

117

11 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ATTENTION: Lt. Col. C. E. Hatchin

SUBJECT : Special Project

1. With reference to our discussions of 4 October 1951 on the subject, I am enclosing a briefing memorandum on Project Artichoke. I trust that this will be helpful to you as a concise statement of the aims and scope of the project.

2. It is understood that you will use the attached memorandum to brief the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Research & Development Board, and key personnel in their respective offices having a "need to know". Since, as indicated in paragraph 4 of the memorandum, this is a controlled project, I would appreciate your providing me with the names of those who have been briefed on the subject.

3. I shall look forward to meeting with you and the individual designated by the Chairman, Research & Development Board. Dr. Chadwell has indicated that he would like to attend the initial discussions also.

[Redacted signature]

Project Coordinator

- Distribution:
- Orig & 1 forward
 - 1 - Dep. Dir. (Plans)
 - 1 - I&S
 - 1 - Project File ✓

SC

OSI/ [Redacted]

[Redacted signature]

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PROJECT ARTICLES

1.
36 881

(117)

1. CIA has established and is actively pursuing a project to determine Soviet capabilities for eliciting information or otherwise controlling the actions of individuals through the use of drugs or other new scientific techniques.

2. The purpose of the project is to permit the development of countermeasures in this field for the protection of U. S. Government Officials, including military and other U. S. personnel who might fall under Soviet control as well as high level officials who might be subjected to control without their knowledge.

3. The Chiefs of the Intelligence Agencies of the Department of Defense have been briefed on the project and have assured CIA of the cooperation of their departments. Individuals from these departments have been designated to provide interagency coordination in this matter.

4. Due to the sensitive nature of the project, only those having a specific "need to know" in the interested agencies are briefed on the existence or the aims of the project. A key list of those having knowledge of the project is maintained in CIA.

5. The coordination of the project on an inter- as well as intra-agency basis is the responsibility of the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, Dr. E. H. Chadwell. Dr. Chadwell has designated ~~_____~~ of his staff as project coordinator.



6. A panel of consultants headed by ~~_____~~ ^{a consultant CIA consultant} has been established to advise and assist in the program.

7. In developing the project, CIA is undertaking:

a. A careful review of all available information on Soviet activities both in interrogations and in research on special scientific materials or techniques which might be adaptable to interrogations.

b. A parallel review of U. S. research and development on special scientific materials or techniques which might be adaptable to this purpose and might therefore be expected to be used by the USSR.

c. Specific research programs aimed at developing the full potential of materials or techniques as they are uncovered and the countermeasures, therefore.



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8. In establishing the specific research programs, CIA recognizes the necessity for full coordination with other agencies. Where gaps in research are known to exist, attempts will be made to orient existing projects toward these gaps. Failing this, efforts will be made to establish new projects to cover the required research area.

This was in file at 21 Oct 51 (117)
for information reasons. Para 1-3
but not there. I believe the table
is located elsewhere in
the file.

4. Subject of investigation:

a. Purpose of study:

Our principal goal remains the same as it was in the beginning: the investigation of drug effects on ego controls and volitional activities, i.e., can wilfully-suppressed information be elicited through the aid of drugs affecting higher nervous centers? If so, which agents are better for this purpose? What are the initial signs and symptoms of drug effects? Can these be recognized by the subject or observers?

We now add to these the following: Can these signs and symptoms be taught to security officers so that they can detect the use of such agents in themselves or others?

Practical purposes of this study are to gain information which will permit us to detect what work of a similar nature may be in progress in enemy hands (to be judged in escaped or returned prisoners). In my judgment this is less important than ourselves discovering how to elicit wilfully suppressed information from wartime prisoners. Both of these purposes are to my mind less urgent than obtaining information which will serve to guard individuals who possess top-level information from indiscretions caused by the use of drugs of the type studied here. There is no question that drugs are already on hand (and new ones are being produced) that can destroy integrity and make indiscreet the most dependable individual. Example: a physicist with top-level information could be made careless without his knowledge. In practical terms a table of signs and symptoms arising from the use of old and especially new drugs for the use of security officers will be prepared as information is obtained. (Much is already known about the "standard" agents, little or nothing about the new.) Such information is highly desirable for obvious reasons.

Background: General plan of study:

(1) Pilot Study: This is at present nearing completion.

It has consisted of a series of experiments employing an experimental design for study of the effects of drugs on conscious suppression of experimental or non-threat secrets. Drugs used have included pentothal sodium, sodium amytal, benzodrine, ethyl alcohol, scopolamine, morphine, methedrine, and multiple combinations of these drugs as well as hypnosis (c.f. semi-annual report of June 19, 1951). Since this initial report, modifications of this technic have been utilized in study of ether and mescaline subjects. These findings as well as those of marijuana and lysergic acid, on the agenda for the remainder of the year, will be described in the annual report.

In this pilot study the emphasis has been directed primarily at the effects of the above drugs on the overt behavior of the subjects, specifically on the ability of the subject to retain "experimental secrets" and maintain control of his voluntary activities. The procedure utilized has been outlined in the above-mentioned progress report.

In general, the results of this part of the investigation, with the exception of ether, have indicated that within the limits of the amounts administered,

4 a. Continued

intellectual functioning and volitional control has not been impaired sufficiently to break down the experimental set produced by the "secret". Thus the next step involves the evaluation of the various drugs as to their differential alteration of psychological functions essential to the maintenance of wilful control.

(2) As a result of the above pilot studies, it seems clear that the practical and security aspects of the investigation are only to be answered by evaluation of the differential effects of various drugs on psychological functions basic to ego control and volitional suppression. To this end, a systematic evaluation of the effect of drug agents on the functions necessary to the maintenance of ego controls has been instituted and constitutes the next step in the proposed continuation of the study.

This involves necessarily an arduous, step-by-step investigation of the effects of progressive amounts of drug as well as variation of interrogation procedure, in that drug effects do not bear a constant linear relation to the amount of drug given. The object of this phase of the investigation is to discover the best agent as well as the optimal doses (combined with the most effective interrogation procedure) to modify volitional control. For example, too large a dose of mescaline will induce such marked anxiety and loss of reality contact that information cannot be reliably obtained.

It is proposed that this further step in the investigation will be effected in the procedures to be subsequently described (cf (c), infra).

b. Nature of control work (cf (c) infra).

c. Method of procedure:

The prospectus for further work accordingly includes systematic survey, in the light of experience gained from the pilot experiments, of drug effects underlying the suppression mechanism. These include: (1) activation of anxiety associated with basic conflicts as well as that induced by the experimental situation, (2) breakdown of character defenses for the handling of anxiety, in particular those related to intellectual functions, (3) memory disturbance, (4) disorientation as to time, place, and person (particularly in regard to the change induced by the drug in the individual's capacity for realistic identification of the interrogation situation), (5) language changes (alteration of symbol-referent relationship).

Experimental Design:

I. Baseline evaluation of above functions by:

- (a) Physical examination
- (b) Psychiatric interview
- (c) Psychometric examination

- (1) Rorschach
- (2) Thematic Apperception Test
- (3) Projective Drawings
- (4) Gestalt Perception
- (5) Language analysis based on 3,000 work sample of standardized interview

- II. Administration of drug and repetition of evaluative procedures as above, plus the "experimental secret" technic.

- III. Placebo Experiments and the "Unknowns Technic": A placebo session will be interposed in a series of drug sessions to control suggestive effects of experimental procedure and to establish as objectively and soundly as possible the observations of the experimental team. These will be a part of the study where the agents used are employed as unknowns, unknown to all members of the team engaged in evaluation. Previous work in this laboratory has shown that the "unknowns technic" is absolutely essential when subjective responses are dealt with. The investigator's bias must be removed in this way. Using the same subject for as many different drugs as is medically feasible constitutes a control on individual differences. In the light of previous experiments it is judged that pentothal sodium, marihuana, scopolamine, morphine, ether, mescaline, and probably lysergic acid and its derivatives will be drugs of particular interest in this stage of the investigation.

Completion of this phase of the study will provide the information needed to draw up a table of drug signs and symptoms - subjective and objective - referred to in the "Purpose" section above.

- IV. A fourth phase of the work will be concerned in the future, as in the past, with the neurological effects of the agents studied, in this instance under experimental conditions.

The basic knowledge of the effects of these drugs on psychological functioning will then permit specific informed hypotheses of the "which drug for which purpose" nature, which should then be critically tested under "field" conditions, i.e., prisoners of war, if possible, Federal prisoners, if possible, security officers, etc., under threat conditions beyond the scope of civilian experimentation.

~~_____~~

5 (20)

Assistant Director/OSI

6 November 1951

Deputy Security Officer/CIA

Project ARTICHOKE ~~_____~~

In response to your inquiry, the subject person is approved for an approach to determine his interest in possibly serving with Project ARTICHOKE. This clearance is granted on a limited amount of investigation and is granted solely to determine subject's interest in working on a highly classified research project. This person must not be briefed on ARTICHOKE itself, but it can be explained in terms of a government research program believed to be of interest to the individual.

After determination for the person named of his interest in serving with the project, this office should be advised and a full investigation will be completed with a view to clearing this person as a consultant to the project.

~~_____~~

[Handwritten initials]

~~_____~~
cc: Addressee
File
BLUEBIRD file
~~_____~~

~~_____~~

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Project

(b)(3)

USE OF ANTI-HYPERTENSIVE AND ANTI-CHOLINE COMPOUNDS*
FOR THE CONTROL OF STRESS REACTIONSObject of Investigation

The object of the present project is to find the most effective method of inhibiting the alarm reaction stimulated through the autonomic nervous system in individuals under stress. The method of approach is to devise chemical blocking agents or drugs which may be administered at the proper time to prevent both cholinergic and adrenergic manifestations of the autonomic nervous system.

General Considerations

In individuals under stress both cholinergic and adrenergic responses occur. "The sympatho-adrenal system frequently discharges as a unit and this occurs especially under circumstances of rage and fright (Cannon, 1932). The autonomic structures all over the body are affected at the same time. The heart is accelerated; the blood pressure rises; red blood cells are poured into the circulation from the spleen; the blood redistributes itself from the skin and splanchnic bed to the skeletal muscles; the blood sugar rises; the palpebral fissures widen; the pupils dilate; and, on the whole, the organism is better prepared for fight, or flight." (Goodman & Gilman)

The splanchnic innervation of the adrenal medulla which liberates epinephrin into the system is triggered by the release of acetylcholine. This release of acetylcholine is a prime motivator of the alarm response

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in both the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic nervous system. The acetylcholine release therefore affects all the categories of fibers of the parasympathetic system and also all autonomic preganglionic nerves, whether sympathetic or parasympathetic, the splanchnic (preganglionic) fibers to the adrenal medulla, the "sympathetic" fibers to sweat glands and certain blood vessels, and the somatic motor nerves to skeletal muscles.

Plan of Procedure

It is obvious that to arrive at the objective of these investigations, suitable facilities for clinical testing must be provided. It is understood that these will be available elsewhere, but that preliminary clinical screening will be performed by the principal investigator to determine the most effective combination of anti-cholinergic and anti-adrenergic compounds for inhibiting alarm responses.

At present the standard anti-cholinergic and anti-adrenergic drug preparations usually combine phenobarbital and belladonna with or without the addition of xanthine derivatives or hyoscyamine. Among the available preparations marketed by drug concerns, the following may be listed:

BELLADONAL

The alkaloids of belladonna leaf	.25 mg.
Phenobarbital	50 mg.

BELBARB

Phenobarbital	1/4 gr. (16 mg.)
Hyoscyne Hydrobromide	0.0072 mg.
Atropine Sulfate	0.0240 mg.
Hyoscyamine Hydrobromide	0.1280 mg.

PUROBARB

Phenobarbital
Theobromine Calcium

1/6 grs.
3.25 grs.

NEBUTAL AND BELLADONNA

Nebutal Sodium
Extract Belladonna

1/4 gr. (15 mg.)
1/6 gr. (10 mg.)

DONNATAL

Hyoscyamine sulfate
Atropine sulfate
Hyoscyne hydrobromide
Phenobarbital (1/4 gr.)

0.1037 mg.
0.0194 mg.
0.0065 mg.
16.2 mg.

It is planned to administer these preparations first, in order to get a base line to determine how far beyond these presently available materials the researchers must go to produce satisfactory results. The methods that we will use here to screen the effectiveness of these compounds will be the control of blood pressure in hypertensive patients, in patients under excitement, and also the effect of these compounds on the palmar sweating test. This test is performed by placing the palm of the subject's hand on filter paper previously dipped in tannic acid and dried. The amount of the imprint left by the hand is a measure of palmar sweating. The best of these preliminary compounds will be given the grade "10", and new experimental preparations will have their effectiveness expressed numerically according to their relative effectiveness as compared to the best of these compounds.

The use of new compounds, available either commercially or synthesized by the investigator, will fall into two groups: The first group will be labeled "Anti-hypertensive Agents." The second group will be labeled "Anti-cholinergic Agents."

The anti-hypertensive agents will include phthalazine derivatives, a group of magnesium salts of alkylamine phthalates and of the double amine derivatives of propranol. A number of these compounds have been prepared by the chief investigator. Others will be obtained from leading pharmaceutical companies, such as priscoline, which is a sympatholytic agent marketed by CIBA, and Dihydroergocornine available from Sandoz.

Among the anti-cholinergic preparations, some of the 6-methoxy quinoline derivatives prepared by the principal investigator will be tested along with blocking agents devised for pilocarpine and eserine. These are an outgrowth of anti-asthmatic therapeutic agents devised by the principal investigator.

In addition, from commercially available supplies, such compounds as Barbitone will be investigated.

The object, as previously stated, is to find the most effective combination of anti-cholinergic and anti-adrenergic compounds which will prevent the release under stress of the chemical effectors which produce the alarm response in individuals.

The principal investigator will conduct both acute and chronic toxicity studies on all compounds submitted for clinical investigation. In addition to this, preliminary pharmacological studies on the relative anti-hypertensive and anti-cholinergic effects of these compounds will be carried out.

USE OF ANTIHYPERTENSIVE AND ANTI-CHOLINE COMPOUNDS
FOR THE CONTROL OF STRESS REACTIONS

The following budget is proposed for these investigations:

Administration, office overhead and travel	\$ 3,000.00
Chemical Assistants and Consultation part-time	3,600.00
Laboratory technician for pathologic sections, chronic toxicity, etc.	2,400.00
Clinical technician for clinical laboratory determination	3,000.00
Equipment, supplies and chemicals	<u>3,000.00</u>
	\$ 15,000.00

November 13, 1951

Typical Materials to be Evaluated in Project

Atropine

Syntropan

Banthine

Other standard synthetic Atropines

Bistrin

Veraloid

Aprosoline (CIBA)

Experimental compounds will be tried only after evaluation of acute and chronic toxicity data (and other pertinent data) by the responsible Medical Officer on the project.

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Assistant Director/OSI

15 November 1951

Deputy Security Officer/CIA

Project ARTICHOKE - [REDACTED]

In response to your inquiry, the subject person is approved for an approach to determine his interest in possibly serving with Project ARTICHOKE. This clearance is granted on a limited amount of investigation and is granted solely to determine the subject's interest in working on a highly classified research project. This person must not be briefed on ARTICHOKE itself, but it can be explained in terms of a government research program believed to be of interest to the individual.

After determination for the person named of his interest in serving with the Project, this office should be advised and a full investigation will be completed with a view to clearing this person as a consultant for the Project.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CC: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ADVICE OF PROJECT ACTION

Enclosure

<input type="checkbox"/> DEPUTY DIRECTOR	<input type="checkbox"/> AD, RR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PL.)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AD, SI
<input type="checkbox"/> DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADM.)	<input type="checkbox"/> AD, SO
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIST. DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADM. GEN.)	<input type="checkbox"/> ADVISOR FOR MGT.
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIST. DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADM. SPEC.)	<input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, ADM. SERVICES
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIST. DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADM. IAS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMPTROLLER
<input type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COUNSEL	<input type="checkbox"/> PERSONNEL DIRECTOR
<input type="checkbox"/> AD, CD	<input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, PROCUREMENT
<input type="checkbox"/> AD, CI	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> AD, IC	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> AD, KE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> AD, O	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> AD, PC	<input type="checkbox"/> VITAL DOCUMENTS
	<input type="checkbox"/> PRC FILE

CIA PROJECT NO.

OSI-111-52 (123)

PROJECT TITLE

External Research Project with [redacted] and Associates

PROJECT DURATION

Fiscal year 1952

DESCRIPTION AND SCOPE OF PROJECT

Submitted by OSI to conduct research in the application of side tone delay to interrogation techniques. This project, which was concurred in by DD/P, AD/LS, AD/PC and AD/SO, will be implemented by transfer of funds to the Office of Naval Research which will establish the project with the [redacted] and Associates.

Approved by the PRC on 21 December 1951.

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED COSTS

OBJECT CLASS			
01 Personal Services	[redacted]	\$	[redacted]
02 Travel	[redacted]		[redacted]
03 Transportation of things			
04 Communications			
05 Rents and Utilities			
06 Printing and Binding			
07 Other Contractual Services			
08 Supplies and Materials			
09 Equipment	[redacted]		[redacted]
Other	[redacted]		[redacted]
TOTAL		\$	[redacted]

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OR LIMITATIONS

Enclosure (1)

RECOMMENDATION (PROJECTS REVIEW COMMITTEE)	FINAL ACTION
APPROVED (DISAPPROVED)	APPROVED (DISAPPROVED) P
<i>[Signature]</i>	
DEC 28 1951	
SIGNATURE OF COMPTROLLER	DATE
<i>15/ A. H. Ballou</i>	28 DEC 1951
	WALTER B. Smith
	DEC 29 1951

①

13 AUG 49 (2)
1:30

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Mr. Dulles:

Dr. Chadwell came by and left these papers for you. He asked me to tell you that if you will have this coordinator report to you, that would be just fine. If not, Dr. Chadwell will be glad to pinch-hit.

Also, the group that signs this letter advises that you present the plan individually to the IAC member representing Navy, Army, Air Force, and FBI, with a solicitation for their assistance and their designation of an individual in each of the organizations for us to work with.

These papers were prepared on a schedule to be available to you for the IAC meeting on Thursday of this week. If you present it to the IAC meeting rather than handling it individually, the group signing it suggest that other offices and Department of State and AEC representatives be dismissed before you discuss this subject.

Dr. Chadwell asked me to tell you that the above would have been the points he would have discussed with you had he seen you in person this P. M. He said he would come over to see you any time you suggest if you care to discuss this matter further with him.

A.T.

①

30260

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J. J. ...

23 February 1949

NOTES ON BEHAVIOR OF CONFESSEES

1. Reasons for Analysis:

- a. Behavior is abnormal for human
- b. German brutality extracted info - but did not produce converts in open court.
- c. New method must be entailed.

2. Background:

- a. Conduct in public appearance repetitive
- b. Recorded prior to German attack on Russia.
- c. No indication came from Germany since British agents who "gave" were not "converted".

d. Symptoms (present, absent and undetermined)

(1) Present:

- (a) Sense of shame
- (b) Weakness or loss of will
- (c) Lack of emotional control

- 1. Tears
- 2. Shouting
- 3. Hoarseness in trained speakers
- 4. Breaking of voice
- 5. "Sawdust trail" behavior
- 6. Whispering
- 7. Waving of arms - exhortation
- 8. Self abnegation
- 9. Elaboration and extrusion of the subconscious
- 10. A kind of reconditioning, -creation of a new frame

11. Some weight loss

(2) Absent:

- (a) Gross physical weakness
- (b) Sphincter control
- (c) Disturbances in osmic, auditory, visual, gustatory or peripheral sensory functions.
- (d) No gross disturbances in coordination

(3) Undetermined:

- (a) Level of cerebral activity involved
- (b) Effect on digestion
- (c) Effect on circulation
- (d) Effect on respiration
- (e) Effect on excretions
- (f) Effect on sexual functions
- (g) Effect on cutaneous apparatus

3. Both ~~Fogliotti~~ and ~~Thorez~~ spent the war years in Moscow—both have shown evidence of very bad judgment—bold, forceful—even treasonable statements in a milieu which has been shown to be distinctly unfavorable.

17 May 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR:

~~_____~~
Room 2161 G Building

SUBJECT:

Communist "confession" techniques

Psychology 3-
(b)(3)

1. With reference request of 29 April 1949, there is no body of reliable information on techniques employed to obtain "confessions".

2. Evidence is inferential but is sufficient in quantity to be convincing and to enable firm opinion as to the method employed.

3. Of the techniques considered, direct physical torture, diabolic persuasion and attack by drugs were considered and rejected. Psycho-surgery, electric and drug shock were also investigated and rejected in the light of evidence and reports from files and by observers.

4. It is the opinion of OSI that the incongruities of the confessions and anomalous behavior of defendants can only be explained by the application of procedure which has resulted in a basic change in the functional organization of the defendant's mind with associated change in character structure.

5. Without presenting the detailed evidence, suffice it to say that all points toward the application of techniques of hypnosis and/or psycho-analysis, the confessions being elicited either by virtue of post hypnotic suggestion with resultant trance state, or by means of accelerated psycho-analytic techniques combined with post hypnotic behavior.

