

Date : 08/06/95

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10089
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 11-H-08

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 10/09/75
PAGES : 92
SUBJECTS : CIA

ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA, PATRICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

ORIGINAL
Vol. 1 of 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/19/77 BY EG

~~TOP SECRET~~

The United States Senate

R1572

Report of Proceedings

DATE 3/19/77
BY EG

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000751031

Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction.)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

A

C O N T E N T S

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

ant

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WITNESS

Bronson Tweedy

PAGE

4

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

FOR IDENTIFICATION

No. 1	3
No. 2	11
No. 3	28
No. 4	32
No. 5	35
No. 6	39
No. 7	41
No. 8	43
No. 9	46
No. 10	57
No. 11	58
No. 12	63

WARD R PAUL

4100 ... WASHINGTON ... 20001

TOP SECRET

TASCIONE:amt

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Thursday, October 10, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 o'clock a.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Richard Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.

Phone (Area 202) 344-4008

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Schweiker. Would you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meeting you.

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just received the oath from Senator Schweiker, who has now left the room, and you are under no obligation to continue to testify in his absence, but obviously the Committee would appreciate it greatly if you would continue to testify.

Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's absence?

Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.

Mr. Baron. You are willing to testify to the truth as best as you can do it?

Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily without

WARD & PAUL

410 Constitution Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20001

Phone (Area 202) 544-6008

WARD & PAUL

410 East 50th St., Washington, D.C. 20013

1 counsel?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

3 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you may cease answering
4 questions at any point if you wish to consult with counsel?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

6 Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all of your Consti-
7 tutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amendment
8 rights to remain silent?

9 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

10 Mr. Baron. All right, then.

11 Let us proceed to review a set of documents which were not
12 available to us in your first examination. The attempt here
13 today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered
14 in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few
15 main events in the alleged story of an assassination plot
16 against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of
17 these documents.

18 Let me introduce as Exhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles
19 to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert Guthman on
20 October 26th, 1960.

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 1 for
identification.)

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

2 Mr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous
3 appearance, did we not?

4 Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.

5 May I correct the date? It is August 26th.

6 Mr. Baron. Certainly.

7 Mr. Tweedy. It is rather important.

8 Mr. Baron. It is August 26th.

9 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, we did indeed discuss it the last time.

10 Mr. Baron. After you took another look at this cable
11 this morning before we went on the record, you made a remark to
12 the effect that this cable was a source of authority as far as
13 you were concerned at the time.

14 Is that your impression now?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

16 Let me just add to that a bit. The cable per se I did not
17 remember, but it is perfectly obvious the cable is the authority.
18 When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly
19 implied the only reason the subject was being raised is because
20 it had been of national policy level concern. I do not think
21 it could be more clear-cut than that. This was basically, this
22 was the formal expression of that by the Director himself.

23 I cannot remember which came first, did I see this cable
24 first, or did I talk to Mr. Bissell first. I suspect that I
25 talked to Mr. Bissell first. It must have been absolutely in

READ & PAUL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

5

1 the same time period.

2 This merely confirmed what I think I probably heard from
3 Mr. Bissell first.

4 Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are
5 referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the
6 purpose of assassination.

7 Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that
8 the thrust of the American position was that there was no
9 solution in the Congo without the fall from power of Mr. Lumumba,
10 and no measure should be overlooked to achieve this -- constitu-
11 tional, revolutionary and indeed, executive action, if you want
12 to call it that.

13 Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

15 But none of these possible measures were excluded, and the
16 main point was that everybody agreed that Lumumba had to go or
17 we were in for very serious trouble in the Congo.

18 Mr. Baron. You were referring a moment ago in discussing
19 this cable from Allen Dulles to the fact that when you first
20 discussed the possibility of assassinating Lumumba as one means
21 of removing him from power with Richard Bissell, Bissell referred
22 to this cable.

23 Mr. Tweedy. No, I would have seen this cable when it went
24 out. I am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, because I
25 cannot remember the sequence of events. It would have been a

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-4000

WARD & PAUL

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2009 pursuant to E.O. 13526

TOP SECRET

6

1 perfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It
2 is conceivable that this went out before I talked to Bissell, I
3 do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem.

4 Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents
5 that we are about to introduce into the record today, before
6 we begin taking your testimony on the record, are you able to
7 pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with
8 Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terms of time?

10 Mr. Baron. Yes.

11 Mr. Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assume --

12 Mr. Baron. It would have taken place shortly before this
13 Allen Dulles cable?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly before, or shortly after,
15 because the next series of cables obviously get the show, as
16 it were, on the road.

17 May I comment just generally on those cables as a group?
18 There are no surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in
19 terms of detail. Much of it, even to this day, I still do not
20 remember.

21 One aspect emerges very clearly for me, that we were very
22 careful about examining this on the possibilities of doing
23 anything against Lumumba. Basically, this whole period was a
24 series of exchanges with the field who were seeking, as you can
25 see from that cable traffic, various measures that might perform

TOP SECRET

FORM (REV. 2-27) 344-6008

WARD & PAUL

410 Fifth Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

TOP SECRET

8

1 a number of them, because he wanted to remain familiar with
2 them.

3 (Discussion off the record.)

4 Mr. Baron. Back on the record on this subject.

5 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of
6 detailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand,
7 it was perfectly clear that he remained actively interested in
8 it. I am sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin
9 O'Donnell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with
10 that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten entirely that Justin
11 O'Donnell had ever played a role in this. I am sure when he
12 fixed on O'Donnell the possibility to assist the Chief of Station
13 he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I
14 remember it, but hardly.

15 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Bissell
16 said to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of
17 assassinating Lumumba about the level at which the exploration
18 of this prospect had been authorized?

19 Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on
20 except that it was perfectly clear to me that he was quite
21 confident that this was -- I am now talking about the elimination
22 of Lumumba by whatever means. I am not talking necessarily
23 about assassination; I want to be quite clear on that.

24 I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levels of
25 Washington were agreed that Lumumba must go. I cannot go any

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

U
S
S
E
R
S

410 100-100000-1 Washington, D.C. 20505

4101001-1000000 (Rev. 2-27-54)

1 further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell
 2 said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on
 3 this or that this had been discussed with the policy levels
 4 of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to
 5 me nor does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear
 6 that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing
 7 any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.

8 Mr. Baron. Off the record.

9 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

10 Mr. Baron. We are back on the record now.

11 When we stopped, we were discussing your account of your
 12 meetings with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinating
 13 Lumumba had arisen among other means that had been considered
 14 in disposing of Lumumba. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate
 15 directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the
 16 President of the United States for moving forward with an
 17 operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly
 19 never mentioned the President at all.

20 Mr. Baron. By name?

21 Mr. Tweedy. By name, or even by any indication. It was
 22 merely my impression reinforced, certainly, either before or
 23 after, of this cable of Allen Dulles that this was a policy
 24 level decision, but the extent to which the Executive had
 25 assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.

WARD & PAUL

4101001-1000000 (Rev. 2-27-54)

TOP SECRET

10

1 It is perfectly obvious that the Agency felt that it had
2 the support of the Executive in efforts to eliminate Lumumba.
3 It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that
4 if it ever came down to the point where somebody said, I think
5 we can do it, and we decided upon the means, that someone would
6 have said, well, before we do, obviously there has to be final
7 approval. I would not have known where the final approval
8 would have come from. I would not expect that my correspondence
9 with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville would result in the
10 assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further reference.

11 Mr. Baron. You were under the impression that whatever
12 steps you were involved in toward eliminating Lumumba, as you
13 put it, were fully authorized at the highest level of the
14 government?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was.

16 Mr. Baron. That would include the President?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that
18 question, Mr. Baron. When somebody at my level, fairly senior
19 though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy
20 level wants something done, it is very difficult for him to
21 judge whether the President per se has been in contact with the
22 Agency or that he has done this through his National Security
23 Advisor, the Secretary of State, or whoever. There could be
24 no way that I could judge that.

25 I think it would be quite misleading if I were to try to

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

WARD & PAUL

210 THE STREET OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

read into it either then or now.

Mr. Baron. Whatever impression you had of the extent of the authority for the steps that you were taking to eliminate Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.

Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.

Mr. Tweedy. Which merely indicated to me that the Agency was confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus acting accordingly.

Mr. Baron. Between this cable on August 26th which Allen Dulles dispatched to the Congo and the cable we will now mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldville on September 19th, marked Eyes Only, Guthman from Jadwin--

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

TOP SECRET

12

1 Mr. Baron. Were there any other meetings that you recall
2 between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you to
3 move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation stage
4 in assassinating Lumumba?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. I just do not recall
6 that that ever occurred.

7 Mr. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.

8 This cable indicates --

9 Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?

10 Mr. Baron. Yes.

11 (Discussion off the record.)

12 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

13 This cable begins with your indication to the Chief of
14 Station that someone was proceeding shortly to the Congo who
15 would announce himself as Sid from Paris.

16 First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is
17 the Chief of Station, is that right?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

19 Mr. Baron. Who we agreed would be referred to as the
20 Chief of Station or by his alias, Hedqmena, and Jadwin is --

21 Mr. Tweedy. My pseudonym.

22 Mr. Baron. Did you have a first name in the pseudonym?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Thomas K.

24 Mr. Baron. Who was Sid from Paris?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I was trying to think. The identity is Sid

TOP SECRET

FORM (Rev. 2-27) 544-0000

WARD & PAUL

1111 First Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004

TOP SECRET

13

1 Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.

2 Mr. Baron. If I represent to you that we have had testimony
3 from Sidney Gottlieb that this identity stood for himself, does
4 that refresh your recollection?

5 Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption
6 that it probably was, but I could not recall, so I find -- in
7 other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would have
8 expected.

9 Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of
10 dispatching Sidney Gottlieb on a mission to the Congo?

