabolic, but it works. -- These boys, whom they have made into powerful men, are proving to be the most fanatical agents. They never defect". "The two-year course on spying, Alemany said, includes a "little of everything, even elementary English. The graduates are assigned to Cuban embassies as untitled attaches"."

"Mr. Alemany has further told us, his workmates in UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, that he has knowledge of the Galbe case, and that he knows the Cuban Charge in Athens to be just the type of person of which he speaks in his interview --a definitely undesirable sort by any standard. He adds that, while in Japan, Galbe's preposterous behaviour was widely commented within Tokyo diplomatic circles. The unanimous impression was one of shock and concern, and it was expected that the Greek Government would react promptly and energetically."


"We all know, Cubans and Greeks alike, that Galbe is no credit to the Cuban people and is an insult to the Greek nation. Thus, we write with the thought that the facts forwarded in this letter will further unmask Galbe and show what he really is".

Sincerely,

Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro  
Secretary General

Miami, September 16, 1965

Ref: 195



# press release

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New York City, N.Y.

Chamber of Deputies  
House of Parliament  
Athens, Greece.

H.E. Ambassador of Greece  
Greek Embassy  
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United Nations Bldg.,  
New York City, N.Y.

Chamber of Deputies  
House of Parliament  
Athens, Greece.

H.E. Ambassador of Greece  
Greek Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

YES  NO  
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 REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELETYPE  RET. TO BRANCH   
 SYMBOL  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASS: SECRET MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES: 18

26 **SECRET**

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED  
*Falk (Dms) 2011*

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3	CA	7	Ew
4	RR-RE	8	C

FROM: 30 WAVE

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UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ BY: D  
 FILE NO. WMLC 8

FILE NO. 21, FILINT 2, FILD4

**SECRET**

SECRET 212122Z  
 DIR CITE WAVE 5042  
 TYPIC ZPPERUSAL

21 SEP 65 IN 56628

REF: 0/27839-65, 17 SEP

WISH USE VIA AMSCROLL ELEMENTS OF REF REPORT ON CUPAN SWAR  
 ACTIVITIES. AS PERS WOULD USE END OF PARA 7 DESCRIBING CLOSING OF  
 SALE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN SPECULATION COMBINED WITH PARENTHETICAL  
 INFORMATION ON PARA 2 RE IRANIAN 11 SEP TENDAR. WOULD THEN EXPOSE  
 WESTZUCKER (SEE PARA 6) AS CO-BETWEEN THIS DEAL. WOULD NOT USE  
 SPECIFICS OF OFFERS AND COUNTER-OFFERS IN ORDER PROTECT SOURCE.  
 PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFB 5042 0/27839-65 17 SEP AMSCROLL CUPAN 7 3 IRANIAN 11 SEP  
 WESTZUCKER 6 CO-BETWEEN NOT USE COUNTER-OFFERS

**SECRET**

BT

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

PROCESSING

PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO C/FE; COS, Tokyo; COS, Mexico; COS, Caracas

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMWASP/AMSCROLL/Operational  
o AMSCROLL Report of AMWASP-1 Defection

MICROFILMED  
SEP 23 1965  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: WAVE 5450, 31 August 1965

1. Subject report prepared by AMSCROLL presents a roundup of preparatory activities and subsequent publicity of the AMWASP-1 defection as sponsored by the AMSCROLL organization. Due to the number of HISPAN assets which interplayed in the particular operation, the report is attached under separate cover No. 1 in true names and identities without reference to the HISPAN assets involved.

2. Under separate cover attachment No. 2 contains samples of written propoganda and an AMSCROLL mailing list.

3. Also forwarded under separate cover, attachment No. 3, are the Spanish and English tapes of the AMWASP/1 statement.

*Philip G. Elnard*  
PHILIP G. ELNARD

**Attachments:**

- 1. Report, u/sc *att*
- 2. Prop and Mailing List, u/sc *att*
- 3. Tapes, u/sc *att*

**Distribution:**

- 3 - WH/C, w/attachs
- 2 - WH, w/No. 1 attach *see Dist. WH/1 w/att #1*
- 2 - C/FE, w/No. 1 attach *see Dist. C/FE/1 w/att #1*
- 2 - COS, Tokyo, w/No. 1 attach
- 2 - COS, Mexico, w/No. 1 attach
- 2 - COS, Caracas, w/No. 1 attach


*To OUT pouch*

CS COPY

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO <i>B-201-333974</i>	DATE TYPED 10 Sept 65	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER SEP 17 1965
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <i>LFGX-54</i> UFGA-23,072	
CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3	



3P

Separate Cover Attachment to  
No. 1 to --- UFGA-23072  
UFGA-00054

S E C R E T

Unidad Revolucionaria Memorandum

The following steps have been taken in the defection and subsequent publicity of Gilberto Alemany, Trade Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, Japan:

1. A press conference was held on August 27th at 7 p.m. in the Biscayne Room of the McAllister Hotel, which was attended by most of the members of the Miami area press, (approximately 50 persons in total) in response to Unidad Revolucionaria (UR) invitation. Mr. Alemany read a statement prepared by him and by members of the UR, which was also mimeographed and distributed both in English and Spanish to the persons present at the Conference. Photos of the event were taken, to be later published in the UR publications. A recording of the proceedings was made.

2. Coverage by the press included the following items:

a. A front-page article by Mary Louise Wilkinson in the Miami News of August 28th. (Both editions).

b. An article by Don Bohning in the Miami Herald of August 28th.

c. A front-page story in the "Diario de las Americas" of August 29th by Benjamin de la Vega.

d. An editorial in the Miami News of August 30th.

e. An article by Humberto Medrano in the "Diario de la Americas" of September 1st.

f. A story in the "El Universal" of Caracas, Venezuela, of September 1st.

g. TV stations Channel 4 and Channel 7 broadcast filmed stories of the press conference on August 27th and 28th.

h. Radio stations WRUL and Radio Americas taped interviews with Mr. Alemany on August 31st.

i. Radio program "La Voz de Cuba" also taped an interview on August 31st.

j. A.I.P. interviewed Mr. Alemany (Jose M. Illan) on September 1st for a cover story in that publication.

k. The "Voice of America" taped an interview on September 2nd (Manolo de la Torre).

l. Mr. Al Burt, Latin editor of the "Miami Herald", interviewed Mr. Alemany on September 2nd for a subsequent story.

s/c att. 1 UFGA-00054

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19-120-26

S E C R E T

m. Radio Tropical of Caracas, Venezuela also broadcast the story on September 1st.

3. Mr. Alemany's defection statement was sent to the following addresses:

a. On August 28 and 31, to the attached list of Japanese newspapers in Tokyo. (

b. On August 31st, to 110 Japanese firms on the UR blacklist.

c. On September 1st, to the UR economic mailing list in the United States and Canada, which includes sugar brokers, business concerns, economic publications such as "Journal of Commerce", etc.

d. On September 2nd, the Spanish version was sent to 148 addresses in Spain, which includes Spanish firms, newspapers and government offices.

e. To 100 Latin American newspapers and Japanese embassies, including the Japanese embassy in Washington.

f. To 150 shipping firms in the United States and Canada.

g. To economic publications throughout Europe.

h. To the members of the Japanese Trade Mission which toured Latin America during March, with personal letters from Dr. Cavada.

i. The UR is currently completing the mailings to the other addresses on its blacklist in other countries.

4. The UR has prepared a summary of Alemany's original statement which is being sent to the addresses not yet covered.  
(Copy attached)

5. Dr. Rivas-Vasquez of the UR propaganda section contacted Mr. Martin Correa, Secretary General of the Venezuelan Dockworkers for further steps in that area. Rivas-Vasquez also spoke to Mr. Salvador Romani, of the Movimiento Anti-Comunista Femenino de Venezuela, and Mr. Carlos Andres Perez, former Venezuelan Cabinet member and future presidential candidate. Mr. Martin Correa also requested, and was granted, a private interview with Mr. Alemany on Saturday, August 28, which was also attended by Dr. Selgie, president of the UR.

6. Additional follow-up action is listed below:

a. Mr. Enrique Lindner, the UR delegate in Washington, D.C., was instructed to try to get Mr. Alemany's statement into a leading national magazine or publication, for which he was sent copies plus photostats of the confidential documents brought by Mr. Alemany during his press conference. Mr. Lindner was hopeful of arranging insertion of the statement in the magazine "U.S. News and World Report."

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

b. The NBC television program, "The Today Show", was approached and offered an interview with Mr. Alemany through Mr. Paul Cuningham, associate producer of that program.

c. Mr. Alemany has drawn up a plan which includes the writing of personal letters by him to a number of directors of Japanese firms with which he dealt in Tokyo.

d. Mr. Jose Alvarez Diaz, a trade specialist and Cuban economics professor at the University of Miami is preparing an analysis of Mr. Alemany's defection statement, which he will try to have published in a leading economic publication.

e. An attempt is being made to arrange for a television panel show on one of the local stations.