6. The feasibility of accomplishing the foregoing has been established in psychiatric and clinical practice and the usefulness of this method may be extended to the following areas:

- a. Interrogation
- b. Counter measures to interrogation
- c. Directed activity
- d. Preparation of agents for covert activity

7. Methods are being studied and evaluated by OSI, and fuller report will be forthcoming.

(b)(3)

METHODS OF INDUCTION

1. Passes
 - a. Old method
 - b. Requires much time
 - c. Requires cooperative subject.
2. Contact

Passes with contact with body.
3. Sense Stimulation

(Overstimulation) - fixation methods.

 - a. Fatigue of sense of sight - especially by having subject stare at bright object held above line of vision.
 - b. Bright objects, coins, keys, etc.
 - c. Soft music, monotonous poetry
 - d. Cooperation required.
4. Suggestion - as of sleep.
 - a. Comfort
 - b. Relaxation
 - c. Suggestion or command to sleep
 - d. Cooperation required
5. Making (suggestive) Hypnosis - combination of 3 and 4.
6. Drug Hypnosis
 - a. Rapid
 - b. Works when other methods fail
 - c. Trance same as that of foregoing

d. Technique

- (1) Narcosis induced by gradual admin. drug.
- (2) Hypnosis induced by verbal suggestion during light narcosis preparatory for analysis and hypnosis.
- (3) Routine investigation history, mental state, etc.
- (4) Regression and eliciting of remote events, especially of childhood to establish content and dynamics of ideation and orientation.
- (5) After salient factors determining patient's orientation are determined - new associations are created to obtain new orientation to reality.
- (6) Repeat daily.
- (7) Post-hypnotic state re-inforced in waking patient by explanation, persuasion and re-education.
- (8) Since transference phenomena are common, it is important to choose an object which can be made suitable and is adequate for environmental contact.

- 3 -

1. Charges- Sabotage of Russian Industrial Program

Dissemination of propaganda of anti-communistic nature
Disclosing military secrets to fascist military forces.
Attempting to introduce Bourgeois socialist doctrine.

2. Relative Importance of Activity of Defendants.

Key political and military figures.
Key government technicians and managers.

3. Political significance of trials.

Evidence of tightening of controls of Politburo.
Effort of Stalin to eliminate all opposition.
(Reference to poisoning of relative of Stalin's)
Also some reference by historians to almost
frenzied period of S- reflected in purge activity.
Stalin did not repeat mistake of Trotsky exile.

4. Behavior of Defendants

I. Precise arrangement of Courtroom.
Defendants in row facing Prosecutor.

Orderly and timed procedure of trials.

No interruption or cross examination as in U.S.

II. Evidence of guilt and confession presented by each
defendant as called upon by Vichinsky.

A. Testimony of each defendant ^{made} recited as a well
rehearsed and just short of repetition from memory recital of the
events leading up to and the nature of defendants' guilt.

B. Further confession of having been guilty of
plotting against the soviet state and therefore against the people.

C. Prompting from the Prosecutor at times when the
defendants faltered. Indication that defendants waited for the prompting
and at all times looked directly at P. One defendant ***
promulgator of soviet legal codes faltered and broke down at one point
and instant down. Was allowed to continue his testimony later.

Not many instances of this kind of breakdown. Generally testimony
was given haltingly but steadily.

5. Newspaper Accounts

I. Verbatim newspaper accounts of trial are in tone of
guilt already an established fact and purpose of trial merely a
chance for the defendants to publicly proclaim their infidelity

AN ANALYSIS OF CONFESSIONS IN RUSSIAN TRIALS

1. ORIENTATION:

Since the notorious Moscow trials of 1937, overt Russian judicial procedure has been noteworthy for the dramatic trials in which the defendants have exhibited anomalous and incomprehensible behavior and confessions. Characteristics and manner of the defendants, and formulation and delivery of the confessions, have been so similar in a large number of cases as to suggest factitious origin. Most noteworthy and incredible has been the recent "confession" of His Eminence Cardinal Josef Mindszenty while on trial in the People's Court of Hungary for *collaboration*

The evident incongruities prompted this study, the purposes of which were to analyze a number of instances of trials and confessions to investigate:

- a. The overall pattern of the arrest, trial, and performances of the members of the cast.
- b. The occurrence of any consistent or recurring details of procedure or behavior.
- c. If the foregoing formed a congruent pattern, the method by which the result was achieved.

2. PROCEDURE:

Source material was widely diverse and references made to significant items. It became apparent at the outset of the study that the style, context and manner of delivery of the "confessions" were such as to be inexplicable unless there had been a reorganization and reorientation of the minds of the confessors. There is adequate historical experience to establish that basic changes in the functional organization of the human mind cannot be brought about by the traditional methods of physical torture--these at the most, achieve a reluctant, temporary yielding and, moreover, leave their mark upon the victim.

Newer or more subtle techniques had, therefore, to be considered for the working hypothesis. Among the recognized methods are:

- a. Psychosurgery: a surgical separation of the frontal lobes of the brain.

- b. Shock method:
 - (1) electrical
 - (2) drug: metrazol, cannabis indica, insulin, cocaine.
- c. Psychoanalytic methods
 - (1) psychoanalysis
 - (2) narco-analysis and synthesis
 - (3) hypno-analysis and synthesis
- d. Combinations of the foregoing.

In order to develop group patterns of behavior and interactions certain significant elements were tabulated, Chart 1.

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⑤

The Director of Central Intelligence

15 August 1949

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Report No. 1 on trip to FROON and USFA, 22 June to 7 August 1949
inclusive.

1. OBJECTIVES. Major objectives were: (a) to develop information on procedures used in Russian-controlled countries for obtaining "confessions" (Appendix A), and (b) to apply special methods of interrogation for the purpose of evaluation of Russian practices and capabilities in this area (Appendix B).

2. BACKGROUND. (1, a.). Since the notorious Moscow trials of 1937 and 1953, Russian-controlled judicial procedure has been noteworthy for the dramatic trials in which the defendants have exhibited anomalous behavior and confessions. Trials have often been staged affairs with rigid settings. Preliminary study of records of a number of trials, especially that of Cardinal Mindszenty, led to the inference that the style, content and manner of delivery of the "confessions" could only be explained on the basis of a reorientation of the minds of the confessees. There is adequate historical experience to establish that basic changes in the functional organization of the human mind cannot be brought about by psychological duress or physical torture alone. Investigation of the use of more subtle techniques was indicated. Recent reports of unusual and bold behavior among activist PWs returning from Antifa schools in the USSR suggested that special techniques for reorientation may have been applied to them as well.

3. CONCLUSIONS.

a. It is a reasonable certainty (though unproven) that "confessees" in high-level trials of political or propaganda significance in Russian-dominated areas are prepared by hypnosis. Hypnotic control is begun following a period of psychological duress and drugging, the re-education under hypnosis being reinforced with interim dialectical pressure.

b. There is no evidence that hypnosis is being employed by the USSR in the preparation of activist or espionage agents for routine missions.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Consideration to be given to an operation for the escape of Cardinal Mindszenty.

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4. RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued)

b. An operational team of two men be trained by CIA in special methods of interrogation and sent to the European Theatres.

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APPENDIX A

Background and Procedures Used in the Preparation
of Defendants For Confessions

Sources:

1. Reports of trials in Russia and satellite areas.
2. DASHKIN, Franklitz, Brigadier General (Czech), witness of 1933 trials of ZIMOVIEV, BUREZHIN and KUDAK.
3. SULNAR, Lasso and Hanna, nee FLORIAN-FISCHEK, handwriting experts, and forgers for the political police during the Hindszanty trial.
4. KAPPANYI, fru, Captain, Hungarian Army, in contact with KOVACH, Aladar, Hungarian author.
5. SZATMARI, Emil. Alienist and psychiatrist for the Hungarian People's Court.
6. Two senior lieutenants, MOB.
7. Captain, MOB.
8. SCHNEIDER, Colonel General, Reichswehr.
9. Sources with knowledge of Gestapo and SD methods.

The use of psychological duress, drugs and hypnosis, both for interrogation and preparation of defendants for trials was known to both the German and Hungarian political police. (AVO, BAH, and SD). A German Professor ORSCOS, Ferencz, living in Hungary during the Nazi occupation in 1944 cooperated with the Germans in these special operations. From them and his own experience he learned the use of a drug called "ORSC" (Scopolamine-Hydnrotamine-Hukatal), which causes slow mental excitement and then depression and which had enjoyed use in the treatment of some mental disturbances. It came into extensive use in Hungary where the Gestapo applied it to reduce subjects to a highly suggestible mental state, after which hypnosis was induced and interrogations carried out, or preparations for trial made. Working with ORSCOS under Gestapo guidance were Dr. VOELGYESSY, Ferencz (the best hypnotist in Hungary), and two of VOELGYESSY's assistants, TAMASEA, Dr. Stefan and probably BALINT, Major Stefan, now a major in the BAH.

The first two known independent Hungarian uses of special methods for confessions were the HAZY trial and the ARANY trial. It will be remembered that during the ARANY trial in 1947 the defendant initially

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regudiated his personal history statement as presented by the police and stated before the court that he had been mistreated and hypnotized. The court was recessed, ARAMY was returned to prison and the court reconvened on the third day, when ARAMY acknowledged the statements in the original personal history and confessed guilt to all charges which were as usual presented in full, to be answered "Yes" or "No". During the ARAMY trial, KLEEMAN, Dr. Androv, the court psychiatrist and a reputable physician, was not allowed to interview the defendant or to be in close proximity to him. KLEEMAN later stated that it was his impression that ARAMY was in a state of hypnosis while on the stand.

In the trial of CHORNIKY, Victor (son-in-law of the first President of Hungary), a similar procedure was followed. CHORNIKY was tried in mid-1948 for selling a Hungarian secret code to the United States. The CHORNIKY case was followed closely by a number of people because he was the first Jew to be tried for treason and it was of special interest to source, who knew CHORNIKY and family well and was also Jewish. Source also was in close contact with SOLYOM-FERENC, Wilkos, who was a prisoner at Andrassy Street 60 with CHORNIKY and spoke with him daily. Source states that in the first few days in prison CHORNIKY denied all charges, but after three to four days stated that he had been receiving daily interrogations from Professor VOELGYESSY. Following this observation, SOLYOM-FERENC noted daily changes in personality of CHORNIKY and gradual alteration in statements made after interrogation. After ten days of treatment CHORNIKY was proclaiming his guilt to his fellow prisoners, several of whom by that time had become reguinated with the application of hypnosis and were of the opinion that CHORNIKY had been hypnotized repeatedly. Prior to the trial CHORNIKY was interviewed by KLEEMAN who, according to source, (at that time an agent of the political police), said that CHORNIKY was definitely in a state of hypnosis during his trial. Source, who witnessed trial, stated that CHORNIKY's delivery was that of a hypnotized individual and that contrary to his usual rapid speech, he spoke very slowly as if reading from a text. Source talked with CHORNIKY in an anteroom prior to trial and noted that CHORNIKY did not seem normal and was astonished at prisoner's statement, "I admit my guilt and I am sure I will not be sentenced to death." Defendant also did not recognize source, although they were old friends and in brief conversation was detached and exhibited obvious gaps in memory for events both had witnessed. As usual, the defense attorney did not carry out a direct or cross examination. Further evidence of a hypnotic trance is given by the behavior of the defendant during the trial, in which source twice passed CHORNIKY's line of vision to the latter's complete indifference. To source and others working in the laboratory of the EAH, there was general acceptance and comment as to CHORNIKY's being hypnotized, although no open statements were made.

The preparation of Cardinal NERDSZENTY followed the same general pattern but was perhaps better planned and executed, with the advice and assistance of a Russian delegation.

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Within about three or four weeks time in the autumn of 1948, the decision to weaken or discredit the position of the Catholic Church in Hungary was forced upon the Hungarian Politburo by a series of events: (a) the fortuitous meeting of the Communist County leaders who were working in an unfavorable milieu which was about 70% Catholic, (b) the beginning of the Communist peace offensive, (c) the beginning of the Party purge, and (d) NAYARADI's defection. At this time a secret meeting was called to decide upon tactics. Present were SZAKASITS, Arpad; RAKOSY, Matias; MAROSAI; GEROC; FRISCH; RAJK; LAPY, Julius, and others. RAJK recommended the BASH method and wanted to foster an anti-Communist demonstration and have a mass slaughter including NINDSZENYI. As an alternate method RAKOSY wanted to deal with NINDSZENYI by luring him from the country and preventing his return. In the absence of agreement GEROC and FRISCH (both Moscow-trained), insisted that a group should go to Moscow to get overall policy in light of future requirements in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. GEROC and RAKOSY, RAJK, ZIBAY and VAS went and returned in four weeks. RAJK, who was not in agreement with the Moscow decision, was kept for two additional weeks, in which time he was relieved of the Ministry of the Interior and appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. His place as overall head being taken by a reliable Moscow-trained man, KADAR, Jon.

After their return the old AVO (secret police) were reorganized and purged, and in three weeks a separate military office created, the BAH (secret police of the Ministry of Interior), made up of tried, screened Communists and GABOR, Peter was made head. GABOR was not under the control of the head of the Hungarian state, but received all orders through GEROC and FRISCH.*

On or about November 1948, a Russian delegation arrived in Budapest. It was headed by TISCOV (now Russian Ambassador to Budapest), and five or six others who were attached to the BAH. It is not known whether SAVELIEV, KANTAROFF or ERVINSKY were in this group, although other reports have identified the latter two as being in Budapest at this time. On or about 5 December there also appeared fifteen or twenty MVD officers of Hungarian origin. About this time TISCOV and PUSCHKIN ordered President SZAKASITS to take action to separate the Church within four weeks.

The problem was discussed in the presence of source at a justice session meeting of the Communist party. Present were SZEBELY, LAPY, FREY and the Minister of Justice, et al. The point at issue was how to produce sufficient evidence against NINDSZENYI to publicly discredit him and the Church. The Russians brought with them hundreds of documents collected by their agents and the BAH had an additional large quantity on hand. The great problem was how to organize the material for public exhibition and present a credible case. Very few of the documents were original, most being photostats, intercepts and agent reports. Photostats and transcripts or originals could not be used without revealing

* "BOEDA" reports Peter GABOR's suicide in Budapest on 4 August 1949.

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source and methods of operation. The solution of ELPHARTY, Irvin, Chief of the Economic Section, BAH, was adopted. This method was SOP in this section of the BAH and is usually carried out as follows: Intercepts were compared with catalogued letters in files and authorship or original identified or verified. A literal copy of photostat or intercept was forged and placed in house of defendant, which would then be searched and forgery found. In the KINDESMITZ case photostats were available of correspondence between KINDESMITZ, CHAPIN, SCHOFIELD and others. In the case of BARATY original letters were not available for copy so words from numerous other letters were pieced together to get words for the original. In the trial of Baron (fn) KRAY, it was noted that there were no intercepts since 1947 because all correspondence was delivered by courier and, on insistence of KINDESMITZ burned after reading.

The arrest of KINDESMITZ was made on 26 December. On 28 December public reaction was so great that Moscow ordered immediate publication of derogatory documents. In the rush of preparation, confusion and disagreement arose between the Minister of Economics and the Minister of Foreign Affairs as to scope and extent of publicity. The police, (QABOR, Peter), stepped in and decided to publish CHAPIN, SCHOFIELD and KONTIGLY letters which had been forged either from photostatic copies or by synthesis of words from a number of letters. After forgeries were created, copies were given to the Budapest newspapers. One paper, "VILAG", of the radical democratic group, refused to publish and went on record as stating letters were forgeries. The editor, UJPKA, Geza, was jailed. The SULMARs were called in by police to substantiate forgeries. Hanna SULMAR went to the American Legation and additional information from this point on the forgeries may be obtained from the Department of State. A notable error was made by BAH in that the original forgery which appeared in the Budapest papers on the 4th of January was dissimilar in format from the second forgery prepared by SULMAR and which was published in the Yellow Book. Photostats of both forgeries were presumably turned over to CLARK, Philip, Second Secretary of the American Legation.

Two weeks were occupied in preparing documentary material for the trial. In this period about 200 other individuals associated with KINDESMITZ were also arrested since the staging called for KINDESMITZ to be principal defendant and to select from the 200 a few who could be used to testify against him. ZAKAR was disclosed to source by police as being very important. He was inclined to be fanatic, wanted to be a martyr, and had been picked as target by police because of his great singleness of purpose which made it very easy to deal with him by dialectical means.

In the first two weeks period of preparation the usual police methods were applied to the Cardinal. There was first a physical search which was highly impersonal and carried out by guards who neither spoke nor revealed any sign of human interest. The prisoner was then placed

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in a cell or room where people wandered in and out for a day or two, ignoring the prisoner completely. Impersonal treatment continued, but he now began to receive food and a private cell. On or about the 5th day the prisoner was given pen and paper and instructed to prepare a personal history report. The Cardinal wrote one of twenty lines. This was sent to BAH where it was given careful study and made a basis for dialectical attack. This is an important part of the preparation of a prisoner. Each point in the personal history is argued about endlessly, "You say you are a peasant--well wasn't your father, etc.", and going from this into semantic and political issues. This may go on for days until the prisoner, who has been cut off from human contact and not allowed to speak on the issue for which he was arrested, begins to doubt his own ability to think and express himself. Six full days' interrogation and dialectic argument were expended on the 20-line personal history statement of NINDSZENTY. NINDSZENTY's confidence was considerably shaken at the end of this time, but he refused to sign the statement of police to the effect that he had lied in his personal history statement. After this, administration of "GSM" was begun on 4 January by special permission of TISSOT and processing by VOLGHESSY and TARKANA initiated. On the 6th of January, VOLGHESSY dictated to NINDSZENTY (while under hypnosis) a two to three page life history. GABOR, Peter showed this to SULVAR who immediately identified the document as one executed while NINDSZENTY was in an abnormal condition, probably under hypnosis, (which GABOR readily admitted). Since this document was useless for publication and NINDSZENTY was proving difficult, another conference was held in the police laboratory, responsibility for forgeries and handling of trial procedure having in the interim been consolidated in the BAH and the crime laboratory, for both criminal and political trials. At the time of this meeting ASZBALCS, Colonel George, and CSZKO, Colonel Gyula, Party Commissars in the Ministry of Interior, stated to source that they were as yet unable to get a satisfactory compromise or damaging statement from NINDSZENTY and it would, therefore, be necessary to continue processing. They were perturbed because the Russian experts headed by TISSOT were impatient and a meeting was called with the Russians to decide whether (a) to turn the whole matter over to the Russian experts or (b) to continue with Hungarian facilities. The Hungarians were willing to continue because of experience and familiarity with the language but the thought of failure was a deterrent. The Russians were prepared to go ahead but they also did not want to risk the consequences of failure. The matter was referred to Moscow and decision was made that the operation was to be Hungarian, but under Russian guidance. This meeting was called on or about 10 or 11 January 1949. From this point on NINDSZENTY was left to the psychologists. He was permitted to write letters and had a special call at Andrassy Street 60 which was segregated from the remainder of the prison and provided with special passage to interrogation rooms. From this time on he was not seen by other prisoners or any but his special guards until the day of the trial.

On January 26 and 27 the prosecutor, ALAPY, Julius, in accord with law, went to the prison to advise NINDSZENTY that the latter was now in

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custody of the court and to inquire if the prisoner had any new statements to make. ALAMY later stated to CSORNA, Bela, the official court news correspondent, that at no time had he seen anyone as apathetic, unemotional and detached as the prisoner.

On 2nd February HINDSZUREY was taken to the court prison. The usual court guards were relieved by BAI guards and for the first time in the history of the court both court psychiatrist KOLITIAN and the psychologist, BALASSA, Vlaslos, were excluded from the building for the duration of the trial and prohibited from speaking to the prisoner. It was further ordered that no photographs be taken at the trial except of designated areas.* The details of the remainder of the trial may be gotten from published material.

The entire procedure described by sources, the staging of the trial and the behavior of the defendants are all consistent with hypnotic control, both in the preparation and in the courtroom behavior.

* The prohibited areas for photography were those occupied by the experts and the police section. Source on 4 February, in search of the Chief Prosecutor, entered logo and saw in the section for police and experts a large number of Russian officials and military.

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APPENDIX B

Possible Russian Application of Special Methods


The possible application of special methods to activist PWs and agents was investigated by two means, (a) straight interrogation of some 300 to 400 PWs and (b) straight and special interrogation of 10 or 12 suspected agents.

Many of the PWs were returning from a number of Antifa schools, including Ufa, Tiflis and Krasnogorsk. There was no evidence that any of the PWs had received special treatment. The Antifa courses, which usually extended for from three to eight months, were of the conventional pattern already reported. The PWs were 90% disaffected from the Antifa training by the time they reached the border and of the remaining all but 1% of the original become disaffected later.