11 Mr. Tweedy. I have the most unclear recollection that I
12 discussed with Mr. Bissell Sidney Gottlieb's going to the
13 Congo. I have no recollections of any conversations I had
14 with Mr. Gottlieb himself, although I am quite convinced I had
15 them.

16 In other words, it is inconceivable to me that he would have
17 gone to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot recall the
18 substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imagine
19 Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was
20 all about, the operational problems involved, so that he, in
21 turn, could be somewhat sensible about what his own supporting
22 role in this might be.

23 When I say this, it is a reasonable assumption but it is
24 not direct recollection.

25 Mr. Baron. Does this cable indicate to you that you did

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

14

1 dispatch Sidney Gottlieb to the Congo on a highly sensitive
2 mission?

3 Mr. Tweedy. It does indeed.

4 When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be
5 more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I
6 am sure the authority for him going would have come from me
7 rather than me, but we arranged the details.

8 Mr. Baron. Your comment about the fact that the authority
9 would have flowed from Mr. Bissell directly is borne out, is it
10 not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?

11 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, exactly.

12 Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have
13 both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a
14 cable?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization
16 on matters of either particular sensitivity or so important that
17 the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence
18 on a subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and
19 send out cables and have it actually signed off by the DDP.
20 That was quite a common practice in the Agency.

21 Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection, having seen this
22 document, of the fact that you set up a special channel using
23 the YQPROP sensitivity indicator?

24 Mr. Tweedy. I did not recall YQPROP, but I recall special
25 channels.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 546-6008

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002

TOP SECRET

15

1 Mr. Baron. This would have restricted all traffic from
2 yourself to Chief of Station, is that correct?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. My Deputy would also have access to it
4 in my absence.

5 Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

7 Mr. Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?

8 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed he would.

9 Mr. Baron. Allen Dulles also?

10 Mr. Tweedy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.

11 Mr. Baron. Why was a special communications channel set
12 up in this cable?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Because of the sensitivity of the subject.
14 This, again, was a frequent procedure in the Agency on sensitive
15 matters. If one was about to mount a sensitive operation, one
16 of the first things normally done was to set up special
17 communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages
18 could be restricted to what was required.

19 Mr. Baron. In this case, the especially sensitive subject to
20 which you were restricting communications access was the elimi-
21 nation of Lumumba by one means or another?

22 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

23 Mr. Baron. What was the assignment that Sidney Gottlieb
24 was to explain to the Chief of Station when he arrived in the
25 Congo?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

100-100000-100000

TOP SECRET

16

1 Mr. Tweedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume
2 that Sidney Gottlieb would have discussed with the Chief of
3 Station Instruments which TSD might have which could be of
4 assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed
5 his inventory, whatever it might be, and the two presumably were
6 trying to come to some conclusions as to what might have the
7 best chance or the most practical chance of being used.

8 This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that
9 would have been the purpose of the exercise.

10 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you the testimony of Sidney
11 Gottlieb about two conversations that he had at Headquarters
12 before he undertook the mission to the Congo in September of
13 1960.

14 First, when Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable and some
15 subsequent cables which we will discuss today, he said these
16 cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took
17 a trip to the Congo and arrived on September 26th as is indicated
18 by a subsequent cable, and left on October 5th, as is indicated
19 by another cable.

20 Dr. Gottlieb said before he left the Congo -- I am sorry,
21 before he left for the Congo -- he had a conversation with you
22 and Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take a lethal
23 material to the Congo and give it to the Chief of Station
24 with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible
25 and to instruct the Chief of Station in the technical means by

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

17

1 which this lethal material could be administered through
2 Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.

3 Mr. GOETTLAB also testified that in that conversation you
4 indicated to him that these instructions were being given at
5 Richard Bissell's authority.

6 Did that conversation take place?

7 (Discussion off the record.)

8 Mr. Tweedy. His testimony does not basically refresh my
9 memory. The only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is
10 that he had an instruction from me to tell the Chief of Station
11 to use this material and go ahead and assassinate Lumumba, as
12 if, in effect, that is all the authority that was necessary.

13 To be frank, that does not make sense. The rest of it is
14 perfectly feasible. I do not recall it in the detail, but I
15 am not going to deny what SID said. I think his recollection
16 that I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station and
17 sort of get the show on the road and use the poison and
18 assassinate Lumumba without any further ceremony is just not the
19 way it would have happened.

20 Mr. Baron. Why is that?

21 Mr. Tweedy. For the simple reason that under no circumstances
22 would that instruction have been given by me without reference
23 to higher authority up through the chain of command.

24 Mr. Baron. When you say reference to higher authority,
25 what do you mean?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

110 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

TOP SECRET

18

1 Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance
2 would be Mr. Bissell.

3 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb did testify --

4 Mr. Tweedy. I understand.

5 Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with
6 him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the
7 assignment you were giving to Gottlieb.

8 Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr. Gottlieb would disagree
9 on is that there would be no further reference, which his
10 statement implies from Leopoldville before they took any action
11 on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this
12 matter, and that was never a matter, to the best of my recollection,
13 that was ever delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words,
14 Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, go ahead
15 and do it in your own good time without any further reference
16 to me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence
17 as I read it that way at all.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall if Mr. Bissell ever went as far
19 as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the
20 assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would be
21 practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority
22 for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that
23 the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances,
24 authorized to proceed to assassinate Lumumba?

25 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 207) 544-6008

WARD & PAUL

Highway 2000 N. W. Wash. D. C. 20001

TOP SECRET

19

1 Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way
2 or the other?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to me
4 this way.

5 Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this
6 meeting with Dr. Gottlieb into component parts.

7 You agree now, having heard Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, that
8 it is true that you had asked Dr. Gottlieb to go to the Congo?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.

10 Mr. Baron. It is also true that you knew that Dr. Gottlieb
11 was to carry a lethal material to the Chief of Station in the
12 Congo?

13 Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, I do not disagree with him.
14 I do not frankly recall that at this point, but I am perfectly
15 wedded to accept what he says.

16 Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the moment, that you would have
17 required the Chief of Station to check back with Headquarters
18 before he carried out an assassination mission, would it be
19 true that you assigned Dr. Gottlieb the task of instructing
20 the Chief of Station to assassinate Lumumba on that basis?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Dr. Gottlieb was the head of the Technical
22 Services Division, or whatever it was called in those days.

23 Mr. Baron. Let me jump in for a moment.

24 At this point, for about a year and a half, he was the
25 Science Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Technical

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

TOP SECRET

20

1 Services shortly thereafter.

2 Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructed
3 Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am
4 sure I never instructed Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. This
5 is the way you put it to me.

6 Mr. Baron. Let me correct that.

7 What I meant to say was, would you have asked Gottlieb
8 to convey the instruction to the Chief of Station that he was
9 to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he
10 confirmed it with Headquarters?

11 Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that is almost certainly not.
12 That would have been covered in other correspondence, which I
13 think is demonstrated by these cables, to the Chief of Station
14 direct from me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have
15 used, neither would Mr. Bissell, Mr. Gottlieb as the channel
16 for this instruction.

17 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb has also testified that, aside
18 from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and
19 instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about a
20 mission to assassinate Lumumba, that he had one further role
21 in the Congo; he was to serve as a technical advisor to the
22 Chief of Station on the feasibility of using these biological
23 substances to carry off the operation.

24 As Gottlieb put it, Gottlieb was to stay down there for
25 a short period of time to determine the technical feasibility

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

100-107000-1000

TOP SECRET

22

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

tape 1b

1 think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is
2 perfectly clear that we would not have expedited anything at
3 the risk of doing it unprofessionally.

4 Mr. Baron. At the point that Gottlieb left for the Congo
5 after talking with you, would he have been empowered to convey
6 to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could
7 be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out,
8 concealment of the U.S. hand and use of these materials before
9 their potency waned?

10 Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would be in no
11 position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if they
12 reached that point in planning, that as of the last time he
13 was at Headquarters that there would probably be an approval
14 from Washington.

15 Mr. Baron. You would expect, then, the Chief of Station
16 would have been expected to reconfirm with Headquarters the
17 fact that he had a go-ahead?

18 Mr. Tweedy. It would never have occurred to me otherwise.

19 Mr. Baron. It would be your testimony that, although you
20 do not specifically recall your conversation with Dr. Gottlieb,
21 you would have made that clear to Dr. Gottlieb?

22 Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought so, yes, but I could not
23 comment any further.

24 Mr. Baron. The reason for that is you do not recall the
25 conversation?

WARD S. C. WASHINGTON DC 20031

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

23

1 Mr. Tweedy. Not only that; Dr. Gottlieb was as familiar
2 as I was with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project
3 and what was involved and the way that the Agency did its
4 business, which was things of this kind were not dealt with on
5 sort of an offhand basis.

6 Mr. Dawson. What is offhand?

7 Mr. Tweedy. The fact that the field and Dr. Gottlieb were
8 given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they
9 would go about it and when, without further reference to
10 Headquarters.

11 Mr. Dawson. If we are to tie this to the cables, then,
12 is there something in the cables predating Gottlieb's visit to
13 the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previously
14 been authorized by some words in those cables?

15 Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had previously been
16 authorized?

17 Mr. Dawson. The authorization of the assassination effort,
18 the elimination of Lumumba.

19 Mr. Tweedy. Only in the most general terms. No operation
20 had been put forward by the field. In our business, these
21 things were done by operational planning, at which point one
22 came up with an operation that was agreed upon by the Station
23 and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have been either
24 implemented or not, according to the say-so from Headquarters.

25 Mr. Dawson. That kind of operational planning is

TOP SECRET

Phone Area 202 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

1000

TOP SECRET

25

1 Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any
2 prudent Chief of Station would check back to reconfirm his
3 authority to go ahead with an assassination operation, but Dr.
4 Gottlieb said in his conversation with you he was not told
5 that he should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement
6 that he should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded
7 with the assassination of Lumumba.

