

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10049

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ICCCA
FROM :
TO : JOSEPH CALIFANO

TITLE : SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 84

SUBJECTS :

- CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS
- CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA
- CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS
- CONTROL OF TRAVEL BY SUBVERSIVES
- TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES
- EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
- SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 13. Collection of papers produced by the Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
 Declassify Exclude Exempt

Authority _____

Refer To
Review Date 8/19/2015 By Ke @ Gomer

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BY AMM DATE 6/24/16

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To Joseph Colifano, with thanks
for patient help in a high
pressure problem.

W. K. ...
my son ...

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

PAPERS ON

CONTROL OF TRAVEL BY SUBVERSIVES
CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS
CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA
CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS
SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN
EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

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The papers included herein embody a series of action programs designed to impede the Castro-Communist subversive effort in Latin America. They were developed by an inter-departmental group which included representation from the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency and United States Information Agency.

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES
AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American countries. Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them all will not completely solve it. The practical problems involved are too numerous and complex.

With respect to diminishing legal travel to Cuba, we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of those Latin American countries through which the subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations the direct actions required have strong political and sometimes legal implications - implications which cannot be overcome easily, even when the leaders of these countries choose to do so.

In the matter of clandestine travel, we are confronted not only with the great depth of communist guile, born of two generations of experience in the international movement of subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of the Latin American community.

In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside with the communists. Cuba's insular character imposes certain sharp limitations upon personal movement. Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone who enters the country must do so either by water, or air. There can be no slipping through the barbed wire.

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On the other hand, this same geographic situation makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpatrolled Central American coastline, within 175 to 850 miles from Cuba. There are at least 93 airfields, other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow, number well into the thousands.

Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects. Under the proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely. More - probably much more - would be rendered difficult. Some hitherto legal movement would be driven underground. Previous clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated and harassed to the point where it becomes more costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, hopefully, less extensive.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

We do not know enough about the movement of subversive trainees, into Cuba and - more important - out of Cuba. We do not know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed. This is particularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extremely limited.

Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate:

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Legal Travel Into Cuba

Country	No. of Legal Travellers	Country	No. of Legal Travellers
	1962		1962
			Jan-Feb 1963
Mexico	4912*	Argentina	500
Guatemala	80	Uruguay	115
El Salvador	100	Paraguay	60
Nicaragua	50	Brazil	400
Costa Rica	216	Honduras	92
Venezuela	200	British Guiana	40
Colombia	400	Panama	56
Ecuador	208	Trinidad	Unk
Peru	181	Jamaica	593
Bolivia	500	Dominican Republic	None
Chile	551	Haiti	Unk

* In transit, including about 300 Mexicans

While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico. On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of 1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average.

Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that at least 1,500, and perhaps as many as 2,000, have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many

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of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; some by legal means; some probably by illicit means. There is no reason to presume, moreover, that the travel to Cuba of the remaining 3,000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the best interests of the hemisphere.

Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights. Some travelled to Trinidad or Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KLM flights to Havana. Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial flights to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by Pan American, KLM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City and Havana remained the sole direct and regular airline connection between Cuba and the remainder of Latin America.

The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico is scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only a single flight is completed per week. Aircraft now employed are British Britannias - an obsolescent model. Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports for the old Britannias. Delay by the Mexicans in granting this approval can have the favorable effect of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition. If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative.

Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana.

KLM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles. However, it is now considering doing so. In this regard it is concluded that resumption of scheduled flights by a United States carrier could serve as an encouragement to KLM and others to do the same.

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Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop regularly at any other Latin American country, though the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, enroute to Cuba. Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrangement to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new order of magnitude.

A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying both material and personnel. The Canadians have been unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification of the passengers.

There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers operating between Latin America and Cuba. However, a number of trainees from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to Cuba.

Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illicit procedures. The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin American governments subsequently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveillance over their activities upon their return.

Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel by legal means. This must be countered directly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater importance, is the problem of illicit movement both into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present most limited. Elimination of this intelligence void must be accorded high priority.

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III. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations

Success of many of the overt actions proposed in the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining actions must take place. Presented briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors of Latin America in terms of participation in a coordinated program of travel control.

As a general matter, the imposition of controls on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin American country. This, coupled with their current lack of full awareness of the danger represented by Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the willingness of some governments to impose controls unilaterally. This is especially true since they recognize that unilateral restraints will have little effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also taken. It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American countries would respond favorably -- albeit in varying degrees -- to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training.

The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired subversion than is Latin America at large, and can be expected to react favorably to proposals for reducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. However, their ability to carry out commitments which they may make will be limited by domestic legal and political considerations, as well as by their countries' technical incompetence in such matters.

Since Mexico is currently the principal hemisphere transit point for legal travel of subversives to and from Cuba, its attitude is of great importance. Mexico, to date, has taken several significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close

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surveillance over travellers, to include stamping passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA). These actions all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even further cooperative steps, particularly on an unpublicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the political hazards of taking a public OAS position are not involved. In this regard, the Central American Presidents would probably agree individually to seek the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow of persons to Cuba through that country.

Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered public resistance, and are not enforced. The Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy, but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued only on the personal approval of President Duvalier. Colombia could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but has shown no inclination to do so. Other countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central American nations, plead the existence of legal or constitutional barriers which preclude the prohibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they have made little effort to remove these barriers.

Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to the left and gives little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct or via third country.

The elimination of all legitimate passenger service to Cuba from Latin America could be

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achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a growing willingness to take action oriented in this direction. In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption of regular passenger service to Cuba by United States companies would render more difficult our efforts to persuade Latin American and other free world countries to take a grave view of the situation, and to participate in dynamic action.

Virtually, all the Latin American countries would be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their return to home countries, once they put their new training to use. The efforts of these nations will not be dramatically effective, however, since, in the area of internal security, all of them suffer from deficiencies in technical skill, training, equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of urgency. The United States can provide essential leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies.

IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel

Listed below are specific actions contemplated to impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba. Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged and involving travel documents which are presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS - wholly or in part - by its Special Consultative Committee on Security.

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1. Immediate Impact Actions

The following actions offer promise of producing early, visible and effective results.

a. Administrative Actions

(1) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to:

(a) Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba."

(b) Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of a third country who cannot produce a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba.

(c) Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not an integral, non-detachable part of the travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen.

(d) Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected.

(2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country of the nationals involved.

(3) Make covert arrangements with police and other security and administrative officials in countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of travel and thus discourage prospective travellers.

b. Intelligence Actions

(1) Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have travelled,

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or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence program, and the requirement to protect our sources.

(2) Intensify current efforts to introduce covert, U.S. - controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program.

c. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Prohibit resumption of air service to Cuba by U.S. carriers, in order to provide a favorable example to other nations.

(2) Expand current restrictions on foreign shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by closing United States ports to all ships of any shipping line which continues to send any ships to Cuban ports.

(3) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to prohibit ships arriving from or departing for Cuba from embarking or disembarking passengers in their ports.

(4) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry.

d. Propaganda Actions

Pursue a hemisphere-wide publicity campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for subversive purposes, in order to discourage prospective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba.

2. Longer Range Actions

The following actions should also be undertaken without delay. Their ultimate results may be of far-

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reaching importance, but probably will be longer in realization.

a. Political Actions

(1) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations with the five Latin American governments which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

(2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered for identification of evaders.

(3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effective cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bilaterally among the several states, in the interchange of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the American Republics to review the implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of subversives in the Caribbean.

(5) Urge other Latin American nations to negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to enlist cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba.

b. Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program.

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b. Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program.

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c. Administrative Actions

(1) Encourage Latin American governments to institute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of passengers to Cuba.

(2) Request governments of Latin American countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as requested.