Among the agents processed by one method or another were two KGB officers, three double Russian agents, a Czech and several doubtful low-level confusion agents. An additional number of Russians were interrogated and reviewed psychologically for evidence of special processing. The results in all cases were negative, there being no evidence of preparation by special methods and indeed there was no knowledge on the part of any agents of the application of special methods of interrogation by the Russians as applied to prisoners or suspected agents. Details of methods of processing and recommended techniques will be made the subject of a separate report.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Security Branch

DATE: 23 August 1949

FROM : Security Research Section

SUBJECT: Security and Co-ordination Among Intelligence Agencies in the Field.


During a recent trip through Germany and Austria, numerous opportunities for observation brought to light a situation involving a dangerous lack of adequate security and proper co-ordination among the majority of intelligence gathering agencies in the field.

It was very discouraging to find that the field representatives of our own organization surpassed, by far, all other agencies in conjunction with appropriate security measures. After overhearing unsolicited remarks concerning S. O. Field operations, it is obvious that this is the unanimous opinion of the working personnel of the other agencies engaged in similar work.

Unfortunately, among the majority of the agencies, other than our own, both the physical and personnel security is inexcusably neglected. The physical aspect is one that could be corrected locally when proper incentive is stimulated or when stern directives are issued by those in a position of authority. The personnel security problem is, on the other hand, one which is not entirely the fault of the agency involved. Although there is extremely poor co-ordination among the twenty-three odd collection agencies in the field, the main disadvantage seems to be a lack of knowledge of modern security validation systems, and the lack of equipment to carry out a program involving such systems.

Among most of the organizations, the clearance of American personnel working for them is inexcusably lax. Many of the employees are of dubious foreign extraction and still have relatives residing under unfriendly influence behind the Iron Curtain. The clearance of foreign personnel working for the various United States agencies is even more inadequate. As far as can be determined by the many inquiries made, the only clearance given in numerous cases was one by the Provost Marshall, who had neither the necessary experience nor facilities to conduct a proper security clearance program. The loyalty of many of these foreign employees is extremely questionable. With a great number, there is absolutely no motive for, and no reason to believe, that there exists a loyalty to the United States. With many individuals, it can be safely assumed that loyalty to the United States is strictly secondary to their loyalty to Germany. It would seem that these persons, who are now working in extremely sensitive areas among various agencies, should be carefully processed by every modern means known to security officials.

Throughout the majority of the agencies, there are extremely disorganized and inefficient systems for establishing a security validation of the sources of information. There appears to be little or no determination of motive among the informants and deserters. These motives fall in one or more categories, such as:




Memo to Chief, Security Branch from Security Research Section - 23 August 1949
Subject: Security and Co-ordination Among Intelligence Agencies in the Field.


- a. An enemy agent representing the interest of an unfriendly country.
- b. A double agent actually loyal to an unfriendly country.
- c. A professional agent selling the same information to any country.
- d. Confusion agents for the purpose of monopolizing the funds and personnel of agencies utilizing them.
- e. The psychopathic informant desiring only continual attention and giving fictitious information.
- f. The opportunist type informant who sells the same information to several different allied countries and to several different agencies within those countries.
- g. A sincere informant who is attempting to allow his information to be used for the greatest benefit of the various United States agencies.

The present procedure for determining the type of informant being dealt with is extremely inadequate. Many times an informant or apparent deserter is handled in such a way that he might very successfully operate to the benefit of an unfriendly power. On many occasions, he is allowed to be exposed to highly classified physical areas and information which greatly expedites his mission if he is operating as a double or professional agent. Numerous examples were observed where confusion agents and psychopathic informants were monopolizing an amazing amount of confidential funds and an enormous amount of time of key personnel in the various agencies. Numerous cases were also observed where an opportunist source was giving the same information to four or five different agencies. Due to a nearly complete lack of co-ordination between these agencies, the final publication of the information involved was considered verified from four or five different sources, although actually coming from the one informant involved. The danger of such false verification practices as these is readily apparent.

One of the most unfortunate aspects of the entire situation is the extreme injustice to the sincere informant. In numerous cases, an informant or Russian deserter is given VIP treatment by an agency in Berlin, partially exploited, and then sent to another agency in the American Zone of Germany where he is locked in solitary confinement for months pending a decision concerning the existence of a security risk. By the time the person is actually exploited, his morale is so bad that he is extremely uncooperative.

During the recent tour, a security validation service was provided merely as an unofficial favor to agencies who desired it. In several different cases, situations that had been lingering unresolved for months were cleared up in a half of day of processing by techniques involving modern interrogation aids, both mechanical and medical. At the termination of the tour, the unanimous







Memo to Chief, Security Branch from Security Research Section 23 August 1949
Subject: Security and Co-ordination Among Intelligence Agencies in the Field.


request from all agencies concerned was that such a service be made permanent for the utilization of all agencies operating in Germany and Austria. These requests came from such individuals as General Hill in Berlin, Colonel Partridge in Heidelberg, Colonel Thoroughman (Commanding Officer of European Command Intelligence Center), from the S. O. Theatre Command, and many other individuals representing intelligence operations in both Germany and Austria.

This service could be established by one of two methods. It could be expected that each agency involved train their own personnel and procure their own equipment. For many reasons, including the lack of qualified personnel and the lack of equipment procuring channels, it would seem that this solution would not be practical. The other solution would be for CIA, in their capacity as an intelligence co-ordinating organization, to establish and maintain a security validation service to be offered to, and utilized by any organization engaged in the collection of intelligence in that theatre. Suggested details concerning the establishing and maintaining of such a service are covered in a separate report.



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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Security Branch

DATE: 27 September 1949

FROM : Interrogation Research Section

SUBJECT: Establishing of Security Validation Teams

During the recent overseas trip and as a result of discoveries during this trip, and because requests from various field personnel in responsible positions, it is highly recommended that some type of security validation team service be furnished to various home and overseas operational units of this organization. Below are listed some suggestions which might aid in the planning and establishing of such a service. These suggestions are by no means intended to be final and complete plans but merely a basis around which a more detailed plan might be constructed.

CAPABILITY OF TEAMS:



Security validation teams would be trained to conduct skillful general interrogation, Polygraph interrogation, drug interrogation, hypnotic interrogation, and in some locations, the administering of operational hypnosis.

FUNCTION OF TEAMS:

In the United States, the function of the security validation teams would be as follows: The ultimate Polygraph screening of all CIA personnel; the processing of any loyalty cases which might arise from time to time; more detailed screening of special security categories such as screening for Special Intelligence information, Atomic Energy information, overseas departures, and any special category having access to highly classified information. The overseas teams would conduct screening of certain categories of overseas personnel; the processing of various informants and foreign operational personnel being utilized; and any sensitive cases which might arise. These teams could also offer adequate cover for the use of operational hypnosis, and could offer its services to other agencies and serve a four-fold purpose as follows: 1. To clear up some of the numerous cases which have been lingering for months and even years; 2. To give CIA personnel an opportunity to pick out the best informants and potential operational personnel from the subjects offered them for screening; 3. Such a service would offer an opportunity to keep unofficially informed of the operational activities of other intelligence gathering agencies in the field; 4. Certain personnel on these teams could aid in the collection of information concerning interrogation techniques and special operational procedure being utilized by Russia and Russian dominated countries.

LOCATION OF TEAMS:

These teams could be located both Stateside and in various important overseas theatres. The eventual location of the Stateside teams would include Washington, D. C. and possibly one or two other locations serving the central and western United States.

[REDACTED]
Memo To: Chief, Security Branch from Interrogation Research Branch Page 52
Subject: Establishing of Security Validation Teams 27 September 1949

For the present, it would seem important that concentration be placed upon establishing and the successful operation of a team in Washington, D. C. The nucleus of this team already exists in the form of our present Polygraph screening program.

In conjunction with the establishing of overseas teams, the eventual location would depend upon the current world situation. It would seem desirable to establish the first team in [REDACTED] to be utilized in conjunction with the great deal of cases presented our organization by the [REDACTED] Command Intelligence Center facilities.

TEAM COMPLEMENT:

Each team should have an interrogator qualified to do skillful detailed and general interrogation, to conduct both drug and hypnotic interrogation. In areas necessitating handling of a large number of subjects, these functions could be divided among two or more men as the occasion demands. Besides these specialists, a medical man should be available for the administering of drugs, as should a clerical worker to facilitate the handling of paper work.

TEAM EQUIPMENT:

Depending upon the volume of subjects handled, each team would be equipped with one or more Polygraphs, medical supplies, recording and monitoring equipment, clerical equipment and supplies.

TEAM TRAINING:

It would seem advisable to train all United States team personnel in Washington and then assign them depending upon the area demand. Overseas team personnel could receive preliminary training in Washington and from there given overseas training in [REDACTED]. After receiving this training, personnel could be sent to other areas necessitating replacements.

COORDINATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:

The coordination and responsibility of teams in both the United States and overseas is a problem which would require decisions at a level higher than this office. Such activities would necessitate the cooperation of Inspection and Security, Office of Scientific Intelligence, Office of Special Operations and perhaps other branches to a limited extent.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Chief, I & S Staff

FROM : Interrogation Research Section

SUBJECT: Problems Involved in Obtaining a Psychiatrist

DATE: 27 February 1950

Some of the problems involved in the procurement of a consultant or full time psychiatrist are as follows:

1. A reputable civilian psychiatrist could not afford to be available to us on short notice.
 - a. Even the highest government salary would not begin to compare with his private income.
 - b. He would be obligated to keep appointments with patients which have been scheduled weeks in advance.
2. He might not have the interest or motivation to be active in such a narrow scope of the over all psychiatric field.
3. His ethics might be such that he might not care to cooperate in certain more revolutionary phases of our project.
4. Very few psychiatrists are now on active duty and are, therefore, difficult to procure through that channel.
5. Very few psychiatrists are really capable in the application of hypnosis and have no interest whatsoever in ESP.

It is believed that we are fortunate in having located a candidate to fill such a billet in CIA. This man is Dr. ~~_____~~, now on active duty at the ~~_____~~ also has an office of his own in town and a two-day a week private practice. He has the following points in his favor as far as overcoming the above mentioned difficulties:

1. He is on active duty working toward retirement (five years to go).
2. He is extremely interested in the use of hypnosis, drugs and ESP.
3. His ethics are such that he would be completely cooperative in any phase of our program, regardless of how new or revolutionary it may be.
4. He has an office in town which could be used as a remote location for some of our work.
5. He would be willing to go on trips whenever necessary.

The disadvantage in obtaining ~~_____~~ on a part time basis is as follows:

1. He is ~~_____~~

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(b)(6)

MEMO

Asst. Directors and persons
they designate

8 March 1950

MEMORANDUM TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GCO
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GFC ✓
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GSI

SUBJECT: Project "Bluebird"

1. It is desired to call a meeting at 2:00 P.M., 14 March, in Room 201, 2210 H Street, of one or two designated persons from each office above to discuss operational requirements for highly specialized interrogation teams to be known as Project "Bluebird".
2. This project is regarded as of the highest security classification and to be known only to the fewest persons specifically designated by Assistant Directors. It is being considered at the definite request of your operating officials.
3. The agenda for the meeting will comprise discussion on the procurement, training, and control of two "Bluebird" teams, the research to be conducted by these teams, and their availability for operational use from a defensive standpoint outside the United States.
4. It is hoped that a concurrence of opinion may be arrived at on a plan which can then be submitted for the required covert administrative support, including funds and vacancies to organize these teams. It would be appreciated if you would send representatives who would be empowered to speak fully for you.
5. If any Assistant Director above desires further briefing on this matter before the meeting, either ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ or I will be glad to come see you.

Stewart Edwards
STEWART EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Inspection & Security Staff

[Redacted]

11

Team Personnel

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Vertical line with tick marks on the right side of the page.

[REDACTED]

#12

28 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
SUBJECT: Russian Interrogation Methods.

1. Mr. J. Alberti of ONI told the undersigned that a Mr. Jacobsen (of State Department, recently returned from Bulgaria (?), had written an extremely interesting report on the Voegler case giving details of Russian methods to obtain confessions. Alberti stated that as far as he knew the State Department had not disseminated this report which was being held by a Mr. Samuel Klaus in State, apparently because of security reasons inasmuch as the report apparently revealed State Department connections with the case.

2. The above is forwarded for your information and file.


[REDACTED]

Deputy Chief, Advisory Council

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff
SUBJECT: Project Bluebird

DATE: APR 5 1950

There is submitted for your approval and authorization for allocation of funds Project Bluebird. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this project and its covert nature, it is deemed advisable to submit this project directly to you, rather than through the channel of the Projects Review Committee. Knowledge of this project should be restricted to the absolute minimum number of persons.

This project is now extremely important because of the expressions of interest in this type of a program developing in various areas of the Agency. It is most important that these varied interests be brought into a single project where appropriate controls can be exercised. This will avoid compromise of our techniques and interest in this field.


It is requested that this project be approved and authorization granted for the necessary funds as set forth in the attachment.

Sheffield Edwards
SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

Concurrences:

[Redacted signature]
AD/GSC



cc attached memorandum of concurrence)
AD/GPC




Approved for *[Redacted]*

Rosenblatt

20 Apr. 1968
R. H. MILLER
DEAN ADRIAL, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE



1



13

PROJECT BLUEBIRD

Type - Operational Support


1. References.

Meeting of representatives of ADEGO, ADOPE, ADOSE, and Chief, ISSS, on 14 March, where agreement was reached on the following proposal.

2. The purpose of this project is to provide for the immediate establishment of interrogation teams for the operational support of CGO and GPC activities. The teams will utilize the polygraph, drugs, and hypnotism to attain the greatest results in interrogation techniques. It is important that this project be established inasmuch as a considerable public and government interest has recently developed in the use of hypnotism for interrogation and for personality control purposes. This interest stems from the recent spy trials in Hungary and other satellite countries. Within a number of areas of CIA there has developed considerable interest in the field of hypnotism and one of the basic purposes of this program is to bring all such interests within the purview and control of a single project. It is extremely important that any action by CIA in these fields be restricted to the knowledge of a minimum number of persons on a Top Secret basis to prevent compromise and unfavorable repercussions. Further, activities in this field are so highly specialized that untrained personnel should not experiment or attempt to apply the techniques of hypnotism under any circumstances. This project will provide highly qualified and technical personnel to perform all aspects of interrogation for all areas of the Agency.

The immediate purpose of the program is to provide interrogation teams utilizing the cover of polygraph interrogation to determine the bona fides of high potential defectors and agents, and also for the collection of incidental intelligence from such projects. A team is to be composed of three persons consisting of a doctor -- psychiatrist, a polygraph -- hypnotist, and a technician.

It is proposed that two teams be established to meet current anticipated requirements. As it will require approximately five months to adequately train two polygraph -- hypnotists, ISSS will make available immediately its hypnotist -- specialist for field assignments in order that a team will be immediately available for service. To complete the team a doctor and a technician will also be required for immediate service. In order to provide for two teams it is proposed that two doctors -- psychiatrists, two polygraph -- hypnotists and two technicians be authorized under this project. In this manner one team will be available for immediate service and within six months two full time teams will be established. It is further proposed that the doctor -- psychiatrists be set up in an office in Washington which will serve as a cover for training, experimentation, and indoctrination purposes in the use of drugs and hypnotism. The doctors will be available for field assignments with the interrogation teams. All training of the team personnel will be conducted by ISSS. The team personnel, when not on



field assignments, will be utilized for defensive training of covert personnel, study, and experimentation in the application of these techniques. This project is for the defensive use at this time of drugs and hypnotism. However, positive application of hypnotism will not be used until further experience in this field has been obtained and subject to approval of the DCI.

3. Operational Control.

The ADBO, ADCOC, and Chief, I-SS, will serve as a board for the operational control on the use of interrogation teams. GSO and OPC will submit to the board proposals for the use of interrogation teams on specific projects. Board approval will be granted only for specific projects and will not be granted for general assignment to a geographic area without a specific project in mind and without adequate controls.

4. Security.

The use of interrogation teams will be considered as Top Secret and knowledge of such activity within CIA will be restricted to only those who of necessity must have knowledge of such operations. The use of interrogation teams for operational support projects will in each case be granted only upon consideration of all security factors involved to prevent compromise of their use and techniques and to avoid repercussions to CIA.

5. Team Control.

The personnel of the teams will be assigned to Chief, I-SS, and will remain under I-SS control except when on specific assignments to the field. When not on field assignments the teams will be utilized for training, indoctrination, and experimentation purposes on mutually agreed projects in support of the covert offices.

6. Training.


All training of team personnel in polygraph, drugs, interrogation, and hypnotism will be conducted by I-SS.

7. Field Support.

Field support for interrogation teams will be provided on specific projects by either GSO or OPC, in accordance with the decision and control features of the operational control board.

8. Budget.

The estimated budget for this project for one year is as follows. Details are contained in Attachment A.



- 3 -

B




Personnel

Supplies

Equipment

Transportation

Rent



6 APR 1950 514

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Project Bluebird

1. The Office of Policy Coordination concurs in the attached project proposal, Bluebird, with the understanding that procedures, controls and organizational structure proposed cover only the field development phase of this activity. It is the understanding of this office that on the completion of this phase, the entire subject will be reviewed with the view to determining operational procedures and controls.

2. The above proviso was, I understand, orally agreed upon at the meeting on 14 March in the offices of Chief of I&S.

FRANK G. LISNER
Assistant Director for
Office of Policy Coordination



7-133
(15) S

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

20 April 1950

MEMO FOR: Budget Officer
Chief, Special Support Staff
Chief, Administrative Staff
Management Officer
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Project ~~SECRET~~


1. The Director, on 20 April 1950, approved Top Secret Project ~~SECRET~~, to be implemented by the Chief, I-SS, and an expenditure of _____ in connection therewith during the remainder of the Fiscal Year 1950 and Fiscal Year 1951. Both vouchered and unvouchered funds have been authorized, the determination of the division into those categories to be charged to the Chief, I-SS.

2. Implementation of this project will require certain support activities from each addressee listed above. The Chief, I-SS, will communicate to each addressee such information in connection with this project as he may deem desirable when he requests support action. However, reference by him to this project by its code name will be considered sufficient basis for providing the requested support.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. T. SULLIVAN
Acting Executive

cc: Chief, I-SS (w/TS41007-Cy 1 of 6)
Exec TS file



~~SECRET~~

Copy ___ of 7

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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
TO : Deputy Chief, I & S Staff
FROM : Interrogation Research Section
SUBJECT: Procurement of Personnel

DATE: 4 May 1950

Below are listed the qualifications to be set by the two individuals desiring detailed training in the use of Subconscious Isolation:

1. Must be able to speak Russian fluently.
2. It is desirable that he speak other languages such as German, Rumanian, Hungarian, etc.
3. Must be a competent interrogator.
4. Must have a background of psychology (either formal or practical).
5. Must be willing to travel.
6. A background in the use of stage or laboratory hypnosis is desirable.
7. A background in the use of truth serums or narco-analytic procedures is desirable.
8. A background in the use of the Lie Detector is desirable.

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Chief, Special Support Staff


8 May 1950

Deputy Chief, Inspection & Security Staff




Procurement of Personnel

Reference is made to the memorandum of 20 April 1950 from Mr. Shannon, Acting Executive, to Chief, Special Support Staff, concerning PROJECT GUARDIAN. In connection with this Project there is an allocation of funds for two GS-13 positions and it is requested that action be taken to locate candidates for the filling of these two positions.

In order to permit recruitment action for these two positions there is attached hereto a list of qualifications desired for the filling of these positions. This is submitted in the form of an attachment under the classification Confidential for writing purposes. It would be appreciated if any applicants can be found possessing the necessary qualifications that the papers on such persons be referred to this office for consideration prior to any action toward appointment.



Attachment (1)






ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: Qualifications to Positions GS-13

1. Must be able to speak Russian or German fluently.
2. Desirable that he have a college degree.
3. Must have a background of psychology, either formal or practical.
4. Must be willing to travel.
5. Desirable that he have experience in interrogation either from security, investigative, or intelligence work.
6. Desirable that he have some training in medicine or working experience in this field.
7. It is particularly important that the applicant possess a definite degree of self-confidence and a pleasing personality which permits him to meet people in various walks of life with an air of assurance and confidence.





Copy # 1 of 3
C-11 14 231 + 55
cc - 3
52

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

9 May 1950

SUBJECT: Project Fluchbird

On 9 May a meeting was held in the office of Dr. Chadwell, OSI, between ~~██████████~~, OSI, and Messrs. ~~██████████~~ of IAGS. The meeting was called for the purpose of determining the method by which OSI might lend support to Project Fluchbird, the covert collection of information from the U. S. Government sources. The following points were agreed upon:


(b)(3)

1. IAGS would provide ~~██████████~~ with a copy of the IAGS collection request which was sent to CSO for information on drugs and police interrogation methods.

2. ~~██████████~~ will arrange for the Surgeon General of the Army to place on the search list of the Nuremberg Trials papers request for information on drugs, narcoanalysis, and special interrogation techniques.

3. It was agreed that ~~██████████~~ would set up a program for the collection of intelligence from U. S. Government agencies and from public sources using an adequate cover to screen out direct CIA interest. The following are the categories of information:


- a. Speech including drugs.
- b. Narcoanalysis and hypnotism.
- c. Soviet and satellite trials wherein it is suspected that a or b above was used on the defendant (in all cases or event)



or other special drugs or interrogation.


h. Mr. ~~██████████~~ will advise Dr. ~~██████████~~ of various sources of information in Government where arrangements may be made for the collection of information set forth in paragraph 3 above.