S E C R E T

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 45

*Thin Titles 1881*

42? **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

JMWAVE

ACTION

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PAGED

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TIME

BY 2

INFO

FILE VE, WH8 CA2, CA/PROP, CA/04, DO4, DO/H3, FE8, CI, C/08, FI, FILINT, CA/REG

SECRET 11.1006

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 5655

11 SEP 65 IN 50224 EW

TYPIC MHSPAWN MHVIPER

MARTIN CORREA, VEN AD DEPUTY, PRES OF PORTWORKERS FEDERATION OF VEN, MEMBER CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT COMMITTEE, AND CLOSE COLLABORATOR AMICE AND AMSCROLL, NOW ORGANIZING CONTINENTAL CONVENTION OF PORTWORKERS TO BE HELD CAPACAS 8-10 OCT 65. IN ADDITION REGULAR CONVENTION AGENDA WHICH INCLUDES ELECTION OF NEW EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL FEDERATION AND REVISION FEDERATION STATUTES, MAIN PROGRAM OF CONVENTION AIMED AT OBTAINING UNIFIED INTERNATIONAL ACTION RE CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT. DURING CORREA VISIT 18-31 AUG TO JMWAVE AREA, CORREA DISCUSSED CONVENTION PLANS WITH AMICE AMSCROLL AS FOLLOWS:

A. CONVENTION AND ITS AGENDA APPROVED AND SUPPORTED BY AND LABOR SECTION OF AD.

B. WILL INVITE INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND CONVOKE ROUND-TABLE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF COMINT COMMISSION AGAINST COMMUNIST TYRANNY OF CUBA FOR PURPOSE CLARIFY AND APPLY COORDINATED CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT ACTIONS.

**SECRET**

WRAPLY

577

*[Handwritten signature]*

U.R.  
AMSCROLL  
19-20-26

~~SECRET~~ IN 50224 PAGE 2

C. COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CONVENTION WILL TOTAL APPROX \$12,000, IN ORDER DEFRAY ROUND-TRIP TRAVEL AND LODGING EXPENSES 25-30 INTERNATIONAL DELEGATES, RADIO/TV COVERAGE, AND COSTS OF SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, ETC.

2. CORREA PLANS ATTEMPT RAISE PORTION NECESSARY FUNDS FOR CONVENTION FROM LOCAL VEN SOURCES SUCH AS CTV, AD, AND SPECIAL LOTTERY AND FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN AMONG VEN/CUBAN EXILE PUBLIC. SIMILARLY, AMICE AND AMSCROLL HAVE BEEN ASKED ATTEMPT RAISE PARTIAL FUNDS BY PUBLIC FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN IN JMWAVE EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. ACCORDING AMICE, CORREA HAS OBTAINED RNBEING'S AND RNLEPTOME'S APPROVAL RE PARA 1 ABOVE PLANS. WHILE NO COMMITMENTS OF CLOSE COLLABORATION OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FORTHCOMING FROM EITHER, RNLEPTOME WILLING PARTICIPATE IN CONVENTION AND PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 OCT.

4. IN VIEW NEED INTRODUCE MORE COORDINATED HEMISPHERE EFFORTS AND COMMON VITALITY IN BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN, ABOVE MEETING WOULD APPEAR ABLE SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE STIMULATE MHVIPER PROGRAM. IT ALSO MAY BE POSSIBLE GAIN ADDITIONAL MHSPAWN MILEAGE DUE ITS TIMELINESS AND TIE-IN RECENT AMWASP-1 DEFECTION AND CURRENT HEMISPHERE TOUR JAPANESE TRADE DELEGATION. STATION FEELS CONCENTRATION OF CUBAN

~~SECRET~~

*See [unclear]*

~~SECRET~~

MI 50004 1102 3

EXILE SUPPORT AT MEETING MAY DETRACT ITS OVERALL IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS, THUS PREFERABLE STIMULATE MORE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM AMONG THOSE ORGS WITHIN CUBAN BOYCOTT/IPHOODCAP FRAMEWORK. STATION WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE HQS VIEWS AND POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL PLANS RE ABOVE MEETING IN ORDER PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT THROUGH LOCAL ASSETS.

SECRET

CFN 5655 MARTIN CORREA VEN AD AMICE AMSCROLL 8-10 OCT 69 18-31

CIV AD ORIT 112.000 25-30 IV CIV AD RMBEING'S RMLEPTOME'S I

7 OCT AMWASP-1 IPHOODCAP

BT

~~SECRET~~

Question use of AMWASP in the op.

G

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES: 28

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E.I. Harrison/sp  
WH/C/CA/PP  
6678  
18 Aug 65

INDEX  
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**SECRET**

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SIG-GEN

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INFO

CITE DIR

36520

TYPIC MHVIPER MHSPANN

REF: WAVE 5061 (IN 34271) \*

HQS HAS NO OBJECTION ANSCROLL PLAY REF "FREE NAVIGATOR" STORY. HOWEVER, KUCLAM REPORT 16 AUGUST STATES SHIP LEFT FOR ROTTERDAM 11 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

\* Requested approval ANSCROLL play of "Free Navigator" story.

DC/WH/C/CA DRi

C/WH/C/MO Chen

*Allores*  
WILLIAM V. BROE  
CAWH

*Scroll 19-120-26*  
*4/24*  
JOHN T. FLYNN  
ADCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

18-8

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

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downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.



UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

MEMORANDUM 1076

TO: Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro  
FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vasquez

REF.: News Coverage of Press  
Release on Soviet "Fishing"  
Base.

Press Coverage on U.R.'s press release regarding Soviet  
"Fishing" Base follows:

July 20, 1965:

Norman Diaz  
W.M.E.T.

Manolo Reyes  
W.T.V.J. Channel 4

Wayne Farris  
W.C.K.T. Channel 7

Tony Solar  
"Noticias en Espanol"  
Miami News p. 9-A

JULY 21, 1965:

Radio-Hora  
W.M.E.T.

JULY 22, 1965:

Diario Las Americas  
"Micronoticias" p. 16

JULY 24, 1965:

Agencia de Informaciones Periodisticas  
(A.I.P.) No. 324

UR

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MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA


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"Novedades" (will forward date)  
Mexico, D.F.,  
Mexico

Vida del Litoral (will forward date)  
"El Universal"  
Caracas, Venezuela



Miami, July 22, 1965



# press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM  
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:  
10 S. E. 9 St.  
MAILING ADDRESS  
Box 3940  
Miami, Florida  
PHONE:  
373 - 8033

## U.R. REPORTS

### SOVIET "FISHING" BASE IN HAVANA

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) has learned from its underground sources in Cuba the following information:

The Russians are constructing docks, warehouses, freezers, dry docks, buildings with communication equipment and other necessary installations for the operation of a fishing fleet in the east coast of the port of Havana, according to the Cuban-Soviet agreement of September, 1962.

These constructions are directed and supervised by Soviet technicians with the collaboration of Cuban "slave work". The Soviet Union furnishes all the necessary equipment and machinery, in addition to the above mentioned supervision and technical assistance; Cuba offers the labor as well as the basic construction materials.

It was stipulated that the Soviet Union and Cuba would share in equal parts this fishing terminal which original cost was \$12 million "pesos" but now it has come up to \$30 millions and is expected to be finished by the beginning of 1966.

However, it has been learned that due to the large sum owed by the Castro-Communist regime to the Soviet Union, the Russians have decided that these facilities will be for their exclusive use once they are concluded.

All the fish caught will be taken to this terminal, processed and exported to the Soviet Union and Europe in Russian vessels, without any profit for Cuba, nor the Cuban fishing vessels will be allowed to use said installations.

This area of the east coast of the port of Havana will be closed as soon as installations are finished and only Soviet personnel will have access to that zone.

This absolute control of the Soviets in the same port of Havana has led many to think that said installations will not only serve for operating Soviet trawlers - which activities in espionage, infiltration of subversive and terrorist agents are well known - but that it might hide military constructions, submarine pens, and other installations - that could threaten the security of the Hemisphere.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

Miami, July 19, 1965  
Ref: 190



# boletín informativo

UN SERVICIO DE PRENSA DEL  
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFICINAS:  
10 S.E. 9 St.

DIRECCION POSTAL:  
Box 3940  
Miami, Florida

TELEFONO:  
373 - 8033

## U.R. Informa:

### BASE "PESQUERA" SOVIETICA EN LA HABANA

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) ha podido conocer a través de sus fuentes clandestinas en Cuba los siguientes informes:

Los rusos están construyendo muelles, diques secos, naves refrigeradas, plantas de comunicaciones y demás instalaciones necesarias para las operaciones de una flota pesquera en la costa este del puerto de La Habana, conforme a lo estipulado en el acuerdo Soviético-Cubano de Septiembre de 1962.

Estas construcciones se llevan a cabo bajo la dirección y supervisión de técnicos soviéticos, con la colaboración de "trabajo esclavo" cubano. La Unión Soviética facilita todos los equipos y maquinarias, además de la mencionada supervisión y asistencia técnicas, y Cuba pone la arena, piedras y materiales básicos de construcción, aparte de la mano de obra.