(3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in improving immigration and customs controls.

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds. This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into disrepair.

(2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft.

(3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure.

e. Propaganda Actions

(1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discrediting the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities.

(2) Identify returned trainees who are dissatisfied with their Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for provision of intelligence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

In view of the important political, psychological, and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from any success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures should be undertaken by the United States in that body, at times and under circumstances which give regard to the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give recognition to the fact that progress will probably be slow.

a. Pursue adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of subversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same time, creating serious obstacles to other related Cuban subversive activities.

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b. Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein.

c. Once the initial comprehensive program in b. above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

d. Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution, binding upon all member states, to terminate regular air and maritime carrier traffic with Cuba.

V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, one of the results will be to force the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels. It may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal movement will acquire steadily increasing importance.

The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the preceding section, in terms of immediate impact projects which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which, while of great importance, cannot be expected to mature as rapidly.

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence Actions

(1) Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and

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determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program, to host government.

(2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned to institute surveillance and other control measures.

b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions

(1) Continue current US sea and air surveillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.

(2) Continue the development, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities.

(3) Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned via the American Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of subversives.

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Surveillance Actions

(1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving:

(a) Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by US forces.

(b) A US military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American

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Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command.

(c) A unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters.

(d) US assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned.

b. US Military Assistance Actions

(1) Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean and Central American area, with the necessary small patrol craft, training and logistical support, including fuel for operations if required, to enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs.

(2) Provide US Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces. This may take the form of a Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a combination of both.

(3) Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required.

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FUNDS

CUBA

CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS

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CUBA

DIRECT CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO AND
WITHIN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to recommend measures which will impose direct controls upon the flow of funds from Cuba to and within other Latin American countries.

We possess evidence that Cuba is providing financial support to subversive campaigns in other Latin American countries, but the full dimensions of the problem, in terms of amounts involved and methods used, are not known. We need more information. The difficulty with which this information is procured underscores the problems of counter-measures, since funds can be transferred internationally or acquired locally in many ways, all difficult to detect and harder to prevent. While we may be able to diminish the flow through some channels and increase the difficulty of Castro's subversive financial operations in others, we cannot hope to succeed in stopping them altogether, and even if this were feasible, the possibility of financial support of subversion by the USSR and other Bloc nations would remain.

Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that the impediments recommended herein are of insufficient importance to warrant their imposition. Impediments to the movement of funds can be imposed at relatively little cost to the United States, and they will have some effect in interfering with Castro's pursuit, through subversion, of his basic objective of gaining communist allies in Latin America. This effect could be very significant when added to others that we hope to achieve through our over-all anti-subversion program.

In examining this problem, it quickly became evident that the most effective countermeasures are to

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be found in the area of reducing the capability of Cuba to acquire reserves of free world convertible currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars, Pounds Sterling, Swiss francs, etc. Cuban pesos are usable only in Cuba. They are not convertible to any other currency and are therefore of little if any value elsewhere in the world. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange, moreover, have been steadily diminishing and are now estimated to stand at not more than \$25 million to \$50 million. If we are willing to intensify our efforts to weaken the Cuban economy, these foreign exchange reserves can be reduced further. However, it must not be overlooked that the Soviet Union can provide foreign exchange for Cuban use.

While of transcendent importance, this question of diminishing Cuba's foreign exchange through economic measures is properly related to the larger objective of weakening the economic position of Castro-Communist Cuba, and thus advancing further toward the goal of causing the downfall of the Communist government. As progress is realized in this broad endeavor, there will be a reduction in Castro's ability to finance subversive operations in the Hemisphere.

The matter of intensifying our economic warfare against Cuba is regarded, however, as beyond the purview of this committee. Therefore, the program of actions recommended in this paper has been directed to the transfer of funds. This includes physical transfers, transfers through bank transactions and transfers by subterfuge in connection with trade.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. The Castro regime may transfer convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries by four general methods:

a. Introduction by hand, by legal or illegal travellers.

b. Transfers through international banking institutions.

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c. Introduction by Cuban or Bloc diplomatic personnel, including couriers.

d. The practice of subterfuge in connection with international business transactions.

These methods are discussed in following paragraphs, along with steps which might be undertaken to diminish the effectiveness of each.

2. Introduction of Funds, by Hand, by Individual Travellers

This is the least convenient and least dependable method in terms of the hazard of theft, loss, misappropriation, confiscation or extortion. Nevertheless, we have evidence that this technique is employed. Funds can be introduced by legal travellers, where there are no effective controls, or they can be introduced by smuggling. With respect to smuggled funds, it is noted that the measures previously approved for control of illegal travel will likewise be effective in impeding the illegal movement of funds by such persons. In like manner, the measures previously approved for control of legal travel will affect the movement of funds by persons in that category.

Additional restrictions on the introduction of funds by legal travellers might be adopted by Latin American countries, in the form of limitations on amounts or administrative requirements for declaration of sums in hand. However, recommendation on our part to institute such controls would be contrary to our established policy of encouraging the Latin American nations to maintain free exchange systems. These countries need foreign exchange, and would consequently be hesitant to adopt any actions which would limit their means of acquiring it. Additionally, the adoption of controls on the importation of foreign exchange by Latin American nations would impose an undesirable burden on legitimate business and other travel from the United States, as well as from other friendly nations.

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Thus, in the category of movement of funds by travellers, it is concluded that little more should be done at this time than is currently in motion.

3. Transfers through Banking Institutions

In addition to physical transfers of currency, Cuba can transfer funds to subversives in Latin America through banking institutions, either by cable or by mail. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange are held principally, in the State Bank of Russia, the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (a Communist owned institution) in Paris, the Bank Intra of Switzerland, the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada. Funds from these deposits are transmitted on order of the National Bank of Cuba, which controls all of the accounts.

U.S. dollars are the principal currency used in Latin America. The transfer of dollars from these overseas accounts to subversives in Latin American countries can be impeded, in a significant degree, through the institution by the United States of blocking controls against Cuba, under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This blocking action would prohibit all transactions with Cuba by persons or institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and would effectively interrupt Cuban movement of U.S. dollars to Latin America through any U.S. bank.

Movement by Cuba of dollars through banks of third countries would also be greatly diminished by this action. It is known and generally accepted in international banking circles, that it is standing U.S. policy that any foreign bank which transfers dollars through U.S. banks in behalf of a blocked country is subject to having its own U.S. accounts blocked. Because of the importance of U.S. banks in international trade, foreign banks cannot afford such a restriction. This policy has been effective in the past, having deterred foreign banks, even those of Communist countries, from engaging in dollar transactions on behalf of Communist China, which have been blocked by the U.S. for over twelve years.

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With U.S. dollar channels blocked, other, less desirable, avenues would remain open to Cuba for bank transfer of convertible currencies such as Sterling, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, etc. If the British and Canadians could be persuaded to prohibit remittances in their currencies in behalf of Cuba, the latter's capability to move funds through banking channels would be further curtailed, and transfers in other currencies, such as Swiss francs, would be relatively easy to detect and monitor. While it is unlikely that British and Canadian cooperation would be forthcoming in this degree, these countries could still make a valuable contribution to the campaign against Castro-Communist subversion by providing intelligence concerning major transactions in their currencies by Cuba.

4. Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel

We know that convertible currencies have been carried to Latin American countries illegally by diplomatic representatives and couriers of both Cuba and the Bloc countries, under the protection of their diplomatic immunity. This form of transfer can be diminished through the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba by those countries in Latin America which have not already taken such action. However, the diplomatic facilities of other Bloc countries would probably remain available to Cuba in some Latin American nations.