5. Upon completion of the preliminary stages of the above steps a meeting will be set up between Dr. ~~██████████~~ Colonel Clark, Office of Secretary of Defense, and IAGS wherein Clark and ~~██████████~~ will divide up the fields of collection of information set forth in paragraph 3.



6. Upon development of the above collection activity, consideration will be given to estimates on this field as a method of unconventional warfare with further consideration of the presenting of this paper to the Office of Secretary of Defense for consideration. This latter program is one which will be subject to consideration dependent upon developments of the program set out in paragraphs 1 to 5.

(b)(3)



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

copy 1 of 3
19

TO : Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: 15 May 1950


1. I am very desirous of obtaining the covert detail of [REDACTED] to this staff for the period of one year in connection with Project "Bluebird," which you recently approved. [REDACTED] is himself a practicing hypnotist and has done considerable work on the other techniques involved.

(b)(3)
4
(b)(6)

2. [REDACTED] is willing to come. He is a Reserve Officer on active duty and has an office in Washington. All that would be needed would be for Admiral Clarence Brown to issue orders placing him on a research assignment in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for the period of one year. [REDACTED] is a flight surgeon but we could arrange for him to continue to get his flying time. He would not be known as assigned to CIA.

3. Would you be willing to call Admiral Brown and ask him if I could come over and talk to him about it, or, of course, you may wish to handle the matter yourself. My idea would be to explain to him our worry over the possible use of drugs and hypnotism against our people in the field and to stress the need for conducting research on what the dangers are and possible preventative.

Edward Edwards
EDWARD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC



[Redacted]

Management Officer

31 May 1950

Inspection & Security Staff

Project "Bluebird"

A Top Secret Project known as "Bluebird", in support of operations of CIA, was approved by the Director on 20 April 1950 in the amount of [Redacted]. This amount was analyzed at following estimate of the various requirements, including salaries, travel, communications, contractual services, supplies, material, and equipment.

(b)(1)

As indicated in these estimates, and with reference to the memorandum from the Director, dated 20 April 1950, it is requested that immediate action be taken to assign our unattached T/O to provide five additional slots under Policy Control Staff as follows:

- 2 -- GS-13 Research Planning Specialists
- 2 -- GS-9 Security Technicians
- 1 -- GS-4 Clerk-Stenographer

IASS is vital to current operation of this project. Your early compliance, therefore, would be appreciated.

/s/

(b)(3)

[Redacted]
Deputy Chief, Inspection & Security

cc: Admin. Office
I&SS File ✓

[Redacted]



~~SECRET~~

23

21 June 1950

“EYES ONLY”

AD/30

MEMORANDUM TO: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR/CSO

SUBJECT : Priority Requirement for Bluebird Team

1. Reference to request contained in [redacted] memorandum of 19 June 1950, ICS is prepared to send a Bluebird Team to [redacted] between 24 July to 1 August 1950.

2. Prior to the dispatch of such team, recommend the following matters be considered in implementation of the project:

(a) The team to be sent is the basic team which has just been completed by the addition of a doctor-psychiatrist. For development of the whole project, and training of a second team, it is felt that the stay in Japan should not be over four weeks.

(b) This will be the first project of this bluebird team and the captain of the team must be allowed considerable latitude by your operating officials. The project will serve as a training and research project in addition to its operational significance.

(c) Urge your consideration from both policy and security standpoint as to possibility of performing project without knowledge of REC. I feel that REC should not be briefed on entire project but that intensive Polygraph interrogation be used as a cover.

(d) I urge that the exact nature of the Bluebird Project, even in the Area Division and in [redacted] mission, be kept on an Eyes Only basis to the very fewest both in headquarters and in the field and that cables to and from the field on the subject be similarly treated.

3. I suggest that at an early date, a conference with you, Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted] on the details would be helpful to us.


SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Inspection & Security Staff

~~SECRET~~

A. obo

31/763

24



23 Jun 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 Attention: Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Mr. Robert Vogler


REFERENCE: ~~_____~~ dated 8 June 1950
 Top Secret
 Serial: ~~_____~~

1. Field representatives of this Agency were advised that in the event of Mr. Robert Vogler's release from prison in Hungary, they are to give every assistance to his expeditious movement to the United States without interrogation in the field.


2. You are probably aware of the fact that this Agency has conducted a considerable amount of experimentation along the lines indicated in your paragraph 2. The matter is naturally one of priority operational interest to this Agency. I request, therefore, that my representative be given an opportunity to discuss the results obtained by the interrogation of Mr. Vogler, as well as the major implications in terms of medical research and interrogation techniques with the responsible officer in charge of the Navy's project.

(stamp) R. H. HILLENKOEPTER
 REAR ADMIRAL, USN
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SO DB



COPI



C. C. ...

.25 S

19 July 1950

Deputy Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

Travel Orders

It is requested that orders be cut for three individuals to proceed from Washington to [redacted]. These orders are to include the following persons as [redacted] no CIA interest is to be shown. The assignment should follow the general language as follows:

[redacted],
on or about 1 August 1950, for temporary duty not to exceed ninety days in accordance with instructions issued by [redacted].

ack (b)(3)

Orders should be cut for the following employees and the grade and title are furnished for use if necessary in issuance of the orders:

- [redacted], GS-12, Administrative Officer
- [redacted], GS-12, Administrative Officer
- [redacted], GS-11, Administrative Officer

[redacted]

[redacted]

5
(b)(3)

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Wed. 2 August 1130 Standard Time
Wed. 2 August 1315 " "

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Thurs. 3 August 1245 " "
Thurs. 3 August 2030 " "

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Fri. 4 August 0900 " "
Fri. 4 August 1615 " "

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Sat. 5 August 1900 " "
Sun. 6 August 2300 " "

[redacted]

(b)(3)

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Thurs. 3 August 2110 Standard Time
Fri. 4 August 0335 " "

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Fri. 4 August 0900 " "
Fri. 4 August 1615 " "

Leave: [redacted]
Arrive: [redacted]

Sat. 5 August 1900 " "
Sun. 6 August 2300 " "

26
27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

20 July 1950

SUBJECT: Mr. [redacted]

[redacted] who was assigned to the field and stationed in [redacted] called 12 July 1950 and requested assistance for the purpose of interrogating a 29 year old [redacted] clerk who works in the [redacted]. This clerk has been supplying information to [redacted] and of recent date has been furnishing significant false information obtained from sources other than the [redacted]. [redacted] is interested in some means of interrogating this source in order to develop the purpose and source of the false information.

I informed [redacted] that no means were available by which a non-professional individual could arrange for an interrogation of the nature he proposed. However, I indicated that in the near future if any personnel so trained should enter that theater of operations consideration as to use in the subject case would be given to his problem. In the event of such an assignment in the future this office should communicate with [redacted], OSO, to discuss the possibilities of application of special techniques to this particular problem.

[redacted]

[redacted]

25 July 1950

osd

27

Call [unclear]
[unclear]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

copy to [unclear]

SUBJECT: [redacted]

all (b)

1. Mr. [redacted] OPC, telephoned about [redacted] ^{consent} having joined OPC to take active part in field work on "Bluebird". [redacted] solicited cooperation with OSI to build up background for N. and made appointment for N. to meet [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] will be available for four to six weeks for indoctrination, and any use of him which will be of mutual benefit to OSI and OPC is agreeable without reference to [redacted]

2. [redacted] in a subsequent conversation, confirmed [redacted] ^{consent's} assignment to project and stated that so far as security is concerned, any information should be given to [redacted]

Continuation by Dr. [redacted]

^{consent} 3. Dr. Chadwell talked to [redacted] regarding the program for [redacted] and it was agreed that N. would make no contacts outside of CIA without first clearing through CHM. It is understood that N. might desire contacts in the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army. These contacts would also be made through CHM.

4. It is understood that under no circumstances is the special project to be discussed with any persons other than those especially cleared. In a telephone conversation, [redacted] informed [redacted] that clearances had been started on [redacted] long before special projects were considered. For the time being, N. will be assigned to work with CHM and will review information material in OPC. He will review literature and summarize some special information under the direction of CHM but will not be given any documents above "Secret". He will be given the polygraph interrogation and after one month to six weeks of ground work, he will be given a specific assignment in the field of interest, if his qualifications justify such assignment. Up to the present time he has not had any special training and does not have any special knowledge on the subject. He is not a psychiatrist.

5. It was mutually agreed, at least for the time being, that it would be inadvisable to have an interview with Dr. [redacted]

H.M.C.

Chadwell

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Special Security Division

26 July 1950

Deputy Chief, Inspection and Security

[REDACTED]

It is requested that a report investigation be conducted on [REDACTED] who is an officer of the [REDACTED]. It is contemplated [REDACTED] will be used in an operational area it is necessary that he be given a limited amount of classified information.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JUL 31 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHIEF
INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Robert VOGELER
BLUEBIRD PROJECT

1. There is transmitted herewith one copy of a TOP Secret communication on subject addressed to the Director of Naval Intelligence which originated in this Office, together with the Navy's reply. These are being forwarded for your information and retention so that you may be advised of all action in this case.

2. It is suggested that you may wish to discuss this matter further with Dr. Chadwell. Any additional information pertinent to this case which comes to the attention of this Office will be forwarded to you as received.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SO DB-26121 a

Attachments: Two

1. SO DB-26121 dtd 23 Jun 50
2. Memo to ODI 5 Jul 50 fm Navy

30

50

071




Reference Guide to Material in Central

BLUEBIRD Files of OSI

Until such time as the material requires a different system of indexing, reference sheets will be issued as follows:

- 1) A serial number and full bibliographic reference will be given for each item.
- 2) Topical reference will be to document number only.
- 3) Topical references will be grouped as follows:
 - A. Personnel - This will include victims, officials, scientists and others.
 - B. New Techniques - Drugs, Hypnosis, etc.
 - C. Conventional Techniques - This will include references to prisons.
 - D. Research - Fundamental or applied. This section may contain a second reference to research worker.
 - E. Discussions, Outlines and bibliographies.



[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

41998

31

August 16, 1950

721

9-1-5

Mr. [REDACTED]
2430 E. Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

I have continued to maintain my interest in the problem which you, Dr. [REDACTED] and I discussed last year.

I have heard recently that Dr. [REDACTED] is no longer with you.

I have just received word that I am to make an inspection trip of Army Hospitals in the Pacific Ocean Area beginning 1 November 1950 as a consultant to the Surgeon General of the Army. This trip was projected about a year ago. I was wondering whether I could be of any assistance to your people while making this trip either in connection with the matter we have discussed in the past or in any other capacity where my talents could be used.

Yours cordially,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]

H. D.

CIA # 100-261
Copy # 3 of 3

14 August 1950

Assistant Director, Special Operations
Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

32


Interrogation of Robert VOGELER
SHEPHERD PROJECT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to your memorandum of 31 July 1950 concerning the possibilities of interrogation of Robert Vogeler in the event of his release from prison in Hungary.

This matter has been discussed with Dr. Chadwell, OSI, who advises that recent information from the Department of the Navy indicates the possibility of release of Robert Vogeler is extremely remote in view of the publicity given abroad to negotiations for Vogeler's release. In the event, however, that Vogeler is released this office will coordinate any activities with OSO and OSI.

SHEPHERD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC



15 Aug 75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AUG 14 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHIEF
INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Interrogation Techniques

1. Set forth below is an extract of information pertinent to the above subject as it appeared in a letter addressed by Mr. [redacted] to the U. S. Legation in [redacted], who in turn forwarded it to the Department of State. The Legation described Mr. [redacted] as a former member of the [redacted]


(b)(3)

2. Paris, 16 January 1950



"Mr. [redacted]


Dear Mr. [redacted]

Formula of the Truth Serum. I had promised you in [redacted] to send you the formula of this serum. With this serum all the arrested persons (as was the case with Mindsenty, Raijk etc.) are injected, so that they completely loose their own will thereby and then give such confessions as were talked into them. These injections are called: PHENOLAL. This serum is made by synthesis and is derived from Thiouree (sic). The chemical formula is




A chemist will understand this formula immediately. These injections are used in Russia as well as in the other satellite countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria etc) at similar trials in order to drug the accused to the point where they admit themselves that they are guilty. I hope that you are satisfied with my information today, and I await further favorable news from you." ...






3. Although the use of pentathol in this connection is, of course, well known, the above is furnished as of possible interest to your Staff.



Assistant Director
Special Operations

(b)(3)

EO DE-21549



31 August 1959

34

~~Mr. [redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~

Dear ~~[redacted]~~

In reply to your letter of 16 August 1959 I wish to advise you that Mr. ~~[redacted]~~ is at present on an extended leave of absence. Your letter will be turned over to him upon his return, which should be well in advance of your departure.

Yours very truly

~~[redacted]~~

32

24 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED], U. S. Navy
Medical Corps (retired)

(b)(3)

1. An uncle of mine, now retired, who was Deputy Surgeon General for the Navy during the war has recommended most highly [REDACTED] as a man for the program in which you are interested. He was one of the top men in psychiatry in the Navy and at one time commanded a Navy medical hospital for psychiatric patients. His age is fifty-nine, and he is now living in Arlington. I will give you further facts when I see you.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Chief, I & S Staff

DATE: 27 October 1950

FROM :

SUBJECT:

There are a few answers to certain questions which were brought up at the conference which, because of the time limitations, I was unable to discuss at the time.

I am more convinced than ever concerning the necessity of the preventing of the dissemination of knowledge that we are using a hypnotic technique. Because of this, it seems inevitable to rely upon the oral technique of drug administration. Although this method may well succeed in a large portion of cases, in those in which it fails, the subjects would have reason to know that hypnotic attempts had been tried and might well pass on such information to other people. In our recent research project, no word or manipulation which could be construed by the individuals affected as the commonly recognized hypnotic technique.

The same general objections would be applicable to the surreptitious use of drugs by the agents in that the attempt to use anything similar to a hypnotic technique might be recognized by the subject. As you know, since time is memorial, attempts have been made to extract information from individuals under the influence of alcohol, sometimes with success, often with failure. As a matter of fact, other drugs used to affect the state of consciousness are not much different in their effects than that of alcohol. It is probable that the intravenous use of solutions of alcohol might be just as efficacious as that of any of the preparations we are now using. In a comparison between the effects of alcohol and the other drugs, it must be remembered that there is a wide difference in individual response to any of them.

We shall continually strive to attain more knowledge and better techniques. In the meantime, my general feeling is that because we have accomplished things which seem almost impossible, the authorities concerned almost believe that nothing is impossible. As you know, there are definite limitations, especially since we are so greatly handicapped by popular and official prejudice against some of our methods.

Concerning the discussion of the work at the University of Indiana as to the development of a better Polygraph, it is my opinion that the operators will always be more important than the machine. I really believe that successful D. D. machine operation technique is essentially a hypnotic one. This also explains why it seems important that the subject be screened from an elaborate intravenous injection used because the latter, if visualized by him, would greatly divert his attention and might well upset the successful completion of the technique. On the other hand, the very mystery of the subject's not knowing what is going on behind the curtain enhances the psychological aspects of the method.

[Redacted signature and stamp area]

38

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Inspection & Security Section

DATE: 4 November 1950

FROM : Chief, Staff D/OSO


SUBJECT: BLUEBIRD Project

1. In connection with the above project and related matters, a few selected officers of OSO experimented during 1945 and early 1947 with a substance (drug) known under the cryptonym "SUNAR". This material was used with some success by at least one responsible officer of this office ~~being~~, being orally administered in alcohol and also by insertion in crystal form into a cigarette.

2. Unfortunately, the files of OSO fail to reflect full details concerning the nature, characteristics, use and effectiveness of this substance. It is known, however, that the substance was originally furnished to OSS or SSU by the Alcoholic Tax Unit and the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury Department. ~~being~~, formerly with OSS and now believed to be stationed with the Narcotics Bureau either in Chicago or San Francisco, should be in possession of additional details concerning this matter.

(b)(3)

ACTION: It is suggested that appropriate inquiries be instituted by WSS to determine the full nature and use of this substance, and it will be appreciated if at least the substance of the results of these inquiries are made available to me. As you are well aware, this Office is of course most interested in anything which can be developed concerning the possibility of oral administration, particularly surreptitious oral administration of such substance in connection with BLUEBIRD matters.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy # 375

BLUEBIRD PROJECT

NOV 9 1953 (39)

I. Proposed Expansion of Project BLUEBIRD

- a. Establishment and training of additional teams.
- b. Method of operation and control of teams.
- c. Operational research program.
- d. Coordination of drug research with interested departments.
- e. Collection and estimates on foreign capabilities in interrogation fields.

II. Establishment and Training of BLUEBIRD teams.

At the present time one doctor and two technicians are employed on BLUEBIRD. A doctor is detailed from OIC to the Project. A personnel action is in process for the employment of an interrogator.

In order to meet Agency requirements it is estimated that three full teams will be necessary to cover adequately the geographic areas. With a complement of three full teams the personnel of such teams can be utilized to train additional teams if Agency requirements deem an increase in this program to be necessary.

a. Experience to date has shown that an interrogation team operates most efficiently with the following trained personnel:

- (1) Medical doctor (trained in SI)
- (2) SI interrogator (language ability of extreme importance)
- (3) Polygraph operator (should possess working knowledge of SI and foreign language ability)
- (4) Interpreter (trained interpreter necessary if neither interrogator nor polygraph operator possess language ability)
- (5) Technician (trained in polygraph, communications and photography).

b. The functions of the interrogator, polygraph and interpreter may be interchangeable depending upon the qualifications of the personnel assigned. In order to fulfill the team requirements it is proposed that OIC and OIC each assign three employees possessing qualifications to meet the positions of interrogator, polygraph operator and interpreter. The six employees should be detailed to IASS. IASS will recruit a medical doctor to complete the medical complement of the three teams.

IASS will train the personnel so detailed and will determine which of the team functions the individuals are best qualified to perform. If it is found that IASS is unable to train the personnel in multiple specialities as interrogator, polygraph operator and interpreter, IASS will call upon OIC and OIC for additional personnel to complete the team requirements.

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Training. IASS will train the personnel so assigned at T-13, 2210 Covert office. Training will cover all aspects

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c - Program

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of BLUEBIRD activity and will include special information and techniques developed in the course of the operational research program.

III. Method of Operation and Control of Teams.

a. In order for field personnel to provide headquarters with proper subjects for BLUEBIRD application, it is recommended that field station chiefs be advised to submit to headquarters all cases which they deem worthy of special interrogation. The field should be advised that cases involving high intelligence potential or special operational interest will be considered by headquarters on the basis of full information submitted by the field chief.

b. In order to eliminate low interest cases, the field should screen out by regular interrogation techniques all routine cases. BLUEBIRD techniques will only be employed in cases where headquarters determines that the intelligence and operational potential is great and where other means of extracting information are not feasible or have not been successful. Security considerations will be an important factor in this determination.

c. Approval for the application of BLUEBIRD techniques will be made only by the BLUEBIRD Control Board.

d. Teams will be dispatched to the field in support of approved projects. The interested area must provide full operational support to the BLUEBIRD team in the field. The BLUEBIRD team commander will make final determination as to the interrogation techniques to be employed and the degree of application of subconscious isolation.

e. Team personnel assigned to PMS will be employed full time in the BLUEBIRD Project and will be subject to PMS control for training and use on team projects approved by the BLUEBIRD Board.

f. GSO and GFC to submit cases requesting use of BLUEBIRD as soon as possible for Board consideration and for schedule of assignment of team projects.

g. The Board to give consideration to assignment of teams to geographic areas for periods not to exceed two months to service special requests for BLUEBIRD interrogations and for team experience on routine cases under sound security conditions.

IV. Operational Research Program.

a. Continued experimentation on the intravenous use of drugs for the inducement of SI on willing subjects.

b. Continued experimentation on the oral application of drugs as an inducement to (polygraph) SI on willing subjects.

c. Experimentation on the surreptitious oral application of drugs on unwilling subjects for speech inducement purposes.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. Experimentation in the use of the hypnospray as an inducement (polygraph) to SI on willing subjects.

d. Experimentation with the hypnospray as a surreptitious speech inducing means on unwilling subjects without the use of polygraph or further intravenous injection of drugs.

f. Establishing specifications and the manufacture of drug ampules for use in hypnospray to cover the various types of uses in the above categories and to include application of stimulants to offset the effects of drugs.

g. Continued experimentation in basic SI techniques.

h. Obtaining the services of a security cleared trustworthy stage hypnotist as a consultant to determine those elements of stage hypnotism which might be utilized to produce a SI condition in an unwilling subject with or without the surreptitious use of drugs. In addition the hypnotist could be used to train the team in the various techniques of hypnotism. The use of such a consultant would be under the cover of defensive training of our personnel.

V. Maintain close working relationships and support, if necessary, on drug research programs being conducted by other departments. These departments have facilities for extensive research in the use of drugs and appropriate cover under which to conduct research. These programs can be adapted to meet our operational problems in research in the field of drugs.

