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## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD BISSELL

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PAGES : 239

SUBJECTS :  
TRANSCRIPT, RICHARD BISSELL  
PARTICIPANTS: SENATORS CHURCH, HUDDLESTON, MORGAN, HART  
PARTICIPANTS: SENATORS TOWER, BAKER, GOLDWATER, SCHWEIKER

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SSCI Box 231, Folder 4, Testimony of Bissell

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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1 '61.

2 The questioning goes as follows: "What instructions were  
3 you given by Mr. Bissell at the meeting?"

4 Answer, from Mr. Halpern. "Mr. Bissell said that he had  
5 recently, and he didn't specify the date or the time, he had  
6 recently been chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House  
7 by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it,  
8 sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of  
9 Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both ~~Mr. Zogby~~ and  
10 to me were to plan for an operation to accomplish that end."

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11 Then at page 36 and 37, Mr. Smothers returned to the same  
12 meeting. Mr. Smothers, at page 37, asked the question of Mr.  
13 Halpern as follows:

14 Question, "Let me ask you it another way. What was your  
15 understanding of what Mr. Bissell had been told to do by the  
16 President and the Attorney General?"

17 Answer, "To get rid of Castro and the Castro regime on the  
18 island of Cuba."

19 Now, in substance, did you have such a conversation with  
20 Mr. Halpern?

21 Mr. Bissell. I assume his testimony is correct. I don't  
22 happen to remember the meeting.

23 Mr. Schwarz.. All right.

24 And did you have some conversation with the President and  
25 the Attorney General in which they told you in effect, in

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23 June 1975

SUBJECT: Question 3 of 4 Questions Developed during SSC Hearing of Mr. Richard Bissell on 12 June 1975:

"A CIA cable (OUT 51708, dated 1 May 1961) contains a paragraph that certain information from another cable or report was to be withheld from the Department of State. The Committee question is, What is it that was to be withheld? Why? Was it actually withheld and for how long?"

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 3:

This answer is based on our assumption that the Committee's query concerns paragraph two, OUT 51708. The background is this. Consul General Dearborn had instructed the Chief of Station to determine from CIA whether or not detailed information on plans of the dissidents to undertake the assassination of Trujillo which the Consul General had acquired and reported to CIA (IN 44067, 30 April 1961) had been given to the Department of State. CIA Headquarters replied (OUT 51708) that the substantive intelligence concerning the plans and identities of those who, according to the report, would participate had been passed to the Department of State on 1 May 1961.

In its reply (OUT 51708), CIA Headquarters appended as paragraph two a query of its own. With parenthetical

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~~The Department of State postpones the release of this document under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)~~

Reviewed on 9/5/94 *[Signature]* S E C R E T

~~Reviewed on 7/5/94 *[Signature]*  
Postponed Under [Signature]~~

clarifications added to permit easier understanding, it was:

"(Mr. John Barfield, a Foreign Service Officer who was then assigned to the Consulate) IS NOW HQS AREA (meaning in Washington, D.C.). PLEASE ADVISE PRIORITY IF HE WITTING (that M 3 sub-machine guns) POUCHED TO STATION AND IF HE AWARE THIS MATTER NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE."

The Chief of Station replied (IN 44957, 2 May 1961) that Consul General Dearborn had informed him that Mr. Barfield was aware of the presence in the Consulate of the submachine guns but that the Consul General, in a note sent via another Consulate employee who was traveling to Washington at the same time, had asked Mr. Barfield not to talk about them to Department of State personnel unless queried (presumably by authorized officials). The cable included the suggestion that CIA Headquarters ask Mr. Barfield to plead ignorance if asked about the presence of the submachine guns and to refer any inquiries in the Department of State to CIA.

The exchange evidently reflected the intent of Consul General Dearborn - and CIA Headquarters - to limit knowledgeability of sensitive details to those officials of the Department of State who were already aware. It is noted that Mr. Barfield was in 1961 the target of tendentious regime-inspired radio commentary in the Dominican Republic. Further allegations could have impaired his ability to serve in that country.

**TOP SECRET**

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

Vol. 3 OF 3

*Bissell 7/22*

*R566*

**The United States Senate**

INVENTORIED

ON 5/17/77

BY RS

**Report of Proceedings**

INVENTORIED

ON 2/16/77

BY BC

**Hearing held before**

**Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental**

**Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities**

SSCI Box 231, Folder 4

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Record Number 157-10011-10017

*10 May 74*

(1) (A)  
(1) (B)  
(1) (C)

*FBIent*

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 11/15/93

**Tuesday, July 22, 1975**

RELEASE IN FULL

RELEASE IN PART

TOTAL DENIAL

**Washington, D. C.**

*0, 17, 39, 51, 52*

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. There's one case officer I think we need for  
2 about twenty minutss on the Cubella thing, and I think his name  
3 is Nestor Sanchez.

4 Senator Schweiker. I don't think that was the name.

5 The Chairman. Well, let's see if we can get Sanchez, and  
6 then there was Pedro San Juan who can be deposed. It is a very  
7 small item, but we should track it down.

8 If there are any other loose ends, let's tie them up just  
9 as quickly as we can.

10 Mr. Smothers. Senator, we are now trying to track down  
11 the other addressees on the 13 August memorandum. We have  
12 heard from three of them, and one of them is the Ambassador to  
13 Santo Domingo, and we are sending written interrogatories.  
14 Another one, Mr. Wilson, is in today, and we have still another  
15 one who is in South Carolina, and we will be talking with him.

16 After some further inquiry, it may be necessary, we will  
17 probably have to make a decision whether we will need to talk  
18 to General Lansdale again. I believe we are already planning  
19 for Mr. Maheu and if we are, we should certainly have that  
20 picture clear in about another week.

21 The Chairman. Last night, Senator Tower and I met with  
22 the leadership relative to the problem that the Committee faces  
23 with finishing up its work on the assassination issue. It was  
24 the strong feeling of the leadeership that the Committee should  
25 issue a united report and that we should make every effort to

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1 Mr. Bissell. Well, Ray Kline, at that time, I think was  
2 ~~the Station Chief~~ in Taiwan. Roberts was a Marine, a retired  
3 Marine officer who was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation.

4 The Chairman. Well, wasn't the other man then brought  
5 over to also be in this project as well? He was, initially.

6 Mr. Bissell. I don't believe Mr. Kline was ever involved  
7 in it. I could be wrong about that, but I am almost certain  
8 that he was not.

9 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read  
10 the whole paragraph so that nobody accuses me of excerpting  
11 part or parcel of the paragraph. It tells a package, but it  
12 has some names I'd like to ask the witness about. It says,  
13 "Whether or not the zealots received direct orders from the  
14 President or the Attorney General, they did receive orders to  
15 eliminate Castro from power in Cuba. The secret war was a  
16 result of that policy, and Castro's assassination, if not  
17 specified, was a logical objective of that war. Acting on the  
18 President's authority, JMWAVE trained several thousand Cubans  
19 in guerrilla tactics, armed then with weapons and explosives  
20 and sent them down to the Caribbean with hopes of glory. All  
21 of them sought to end Castro's hold on Cuba, and many of them  
22 made attempts on Castro's life in the impromptu tradition in  
23 the attack on the Laquina Hotel which is referred to above.  
24 By the end of 1961" -- I believe this is in your timeframe,  
25 Mr. Bissell -- "several men affiliated with the CIA had already

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1 Mr. Dennin. Now, in Paragraph 2 of the same memorandum,  
2 it is stated that these arms would presumably be used against  
3 key members of the Trujillo regime?