8 Mr. Tweedy. I cannot comment on his statements, because
9 I cannot recall what I said to him. It certainly is perfectly
10 conceivable to me that I could have had this conversation with
11 him and not mentioned this, that this would be covered in all
12 the basic correspondence that I was having with the Chief of
13 Station.

14 Mr. Harol. So then it is possible -- or is it probable
15 that in your instructions to Sidney Gottlieb about his mission
16 to the Congo you might not have explicitly mentioned the
17 requirement that the Chief of Station return to Headquarters
18 to reconfirm his authority to move ahead with the assassination.

19 Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. I am not going
20 to say it is not possible. I am merely saying that that is
21 not the way we did business, and on the whole, Sidney Gottlieb
22 would be as familiar with that as I would -- perhaps not as
23 familiar with it, because he was on the technical side where I
24 was on the operational side and used to this chain of command
25 thing and the relationship between the Division and Station

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

WARD & PAUL

APPROXIMATELY MAY 1950

PHONE (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 EAST MOUNTAIN ST. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004

1 Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy to the Chief
2 of Station for his eyes only on September 22, 1960.

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 3 for
identification.)

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Tweedy. This is mostly discussion of ⁰⁴ ~~Rehotroff~~

Mr. Baron. The man you referred to was at this time an agent that was in contact with the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I remember him very well. I could not possibly remember his name. I remember him very well; I met him later.

Mr. Baron. He proved to be a highly effective agent for the Station?

Mr. Tweedy. He was a very good intelligence agent, an excellent intelligence agent, for the simple reason that he was able to make contact with groups and media in the Congo which was very difficult for non-Africans to reach. He was, for a year or two, a first-class intelligence source basically; not an action source, but an intelligence source.

Mr. Baron. When you read the sentence that is at the beginning of paragraph B on the first page where it says: "Concur this possibility worth watching, but if decided support for ~~TOP~~PROB objectives. Believe essential such be provided through third national channel with PBPRIME role completely concealed."

What are you referring to there?

Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure; I do not remember. I do not recall what the incoming cable said.

What I am obviously saying is ⁰⁴ ~~Rehotroff~~ had, I guess, an ⁰⁸ [redacted] wife who was, at least had been, a [redacted] ~~employee~~. I think what I was saying is, if we wanted to use

WARD & PAUL

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~



Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

SECRET COPY OF ...

1 ⁰⁴ Schotroff directly in an assassination attempt, that I would
2 not dismiss it out of hand.

3 Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its security?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

5 Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "YOPROP objec-
6 tives" would refer to an assassination attempt?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. That the assassination, discussion of an
9 assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP
10 channel?

11 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

12 Mr. Baron. On the last page of this document --

13 Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that worries me about this
14 conclusion of mine is this, the more I read it, 2-B is another
15 paragraph, which may not have had anything to do with ⁰⁴ Schotroff
16 at all and I do not feel, at least I cannot recollect, why
17 any leaks would almost certainly have included the ¹¹ [redacted]
18 if ⁰⁴ Schotroff were involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to
19 feel I am talking about somebody else and not ⁰⁴ Schotroff.

20 Mr. Baron. I will represent to you in other cable traffic,
21 I believe, which we will review as we proceed here, there was
22 discussion of the use of another [redacted].

23 Mr. Tweedy. This was probably the case. I do not think
24 this refers to ⁰⁴ Schotroff. B here I do not think refers to
25 ⁰⁴ Schotroff. I cannot recall --

716R



Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20001

1 Mr. Baron. Who?
2 YOPROP objectives would still refer to exploring possibilities
3 to an assassination attempt?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

5 Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with a
6 different agent?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. On the last page, paragraph 3, it tells the
9 Chief of Station: "Not intended you construe above comments
10 as basically negative. You and colleague understand we cannot
11 read over your shoulder as you plan and assess opportunities.
12 Our primary concern must be concealment PROPRIME role unless
13 outstanding opportunity emerges which makes calculated risk
14 first class bet. Ready entertain any serious proposals you
15 make based our high regard both your professional judgments."

16 What are you referring to in that paragraph? What message
17 are you conveying to the Chief of Station?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think if you read the cable you will
19 notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his
20 proposals. These were exploratory proposals. I wanted --

21 Mr. Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission?

22 Mr. Tweedy. You keep coming off with an assassination
23 mission as if this was always just around the corner. What I
24 am saying is, we are in a period here quite common in our
25 business of very intensive operational planning and exploration.

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 1st Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20001

1 All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had
 2 commented on it here; in the end, I say, do not be discouraged
 3 because you do not see the probable channel we will use. I
 4 assume the colleague was Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was
 5 still there.

6 Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had
 7 already cabled that his arrival was imminent?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I assume that that is the colleague. I do
 9 not think he would have talked to anybody else on it. That is
 10 all it means.

11 It is, if you like, a technique of management.

12 Mr. Baron. Moving on to a document that we will mark
 13 Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allen W. Dulles of September
 14 24, 1960 and your pseudonym is also listed as one of the senders
 15 of the cable to the Chief of Station.

(The document referred
 to was marked Tweedy
 Exhibit No. 4 for
 identification.)

20



TOP SECRET

33

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

1001 1/2 Street N.E. Washington, D.C. 20004

1 Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the first paragraph, it says:
2 "We wish give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba
3 from any possibility resuming governmental position or if he falls
4 in Leop" -- meaning Leopoldville -- "setting himself in Stanley-
5 ville or elsewhere ?"

6 First, for the record, any time your pseudonym "Jadwin" or
7 your name "Tweedy" appears in the upper left hand corner of a
8 cable or your signature appears on the bottom, you dispatched
9 that cable? Is that not right?

10 I am referring generally to the cable traffic.

11 Mr. Tweedy. What it means is this. It could mean several
12 things, but I personally dictated the cable and dispatched it
13 without further reference, or for some reason I constructed the
14 cable and had it released by a higher authority, either Mr.
15 Bissell or Mr. Dulles. Although those were not the only alter-
16 natives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in one
17 form or another.

18 I would guess that I dictated the cable and that Mr. Dulles --
19 and I do not have any idea how this came about -- Mr. Dulles
20 wanted to see it, and Mr. Bissell suggested that it go out
21 from Mr. Dulles and myself, I just do not know. What this
22 means is, Dulles and Tweedy were totally aware of the cable.

23 Mr. Baron. Returning then to the sentence I cited from
24 the cable where you and Dulles were talking about giving every
25 possible support in eliminating Lumumba, what message --

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

34

1 Mr. Tweedy. "Eliminating Lumumba from any possibility
2 resuming governmental position." This, if I may say so, reverts
3 to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the
4 U.S. position was that Mr. Lumumba must be removed from a
5 position of authority in the Congo and that assassination was
6 not by any means the only way by which this might be accomplished.

7 This, I think, merely reiterates that it is not a -- being
8 a YOPROP cable does not refer specifically to assassination.

9 Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase "elimina-
10 ting Lumumba" in this context contemplate assassination as
11 at least one of the possible means that might be used?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid if I may say so you are putting
13 words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. He has two
14 messages now from Mr. Dulles. The first one, I think, was
15 perfectly clear. Since then he has had messages from Mr.
16 Dulles' subordinates like myself. This merely makes it clear
17 again that Headquarters wishes to "give every possible support
18 in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental
19 position." and I cannot say more than that, and I think to say
20 that this stresses assassination would be quite untrue. But the
21 Chief of Station in Leopoldville was already under instruction
22 to be considering this as one of the possibilities.

23 Mr. Baron. Assassination?

24 Mr. Tweedy. This does not change that.

25 Mr. Baron. I think that is fine.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 Constitution Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

1 The interesting aspect of that sentence for me is the
 2 rest of the sentence where it makes it clear that not only is
 3 there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position
 4 in Leopoldville, but anywhere else, and it would seem that
 5 assassination would at least have to be one of very few means
 6 that could insure that fact that Lumumba would not resume a
 7 position of power anywhere.


8 Mr. Tweedy. I do not think I can comment any further.

9 Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable
 10 dispatched from the Chief of Station on September 27th, 1960
 11 for your eyes only, and this cable begins with a reference to
 12 Dr. Gottlieb.

13 It says he was contacted 26 September. "We on same wave
 14 length." Then it continues, "Hence believe most rapid action
 15 consistent with security indicated."

16 The next paragraph says, "Basis 2 talks considering
 17 possibilities:" -- there follows a list of possibilities from
 18 A to G and paragraph 3 on the bottom of page 2 says, "Plan
 19 proceed on basis priorities as listed above, unless instructed
 20 to contrary."

(The document referred
 to was marked Tweedy
 Exhibit No. 5 for
 identification.)



TOP SECRET

36

1 Mr. Baron. Does that indicate to you that on the list of
2 priorities, priority A would have been considered by the Chief
3 of Station to be his top priority?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph 2: "Basis
5 2 talks considering possibilities" of dispatching ⁰⁴ Schotroff
6 to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would
7 it not?

8 Mr. Baron. Yes. "Recall ⁰⁴ Schotroff from Stanleyville" --

9 Mr. Tweedy. -- "and have him take refuge with Big
10 Brother" --

11 Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act as inside man to brush up
12 details to razor edge. Also would provide info on food and
13 agricultural problem. Guthman recalling ⁰⁴ Schotroff to Leop."

14 When Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable, he testified that
15 this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th
16 of September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where
17 they discussed various operational possibilities of getting rid
18 of Lumumba. The letter A represented their top priority plan.

19 Would you agree with that interpretation of the cable?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I would think so.

21 Mr. Baron. Would you --

22 Mr. Tweedy. When he says: "Plan proceed on basis prior-
ities as listed above" this again is not what he was going to
do at the conclusion of this without further reference carry
out an assassination. He says, what we see is ⁰⁴ Schotroff at the

TOP SECRET

FORM (Rev. 7-27) 144-6000

WARD & PAUL

144-6000 (Rev. 7-27) 144-6000



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

37

1 best answer to our problem.