5. Transfers Through Trade Subterfuge

An effective method of disguising transfers of funds for subversive purposes is to give such transfers the appearance of legitimate payments for items received in trade. In one technique, goods may be sent to a Cuban addressee by a subversive in the export-import business in a Latin American country bearing an erroneous invoice. A shipment having an actual value of \$10,000 can be invoiced and paid for at \$12,000, thus achieving a direct transfer of \$2,000 from Cuba to the Latin American country whence the shipment originated. Such

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transfers of funds could be eliminated only by the interruption of all trade between Cuba and other Latin American countries. And even if this were achieved, the same technique could be used, although at greater cost and with much more difficulty, to transfer Cuban funds to Latin America via France, for example, through a third party French Communist import-export firm.

Another commercial technique for transferring funds from Cuba directly to Latin America, through trade, is by means of uncompensated exports. As an example, a Cuban source might send \$5,000 worth of Cuban publications to a leftist bookstore in Chile. The bookstore would not pay Cuba for the publication, but instead would use the proceeds of the sale for subversive purposes. This method also could be fully controlled only by an interruption of trade with Cuba.

6. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods

All of the above mechanisms are usable, and probably all are employed now. However, since large sums can now be transferred readily through banking institutions, with small risk of loss or exposure, this method is considered to be the most significant and is deserving of the greatest attention in an action program. Next in importance probably is the transfer of currencies by diplomatic personnel - a procedure involving small risk of loss or exposure. Transfers by legal or illegal travellers are considered to be less important in view of the risks involved, the physical limitations on amounts which can be carried by individuals and the availability of other means. Trade subterfuge would presently appear to be of least significance, since such arrangements involve more difficulties than any of the other available methods.

III. Actions Recommended

1. The actions proposed herein, when added to those already proposed for controlling the movement of sub-

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versive persons, propaganda and arms, will serve to inhibit directly Cuba's effectiveness in financing subversion in Latin America. It must be acknowledged however, that Cuba's efforts to provide convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries cannot be rendered wholly ineffective by these measures alone. Complementary steps designed to reduce the ability of Cuba to acquire foreign exchange will also be required to constitute a full attack on the problem.

2. The following actions are recommended as promising to have some significant effect:

a. Establish regulations blocking

(1) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars to Cuba;

(2) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars directly or indirectly from Cuban accounts to free world countries; and

(3) all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals, or transactions involving property in which there is a Cuban interest.

These actions should be taken only following the development of detailed implementing instructions by the State and Treasury Departments and their final evaluation in light of other considerations which bear on the matter.

b. Seek opportunities to persuade Latin American nations which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

c. Increase intelligence efforts to gain information concerning:

(1) the size and location of Cuban accounts in free world banking institutions;

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(2) transfers of funds from these accounts to recipients in Latin America; and

(3) Cuban movement of currencies to other Latin American countries by legal and illegal travellers, including diplomatic personnel.

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d. Where locally feasible, encourage Latin American nations to impound funds of known Castro-Communist organizations.

e. Encourage Latin American countries to enlist the cooperation of their financial institutions in detecting suspicious accounts and in exposing transfers of funds for subversive purposes.

f. Seek, using appropriate means, to induce Canada, Great Britain, and other NATO countries to provide information on the direct or indirect transfer of significant amounts of their currencies by Cuba or Cuban nationals to other Latin American countries.

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g. As applicable, persuade Latin American countries to sever all direct or indirect trade relations with Cuba, except those involving sale to Cuba of foodstuffs and medicines.

h. Encourage Latin American countries to establish surveillance of known or suspected Communist controlled businesses to inhibit transfers of funds to subversives through such establishments.

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i. Encourage Latin American countries to expose and publicize illegal transfers of funds for subversive purposes.

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

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CUBA

MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. They complement the basic actions relating to control of movement of subversive trainees to and from Cuba, which actions are generally applicable in the solution of this problem as well. As in the companion measures for control of the movement of subversive trainees, successful execution of the actions proposed below will reduce the flow of propaganda materials but will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through which propaganda materials flow. As these legitimate outlets are blocked by the initial steps herein proposed, it will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists and their sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass exportation of materials to the production and dissemination of the same materials in a clandestine environment within the several Latin American countries. Of the two threats, the illicit production of propaganda materials in each country will be by far the more difficult to abate.

In combatting these threats, one of the most powerful factors is the influence of our own information and counter-propaganda efforts, which USIA and CIA have increased greatly during the past two years. This paper, however, is concerned wholly with direct actions; actions designed to impede the movement of propaganda materials to and within Latin America.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

While the Castro image has faded somewhat in Latin America, and the attraction of Cuba as a model has diminished, the susceptibility of the Latin American people to communist propaganda remains high. The basic social and economic factors which have made this true in the past have not greatly altered, and the variety and quantity of propaganda materials with which the Latin Americans are now beset are impressive, as exemplified in the many millions of dollars which the communists are estimated to be investing in the project annually. It is a large program and it presents a continuing threat to the tranquility of Latin America.

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Our efforts to combat the problem, moreover, are complicated by the fact that freedom of thought, expression and press are generally highly regarded in Latin America, albeit not universally honored, and any proposals to reduce the flow of Castro-Communist subversive materials must be influenced by this fact. Otherwise the United States may find itself indicted for fostering police-state methods, a charge which could alienate many of the Latin Americans we seek to influence.

For the purpose of this paper, propaganda materials include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings, printed materials, (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, books, newspapers, news service output), motion pictures, duplicating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications equipment, and printing resources, particularly paper stockpiles.

However, to be complete, "movement of propaganda materials" must extend also to publications which are hand-carried into a country by legal or illegal travellers for subsequent reproduction. It must also include materials transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic channels, shipments via postal channels, quantities introduced through smuggling operations; oral transmission of propaganda guidance by individual travellers or by Radio Havana, and the dissemination of communist oriented news by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, for reproduction by local outlets. Finally to be considered are thematic guidance, which can be reproduced and exploited locally by returning trainees, front groups and sympathetic publications and, in some countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay, the products of those commercial establishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro-Communist materials as a matter of policy or ideological conviction.

Press and Publications

There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and periodicals in Latin America, and infiltration of the democratic press, coupled with the non-critical attitudes of some newspapermen, increases greatly the diffusion of the Cuban propaganda line. There are 228 Communist-oriented publishing houses and bookstores in Latin America, serving as outlets not only for 30 different Cuban periodicals, but for a large variety of other Communist printed material.

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Every Latin American country except the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela permits these bookshops to operate. Many of them offer publications at very low prices or give away several books with the purchase of one, and easy credit terms are available.

Excluding TASS and the New China News Agency (NCNA), Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency in Latin America. It operates openly, although not entirely without restriction, in ten countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. While most users of Prensa Latina releases are covert or overt Communists, some non-Communist media make unattributed use of Prensa Latina releases. This is especially true of radio broadcasts.

All of this publication activity is essentially overt. However, decrees banning Communist propaganda have not prevented the clandestine publications and distribution of periodicals and books in some countries, and propaganda materials continue to seek entry through the mails. In Panama, for example, postal and customs authorities destroy an average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda per month. Another ten tons per month is seized and destroyed in Costa Rica. This suggests the further quantities, perhaps larger, may be finding their way into these and other countries.

Radio

Short wave radio is the principal direct mass audience medium used by Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America. The Castro regime has constantly increased Radio Havana's short wave broadcasts to Latin America to a current level of 115:30 hours per week.

Cultural Activities

Penetration under the guise of cultural activities is a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America, where there are now some 64 Cuban binational centers and Friendship Societies.

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Films

Feature films and short documentaries produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry play a direct propaganda role. These films are shown primarily in binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups, and in private or clandestine meetings.

It will be seen from this brief review that Latin America is the target of a broad-scale propaganda program, comprising not only propaganda materials but including also the ideas, the knowledge and the resources which are necessary to make those materials effective.