VI. After the programs have been developed, it is recommended that BLUEBIRD conduct experiments and develop techniques to determine the possibilities and the practicability of positive use of SI on willing and unwilling subjects for operational purposes. Positive use of SI would be for the purpose of operational control of individuals to perform specific tasks under post hypnotic suggestion and in addition would cover research in training fields and defensive conditioning against application by SI by unfriendly elements. This field, if it is found that the application of SI is possible and practicable, offers unlimited opportunities to the operating offices.

VII. BLUEBIRD personnel to prepare lectures for key operational personnel in CSO and CPC on aspects of BLUEBIRD which will permit them to consider possibilities and refer operational requests to the BLUEBIRD Board. In addition prepare training lectures for Agency field personnel on interrogation techniques as a defensive measure.

VIII. CSO and OSI to accelerate the collection and estimate program in the fields of interrogation for greater coverage and more detailed data on foreign capabilities.

IX. CSO and CPC to encourage training and assignment of polygraph operators to field stations for screening of potential BLUEBIRD cases and to act in many cases in direct support of BLUEBIRD projects.

OSI

(41)

4

25 January 1951

Deputy Security Officer, CIA

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Reputable U. S. Psychiatrists

1.

U. S. psychiatrists whose technical background is such as to warrant an approach to them for advice on personnel.

2. You will remember our recent conversation regarding an advisory panel for Bluebird.

3. [redacted] gave the following information, which I have not yet tried to check:

In my opinion the first approach should be made to [redacted] who is ready to take any steps that you may wish.

OSI

4. A fourth psychiatrist has come to my attention through information from [redacted] of my Office, namely, [redacted]

[redacted] who is considered by [redacted] to be a reputable psychiatrist. [redacted] was a classmate of [redacted] brother of [redacted] and is known personally to [redacted]

cc: Med. Div/ST

COPY

12 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Special Interrogations

1. In our conversation of 9 February 1951, I outlined to you the possibilities of augmenting the usual interrogation methods by the use of drugs, hypnosis, shock, etc., and emphasized the defensive aspects as well as the offensive opportunities in this field of applied medical science. The enclosed folder, "Interrogation Techniques", was prepared in my Medical Division to provide you with suitable background.

2. During the summer of 1949 Dr. [redacted], my predecessor as AD/SI, and Mr. [redacted], then in I & SS, demonstrated in [redacted] the feasibility of conducting interrogations under induced subconscious isolation. In the fall of 1950 Mr. [redacted] and [redacted], a medical doctor now with I & SS, conducted further experiments in the East. The program is now under the control of an I & SS-OPC-CSO committee with Colonel Edwards as chairman. OPC has a Dr. [redacted] who knows some parts of the field, and Mr. [redacted], OAD/CSO, doubtless has some information.

3. I believe that it is to our advantage to develop this activity more aggressively and recommend serious consideration of the following programs:

I. Defense: Responsibility and authority in OSI.

a. Continued collection of intelligence of Russian activities by the Medical Division/SI and publication of intelligence reports, including Section III in "Interrogation Techniques" folder to a limited audience.

b. Creation of a small review panel of such people as [redacted] of the University of [redacted], a carefully selected psychiatrist, and perhaps Dr. [redacted] Chief, Medical Division, OSI. Waivers of security clearance would have to be used to activate such a panel immediately.

This panel should have access to all material bearing on the subject now available to CIA and that in other agencies of the government to which CIA can open the doors (FBI?)

[REDACTED]

h. The above recommendations have not been brought to the attention of the Chief of I & SS, AD/SO nor AD/PC. You may want to solicit their comments. Lt. Colonel Cuyler Clark in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is familiar with many of the general implications involved, as is [REDACTED] of England, and [REDACTED], [REDACTED] of Canada. (b1)

/s/ H. M. Chadwell

H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

Attachment - 1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

43 S

TO : [REDACTED]
Through: [REDACTED]
FROM : [REDACTED]

DATE: 21 February 1951

SUBJECT: Hypospray, ampules, etc. (Bluebird)

Reference is made to our recent conversations regarding the hypospray instruments and various types of ampules that can be made for use in the instrument.

The "B" team has given considerable thought to the possible uses of hypospray and all concerned are agreed that this instrument (or variations thereof) would be of extreme value in certain operations. There are, however, many questions that arise and require answers in this connection. The most obvious are set out below:

1. The regular commercial HYPOSPRAY discharges a 1cc ampule. Is this the only size hypospray made or developed commercially or experimentally? A 3cc or even a 2cc, if workable and clinically sound, would, it is believed, be of greater use to us than a 1cc instrument. Full details are needed including all known tests.
2. Very little is known about the various types of ampules used in or made for the hypospray (commercial or experimental). We would like to obtain all available information in this connection.
3. Also in connection with (2) above, we would like to know what concentrations of liquids and solids, types of liquids and solids have been tested in the hypospray and with what results.
4. We would like to know if the standard 1cc hypospray is made or has been made in any other form, shape, size, or weight. The standard hypospray is quite heavy and a lighter, more easily carried model would be of great help. Also, has an instrument been built having a double barrel and capable of firing two ampules simultaneously?
5. The hypospray was invented or developed by James H. McKibbin an officer of the R. P. Scherer Corp. of Detroit, Michigan. Both McKibbin and R. P. Scherer are highly regarded and reputable individuals according to I&SS confidential information. We would like to know, if possible, what experimental work these individuals (or the R. P. Scherer Corp.) have done on the hypospray or similar instruments and the ampules that they have used and tested. We would like to know if the R. P. Scherer Corp. is still making ampules for the hypospray, although the rights to the instrument have apparently been sold to the E. R. Squibb Company, Brooklyn, New York.



- 2 -




6. Since all rights to the hypospray are now owned by the E. R. Squibb Company, Brooklyn, New York, we would like to know if Squibb is manufacturing the hypospray now; what, if any testing or new developments they have made on the hypospray; are they making their own ampules and if so what sizes, types, solutions, contents they are using. We should also like to know how we can make immediate purchase of hypospray instruments and ampules (see following).
7. We would also like to know the names of individuals (doctors, technicians, experimentors) who have worked on or used the hypospray and what tests (and results) have been made by these persons. Further, if any institutions, hospitals, clinics, etc., have made extensive use of the instrument we should like to know their names.

Based on "B" experience and research to date, this office would like to secure immediately via direct purchase or by contract arrangement six (6) of the standard commercial HYPOSPRAY instruments. In addition, arrangements should be made for the manufacture and purchase of the following ampules for the above instrument:

300 sodium amytal (one grain each)
100 caffeine sodium-benzoate (two grains each)
100 caffeine sodium (seven and one-half grains each)

It is believed that the Squibb Company would be the only present source of hypospray instruments, however, ampules can probably be purchased from both Squibb and R. P. Scherer Corp., at Detroit, Michigan.

In the event, it is felt that these items would be difficult or slow to obtain through normal Agency channels, this office believes that they could be purchased ~~through normal channels~~ directly.



Subject: HYPOSPRAY

Additional information concerning the use of the hypospray instrument is requested as follows:

1. The hypospray instrument, as presently designed, discharges a 1cc ampule. Has any experimentation been carried out or has an instrument been developed which would permit the use of a 2cc ampule or even a 3cc ampule?

2. The present hypospray instrument is quite heavy in weight. Have other models been developed using lighter metals which permit an easier handling and carrying of the instrument? Also has an instrument been developed utilizing a double barrel and capable of firing two ampules simultaneously?

3. Are there available any reports on the use of the hypospray with results of research on the effects of various drugs and serums utilized in the hypospray?

Any information on the above would be appreciated.

))

435

Subject: Hypospray

Request that arrangements be made for procurement of the following supply of ampules for use in a hypospray instrument:

- 300 ampules sodium amytal (one grain each)**
- 100 ampules caffeine sodium-benzoate (two grains each)**
- 100 ampules caffeine sodium (seven and one-half grains each).**

Army Perfecting 'Gun' For Painless Inoculations

Advantages of New Method Obvious in Wartime

By Thomas R. Henry

A "shot" gun by which large groups of people can be inoculated quickly and painlessly is being perfected at the Army Medical Service Graduate School here.

By means of it vaccines, antibiotics or morphine are shot against the skin under high pressure.

Its advantages would be obvious with any threat of biological warfare when it might be necessary to inoculate an entire population. It also, Army doctors believe, would serve well in the case of troops ordered suddenly overseas.

With a hypodermic needle it is necessary to fill and sterilize after each injection, a time-consuming process. Use of the needle always is somewhat painful and many persons have a great psychological dread of it.

The new method requires no needle. It is absolutely painless. The sensation is no different from that caused by a water spray under high pressure.

Method Avoids Infection.

Other important advantages pointed out are:

With hypodermic needles there is some danger of transmitting infection, such as syphilis, malaria or yellow jaundice. This is especially true when large numbers must be treated in a hurry.

Since there is no penetration of the skin, except by the vaccine itself, no sterilization is needed. Practically no experience or training is necessary. Use of the needle is a job for a doctor or trained technician. This would be very important in such an emergency as a mass bombing.

When produced in quantities, jet-injection apparatus will be relatively inexpensive.

There is occasional failure of the jet to penetrate the skin of persons with particularly thick hides or with thick rubber. A control that will enable operator to vary the pressure according to the individual is being worked out.

The method is worthless for any but lesions under the skin. It cannot be used for injections into the blood.

Jet injections have been in use, but on a very limited scale, for some years. The Army's apparatus is a great improvement over any used in the past. Discovery of the method is believed to have come from observations of automobile oil being forced through the skin of mechanics. It also was noted that fine jets of oil at high velocity, as from a leaking hydraulic line, could penetrate human skin and leave little or no mark.

The apparatus, it is emphasized, still is in the experimental stage and will not be used for some time.

A new antibiotic active against amoebae in dilutions as great as one in 130 million has been reported to the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

It is extracted from a species of mould, like penicillin. The new substance, described by Dr. Max C. McCowen and his associates of the Lilly Research Laboratories at Indianapolis, appears to be the most potent agent yet found against the microscopic animals responsible for amoebic dysentery and many other maladies.

New Amoebic Antibiotic.

The new antibiotic, called fumagillin, seems to be specific against amoebae. Tests show that it apparently has little effect against other micro-organisms such as bacteria, fungi or viruses. It is the first substance yet found which seems to be specific against amoebae. Even in crude form it is effective, in laboratory tests with animals, in dilutions as high as one part to 16 million.

The principal tests to date have been with experimental infections with rabbits. It was found, according to Dr. McCowen and his associates, that the animals could be completely cured by the microscopic organism in four divided doses administered over two days. Less than 100 milligrams per kilogram of body weight was administered. Quite similar results have been brought about with young rats.

Tests with humans, where amoebic diseases such as dysentery are likely to be very serious, await further experiments with animals. Maladies caused by these organisms are likely to be extremely serious and sometimes tend to run in epidemics. The bacteriologists emphasize that their report is entirely preliminary, but they are no longer to believe that fumagillin would have detrimental effects on humans.

They have demonstrated that it has no effect on influenza in mice.

12 March 1951

44

44

SUBJECT: Bluebird Activity.

Technical Aspects

Supplementing a report dated 23 February 1951, following is a summary of the technical problems which confronted the B. Team in the field.

Technical Equipment Available. The team was assured that sufficient technical equipment of good quality existed in the field and would be immediately placed at their disposal upon arrival. This equipment consisted of one wire recorder and the use of one polygraph instrument. Repairs were effected on the recorder before it could be used. The quality of this recorder was not considered good enough to record interrogations with the idea in mind that such recordings would be used for future transcription or training purposes. A request was made for equipment, possibly renting locally. A search was made in the local market and no such equipment to fit our needs could be found. An employee succeeded in getting one Model American Tape Recorder. This machine was immediately put to use.

The polygraph instrument was used only as a cover. However this was fortunate, since the Electrodermal Unit was inoperative in each session. Repairs were not attempted since it was indicated that facilities for repairs existed locally.

Results. Recordings were made of all pertinent questioning and were of average quality. A complete transcription has since been made. The need for reliable photographic equipment was urgent. Nothing in this type of equipment could be located when needed.

Recommendations. Prior to future trips, the B. Team should be completely informed of existing equipment in field stations prior to their departure. However in this connection preparations are now being made to have in readiness complete units of technical equipment for immediate use. Consequently should there be a shortage of desirable equipment, it could be immediately be dispatched to the field installation.

(12 March - 51)

no copies

45

to Blue bird file.

The ^{CIA} ~~men~~ men who approached ^{O.I.} ~~the~~ to solicit a team for the East were
~~_____~~

~~_____~~ has recently left for the field, it
is replaced in Washington by ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ is the junior member of the
group.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

DATE: 13 March 1951

TO : Deputy Director, Plans

FROM : Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

SUBJECT: Special Interrogations

REFERENCE: Memo. AD/SI to DD/P dated 12 February 1951
 Memo. DD/P to AD/SI dated 26 February 1951

Reference subject matter was discussed at a meeting of 9 March 1951 by OSO, OPC, I&SS and OSI and the following recommendations concerning this program were agreed upon.

- a. The full development of a program in the field of Special Interrogations should be undertaken immediately.
- b. To insure cooperation from IAC Agencies, the principal members of the IAC should be briefed concerning CIA interest in this field for the exchange of information and the coordination of related programs presently being conducted by IAC Agencies.

It was agreed that the development of the Special Interrogation Program should be organized as follows:

OSI

- A. Appointment of a Coordinator (action man) with authority over all aspects of this program for coordination, development and experimentation.

Establishment of a panel of qualified professional personnel to evaluate possibilities and give direction in the field of research and experimentation for the development of this program.

To establish full coordination with IAC Agencies and determine their activities in related fields which might supplement or be utilized for research and experimentation purposes as determined necessary by OSI.

To establish, if necessary, projects for research with clinical or laboratory facilities on aspects of this program as determined necessary by the Coordinator and Panel.

To give direction to the field interrogation teams on types of experiments to be conducted and to provide the teams with developed information on drugs, hypnosis, and other means of interrogation for field experimental purposes.

4/6

- F. To receive from I & SS and field interrogation teams information on techniques and clinical reports developed from field experiments.

I & SS

Under the general direction of the OSI Coordinator I & SS will be responsible for:

- A. Recruitment of interrogation teams for OSO, OPC and I&SS and training in the fields of:

Polygraph	Psychological Interrogation
Hypnosis	Technical Interrogation
Drugs	Team Coordination


Such recruits are to be carried on the T/O's of the office concerned.

- B. Upon completion of training, the teams to be assigned to OPC or OSO for use at European or Far East bases for practical experience utilizing aliens as subjects.


OSO-OPC

Under the general direction of the OSI Coordinator will:

- A. Supply I & SS with any available qualified personnel for training and organization in field interrogation teams.
- B. Assign, upon completion of training, the teams to appropriate operating bases overseas for team experimental operating purposes.



- C. Conduct at the overseas bases operational experiments utilizing aliens as subjects in the following phases of activity.
 1. Operational interrogations on a case basis as requested by OSO-OPC.
 2. Interrogation of defectors and alien contract personnel to determine bona fides and for intelligence purposes.
 3. Experimental interrogations utilizing all types of techniques.
 4. Experiments to determine the possibilities of positive (post-hypnotic) control of individuals for operational purposes.



4/5

- 5. At the direction of OSI Coordinator conducts experimental interrogations utilizing specific methods or materials for research purposes. Interrogation teams to provide OSI information on techniques and clinical reports obtained as result of all types of interrogations and experiments.

Under the above proposal Agency wide direction is provided through the OSI coordinator who will be responsible for the aggressive and active development of all phases of CIA activity in this field and coordination of the IAC Agencies in related programs. The OSI Panel will provide professional guidance in the fields of development and research necessary for the full implementation of this program. I & SS will provide the training facilities for operational team personnel. The field interrogation teams provide a means of conducting under field conditions experimentation with techniques and materials.

The security aspects of this program will be a matter of continuing concern and the necessary security guidance will be provided by I & SS to all phases of activity, domestic and foreign.

H. MARSHALL CHANDLER

[Redacted signature]

Concurrences;

[Redacted signature]	<u>13 March 1951</u> Date
<u>Security Officer, CIA</u>	<u>13 March 1951</u> Date
[Redacted signature]	<u>13 March 1951</u> Date

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted signature]

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47

MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/OSI ✓
AD/OSO
OPC


MAR 17 1951

FROM : Assistant Deputy/Inspection and Security
SUBJECT : BLUEBIRD

1. Documents pertaining to the Project BLUEBIRD require special handling because of the extremely sensitive nature of the information pertaining to this project. For the control of documents pertaining to this project the following security requirements are set forth:

- a. All documents within CIA will be classified TOP SECRET and will be handcarried in transmission from one office to another on an "Eyes Only" basis.
- b. It will be possible to classify some documents as SECRET when the subject matter of a document does not specify the true purpose of this program nor does it make direct reference to the materials and means utilized in furtherance of this program.
- c. Arrangements should be made with key officers in Army, Navy, Air and FBI who will serve as contact points in their respective departments for exchange of information concerning this program.
- d. Documents sent from CIA to the above departments should be on a TOP SECRET "Eyes Only" basis to the contact officials in each department. The contact officials should be advised that further dissemination should be limited to only those persons who have "need to know."
- e. A control list will be established for all persons who have a need to know and are briefed on this project. The list will be maintained by each office (OSO, OPC, OSI) will keep informed of those persons who have been briefed and should be added to the control list. For coordination and implementation purposes the control list will be available to the respective offices to determine those persons who have been appropriately briefed and cleared to participate in this project.

SHEPHERD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC



S
48

21 March 1951

Rear Admiral Herbert Crossbeck
Bureau of Medicine & Surgery
Department of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Rear Admiral Crossbeck:

Reference is made to informal arrangements with you under which ~~Mr. Crossbeck~~ is returning to duty with your staff on 1 April 1951.

I wish to express the sincere appreciation of this Agency for your courtesy and cooperation in making available the services of ~~Mr. Crossbeck~~. His work with our staff has proved to be of great benefit in the development of our program. ~~Mr. Crossbeck~~ has rendered faithful service and his experience and knowledge have been very beneficial in guidance of our personnel.

Your assistance and cooperation in this matter is sincerely appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Sincerely,

SUMFIELD LEWIS
Colonel, CSC
Security Officer - CIA

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5

22 March 1951

TO: Colonel Sheffield Edwards
Chief, Inspection & Security Staff

FROM: Chief, Staff *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: BLUEBIRD, Possible Recruitment of *[Redacted]*

1. In connection with the recent special operation in *[Redacted]* involving the services of the BLUEBIRD team, a senior *[Redacted]* staff officer had occasion to call upon *[Redacted]*, who is presently attached to the *[Redacted]* General Hospital in *[Redacted]*. At our behest, *[Redacted]* performed certain medical examinations after being informed of the fact that the requests were part of a clandestine intelligence operation. *[Redacted]* expressed considerable interest in the field of intelligence activities and asked if there were any sectors of intelligence work to which a doctor could make a contribution.

2. *[Redacted]*, who was trained at *[Redacted]* is a specialist in cardio and neuro-vascular matters and has studied in the fields of psychology and psychiatry. According to his Commanding Officer, he is highly regarded for his professional proficiency. It should be noted also that he made a most favorable impression on the staff officer who contacted him.

3. In view of the difficulty in securing competent and adaptable medical men for the BLUEBIRD project, it would appear that *[Redacted]* might make a more than acceptable recruit for BLUEBIRD work. It is suggested that you give consideration to procuring his services, either by assignment from the Army or otherwise if you consider it advisable, for use in this connection.

4. It will be appreciated if you will advise us whether or not you have any interest in attempting to procure the services of *[Redacted]*. We are obligated to give him an answer of some kind in view of his definite expression of interest in a position involving both the medical profession and intelligence.

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5. Our field representatives are being advised of the referral of this matter and instructed to take no further action pending additional instructions from headquarters. If you desire us to take any action with regard to approaching ~~the~~ we would be happy to do so.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ^S

TO : Asst. Deputy Director for Inspection and Security
FROM : Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

DATE: ^{#50}

SUBJECT: Conversations with [REDACTED] on Saturday, 24 March 1951

1. The conversations with [REDACTED], concerning the possible availability of [REDACTED], took place in New York as planned.
[REDACTED]

2. Conversations covered only part of the defensive aspects of Project BLUEBIRD. [REDACTED] was convinced that:

a. The project was of such importance that it was to the interest of national defense to have it successfully carried out,

b. That [REDACTED] was competent to undertake the assignment as coordinator, and

c. That [REDACTED] would be given the opportunity to decide whether or not he would undertake the CIA assignment. If he so decided the company would not stand in his way.

3. [REDACTED] felt that [REDACTED] was not uniquely qualified for the job, and he felt that there must be somebody else who could carry it on as successfully as [REDACTED]

4. The conversation developed the company's policy, to take to Secretary of Defense Marshall's level any call to uniformed service of [REDACTED] on the basis that he was an indispensable man in an indispensable industry.

5. [REDACTED] plans to be in Washington on Saturday, 31 March for further conversations with me. I would judge our chances of getting his services as not higher than 50-50.