Se había estipulado que la Unión Soviética y Cuba usufructuasen a partes iguales esta terminal pesquera de vastas proporciones, cuyo costo original era de \$12 millones de "pesos", pero que ya asciende a \$30 millones y que se espera estará terminada para principios de 1966.

Sin embargo, se ha podido conocer que debido a la cuantiosa suma que el régimen Castro-Comunista adeuda a la Unión Soviética, los rusos han determinado que estas instalaciones serán para su uso exclusivo una vez terminadas.

Toda la pesca será llevada a esta terminal, procesada y exportada para la Unión Soviética y Europa en mercantes rusos, sin que se derive provecho alguno para Cuba y sin que los pesqueros cubanos puedan hacer uso de dichas instalaciones.

Esta área en la costa este del puerto de La Habana será cerrada en cuanto se terminen las instalaciones y sólo el personal soviético tendrá acceso a esta zona.

Este control absoluto soviético en el propio puerto de La Habana ha hecho pensar a muchos que dichas instalaciones no sólo servirán para las operaciones de los "pesqueros" rusos -cuyas actividades de espionaje, infiltración de agentes subversivos y terroristas son harto conocidas- sino que pueden esconder construcciones militares, bases para submarinos y otras instalaciones que amenazan la seguridad del Hemisferio.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

Ref.: 194

Miami, 19 de Julio de 1965

INDEX  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22  
 R-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
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**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

FROM JACQUES *FR* *VR*

ACTION  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO FILE *VR, CA 2, CA/100, CE/100, 100*

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3	7
4	6

16 Jun 65 IN 92094

SECRET 162345Z

DIR CITE WAVE 3048 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC MHVIPER

1. AMSCROLL SECGEN REPORTS FINAL SESSION CHAMBER COMMERCE OF AMERICAS UNANIMOUS PASSAGE RESOLUTION DRAFTED BY AMSCROLL DENOUNCING CASTRO REGIME AND RECOMMENDING MEMBER NATION FIRMS DESIST TRADE WITH CUBA DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AND USE INFLUENCE OTHER FREE WORLD FIRMS DO SAME. CURACAO, SURINAM AND ARUBA ABSTAINING LACKING AUTHORITY FROM DUTCH GOVT BUT EXPRESSED SYMPATHY.

2. MOTION INTRODUCED BY MANUEL CASTILLO, FORMER PANAMANIAN CONSUL MIAMI, WHO ALSO TAPING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT PANAMA TO CUBAN PEOPLE FOR AMSCROLL RADIO PROGRAM. AMSCROLL ISSUING PRESS RELEASE, CARRYING RESOLUTION AMI HIGH 17 JUNE. POUCHING DETAILS.

SECRET

CFN

**SECRET**

C/EE

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED	ACTION
TO Chief of Station, Athens		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO Chief, EE; Chief, WH			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT NYX18/PBRUMEN/Operational Letter from "Nation" Reporter to AMSCROLL			ABSTRACT
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			MICROFILM
<p><b>AR: Pls advise of any operational interest.</b></p> <p>1. Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a letter received by AMSCROLL from an individual who claims to be a reporter for Nation, and who says that he is planning to visit New York and Miami in the near future. He expresses sympathy with the cause of Cuban freedom, based on his following of the AMSCROLL publicity in the Galbe affair, and asks to meet AMSCROLL principals to work out some ideas presumably for a subsequent anti-Castro campaign.</p> <p>2. Please advise if you have any specific operational interest in this individual, or if you have any preferences in the matter of AMSCROLL's dealing with him. AMSCROLL is replying with thanks for the writer's interest and with anticipation of future close and friendly cooperation.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>PHILIP G. ELMARD</b></p> <p>Attachment: Letter, zerox copy, u/sc (att'd)</p> <p>Distribution: 3 - COS, Athens, w/attach, u/sc 2 - C/EE, w/attach, u/sc 2 - C/WH, w/attach, u/sc <i>acc w/all fwd w/h/c/ES</i></p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO  63 COPY  CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>		19-120-26 DATE TYPED <b>14 June 65</b> DATE DISPATCHED <b>JUN 26 65</b>	
		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>UFGA 22,012</b> HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER <b>19-120-26</b>	

1 att

Mr. Seigle,  
First, sorry for my bad English.  
In the Athenian newspapers I read your  
letter you send to the Greek prime  
minister Mr Papandreu. I agree that  
Greek premier must set out of this coun-  
try Mr Galbe, the Cuban charge  
's offices in Athens. Many readers  
of the Athenian newspapers asked to  
take your address. They want to ex-  
press you their feelings. Many of them  
wrote that they want to go to Cu-  
ba "to set out in 3 (!) days Fidel Ca-  
stro".

Anyway, this is the preface of  
my letter. What I want to tell you  
is that I am a reporter of a great  
and old Athenian newspaper. I  
should like very much to be in touch  
with you, since I intend to come in  
a couple of months to the World's  
Fair of New York - as I went again  
last year - and then, to come in  
Miami. So, I want very much to  
meet you and have an interesting  
interview with you and your revo-  
lutionary army, for my newspaper.

16 June 1965  
att. #1 to UFGA-22012

So, I am waiting  
your letter and details about  
your address there, so that I can  
find you easily. I will write  
you then some interesting suggestions  
about our meeting, interview, re-  
volutionary movement etc. I guess  
always good ideas. Good by until I will  
have news from you. Thank you  
very much.

Sincerely yours  
Dimitrios Zoubovki  
Journalist  
Member of the Union  
of Athenian Press.

---

My address:  
D. Zoubovki's  
8 Seizani str.  
Dimitrios  
Athens  
Greece

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING		
		PRO POSTED	ACTION	ACTION REQUIRED
TO Chief, WH		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSCROLL/Operational Progress Report 1 January - 31 March 1965			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES				
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI				
REFERENCE: UFGA 19537, 1 February 1965				
A. OPERATIONAL				
<p>1. During the reporting period AMSCROLL continued to function as Station JMWAVE's MIVIPER action and propaganda vehicle. Toward the end of March AMSCROLL also assumed the bulk of the heirloom operation which is now being taken over by a separate committee. Some of the more significant activities, which have been covered in other correspondence, were "black list" letters to specific firms in Japan and Greece, sent at the behest of and according to guidance from Tokyo and Athens Stations, AMBLEAK-1's "truth squad" tactics against the Japanese trade mission touring Latin America and the initiation of regular reports to Spanish officials, in a list provided by Madrid Station, on the anti-Spanish contents of broadcasts from Havana by the Cuban-Spanish Friendship Association.</p>				
<p>2. Although there were some petty disagreements among AMSCROLL personnel, reported in detail by our unilateral penetration, AMFRAME-1, there was relative calm during the period, and occasional manifestations of <u>esprit de corps</u> were noted in AMSCROLL despite the general flagging of morale in the exile community at large.</p>				
<p>3. The only change in the AMSCROLL executive committee took effect in March when the Secretary of Finance, Identity, resigned to take a position in an Ecuadorian commercial firm. Other personnel changes were made with only minor significance.</p>				
B. PRODUCTION				
<p>4. Propaganda to Cuba (samples in Attachment 2) included the pony-sized monthly bulletin; a leaflet on personal security, this being a new issue showing that the greatest danger to self and family is to do nothing while Castro-Communism tightens its grip on the whole of Cuban</p>				
Attachments:		(Continued)		
<p>1. Identity, USC 2. Prop Samples, Cuba, USC 3. Prop Samples, LA, USC 4. Press Release, USC</p>		<p>DATE TYPED 28 May 65</p> <p>DATE DISPATCHED JUN 9 1965</p>		
Distribution: 3- WH/C		<p>DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 21797</p> <p>HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26 19-120-26/3</p>		
		<p>CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b></p>		

S E C R E T

UFGA 21797

society; "handwritten" cover letters, which are actually printed script to make the propaganda envelopes appear to contain personal letters when put to the light test by censors; and receipt acknowledgment forms, a simple slip of paper now attached to all propaganda mailings requesting the recipient to send the form back to AMSCROLL's post office box, or to any other address in the free world for forwarding to AMSCROLL, as a check on how much propaganda is getting through. During the period AMSCROLL sent out 58,000 envelopes containing 130,000 items.

5. To Latin America primarily, with a scattering of items to Europe, Asia and the United States, AMSCROLL sent out 30,000 items including its tabloid house organ (which is now cut down to 4 pages from its former 8, and is published only once a month instead of twice), several booklets reprinted by continued request of correspondents (one of the largest orders having come from Dominican General Wessin y Wessin shortly before the rebellion) and a map showing training sites in Cuba for Latin American guerrillas (samples in Attachment 3).