III. Direct Actions to Impede the Legal Movement of Propaganda Materials

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated to impede the legal movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. For the purpose of this paper, legal movement is defined as movement by recognized private and governmental carriers and communications, as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching.

These actions offer promise of achieving early and effective results in some Latin American countries, but they do not have universal application, and those which may be feasible in one country may not be necessary or feasible in another.

1. Political Actions

a. Induce news media to diminish the utilization of Prensa Latina.

b. Persuade those governments which receive Cuban and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close surveillance over the propaganda activities of the Communist embassies with a view toward prohibiting abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive purposes.

c. As applicable and feasible, induce Latin American countries to:

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(1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation to provide severe penalties for any person engaging in dissemination of Cuban-Communist propaganda which inspires terrorism or proposes the overthrow of the legal government by force and violence.

(2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates at international meetings held in Latin America. (Delegates are propaganda disseminators.)

2. Intelligence Actions

a. Continue U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify individuals, organizations and facilities involved in propaganda importation, reproduction and/or dissemination; make available to each country selected intelligence concerning these individuals, organizations and their activities. 090

b. Encourage each country in which the Communist Party is illegal to offer rewards for information leading to interception of Castro-Communist propaganda and, in countries where the Communist party is legal, for conviction of persons supplying or disseminating propaganda materials considered dangerous to the country's tranquility.

c. In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, urge full and effective cooperation, with the appropriate organs of the OAS and bilaterally among the several nations, in the interchange of information concerning movement of propaganda materials.

d. Persuade Latin American countries to report promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country concerned, the identity of any national of that country who arrives from Cuba and who is discovered to have been carrying Communist propaganda materials.

3. Covert Actions

a. Disrupt the reproduction and distribution of propaganda materials, and the procurement and delivery of related supplies and equipment.

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b. Seek opportunities to induce Latin American printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint Castro-Communist propaganda in the process of reproduction.

c. Disrupt Castro-Communist sponsored labor and youth congresses, industrial and agricultural exhibits in Latin American countries.

d. Maintain or increase pressures on media owners, local advertising agencies and film producers and/or distributors who accept Communist materials.

e. Dissuade US and local business firms from advertising in Latin American media which carry pro-Communist materials; provide informally to US firms, for information, lists of such media in order to encourage their support of a non-Communist press.

f. Inhibit the spread of Cuban and Bloc binational centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America by an active program to expose their subversive activities and objectives.

g. Where it can be determined that expenditure of the funds is clearly justified, provide financial support to selected non-Communist news media requiring assistance in order to compete with Communist-aligned publications which have significant circulation or impact.

h. Induce Latin American countries to organize surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use of these supplies for printing Communist materials.

IV. Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement of Propaganda Material

Many of the actions outlined in Section III related to the legal movement of materials will serve also to restrict illegal movement. Additional measures designed specifically to impede clandestine traffic are enumerated below.

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1. Intelligence Actions

a. Use penetration and other intelligence techniques to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries; determine routes and methods employed; report selected information, consistent with requirements for protecting our own intelligence program, to the governments concerned.

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b. Utilize the U.S. intelligence community to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean and Central American area, giving particular attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use the evidence obtained to induce the governments concerned to initiate surveillance and other control measures aimed at interception of propaganda materials.

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2. Surveillance and Reporting Action

Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean surveillance system, approved by the President in the study on movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding the movement of propaganda materials by illicit means.

} JCS

3. Political Action

Where legally feasible to do so, induce each Latin American country to improve its police procedures designed to expose the subversive Communist propaganda apparatus in that country, and to detect and eliminate corrupt officials who permit illicit shipment of propaganda materials.

4. Technical Assistance Actions

a. Provide technical assistance, where requested to enable Latin American governments to locate clandestine transmitters.

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b. Assist in the accelerated improvement of the capabilities of Latin American internal security forces, especially those patrol and intelligence activities whose function is the prevention of clandestine propaganda activities. Provide equipment, training and advice as required.

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CUBA

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS

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ARMS

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CUBA

DIRECT CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO AND
WITHIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

I. Introduction

There is presented herein an action program aimed at controlling the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries through inhibitions on movement of arms, restraints on their sale, ownership and fabrication, and controls over the movement of the critical components which are essential to the local manufacture of weapons.

If success is to be achieved in reducing their use for subversive purposes in Latin America, the term "arms" cannot be limited to firearms in the narrow sense. In addition, it must include explosives, fuzes, detonators and demolition equipment; all the weapons of hand-to-hand combat; grenades and mines; underwater demolition equipment; lethal gases, chemicals and instruments for their projection; undercarriages and transportable appendages for automatic weapons, mortars and other heavy weapons; spare parts, special tools and equipment for maintenance of weapons; portable radar and fire control equipment; special sabotage devices; and printed instructional material relating to any of the items listed above, or relating to techniques for their employment in sabotage and demolition.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

Our information regarding traffic in arms between Cuba and the remainder of Latin America is extremely limited. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency both conclude that Cuba is probably not now sending significant quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents. Rather the Cubans appear thus far to have followed common guerrilla practice in the matter of firearms supply, instructing the subversive trainees who attend indoctrination in Cuba to obtain weapons by theft in their own countries, or to fabricate them locally, rather than to rely upon supplies provided from Cuba or elsewhere.

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Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to assume that the Castro government will not or cannot export arms to Latin America when to do so will serve its purposes. The very large quantities of US arms furnished to pre-Castro Cuban governments, those weapons collected from the Cuban people in 1961, and the sizeable Bloc arms shipments delivered to Cuba since that time, provide the Castro regime with large stocks which are available for transfer to subversives in other countries, should a decision be made to do so. Moreover, Cuba has a considerable air fleet and a large array of small craft. These unite with Latin America's long, unguarded coasts, numerous isolated landing fields and inadequate local security forces, to make the threat of illicit arms shipment a considerable one.

On the basis of these facts it is concluded that the immediate problems with respect to arms movement are twofold: -- to prevent internal assembly of illegal arms and their distribution in and between Latin American countries, while at the same time improving our capability to impede the movement of arms to those countries from Cuba.

It is to be noted that, with respect to a number of Latin American countries, national policy decisions are a precondition to many of the actions proposed below. These countries will have to find the resolution to deal much more firmly with the general problem of Castro-Communist subversive activities than they have in the past if the proposed actions are to be effective.

III. Actions Concerning Legal Arms Movement

For the purpose of this paper, legal arms movement is considered to be the movement of weapons and other instruments of violence or the special materials from which they are made, resulting from overt orders placed by Latin American governments or private groups, and then subsequently shipped openly.

Many of the actions, which have previously been approved with respect to controlling the movement of subversive personnel, will have a direct application

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to the arms control problem. Listed below, in addition, are proposed courses of action contemplated specifically to impede legitimate arms traffic to, within and between Latin American countries for subversive purposes.

1. Intelligence Actions

a. Intensify US intelligence efforts in each Latin American country to determine the final recipients of legal arms purchases and, consistent with our own intelligence requirements, make this information available to the host government.

b. Monitor covertly, suspected sources of local weapons manufacture (machine shops, metal fabricators, foundries). Report positive findings to host government, where appropriate.

2. Political and Administrative Actions

a. Persuade each Latin American country to confirm the accuracy of cargo manifests of all ships and aircraft departing for or arriving from Cuba, and to intensify formal inspection of all cargo, regardless of country or origin, for munitions materials.

b. Provide further US technical assistance to Latin American countries to improve customs procedures and controls for ports, airfields and border stations.

c. Through the US diplomatic mission in each Latin American country, impress upon the appropriate ministries the need for ensuring the bona fides of all legal purchasers, dealers, brokers, and transporters of arms, munitions and explosives, and confirming that they are not communist relay points.