6. Please accept my thanks for the arrangements you made with me to permit me to speak freely with [REDACTED]

H. Marshall Chadwell
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL

Encl: 1
[REDACTED]

51 S

31 March 1951

Chief, Staff [REDACTED]

Security Officer/CIA

BLUEBIRD - [REDACTED]

Reference is made to your memorandum of 22 March 1951 concerning [REDACTED] presently attached to the [REDACTED]

I&S is very much interested in [REDACTED] for use in connection with BLUEBIRD. It would be appreciated if biographic information sufficient for identification purposes concerning [REDACTED] could be obtained in order that I&S may conduct a covert investigation before any open approach for possible use is made to [REDACTED]. Your cooperation in this matter is sincerely appreciated.

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC

[REDACTED]

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
52

Assistant Director/SI

6 April 1951

Security Officer/CIA

BLUEBIRD





For your information there are attached hereto reports of test cases by BLUEBIRD teams abroad. The substantive information derived from the interrogation has been eliminated from the reports; however, this information will be of interest and guidance to the coordinator in consideration of work to be performed in this program.

slit

~~SHEPPARD EDWARDS~~
Colonel, CSC

(b)(3)

Attachments (*No attachments nor 76*)



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

53

9 April 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Captain John Bachulus, USN
Department of The Navy
Room 5D736
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Reference is made to recent conversations concerning a research project under the direction of Dr. [REDACTED] and related problems of interest to this program and to this Agency. There are attached hereto two memoranda (blind) requesting information and materials and it is requested that these be transmitted to Dr. [REDACTED] for any assistance he may be able to provide concerning these two topics.

There is also attached for information purposes the results of certain interrogation tests conducted abroad which may be of interest to Dr. [REDACTED]. It is requested that the connection of this Agency to these tests be held in confidence by your office and not make known to Dr. [REDACTED] and his colleagues.

Any assistance that you can render in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC
Assistant Deputy/Inspection and Security

Attachments (3)


MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

9 April 1951

Subject: Project BLUEBIRD

Dr. Chadwell advised today that [REDACTED] had agreed to head up the BLUEBIRD Panel in OSI. [REDACTED] indicated extreme interest in this matter and is very anxious to get the program under way.

In addition Mr. Dulles briefed representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air, AEC and FBI on the BLUEBIRD Project. Each of the representatives above expressed considerable interest in the program and promised full backing. Each promised that a representative of his department would be nominated to support directly this project on behalf of his department. AEC and Joint Chiefs advised that they would be interested in information received as a result of activities but that no direct interest was necessary on their part. The FBI representative advised that they had information concerning this matter which might be of assistance to this program.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Asst. Deputy Director (Admin), I&S
ATTENTION : [REDACTED]
FROM : Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

DATE: APR 25 '51

SUBJECT: Conversations with Dr. [REDACTED]

1. Mr. [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] held a cocktail party at his home on the evening of 23 April to introduce Dr. [REDACTED] and Dr. [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]. These gentlemen are in the city primarily for a meeting called by AEC about analytical detection equipment. Among the guests were Dr. and Mrs. [REDACTED]. During the informal conversations, Dr. [REDACTED] asked to have three or four minutes for private conversation, and we retired to the library.

2. Dr. [REDACTED] asked what was happening in CIA on the subject very close to his heart of special interrogation methods; said that he had heard from somebody in CIA, probably from one of the covert shops, that [REDACTED] had assumed leadership of the program. He said that if CIA did not plan to develop the program aggressively, he felt it was so important that he was planning to take personal steps within the Department of Defense. I told him of the selection of Dr. [REDACTED] and asked if he, [REDACTED], would be willing to talk with [REDACTED] and myself. The answer was in the affirmative. I also asked MacIne if he felt that the first thing that should be done in this program was to put out a word of warning to the Department of Defense on the defensive aspects, and if so, what sort of warning should be given. He said that he would like to think about it and would be glad to talk about it at the time that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] saw him.

3. [REDACTED] has been to [REDACTED] recently, perhaps on two trips, and knows something about the methods that the Chinese are using for uniformed personnel. He knows of no use of drugs or hypnosis, but has received reports on the use of duress. He says that there are formal Army reports on the subjects.

4. With your concurrence I will ask Dr. [REDACTED] to talk with Dr. [REDACTED] early in the program. I am sure that Dr. [REDACTED] would appreciate any briefing that you may wish to give him about the scope of these conversations.

5. On an entirely different subject, and divorced from the conversation with Dr. [REDACTED], have you given any thought to the program that should be planned for the debriefing of Mr. Vogeler, should he become available in the near future?

[REDACTED]

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. [REDACTED]

DATE: 1 May 1951

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] left the following name and address for you:

Mr. J. H. Alberti
Special Assistant to the Chief, Collection
and Dissemination
Office of Naval Intelligence
Room 5A728
The Pentagon

Code 131, Ext. 72058

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Security Officer, CIA

MAY 4 1951

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37

Conversations with Dr. [REDACTED]

Reference is made to your memorandum of 25 April 1951 concerning your conversations with Dr. [REDACTED]. It is felt that it would be a keen interest in this program, and it is felt that it would be well to consult with him for any knowledge and experience and suggestions he may furnish to OSI. It is not felt, however, that he should be brought fully into the picture and take part of the OSI panel. His interest in this field should be encouraged, but his participation should be limited to the above.

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SHEPPARD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC

[REDACTED]

14 June 1954

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Translation of "The Use of Intoxicating Drugs (Mescaline and LSD) in Psychotherapy"

Not yet

The attached translation was made by [redacted] of Medicine Division, O/SI. You may find it an interesting report of clinical evaluation of LSD 25.


[redacted]

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Chief, Medical Staff
- Director of Security
- Chief, [redacted] DD/P
- 1 - Foreign Documents Division, O/O
- 1 - Opns/SI
- 2 - OAD/SI

For [redacted]

added to AD/SI file
from Opns/SI
6 June 1955



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

336

TO :

~~D. H. [redacted]~~

DATE:

22 June 54.

FROM :

9-75 ~~[redacted]~~

SUBJECT:

Intoxicants and Addiction (alcohol & Sod. barbitals)
+ amphetamine -

Tentative arrangements - pending your approval -
have been made to show the movies 1169 and 1217
from the Addiction Research Center

on Wednesday June 23rd 1954.

in Building 14 - 3rd floor

If time is inconvenient, please suggest other time -

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

337

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: _____ TELEPHONE NO. _____

DATE: 13 Jan 1955

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D			
1. c/ms						<p>Card date separately but file this with date of attach - i.e. 14 Sept '54</p>
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
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15.						

54-60

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Medical Staff


DATE: 13 January 1954

FROM : Agency Official

SUBJECT: Project Operations Report, ~~August-September~~ August-September 1954.

1. Attached herewith is the report of the PROJECT Team operations ~~in August and September of 1954.~~ in August and September of 1954.
2. The report is forwarded to you "Eyes Only" but you, of course, can show it to such members of your Staff you feel should see it. Since the report contains certain operational material, the Security Office requires that it be treated with the highest security precautions.
3. If you do not wish to retain this copy, please return it to the writer.

Agency Official


54-61--

TO : Director of Security
VIA : Deputy Director of Security
VIA : Chief, Security Research Staff
FROM : Agency Security Officer
SUBJECT: Project Operations Report
~~August-September 1954~~

DATE: 14 September 1954

1. Between Wednesday, 25 August, and Saturday, 4 September 1954, the Project Team conducted special interrogations near ~~_____~~ on three operational cases. Another case was studied at ~~_____~~ but turned down on both medical and security grounds. In the opinion of all team members, case officers and others directly or indirectly involved, the project operations were successful. Details follow.

2. The Project Team was composed of the following individuals: a psychiatrist and consultant to the Agency Medical Division; a Medical Officer for the ~~_____~~, a Technical Specialist and Staff Officer; and the Co-ordinator and Staff Officer.

3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of the Project techniques, operations at ~~_____~~ were carried out ~~_____~~ in a suburban area. ~~_____~~, of medium size, is in a reasonably protected area, partially fenced and screened by shrubs and trees from its nearest neighbors. A limited and highly trusted indigenous household staff, consisting of husband and wife provided meals as required but were kept entirely away from the project operations which took place in a carefully guarded basement area. Armed military guards (in plainclothes) on a twenty-four hour basis covered the ~~_____~~ but guard protection was not required on the second ~~_____~~ and third ~~_____~~ cases. Security measures were carried out under the direction of an operations officer case officers of his staff and insofar as can be determined, no security problems arose during the handling of these cases owing to proper and cautious control of the subjects, transportation and choice of location.

4. Only one unusual security situation presented itself and that was the use of ~~_____~~ as interrogator-interpreter in the ~~_____~~ case. ~~_____~~ He is, however, an American citizen, ~~_____~~

54-62

and a completely trusted ~~person~~ of a number of years standing. According to an operations officer, ~~he~~ had been briefed concerning many operations at the highest levels and was the ideal choice for interrogator-interpreter in these ~~cases~~ cases because of his unique language ability, his very excellent interrogation methods and direct personal knowledge of the case itself. After consideration of all the facts and with the agreement of both operations officers from an operations point of view, the writer accepted ~~him~~ as interrogator-
interpreter but denied him access to technical details of the project.

5. Technical matters in the cases ~~were~~ were entirely handled by a technical officer using equipment obtained from ~~the~~ ~~agency~~. Full tape recordings were made of all cases. Tapes were turned over to the case officers involved upon completion of each case. In addition, he assembled a two-way transmitting and receiving unit which was used during the cases and which enabled our medical consultant, Agency medical officer and me to be kept abreast of the interrogations as they were carried on by the interrogators and/or case officers.

6. For matter of record, it should be noted that technical equipment ~~is~~ is in poor condition and needs much repairing and overhaul. This is not the fault of ~~the~~ but is apparently due to a lack of a technical specialist at ~~the~~. In view of this, our technical officer and the writer recommend a small, compact unit (probably battery-powered) be designed and assembled for special use in connection with the project work and that it be sent to our medical officer at ~~the~~ where it can be held in a ready status for future work.

7. ~~Each~~ Each subject was told in general terms that they were to be used on further work but that policy demanded persons going on assignments be tested physically and psychologically for our protection as well as theirs. Hence, a complete physical and psychiatric-psychological examination was required. These examinations were then in each case carried out by our psychiatric consultant and Agency medical officer. All subjects readily accepted this ~~and~~ and the project technique was introduced easily and with full consent of the subjects. It should again be noted here in the record that these medical/psychiatric examinations are very valuable for several reasons

- a) They give a good medical and psychiatric picture of the subject and aid in assessment of his physical and mental capacities.
- b) A subject's story is re-introduced from a new angle and often important background material turns up in the examination.

- c) The examination gives the doctors an opportunity to gain the subject's confidence (establish rapport) and also provides ~~for the use of intravenous injections.~~

CASE 1 — ~~_____~~

1. On 25 August and prior to the actual use of the PROJECT techniques, all participating personnel were given a complete, detailed briefing of the case by the Operations Officer and ~~_____~~. Procedures were worked out, a general time schedule was prepared and all necessary operational instructions for PROJECT were issued.

2. ~~_____~~

3. Following established patterns ~~_____~~ as explained above, our Psychiatric Consultant and agency Medical Officer began a combined physical-psychiatric examination at 2:07 P.M., Thursday, 26 August, with ~~_____~~ acting as interpreter. This examination concluded at 5:15 P.M. Subject was cooperative throughout the examination. The Psychiatric Consultant and agency Medical Officer described subject at this time as in good health, having no abnormalities and with some nervousness and tension shown. He also was described as mentally shrewd, guarded and clever.

4. On Friday, 27 August, at 10:22 A.M., after a brief discussion among participating personnel, our Psychiatric Consultant and agency Medical Officer again with ~~_____~~ acting as interpreter, began a second physical and psychiatric interview and examination. During this interview, Psychiatric Consultant continued his background probing stressing subject's education, scholastic knowledge and personal views on topics of general interest. Subject again was cooperative and rapport, seemed well established. This session ended at 12:00 noon.

5. At 1:50 P.M., on the same day, the third session began. Subject was told his blood pressure was elevated and certain medical steps were required to reduce it and make him relax.

Note: A detailed medical report has been filed by our Psychiatric Consultant on all cases handled and covers medical and psychiatric aspects of these cases. Copy is attached.

6. At approximately 2:00 P.M., subject was asked to recline on the bed and at approximately 2:15 P.M. intravenous injections were begun. From

54-64

SECRET

roughly this point until 5:22 P.M., when the interrogation ended, PROJECT techniques were applied. These techniques, which followed a previously agreed upon plan were in three stages:

- a) A phantasy in which [redacted] posed as subject's [redacted] (speaking [redacted]). Results were controversial although professional opinion reflects that subject had little control. Time, thirty to forty minutes.
- b) A phantasy in which [redacted] posed as a close friend of the subject who greeted subject upon his return to Russia. Results were very good and confirmed basic material. Time, forty to fifty minutes.
- c) Following development of phantasies as described above, subject was interrogated directly by [redacted]. Results were again good, significant material was confirmed and from a professional view, subject had little control. Time, thirty to forty minutes.

7. On Saturday, 28 August 1954, at 10:00 A.M., a general conference was held in Operations Officer's office and the case reviewed. It was agreed that results were good and that subject had given the general impression of the truth with some unexplained details. [redacted] Alex also pointed out that of extreme interest and significance to him was that subject while under PROJECT had spoken highly of the Americans. This conference concluded at 10:24 A.M.

8. At 11:09 A.M., the same morning, both doctors and [redacted] began a final interview with subject. Subject's condition was regarded as satisfactory, only complaint being a headache. Subject spoke of dreams (see Psychiatric Consultant's report) and in general appeared somewhat confused in regard to the previous day's activities but no antagonism was noted. Tests were not run to check amnesia. Subject spoke of having a "feeling of satisfaction" and reiterated a willingness to do anything for us and of hating the Soviets. The interview was concluded at 11:42 A.M. and team returned to station headquarters at 12:30 P.M. For the record, it should be noted that subject was informed at the conclusion of this interview that all tests and examinations were finished; that we were now convinced he had told us the truth and that a "favorable" report would be made to "higher authorities" on his behalf. It should also be noted, in response to a request from the Operations Officer, that the team agreed that there could be no objection into operational use of the subject [redacted]

54-65

CASE 2

1. Following standard procedure and prior to use of the project techniques, a full discussion was held by all participating personnel concerning this case on Saturday, 28 August 1954. Details of the procedure, a general time schedule and necessary operating instructions were worked out. Specific briefing was handled by a Case Officer, who acted as interpreter-interrogator throughout.

2. The subject, [REDACTED]

3. On Sunday, 29 August 1954, at 2:00 P.M., a CIA psychiatric consultant and a CIA physician with an interpreter began a combined physical-psychiatric examination. This examination was concluded at 4:47 P.M. Both doctors described subject as physically "normal." During the course of the examination, subject reported with material deviation his previously given life story. He appeared frank, unguarded and fully co-operative. The psychiatric consultant described subject as a "very dependent individual" at this time.

4. On Monday, 30 August at approximately 10:00 A.M., after explaining the necessity of further examination to subject at conclusion of the previous day's examination, actual project treatments were commenced. First injection was made at 10:30 A.M. and subject went rapidly into a sound sleep, (see consultant report) Subject, however, after a short period of time and after stimulation reacted poorly to the treatment and two attempts to introduce phantasy were unsuccessful. Subject then continued to resist treatment although massive doses were tried until approximately 11:15 A.M. when additional injections produced a satisfactory state and the interpreter opened up with direct interrogation. This interrogation which lasted about forty-five minutes produced satisfactory information of a confirming nature. The psychiatric consultant stated that in his professional opinion this induction was satisfactory and the interpreter confirmed the accuracy of the subject's statements at this time. The session concluded at 12:27 P.M.

5. At 1:15 P.M., the psychiatric consultant and the interpreter held a short, follow-up interview with the subject. This concluded at 1:30 P.M. and the case was terminated.

6. At 2:30 P.M., all participating personnel discussed the case in the office of the operations officer. Team conclusions, based on the professional

3. On Tuesday, 31 August at 10:12 A.M., following previously agreed upon patterns and cover, The psychiatric consultant and CIA medical officer with a Case Officer, acting as interpreter began routine physical and psychiatric examinations. These examinations continued until 1:00 P.M., were interrupted for lunch and began again at 2:00 P.M. and continued until approximately 3:35 P.M. At 3:35 P.M., Project treatment began with the first intravenous injection.

4. At this point, it is important to note in the record that the psychiatric consultant in his psychiatric probing during the previous three hours examination, had turned up a distant cousin of the subject's, [redacted] by name, for whom the subject had a rather deep and long-standing devotion although he had not seen him since 1940. [redacted] and the subject had lived together as children and subject seemed concerned about [redacted] his present life and whereabouts. Because of this and at the psychiatric consultant's suggestion, it had been agreed to attempt to create a phantasy around the figure of [redacted] as a first effort with the subject.

5. Subject reacted very rapidly to the Project treatment. When desired depth had been reached, the Case Officer left the operations room and the interrogator (who as noted previously speaks fluent [redacted] entered and took his place. As the subject slowly emerged from the first effects of the injection the phantasy was introduced by the interrogator speaking as [redacted] The phantasy rapidly developed. Subject vividly and excitedly talked to [redacted] asking about him, his personal life, his present address and many related matters. [redacted] (the interrogator) answered subject's questions and in turn asked revealing questions to the subject. These questions, highly pertinent to the operational use of the subject, were answered freely by the subject and the information taken during the three-quarter hour period the phantasy continued was regarded as revealing and valuable.

6. At approximately 4:20 P.M. and after all pertinent matters had been covered and with subject showing signs of restlessness, additional injections were given subject and the phantasy was broken off by the induction of sleep. At about this time, the interrogator and the writer who had been in the operations room left and only the psychiatric consultant, CIA med. officer & case officer remained—the same group that was present when treatments were commenced at 3:35 P.M. It is interesting to note that as the subject gradually aroused and the effects of the treatment dissipated, the subject

continued to insist that [redacted] had been with him in the room and must be somewhere near about. The subject even insisted to the Case Officer that he had tricked him and that he wanted [redacted] returned to the room. Finally, the subject, although still confused, accepted the suggestion of the Psychiatric Consultant that he had dreamed vividly and seemed highly amused by his dream.

7. The case was concluded at about 5:30 P.M. after the Psychiatric Consultant and CIA Medical Officer had checked subject's condition and found it satisfactory. (Medical report indicates previous heart condition.)

8. On Wednesday, 1 September 1954, a general conference was held with the Operations Officer, all case officers involved and the PROJECT Team present. The case of [redacted] was discussed and results termed as highly satisfactory and important. The PROJECT Team, based on the observed results of the treatment and on the professional opinions of the Psychiatric Consultant and CIA Medical Officer interposed no objections to operational use of subject or returning him through the Iron Curtain. In addition, general matters involving all cases were discussed and results were reviewed.

9. It should be noted here that all of the above cases were handled under straight drug techniques—hypnosis or narco-hypnosis was not attempted. This was agreed upon for two basic reasons: a) The Psychiatric Consultant was extremely pressed for time and b) there were no [redacted]-speaking case officers available or present [redacted] who were in any way grounded in hypnosis.

10. At the conclusion of the work at [redacted] the PROJECT Team returned to [redacted] at the request of officers there to exercise the possibility of the use of the PROJECT techniques in connection with two subjects. After a careful examination of all details available in these cases, PROJECT treatment was denied on both medical and security grounds. Hereafter on Saturday, 4 September, after studying the above cases on Thursday and Friday, the PROJECT Team left the area.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In the opinion of the PROJECT team members, the effort was profitable and generally successful. As has been stated before, absolute predictions as to outcome of cases cannot be made in advance. Certainly promises cannot be guaranteed. However, it is still felt that the PROJECT techniques are a valuable support weapon and should with more casework and more research become increasingly efficient and certain.

SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. The PROJECT Team greatly appreciates the opportunities for handling actual casework. This is the only positive test of research and study.

2. The efforts of the interrogator in handling the very unusual aspects of the ~~case~~ case with very little opportunity for preparation deserves commendation.

3. The Project Team again wishes to thank the Medical Division for their complete support in this operation. The psychiatric-medical work which is the basis for the Project operations was carried out with remarkable success by the psychiatric consultant and CIA medical officer. In these cases, because of the understanding and capacities of psychiatric consultants these physicians ~~and~~, rapport was reached with the subjects and cases were rapidly, smoothly and profitably handled. It is particularly worthy of comment that on very short notice, the Medical Division not only authorized participation of the consultant but assigned the CIA medical officer to the operation with resultant loss of his services to urgent medical problems in the operations area.

4. In connection with the above, the writer recommends that some official communication be addressed to the psychiatric consultant in appreciation of his efforts on behalf of the Project operations and his high motivation in interrupting a pleasure trip, at great inconvenience to himself and his wife to assist the Agency in urgent work.

1. Subject is a [redacted] who has been thoroughly examined since March. We were briefed completely by [redacted] and the interrogator on 25 August. Subject was first examined at two o'clock on the afternoon of 26 August. He appeared tense, apprehensive, perspired freely, and gave further evidence of tension in that his blood pressure was elevated. As a preliminary step, the [redacted] radical consultant performed a physical examination which revealed no evidence of abnormality. Subject was cooperative during this procedure but displayed increasing evidence of tension. The examination was conducted through the interrogator acting as interpreter. There were no problems during this part of the examination. The details of the material listed or already discussed will not be repeated.