4 Mr. Bissell. That's right.

5 Mr. Dennin. That's the last sentence of Paragraph 2.  
6 And you are aware, are you not, sir, that this memorandum was  
7 concurred in by your Deputy that would be at the time Mr. Helms,  
8 where it says, concurred, Deputy Director of Plans? And from  
9 your review of the IG report, I take it that you did not concur  
10 in it, but that Mr. Helms did in your absence?

11 Mr. Bissell. I believe that is the case. This copy  
12 doesn't show it.

13 Mr. Dennin. We have requested, and I heard again on this  
14 from Mr. Elder yesterday, that there is no copy extant which  
15 would show who actually signed, on behalf of the Chief, Western  
16 Hemisphere Division, and I can inform you sir, that  
17 that was not again, according to the IG report, Colonel King,  
18 but apparently in his absence, his deputy, ~~Mr. Gomez~~ was not  
19 you as DDP, but it was your deputy who concurred in that, and  
20 further that it was not the Director of Central Intelligence  
21 which approved it, but his Deputy, at the time General Cabell.

22 Mr. Bissell. Right.

23 Mr. Dennin. Everybody was apparently out of town at that  
24 particular point.

25 (The document referred

1 the outgoing the same.

2 Mr. Dennin. The Deputy being the COP?

3 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

4 Mr. Dennin. And the C/CA, that was the individual in the  
5 office charged with what?

6 Mr. Bissell. Covert action.

7 Mr. Dennin. Specifically that would include provision of  
8 things and getting advice on things like placing bombs?

9 Mr. Bissell. I suppose it would, although most of its  
10 efforts had to do with political action.

11 Mr. Dennin. Turning to Tab K, that being a memorandum for  
12 the record of the February 15 meeting in New York, the memorandum  
13 of February 16, you will note on page 5 that that memoranda  
14 describes a meeting held between the Chief, WH3, that branch  
15 of the CIA having direct line responsibility for the Dominican  
16 Republic.

17 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

18 Mr. Dennin. And the Chief at that time would have been a  
19 ~~Mr. Ned Holman~~?

20 Mr. Bissell. I believe that's right.

21 Mr. Dennin. And this memorandum represents the meeting

22 ~~Mr. Holman~~ had in New York City with ~~EMDECK-4~~ and his cousin.

23 And in Paragraph 2 of that memorandum it is stated that U.S.

24 Consul Dearborn has given the opinion that ~~EMDECK-4~~ is

25 "the king pin in the plot of the Dominican Republic." Do you

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1 see that, sir?

2 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.

3 Mr. Dennin. Now let me point out a couple of things  
4 raised in this memorandum. Once again there is very specific  
5 discussion of assassination, a method of assassinating Mr.  
6 Trujillo which is discussed as using a powerful bomb. A  
7 further method is putting poison in Trujillo's food or alter-  
8 natively in his medicine, and finally, possible methods of  
9 delivering arms and materials to the dissidents are discussed.  
10 Specifically at the end of that Paragraph 3 you will note that  
11 ~~Holman~~ reports that ~~EMDECK~~ turned his attention away from arms  
12 and started talking about delivery of other types of materials,  
13 exotic materials, powerful bombs,

14 Mr. Bissell. I am not finding that particular paragraph.

15 Mr. Dennin. Say the beginning of Paragraph 4. Let me  
16 just read you the first sentence of Paragraph 4.

17 "~~EMDECK-4~~ said the object of obtaining this kind of help  
18 anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using  
19 arms or grenades, he began to speak of more exotic materials  
20 and methods." And then it goes on to talk about the powerful  
21 bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's  
22 evening walk.

23 Do you see that, sir?

24 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.

25 Mr. Dennin. Would you agree with me that there is no

1 question whatsoever that based upon this memorandum for the  
2 record, if it accurately describes the conversation which the  
3 Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division-3 participated, that  
4 assassination was being discussed, that it was being discussed  
5 in a very specific sense, and that it was made perfectly clear,  
6 as the first sentence in Paragraph 4 indicates, that the purpose  
7 to which the exotic materials sought by the dissidents would be  
8 put was the assassination of Mr. Trujillo?

9 Mr. Bissell. I do.

10 Mr. Dennin. <sup>X</sup>Would you feel that this memorandum would have  
11 come to your attention, either directly from ~~Mr. Holman~~, or  
12 from his immediate superior, Colonel King?

13 Mr. Bissell. <sup>X</sup>I would guess this or a summary, and  
14 conceivably it could have come to my attention, again in the  
15 form of an outgoing cable or something of that sort. (96)X

16 Mr. Dennin. Now having taken some time to go over this,  
17 sir, and the reason I do, I would like you now to turn to and  
18 consider the memorandum from you which is under Exhibit L  
19 in the Senator's bill -- and Curt, you have in your book, on  
20 top of that, the minutes of this Special Group meeting, on  
21 February 14th, '61.

(The document referred to  
was marked as Bissell  
Exhibit No. 9 for identifica-  
tion.)

1 The Chairman. Why didn't you include that in the memor-  
2 andum?

3 Mr. Bissell. <sup>A</sup> I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not  
4 remember what considerations moved me. I don't know whether  
5 it was because this was common knowledge and it seemed to me  
6 unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, there was  
7 an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if  
8 it were the latter, in this case. (103) A

9 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, if Counsel will yield? Since  
10 I was originally asked to join Counsel to do work up on the  
11 Trujillo program, and I think he knows this too, it appears in  
12 the record before the Committee out of the '67 Inspector  
13 General's report and all of the cable traffic which was directed  
14 from the Consul General to the State Department through the  
15 CIA channels that this plan of the high explosive device was  
16 transmitted to Consul General Dearborn, ~~the Station Chief~~ who  
17 promptly classified it as an insane idea, which, if they try  
18 to do this, because of the heavy guard, they're going to all  
19 get themselves killed.

20 And it would appear to me that if that transpired before  
21 the memorandum, the memorandum standing on its own looks very  
22 bad, but with this other information having been transmitted  
23 back to the Dominican Republic that it was a foolish plan, it  
24 would appear that there was no plan that they thought was  
25 workable in the United States government.

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1 Mr. Dennin. Among other things, that advises -- well,  
 2 that our position, our being the Agency, is that you should  
 3 attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents  
 4 to the opposition groups until headquarters, by that you mean  
 5 CIA headquarters, are better prepared to support assassination  
 6 and assassination is added in, I believe the original word is  
 7 the code, ~~EMSEWA~~ effect a change in the regime and to cope  
 8 with the aftermath.

9 On page 2, it indicates that "Headquarters is prepared to  
 10 take the following actions: deliver machine guns and ammunition,  
 11 as soon as the capability to receive those was developed" and it  
 12 *B it* was always the understanding and knowledge of Headquarters at  
 13 that time and specifically your understanding and knowledge when  
 14 you received and reviewed this cable, that those sought after  
 15 machine guns were to be used specifically in connection with  
 16 an assassination attempt on Trujillo, wasn't that so?

17 Mr. Bissell. It probably was. I don't remember whether  
 18 there was any other use, possible use of them, but I'm going  
 19 to let that stand. (107) *B*

20 Mr. Dennin. Well, going back to just those, there is no  
 21 doubt on that, to the document at Tab M, M as in Mary --

(The document referred  
 to was marked Bissell  
 Exhibit No. 11 for  
 identification.)

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1 Mr. Dennin. Going into April, sir, now, trying to move  
 2 somewhat quickly, in April of 1961, ~~Mr. Owen~~ returned from the  
 3 Dominican Republic and, as reflected in the document under Tab  
 4 O which is an April 11, '61 memorandum, that reflects an  
 5 April 6, '61 with ~~Mr. Owen~~ and he was ~~the Chief of Station~~ in  
 6 the Dominican Republic, was he not, sir?

(The document referred  
 to was marked Bissell  
 Exhibit No. 14 for  
 identification.)