6. News releases were issued on a number of current topics, AMSCROLL as usual taking the economic warfare angle on the news of the day as it effected Cuba. The 17 releases of this period were sent to newspapers, wire services, magazines, radio and TV stations throughout the free world in approximately 350 copies each. The local public media made use of approximately 65% of AMSCROLL's press releases. Although occasional indications are received that AMSCROLL materials are used in other newspaper and magazine articles, radio programs and the like, there is no way of making a good estimate of the amount of such replay. Among the more important titles were the following (copies in Attachment 4):

- a. Free-World Ships Continue Aid to Cuban Economy
- b. Cuban Budget Includes Proof Economy Crumbling -- an Analysis
- c. Possible Soviet Curtailment of Cuban Aid Seen
- d. Greek Firm Bilked in Cuban Trade Negotiations
- e. Japan Seeks Expansion of LA Trade While Defying OAS in Cuban Traffic
- f. Sovbloc Undermining Castro Sugar Markets
- g. Castro Auctioning Heirlooms Taken from Fleeing Refugees

7. Other political action and propaganda moves noted in paragraph 1, above, were reported separately in detail, and a full set of "black list" correspondence was forwarded to Headquarters in UFGA 21616 with a request for any further MHVIPER leads which might contribute to the further effectiveness of this campaign.

8. AMSCROLL radio programs, 15 minutes daily over both WMIE and AMTHIGH, carried much the same themes as the AMSCROLL press releases, but with adjustments as necessary for the Cuban audience, e.g., while AMSCROLL press releases might complain about continued free-world trade with and shipping to Cuba, the radio program would emphasize any decreases in the number of ships.

9. Reactions to AMSCROLL propaganda continue to arrive from Cuba, but at a slow pace. The 24 letters received during the past period contained 7 newspaper clippings and three pages torn from telephone books, as requested in AMSCROLL radio programs. Nine of the letters mentioned the AMTHIGH broadcasts, one noted receipt of the pony-sized bulletin and two remitted the small acknowledgement forms which accompany all AMSCROLL propaganda mailed into Cuba. Detailed statistics on these are submitted in a separate report from JMWAVE.

#### C. FINANCIAL

Salaries (January - March)	\$ 15,360.00
Operational Expenses (January-March)	36,500.00
TOTAL	\$ 51,860.00

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA 21797

**D. FUTURE PLANS**

No substantive changes are contemplated in the handling of this activity. Efforts will be continued to judge the efficacy of current programs, and to adjust the amount and type of propaganda produced as necessary.

*for*   
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CLASSIFICATION

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>SEPARATE COVER ATTACH- MENT NO. 1 TO UFGA 2179</b>
<p><b>IDENTITY: Reinaldo MIYARES Lopez</b></p>		
FORM 53a 5-60 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	PAGE NO. <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

100-100000-1  
 100-100000-1  
 100-100000-1  
 100-100000-1

UFGA-21616  
20 May 65  
19-120-26

9 OCT 1968

19-132-49/3

- 1. It was KAPOE and unprocessed.
  - 2. It was RHEAT and unprocessed.
  - 3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
  - 4. It was DEFERRED.
  - 5. It was classified into file # 19-132-49/3
  - 6. It is an indexed document.
- For filing with attachment.

REMOVAL SLIP  
DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER UFGA-21552  
DOC. DATE 19 May 1965

w/s/c/att. 5

THE CC COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 19-120-26  
9 OCT 1968

BY RID/ARD RPU ON \_\_\_\_\_ AND FORWARDED TO RID FILES  
RID/AN  
RID/MIS  
RID/PS

- 1. It was KAPOE and unprocessed.
  - 2. It was RHEAT and unprocessed.
  - 3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
  - 4. It was DEFERRED.
  - 5. It was classified into file # 19-126-34/3
  - 6. It is an indexed document.
- For filing with atts. 1, 2, 3+4.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: JHart:dap  
UNIT: DCWHD/C  
EXT: 7264  
DATE: 28 April 65

INDEX  
 NO INDEX

**SECRET**

ROUTING			
1	PP	4	mo
2		5	D
3	DCWHD/C	6	K

TO: JMWAVE MADRID

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C

INFO: JWP, WE 6, CAZ, CA/ADP, CA/AS, CA/CA, VR, FILE

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO MADR

CITE DIR 05230

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

REF: DIR 04886

*Handwritten initials: JSU, EX*

PARA 2 REF SHOULD READ: "HOPE AMSCROLL CAN SET UP  
NON-POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF REPUTABLE CUBANS AND ACT AS ITS  
EXECUTIVE AGENT."

END OF MESSAGE

*Handwritten signature: Desmond FitzGerald*  
Desmond FitzGerald  
CWHD

*Handwritten signature: WE/5*  
WE/5

*Handwritten signature: John L. Hart*  
John L. Hart  
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

28-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

*J. HART*  
*Full*  
*Amscroll* 22

ORIG *R* *R*-Ractletter/bh  
 UNIT C/WH/C/CA  
 EXT 6567  
 DATE 27 Apr 65

MESSAGE FORM  
 15 **SECRET**

INDEX  
 NO INDEX  
 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO JMWAVE MADRID

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF. *WH/C 8* INFO *VR, FILE, DDP, WE 6, CI/ops, CI/OA, CA 2, CA PROP*

27 APR 65 18 10 z

TO WAVE INFO MADR CITE DR

TYPIC KEYWAY MIVIPER

REFS: A. MADR 3992 (IN 52779)  
 B. WAVE 1064 (IN 51819)

04886

1. CONCUR REF A. DO NOT DESIRE COMMITTEE BE SET UP MADR; FOR MAXIMUM CONTROL, FEEL THIS BEST DONE WAVE AREA.
2. MOST PLEASED EFFECTIVE ROLE PLAYED BY AMSCROLL TO DATE. HOPE AMSCROLL CAN SET UP NON-POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF REPUTABLE CUBANS WHICH WOULD ACT AS ITS EXECUTIVE AGENT.

END OF MESSAGE

*John L. Hart*  
 DESMOND FITZGERALD  
 C/WH

WE/5 *L. RATI*

*JLH*  
 JOHN L. HART  
 DCWH/D/C

5  
4  
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1

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1

RELEASING OFFICER *27-9*

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM *JmWave*

ACTION *WJ/CR*

ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO *VR. FILE DDP, WEB, CUCI/OPS, C/ORA, F*

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
1	<i>PR</i> <i>CA-EW</i>
2	<i>FS-TC</i>
3	<i>MO</i> <i>J</i>
4	<i>X</i>

**SECRET 242049Z**

MADR INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1064

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

REFS: A. WAVE 0150 *(IN 35346)*

B. DIR 04279

C. MADR 3910 *(IN 49141)*

D. WAVE 1049 *(IN 51462)*

**ATTENTION**

**24 APR 65 11 51 019**

*U*

*SC*

1. VIEW APPARENT SENSITIVITY RE USE AMSCROLL

NAME THIS OP, SUGGEST MADR HAVE MUSSO REPLY TO AMSCROLL LETTER AS SUGGESTED PARA 7 REF A, STATING HE SETTING UP INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE AND ASKING AMSCROLL PARTICIPATION. MUSSO COULD THEN PLACE ADS PER REF B WHICH WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE COMING FROM EUROPEAN LOCATION.

2. IF ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE PLS ADVISE AND WAVE WILL ESTABLISH COMMITTEE AND PLACE ADS.

**SECRET**

CFN

**SECRET**

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**S-E-C-R-E-T**

## PROCESSING

	DATE INDEXED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
TO Chief of Station, San Jose	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO Chief, WH Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

SUBJECT **TYPIC/OPERATIONAL**  
**Forwarding of Counterrevolutionary Handbook Studies**

### ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: **UFGA-18641, para 3, dated 17 November 1964**

ACTION : See paragraph 2.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy of each of the following Counterrevolutionary Handbook Studies:

- AAM - Asociacion Amigos del Mar (AAM) and Fraternidad de las 90 Millas
- ACCE - Asociacion de Colonos Cubanos en el Exilio
- ANAC - Alianza Nacional Anti-Comunista
- ANC - Asociacion Nacionalista Cubana
- FJC - Frente de Joventudes Cristianas
- FJR - Frente de Joventudes Revolucionario  
(The FJR, being a newly formed organization, is not listed in the Index to the Counterrevolutionary Handbook. It is suggested that it be "written in" until a new Index can be completed.)
- JURE - Junta Revolucionaria Cubana
- MAPA - Movimiento Accion Patriotica Americana
- MIRR - Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
- MRN - El Movimiento de Resistencia Nacional
- MRTN - Movimiento Revolucionario 30 de Noviembre
- OAS - Operacion "Alpha 66"
- ROCE - Radio Club de Cuba en el Exilio
- RDR - Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
- SFNE - Segundo Frente Nacional de Escambray
- UND - Union Nacional Democratica "Movimiento 20 de Mayo"

2. The above listed studies should be filed alphabetically in Part II of the Counterrevolutionary Handbook forwarded under reference.