IV. Actions Concerning Illegal Arms Traffic

Listed below are proposed actions designed to impede the illicit fabrication, transportation and distribution of arms, in the broad connotation of the term

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as presented in Section I. By virtue of their specific nature, the actions do not have universal application, and those which may be effective in one country may not be necessary or feasible in another.

1. Training, Orientation, Indoctrination of Latin American Personnel

Offer US assistance to Latin American nations in initiating training programs to educate law enforcement, military, customs, border police, and other officials in the technical aspects of arms control, to include creation of an awareness of the characteristics of all mechanisms of destruction and violence.

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2. Intelligence Actions

a. Penetrate subversive elements or groups in each Latin American country to acquire intelligence concerning illicit arms manufacture and movement. Provide the affected governments with this information, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program. Assist in disrupting such manufacture and movement by covert means.

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b. Utilize the resources of the US intelligence community to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic which could be used for arms shipment from Cuba and between other Latin American countries.

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c. Propose bilateral arrangements providing for the exchange of information on arms movement among the US and Latin American countries, along the same lines as proposed for other information relating to subversive personnel and propaganda movement.

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d. Encourage Latin American countries to utilize their private aircraft in Civil Air Patrol Programs for the purpose of extending in-country surveillance of coasts and borders.

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3. Political and Administrative Actions

a. Urge Latin American countries to intensify application of those internal law enforcement measures which are designed to impede the illicit traffic in arms. Provide US training and technical assistance, as requested.

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(OSD+JCS)

b. Encourage Latin American countries to offer rewards for information concerning the location of arms caches and for positive identification of persons engaged in illegal arms manufacture or traffic.

c. Induce Latin American countries to expand and intensify port, airfield and border inspection of incoming and outgoing cargo for contraband arms.

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d. Request diplomatic missions to bring to the attention of each Latin American state the necessity for employing strict physical security measures and reliable accountability procedures with respect to all arms and ammunition issued to units of the armed forces, militia and law enforcement units.

e. Where applicable, propose bilateral agreements among neighboring Latin American countries concerning establishment of cooperative procedures to prevent illicit arms traffic.

f. Through bilateral or OAS mechanisms, as appropriate, encourage Latin American countries to:

(1) Re-examine and adjust, as necessary, the licensing qualifications and procedures for all companies engaged in the manufacture, transportation and sale of explosives and firearms, to provide a ready basis for controlling their activities.

(2) Establish rigid control procedures for the disposal of surplus and obsolescent arms in use by armed forces and police.

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4. Propaganda Actions

a. Publicize confiscation of communist arms caches, illegal arms movements, apprehension, conviction and punishment of arms smugglers and illicit arms manufacturers. Utilize news media, UN and OAS forums.

b. Continue exposure, in Latin American mass media, of Castro Cuba as the focal point in the international conspiracy to undermine established Latin American governments by means of violence, armed insurgency and terrorism.

5. Military Actions

Exploit the mechanisms of the Caribbean surveillance system, approved by the President in the study on movement of personnel, to impede illicit traffic in arms. This will be supported by the revised military assistance guidance which was also approved in the study on personnel movement.

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6. Covert Actions

a. Where favorable circumstances arise, provide for supply to known indigenous communist groups of specially prepared arms which will malfunction in such a manner as to cause injury to the user, and thus generate both doubts and fears among the communist subversives involved.

b. Apply subtle sabotage to intercepted illegal arms shipments and permit them to proceed to destination.

c. Through agents, attempt to purchase arms from suspected illicit sources in Latin America, in order to expose these sources and to determine facts concerning their method of delivery. Also through agents, attempt to sell arms, to expose illicit purchasers.

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CUBA

SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN

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CUBA

THE ORGANIZATION OF A CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

I. Introduction

On 8 March 1963 the President approved the establishment of a coordinated Caribbean sea surveillance system involving:

a. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S. forces.

b. A U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the United States American Ambassadors to countries concerned, through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command. (The feasibility and desirability of establishing these intelligence centers is being studied further, on a priority basis.)

c. Seeking initiation of unilateral surveillance and interception efforts by each country in its own territorial waters.

d. U.S. assistance in final interception in territorial waters upon request of the country concerned.

It is the purpose of this paper to present the detailed actions required to put this decision into practical effect, with emphasis particularly upon the function of United States forces, and giving consideration to the fact that the decision was addressed to surveillance of surface movement only and not to the surveillance of air activity.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

General Considerations

The thousands of ships and craft operating in the Caribbean provide an excellent means for clandestine movement of personnel, arms, equipment and propaganda materials from Cuba to the other countries in the Caribbean, as well as

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between Caribbean countries. The many miles of essentially unguarded coastline in the area enhance further the attractiveness of these means of disseminating elements of the Castro-Communist program. While our information on the extent to which this procedure is now exploited is meager, there is little question that it constitutes at least a potential danger, one that we must be prepared to meet.

The Caribbean surveillance system envisaged herein must have the capability to:

a. Detect, in Cuban or international waters, suspicious ships, and small craft, and

b. Identify and track these ships and craft in international waters, until they can be apprehended and inspected in the territorial waters of the state which is the intended destination or, alternatively, to

c. Detect, in territorial waters of a Caribbean state, ships or craft bearing subversive cargo, and apprehend those vessels prior to their escape into international waters or into the territorial waters of another state.

Development of a program to meet the above problems will be sharply affected by the fact that Central American countries have only limited capabilities to patrol their own coastal waters by sea or air. Their intelligence capability is small and their communications resources are meager.

Special Considerations

a. Detection and Identification

Detection of suspicious surface travel can result from visual sighting by air or surface craft, radar contact or radio intercept. It may derive from observation only, or may result from intelligence.

The identification of those surface vessels which are actually transporting subversive cargo can only be achieved by intercepting and

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searching all suspicious subjects. In the absence of a political decision permitting such operations in the open sea, this must be accomplished in territorial waters of friendly countries, and will prove a costly and burdensome undertaking.

In any event, effective detection and identification within the jurisdiction of a friendly power, in the territorial waters or ashore, will demand the coordinate use of indigenous resources including naval forces, air forces, military or paramilitary forces, fishermen and the local populace. These resources must be organized for rapid reaction to warnings of impending subversive activity.

b. Interception

Suspicious targets which have been detected and identified in international waters, or those upon which advance intelligence has materialized, could be shadowed to the limit of the capabilities of sea and air forces available, and the movement reported. In the absence of a political decision to authorize visit and search on the high seas, subsequent action on the high seas would be confined to observation. In territorial waters interception would be accomplished by or with the consent of the country in whose waters the interception occurs.

c. Intelligence and Communications

The difficulties inherent in timely detection, identification, and interception of craft bent on subversive missions point up the need for intelligence on prospective movements coupled with adequate means for rapid interchange of this information. The Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken action to improve U.S. communication networks, but the systems of the Latin American nations concerned are, in most cases, unsatisfactory.

d. Command Arrangements

An uncomplicated cooperative system is visualized, based on each nation policing its

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own shoreline and adjacent waters, with its own surface and air forces, coupled with agreements between neighboring countries to provide mutual information and assistance. An over-all command structure for the system as a whole is neither required nor desirable.

e. Funding and Logistical Arrangements

The operation of a modest surveillance system, as envisaged herein, would still entail operations on a larger scale than currently in force, with corresponding additional costs to cover materiel and training for the Latin American participants. These financial requirements should be fulfilled over and above current programs, and accomplished through existing channels.

III. Attitude of the Latin American Nations

Given support and encouragement by the U.S., it is concluded that some of the countries bordering the Caribbean Sea would be willing to participate in a coordinate surveillance effort. However, the intense national pride and the sensitivity of the countries involved makes it by no means certain that any will participate to the precise degree or in the exact manner considered most desirable by the U.S.