2 Mr. Baron. Does he not indicate in this cable though
3 that he would proceed to implement these plans unless he were
4 instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable
5 might constitute his request for a confirmation.

6 Mr. Tweedy. I disagree. I think these various possibili-
7 ties still need further exploration is what he was suggesting
8 to Headquarters. he concentrate on that is the best possible use
9 of ⁰⁴ ~~Schottruffe~~ on this including further operational intelligence
10 on the situation which might lead to an agreement that we would
11 use this man, and then all these others, but it does not in any
12 sense, as far as I am concerned, it is not in any sense the
13 Chief of Station. saying, if A looks terribly good I shall just
14 go ahead and finish the job without further reference. Not at
15 all.

16 Mr. Baron. I do not understand how you can read the phrase
17 "unless instructed to the contrary" in that way.

18 Mr. Tweedy. Because there are other possibilities here.
19 I am sorry, but I am afraid looking at it fifteen years later --
20 in the subject that you are engaged in, I think you would look
21 at it entirely differently than I would, working on a day-to-day
22 matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothing
23 in this cable which says that they have the answer to

24 ⁰⁴ ~~Schottruffe's~~ use.

25 Mr. Baron. Does paragraph A indicate that ⁰⁴ ~~Schottruffe~~ would

TOP SECRET

~~SJS~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

20001

430 100 0000 01 0000 00

TOP SECRET

38

1 take refuge with Big Brother, meaning move into Lumumba's
2 entourage?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I think probably this would be -- I am trying
4 to think how this was.

5 Was this possibly ⁰⁶ insingak?

6 Mr. Baron. I do not know the operational details.

7 Mr. Tweedy. He did have some access to Lumumba's entour-
8 age, which was the reason we were so interested.

9 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that this cable is suggesting
10 that ⁰⁴ Schotrouse be recalled to Leopoldville so that he might
11 move into Lumumba's entourage?

12 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

13 Mr. Baron. Where it says he "would thus act as inside man
14 to brush up details to razor edge," would you assume that refers
15 to exploring the means by which Lumumba might be poisoned?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I think that is quite a possibility. I cannot
17 specifically say yes. I suspect he was our best potential source
18 for operational intelligence, if you like, on this.

19 Then he says "Also would provide info on food and agricul-
20 tural problems." I have a vague recollection at this point that
21 he was reporting rather importantly on aspects of food and
22 agriculture which was a major political factor within the Congo
23 then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that.

24 I think it is that this would be a byproduct of this, that
25 we would get more good reporting on the subject.

TOP SECRET

2

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence literally instead
2 of an oblique reference to getting access to Lumumba's food by
3 which he might be poisoned?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that.

5 Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which is a
6 cable from the Chief of Station on September 30th to Jadwin,
7 which is yourself --

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 6 for
identification.)

WARD & PAUL

4100 ...

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

TOP SECRET

40

1 Mr. Baron. -- in which the Chief of Station says: "No
2 really airtight op possible with assets now available. Must
3 choose between cancelling op or accepting calculated risks
4 of varying degrees."

5 nd
6 ~~Schotroffe~~ best asset available. View necessity act
7 immediately, if at all, urge Headquarters authorize exploratory
8 conversations to determine if ⁰⁴ ~~S chotroffe~~ willing take role as
9 active agent or cut-out this op."

10 First, would you read the sentence or the phrase "view
11 necessity act immediately, if at all" to refer to the fact
12 that at this point ~~Gottlieb~~ had informed the Chief of Station
13 that the lethal material was of a limited life?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I cannot really comment on that. That is
15 certainly a perfectly reasonable explanation for that remark,
16 but as I do not know exactly where Lumumba sat on that particu-
17 lar moment when this cable was sent, it might have something
18 to do with his availability or something else, I just do not
19 know.

20 Certainly your first point is a possibility. It equally
21 makes clear, of course, that although ⁰⁴ ~~Schotroffe~~ had been use
22 in an operational intelligence support role, he at this point
23 had never been cut in on plans. Of course, Chief of Station
24 did not know whether he would be willing to go along with this
25 set up or not.

26 Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station here is considering an

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Phone (Area 703) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

10000

Phone (Area 707) 544-6000

W A S H I N G T O N

U S D E P A R T M E N T O F S T A T E

1 approach to ⁰⁴ ~~Schotroff~~ first on a hypothetical basis --

2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

3 Mr. Baron. It is clear here, is it not, that ⁰⁴ ~~Schotroff~~
4 is being viewed as a potential assassination asset?

5 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed.

6 Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 7 a cable on 30
7 September 1960 signed by Glen Fields to the Chief of Station,
8 again in the ⁰⁴ YQPROP channel.

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 7 for
identification.)

2/88

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?

2 Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?

3 Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for
4 Fields to check with Bissell in your absence before he sent such
5 a cable?

6 Mr. Tweedy. No. Field's understanding of his authorities
7 and his relationships with the DDP on such matters were exactly
8 the same as mine. We would have seen eye to eye with him.

9 If I had sent the cable, undoubtedly I would have let
10 Mr. Bissell know that I was planning to carry this thing that
11 much closer. The reason for that is that we were getting close
12 to informing a third party that this was in the wind. Therefore,
13 before we actually took this step, I think something like
14 this, a third party being ⁰⁴ **Schwarz**.

WARD & PAUL

tape 2a

15 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, we will introduce a cable on
16 October 7th, 1960, from the Chief of Station to Jadwin, which
17 is yourself.

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 8 for
identification.)

THE SECRET SERVICE

118R



TOP SECRET

44

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Mr. Baron. This cable begins with a reference to Sidney
2 Gottlieb, and he: "Departed Leop for PBPRIME 5 October, view
3 expiration date his materials. However, left certain items of
4 continuing usefulness. Guthman plans continue try implement
5 op."

6 Do you have any independent recollection of receiving
7 this cable?

8 Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see
9 something that clearly occurred, and to me I read, it's
10 terribly hard at this stage to say, of course I remember. It all
11 reads perfectly familiar to me now. To say quite specifically
12 I recall receiving the cable will perhaps go a little beyond
13 my memory.

14 Mr. Baron. Based upon having read this cable at that
15 time, which you assume you did, is that correct?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

17 Mr. Baron. You would have known that Sidney Gottlieb had
18 left the Congo on October 5th and that the Chief of Station
19 planned to continue to try to implement the operation.

20 Mr. Tweedy. Which means that he would continue his
21 exploratory operational work to see if he could come to some
22 solution.

23 Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence still to apply
24 to an exploratory phase, a phase in which the Chief of Station
25 was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as

4101 and 4102, SE Washington DC 20001

TOP SECRET

PHONE (Area 702) 544-6000

1 opposed to moving to implementing?

2 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything
3 else.

4 Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one
5 then, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent
6 was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indeed. That also coincides with my
8 best recollection which is not all that damn good. It is
9 perfectly obvious that ⁰⁴ [Schotroff] was never requested to
10 assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody
11 having been asked to do this.

WALKER & CO.

12 Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, as
13 outlined in the previous exhibit.

14 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

15 Mr. Dawson. Why is it obvious that ⁰⁴ [Schotroff] was never
16 asked to assassinate Lumumba in light of the sentence in this
17 cable that reads, "Although did not pick up ball," -- referring
18 to the fact that ⁰⁴ [Schotroff] did not necessarily pick up the
19 ball on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chief
20 of Station, the Chief of Station nevertheless believed "he
21 prepared take any role necessary within limits security accom-
22 plish objective."


PHONE

WALKER & CO.

PHONE

23 Does that not indicate that ⁰⁴ [Schotroff] was at least viewed
24 as someone who was prepared to undertake an assassination mission
25 if he should be tasked with it?

4/5/52



Phone (Area 202) 544-4008

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20001

1 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time
 2 is the Chief of Station's best assessment of what the ⁰⁴ ~~Schottroffe~~
 3 reaction would be if the thing was formally put to him so
 4 bluntly that he understood entirely what it was all about. I
 5 do not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic
 6 indicates that it ever got so far that we did that, and I think,
 7 my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on whether ⁰⁴ ~~Schottroffe~~
 8 would agree to do it. I think probably in "limits security
 9 accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor. I
 10 cannot really recall anymore.

11 Mr. Dawson. Off the record.

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

14 This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers
 15 back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he
 16 was --

17 Mr. Tweedy. Implied to by Fields.

18 Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the previous cable
 19 of the 30th.

20 Mr. Tweedy. Right.

21 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 9, we will introduce a cable signed
 22 by B. Tweedy to the Chief of Station in the ^{YOPROP} channel.

(The document referred
 to was marked Tweedy
 Exhibit No. 9 for


identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 East Street NE, Washington, D.C. 20001

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28
- 29
- 30
- 31
- 32
- 33
- 34
- 35
- 36
- 37
- 38
- 39
- 40
- 41
- 42
- 43
- 44
- 45
- 46
- 47
- 48
- 49
- 50



TOP SECRET

48

1 Mr. Baron. It begins, "Had good discussion your colleague
2 7 October. Comments follow:"

3 "A. Be assured did not expect YOPROP objectives
4 be reached in short period and understand current situation
5 fully warranted return your colleague."

6 And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were
7 considering dispatching a third country national operator and
8 a senior case officer from the CIA who would "run this op and
9 outside agent full time under your direction."

10 Does this cable refer to the fact that you debriefed
11 Sidney Gottlieb?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it does. That is what it must be,
13 yes.

14 Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that
15 the Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would
16 be disappointed in the fact that he did not pull off an
17 assassination mission in such a short period of time?

18 Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that.
19 All I was saying to a very professional colleague was that we
20 had no illusions about the fact that the planning operation
21 of this would be very difficult, at best, and would take time
22 and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immediate
23 prospects, were such that there was no alternative for Sidney
24 Gottlieb to return. That is all I was saying.