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1 signed this cable, which was not sent, approving the passage  
 2 of the machine guns, a Mr. Herbert, representing the Agency,  
 3 went and saw Mr. Buler at the State Department, and this would  
 4 be under Tab V, as in Victor.

(The document referred  
 to was marked Bissell  
 Exhibit No. 16 for  
 identification.)

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7 Juno 1961

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10 MAY 94

(1) (A)  
(1) (B)  
(1) (C)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Record and Related Policy Decisions on Passing  
Arms to Dominican Dissidents

1. The following is taken from a Memorandum dated 11  
May 1960, Subject: Briefing of Ambassador Farland:

"The Ambassador began by saying that according to  
"Mr. Number One", the leader of the Dominican Dissident  
princeps, (whom he did not identify), the dissidents need  
guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they  
need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic  
sights. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the  
purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the  
dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question  
of whether the United States Government wants to engage in  
this activity."

2. On 21 June 1960 Ambassador Farland told ~~Mr. Holman~~ that  
he thought that an air drop would be the best way to deliver the  
arms to the Dominican dissidents. Ambassador Farland sketched  
for ~~Mr. Holman~~ the location of three possible sites for landing  
a light aircraft near Ciudad Trujillo.

3. In a meeting on 23 June 1960 Assistance Secretary  
Rubottom told Col. J. C. King that the Government of the  
United States was prepared to provide the Dominican dissidents  
with a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the  
removal of key Trujillo people from the scene.

4. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan  
of covert action, to be largely effected through ~~Mr. Holman~~  
~~for Costa Rica, Jose Marti~~, and providing for increased  
propaganda directed against Generalissimo TRUJILLO, and for the  
financial support of selected exile groups. Additionally this  
approval included authorization for the CIA to make available  
to selected exile groups communications equipment and support  
necessary for them to develop a capability of infiltrating  
personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic.

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5. At 12 January 1961 meeting of this Special Group, Mr. Livingston Merchant stated that the Department of State felt that a limited number of small arms and other materials should be made available for the dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Thomas Parrett of the CIA said that he believed that this could be accomplished securely by the CIA and that the plan would stipulate that the actual introduction of the materials into the Dominican Republic would be the responsibility of the Dominican dissidents themselves. The decision of the Special Group was communicated to Consul Dearborn in Ciudad Trujillo, and in a letter dated 31 January 1961 to Mr. Frank Devine of the State Department, Consul Dearborn made the following remark: "With regard to the delivery of the exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision has been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and a too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6. In ~~REF ID: A62~~ 0462, dated 15 March 1961, ~~Consul Station~~, ~~Robert C. [redacted]~~ made the following request: "1. For issue to several dissident people Consul Dearborn requests three thirty-eight caliber Smith & Wesson special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending ammunition complicates problems, advise and we will try to get it from the Marines." The Deputy Director of Plans on 23 March 1961 approved this request and the CIA immediately provided the requested material to the Station. One of these weapons was given to ~~Jorge [redacted]~~, a dissident leader, by Consul Dearborn, and the other two were passed by the Station to ~~Antonio [redacted]~~, an American ~~agent~~ in direct touch with the action element of the dissident organization.

7. On 28 March 1961 in ~~REF ID: A486~~ 0486 ~~the Station~~ requested permission to pass three M-1 Carbines, Cal 30 and supply of ammunition which was available in the Consulate. Also desired U. S. Naval personnel to be passed to the dissidents. This message ~~REF ID: A485~~ 0485 was concurred in by Consul Dearborn and ~~REF ID: A497~~ 0497, dated 31 March, which stated Consul Dearborn also concurred in stated: "We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of support and goodwill to ~~[redacted]~~ dissident leader, ~~name~~. These items (carbines and ammunition) are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The Agency in DIR 32493 of 31 March 1961 approved ~~[redacted]~~ passing the carbines and ammunition and the material was passed to the dissident group over a period of several days in early April 1961 by secure means through the Station cut-out to the dissident, ~~[redacted]~~"

03150

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15 FEBRUARY 61

SECRET

ROUTING

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FEB 16 21 34 '61

DIRECTOR

CIUDAD TRUJILLO

C/WH 2

COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

IN 46419

DIR

INFO

CITE **TRUJ** 0398

**RYBAT EMBEED**

RE: DIR 25039 (OUT 73178)

1. WILL GET REF INFO SOON POSSIBLE BUT CIA officer THINKS ORIGINAL **EMOTH** PLAN FOR ACTION AT CORNERS MAXIMO GOMEZ AND GEORGE WASHINGTON USING HIGH EXPLOSIVE UTTERLY OUT OF QUESTION DUE CONSTANT GUARD THAT POINT. CIA officer VIEW SOME REMOTE CHANCE PLACE CHARGE IN STORM SEWER DRAINING TO SEA ON GEORGE WASHINGTON OPPOSITE JARAGUA BUNGALOWS. THIS MEANS PUT RADIO DEVICE UNDER AIR CONDITIONER IN BUNGALOW. IF THICKNESS GREATER THAN 3 INCHES THIS PLACEMENT TO BE EXCLUDED. GOOD CHANCE DISCOVERY DEVICE AND OR CHARGE IN THIS SITUATION BUT WILL POUCH PHOTOS PENDING RECEIPT **EMOTH** OFFICIAL PLAN.

2. NO DEVICE HERE TO MONITOR PARA 3 E REF FREQS.

END OF MESSAGE

\*C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED INFO RE **EMOTH** PLAN.

*Duplicate  
EXHIBIT 5  
7/5/75  
RST*

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EYES ONLY

16 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with [REDACTED] and his Cousin

1. On 15 February I went to the Biltmore Plaza Hotel in New York registering under the name of [REDACTED] and met with [REDACTED] and his cousin [REDACTED] for approximately 5 hours during which we discussed activities and support of the opposition in the Dominican Republic.

2. I might mention that we have recently been informed by U.S. Consul [REDACTED] that in his opinion [REDACTED] is the king pin of the plot in the Dominican Republic. I would like to say that after this and previous meetings with [REDACTED] I am strongly inclined to concur in the U.S. Consul's opinion.

3. First off, I explained the authorization for the delivery of arms and other materials under certain conditions and suggested that we go into the details of how such delivery might be effected. I said that it had been suggested that an island cache near the Dominican Republic could be picked up by the internal action groups, but the cousin and [REDACTED] ruled out this possibility saying that all these islands, although sparsely populated, are regularly patrolled by Dominican guards. They did however agree that a boat-to-boat delivery could be made off the coast of the Dominican Republic from vessels under our control to fishing vessels owned by younger members of the internal front. They said however that the delivery would have to be made near the mouth of a river since the plotters would not be able to unload on patrolled beaches but would have to sail up some river for some distance before the material could be securely unloaded. [REDACTED] played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of arms although he did say that it is desirable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quantities of arms from Army contacts from Dominican Army munitions depots but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desirable to have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any moment desired.

4. [REDACTED] said that the object of obtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materials and methods which he thought could be more easily adapted. First of all he came up with the idea of a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a near by electronic device. He

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EYES ONLY

-2-

seemed to think ~~that~~ this would be a very easy thing to do, and I had a difficult time explaining to him that we are advised by experts that such a device is very delicate and uncertain. Another method that he brought up would be the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. ~~Some~~ said that he would explore the latter possibility and try to determine whether Trujillo buys his medicine locally or whether they are flown in from the United States. They seem to believe that one or two poison pills could be put into a bottle of medicine and that eventually the dictator would work himself down to one of these pills.