*Rene B. Holman*  
**ANDREW K. REUTEMAN**  
19-120-26

Attachment: CR Handbook Studies, h/w

Distribution:  
Orig & 2-COS, San Jose - w/att  
2-Chief, WH, w/o att.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CLASSIFICATION  
**S-E-C-R-E-T**

DATE TYPED <b>13 April 65</b>	DATE DISPATCHED <b>APR 24 1965</b>
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>UFGA-21009</b>	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER <b>19-9-12</b>	

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

**SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: Jm WAVE

ACTION: (WAVE)

ADVANCE COPY:  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_

INFO: VR. FILE, DDP, CH2, CA/PROP, CHAPS, CHIC 2

1	PP-	5	CA-62
2		0	C
3	EI-TC	7	D
4	DDP	0	F

TIME: RR-05 201

SECRET 100141Z  
 DIR CITE WAVE 0574  
 TYPIC MHVIPER

*file Amscroll  
 N.R.*

**ACTION**  
 18 APR 65 IN 42315

IN REPLY CASTRO CLAIMS REPORTED LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION GOALS BEING REACHED, AMSCROLL PREPARING PRESS RELEASES AND RADIO PROGRAMS 12-14 APR USING FOLL THEMES: SUGAR DISCRETION STILL STRICTLY ENFORCED. WHY NECESSARY IF SITUATION ACTUALLY GOOD AS CLAIMED? CASTRO PROHIBITION PUBLICATION ANY STATISTICS DURING HARVEST GAVE AMPLE WARNING BIG LIE TO COME. AMSCROLL UNDERGROUND REPORTS WIDESPREAD CANE BURNING, SABOTAGE MILLS AND TRANSPORT FACILITIES, SHORTAGE JUTE BAGS, ADMINISTRATIVE DUNGLING, LOW WORKER MORALE BOMBING PUT 65 CROP IN JEOPARDY. GOC REFUSAL CANE CUTTERS TRADITIONAL HOLY WEEK VACATION INDICATES PANIC MORE THAN CONFIDENCE. CONCERN PROBABLY HEIGHTENED BY CONSIDERATION REGINE'S SLIM MARGIN PROFIT EVEN FROM FAIRLY GOOD HARVEST AT CURRENT WORLD PRICES AND COMPETION FROM NEW SUGAR PRODUCING NATIONS. FINAL CRITERION CASTRO BRAVADO. HE ALWAYS TALKS BIGGEST WHEN IN TROUBLE.

SECRET  
 CFN

**SECRET**



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE      TOTAL COPIES 5

**SECRET**

01  COPY     BUNNY  
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM <i>IMWAVE</i> ACTION <i>WHIC 8</i> INFO <i>VR. FILE DDP, EE 4, D04, D0/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, E1</i>	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBED	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 5%;">1</td> <td style="width: 20%;">PP-</td> <td style="width: 15%;">5</td> <td style="width: 60%;">MNO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td></td> <td>6</td> <td>CA-EW</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td></td> <td>7</td> <td>D</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>F1-TC</td> <td>8</td> <td>L</td> </tr> </table>	1	PP-	5	MNO	2		6	CA-EW	3		7	D	4	F1-TC	8	L
1	PP-	5	MNO															
2		6	CA-EW															
3		7	D															
4	F1-TC	8	L															

SECRET 070015Z

DIR INFO HAMB BRLN FRAN GMNY CITE WAVE 0415

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF DIR 95998 ✓

AMSCROLL SENT LETTER 5 MAR TO WIKING, COPIES TO GERMAN FORMIN  
 BONN, GERMAN EMBASSY WASH, GERMAN DELEGATION TO UN, US SECY OF  
 COMMERCE. CONTENTS LETTER IN PRESS RELEASE 6 MAR DELIVERED LOCAL  
 MEDIA OUTLETS AND SENT LARGE NUMBER EUROPEAN PRESS REPS INCLUDING  
 JOURNAL OF COMMERCE CORRESPONDENTS NEW YORK AND EUROPE AND GERMAN  
 NEWSPAPERS.

SECRET

CFN

**SECRET**

SECRET

7 APR 65 11 39 64Z

*tu*

*SC*

*Ex/*



*Revised title to WAVE*

SECRET

*R*

- REFS: A. WAVE 0397 (IN 39527)
- B. DIR 95219
- C. DIR 98577

Regret misunderstanding derived from refs B and C. Primary importance in such propaganda is not to bring scrutiny to lubricants which are basis of large and sensitive NIFASH operation. Also imperative that exploitation of sabotage make it appear to have been done inside PBRUMEN. Request WAVE cancel all uncompleted action which may have bearing on this problem.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ORIG: F. SHERRY/mak  
 UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW  
 EXT: 6957  
 DATE: 1 APRIL 65

INDEX  
 NO INDEX  
 FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

TO: JMWAVE  
 FROM: DIRECTOR

2 APR 65 12:22

CONS: DCI/WH/C <sup>INFO</sup> VR, FILE, ADP, CIFI, CIFI/4;  
 ADAP

TO: WAVE INFO: CITE DIR

RYBAT TYPIC ZRPERUSAL

FRENCH FIRM RICHARD FRERES HAS SUPPLIED SEVERAL HUNDRED <sup>98577</sup> TRACTORS TO CUBA IN LITTLE OVER ONE YEAR. THESE INCLUDED FOUR OR FIVE TYPES OF WHICH CD10 PROBABLY HEAVIEST. MAIN UNLOADING PORT FOR THESE TRACTORS APPEARS BE HAVANA. TWO SHIPMENTS INVOLVING ABOUT 30 TRACTORS OF DIFFERENT TYPES WERE CONTAMINATED WITH ABRASIVES IN MAY AND JUNE 1964.

END OF MESSAGE

Wave 0397  
 6 APR 1965

*[Signature]*  
 DESMOND FITZGERALD  
 C/WHD

*[Signature]*  
 C/WH/C/CA  
 C/WH/C/RO

*[Signature]*  
 JOHN L. HART  
 /DCWHD/C

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

RELEASING OFFICER 2-24

COORDINATING OFFICERS  
**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CMDR P. CHERRY/mak  
WH/C/CA/EW  
6957  
DATE 23 MARCH 1965

INDEX  
 NO INDEX  
 FILE IN CS FILE NO

MESSAGE FORM 25  
**SECRET**

200-100-38

ROUTING	
1	3 X-
2	5
3	7
4	8

TO JMWAVE

FROM DIRECTOR

COM. DC/WH/C 5 INFO DD, ADD, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FID 4, C/CA 2, C/SIO 4,  
C/WE 3, IR, FILE

TO WAVE

INFO

CITE DIR

RYBAT PERUMEN MHVIPER ZRPERUSAL

*FID*

*WAVE 0015  
31 MAR 65*

95219

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE RELAYED: 15 MAR 65, FROM DOSQUE, MINCON, HAVANA TO RICHARD CONTINENTAL, FRANCE. SEND IMMEDIATELY HIGHLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FOR BULLDOZERS C-D10. CONSTANTLY BREAKING DOWN DUE TO DEFECTS IN MANUFACTURE.

2. WAVE PLEASE EXPLOIT. SEVERAL ACTS OF SABOTAGE WERE CARRIED OUT AGAINST RICHARD TRACTORS IN 1964 USING ABRASIVE IN ENGINE BLOCKS. SINCE ABRASIVE WAS DISCOVERED BY CUBANS, LINE SHOULD NOW BE, "HOW DO YOU LIKE OUR MORE SOPHISTICATED METHOD? TRACTORS OUR SPECIALTY, THE HEAVIER THE BETTER."

3. IMPLICATION SHOULD NATURALLY BE THAT ACTS ACCOMPLISHED BY ANTI-CASTRO GROUP WHOSE STRENGTH LIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

RAFOED W. HERBERT  
AC/WH/D

RELEASING OFFICER 23-37

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

JOHN L. HART  
DC/WH/D/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

COPIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 47

**SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: *Imw...*

ACTION: *(WH/C8)*

1	PP-	CA-EW
2		C
3	F-TE	D
4	AS-C	X

INFO: VR. FILE, DDP, WEG, EEA, GWT, CAZ, CA/PEG, CA/PPG, D04, D0/H3, C1/OPS, C1/IG2

E C R E 1 010220L

DIR INFO MADR BERN GNVA HAGU ZURC CITE WAVE 0150B

TYPIC MHVIPER

REFS: A. WAVE 9987 (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES)

B. DIR 91885 \*

C. MADR 3677

D. BERN 4931

**ACTION**

1. PRIOR RECEIPT REF B HAD ASSIGNED AMSCROLL (IDEN) TASK OF SPEARHEADING WAVE AREA PROP ACTION RE CUBAN ART SHIPMENTS EUROPE. AMSCROLL WELL SUITED FOR THIS ROLE IN WAVE AREA DUE ITS ESTABLISHED PRESS OUTLETS, REPUTATION FOR ACCURATE REPORTING AND FACT IT CENTER ORIENTED POLITICAL GROUP WITH EASY ACCESS THOSE EXILE CIRCLES OF CONSERVATIVE PERSUASION WHO OWNED ART OBJECTS WHICH CONFISCATED BY GOG. INTEND CONTINUE USING AMSCROLL IN THIS OP PARTICULARLY DURING FORMATIVE STAGES.