25 But to say what I was trying to express to him was the

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

4100 WASHINGTON BL. WASHINGTON, DC 20004

TOP SECRET

50

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20001

1 agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final
2 request for approval or either approval or no approval. This
3 would not have changed.

4 Mr. Baron. . . Because Gottlieb took lethal materials to
5 the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality,
6 were you not contemplating at that time that the operation
7 might well move from the exploration phase to the implementation
8 phase just as soon as Gottlieb and Hedgeman determined that it
9 was feasible?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I think I would put it quite differently.
11 I think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not
12 being in a position to exploit, if we reached the point where
13 we all agreed that the thing was possible.

14 If they had merely gone over and said we think we can do
15 it, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that
16 would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.

17 Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of
18 Station to cable back for confirmation, but it was certainly
19 within your contemplation at the time that when Gottlieb went
20 to the Congo, when the Chief of Station cabled for confirma-
21 tion, you would probably give him a go ahead to assassinate
22 Lumumba?

23 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all.

24 Mr. Baron. If the operation were feasible?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all. It would not have

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

51

1 been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of my
2 Agency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy
3 levels of the government, would have done if it had come to the
4 point where somebody said, we can do it, do you want us to do
5 it.

6 Mr. Baron. You would have referred that to Bissell?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. He would have referred it?

9 Mr. Tweedy. He would have referred it according to his
10 lights. That was not my business. He was his own level of
11 authority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at my
12 level. I only assume that this would have been discussed at
13 the highest level, certainly at the Agency. I assume that the
14 decision would have had to have been made by Allen Dulles and
15 who else he wished to consult in Washington.

16 These are pure assumptions on my part. Under no circum-
17 stances would I have given the go ahead.

18 Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.

19 Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line.
20 I realize we are going very closely over this ground. We would
21 not be doing it if it weren't important in trying to get you to
22 clarify for the record exactly what shade of meaning you want
23 to attach here.

24 Would it be fair to say that when you dispatched Gottlieb
25 to the Congo you expected to hear back --

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue
2 between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.

3 Mr. Baron. You were hoping?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Gottlieb assisting the Chief of Station in
5 his explorations.

6 Mr. Baron. In view of the entire policy of the Agency at
7 that time, as indicated in the cables of Dulles and the cables
8 from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that
9 Gottlieb and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means
10 of carrying out an assassination mission and then inform you of
11 that.

12 Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to comment on the hope. I do
13 not know what my frame of mind was on that.

14 The purpose of the exercise was to see whether this was
15 possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of
16 policy in carrying out the exploration which was entirely a
17 professional matter. If the exploration had reached a point
18 where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan
19 which we thought made some sense, at that point higher authority
20 would have to take the ball and run with it and let us know
21 what they concluded.

22 Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any
23 authority higher than yourself?

24 Mr. Tweedy. It would start with me in my chain of command.
25 I would not be concerned with the National Security Advisor

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 703) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

1000 North Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002



TOP SECRET

53

1 to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my
2 mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters
3 had been broached to the field by Mr. Dulles, that the thing
4 was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's
5 arena.

6 What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his
7 authorities were from higher authority I cannot tell you.

8 Mr. Dawson. That would have been a matter that would have
9 been between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, is that correct?

10 Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, it would have been
11 between Mr. Dulles and the outside world, the Executive.

12 Mr. Dawson. The chain of command would have been, you
13 would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expected
14 or would have asked what Mr. Dulles' view were?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, we were also an Agency that was
16 very flexible. I am not saying Mr. Dulles might not have talked
17 to me about this, that was because Mr. Bissell was not
18 immediately available, or something of this kind.

19 What I am saying is at the working level, the operational
20 level, the Divisional and the Station level, we had come up
21 with a plan which made professional sense to us which we felt
22 sound enough so that we would present it to our masters, we
23 would have done so and the resultant instruction to the field
24 would have depended on their reaction as far as I was concerned
25 within the Agency. As far as Mr. Dulles was concerned, I cannot

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-4000

WARD & PAUL

1957

1957

TOP SECRET

54

1 tell you.

2 In other words, the degree to which he thought he would
3 have to refer further to Washington on, I have no idea.

4 Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry
5 out an assassination; it was the job of Bissell and those above
6 him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you were concerned?

7 Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concerned, that is the way it
8 started.

9 Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollac-
10 tion that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, we do not have
11 a shot at this, or we do, and we could do it this way, and him
12 saying one thing or another? You have no recollection either
13 way?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic I did.

15 Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.

16 Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. When I say he read
17 every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is he
18 had full access to these cables and anything he had not read or
19 had any reason to believe he had not read, I would have kept him
20 generally briefed on the progress of the planning. Naturally,
21 he would have been interested. He would not have followed it
22 in detail.

23 Mr. Dawson. Would Mr. Dulles have had any access to these
24 cables?

25 Mr. Tweedy. Not routinely. I think he would have expected

TOP SECRET

FORM 1A-10 (202) 544-0000

WARD & PAUL

100-100000-100000-100000

TOP SECRET

55

1 Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this.
2 He did not want any more paper floating around in those days.
3 Mr. Dulles was in even another building. Now, we were all down
4 at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr.
5 Dulles was on E Street. It doesn't make any difference. The
6 number of papers on this ^{the} YQPROP thing would have been restricted
7 to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would have
8 expected to be bothered with the operational details. What he
9 would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on planning
10 the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means.

11 Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information
12 would have been given to Mr. Dulles -- for instance, what I'm
13 thinking was, were there staff meetings at which you attended
14 with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles' presence concerning what was
15 happening generally on a routine quarterly or weekly basis?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have seen Mr. Dulles by and
17 large every day.

18 Mr. Dawson. They would not review meetings on a weekly or
19 routine basis?

20 Mr. Tweedy. He had his own staff meeting every morning,
21 Mr. Dulles did. These were attended by his Deputy Directors, of
22 which Mr. Bissell was one.

23 I used to see Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meeting once
24 a week which all Chiefs of Division attended. Nothing like
25 this would be discussed at those. I had my own private meetings

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

3,011 (Area 202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

56

1 with him on these matters whenever it seemed necessary by one
2 or the other of us.

3 Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1960,
4 which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference to a
5 senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that
6 a reference to the fact that Bissell was considering dispatching
7 Justin O'Donnell?

8 Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that
9 is who it is.

10 Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked by
11 Bissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of
12 Lumumba would fit here?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Sure.

14 Mr. Baron. The third country national referred to in this
15 cable and in other cables as someone you are considering
16 dispatching to the Congo to help with the operation, would that
17 be QJWIN or WIROGUB?

18 Mr. Tweedy. As I told you before, definitely not WIROGUE.
19 Irasumably this other fellow, whose identity and what he was is
20 very, very unclear to me.

21 Mr. Baron. The agent that was run by ⁰³ ~~Arnold Silver~~

22 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. This would have been the man that would
23 have worked with Justin O'Donnell if it had all happened.

24 Mr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will represent to you that
25 QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Donnell.

TOP SECRET

TGR

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20001

TOP SECRET

58

1 Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of
2 Station on suggestions A, B and C for various covert operations.
3 In paragraph C, there is a reference to ⁰² WPROAK.

4 Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the
5 CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba.
6 Is that consistent with your interpretation of the cable?

7 Mr. Baron. It is indeed.

8 Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: "Only direct
9 action we can now stand behind is to support immobilizing or
10 arresting ⁰² WPROAK, desirable as more definitive action might be.
11 Any action taken would have to be entirely Congolese."

12 Now, you signed this cable, but it was not sent in the
13 special sensitivity channel that dealt with Gottlieb's mission
14 to the Congo?

15 Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into
16 the record as Exhibit 11 another cable which you signed on
17 October 15, 1960 which was sent in the ⁰² YOPROP channel to the
18 Chief of Station.

(The document referred to
was marked Tweedy Exhibit
No. 11 for identification.)

TOP SECRET

218

FORM (Rev. 2-27) 544-5000

READ & RECD

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

TOP SECRET

59

1 Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: "You
2 will note from cable through normal channel currently being
3 transmitted" then it continues "on ^{SA}YQPROP suggestions. You
4 will probably receive more along these lines as stumbling
5 bloc⁰² [REDACTED] ROAK represents increasingly apparent all studying
6 Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously
7 becomes number one consideration."

8 Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-
9 awful English.

10 Mr. Baron. The cable continues --

11 Mr. Tweedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked
12 to said there is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba
13 stays in a position of power or influence there. That is what
14 that means.

15 Mr. Baron. The cable continues: "Raise above so you not
16 confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains
17 for specific purpose you discussed with colleague and also
18 remains highest priority."

19 Now, does this pair of cables indicate that at this point
20 despite the indication in the first cable that we looked at that
21 "direct action would be limited to entirely Congolese action"
22 the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters
23 involved in this operation was that exploration of an assassina-
24 tion mission remained the highest priority for the Chief of
25 Station?


TOP SECRET

1/BR

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003



TOP SECRET

60

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Tweedy. I think that is accurate.

2 We had come to the end of the road, at least temporarily
3 on the YQPROP aspect and for the time being we were in no
4 position to approve anything but what was discussed in the
5 ⁰² ~~WFLAP~~ cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo
6 from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search
7 for means to take care of the YQPROP planning aspects.

8 Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose
9 you discussed with colleague --

10 Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with Gottlieb, I am
11 sure.

12 Mr. Baron. It then says: This purpose remains highest
13 priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station
14 that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be
15 assassinated?

16 Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station
17 was that he should retain exploration of possible means of
18 assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continue
19 to seek means to do this, not to do it.

20 Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made
21 yourself clear, as far as you were concerned, you were still
22 asking him to explore and not implement at this point?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Nothing else but.

24 Mr. Baron. Who would have had access to or received
25 distribution of the first cable we looked at which travelled in

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

the ⁰² ~~WI~~FLAT channel?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been restricted, but not as restricted as the other.