5. A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator.

6. At this point ~~some~~ said that a large percentage of the military are most anxious for a change in government and that if the old man were erased there would be no difficulty setting up a provisional government along the lines that the internal front has expressed to us before. I pushed this point and asked him if he did not think he would have to call for help in the event certain Trujillo officers did not quit and attempted to set up a continuist government. ~~Some~~ felt so certain that everything would be all right once Trujillo was eliminated that it took some time to even get him to consider that a possibility of immediate trouble after Trujillo's elimination might exist. The cousin said at this point that he had been told that if the internal front could set up a small group as a provisional government at this time and this group broadcast an appeal for help, U.S. troops would move in in response to maintain order. I pointed out that whoever had told him this did not understand that legally U.S. forces cannot under the present rules enter in such form to support a government that is not in control of the country. I then put forth the proposition that if such a situation did come about, why Balaguer as constitutional president of the country could not be forced or persuaded to issue such an appeal. Both agreed that Balaguer

could be easily made to do this. However, ~~some~~ expressed the opinion that if the U.S. sent troops in in response to an appeal from Balaguer it would appear to the populace that the U.S. is supporting the successor of Trujillo. He seemed quite relieved when I told him that I did not believe the U.S. would offer any support to a continuist government.

PROPERTY  
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

EYES ONLY

SECRET  
EYES ONLY

-3-

7. With regard to the all important point as to support the opposition might expect from the military, neither [REDACTED] or the cousin would or could name any officers on whom they could count; however, it was clear that the key man in their planning is retired General Juan Tomas Diaz. I asked specifically how he could be of any immediate assistance when he doesn't have an active command, to which they replied that Diaz is still the most highly respected army officer in the country. Not only that, they said he may be able to influence the course of action of General Roman, the present Chief of Staff of the Army, even though Roman has made his fortune as a close collaborator of Trujillo and his family. They maintain that as a matter of fact Diaz has already been in contact with Roman and that Diaz can count on Roman obeying his orders at the proper time. They said that Roman cannot be bought off at this time because he is amassing a tidy fortune from his salary and the graft allowed him. However, they maintain that Roman, as are many other people close to Trujillo, is aware that Trujillo's days are numbered and Roman would be tremendously interested in collaborating with the right people in the opposition for the purpose of insuring his own security as well as that of his family. [REDACTED] seemed firm in his opinion that various people who are now or have been close to Trujillo are prepared to collaborate with the opposition at the right moment because of fear for their own personal security and that of their families.

8. It was obvious that the cousin and [REDACTED] set great store by Diaz and it also seems clear that the cousin is the contact of the opposition leadership with Diaz. To [REDACTED]'s suggestion that it would strengthen Diaz tremendously if he could be contacted directly or through his wife officially by an American to let him know that he and the opposition can count on U.S. support against the dictatorship, I expressed the opinion that such action might be highly desirable and asked how such contact would be made. Since neither [REDACTED] or cousin could offer any suggestions, I will ask for [REDACTED]'s comments on the feasibility and desirability of such contact.

9. At this point [REDACTED] went off on the Subject of help from Botancourt and asked why it would not be feasible for the Venezuelans to bomb several targets in the Dominican Republic. I told him that discussions of such a course of action came up some months ago but had not been followed up on for reasons that I cannot now recall offhand. At this point [REDACTED] showed the highest point of enthusiasm that I have seen him reach and he said that if the Venezuelans would carry out a bombing raid with four or five planes aiming at such targets as San Isidro Airbase and one or two other targets, the Trujillo government would collapse and a change would be made immediately. He said that the military as a whole is completely fed up and is ready for a change and that such action as the bombings, showing how really defenseless the Dominican Republic is, would galvanize them immediately into action with the encouragement of the Dominican internal opposition. While I cannot say he convinced me that the

bombings would bring about a successful revolution, it is certainly evident that he is convinced in his own mind that this single action would bring out immediately the downfall of Trujillo and a change to a moderate government led by members of the internal opposition. He strongly urged that such action be planned and carried out immediately and seemed disappointed briefly, at least, when I told him that no authority existed for such action concerned and that in any event the planned and carrying out of such action would take some time.

10. [REDACTED] strongly urged that we build up better capabilities for producing anti-Trujillo propaganda into the Dominican Republic and again urged us to use the medium and short waves of radio station. After some conversation he agreed that people like Jimenez, Rafael Bonilla, and Homero Hernandez would be good people to plan and cooperate in such a program but he emphasized that these men should not be publicly identified with the program and that the broadcasts themselves should, for maximum effect, be made by professional newscasters. He said that such propaganda should be directed at irritating and upsetting Trujillo as much as possible.

11. In regard to the exiles, he agreed that Juan Isidro Jimenez, although he has been gone a long while from the Dominican Republic, is still a man highly respected for his intelligence and culture and he seemed receptive to the idea put forth that Jimenez should be occupying an important position in the post-Trujillo government. In discussing other exiles I managed to work in the name of Horacio Ornes. Both he and his cousin [REDACTED] aware he is engaged in anti-Trujillo exile activity in Puerto Rico both said that they had no objection to coordinating their activity with those of Ornes and his group. [REDACTED] said that he could set up a channel of communication to Fidelio Despradel, who will be a member in Puerto Rico of the Jimenez group and he said he would do so when requested.

12. On the subject of the exiles, [REDACTED] said that it was some time before the leaders of internal opposition learned that we had let relations die with such people as other opposition leaders. He said that on this trip he has talked to [REDACTED] and asked why he had not been receiving messages from him, whereupon [REDACTED] replied that we no longer had relations with him. (This is the first I knew that [REDACTED] had communications with [REDACTED] specifically.) [REDACTED] pleaded that we resumed contact with such people as other opposition leaders, because he said that it was important that he maintain friendly relationships with exiles wherever possible. [REDACTED] also suggested that we furnish the internal opposition with the identities of those exiles of whom we have a bad opinion and they would see to it that through family connections these people would be straightened out and developed so as to become of assistance to a future government and not bitter against members of the internal opposition of the U.S. I agreed with [REDACTED] in principle and said that we would try to do

other opposition leader

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

PROPERTY OF  
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE  
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EYES ONLY

-5-

as he asked out at the same time I pointed out that there were not many of the Dominican exiles that set in this category as far as we know and that if we had dropped some of them it was not because of anything we have against them but would be due to the fact that with limited time and personnel we can only afford to work with those who hold out some prospect of eventual help.

13. As a last point, I emphasized to ~~RODRIGUEZ~~ and his cousin the necessity for the development of stay behind communication facilities and asked them to try to locate some communicators who we could give instructions and equipment to in the Dominican Republic. Both the men were quite pleased to learn that we are interested in setting up alternate channels of communication.

The

14. cousin whose New York address and phone number are on file, will go into a New York hospital for a serious operation in the next few days and will be in New York probably for several months. ~~RODRIGUEZ~~ will return to the Dominican Republic on or about 23 February and in the meantime can be reached by me using the name of \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ in New York.

C/WH/3

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET

INTEROFFICE PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Situation

Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960 U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment of the CODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy. The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see" attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.

On 26 January the CODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul James A. McManara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President Betancourt.

It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations. We say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall the CODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S. consular relations.

II, Operational Summary

A. General It will be recalled that on 24 January 1961 the Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican groups with limited arms and equipment provided their delivery to elements within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans. Immediately following this decision we indicated to witting leaders of the VAD (BETANCOURT - FIGUERES - ORNES Group) and the PCR (Internal Dissident Group with whom DEANGORE is in touch) that we were prepared to provide them a limited supply of arms and equipment provided they developed the capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.

On 27 January Embassy Caracas was authorized to inform President BETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and technical guidance to VAD activities directed by Horacio ORNES,

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specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locating sites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the political organization of the VPD and propaganda. On 30 January [redacted] Caracas is authorized to inform ESTANCOURT that Headquarters was prepared to consider providing arms and equipment to any bona fide resistance element with whom adequate contact can be established. ESTANCOURT was to be encouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered useful to further objectives of the project. [redacted] reported that President ESTANCOURT was gratified to receive the above information.