2. REF A PRESS RELEASE 27 MAR BY AMSCROLL CALLED FOR ALL EXILES WAVE AREA TO FORWARD ALL INFO RE CONFISCATED ART OBJECTS TO AMSCROLL FOR CATALOGING AND USE IN ATTEMPTS IMPOUND ART OBJECTS EUROPE BEFORE IT GOES ON SALE. LOCAL RADIO STATIONS PICKED UP THIS

**SECRET**

SECRET IN 25346 PAGE 2

RELEASE AND GAVE IT FULL COVERAGE. AFP WIRED STORY TO NEW YORK.  
ALSO PICKED UP BY UPI AND AP.

3. AMSCROLL NOW IN PROCESS PLACING ADS IN ABC, MADRID;  
JOURNAL DE GENEVE, GENEVA; DAILY TELEGRAPH, LONDON; LE MONDE,  
PARIS; IL COVIESE, ROME; POST, WASHINGTON (DC); LA PRENSA & TIMES,  
NEW YORK; EL MUNDO, PUERTO RICO; EXCELSIOR, MEXICO, AND EL UNIVERSAL,  
CARACAS ASKING EXILE ART OBJECT OWNERS TO FURNISH AMSCROLL  
COPIES SUPPORTING DOCS SHOWING WHAT ITEMS OWNED AND CONFISCATED.  
AMSCROLL STATES IT WILL CATALOGUE THESE CLAIMS AND TAKE ACTION TRY  
STOP SALES IN EUROPE. SHOULD THIS FAIL AMSCROLL POINTS OUT IT  
INTENDS WARN ART DEALERS AND POTENTIAL BUYERS AROUND WORLD THAT  
CATALOGUED ITEMS WILL BE RECLAIMED BY FREE CUBAN GOVT.

4. AMSCROLL SENT CABLES SWISS EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND SWISS  
DELAGATION UN WITH COPIES MAJOR SWISS DAILIES AND INTERNATIONAL  
COMMISSION JURISTS PROTESTING SHIPMENT HEIRLOOM CARGO TO EUROPE  
FOR SALE UNDER GENEVA CONVENTION PROHIBITION LOOTING OR PLUNDERING  
IN WAR OR PEACE.

5. AMSCROLL WILL START CABLE CAMPAIGN ALONG LINES SUGGESTED  
BY REF D PARA 2 ON 2 APRIL.

6. INITIAL WAVE AREA EXILE RESPONSE TO ART OBJECT CAMPAIGN

SECRET

SECRET 1435346 PAGE 3

INDICATES INDIVIDUALS WHO OWNED ART OBJECTS MORE THAN WILLING  
LET AMSCROLL RUN WITH BALL AS INDIVIDUAL EXILES DON'T WANT GET  
INVOLVED IN PUBLICITY ACTIONS, POSSIBLE LITIGATION, ETC.

7. REQUEST MADR CABLE ADDRESS WHERE MUSSO CAN BE REACHED IN  
SPAIN. SUGGEST AMSCROLL CONTACT MUSSO BY AIRMAIL AT THIS ADDRESS  
AND OFFER WORK IN COORDINATED FASHION WITH MUSSO ON  
ART SHIPMENT PROBLEM. MUSSO COULD COUNTER WITH OFFER SET UP  
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE IF MADR FEELS AMSCROLL CONTINUATION IN  
OP WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY EFFECT SENSIBILITIES OF EXILE LEADERS  
EUROPE WHO HAVE SOMETHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS OP.

SECRET \* APPARENTLY WRONG REF. POSSIBLY DIR 96585<sup>20</sup>  
CFM 12 CASE GUIDANCE FOR **SECRET** PSYEN OP RE SHIPMENT CUBAN  
HEIRLOOMS TO EUROPE.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	PP -	5	CA-EW
		2		6	C
		3	M/D	7	P
		4	FI-TC	8	*

ACTION *500/AVE*

ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO *WHIC 8*

*TR. FILE, DDP, WEC, 664, WNT, CAR, CAIPROP, DOL, DO/HZ, C/OPS, C/ICR, CAIPRO*

SECRET 010226Z

DIR INFO MADR BERN GNVA HAGU CITE WAVE 0151

TYPIC M/VIPER

REF WAVE 0150 (w 35346)

**ACTION**  
1 APR 65 IN 35336

IDEAS: UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, 10 SE NINTH STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

SECRET

CFN

*N*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2nd

*WAVE*

*WAVE*

*WE-8*

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EW

FI TC

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT

DATE

BY

YR. FILE *DDP, WH/2.9, CH-2, CH/PROP, CI, CE/OPS*

SECRET 252221Z

PRIORITY HAGO INFO DIR MADR PARI CITE WAVE 9905

REWAY FROMEN MHVIPER

A DIR 95371

B MADR 3924 *(230088)*

24 MAR AMSCROLL SECCEN (IDEN) CONTACTED FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS ON REF MATTER: ALFONSO FANJUL, CARLOS GARCIA BELTRAN MENDOZA, MARIO SEIGLIE (SR), AND MRS DON PEDRO SANCHEZ. THEY IN TURN CONTACTING FRANCISCO ZAYAS, CIFO SOSA MENDOZA, LILIAM GOMEZ MENA, NORBERTO AZQUETA, SAHARA JOHNSON DE AGUIERA, MANUEL ASPURU, ENRIQUE MENDOZA, GUILLERMO SALDO AND MEMBERS OF SARRA FAMILY.

ABOVE PERSONS PREPARING TEXT NIGHT LETTERS WHICH MUST SEND 25 MAR. WILL ADVISE WHEN FURTHER DETAILS KNOWN.

SECRET

*Request WAVE Have LOCAL CUBANE SEND CIVILIAN LHMNS CIA TO PART RE SHIPMENT 25 MAR 1975*

*U*

*CH*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

<b>SECRET</b>	
SEARCHED INDEXED	
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ASSEMBLY COPY	
<input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED	<input type="checkbox"/> FLOTTED
<input type="checkbox"/> THIRD	UNIT

REFERENCE TO THIS MESSAGE  
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 CA-10  
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 L

THRU WAVE

WAVE-9

FILE, DDP, WH/C-2, CA-3, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS

25 MAR 1961

052221Z

INFO DIR MADE PARI CITE WAVE 9907

RECEIVED MHWIPER

IN 31175

MARIO REIGLIE (JR), UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

S L T

EX

TOTAL COPIES 30

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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FROM: *U.R. File*  
 JMWAVE

ACTION: WHIC 8

1	PP -	5	(A-E)
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3	RR-RE	7	D
4	MO	0	X

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UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: 001 BY: \_\_\_\_\_

INFO: VR. FILE *DDP, WH 7, FEB. CAZ, CA/PROP. D 04, D 0143*  
 CITEZ

SECRET 102334Z

RIOD INFO SAOP DIR TOKY CITE WAVE 9406 (INGHURST ACTING)  
 TYPIC MHVIPER PSYCH

- REFS: A. RIOD 7545 (NOT SENT SAOP) (IN 18375)  
 B. DIR 90763  
 C. WAVE 9256 (NOT SENT SAOP) (IN 17647)

1. RE REF A, AMSCROLL (IDEN) SENDING CABLE 10 MAR GOB FINANCE, COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES MINISTRIES, GENERAL BRAZ BRANCATO (WHO ONCE WROTE AMSCROLL FROM PORTO ALLEGRE WITH FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON PROP LEAFLETS), GOVERNOR LACERDA OF GUANABARA, INDUSTRIAS REUNIDAS F. MATARAZZO (SAOP), S.A. VOICRANTIN (SACP), FUDICAO IUPY S.A. (SANTA CATARINA), AMERICA FABRIL S.A. (RIOD), FABRICA TECIDOS BANGU (RIOD), MESBLA S.A. (RIOD), JORNAL DO BRAZIL, JORNAL DO COMERCIO, O BLOBO, O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, GAZETA ESTIADO SAC PACLO, FOLKA DE SAO PAOLA, O CRUZEIRO, CONJUNTURA ECONOMICA AND TRIBUNA DA IMPRESA. SUMMARY CONTENTS FOLL: CONNECTION VISIT JAPANESE TRADE MISSION WISH CALL ATTENTION SEVERAL ASPECTS CURRENT JANANESE TRADE POLICIES WHICH SHOULD INFLUENCE ANY DEALINGS: JAPAN-CUBA TRADE AMOUNTED 87 MILLION DOLLARS LAST YEAR FOR INCREASE 340 PERCENT; THIS YEAR JAPAN

SECRET

BOUGHT 185,000 TONS CUBAN SUGAR AND WILL BUY 200,000 TONS  
JAPAN ALSO DELIVERING LARGE NUMBER FISHING VESSELS AND PROVIDING  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CUBAN FISHING INDUSTRY. DETAILS ABOVE MEXICO'S  
EXC/LSIOR, NEW YORK JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND JAPAN'S OWN ECONOMIC  
JOURNAL.. THESE ACTIVITIES DIRECT OPPOSITION TO OAS RESOLUTION JULY  
54 WHICH BROKE DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES BETWEEN CUBA AND  
AMERICAN STATES AND URGED ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF SIMILAR IDEALS ACT  
ACCORDINGLY. THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT INCREASE JAPAN'S TRADE WITH  
COMMUNIST CUBA UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARD OAS MEMBER NATIONS AND JAPAN  
AIDING AND ABETTING ENEMY BY SUPPORTING MAINTENANCE BASE FOR  
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION OUR HEMISPHERE. SINCE BRAZIL  
ONLY RECENTLY AVERTED NEAR DISASTER COMMUNIST TAKEOVER, BRAZILIANS  
KNOW FULL AND ACTIVE COOPERATION NEEDED IF OUR CONTINENT TO REMAIN  
FREE COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM. WE EXPECT BRAZIL'S PEOPLE, PUBLIC  
MEXIA, BUSINESS MEN AND GOVT TO INSIST THIS TRADE MISSION  
WHICH SPONSORED BY JAPANESE GOVT PROMISE CURTAIL TRAFFIC WITH  
COMMUNIST CUBAN ENEMY AS PREREQUISITE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BRAZIL.