Mr. Baron. Would somebody at the Embassy conceivably have been cut in on cable traffic in the channel that dealt with ~~WI~~FLAT operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Could be, certainly.

Mr. Baron. In other words, the purpose of sending a second cable on the same day which dealt with action against Lumumba was what?

Mr. Tweedy. The simple reason I think -- I say I think, because I cannot tell you so -- as I said a few minutes ago, obviously you'd come temporarily to the end of the line on YQPROP. Measures taken to shore up ~~WI~~FLAT ⁰¹ position in the Congo, Mabutu would have served to support the general objective, of containing Lumumba by whatever means. It is all part of the same purpose.

Once again referring to the original cable from Mr. Dulles which said all means, in effect, and I think the reason I'm putting this in the open channel, the open channel is still --

Mr. Baron. Simply the ordinary channel used between yourself --

Mr. Tweedy. Still a restricted channel. RIBAT is a restricted thing, in any event. This could have been discussed with the Ambassador or the Embassy, if any aspect of it seemed

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S. E. Washington, D. C. 20003

3/5R

TOP SECRET

62

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20001

1 appropriate by the Chief of Station.

2 Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have
3 been seen by the Chief of Station?

4 Mr. Tweedy. The Embassy would not have been shown this
5 cable anyway. We do not show the traffic to the Embassy; we
6 discussed it.

7 Mr. Baron. It would have been propr for the ⁰²PLAT cable
8 to be conveyed in some manner?

9 Mr. Tweedy. To be discussed.

10 Mr. Baron. Between the Chief of Station and perhaps the
11 Ambassador?

12 Mr. Tweedy. Discussed; only orally.

13 Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable clearly would
14 have been restricted to the Chief of Station?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I have no reason to believe that the YQPROP
16 business was discussed with the Ambassador, I do not
17 believe it was, although Mr. Dulles, in his original cable, said
18 he could, if he wanted to.

19 Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as the final exhibit for
20 the moment Exhibit 12, a cable of October 17, 1960 going to
21 Jadwin from the Chief of Station.

22 In this cable, the Chief of Station is responding to your
23 suggestion that a senior case officer might be dispatched to
24 the Congo to handle the YQPROP operation. He says it is an
25 excellent idea. Is that a fair interpretation?

TOP SECRET

1002



Phone (Area 207) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 12 for identification.)

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 by a rifle, that would be the opening of the hunting season.
2 In other words, the point where they knew how it could be used
3 and Headquarters had approved its use.

4 Mr. Baron. I have one other general question before we
5 take a break, and that is, returning to Sidney Gottlieb's
6 account of his conversation with Richard Bissell about making
7 preparations for carrying off an assassination against an
8 African foreign leader if it were required, Gottlieb said in
9 that context that he had higher authority for such an operation.
10 Gottlieb also said that he clearly interpreted Bissell to mean
11 that Bissell had Presidential authority for such an operation?
12 Did you have any knowledge of such a conversation between
13 Gottlieb and Bissell from any source?

WARD & PAUL

tape 2b 14 Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that Gottlieb and I ever
15 discussed higher authority and approval. I do not say that it
16 did not occur. If Gottlieb said that he had this impression
17 in talking to Bissell, I cannot say no, but I cannot comment
18 on it further.

410 First Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20004

19 Mr. Baron. For the moment, we have no further questions
20 and we will take a break now and pick up again before the full
21 Committee and Executive Session this afternoon.

22 Thank you very much for your patience in going through these
23 documents one by one. It has been extremely helpful to us.

24 (Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the hearing concluded.)
25

TOP SECRET

REF ID: A6
SERIAL: 2443
DATE: 19 September 1960

SECRET

1	DEFERRED	4
2	ROUTINE	5
3	PRIORITY	6
4	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	7

7/1/60

OUT 7/1/60

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF
INFO: DDP, S/C 2

TO (PRITY) LEOP

INFO

CITE DIR
0144

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN FROM JADWIN
RYBAT YOPROP

1. IDEN PROCEEDING BRAZZAVILLE SHORTLY AND SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. HE WILL MAKE HIS WAY LEOP SOONEST THEREAFTER AND CALL YOU AT OFFICE ON ARRIVAL. WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". BRIEF COVER DISCUSSION WILL THEN BE HELD IN WHICH "SID" SUGGESTS MEETING YOU AT OFFICE AND YOU WILL RESPOND BY AGREING AND SETTING THE TIME. HOWEVER THE ACTUAL MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN TIME MENTIONED IN THIS CONVERSATION AND IN FRONT MAIN ENTRANCE NEW STANLEY HOTEL. "SID" WILL CARRY UNROLLED COPY OF "PARIS MATCH" IN LEFT HAND.

2. IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE IDEN SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. HOWEVER HIS ETA NOT FIRM AND YOU SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY SOME DELAY.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

IRECTOR

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

INFO

PAGE TWO

CITE 012

3. ACKNOWLEDGE ABOVE SOONEST, WITH ANY REVISIONS YOU WISH MAKE IN ABOVE PROCEDURES. CONTINUE USE YOOPROP INDICATOR ALL TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.

END OF MESSAGE

Fluety
DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Fluety
CIAF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy 1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1. Tweedy 589
2. C/AF 2445
3. 19 September 1960

SECRET

1		4
2		5
3		6

● LEOPOLDVILELE
1. DIRECTOR
2. C/AF
3. JDD, S/C 2

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	INITIALS
	X PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

SEP 19 1960

71464

71465

(PRITY) LEOP INFO

CITE DIR 01443

RYBAT YOPROP

RE DIR 71464 (OUT 01443)

IDEN SIDNEY BRAUN.

END OF MESSAGE

DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

S. T. Tracy
C/AJ
2445
22 September 1948

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

LEOPOLDVILLE

4. DIRECTOR

11. C/AF

12. 109, 8/10 2

DEFERRED	
ROUTINE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT 7:43P

(PRITY) LEOP

INFO

CITE DIR

0300

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

0300

RYBAT YOPROP

RE LEOP 0025 (IN 18989)

IF VERY WELCOME. COMMENTS FOLLOW.

A. RE 2A. CONCUR MAXIMUM USE ⁰⁴ ~~SCOTTROFF~~ FOR COLLECTION OF INTEL. MUST REMAIN UNWITTING FOR TIME BEING ALTHOUGH FUTURE

YOU WILL BE ASSESSING FOR MORE ACTIVE ROLE. ALTHOUGH ⁰⁴ ~~SCOTTROFF~~ HAS APPARENTLY MAINTAINED SPLENDID COVER, MUST REMEMBER CLOSE

EXAMINATION HIS BACKGROUND WILL REVEAL HE ~~RESIDENTIALLY~~ ^{AX}

¹¹ ~~PERPRIME~~ ONE LEG ON ¹¹ ~~PERPRIME~~ PASSPORT AND WIFE ^{AX}

B. RE 2B. CONCUR THIS POSSIBILITY WORTH WATCHING BUT IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR YOPROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH PERPRIME ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. IMAGINE YOU CONCUR OUR BELIEF SUBJECT'S SECURITY LIKELY BE POOR AND LEAKS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY

CLUBE

24 1945

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICERS

USR

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	
DEFERRED			
ROUTINE			
PRIORITY		URGENT	
OPERATIONAL		REGULAR	
IMMEDIATE		L	
OUT 74837			

TO :
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 CONF:
 INFO:

INFO PAGE TWO

CITE DIR 03094

C. RE 20. YOU MUST HAVE MUCH BETTER PERSPECTIVE
⁰⁵ PROMOTION TOPIC THAN WE, BUT TRACES INDICATE [REDACTED] CONNECTION
 AND THUS OUR COMMENTS ALONG LINES B ABOVE.

D. RE 20. UNDERSTAND STATION HAS HAD REASONS QUESTION
⁰² WILLAM REPORTING RELIABILITY AND WE MUST ASSUME [REDACTED]
 CONNECTIONS COMMENTS AS ABOVE.

E. RE 22. FROM TRACES HERE ASSUME SUBJECT MAY BE ARMED
 ARM SUPPORTER OF KASAYUBU. NOTE PREVIOUS CZECH CONNECTIONS.
 COMMENTS ALSO AS ABOVE.

F. RE 27. AWAITING YOUR FURTHER EXPLORATION CNA CAPTA
 CERTAINLY INTERESTED ANY POSSIBLE CNA SOLUTION. THIS SHOULD
 PROVIDE MAXIMUM CREDIBILITY.

G. RE 26. ASSUME YOU AGREE SUBJECT LEOP 0009 LIKELY BE
 MOST RISKY VEHICLE THESE PURPOSES.

SEP 24 1975

CIA

RE PARAS THREE AND FOUR, INTERESTED YOUR CONTINUING

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICER
 SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

9/28

1		4
2		5
3		6
P R I O R I T Y	DEFERRED	
	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
		031 1231

DIRECTOR
 1.
 2.

INFO PAGE THREE

CITE DIR 03074

ASSESSMENT ⁰⁷ ~~W~~BOTTLE AS GENUINE THIRD NATIONAL ASSET ON GROUND OF
 WHATEVER ROLE THIS OP YOU MIGHT CONSIDER HIM. SOMEWHAT CONCERN
 YOUR RECENT REPORT HE MISUNDERSTOOD OR DISOBEYED INSTRUCTIONS
 RE ⁰⁶ ~~EXPLOITATION~~ EXPLOITATION, BUT HIS APPARENT INCREASING ACCESS TO
 MILIEU OF GREAT INTEREST. WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL
^{CANDIDATE}
 WITHOUT CONTACT AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL AND WILL ADVISE
 SHORTLY.

3. NOT INTENDED YOU CONSTRUE ABOVE COMMENTS AS BASICALLY
 NEGATIVE. YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YOUR
 SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN
 MUST BE CONCEALMENT PRIME ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY
 EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY
 ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGARD
 BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS.