In Headquarters contact with FCR exiled leaders, they disclosed their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices. They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability. On the other hand the VPD, while claiming no internal organization, claimed a sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments of President ESTANCOURT and Jose FIGUEROES.

B. Frente Civica Revolucionaria (FCR)

(1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders of the FCR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadre in Puerto Rico. It is contemplated that they will develop maritime capability, be in touch with their internal counterparts through W/T facilities, and develop plans for implementing the internal group's plan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with the OPHES Group (VPD) and in the interests of security we plan to keep them compartmented for the time being.

(2) Through [redacted] in Ciudad Trujillo we are attempting to ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay-behind communication capability.



C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)

(1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the OPHES group) in repairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an arms delivery capability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to complete this work. Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.

(2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda and organizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope that the VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information within the Dominican Republic.

D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability

(1) During the summer of 1960 VII Division made use of Fernando MUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head of the

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22-12609

001

DATE 20 MARCH 1961

SECRET

DIRECTOR

FROM ~~CIUDAD TRUJILLO~~

ACTION: C/MH 2 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR WH AT 2320, 19 MAR) , WH NOTIFIED AT 2320, 19 MAR)

INFO DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, ADDP/A, S/L

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REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 21455

*Details on involvement in assassination planning*

TO DIR

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CITE

~~TRUJ~~ 0471

~~RYBAT EMBEDED~~

1. STATION/SAW an/ AND an/ opposition leader ABOUT TWO HOURS 18 MAR AT PRADO APARTMENT. SECURITY PRESUMABLY MAINTAINED BUT SIM CARS IN RELATIVE ABUNDANCE IN NEIGHBORHOOD AFTER MEET WHICH NOT SURPRISING AS IT END TRUJILLO STROLL TIME.

2. An / opposition leader PROVED BE DOUR NOT PARTICULARLY OPEN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD TO BE COAXED AT TIMES BY an / opposition member WHO MUCH BETTER MOTIVATED AND PROBABLY MORE DYNAMIC. NOTE HOWEVER an / opposition leader HAD LITTLE WARNING MEET AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT OR WHOM EXPECT. NEVERTHELESS PAST AMERICAN RECORD DOMREP AND WIDESPREAD ASSUMPTION TRUJILLO HAS MANY KEY AMERICANS IN POCKET OBVIOUSLY MAKE FOR DIFFICULT ATMOSPHERE FOR WORK WITH an / opposition leader ONE RESULT IS HE SEEMS VERY HESITANT NOW REVEAL MORE NAMES OR MINUTE DETAILS. DOUBT WILL AGREE TO MORE MEETS SOON FOR UNDERSTANDABLE SECURITY REASONS.

3. HIS GROUP / assassination PLAN NOW THIS. GROUP KNOWS IDENTITY Trujillo MISTRESS IN CAPITAL. HE VISITS HER ONCE WEEK OR ONCE IN TWO WEEKS. GOES HER APARTMENT INCOGNITO AND LIGHTLY GUARDED. GROUP APPARENTLY HAS SOMEONE IN BUILDING WHO CAN ALERT THEM TO VISIT. DRESSED AS ARMY OFFICERS SMALL GROUP WILL GO TO ENTRANCE, DISTRACT GUARD WITH

SECRET

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28 MARCH 1961

SECRET

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OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

GROUP 0471 IN 21455

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PRETEXT, DISPATCH HIM OR THEM IN SILENCE, ENTER APARTMENT AND TRY assassination POSSIBLY INCLUDING MISTRESS, IN SILENCE.

4. TO DO THEY NEED FIVE M 3 OR COMPARABLE MACHINEGUNS AND 1500 ROUNDS AMMO FOR PERSONAL DEFENSE IN EVENT FIRE FIGHT. WILL USE QUIET WEAPONS FOR BASIC JOB. An / <sup>opposition leader</sup> EVEN TURNED DOWN TENTATIVE

OFFICER OFFER MARINE CONCUSSION GRENADES AVAILABLE HERE. SAYS ALL IN GROUP EXCEPT HIM ACQUAINTED RAPID FIRE WEAPONS.

5. MUCH FUTILE SPARRING ON USE AIR OR SEA DROPS. An / <sup>opposition lead</sup> FINAL POSITION WAS US Govt GET ITEMS HERE SOONEST VIA POUCH OR SIMILAR MEANS. EVIDENT HE ACTUALLY WORRIED THAT DELIVERY BY OTHER MEANS WOULD COMPROMISE ENTIRE PROJECT! OBVIOUS HE CAN COUNT ON ONLY ONE GROUP BOTH RECEIVE ARMS AND DO / <sup>assassination</sup> APPARENT THAT TO INSIST ON WAYS WHICH MORE SECURE FOR US Govt WOULD TAX HIS RESOURCES TO SUCH EXTENT THAT HE INSISTS THAT AFTER / <sup>Assassination</sup> AIR DROPS WILL BE FEASIBLE AS PART EFFORT CONTROL SITUATION HE MIGHT DECIDE DROP PLAN.

OFFICER EMPHASIZED THAT IF HQS WILL NOT POUCH ITEMS THIS DOES NOT MEAN NO US Govt INTEREST IN PLAN. THIS THOUGHT EASIER SELL <sup>opposition mt</sup> THAN an / <sup>opposition leader</sup> BUT BOTH OBVIOUSLY FIGURE THEIR DAYS NUMBERED AND WANT TO STRIKE NOW.

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DATE 20 MARCH 1961

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OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

0471 IN 21455

TO INFO CITE

and an opposition member

6. An opposition leader / CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDE APPEAL BY

BALAGUER AFTER <sup>assassination</sup> / MAINTAIN IT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL OPPOSITION AS WOULD LINK PAST WITH FUTURE. <sup>opposition leader</sup> / AN / EXPEC AND WILLING RISK CHAOS FOR PERIOD OF UNDETERMINED LENGTH AFTER

assassination MAINLY BECAUSE FOR SECURITY REASONS HIS GROUP CANNOT

APPROACH MILITARY AND HOPE TO GET DECISIVE AGREEMENT SUPPORT BEFORE

assassination. <sup>1</sup> OFFICER / STATION / TOOK LIBERTY SAY US GOVT CANNOT PERMIT ANOTHER C

EVOLVE FROM CHAOS. BOTH DISSIDENTS INSISTED NO COMMUNIST STRENGTH

AND NO CHANCE CASTRO WAVE HERE. <sup>opposition</sup> AN / SAID NOT EVEN CONVINCED A

REAL VALUE IN PRESENCE AMERICAN NAVY IN AREA, WHICH APPARENTLY SOME

ONE ELSE'S IDEA, EXCEPT FEELS MIGHT MAKE MILITARY MORE AMENDABLE

COOPERATE. PLACES MORE VALUE ON AUDA TYPE ACTIVITY AND MORALE

VALUE INVASION BY EXILES WHEN <sup>assassination</sup> / <sup>opposition leader</sup> DONE. AN / CLEARLY

RECOGNIZES MILITARY ONLY PEOPLE WITH REAL POWER IN CHAOS.

7. HE AGREED CIA OFFICE SUGGESTION US GOVT TRY REACH OTHER

MILITARY THRU OTHER CHANNELS. AGREED GIVE US LIST NAMES TO ASSIST

EFFORT AND AVOID CROSSED WIRES. AGAIN EVIDENT HIS ONLY MILITARY

ASSET IS a high / <sup>military leader</sup> BOTH DISSIDENTS CONCERNED THAT PROCESS OF OUR

GETTING AT MILITARY TOO SLOW BUT CIA OFFICE SOUGHT EXPLAIN ADVANTAGE

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DATE 28 MARCH 1961

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ACTION  
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OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

**TRUJ** 0471 IN 21455

TO INFO CITE

member 1  
an opposition / IS OFFICER'S CANDIDATE FOR THIS JOB. OFFICER HOPES

SEE HIM ABOUT 22 MARCH.