Inter-service rivalries, political considerations, mistrust of the military by their executive branches, and antagonisms between indigenous police and armed forces will all tend to impede the program. However, the proposals that follow will serve to diminish these impediments, and to establish goals not only for U.S. planning, but for U.S. efforts to encourage the Latin American participants as well.

IV. Actions

To be effective the coordinated Caribbean Surveillance system will require:

a. Multinational actions to reach agreement on surveillance, and on the means to control it.

b. Unilateral and cooperative measures to detect, identify, track and apprehend clandestine movements of subversive personnel, arms and equipment.

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c. A mechanism which ensures the rapid assembly and dissemination of the required information to the responsible agencies of the countries concerned, i.e., an alerting system.

d. Improved communications facilities in the area.

These measures can only be effective if the participating Caribbean countries are willing to develop and improve their counterpart internal security capabilities. Specifically, there is a requirement for additional effort on their part in counter guerrilla training, police operations, intelligence, and air and ground mobility.

Listed hereafter are specific actions designed to fulfill the foregoing requirements.

a. Multinational Actions to Control the Surveillance Effort

(1) Consult the Caribbean countries with a view to requesting the President of one of them to invite ministers from the other countries, as appropriate, to meet for the purpose of discussing implementation of a multinational surveillance program. Arrange at this meeting for the governments of the participating nations, including the U.S., to issue a joint declaration that the export by Cuba of subversive personnel and material will call for all to take the necessary measures to safeguard the countries concerned.

(2) Encourage arrangements between Caribbean states for mutual cooperation in coastal surveillance.

(3) Make bilateral arrangements, as necessary, with each participating nation as to the conditions under which U.S. combatant forces may enter the waters in which we recognize the participating nation's territorial sovereignty.

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SUPPORT

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b. Unilateral Surveillance Actions

(1) Continue general U.S. surveillance of Cuba and its contiguous waters, reporting all suspicious contacts to the U.S. alerting centers at Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone. DOD

(2) Maintain a continuing U.S. capability to respond to requests for interception assistance from Caribbean countries; this capability to include facilities for communication with the U.S. air and surface units (or headquarters) conducting close-in surveillance of Cuba, and with the principal units and command headquarters of the participating Caribbean countries. DOD

(3) Require the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a program for exploiting the surveillance and reporting capability of U.S. commercial, fishing and pleasure craft in the Caribbean.

(4) Propose that each Caribbean country establish intensive civilian and military information programs to motivate civilian and military participants in the surveillance program.

(5) Propose that each Caribbean country organize (or expand) its Coast Guard type force utilizing U.S. MAP-provided patrol craft for in-shore patrols. DOD
SUPPORT

(6) Encourage each participating country to develop emergency procedures which will provide for rapid concentration of available forces in any critical area in case of alert. DOD
SUPPORT

(7) Request the governments of each Caribbean country to issue directives requiring that all of their ships and aircraft on routine operations or business be alert for and report suspicious contacts, in accordance with a pre-arranged system.

(8) Propose that the Caribbean governments intensify the patrol and intelligence activities of both military and police forces in border areas, to include the institution of coast watcher programs where feasible. DOD
SUPPORT

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(9) Propose that the Caribbean governments augment their military surveillance capability by arranging for service, as needed, of local surface pleasure and commercial craft, and private aircraft; the service to be patterned after the Coast Guard Reserve programs and the Civil Air Patrol in the United States.

DOD
SUPPORT

c. Actions to Establish an Alerting System

(1) Complete priority study on establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned via the United States Ambassadors, of Castro-Communist subversive movements.

DOD
(COMPLETED)

(2) Propose that each Caribbean country consider the desirability of establishing a central headquarters authority to coordinate its air and surface military and civil patrols, its coast watching activities and its intelligence and alerting procedures, and to serve as a central point of contact in the surveillance system.

DOD
SUPPORT

(3) Encourage participating countries to make maximum use of U.S. mobile intelligence training teams, as well as spaces available in U.S. intelligence training schools.

DOD
(BEING ACCOMPLISHED)

d. Actions to Develop Effective Communications System

(1) Encourage participating countries to make maximum use of U.S. mobile communications training teams, both air and surface.

DOD

(2) Continue emphasis on improving U.S. communications in the area and encourage participating countries to improve their own communication capabilities.

DOD (BEING ACCOMPLISHED)
AND OTHERS

(3) Pending the improvement of indigenous communication facilities and capabilities, U.S. and participating country surveillance headquarters exchange contact information on a priority basis, utilizing U.S. provided facilities described in c.(1) above.

DOD
(BEING ACCOMPLISHED)

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(4) Provide for limited scope combined exercises including U.S. forces and Caribbean country navy, air force, and coast guard units, together with the necessary headquarters, to improve communications and procedures, and to develop a rapid response capability in the participating Caribbean countries.

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CUBA

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

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INTELLIGENCE

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion throughout Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the US Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Compounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and disputes which have characterized relations among the nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not completely healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis.

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b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous entity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange of intelligence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as attainable.

c. Additional impediments to intelligence exchange are the generally low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the absence of adequate security systems, and the lack of security consciousness. Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be concluded, however, that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of subversives, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, the movement of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence

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gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise.

2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

The following describe generally the categories of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material under each:

a. Travel information - Unevaluated information devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or Soviet Bloc countries. Such reports can be reduced to a few elements such as identification of the individual, point of departure, date and time of departure or arrival, destination, and carrier. When presented in an abbreviated form such information offers minimum security problems with respect to exchange with one or more countries.

b. Intelligence information reports - Unevaluated information derived from clandestine collection operations or confidential sources reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or communist connected subversive individuals or groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds; on shipping and air movements and on results of surveillance efforts. Because continued receipt of such information by the United States is dependent on careful protection of sources and methods of collection, the exchange of this information with other countries must be carefully controlled by the collecting department.

c. Intelligence reports and studies - Evaluated intelligence in all of the above areas, prepared by an appropriate element of the US government in a form which is releasable to other Latin American countries.

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news stories drawn from press, periodical and other overt publishers. Selected for maximum impact on

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other countries particularly where such information is not freely available to security services, as in the case of foreign broadcast reports.

3. Current Exchange Arrangements

a. At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in those Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passing of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. In 1962, CIA received information reports from 26 services with which liaison is maintained in Latin America and released reports to 35 recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

c. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies and the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Air Force, through its attache system in Latin America, likewise has an exchange program. This is accomplished on an informal basis and is bilateral in nature.

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d. Exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State.

e. As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired.

f. United States experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange.

g. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a "Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to

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counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting, the OAS has been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery.

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has also demonstrated an awareness of the need for exchanging intelligence regarding communist subversion. Annex 4 of the General Military Plan prepared by the IADB requests the American States to report information to the Board and to establish agreements among themselves for exchanging information of collective interest. The United States has approved the General Military Plan, but similar action has not been taken by all member countries.

i. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved.

III. Existing Programs

Enumerated below are the principal programs now in progress. They are subject to continuing improvement.

1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being conducted by CIA, DOD and other US agencies with their Latin American counterparts in instances where it has been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements.

2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of establishing military intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination with appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activities directly to the countries concerned through the US Ambassador.

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3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean Command by CIA and other elements of the U.S. Embassies in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate.

4. Various agencies of the U.S. Government are now disseminating to Latin American governments unclassified studies and reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

5. U.S. Government communications systems throughout Latin America are being expanded and improved upon on a high priority basis.

6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Additional programs could be established in other countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned.

7. All information received by CIA concerning travel to and from Cuba is put into a computer system capable of producing lists of name, by country, by point of travel, or sorted on various other bases.

IV. New Actions Recommended

1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III.1. by recommending an Embassy intelligence committee to coordinate procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with the host governments.