2. It was my impression during the entire first examination that Subject was very guarded but not particularly evasive. He responded readily to questions without hesitation and became emotional on only one occasion, which was in regard to thoughts about his father's grave. He was able to discuss his wife and children without such evidence of emotion. He kept himself well in hand, and in this first examination there were very few, if any contradictions which I could detect. It should be noted, however, that it was very difficult to get him to discuss anything pertaining to himself. He discussed freely his family and asked if we wanted to discuss his wife's family. At the slightest provocation, he would burst into political and ideological discussions, but in regard to personal matters he was more guarded and less verbose. The interview was terminated after three hours.

3. The next morning, 27 August, at approximately nine o'clock the interview was resumed. More personal matters were elicited during this interview, none of which seemed to be particularly pertinent. His biological knowledge was discussed and found to be very scanty. His classification, for example, of living beings was quite inadequate, but I don't believe that this has any great significance because he was teaching at the 7th-grade level and he himself had had no biological training but had been rarely told that he would teach the subject and was teaching from a textbook.

4. He mentioned "scholastics" on one occasion, but it developed that he had no knowledge of scholasticism except what he had heard about the stupidity of scholastic philosophers while taking a course in the history of education. His concept of God and religion was discussed. He stated that on one occasion he had been urged to study for the priesthood and that at the present time, he was qualified to be a priest, but his knowledge in this area is also very sketchy and insufficient. It is of interest to note that he has no knowledge

5.4-71

of Pavlovian physiology and that he completely rejects, on the basis of some scholastic authority the source of which is not clear, the Mendelian theory of heredity. He studied psychology during a course in the seminary but was taught no theory of behavior and was given a classification of personalities which dates back at least a hundred years.

5. In the area in which we explored, he seemed to have no specialized knowledge. This is in conformity with his statement that he is a grammar-school teacher in a small school. The examination was terminated at twelve o'clock with the statement to the patient that it would be necessary to make some more psychological tests before we could conclude this part of the examination. He expressed willingness to cooperate and the relationship during the entire morning was considered good.

6. At 2:15 p.m. Subject was told that we had noted/a number ^{on} of occasions that his blood pressure was elevated and that before continuing the examination, we desired to have him more relaxed, even if it were necessary to give him some medicine to bring about such relaxation. He was asked to recline on the bed. His initial blood pressure was 150/95. After ten minutes of conversation, his blood pressure dropped to 160/80, but his pulse which was originally 120 was still the same. He was told, therefore, that we would have to draw some blood in a effort to lower his pressure. He accepted this readily and stated that "he would be willing to give all five liters of his blood" if the Americans asked him to. The ~~medical consultant~~ medical consultant used a 20-gauge needle to enter his left antecubital vein and made an initial injection of 3cc of 2½ percent solution. Almost immediately Subject commented upon a feeling of relaxation which increased with the injection of 2cc more of the solution, shortly after which, he complained of light-headedness and a feeling of drowsiness. The injection was continued slowly at the rate of about 1cc per minute, until 20cc of the solution had been given, at which time Subject was sound asleep. Through the same needle, he was given 2cc of the second solution. There was no immediate response to this.

7. According to the previously adopted plan, the interrogator was supposed to induce the phantasy that he was a ~~speaking~~ speaking case officer. This attempt was made as Subject gradually returned to a responsive state. At this point, we have somewhat of a difference of opinion. It is my feeling, on the basis of the interpretation which I was receiving, that the interrogator succeeded in some measure in this effort. The interrogator, however, feels that Subject identified him as himself almost immediately. However, the conversation as it proceeded impressed me as one which would not have been appropriate if Subject were certain of his interrogator. For approximately thirty minutes, Subject was in a good state of detachment, and it is my

54-72

belief that he had very little control during this period. After thirty minutes, his control gradually returned to the extent that he recognized a fourth party in the room, whereas before there had been only three.

8. Before complete recovery, he was given another injection of the first solution over a period of five minutes, consisting of 15cc. He had another good initial response and this time the interrogator imitated a friend who greeted Subject upon his return to ~~the room~~. This response was exceptionally good and was associated with a good initial response of hatred to his interrogator. This response remained very good for approximately thirty-five minutes. During this session also, the interrogator thought that he had been recognized as himself, but this was proved erroneous by further developments and the interrogator himself recognizes that the man was living actively in his phantasy. Everything which was said was appropriate to the circumstances. The content is on the recordings of the interview.

9. After forty-five minutes, he again began to control himself well, and he was given an intra-muscular injection of 1cc of the second solution followed in ten minutes by 15cc of the first solution. His response was again good and the interrogation proceeded with direct interrogation. It was considered that during the first thirty minutes of this session, Subject had little control. His final blood pressure was 130/80.

10. It is my overall impression that from a technical standpoint, it was a satisfactory interview. For approximately thirty minutes at the beginning of each of the three segments of the procedure, there was good detachment from reality and loss of control. There are two things, however, that need clearing up, neither one of which is probably very important. At one time Subject stated spontaneously that he would like to smoke his pipe. To the best of our knowledge, he is not a pipe smoker. The second point is that he changed a number of parachute drops from two to eight. Otherwise, as I understand from the interrogator, the story checks "almost too perfectly." It is my own impression, based on the total examination, that in the areas which were covered, Subject was telling the truth.

11. At a final interview on 28 August, conducted with the same case officer, Subject complained of a headache and related a rather involved dream in which he was in a railroad station in ~~the town of~~ having the feeling that he had recently come there from ~~the town of~~. He was looking at the train schedule to try to find the town of ~~the town of~~. He had difficulty in finding this but finally did locate it at the end of the list rather than where it should have been. While he was standing looking at the sign, one of his former case officers

appeared. While he was trying to make up his mind whether he should cuss him out, the case officer appeared to become extremely small and then rose to rather gigantic proportions. He proceeded, however, to berate him subsequently. While this was going on, another case officer replaced the first and then he awakened. One point in regard to the whole dream that should be mentioned is that he felt a very superior attitude toward all the ~~people~~ who were walking around the station. In reference to the interpretation, he mentioned that ~~he~~ indicated the time of his life when he was happy, that he had spent a good deal of his life in ~~the~~ and that the case officer who grew small and then large produced the association of an experience of the previous afternoon when he thought he saw a fourth person in the room who was very tall and dark in appearance. No real attempt was made to test his amnesia for the events of the preceding day, but one has the impression that he has mixed feelings in regard to it with confusion in his own mind as to how real any part was.

12. He was reassured that our tests were finished, that we were convinced that he had told the truth, and that we would recommend to higher authorities that he be given greater privileges.

54-74

1. Subject is a [redacted] He appeared to be cooperative and on the first morning, which was held on 27 August from two o'clock until five o'clock, his life history was discussed. Since his history has been previously recorded, no comments will be made about this. His speech was free, unguarded, and frank. He very definitely gives the impression of an individual who, while somewhat resentful of authority, is quite acquiescent to it. He is a dependent individual and, although having a fair education, he has no great insight and tends to parrot much of his learning.

2. He was treated on the morning of 30 August, starting at 10:30. His blood pressure was 130/80. A complete physical examination had been done the day before which was entirely normal. He was given 20cc of the first solution and went soundly to sleep. After completing the arrangements in the room, he was awakened and an attempt was made to induce a phantasy of a friend talking to him upon his return from the West. This was unsuccessful. He immediately integrated himself and was quite aware of his surroundings. Being obvious that this attempt was unsuccessful, he was slowly given 15cc more of the first solution, followed by 1cc of the second solution. An attempt to induce a phantasy was still unsuccessful. He drifted into ideological discussions along with a good deal of self-condemnatory conversation. Although he was influenced by the injections and was more verbose and more frank, this was not considered a very satisfactory phase.

3. About 11:15, the injection of the 20cc of the first solution was started and, in an effort to overcome the difficulties encountered in the first two phases of the examination, this was given continuously instead of intermittently. With this type of injection, a rather satisfactory comatose state for interrogation was obtained. The case officer then proceeded with a regular interrogation. At the termination of the interrogation, he was given 1cc of the first solution. Until the interview was terminated, he continued to speak freely and frankly and was much less guarded than he had been before. The last forty-five minutes of this phase was considered satisfactory.

4. In summary, Subject seemed to be a depressed, emotionally unstable, somewhat idealistic, [redacted] who has made one suicidal attempt of serious proportions and who may well make another. He believes that he is mistrusted, although he appears to be superficially pleasant and happy, there is a good deal of depressive material close to the surface. He does not have an amnesia for the procedure, but he knows nothing about it except that he was told some blood would be drawn. He readily recognizes by the effects that he was given something

54-75

in addition to the drawing of blood, but he does not know how many solutions were used or of what nature. He asked if a narcotic had been given and he was told that it was merely a weak solution used in psychological testing. He questioned my identity as a physician a number of times although he accepted the medical consultant as a genuine physician. His final conclusions seemed to be that I was some sort of psychologist. It is my opinion, after the total examination, that Subject is probably telling the truth.

5. I seriously question his value for operational purposes. His dependency makes him grasp for the nearest authoritative source on which he can lean. His doing this at the present time with us indicates that he is just as likely to do so if he returned to his home territory. This does not indicate that he is not telling the truth now, but that he would probably also tell the truth upon his return. We consider his operational potential nil, except perhaps to return to his homeland with a good deal of pseudo information.

54-76

1. Examination was conducted on 31 August 1944 in the same location as Cases No. 1 and 2 (~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~). The examination started at 10:30 a.m., was interrupted for lunch at 1:00, was resumed at 2:00, and the treatment started at 3:35. In the initial examination, the pertinent factors in the case were reviewed. These are recorded elsewhere and will not be repeated. It was decided to attempt to induce a phantasy of a meeting between Subject and ~~XXXXXX~~. The induction was started at 3:35 and Subject was given 15cc of the first solution, at which time a substitution was made in interrogators and in place of the one who had previously conducted the examination, a ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ speaking interrogator. ~~XXXXXX~~ took his place. As Subject aroused, the interrogator started a discussion in the phantasy was rapidly and vividly induced, Subject clinging to his old friend and attempting to find out his present address and what he had been doing since 1940, which was the last contact Subject had had with him. In order to be certain that the situation was kept under control, Subject was given a continuous injection, receiving over the next hour 25cc of the first solution (a total of 40cc). After all pertinent information had been obtained, sleep was induced to break off the phantasy. This was done with difficulty, however, because when Subject aroused, he insisted that ~~XXXXXX~~ had been present. As he was more completely aroused, he recognized the impossibility of this and began to joke about the fact that he had dreamed so vividly. When he did arouse, the situation had been returned to normal and his original interrogator took the place which he occupied at the beginning.

2. None of Solution No. 2 was given because Subject's history reveals susceptibility to angina pectoris which he has had for about two years. In view of his negative physical examination, it was decided safe to proceed with the treatment. His physical condition at the end of the procedure was good. Except for a slight feeling of being drunk, he was fully aroused and talking clearly.

3. This treatment was highly successful from a strictly professional viewpoint. The phantasy was vivid and quickly induced. It was maintained as long as the interrogator desired and had to be terminated by induction of sleep.

54-77

TRANSMITTAL SLIP *2 Oct 25*

TO: *Mr. [redacted]*

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:
Attached memo from [redacted] informs DCI that [redacted] has new process for mass production of LSD.

Job 61-224 Box 2

FROM:

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP

11735

INITIAL

[Redacted initials]

338

26 October 1954

6-1983

INTELLIGENCE

INFORMED GENERAL

75-2500

availability of LSD
 ed Synthesis by

available only in small
 several channels, in-
 y Attaché, that the
 kilograms of this
 sted the services of a
 companied Mr. [redacted]
 Company. It turned
 out in their possession

19	Director Staff	Y		
20				
21				
22				

SUSPENSE _____
 Date _____

Remarks: *have*

You may recall that I had ~~reviewed~~ *reviewed* the Dulles material three days a week. He unearthed the attached which may or may not add to our literature on this topic.

Executive Secretary

10/25/54

Date

rt derived from ergot
 c measure to the fact
 n limited quantities and
 als.

ed since [redacted] and
 ial total synthesis of
 nch step of their synthesis
 s of other products in
 els that in a matter of
 ities.

4. Hitherto, LSD could not be considered seriously as a candidate Chemical Warfare agent for overt use. This was due to two factors:
- 2) Until recently, only volatile liquids could be disseminated in a suitable fashion in bulk. LSD is a solid.

Consistent notes by CPC 10/30 & QWD/e

54-78

[Redacted]

26 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INSPECTOR GENERAL

VIA

: Deputy Director (PlhDs) *JK*

75-3564

SUBJECT

: Potential Large-scale Availability of LSD through Newly-discovered Synthesis by ~~_____~~

1. Up to the present time LSD has been available only in small amounts. In 1953 it was reported to us through several channels, including a message from a United States Military Attaché, that the ~~_____~~ had 10 kilograms of this material for sale. You will recall that we enlisted the services of a representative of ~~_____~~ who accompanied Mr. ~~_____~~ to discuss the matter with the ~~_____~~. It turned out that, according to ~~_____~~ at least, the amount in their possession was in gram rather than kilogram quantities.

2. The availability of materials of this sort derived from ergot in such small quantity is probably due in a large measure to the fact that ergot itself is a natural product produced in limited quantities and containing only a small amount of active materials.

3. This situation is now completely changed since ~~_____~~ has developed a practicable commercial total synthesis of LSD using readily available raw materials. Each step of their synthesis has been accomplished in comparable syntheses of other products in pilot-plant quantities. Therefore, ~~_____~~ feels that in a matter of months LSD could be available in tonnage quantities.

4. Hitherto, LSD could not be considered seriously as a candidate Chemical Warfare agent for overt use. This was due to two factors:

a) Until recently only volatile liquids could be disseminated in a suitable fashion in bulk. LSD is a solid.

Investment noted by CPC 10/30 & QWD/E

54-79

[Handwritten signature]

b) LSD could not be obtained in sufficient quantities.

LSD can now be produced in quantity and recent technical developments make it possible to disseminate solids in an effective manner.

5. Most of the significant information currently available on the disabling effects of LSD on humans has been obtained from the research activities supported during the past three years by the Chemical Division of ~~DD/P~~ under the direction of ~~DD/P~~. ~~DD/P~~ is continuing its research effort toward developing a capability for covert use of this material and the availability of LSD in large quantities will not affect our program. However, we feel it is highly advisable that certain components of the Department of Defense be advised of both the new syntheses at Lilly and our data on the effects of this material on human beings.

6. ~~DD/P~~ therefore intends to apprise the Chemical Corps and the Air Force of this information through previously established scientific channels. Since the covert use of this material is not affected by this new situation, we will advise these components of the Department of Defense that any restrictions on dissemination of information to the public on LSD should be initiated by them.

7. The above is furnished for your information only. No action is required.

Chief, DD/P/

54-80

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

339

TO : ~~_____~~
FROM : ~~_____~~
SUBJECT: Article 100

DATE: 5 Nov. 52

Attached are two files - one from O/S D, the other from Ops Staff - in which there marked key papers re Article 100. One vital document is not here apparently, the one which transferred overall responsibility from O/S 1 to D/S O. This was a ^{*staff} ~~staff~~ ^{order} to D/S 1 dated 29 August 1952, which I prepared and ran through the various pertinent offices.

In O/S 1, only ~~_____~~ I of his name and I are cleared for this project. ~~_____~~

① Get reports from [1]

② Abraham

③ -

④ Lashbrook

② Contact Col Russett

no compensation claim

+ through his wife

for the wife

[Gibbons]

③

Carol will talk

with Billie (for) -

④

I impound all

LSD in our possession

Alan #36

54-82

Stop all tests under
our direct control
at present location

⑤ Consider effect on
outside experiment
under our grant in
aid - when reports in
under ① above.

⑥ Efforts to find out
if any circumstances
re use of LSD

⑦ Keep track of all
of the meetings

participating; then

Ashen #36

54-83

3

8) Lang H. Shoff
 talk with G. L. ...
 + if ~~any~~ buy
 Abraham to
 Washy to get
 report rec'd

9) Review any
 interest of
 Agency policy +
 Dept. Admin. instructions

10) Look over instructions
 on use of LSD

Alson = 36

54-84

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
(Sender will circle classification top and bottom)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO-		INITIALS	DATE
1	MR. WISNER - PERSONALLY		
2	MRS. HELMS - PERSONALLY	W	7 June
3			
4			
5			
FROM-		INITIALS	DATE
1	I.G.	W	7 June
2			
3			

- APPROVAL
- INFORMATION
- SIGNATURE
- ACTION
- DIRECT REPLY
- RETURN
- COMMENT
- PREPARATION OF REPLY
- DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE
- RECOMMENDATION
- FILE

Remarks: Frank - Dick: The DSI has reviewed the attached file and discussed the same with me including my recommendation. In my suggestion he has asked me to forward the file to you for recommendation. He has also asked me to have a copy of the file to him - and suggest that he be given to him either within a week or two. Please advise me.

CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

to yourself, as to the state of
the knowledge of persons are:
Doubt, Gable, Knapfield, (Marty),
Edwards, * , Field and
Gambler, These involved,
of course, with Gibson,
Dunn, Lashbrook, (Marty),
& Hughes.

Part

* CIA Officer

RETYPE FOR CLARITY

(15)

TO--

1. Mr. Wisner-Personally
2. Mr. Helms-Personally

FROM--

1. IG

REMARKS:

Frank-Dick: The DCI has reviewed the attached file and discussed the same with me including my recommendations. On my suggestion he has asked me to forward the file to you for recommendations as to action to be taken--and suggests that this be given to him within a weeks time. Please restrict the case to yourselves, as to this date the knowledgeable persons are: Dulles, Cabell, Kirkpatrick, Houston, Edwards, *, Fields and yourselves. Those involved, of course, were Gibbons, Drum, Lashbrook, Gottlieb, and Hughes.

L. B. K.

* CLA Officer

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CASE FILE X-866287

Mr. C. R. Middleton informed the undersigned by telephone on this date that the decedent following the injury in Frederick, Md., was sent to New York City for treatment authorized by the employing agency.

M. A. Stevenson
1/5/53

Handwritten signature

311

4 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Frank R. Olson

1. I have been informed by Dr. Lashbrook that Mrs. Olson has been notified of a favorable ruling on compensation by the Bureau of Employees Compensation. I have forwarded the final papers to the Bureau and, consequently, believe this case is closed so far as the General Counsel's Office is concerned. It is possible that we may be called on to help in connection with the Veterans Administration on the lapsed life insurance policy, but I trust any such help will be in the form of advice rather than action.

2. My comments on this case are fairly simple. There is no dispute as to the facts. All agree on how the experiment was carried out and on the succeeding events as they relate to Dr. Olson. The implications are in dispute. It is, of course, perfectly possible that the suicide grew out of a pre-existing state which was not affected by the experiment. However, we have taken the position officially that the experiment at least "triggered" the suicide, and, as all the facts tend to support this conclusion, we should accept it as final. In any case this has been the position from the start of Dr. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook, yet these two, supported by Dr. Gibbons, are insistent that it is practically impossible for this drug to have any harmful after effects. These two positions are, to me, completely inconsistent.

3. If the drug "triggered" the suicide, ergo the trigger itself is inherently dangerous under certain circumstances. Therefore, I am not happy with what seems to me a very casual attitude on the part of TSS representatives to the way this experiment was conducted and to their remarks that this is just one of the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not eliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at least

*Olson #32
54-1*

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EMPLOYEE'S NOTICE OF INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Federal Employees' Compensation Act

This notice should be submitted to the immediate superior by an injured civil employee of the Federal Government, or by someone on his behalf, within 18 hours after the injury. Notice may be given either personally or by mail. It should be retained by the official superior unless the injury causes disability for work beyond the day or shift when injury occurred, or results in any charge against the Bureau for medical expense, when it should be forwarded to the U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, together with the official superior's report of injury, Form C. A. 2. Before compensation is paid, written claim on Form C. A. 4 must be submitted to the Bureau.

Date of this notice 27 November, 1953

1. I hereby certify that I am employed as a Supervisory Biochemist
(Occupation)

at the SO Division, C-10 Biological Laboratories
(Place of employment)

and on Thursday, 27 November, 1953, at 11:00 a. m.
(Day of week) (Date) (Hour, a. m., or p. m.)

I was injured in the performance of my duties at Smithsonian Institution
(Location where injury occurred)

2. Cause of injury Classified Illness
(Describe as best you can how and why injury occurred)

3. Nature of injury Classified Illness
(Name part of body affected—fractured left leg, bruised right thumb, etc.)

4. Names of witnesses to injury Mr. Carl V. Ruwet
(Name)

5. If this notice was not given within 18 hours after the injury, explain reason for delay and state name of person to whom notice was first given, and when Notice given to my superior on 24 November 1953, at 11:00 a. m.

This injury was not caused by my willful misconduct, intention to bring about the injury or death of myself or of another, nor by my intoxication, and I hereby make claim for compensation and medical treatment to which I may be entitled by reason of the injury sustained by me.