8. BOTH APPROVED OFFICER LEAFLET, TEXT DRAFTS WHICH POUCHING  
 opposition leader  
 22 MARCH AS HDCA 244. An / HAD VOLUNTARILY CITED RADIO  
 PROPAGANDA FROM VENEZUELA AS MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR YET IN  
 ENCOURAGING DISSIDENTS AND AWAKENING OTHERS. AGREED TO TREMENDOUS  
 VALUE SIMILAR BROADCASTS FROM AMERICA AND GREAT DESIRABILITY  
 LEAFLET DROPS. PLEASE ALERT press and propaganda section.

9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY CABLES LATER FULL CIRCLE FROM  
 opposition member  
 ORIGINAL an / PLEA FOR ARMS VIA POUCH. PERHAPS HQS NOW  
 ABLE COPE POLITICALLY THIS PROBLEM. BE ASSURED ATTITUDE OF  
 AND PRESUMABLY OF HIS GROUP IS THAT OF DROWNING MAN REACHING FOR  
 STRAW. HE WANTS STRAW AND NOT OFFERS OF SWIMMING LESSONS. HAVING  
 BEEN GIVE BAREST DETAILS LATEST / <sup>assassination</sup> PLAN CIA / OFFICER  
 ONLY THAT IT SOUNDS MORE INTELLIGENT THAN CITED **TRUJ** 0446 (IN 15268  
 US Govt RISKS LITTLE AND COULD GAIN FROM THIS GROUP'S FEAR. THUS  
 REQUEST HQS STUDY POUCHING AND ADVISE SOONEST. (END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

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24 MARCH 1961

25 MARCH 61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

VECTOR

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D/DC

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ROUTINE

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001 87265

TRUJ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

31569

REF: A. DIR 30613 (OUT 85244)\*

B. ~~TRUJ~~ 0480 (IN 22730)\*\*

C. ~~TRUJ~~ 0471 (IN 21455)\*\*\*

*See signature*

*not US Govt.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. FOR YOUR ORIENTATION AS TO CIA OBJECTIVES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE D.R., OUR ASSESSMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE TO UNDERTAKE AND SUPPORT PROGRAM TO REPLACE THE PRESENT REGIME WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BEST OF THE INTERNAL DISSIDENTS AND RESPONSIVE TO THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE INTERESTS OF U.S. / WE RECOGNIZE THAT PRECIPITOUS, UNCOORDINATED ACTION BY INTERNAL DISSIDENTS COULD LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF A LEFTIST-CASTRO TYPE REGIME. IN THE ABSENCE OF A WELL-DEVELOPED PROGRAM TO COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH, THE MERE DISPOSAL OF TRUJILLO MAY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOLUTIONS. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT ANY FAVORABLE REPLACEMENT OF THE CURRENT REGIME WILL HAVE TO DRAW UPON THE INITIAL SUPPORT AND SUBSEQUENT COOPERATION OF KEY FIGURES IN THE MILITARY. OUR POSITION IS THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO AVOID PRECIPITOUS ACTION BY THE INTERNAL DISSIDENTS UNTIL Opposition Groups AND HCS ARE BETTER PREPARED TO SUPPORT / , EFFECT A CHANGE IN THE REGIME, AND COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH. IN THE MEANTIME WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE GOODWILL AND PROVIDE ~~SUBSTANTIAL~~ SUPPORT TO Opposition/ ~~INTERIOR TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR JOINT~~ PLANNING AND OPERATIONS. THIS ~~STATE~~ SUPPORT ~~SHOULD~~ BE VIEWED AS ESSENTIAL MAINTAIN RAPPORT

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A: DIRECTOR

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ROUTINE

OUT 87865  
DIR 34569

TO: ~~SECRET~~ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

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AND CONFIDENCE NECESSARY INFLUENCE THESE PEOPLE IN THE EVENT THEY SHOULD BRING ABOUT EFFECTIVE CHANGE IN REGIME PRIOR TO DATE FIXED BY CIA. DURING THIS PERIOD WE SHOULD CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Groups

A. INTENSE DEVELOPMENT OF Opposition/ WITH EMPHASIS ON THEIR DEVELOPING CONTROLLED ASSETS WITHIN THE MILITARY.

Groups

B. DEVELOPMENT WITHIN Opposition/ TO RECEIVE ARMS AND AMMO BY SEA AND AIR. WITH EMPHASIS ON SEA RENDEZVOUS. (FYI: OPS LEAD FROM ~~SECRET~~ Contact an MINIMUM RQMS PLAN OPS BY SEPARATE CABLE.)

2. HQS IS PREPARED TAKE FOLLOW ACTIONS:

Opposition Leader

A. DELIVER MACHINE GUNS AND AMMUNITION TO / WHEN HE DEVELOPS CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE SAME. DUE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS CANNOT USE U.S.

Government FACILITIES AS CARRIER. (FYI: HQS PLANNING DELIVERY BY SEA THROUGH

~~SECRET~~ Contact OF ARMS TO BE CACHED ON DEMREP COAST IN ABSENCE ANY Opposition Leader CAPABILITY FOR ACCEPTING AT SEA. / WILL BE INFORMED OF LOCATION ONLY AFTER CACHE MADE. REQUEST STATION COLLECT INFO ON BEACH LOCATIONS WHICH DISSIDENTS HAVE ACCESS TO WHERE HQS MAY DEVELOP CAPABILITY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

(CONTINUED ON PAGE THREE)

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OUT 87835  
DIR 3156

TO: ~~SECRET~~ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

~~SECRET~~

ESTABLISH BLIND CACHE SHALLOW WATER OR BEACH.

B. AIR DROP LEAFLETS ON CAPITOL AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES PROVIDED ~~SECRET~~  
AND CIA Officer <sup>8</sup> CONSIDER ADVISABLE. (FYI: ONE HQS DEVELOPED LEAFLET  
Trujillo  
SHOWING / WHIPPING CHURCH AND MURDERING PEOPLE NOW IN PRODUCTION  
WILL BEGIN PRODUCTION REF C LEAFLETS UPON RECEIPT.)

?

C. POUCHING REVOLVERS AND AMMO REQUESTED ~~SECRET~~ 0462 (IN 20040) ON 2  
~~Station~~ contact  
DO NOT ADVISE / THIS MATERIAL BEING POUCHED. EXPLANATION  
FOLLOWS.

Department

3. HQS HAS INITIATED PLANNING WITH State/ ~~SECRET~~ CONTINGENCY THAT SUDDEN  
BY DISSIDENTS MAY PRECIPITATE CHANGE OF GOVT WITH VIEW DETERMINE WHAT OVERT U  
Gov't. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

8

4. IF ABOVE CLARIFIES HQS POSITION, CIA Officer SHOULD PROCEED ACCORDINGLY  
Department  
EVERT MAJOR POINTS REMAIN UNCLEAR, State/ PREPARING ORDERS PERMIT RETURN FOR C  
SULTATIONS. IF CONSULTATION STILL DESIRED, REQUEST CIA Officer DISCUSS POSSIBILITY  
HE MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY LEAVING AND RETURNING DR WITH ~~SECRET~~ contact  
AND ADVISE PRICE  
DEPARTURE.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

(CONTINUED ON PAGE FOUR)

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OUT 87865  
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TO: ~~SECRET~~ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

~~SECRET~~

Opposition group

W/Comment: \*UNDERSCORES LACK OF / CAPABILITIES AND ADVISES NO AUTHORIZATION FOR POUCHING ARMS.