Amely

END OF MESSAGE
 1915

WAF
 ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

2
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

A. W. Dulles
DCI 570
2801
24 Sept. 60

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	5
P R O C E D U R E	DEFERRED
	ROUTINE
	PRIORITY
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

.. DIRECTION

.. C/S, C/P, C/R, C/D/A, C/A, C/L, C/H 2,
C/H 3, C/O 2

CUT 73573
CUT 73573

OP IM LEOP

INFO

CLIP DIR

RYBAT ⁰² LAT

02521
02521

FROM ASCHAM AND JADWIN

RE: LEOP 0002 (IN 17384)*

1. APPRECIATE EXCELLENT REPORTING YOUR REFERENCE AND COMMEND ⁰⁴ SCHOTROFF'S ALERT ROLE. WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP, SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

2. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF NEFARIOUS PLOTTING GHANA, GUINEA, UAR. TO RESTORE LUMUMBA, GREATLY DISTURBED AT REFERENCE TO MOROCCO AND PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AS MEMBER OF THIS CLIQUE. CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY ACTION WE CAN PROMOTE OR TAKE OTHERWISE TO HELP DETACH THEM FROM LUMUMBA

CAMP 7

SEP 24 1960

CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Handwritten initials/signature

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36
37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44
45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52
53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64
65	66	67	68
69	70	71	72
73	74	75	76
77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84
85	86	87	88
89	90	91	92
93	94	95	96
97	98	99	100

INFO

CHECK

3. DISTURBED AT POSSIBILITY THAT ¹⁰¹ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MIGHT LOSE CONTROL OF HIS FORCES DUE POSSIBLE HIGHER PAY BEING OFFERED SOURCES HOSTILE TO US AS SUGGESTED PARA 4 YOUR REFERENCE. IS PAY SITUATION IN ORDER AND CAN ANYTHING FURTHER BE DONE ABOUT THIS THROUGH UN OR COVERTLY THROUGH ¹⁰¹ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~?

4. AGREE POSITION OUTLINED LAST SENTENCE REFERENCE WHICH WE ASSUME IS FULLY ENDORSED BY AMBASSADOR.

5. AT YOUR DISCRETION, SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: ⁰⁴ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (2) reported on 23 September that Pierre Mulale, Gabriel Yumbu, and Antoine Gizenga of the PSA were mounting a coup against Mobutu and the Council of Commissioners

SEP 24 1975

CIA

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

REC'D FROM

PAGE 2
SEP 22 1975

CIA

PRIORITY

IN 18080
LEOP 0226

D. ⁰² NIJLAM IN CONTACT 5 BALUBAS WHO HE SAYS ANXIOUS LAUNCH REF PROGRAM IF PROPER INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.

E. DIRECTOR GEORGES MASSIANGA RECENTLY TOLD ODACID OFFICER AND GUTMAN HE IN CONTACT SMALL GROUP CNA TROOPS WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IF RECEIVE FINANCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT. GUTMAN WITHDREW FROM TALK AND ARRANGED HAVE ODACID OFFICER INTRODUCE MASSIANGA MEMBER. NO RESULTS. THIS COULD BE PUSHED THROUGH ANOTHER

F. ⁰² NIJLAM TOLD BETTELHEIM HE IN CONTACT CIA CAPTAIN WHO HAS REPRESENTS GROUP OF 4 TRAVAGUES, DEFENSE OFFICER, MEMBER OF COMMISSIONERS, BOLIKANGO AND CAPTAIN. ASKED ⁰² NIJLAM FOR HIM IN CONTACT BELGIAN, FRENCH OR OTHER GROUPS WILLING TRAIN AND ARM 1500 TROOPS LOCATED KITONA AREA. SAID HIS GROUP WANTS MOVE THEM LEOP IN ABOUT 8 DAYS TO TRY TAKE OVER CITY. PLAN NOT FEASIBLE AND DOUBT KASAVUBU AGREES. BUT MIGHT GET CAPTAIN INVOLVED REF OP.

G. SLIGHT CHANCE ⁰² NIJLAM BOTTLE MIGHT TRY THROUGH SUBJECT LEOP 0229 (IN 18077).

3. PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO, CONTRARY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS INFORMATION IS PROHIBITED

9/18/75

PAGE - 3 -

PRIORITY

IN 18909
LEOP 0220

TO

CIT

04

... NOT FEASIBLE, ~~SCHEMATIC~~ POSSIBLE TO
FOR PLANS... AWARE ~~SCHEMATIC~~ LIKE THIRD NAT...
... AVAILABLE FOR CUT-OUT FUNCTIONS, SUCH PERSON...
CONTINUED TO PAGE 4

END OF MESSAGE

RECEIVED FROM

SEP 22 1975

CIA

CRB

STANLEYVILLE

Sept 27

REC'D CABLE SECT.

2

1. 11:00 AM

PRIORITY

SEP 22 1975

C.I.A.

IN 18589

019

010

011 LEOP 2226

FIVE ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT ²¹YOPROP

REF: DIR 01443 (OUT 71464)

1. IDEN REF CONTACTED 26 SEPTEMBER. WE ON SAME WAVE LENGTH
GUTHMAN AFRAID ⁰¹WIFLAT ³¹ WEAKENING UNDER AFRO-ARAB PRESSURE. NEED
BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED.

2. BASIS TALKS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES:

A. RECALL ⁰¹STANLEYVILLE ⁰¹ FROM STANLEYVILLE AND HAVE HIM TALK
REF WITH HIS BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRITH
GUTHMAN. HAZOP EDGE. ALSO WOULD PROVIDE INFO ON FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM. GUTHMAN RECALLING ⁰⁴SECRETARY TO LEOP.

B. SUBJECT LEOP 0981 (IN 16606) SAID HE PLANNED ACTION
WITHIN 6 DAYS. DATE PASSED AND NO ACTION BUT IF PRICE RIGHT MIGHT
GET SHOW ON ROAD.

C. ⁰⁵SENATOR PROMONTORIO WHO UNWITTING GUTHMAN POLITICAL
CONTACT VISITED STATION 26 SEPTEMBER. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE
IMMEDIATE ACTION. SAID HAS NAMES 4-MAN SQUAD WHO WANT INTERFERE
ACHIEVE POSITIVE SETTLEMENT. IF ⁰⁵PROMONTORIO GROUP USED WOULD
NEED CUT-OUT SUCH AS ROWTON. REALIZE PREFERABLE USE THIRD NATION.

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

5

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (OR HOUSE, AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DDP, S/C 2

2	3
1	SEP 30 73 40 20
REC'D CABLE SECT.	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	
IN 20057	

DIR

INFO

CITE

LEOP 0303

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YOPROP

REF: DIR 03094 (OUT 74837)

SEP 22 1975

CIA

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE ⁰⁴ ~~SECRET~~ BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF ⁰⁴ ~~SECRET~~ WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS ⁰⁴ ~~SECRET~~ PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY ⁰² ~~SECRET~~ PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO ~~FRENCH~~ ⁰¹ ~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (OR HESSE, AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DOP, S/C 2

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
SEP 30 73 40 00			
REC'D CABLE SECT.			
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE			
IN 2057			

DIR

INFO

CITE

LEOP 0050

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RE: [REDACTED]

RYBAT YOPROP

SEP 22 1975

REF: DIR 03094 (OUT 74837)

CIA

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [REDACTED] BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [REDACTED] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [REDACTED] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [REDACTED] QUOTE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [REDACTED]

SECRET

PAGE 2

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 2003/1
LECP 2002

TO

INFO

CITE

4. NEW POSSIBILITY EXISTS VIEW 29 SEPTEMBER GUTHMAN
⁰² [KA] LISLE 1 TALKS. ALTHOUGH ⁰² [KA] LISLE 1 PREVIOUSLY FAVORED SUBJECT
 REF OP, NOW BELIEVES ⁰² [KA] LISLE 1 GROUP WOULD BE SUPPRESSED IN
 CONGO AND REPLACED BY GUINEAN SUPPORTED GROUP IF SUBJECT EVER
 REGAINS ASCENDANCY. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION.
 THEREFORE PROPOSE EXPLORE ⁰² [KA] LISLE 1 THINKING SOONEST TO SEE HOW
 FAR HE WILLING GO AND DETERMINE HIS ASSETS. ASSUMING ⁰² [KA] LISLE 1
 MEETING POSITIVE, DOES HQS CONSIDER HIM BE TRUE THIRD COUNTRY
 NATIONAL FROM POINT VIEW SECURITY OF OP? IF ⁰² [KA] LISLE 1 REACTION
 FAVORABLE, BELIEVE THIS OFFERS MEANS ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE EARLY ON
 PAR WITH ⁰⁴ [SCHOTROFFE] IN SO FAR AS ACCESS AND SECURITY CONCERNED

5. RE PARA 1F REF: AS OF NOW DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFO
 EVALUATE POTENTIAL OF CNA.

6. VIEW IMMINENT ⁰⁴ [SCHOTROFFE] AND ⁰² [KA] LISLE 1 MEETINGS, RE
 QUEST HQS REPLY OPIM VIA EQUERRY LINK.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

8/BR

30 SEPTEMBER 1960

LEOPOLDBVILLE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DCP, S/C 2

A M E R I C A N C I T I E S	DEFERRED	30-31	92-54-10
	ROUTINE		
	PERUITE		
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		

SEP 22 1965

OUT 7500
OUT 7590
03080

LEOP

INFO

CIA

CITE DIR

03680

EYES ONLY GUTSMAN

RYBAT YCHTOP

RE LEOP 0052 (IN 20857)

CS COMMENT: * URGED HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY TALKS TO DETERMINE IF SCHOTROFFE WILLING TO TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT.

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH ⁰⁴ SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE. AGREE WITH YOU INITIAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS.