2. AMSCROLL ALSO RELEASING CONTENTS LOCAL PRESS AND WIRE REPS.

S E C R E T

CFN

IN 20328  
PAGE 2  
SECRET



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 334

47 **SECRET** REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AS  COPY  DUBBY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	PP -	5	CA - EW
	2		0	C
	3	RR - EE	7	D
	4	MO	0	Y

FROM IMWAVE

ACTION WHIC 8 ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED UNIT TIME DO1 BY

INFO VR. FILE, WH7, FE6, CAZ, CAPROG, DC4, DCH3, CILIC2

S E C R E T 102334Z

102334Z 20317

RIOD INFO SAOP DIR TODY CITE WAVE 9407 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC MHVIPER PSYCH

REF: WAVE 9406 (IN 70321)

IDEN: UNKAD REVOLUCIONARIA

S E C R E T

CFN

**SECRET**

*File Amscroll*

*CONF*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES *20*

*24* **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5
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FROM *JMWAVE*

ACTION *WH/SA-8*

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO *VR. FILE DDP, FE-6, CA-2, CA/PROP*

*SECRET 23231*  
*Dm*

SECRET 23231Z  
 DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 3600  
 TYPIC MHVIPER  
 REF UFGW 4774

1. ANSCROLL SENT LETTER 17 FEB BASED REF GUIDANCE REQUESTING ASSURANCES FROM *DIIGATA* THAT SPARE PARTS WILL NOT BE SOLD IF ORDERED BY GOC.
2. ANSCROLL USUALLY ISSUES PRESS RELEASE TO COINCIDE WITH RECEIPT SUCH LETTERS BY ADDRESS, BUT THIS CASE WILL ALLOW AMPLE TIME FOR REPLY AND GASE PUBLICITY ON TONE OF RESPONSE.
3. POUCHING LETTER.

SECRET

*SECRET*

<del>MOB</del>	<del>INT</del>	SS	SB
		IOS	PERS
<del>SI</del>		RPTS	LOG
CI	SI	EF	HH
		SEC	NS

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	<b>S E C R E T</b>	TIME POSTED	ACTION
TO	Deputy Chief, WH/SA	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>445</i>		ABSTRACT MICROFILM
SUBJECT	TYPIC/MIVIPER/AMSCROLL/Operational c. Forwarding of Propaganda Leaflet		

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

**ACTION REQUIRED: FYI**

Under separate cover is the latest AMSCROLL propaganda item in support of the MIVIPER program. It exploits an actual case of a firm which literally laughed in the face of AMSCROLL protestations, and shortly thereafter fell afoul of ODMARK with the result that it lost its import-export license. AMSCROLL reproduced the pertinent correspondence in sequence with the comment that this is one of several things which can happen to those who trade with Communist Cuba.

*Andrew K. Reuteman*  
Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:  
Propaganda, USC

Distribution:  
3- DC, WH/SA, w/att., USC

*1-10-65*

Class 1  
Excludes WH/SA/WH/SA  
Controlled and  
Classified

*19-120-26*

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	9 Feb 65	FEB 12 1965
CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
	<b>UFGA 19788</b>	
<b>S E C R E T</b>	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
	19-120-26	

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA continues its research in reference to the firms that are still trading with Communist Cuba. We are making a thorough investigation in order to avoid mistakes, but as soon as completed, the "Black List" will be published and distributed throughout the Free World.

Many firms have already realized what trading with Communist Cuba means, and have also taken into consideration Cuba's credit unworthiness - ONE BILLION DOLLARS of foreign debt. Therefore, these firms have backed away from this shameful and riskful market.

Besides, the people of the Countries of the Free World are sympathetic with our cause; take as an example the boycott started by the Venezuelan Federation of dockworkers in accordance with the first resolution of the "Fifth Congress of Venezuelan Workers", labor unions of other nations have already followed suit.

Or take the case of Mr. Shepherd, from Great Britain, which is illustrated in this pamphlet.

# UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

10 S.E. 9 St. Miami, Fla.

S/c/att. # UFGA-19788

19-120-26

this is one of several things that can happen

denied all U.S. export privileges

to those who trade with Communist Cuba

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA sent Shepherd this letter regarding the "Black List".

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Havana, August 25, 1962

Shepherd Export Ltd.  
London  
Dear Sirs:

First of all, we congratulate SHEPHERD EXPORTS for its long and successful record in the field of international trade for the last five years. We have always admired the spirit of independence, energy and fair play which has characterized your business.

It is our regret that we have to inform you that the United States Government has placed your firm on the "Black List" of firms which are prohibited from trading with Cuba. This is a result of the investigation conducted by the United States Government into the activities of your firm in connection with the Cuban economy.

We are sure that you will understand the reasons for this decision and that you will be able to take the necessary steps to avoid any further complications.

We would like to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance which you have given us in the past and we hope that you will continue to be of help to us in the future.

We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 21st, 1962, in which you inform us of the decision of the United States Government.

We are sorry to hear that you are unable to continue your business with the United States. We would like to suggest that you try to find other markets for your goods.

We are sure that you will be able to find other markets for your goods and we would like to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance which you have given us in the past.

We are sure that you will be able to find other markets for your goods and we would like to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance which you have given us in the past.

We are sure that you will be able to find other markets for your goods and we would like to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance which you have given us in the past.

We are sure that you will be able to find other markets for your goods and we would like to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance which you have given us in the past.

Yours faithfully,  
Shepherd Export Ltd.  
London

UR

Shepherd Export & Trading Company

4 DORSET ROAD - CHESTER  
CHESHIRE - ENGLAND

Dear Sirs:

26 September, 1962

Mr. Fernando Penabaz-Cortés,  
Embassy of the United States,  
27 S.W. 2nd Street,  
Miami,  
Florida,  
U.S.A.

I have your registered letter of August 21st and have read all the English language newspaper reports and would like you to state that neither of you is being held in completely responsible for the U.S. action in taking away the goods and shipping from England.

Yours faithfully,  
Shepherd Export & Trading Company  
[Signature]  
U.K. Shepherd

2 SHEPHERD continued trading with Castro...



3

the outcome . . .



Bureau of International Commerce

On August 21, 1962, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that it had received information from a confidential source that the United States Government had placed your firm on the "Black List" of firms which are prohibited from trading with Cuba. This is a result of the investigation conducted by the United States Government into the activities of your firm in connection with the Cuban economy.

In conducting its investigation, the Bureau of International Commerce (BIC) sent the respondents written questions concerning their trading activities with Cuba. They received a partial answer. The BIC also interviewed the respondents and their business associates. The BIC also reviewed the necessary information in connection with the investigation.

The respondents, including the Bureau of International Commerce (BIC) sent the respondents written questions concerning their trading activities with Cuba. They received a partial answer. The BIC also interviewed the respondents and their business associates. The BIC also reviewed the necessary information in connection with the investigation.

COM-10-1000

*FRAGMENTS*

TOTAL COPIES *34* RI

COPY  DUMMY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

*SECRET*

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	4
<i>JMWAVE</i>		2	6
		3	7
		4	8

ACTION *LORISA 8* ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  BLOTTED  TYPED TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DOI, C02, WEL, DD 4, DD 14 3, F-1017 2, 7, CALP/OP, SR 7,

*CT/IC 2*

SECRET 052150Z

DIR INFO PARI COPE LOND CITE WAVE 7986

TYPIC MHSWAVN

REF: A. DIR 82382

B. DIR 78938

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

GD
AR
CA
HI
NS

5 FEB 65 IN 74970

1. ASSUMPTION PARA 1 REF A CORRECT. SUMMARY RELEASE FOLL:  
 UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) IN RECEIPT CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE FROM  
 NUMBER SOURCES THAT SOVS MAY ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL ECONOMIC AID  
 TO CUBA AFTER PARTY MEETING 1 MAR MOSCOW AND THAT SOVBLOC OFFICIALS  
 STUDYING WAYS DISENGAGE ASAP SINCE CUBA NOW COSTS BLOC 12 BILLION  
 YEAR WHICH MORE THAN IT WORTH. RUSS LEADERS HAVE TO CONSIDER  
 (1) SOV UNION INTERNAL PROBLEMS WHICH NEGATIVE TO CASTRO SINCE  
 ACCORDING STATEMENTS BY KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN AND BREZHNEV DEC 64 USSR  
 FAR FROM REACHING FARM, CATTLE AND INDUSTRIAL GOALS; (2) ATTITUDE  
 EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES WHICH ALSO UNFAVORABLE TO CASTRO JUDGING  
 FROM ARTICLES IN CZECH "LITERARNI NOVINY" AND "KULTURNI ZIVOT"  
 AND BRITISH "FINANCIAL TIMES" WHICH INDICATE COMECON CONSIDERS  
 FURTHER AID TO CUBA BEYOND BLOC CAPABILITIES; (3) CASTRO'S OWN  
 PROBLEMS, E.G. LACK DOLLAR CREDITS AND DEPRESSION IN WORLD SUGAR  
 MARKET WITH PRICE DROPPING FROM DEC 63 PEAK 12.6 TO 2.35 CENTS POUND

SECRET

ON 25 JAN 65.