DOD
SUPPORT

2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

DOD
SUPPORT

3. Arrange for the electrical dissemination to appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries of radio broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of CIA.

4. Make available to as many countries as security permits, sanitized results of the extensive travel coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed by machine. (See paragraph III.7.)

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5. Discourage the employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the United States except in instances where the United States can arrange to provide for the training and control of any third country intelligence advisor.

DOD
SUPPORT

6. Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can be disseminated to selected Latin American governments.

DOD
SUPPORT

7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in their respective countries.

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

DOD


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CUBA

TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

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TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Introduction

The fact that 2,000 Latin Americans have recently been indoctrinated in Communist ideology and subversive techniques in Cuba is just cause for concern, and warrants an energetic response. Our actions to frustrate this movement are already beginning to generate momentum, but it will be idle to conclude that currently programmed impediments upon the movement of people, arms and propaganda from Cuba, will diminish decisively the strength of Castro-Communist inspired subversion in Latin America. While it will be important, so long as the Castro regime survives, to remove the ability of Latin Americans to travel to Cuba, it will be much more important to remove their desire to travel there in the first place.

The root causes of this desire are numerous, but prominent among them are the dissatisfaction of the young people of Latin America, their impatient hope for better things and their curiosity about the world at large. The younger generation of Latin Americans cannot be expected to stand still. They demand rapid and revolutionary improvement and this is what communism promises them, however falsely. We are faced with the challenge, therefore, of convincing the young and restive Latin American student, farmer or labor leader that the progress he desires can best be achieved through the institutions of a free society. One of the best means of establishing this conviction is to show him, at first hand, our own free society in action.)

This useful influence is at work now with the Latin American students who are receiving education and training in the United States. This group - considerably greater in number than those who visit Cuba or the Bloc countries - are underwritten by various agencies of the United States government, private institutions, and, in many cases, defray their own expenses. On balance, these young people return to their countries with a keener understanding of what makes the United States function. While their reaction may not always be completely favorable, it must certainly be more accurate - and thus more favorable - than any picture painted for them by the Communists at home.

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In any case in terms of the numbers of young Latin Americans which we might reach in this endeavor, it is evident that our opportunities are not now being fully exploited. If our efforts can be given stronger direction and intensified, there is reason to believe that we may exert a powerful influence on the most impressionable - and most important - sector of Latin American society, the younger generation.

That is the purpose of this study - to examine those U.S. sponsored training and education programs for Latin Americans which are already in motion, with the objective of determining what improvements can be made which would increase our capability for countering subversion. Attention has been focussed particularly on subsidized training in police, military and certain other fields, selected on a basis of their special significance in the confrontation with Castro-Communist subversive activities.

It is recognized that the much broader area of U.S. secondary school and college level education for Latin American students is also a most fruitful field, which requires similar examination; however, that study is viewed as being conditioned upon educational factors which are beyond the scope of this paper.

Another important field which is complementary to training in the United States, is the broad variety of in-country programs, now being carried out by the Department of State, Peace Corps, AID, USIA, the Armed Forces, private and religious institutions, and civil educational institutions. Through these, the Latin American is exposed at home to U.S. citizens who are interested in his welfare, in terms which provide a direct rub-off of our values. While it cannot be divorced completely from in-country training this paper does not concern itself directly with that sector. It does, however, recognize the importance of the in-country effort, and proposes to make use of the U.S. presence in Latin American as a catalyst to attract promising young people towards training in the North, where they can see organized freedom in action and, by gaining confidence in it, become its champions in their own country.

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II. Existing Programs

1. General

Approximately 15,000 Latin Americans, exclusive of private business trainees, are instructed annually in the United States. Of these, about 10,000 are engaged in undergraduate or graduate studies, including more than 1,000 individuals who receive subsidies from the United States or from their own governments. The remaining 5,000 receive specialized instruction, or are brought to the U.S. for orientation tours. The U.S. Government provides its subsidies principally through the Military Assistance Program, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of State. Also the Inter-Agency Committee on Youth Affairs is reviewing existing programs affecting Latin American youth and studying the possibility of leadership training courses for them.

2. Agency for International Development Programs

During FY 1962, the Agency for International Development brought 1,594 Latin Americans to the United States for training, in age groups as follows:

Under 20	25
21 - 25	160
26 - 30	362
31 - 35	392
36 - 40	288
41 - 45	165
46 - 50	118
51 - on	85

Approximately 240 of these trainees matriculated at a university or school, for undergraduate or graduate degree work. The remainder engaged in on-the-job or less formal training, or attended courses apart from a degree program, for periods varying from three months to a year. Students received training in the following fields:

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Agriculture	249
Industry	164
Transportation	115
Labor	338
Health	167
Education	130
Public Administration	157
Public Safety	119
Community Development	20
Atomic Energy	22
Housing	46
Miscellaneous	68

3. Military Assistance Programs

At the present time, 2,277 Latin American military students are receiving, or are programmed to receive, training in the United States under the Military Assistance Program. Courses vary in length from two-week orientation tours to 83-week flying training courses. However, the majority of instruction is for periods of less than six months, and is distributed in fields as follows:

Flying Instruction (8-83 weeks)	172
Command, Staff and Operational (direction and control of armed forces, 4-23 weeks)	748
Communications/Electronics (6-29 weeks)	66
Equipment Maintenance and Repair (5-28 weeks)	335
Logistics (2-14 weeks)	46

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Administration (4-40 weeks)	8
Professional Specialized (Engineering, Medical, Legal, etc., 4-20 weeks)	306
Orientation (2-3 weeks)	596

4. In FY 1962, 1,869 persons from the other American Republics came to the United States under program of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State. This number is broken down as follows:

Students (Academic study, 1 year)	338
Teachers (6-12 months)	277
Professors/Research Scholars (1-2 semesters)	84
Leaders and Specialists (1-6 months)	299
Educational Travel Grantees (30 days)	871

The 338 Latin American students were for the most part at the graduate level, studying for a full academic year at universities in the United States. Teachers participated in six-month programs of teacher development in their special fields, or in teacher education workshops in Puerto Rico, with a smaller number teaching for a full academic year in United States schools. The 84 professors and research scholars were engaged in teaching or research from one semester to a full academic year, or participated in short-term seminars at U.S. universities. Leaders and specialists in all important fields visited the United States: the former, for periods of from 30 to 60 days for observation and to confer with colleagues in their specialties; the latter for periods varying up to six months for practical study

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and on-the-job training in their special fields (communications media, community welfare work, etc.). The 871 educational travel grantees, comprising approximately 45 per cent of the total number of Department of State sponsored trainees in the United States consisted largely of selected students and student leaders from Latin American universities, and some school teachers, who participated individually or in groups in short-term observation visits relating to their special fields of interest.

5. Training in the Canal Zone

Additional Latin American personnel undergo training in Panama Canal Zone schools of the Caribbean Command and at the Inter-American Police Academy, operated by the Agency for International Development. Additionally, the United States Navy and Coast Guard are establishing a facility to instruct Latin Americans in coastal patrol craft operation and surveillance. While this training does not take place in the United States proper, the Latin American students involved are nevertheless exposed to a school environment which is based on U.S. values.

During the past year, the United States Army Caribbean School trained 1,200 Latin American officers and men, while the United States Air Force School for Latin America trained 494 students. The newly formed Inter-American Police Academy graduated 90 Latin Americans during the same period, and is expanding classes to reach a planned annual rate of 360 in FY 1964.

6. Cost of Existing Programs

The FY 1963 AID, MAP and State Department programs provide \$21.9 million for training a total of 5,165 Latin Americans in the United States. The per capita cost of training under civilian programs of the United States Government is approximately \$5,000 for a full academic year. Military per capita direct costs average \$3,200, with courses usually of less than one year's duration. It is estimated that the per capita costs for short courses (8-16 weeks), both civilian and military, approximates \$1,600.