\*URGES USE OF POUCH FOR DELIVERY OF ARMS AND ASKS HQS REQUEST AUTHORIZATION FOR AIR DROP OF ARMS AND LEAFLETS.

\*STATED ~~SECRET~~ FORWARDING DRAFT LEAFLETS.

\*\*\*DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSOP 210-311.

*RM*  
RICHARD M. BILSELL, JR.  
DDP  
RELEASING OFFICER

C/CA/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

C/ARD  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Co1

SECRET

C-X-4

11 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Project ~~SECRET~~

OIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED

13 MAY 94  
(1)(B)  
(1)(C)

1. This was a general meeting which took place in the office of C/CA on 6 April 1961 from 1630 to 1830 hours. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss ~~SECRET~~ with the ~~SECRET~~ who was temporarily at Headquarters on consultation. Participants included: ~~SECRET~~ three employees of the CA Staff; and an employee of WH/3.

2. ~~SECRET~~ gave a review of ~~SECRET~~ operational activities in ~~SECRET~~, dwelling particularly on ~~SECRET~~'s relations with the ~~SECRET~~, and especially on the insistence of the ~~SECRET~~ leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically five M3 caliber .45 S&W's), and that they be given tangible evidence in the form of a leaflet drop that ~~SECRET~~ is in sympathy with their objectives.

U.S. GOVT.

3. Discussion of the feasibility, ways and means of providing weapons, and conducting a leaflet drop, gave rise to the following questions:

a. The extent of coordination with higher authority required to conduct the leaflet drop; i.e., whether this required the approval of State, or whether it required both the approval of State and of the Special Group.

b. Whether small arms could be sent to ~~SECRET~~ via the pouch --- which was considered the only feasible means of getting arms to ~~SECRET~~ at this time.

c. The means of getting these arms into the hands of the ~~SECRET~~ without running the risk that they could be traced to ~~SECRET~~ U.S. personnel.

4. On the question of the leaflet drop it was agreed that would take up this matter with the appropriate State officials on 7 April; and on the question of using the pouch it was agreed that this should be done, and that WH/3 should request a waiver of the Pouch Regulations for this purpose.

7 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, RI

SUBJECT : Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification

REFERENCE : HECW-582

1. It is requested that the provisions of CSI No. 110-2 be waived and that the referenced dispatch number and its attachments and separate cover attachments be forwarded to the field via diplomatic air pouch.

2. The above request is submitted for the following reasons:

A. ~~Station~~ Ciudad Trujillo has requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection. During a recent visit by ~~the COS~~ to Headquarters, secure means of passing this equipment to the action group was discussed with the appropriate Headquarters staff elements.

B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they developed the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration.

C. It is contemplated that the ammunition will be forwarded as a separate cover attachment to the referenced dispatch which will forward the weapons.

3. I certify that all other transmission facilities listed in CSI No. 110-2 have been considered and found inappropriate.

Chief,  
Western Hemisphere Division

Approved:

(Signed) ~~John L. Lewis, Jr.~~

7 APR 1961

Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET

5. Regarding the transfer of arms to the MOH, after considerable discussion of alternative means, it was recommended that when these arms arrive in TRUJ they be cached by TRUJ Station personnel, who later then, at the discretion of the COS, could notify the MOH through cutouts of their location. COS said that prior to his departure, he would prepare a memorandum setting out alternate methods of getting the arms securely into the hands of the MOH. This has since been done, and a copy is herewith attached. It is recommended that further action by Headquarters be deferred pending receipt of COS's firm recommendation, as noted in paragraph 10. of his memo.

CA/PNG

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SECRET

1994  
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 AS SANITIZED

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 AS SANITIZED

13 May 94  
 (1) (A)  
 (1) (B)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/DRA/1	<i>[Signature]</i>	2 MAY 1961
2	C/WH/3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
3	DDP	<i>[Signature]</i>	
4	C/WED	<i>[Signature]</i>	2 May
5	DCI		
6	CABLE SECRETARIAT		
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE	REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO			DATE
WH/3/DRA/Ten Evanspik			2 May
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

FORM NO. 237  
 1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4  
 which may be used.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-O-342531 (40)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

RIG: ~~SECRET~~ BERNARD J. EVANS, JR.  
UNIT: WH/3/DIR  
EXT: 2056  
DATE: 2 MAY 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: CIUDAD TRUJILLO (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM  
AS SANITIZED  
1994  
13 MAY 94

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO: TRUJ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

- RE: A. TRUJ 0538 (IN 38742)\*
- B. TRUJ 0564 (IN 44067)\*\*
- C. DIR 32773 (OUT 90833)\*\*\*

(1)(A)  
(1)(A)  
(1)(A)

CITE DIR

Not Sent  
But signed

~~SECRET~~

1. HQS EARLIER RESERVATIONS CONCERNING ADVISABILITY DELIVERING REF A ITEMS NOW MET IN SOME DEGREE BY PLANNING FOR SUCCESSOR GOVT AND CONTROL MEASURES ON PART / GROUP AS EVIDENCED IN REF B. SINCE IT APPEARS THAT / GROUP HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO ACTION WITH OR WITHOUT ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, COUPLED WITH FACT REF C ITEMS ALREADY MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM FOR PERSONAL DEFENSE; AUTHORIZED PASS REF A ITEMS TO / FOR THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION ON THEIR PROPOSED ENDEAVOR. HQS LEAVES TO STATION JUDGMENT MOST SECURE MEANS OF DELIVERY WHICH WILL AFFORD MAXIMUM ROOM FOR PLAUSIBLE DENIAL.

2. ADVISE ~~OPRI~~ WHEN REF A ITEMS DELIVERED AND THEIR DISPOSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: \*Four M3 Machine Guns and 240 rounds of ammo.  
\*\*Attached.  
\*\*\*Authorized Station pass 3 carbines and supply of ammunition.

ALLEN W. DULLES, DCI  
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3

DDP

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/WH AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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 AS SANITIZED

*JE* 13 May 94  
 (1)(B)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1		<i>X</i>	
2	<i>C/USN</i>		
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p><i>See General Cabell's note below.</i></p> <p><i>Part. File with</i></p> <p><i>back slip in <del>encl.</del></i></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
<i>Op'd 234-203 Admin</i>			<i>4/6/61</i>
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs. This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of Trujillo's security services, the understandable fear that prevails throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-Trujillo activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently consists of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. CIA has had in the direct custody of ~~its~~ Station in Ciudad Trujillo a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.

B. CIA has established working relationships with selected exile groups. These relationships have taken into account that prominent Caribbean political leaders in effect designated former prominent Caribbean political leader as his emissary and representative to work with Dominican exile groups. Through / prominent Caribbean political leader and with the knowledge of a prominent Caribbean political leader CIA is providing financial support and technical guidance to the following activities:

- (1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose, Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations, Caribbean political leader a representative designated by prominent / , and chaired by a prominent Caribbean political leader and

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SECRET

an Opposition/<sup>leader</sup>, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as the voice of the organization.

(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to the/<sup>organization</sup> so as to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or personnel into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability has not been utilized to date. It is contemplated that both the propaganda program and this limited boat capability will be absorbed by the exile council now being formed by Figueres.

C. With the knowledge of a Caribbean political/<sup>leader</sup>, and using his government as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing a para-military capability in Venezuela.

D. CIA has recently re-located

a highly respected Dominican exile who enjoys the confidence of the internal opposition. He is currently working with the Puerto Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to provide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes and selected administrative skills. Through the/<sup>exile</sup> and a small group of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the internal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through our

our Ciudad Trujillo.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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-5-

E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets throughout the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.

III. COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED

A. Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf" at our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been initiated due to the internal opposition's failure to provide individuals who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican Republic and willing to run the risk of having the radio equipment in their possession.

B. Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and underground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive explosive materials through clandestine channels.

IV. POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION

A. CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition for their use in personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo can be developed by the Station.

B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic, in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.

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ORIG: WJ/3/DP&H  
DATE: 29 MAY 1961 1580

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ROUTING

29 MAY 61 23 27z

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ROUTINE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET OUT 608

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: C/WH 1-5

INFO: DCI 6, D/DCI 7, DDP 8, COP 9, ADDP/A 10, C/CA 11, S/C 11-12

7-94

~~TOP SECRET~~ (TOP SECRET) INFO

REF: ~~TOP SECRET~~ 0609 (IN 13990) \*

CITE DIR

42443  
42443

~~TOP SECRET~~ Officer  
FOR CIA/ FROM STATE

- PRESIDENT HAS NOT APPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS DISCUSSED DURING YOUR STAY HERE WITH ONE MAJOR EXCEPTION: YOU ARE NOT TO REQUEST A PRE-SIGNED REQUEST FOR HELP FROM DOMINICAN DISSIDENT GROUPS.
- WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT YOU CONTINUE TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN PRO-U.S. SENTIMENT AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS. YOUR WORK ALONG THIS LINE HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT RUN RISK OF U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH POLITICAL ASSASSINATION, SINCE U.S. AS MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY CANNOT CONDONE ASSASSINATION. THIS LAST PRINCIPLE IS OVERRIDING AND MUST PREVAIL IN DOUBTFUL SITUATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS MUCH YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF POLICY, INCLUDING MOST OF THE MEASURES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW ENGAGED. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW.
- CONTINUE TO INFORM DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO--WHETHER OR NOT INITIATED BY PRO-U.S. GROUP--THE PRO-U.S. GROUP SHOULD PROMPTLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSTITUTE ITSELF AS REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DECLARE ITSELF SUCH AND REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM U.S., VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND CAN.

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

(CONTINUED)

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ROUTING

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DATE :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE TWO

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ROUTINE

OUT 60694

TO ~~TOP SECRET~~ (OPT) TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR

42443

IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE, DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF SUCH A REQUEST AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT. ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING OF A REQUEST IN ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. UNDERLYING THIS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICY THAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WE TAKE THE CHANCE OF A COMMUNIST TYPE TAKEOVER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EVEN IF WE MUST INTERVENE WITHOUT A REQUEST. THIS LAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DISSIDENTS.

4. REFERENCE TO MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RECORD OF ACTIONS MEANS ONLY THAT FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND THAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT INTERVENTION IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR FORCES TO BE MULTILATERAL. NO BROADER INTERPRETATION IS JUSTIFIED. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONS--WHETHER PROPAGANDA OR COVERT ACTIVITIES--WILL BE CONTINUED ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

5. COVERT ACTIVITIES ARE, AS YOU KNOW, VERY SMALL DUE TO INABILITY OF DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY DISASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES--PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVER--REMAINS OPEN. HOWEVER, YOU MUST REQUEST AND RECEIVE FURTHER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANY SPECIFIC COVERT ACTIVITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE UNABLE TO TRANSFER ARMS TO DISSIDENTS. TELL THEM THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF

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RELEASING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

(CONTINUED)

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TO :  
 DIRECTOR  
 CONF:  
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DEFERRED  
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 OUT 60694

PAGE THREE

TO : **TRUJ (OPT)** TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR. 42443

OUR SUSPICION THAT METHOD OF TRANSFER MAY BE UNSAFE. IN ACTUAL FACT WE FEEL THAT THE TRANSFER OF ARMS WOULD SERVE VERY LITTLE PURPOSE AND EXPOSE THE UNITED STATES TO GREAT DANGER OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. THE BASIC POLICY IS TO CONTINUE TO HOLD OPEN OFFER OF COVERT HELP, WHILE CAREFULLY EXAMINING AND CLEARING THE SPECIFIC HELP REQUESTED. THIS IS FEAR IELM BECAUSE, IN ACTUAL FACT, THE COVERT HELP IS VERY SLIGHT EXCEPT FOR VEREAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

6. WE INTEND TO KEEP UP ANTI-TRUJILLO PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND OTHER EXTERNAL PRESSURES.

7. FYI, IN EVENT OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO MILITARY FORCES WILL BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY TO STAND-BY POSITIONS. ON RECEIPT OF REQUEST FROM PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO IN IMMEDIATELY. IF NO REQUEST IS RECEIVED AND THERE APPEARS TO BE ANY DANGER OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER THEN DECISION WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON WHETHER TO INTERVENE REGARDLESS. THIS MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT A REQUEST BE OBTAINED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. END FYI.

8. BEGIN CONVERSATIONS IMMEDIATELY WITH DISSENTERS INFORMING THEM OF U.S. POSITION AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST. IF THEY ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ADVISE FOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL OF SUCH A REQUEST SHORT OF THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OF A WRITTEN DOCUMENT FOR ADVANCE

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ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGE FOUR

TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR 42443

TO YOU.

END OF MESSAGE  
officer

WH/Comment: Ref was message from CIA/ to State in which he asked what guidance and encouragement he could give dissidents, if he could provide dissidents with draft document request U.S./O.S. assistance in event TRUJILLO overthrown, and asked clarification of President's statement that any action against TRUJILLO should be multilateral.

CS COMMENT: \*\*DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

C/CHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CH/3

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TOP SECRET

(39)

Memorandum of Conversation

mat  
Subj: Slip Hestrogen  
8/31/65 van

DATE: May 3, 1961

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Herbert, CIA  
Mr. Berle

MAY 9 1961

C-1X-29

COPIES TO: ARA: Mr. Coerr - 1  
Mr. Owen - 2  
Mr. Devine - 3  
Mr. Herbert, CIA - 4

TOP SECRET

(4)

739.00/5-361

Mr. Herbert of CIA came in. A local group in the Dominican government wishes to overthrow Trujillo; wishes arms for that purpose.

On cross-examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wanted to know what the policy should be.

I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert said he felt the same way.

FILED  
MAY 10 1961

ad  
A.A.B:mp

02101

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TOP SECRET

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406347

13 May 84  
(1)(A)

23 June 1975

SUBJECT: Question 1 of 4 Questions Developed during SSC Hearing of Mr. Richard Bissell on 12 June 1975:

"Was the transfer of three carbines to the dissidents in the Dominican Republic approved by the Department of State or the Special Group?"

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1:

No specific documentation to show that the Department of State or the Special Group approved the transfer of three carbines to dissidents in the Dominican Republic has been located. It is possible that approval was considered implicit in the 12 January 1961 Special Group decision that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, in consonance with the feeling of the Department of State, as expressed by its representative at the 12 January meeting. In this context, we note that CIA Headquarters instructed the Chief of Station to obtain Consul General Dearborn's concurrence in the passage of the three carbines. The Chief of Station replied that the Consul General concurred. Pertinent messages are OUT 89222, 29 March 1961 and IN 28146, 31 March 1961. Both have been made available to the Committee.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 056759

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(C)

They have decided to give up the plan and disperse." (Attachment E, HDCA 2464, 3 May 1961 and IN 47319, sent 4 May but received by Cable Secretariat 7 May 1961)

(f) In a special briefing paper prepared for Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House, CIA noted that "for personal defense" 3 revolvers and 3 carbines with accompanying ammunition had been passed to internal opposition leaders. (Attachment to memorandum, dated 13 May 1961, probably sent to Special Group members)