2. IT DOES APPEAR FROM HERE THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE ⁰⁴ ~~SCHOTROFFE~~ IS

BEST. WE STILL HAVE SOME WORRY ABOUT PSBRIME STAY TOGETHER WITH QUESTIGIS OF WIFE. HOWEVER WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT HIS ATTITUDE AS WELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACHES THAT MAY EMERGE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT A FEW DAYS STATUS QUD SITUATION WOULD ALLOW FOR MODERATE HASTE.

3. IN ABSENCE MORE DETAILS WE ARE RELUCTANT CONSIDER ⁰² ~~TO~~ ISLE GIE. WHEREAS HE HAS BEEN LONG TIME CONTACT AND IN HIS SPECIFIC FIELD HE IS IN MOST RESPECTS AN AGENT WE WOULD STILL HAVE BASIC QUESTIONS AS TO CONTROL AND SECURITY. WE DO AGREE YOU SHOULD EXPLORE HIS THINKING WITH QUESTIGIS MORE OBLIQUE THAN DIRECT. IF YOU FEEL WE ARE WRONG ⁰² ~~ON~~ ISLE GIE ASSESSMENT PLEASE ADVISE AFTER NEXT TALKS WITH HIM.

4. APPRECIATE HURRY YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEMS. (END OF MESSAGE)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GLENN FIELDS C/15

NO DANCE

Fields

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

7/3R

07 OCT 68

SECRET

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLD, LEE

C/AF

OO/P, S/C 2

OCT 8 03 08 '68

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 24171

PRIORITY DIR

LEOP 15120

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN*

RYBAT YOPPOP

REF: DIR 83583 (OUT 75900) **

1. IDEN DIR 81443 (OUT 71464) DEPARTED LEOP FOR PBRIME 5 OCT, VIEW EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS. HOWEVER LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. GUTHMAN PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP.

2. CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] REF. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, [REDACTED] REQUESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

3. IF HQS BELIEVES [REDACTED] PBRIME STAY OR LOCATION WIFE PERMANENT BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. RECRUITMENT SUCH ASSET LOCALLY NOT FEASIBLE VIEW SECURITY PROBLEM AND LIMITED NUMBER POTENTIAL ASSETS. ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE ASSET HERE IS

W BOTTLE 1. GUTHMAN DOUBTS HE CAPABLE SUCH ACTION. ALSO FEAR HE MIGHT REVEAL DETAILS TO [REDACTED]

SECRET

258

07 OCT 68

SECRET

IN 24171

LOOP 15759

PAGE -2-

4. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

2'S COMMENT: *EYES ONLY APPEARS TO BE IMPROPERLY USED. IN YOUR REPLY
PLEASE ADVISE THE FIELD TO COMPLY WITH REGULATION 50-400.

**WAS AUTHORIZED GUTMAN TO HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH
TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR OUTSIGHT ROLE

SECRET

10445
7 October 1960

504

SECRET

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED]

DEFERRED	
ROUTINE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY	
OPERATIONAL	
IMMEDIATE	

FROM

10 OCT 1960

51A

0178336

(PRIORITY) LEOP

INFO

CITE DIR

04907

RYBAT TOPROP

EYES ONLY GUTMAN

XXXXXXXX

I. HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT. COMMENTS FOLLOW:

A. BE ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT TOPROP OBJECTIVES BE REACHED IN SHORT PERIOD AND UNDERSTAND CURRENT SITUATION FULLY WARRANTED RETURN YOUR COLLEAGUE.

B. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ⁰⁴ [SCHORROFF] SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE MADE WITTING BUT FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES TARGET WILL CONTRADICT WHETHER YOU WISH RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY AGAIN FOR OP INTEL OR MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

C. MEANWHILE WE CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD BATIC OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

UFR

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECEIVED FROM

SEP 22 1975

CIA

PAGE TWO

~~WILL~~ OUTGO ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. IF YOU CONCLUDE IT IS
 SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY EXTRA LOAD THIS PLACES
 ON YOU, WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN
 THIS OP AND OUTSIDE AGENT FULL TIME UNDER YOUR DIRECTION.
 IN ANY CASE THIRD NATIONAL WOULD NOT BE WITTING PRIOR DEPART
 FROM HERE AND WOULD OBTENSIBLY BE SCHEDULED PERFORM
 GENERAL OPS ROLE. WILL ADVISE PROGRESS ON THIS MAN.

2. COLLEAGUE MENTIONED ARRIVAL YOUR FAMILY AND HOPE TAKE
 LUANDA WEEKEND. WARMLY SUPPORT THIS AND ANY OTHER SHORT
 LEAVE YOU CAN SCROUNGE. DO NOT WAIT TILL YOU TOO TIRED TO
 BENEFIT FROM IT.

END OF MESSAGE

[Handwritten Signature]
 CIA

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

BOOK NUMBER 7
RESEARCH AREA
FORM 3662
15 October 1946

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

ROUTING	
1	2
3	4
5	6
7	8
9	10
11	12
13	14
15	16
17	18
19	20
21	22
23	24
25	26
27	28
29	30
31	32
33	34
35	36
37	38
39	40
41	42
43	44
45	46
47	48
49	50
51	52
53	54
55	56
57	58
59	60
61	62
63	64
65	66
67	68
69	70
71	72
73	74
75	76
77	78
79	80
81	82
83	84
85	86
87	88
89	90
91	92
93	94
95	96
97	98
99	100

LEOPOLDVILLE
DIRECTOR

OUT 81476

LEOP INFO CITE OR 05205
RYBAT ⁰² WFLAT CS235

- RE A. LEOP 0101 (IN 25261)
- B. LEOP 0104 (IN 25967)
- C. LEOP 0072 (IN 23052)

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS FOLLOWING:

A. FORMATION ⁰¹ ~~ARMED~~ ⁰² ~~PRÆTORIAN~~ GUARD BY GIVING EXTRA PAY PERHAPS 25-50 PERCENT MORE THAN NOW BEING RECEIVED TO CORES OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN UP TO 200. DO NOT FEEL THAT NATIONAL MILITARY SCHOOL GROUP CAN BE USED FOR THIS. RAISE QUESTION WHETHER LOYALTY ENLISTED MEN COULD BE SO HELD FOR LONG. SUGGEST THIS BEST HANDLED BY GIVING FUNDS TO ⁰² WFLAT 4 FOR HIM TO GIVE TO ⁰¹ WFLAT 4. PURPOSE THIS TO USE ⁰² WFLAT 4 TO KEEP ⁰¹ WFLAT 4'S SPINE STRAIGHTENED.

B. AMMUNITION: WHAT RESERVES AMMUNITION TO BE HELD UNDER ⁰¹ WFLAT 4 CONTROL WOULD BE REQUIRED. ASSUME 10,000 ROUNDS FOR SMALL ARMS MIGHT SUFFICE. WE WOULD REQUIRE INFO CALIBRE AND

REC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SEP 24 1946

716R

6125
15 October 1940

571

2
3
6

MEMPHISVILLE

SECRET

OPERATIONAL	STATUS
-------------	--------

(PRIORITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 0525

RYBAT YOPROP


EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

1. YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA ON ^WYOPROP TYPE SUGGESTION. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING ^{OR} BLOC ^{OR} WROAK REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING OF THIS SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS WITH FRENCH SERVICE THIS WEEK AND RE CONGO THEY CAME UP WITH THIS IMMEDIATELY. (NO INDICATION AT ALL FRENCH SERVICE DOING ANYTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT IT.)

2. RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. RE DIR 01302, RE YOUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OF...

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
EABR



SECRET

1	14
2	15
3	16

DIRECTOR

REC'D
SEP 22 1945
CIA

SECRET	
CONFIDENTIAL	
OPERATIONAL	
SECURITY	
ADMINISTRATIVE	

PAGE TWO

CITE DIR 6400

SOONEST TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORKING ON THIRD NATIONAL MENTIONED THAT REF, BUT WONDER WHETHER YOU THINK EARLY ARRIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE SENSE. SEEMS TO BE YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCERN TO YQPROP. ADVISE.

I HAVE DISCUSSED ^{OR} ~~NO~~ CLAM WITH BETTELHEIM AND POSSIBILITY OF COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION ^{OR} ~~W~~ WIROAK, EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IS ^{OR} ~~W~~ WIROAK ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENTLY. PICKED UP OF ^{OR} ~~WIPLAT~~ MCNA TROOPS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

Handwritten signature
 COORDINATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER
 SECRET

Handwritten initials
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDOVILLE

C/AF

DCP, S/C 2

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
Oct 17 23 48 '68			
REC'D CABLE SECT.			
PRIORITY			
IN 28936			

DIR

NO

11/15

CITE

LEOP 8145

EYES ONLY JAWIN FROM GUTMAN

RYBAT ²PROP

REF: A. DIR 814512 (OUT 78336)

B. DIR 86853 (OUT 81396)*

1. ~~ECOP 2571~~⁰⁴ HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENCOURAGED. THIS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS AG.

2. BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PER OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. SITUATION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN WHAT GOES ELIZ 19 OCTOBER. IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE, GUTMAN WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS.

3. SERIOUSLY DOUBT POSSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STRONG. WOULD CONCUR OP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOWN BUT VIEW ONA WATCHING HOUSE, DOUBT HE WILL TRY THIS IN NEAR FUTURE. BELIEVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT COMMANDO, PER REF B, BUT ASSUME HQS WOULD WANT THIS DONE BY THIRD NATIONAL ASSET.

4. IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH

SECRET

OCTOBER 1969

SECRET

1	4
2	3
3	4

PAGE 2 SEP 29 1965

CIA

PRIORITY

IN 2893

LEOP 81

INFO

CITE

POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCER
 HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES
 NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF
 HUNTING SEASON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ETA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR
 ABDUCTION (SUBJ).

SECRET