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In terms of dollars alone, and apart from the many benefits received, it will be seen that training is a relatively inexpensive endeavor. Furthermore, in contemplating the cost of an intensified program, it is significant that the enrollment in most schools and training courses can usually be increased - in some degree - without corresponding increases in overhead.

7. Difficulties Encountered in Filling Available Military Quotas in the United States

The failure of Latin American countries to take full advantage of military quotas offered has been a persistent problem. In 1962, for example, 15 per cent of the quotas offered were unfilled. This unfavorable situation derives from many causes. During the current fiscal year 18 per cent of unfilled Army quotas have been due to inability to meet course pre-requisites; 22 per cent because of lack of sufficient funds and 33 per cent because of political upheavals. The armed forces of the average Latin American country are small, and the availability of qualified candidates who can be spared for extended periods of instruction abroad is thus limited. The short periods of obligated service and the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps also tends to discourage the training of enlisted men in United States schools, since there is an understandable lack of enthusiasm for spending large sums from limited budgets to train enlisted men who will remain in service only a brief time. Another significant deterrent is the per diem rates required by law to be paid by some countries to service personnel sent outside their homeland. In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay, the legal rates for personnel serving abroad are too high to be supportable by defense budgets, while in other countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, the standard rates are too low to provide a reasonable living for students.

III. Groups Appropriate for Expanded Training Efforts

Three principal groups have been identified as meriting special attention in our program of impeding the growth of Castro-Communist subversion. These are:

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a. Groups directly responsible for the security of the country. Personnel of police, paramilitary and military organizations should receive particular attention, with emphasis on junior and intermediate level personnel involved in administrative and supervisory functions.

b. Groups responsible for the operation of vital facilities. Communications systems, public information media, utilities, transportation and, in some countries, industrial installations are vital to the orderly functioning of a state. As a result, they are prime targets for Communist infiltration and subversion. U.S.-oriented personnel in these occupations, especially at the lower supervisory levels, are in a good position to detect, report on and impede Communist activities.

c. Groups involved in direct supervisory contact with the younger generation. Labor leaders, teachers, athletic instructors, farm advisors, student leaders, and technical school instructors all work directly with young people, and thus play an important role in molding their attitudes.

IV. Actions Recommended

The training actions enumerated below are recommended as promising a useful return in our effort to develop a stronger base of countersubversive conviction among the groups identified in the preceding paragraph. In execution of these actions, priorities should be established in terms of individual country needs.

While the many variables involved render precise calculation difficult, it is estimated that a vigorous pursuit of all of the proposed actions would result in an increase of directly subsidized U.S. training by about 60%, or 3,600 people; at an increased expenditure of roughly \$12,000,000. The financial support involved should be provided over and above existing agency programs.

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a. Security Personnel

(1) Military

(a) Offer expanded opportunities for Latin American junior officers and non-commissioned officers in on-the-job training programs in units of all U.S. Armed Services.

(b) Improve off-duty programs for the above Latin American trainees, to provide them with a close and favorable view of life in the United States.

(c) Select a liberal number of the best qualified graduates from Canal Zone service schools for further training on a higher level in U.S. military technical schools, staff and operations courses. Advanced training should be a continuation of Canal Zone schooling, concentrating on equipment and skills required in Latin America. Quotas should be established for both junior officers and enlisted ranks.

(d) Expand or establish quotas for training of promising young Latin Americans at Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps basic training schools, with a view to their proceeding onward to further training in more advanced U.S. schools.

(e) In order to enhance understanding with students, insure that an adequate number of bilingual personnel, fluent in speaking and writing both English and Spanish, or English and Portuguese, are assigned to the faculties of Service schools which provide instruction to Latin Americans.

(f) Increase the number of students trained at the U.S. Air Force School for Latin America, in Panama, and expand quotas for officers.

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(g) Expand the MAP-sponsored intelligence training conducted by the U.S. Army at Fort Holabird, Maryland, to include junior officers and NCO's. Increase Latin American quotas for intelligence training by all Services.

(h) Review all FY 1964 U.S. Service school quotas for Latin America to determine if increases, consistent with the capabilities of Latin American countries to absorb, can be made.

(i) Encourage, through MAAG's and Missions, increased Latin American participation in military training programs, exercises, orientation tours and exchange programs.

(j) Through additional MAP funding, absorb the costs for training Latin American military personnel in the U.S. and Panama, including international travel costs. Concurrently press for elimination of home country regulations which inhibit filling of quotas.

(k) In military schools engaged in teaching Latin Americans, indoctrinate U.S. instructors in the broader political objectives the U.S. is seeking to achieve through training.

(1) Review curricula of military courses for Latin Americans with a view toward emphasizing constructive participation by their military forces in political, economic, social and civil development.

(2) Police

(a) Increase the police training program of the Office of Public Safety, AID, to an in-put of 1,000 for the next 18 months. (The current program calls for 450 trainees in Panama and 150 in the U.S. during this period.) Select candidates who are in positions to exert maximum and immediate influence within their organizations and communities.

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ACCOMPLISHED)

(b) Through additional AID funding, absorb the training costs for Latin American public safety personnel in the U.S. and Panama including international travel costs.

(c) Provide English language training to Latin American candidates for public safety courses in the U.S. through USIS English language training centers located in Latin American countries.

(3) Customs and Immigration

High priority should be given to security personnel responsible for customs and immigration enforcement, to include consideration of establishing a separate training program in the U.S. for this purpose.

b. Personnel Concerned with Operation of Vital Facilities

(1) Initiate a two-phase pilot training program, under direction of AID and State, to bring about 500 students per year, who are supervisors or potential instructors, to the United States for short courses in English training and orientation. Select 100 of these for further technical training in specialties such as:

- Aircraft operations and airways control
- Radio broadcasting, press and television
- Commercial communications (telephone, radio telephone, cable, etc.)
- Harbor terminal and shipping operations
- Fuel storage
- Urban water, light and power operation and maintenance
- Railroad operations and maintenance
- Bus transportation

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(2) Direct each U.S. Ambassador in Latin America to develop and propose a detailed training program for his country to include specific numbers of students to be trained in the field of vital facilities.

(3) Initiate programs to persuade U.S. city administrations to provide training, at the cities' expense, for selected Latin Americans in the area of city management, planning, services and urbanization.

(4) Initiate programs to persuade U.S. state governments to provide training, at the states' expense, for selected Latin Americans, in the field of province (state) management and planning.

(5) Initiate programs to persuade U.S. business and industrial organizations and labor unions, at their own expense, to provide training, in their particular areas of interest, for selected Latin Americans.

c. Personnel Working with Youth

(1) Initiate programs to persuade U.S. colleges and universities to conduct periodic seminars in the U.S. for athletic coaches and persons concerned with promotion of sports, for the purpose of indoctrinating Latin American instructors in U.S. techniques and coaching philosophy. Provide financial support as required.

(2) Expand existing State Department sponsored programs which relate to teacher education and social welfare.

(3) Expand existing AID programs to encourage the formation of farm cooperatives and other agricultural programs by bringing Latin American supervisory and instructor personnel to the U.S. for training and orientation.

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(4) Conduct seminars on democracy and the characteristics of a free and open society for Latin American political science students, labor and youth leaders and young governmental officials. The seminars will be supported by the Department of State in the United States, and in Latin America by USIS, through selected indigenous labor, youth and education organizations.

(5) Explore all of the programs utilized by various government agencies and the check lists developed by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee to insure that the programs are designed to provide visitors with a full and accurate picture of the U.S., its society, its institutions and objectives.

(6) Expand existing programs under USIA for working with student unions in Latin American universities to insure students receive accurate, comprehensive and sympathetic information concerning the United States.

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