2. LOCAL PLAY LIMITED TO MIAMI NEWS SPANISH-LANGUAGE SECTION, NORMAN DIAZ (WNET) AND MANOLO REYES (CHANNEL 4 TV), BUT TIME MAGAZINE'S J. MALLIN REQUESTED COPY OF RELEASE AND ASKED UR KEEP HIM POSTED DEVELOPMENTS THIS FIELD.

3. AIRMAILING COPIES PER REFS.

S E C R E T

*\* ATTRIBUTED STATEMENT RE SOV DISENCHANTMENT CUBA.*

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-12222

REF TO FILE NO

FILE NO  REF TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG

TOTAL COPIES 35

RI

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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FROM

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY

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VR, FILE, DAP FEB 4 11:00 G. FC 6

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SECRET 041533Z

DIR INFO ATHE PARI LOND MADR CITE (WAVE 7922 (INGHURST ACTING))

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF: A. DIR 77508

B. DIR 81025

FEB 55 IN 73733

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1. AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH SURFACING REF A MATERIAL ISSUED 3 FEB ALL LOCAL OUTLETS INCLUDING WIRE SERVICES. UNDER TITLE "GREEK FIRM LEARNS LESSON FROM TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CUBA" WITH SUBHEAD "LOSES \$182,000 AND HELD FOR DAMAGES BESIDES," RELEASE ATTRIBUTED "HIGHLY RELIABLE UNDERGROUND SOURCES."

2. BEING MAILED 17 ATHE NEWSPAPERS, 2 GREEK PAPERS NEW YORK CITY AND SEVERAL HUNDRED FREE WORLD FIRMS TRADING WITH CUBA. LOCAL AFP STRINGER ADVISES HE CABLING GIST HIS NEW YORK OFFICE.

3. POUCHING PRESS RELEASE ALL ADDEES. WILL AIRMAIL CLIPS HQS.

SECRET

CFN

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ABSTRACT		INDEX

4 Feb 65  
19-126-26

**SECRET**

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RI COPY

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<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING		
	SECRET	PRO POSTED	ACTION	ACCOM- PLISHED
TO	Deputy Chief, WH/SA	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>AKK</i>		ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	
SUBJECT	TYPIC/Operational AMSCROLL Progress Report, December 1964			
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES				
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI				
REFERENCE: UFGA 19181, dated 21 December 1964				
A. OPERATIONAL				
1. During December there was considerable pressure on AMSCROLL to join political groupings being formed by ex-Presidents Urrutia and Prio. Fortunately, AMSCROLL was able to stay out of both without incurring the wrath of either.				
B. PRODUCTION				
2. Although a number of new propaganda ideas were submitted by AMSCROLL for approval, the only new item for Cuban consumption actually printed during the month was the pony bulletin. This and other items already on hand, including 5,000 Christmas cards, totalled 47,000 pieces which were sent in 20,000 covers to Cuba. Another 10,000 items were distributed to Latin America and Spain, and 13,700 to addressees in the U. S. Most of the two latter categories were based on requests from religious, social, and civic organizations. Samples of the items and a breakdown of the actual numbers of each distributed are in the attached AMSCROLL Propaganda Section report.				
3. AMSCROLL broadcasts continued as scheduled. Chief among the themes, which also pervaded the two issues of the AMSCROLL house organ published during the month and the above-mentioned pony bulletin for Cuba, were as follows:				
a. The Congo in lurid detail with outrage at the Communist hand behind the atrocities, and with scorn for the so-called neutralists for their attitude for the rescue mission. AMSCROLL editorialized that except for the cannibalism, Congo tactics including ravage and wanton murder are what brought Stalin, Tito, Mao, and Fidel to power.				
(Continued)				
Attachment:	1. Report & Propaganda Samples, USC			
Distribution:	3- DC, WH/SA, w/att., USC			
	CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED	
		20, Jan, 65	FEB 1 1965	
		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		
		UFGA 19537		
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER		
		19-120-26/3		
	CLASSIFICATION			
	SECRET			

S E C R E T

UFGA 19537

b. AMSCROLL optimistically sees the start of a counter offensive against the rampages of Communism in Latin America. Examples cited were Castello Branco's action in Goiaz Province, Brazil; Venezuelan Army operations in the Andes; Panamanian preparations to control agitation on the anniversary of the Canal riots; Argentine Foreign Minister Zavala's public denunciation of Soviet colonialism in Cuba; Jagan's defeat at the polls in Guiana; and "Operation Ayacucho," a seven-nation military maneuver against an "imaginary" target which has Latin American Communists screaming "foul!"

c. "Che" Guevara's statements before the UN and during his television interview contrasted with quotations from previous speeches, especially his current whining for trade openings with the U. S. as opposed to past claims that U. S. sugar purchases kept Cuba in a state of colonialism. Much was made of the remark of the Nicaraguan delegate to the UN that Guevara's address on behalf of Cuba was a Russian speech with an Argentine accent. It was also noted that "Che" admitted Cuba's support of the terrorism in Venezuela.

d. Cuba's worsening economic situation was, as heretofore, a constant theme. Featured this month were the obvious failures of the foraging trips of Carlos Rodriguez and "Che" Guevara, and a host of specific examples of material shortages admitted by Cuban public media.

e. The Martinez Sanchez suicide and the lack of precise details, especially in its aftermath, got considerable attention in AMSCROLL propaganda, along with other notes on GOC strife.

f. The Sino-Soviet rift was expected to continue, according to AMSCROLL, and the situation does not bode well for Castro's relations with the new Kremlin leaders. Examples taken from press clippings.

g. The CTV boycott against free-world ships trading with Cuba was favorably noted as another facet of the tightening of the noose around Fidel's neck.

h. End-of-year broadcasts centered on the decline of Communism; after a half century it still fails to improve the living standards of the peoples engulfed, but instead increases terror and oppression to forge the populations into automatons for use in the realization of its mad dream of world conquest.

4. Among letters received during the month was a request from Palo Alto, California for a complete set of AMSCROLL publications for the Hoover Institute's archives on world revolutions.

5. AMFRAME-1, who is now second man in the AMSCROLL Propaganda Section by dint of his demonstrated imagination and initiative, came up with a proposal during the month to test reaction to printed materials being sent to Cuba. Implemented immediately, it consists of a small coupon which accompanies each item mailed to 15,000 addressees on a rotating basis each month. The total is divided into four groups for sample purposes, each group being asked to respond to requests for general, readily available information on the basis of different stimuli, either to have the respondent's code name announced over the radio or just listed among the "many" others who are contributing to the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. Theoretically, the assistance would be more fully acknowledged after the liberation. On the basis of results achieved during the first few months, the system will be refined until the most successful method for testing Cuban audience reaction is found. A report will be submitted when sufficient returns are in. The AMSCROLL Propaganda Section report, attached, contains further details and a sample of the coupon.

6. We were pleased to receive EGFA 43043 which credited AMSCROLL propaganda with a minor MHVIPER score on a West German firm which was doing business with Cuba. Evidently a number of free-world firms are disturbed in the same way by AMSCROLL's sabre-rattling letters on the possibility of a black list. A report is being prepared analyzing replies from target firms.

III. FINANCIAL

Salaries.....	\$4,745.00
Operational expenditures .....	9,180.75
TOTAL	\$13,925.75

IV. FUTURE PLANS

7. In process at month's end were a two-year analysis of the campaign against free-world shipping to Cuba, noting gains made and the job still to be done, for publication in booklet form; a new leaflet for Cuba showing how personal and family security are endangered more by not doing anything than by taking whatever steps against the regime are possible depending upon the opportunities which arise; and a leaflet for Latin American distribution showing on a map of Cuba the reported sites for the training of terrorists. A new departure in propaganda to Cuba will be the printing of the backs of all future leaflets in script form so that they will appear to be handwritten letters if viewed through the envelopes. Heretofore AMSCROLL has been enfolding other printed material in a simulated handwritten wrapper, but now each item will have its own "personal letter" built in to save valuable weight and bulk in the covers while still hopefully deceiving Cuban postal authorities.

*for Andrew K. Reuteman*  
 Andrew K. REUTEMAN