Name Mr. Carl V. Ruwet

Address Frank E. Olson, Frederick, Maryland
(Street and number)

(City or town) (State)

277

X-866287

RECORDS FOR THE CASE FILE 2-000107.

C. R. Middleton

Mr. C. R. Middleton informed the undersigned by telephone on this date that the accident involving the injury in Frederick, Md., was sent to New York City for treatment authorized by the employing agency.

M. A. Stevenson

M. A. Stevenson

21 5/53

TRIP REPORT

Date: 26 September 1966

Subject

Briefing of

Time and Place

23 September 1966 at

Attendance

Summary

The primary purpose of this visit was to make
the responsible University official, witting
of possible CIA support for a research proposal sub-
mittal by . The proposal, if funded, will
be through, was completely ac-
cepting of the sponsor. Secondly, a meeting was held
with to review the proposal.
transmitted a letter from, explaining pro-
cedures at

Actions

NONE

DISCUSSIONS

NONE

278

WESTERN UNION
MORNING
MORNING

ET WUKU25 P3)

CAMP DETRICK MD NOV 28 117PME

DIRECTOR BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION DEPT. OF LABOR

DOCTOR FRANK R OLSON EMPLOYEE OF CAMP DETRICK DIED

245 AM 28 NOVEMBER 1953 DEATH APPARENTLY SERVICE

CONNECTED DETAILS FOLLOW

JOHN E THOMPSON CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

855A

U.S.
NOV 30
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Suicide of Frank OLSEN,
Army Civilian Employee, Camp Dietrich.

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1. I was called by telephone at 5:00 A.M. this date by [redacted] and asked to meet with him, Dr. Gibbons and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb in the latter's office in Quarters Eye. I arrived there about 5:40 and was told the following story:

2. Mr. Robert V. Lashbrook, a TSS employee, had been in New York City on two occasions during the last week accompanying Subject, who was taking psychiatric treatment from a Dr. Abramson. Olsen is a civilian employee of the Chemical Corps at Camp Dietrich. The arrangements for Olsen to proceed to New York were made by Colonel Vincent Ruetta (sp.), the officer in charge of Special Operations at Camp Dietrich, and at the suggestion of Dr. Gottlieb. The latter stated that he suggested Dr. Abramson due to the fact that the latter is a cleared consultant of both this Agency and the Chemical Corps, and that the sensitive nature of Olsen's work, part of which he was performing for TSS, made this appear desirable.

3. Dr. Gibbons stated that Olsen had been treated five or six times during the last week by Dr. Abramson. Olsen and Lashbrook returned to the Washington area for Thanksgiving but went back to New York City for further consultation with Abramson. Yesterday, Abramson decided that Olsen should be placed in a sanitarium for treatment for a period and apparently arrangements were made with a sanitarium near Rockville, called Chestnut Hill. Gottlieb reported that Subject had stated he was willing to take this treatment.

4. Last night, Lashbrook and Olsen had a room at the Statler Hotel. At 2:30 A.M. Lashbrook was awakened by a crash, awoke and found that someone had dived through the window, blind, glass and all. Olsen was missing from the room.

5. It appears that Lashbrook called Gottlieb before he called the desk. He then called the desk and police from the 14th Precinct arrived shortly. Lashbrook told the police of the employment of Olsen by Army. He told them that he, Lashbrook, was a Government employee who had been associated with Olsen. Lashbrook had an ACC card and also a CIA badge.

Serialized Olsen #4

53-248

on his person. Police made notes of identifying data on both Lashbrook and the body.

6. When I arrived in Cottlieb's office, he was talking to Lashbrook, who had called from a pay station in the Statler. I told Cottlieb to tell Lashbrook to take another room at Statler and await later phone call from us.

7. I questioned Dr. Gibbons and Dr. Cottlieb at some length on certain matters which had occurred prior to this incident and which will follow later in this memorandum.

8. I then told Cottlieb to call Lashbrook at his room, which turned out to be Room 433 and to tell him Special Agent ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ of the Department of Defense would call on him at 3:00 A.M. to assist and follow any future dealings or interviews with the police. I then sent word of the incident to ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and made the necessary arrangements with him.

EVENTS OCCURRING PRIOR TO THE SUICIDE:

9. In my questioning of Drs. Gibbons and Cottlieb, they related the following events which preceded this incident.

10. It appears that on Wednesday and on Thursday, November 18th and 19th, a group of persons from Camp Dietrich and from TSS assembled at a cabin (two-story log house) at Deer Creek Lake. Cottlieb stated there were seven men from the "Special Operations" of Camp Dietrich and three men from TSS. The latter were Cottlieb, Lashbrook and Hughes of TSS. Gibbons stated that the TSS liaison and connection with the "Special Operations" had been kept "EYES ONLY" to a very few persons both in CIA and at Dietrich. He said it was known to Generals Bullene and Creary of the Chemical Corps. It appears that the purpose of this liaison and connection was to discuss and work on matters of mutual interest in the sensitive and covert fields. Cottlieb said the Dietrich group had meetings once or twice a year at the log-house referred to above.

11. In any event, it appears that the entire group had assembled at Deer Creek Lake by Thursday. - On Thursday evening, it was decided to experiment with the drug LSD, and for the members present to administer the drug to themselves to ascertain the effect a clandestine application would have on a meeting or conference. Cottlieb stated a "very small dose" of LSD was placed in a bottle of cointreau and that all present except two of the persons had a drink thereof. This included Cottlieb and the Commanding Officer of Special Operations, Colonel Vinson Ruetz (sp?). Clsen also was included in the group.

W. R. POWET

See memo 11 Nov 59 - 12

- 2 -

11 Nov 59

53-249

12. Gottlieb reported that the drug had a definite effect on the group to the point that they were boisterous and "laughing" and they could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversations. Gottlieb asserts that the meeting broke up about 1:00 A.M. Friday morning. He stated that Olsen among others complained of wakefulness during the night. Gottlieb stated he drove home Friday morning as did Olsen.

13. On Tuesday, 24 November, it appears that Colonel Ruetter called Gottlieb and stated that Olsen appeared mentally depressed and evidently expressed some concern about him. Gottlieb then suggested that Lashbrook take Olsen up to New York City to be treated by Dr. Abramson. From that point, there were the series of psychiatric treatments and plan to hospitalize Olsen as narrated above.

14. When I arrived, Gottlieb had already communicated with Dr. Abramson. Gottlieb told me that Abramson said that Olsen's condition was one that existed prior to the events of 18 and 19 November. It should be recorded that Dr. Abramson has been experimenting with LSD on behalf of TSS. Gottlieb reiterated many times that outside of the boisterous effect and the inability to think properly, LSD has no harmful or permanently injurious effects.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Lovell:
14 Nov 1953
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CONVERSATION WITH GIBBONS:

1. Lovell has not heard anything from Gibbons.
2. Lovell reported that Charles and George Merck were about to kill the Schwab activity at Detrick as "un-American". Is it necessary to take action at a high place?
3. Lovell knew of Frank R. Olson. No inhibitions. Baring of inner man. Suicidal tendencies. Offensive usefulness?
HMC told Saef Edwards Saturday AM, the 12th.

Chr. is in HMC's office -
No act on HMC's part unless requested

... G. at 2:15

~~...~~ Olson #22
53-252

1 December 1953.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Use of LSD

1. Pursuant to your request, Dr. Willis Gibbons, Chief, TSS, was contacted on the evening of 30 November 1953 concerning points hereinafter noted.
2. Dr. Gibbons has impounded all LSD material in CIA Headquarters in a safe adjacent to his desk. No one else has the combination to this safe; the material was so impounded on 29 November 1953.
3. Dr. Gibbons stated that he is stopping any LSD tests which may have been instituted or contemplated under CIA auspices. A cable will be sent to the field on 1 December 1953 to this effect.
4. Only two (2) field stations, Manila and Atsugi, have LSD material. There is none in Germany although Mr. William Harvey recently expressed interest in the subject. A cable to the field on 1 December 1953 will instruct the field as to non-use and request data as to how much is on hand and who has custody and access.
5. CIA has furnished a limited quantity of LSD to Mr. George White, Chief of New York District, Narcotics Division, Treasury Department. Dr. Gibbons does not now know the exact amount in Mr. White's possession. White is fully cleared according to Dr. Gibbons.
6. In summary, LSD material over which CIA has or had distributive responsibility is located in four places: (a) Dr. Gibbons' safe, (b) Manila, (c) Atsugi, and (d) that in possession of George White. Exact amounts in each location are not yet available.
7. There are several "grants in aid" units and individuals in the United States doing research with LSD. None of these received

material from CIA; some know of the CIA interest and furnish reports to CIA. Only volunteers are used. While some of the work is done with knowledge of CIA interest, it does not appear to be done under the auspices of CIA.

8. Dr. Gibbons said there is very little or no correspondence, either internal or external on the subject, but that he would collect such as existed for the Inspector General.

9. Dr. Gibbons was also asked to collect and have carried to the Inspector General all reports on the use and effects of LSD. He thought by this definition he would have a drawer full of papers.

10. Dr. Gibbons was asked to prepare a list of known clinical grants in aid units and individuals in this country engaged in LSD research. It appears that Dr. Abramson has experimented with this drug.

11. Dr. Gibbons was not clear as to the mechanics of CIA acquisition of LSD but said he would get the answers. The material is not under Federal U. S. Governmental control to the best of his knowledge. It is an experimental drug, and as such, is not allowed to be sold in this country. Most LSD obtained by CIA comes from the Eli Lilly Company with head offices in Indianapolis, Indiana. Dr. Gibbons thought some might have been obtained from other parties but he was not certain. The Eli Lilly Company apparently makes a gift of it to CIA. Dr. Gibbons was not certain whether the company brought it here, to a cut-out arrangement, or whether it is picked up in Indianapolis. The manner of receipting for the material is not clear.

12. Answers to the questions asked by the Inspector General which are not given by the above are being obtained by Dr. Gibbons and will be furnished as soon as he is able to get them to this Staff.

Chief, Inspection and Review

Distribution:

Orig. & 1: addressee

1: I&R Subject file

(282)
1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Willis Gibbons of TSS re Olson Case

1. All LSD is in Gibbons' safe for which he only has combination.
2. Preparing cables to field to find out who has custody and access. Atsugi and Manila. Issuance done only with Gibbons or Drum's concurrence and use only with DD/P approval. Bulline wanted work broadened to include biological as well as chemical.
3. Man in Bureau of Narcotics has some. Has good access to criminal types in N. Y.--George White--expert for Kefauver Commission and close friend of Halley. Now out of town. Got it from us.
4. Grants-in-aid to Dr. Harold Abramson, 133 East 58th. Dr. Robert Hyde, Boston Psychopathic Hospital. U. S. Public Service Hospital, Lexington, Kentucky (Dr. Harriss Isbell). Dr. Carl Pfeiffer, Department of Pharmacology, University of Illinois, School of Medicine, Chicago. Lilly has been trying to make it. Another trying by radioactive to see what part of body it works on. These are top secret cleared. Got grant from a foundation to work through. Is overt. Use voluntary subject. Give us reports. Would go on normally but we insure it does. Abramson is a psychiatrist and his people are abnormal. Rest are normal.
5. Acquisition. Not classified as narcotic--organic chemical. Don't purchase it--because an experimental can't be sold in U. S. Has been doled out by Sandoz Co. of Basle. With one exception LSD has been given to us--Gottlieb and Lashbrook. Eli Lilly and Co. has given us some.
6. Correspondence and memorandum. Have file cabinet drawer full. Don't believe any reports addressed to Agency. DD/P has one memo on subject. Gottlieb's trip to Far East. Mentioned in reports of monthly progress-- is pseudo.
7. Lashbrook (TSS), Hughes (OP), Gottlieb (TSS), Alfred Ulmer (SI), Harold Cooper (PP) all have had it. De Florez, Gibbons, Drum and Roosevelt all know about it. Also Wisner, Helms, Barnes and Scott and Field of the I & R Staff.
8. Gottlieb had discussed use of something of this type with experts from Camp Dietrich and they had all agreed that an unwitting experiment would be desirable. The LSD was given to all of the ten at the camp except Walinovskiy (who doesn't drink) and one other who has a heart condition, both of Camp Dietrich. About 20 minutes after giving the dose, Gottlieb told them what they had been given. They all agreed that it was an interesting experiment and there was no adverse comment. Only after Olson committed suicide was there any action adversely to the experiment itself.
9. According to Gibbons, Olson has a history of mental disturbances. Last summer he apparently told his wife that he was upset and she suggested he see a doctor. He objected to being made division chief because of a fear he couldn't do the job, and after receiving the job shortly thereafter asked to be relieved. On the Monday following the experiment he told Col. Ruetz that he expected to be fired or asked to resign. He then went up to New York with Lashbrook and saw Dr. Abramson. After several trips between New York and

Washington, Abramson finally came to the conclusion that Olson should go to the Chestnut Hill Sanitarium. On Friday night, November 27, Olson at dinner with Lashbrook in New York appeared to be completely rational and discussed the time they would have to get up in the morning to get the train, etc.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Colonel Edwards

DATE: 2 December 1953

FROM : Chief, SSD

SUBJECT: OLSON, Franklin

Subject's death certificate, a copy (photostatic) of which has been obtained and is being forwarded, indicates his occupation as a biochemist and business where this occupation used as "U. S. Army Post". It also gives his wife's name and where they lived.

With reference to cause of death, it states death caused by multiple fractures, shock and hemorrhage; jumped or fell from 10th floor hotel. The certificate was signed by an Assistant Medical Examiner whose signature is illegible.

TO : Colonel Edwards

DATE: 2 December 1953

FROM : Chief, SSD

SUBJECT: ABRAMSON, Harold A.

New York State does not require a license to practice psychiatry. Their only requirement is that an individual be a physician. Subject is a physician but not known as a psychiatrist.

He has engaged in the practice of medicine since 1925. He was educated at Columbia University, receiving his M.D. in 1923. He is a National Research Council Fellow; studied in Germany at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, physical and electro-chemistry; instructor in medicine at Johns Hopkins University 1928-29; instructor in biochemistry at Harvard 1929-31; Associate in Bacteriology at Cornell 1934-35; Assistant Professor of Physiology at Columbia University since 1935; Associate Physician and Chief of Allergy Clinic, Mt. Siani Hospital, New York City (this position indicate of his high stature in medicine at Mt. Siani known as one of the best Hospitals); member of the American College of Allergies; member of American Association for Advancement of Science; member of American Academy of Allergies and American Psychosomatic Society.

A reliable source has advised that to be an authority on allergies one would have to take courses in psychosomatic sciences but this does not make one a psychiatrist.

53-259
O. Pearson #10

(Date)		
TO: Gen Counsel Mr Houston		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS:		
This is Special Agent's report on OLSON case. Attachment hereto is a photostat of Death Certificate. I prefer to not to let TSS personnel see the Agents Report <i>CS</i>		
FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

S
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FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

16-63266-1

3 December 1953

GENERAL:At New York, New York

On 28 November 1953, at 7:50 a.m., ROBERT V. LASHEROCK was interviewed in Room 488, Statler Hotel, 33rd Street and Seventh Avenue.

Mr. LASHEROCK advised that the SUBJECT was a biochemist and Agency employee assigned to a project at Camp Dietrick, Frederick, Maryland. He stated that a Colonel VICENT RUWET is Commanding Officer of the SUBJECT's group. LASHEROCK indicated that he has known the SUBJECT for about one year. He stated that the SUBJECT had been suffering from "persecution delusions and guilt feelings." He indicated that these delusions and guilt feelings were not in areas related to the SUBJECT's work. LASHEROCK stated that the SUBJECT had received a medical discharge from the military service because of ulcers and was drawing disability pay. It was the SUBJECT's feeling that he actually had no ulcers and that he therefore believed that he was cheating the government. In this connection, LASHEROCK stated that the SUBJECT would listen to no reasonable solution to his problem. He stated that Colonel RUWET had become aware of SUBJECT's condition and suggested that something be done about it. As a result, on 24 November 1953, Colonel RUWET, LASHEROCK and the SUBJECT came to New York to consult with Dr. HAROLD A. ABRAMSON who has offices at 133 East 58th Street, New York City, and who resides at 47 New Street, Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, New York. The three consulted with Dr. ABRAMSON on 24 and 25 November 1953 and on the night of 25 November all three went to the Hotel Statler with the intention of departing for Washington, D.C., at about 7:30 a.m., 26 November. At about 5:30 a.m., Colonel RUWET and LASHEROCK arose and were unable to find the SUBJECT. They proceeded to the lobby of the hotel and found SUBJECT there. The SUBJECT told them that he had been "wandering around for a while."

3 December 1953

He also told them that he had torn up what paper money he had and various papers in his wallet. He also indicated that he then threw the wallet away. He was unable to indicate where he had discarded the above articles. Colonel RUWET, Mr. LASHROCK and the SUBJECT returned to Washington, D.C., on the morning of the 26th. The SUBJECT's condition was such that it was considered advisable that they return to New York immediately for further consultation with Dr. AERANSON. Colonel RUWET remained in Washington and LASHROCK and the SUBJECT returned to New York, arriving at La Guardia Airport at about 2:00 p.m. They proceeded by taxi to Dr. AERANSON's residence, 117 New Street, Huntington, Long Island, arriving there at about 1:00 p.m. After about a one-hour consultation, LASHROCK and the SUBJECT went to the Anchorage Guest House at Cold Spring Harbor where they remained overnight. At about 8:15 a.m. on 27 November 1953, Dr. AERANSON met LASHROCK and the SUBJECT at the Anchorage Guest House and drove them to Dr. AERANSON's New York office at 133 East 58th Street. There was a further conference in which all three participated and it was Dr. AERANSON's suggestion that the SUBJECT go to a hospital for treatment. LASHROCK stated that SUBJECT indicated that this was agreeable to him. Dr. AERANSON then contacted the Chestnut Lodge at Rockville, Maryland, and made arrangements for the SUBJECT, accompanied by LASHROCK, to be there at noon on 28 November 1953. The Chestnut Lodge was decided upon after telephonic discussion between Dr. AERANSON and Dr. GOTTLIEB. LASHROCK identified Dr. GOTTLIEB as Dr. SID GOTTLIEB, his (LASHROCK's) supervisor. After the conference and on the afternoon of 27 November 1953, LASHROCK and the SUBJECT returned to the Hotel Statler and checked in. They watched television for a while and then went to the hotel cocktail lounge where each had two martinis. They later had dinner in the hotel's main dining room. LASHROCK stated that no other alcoholic beverages were consumed by either of them. LASHROCK stated that at this time, the SUBJECT appeared cheerful and in a considerably better mood. Shortly before 10:00 p.m., the SUBJECT telephoned his wife. He stated that the SUBJECT appeared reluctant to discuss his condition with his wife. LASHROCK added that the SUBJECT's wife had had psychiatric care early this year. At about 10:00 p.m., the SUBJECT and LASHROCK returned to their room. They had Room #1018 which contained twin beds. LASHROCK stated that shortly after 10:00 p.m. he called Colonel RUWET who agreed to meet them at the plane arrival at Washington at about 9:30 a.m., 28 November 1953. LASHROCK and the SUBJECT watched television in their room until about 11:00 p.m.

3 December 1953

LASHEROCK stated that the SUBJECT remarked that he felt more relaxed than he had for a long time. Both then went to bed and LASHEROCK fell asleep. LASHEROCK stated that recalling that the SUBJECT had "disappeared" the day before, he, LASHEROCK, took the bed nearest the door. LASHEROCK stated that he was unable to fix the time definitely but that about 2:30 a.m. he heard a loud crash of glass. He said that the SUBJECT had jumped through the window shade and the glass and landed on the sidewalk of Seventh Avenue, across the street from Pennsylvania Station. He repeated that his estimate of the time was not accurate and that "that time may be way off." He stated that he immediately, and before reporting to anyone else, telephonically contacted his superior, Dr. COTTLIEB, at his home, telephone VIRGINIA (Virginia) 1574, and told him what had happened. He then reported the incident to the hotel telephone operator. LASHEROCK said that immediately afterward he called Dr. ABRAMSON, who "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely." Shortly afterward, some uniformed police officers and hotel employees came to his room. LASHEROCK stated that he did not obtain their names. He told the police at that time that he did not know why the SUBJECT had jumped and indicated to them that he knew the SUBJECT suffered from ulcers. The uniformed police made a search of the room and found no papers belonging to the SUBJECT, with one exception. LASHEROCK said that this was a letter to the SUBJECT from the Veterans Administration concerning a lapsed insurance policy. This was in LASHEROCK's suitcase. He explained that on Thursday night, the 26th, the SUBJECT had thrown the letter into a waste paper basket and LASHEROCK had retrieved it. While the police were in the room, Dr. ABRAMSON called back and indicated that he had changed his mind about wanting to be "left out completely," and would assist. LASHEROCK stated that no one exhibited any curiosity about this call. He stated that he observed that during the first call to Dr. ABRAMSON the doctor's voice was loud and clear. During the second call, he could not hear the doctor very well and speculated on the possibility of a tapped wire. Following a search of the room by the police, LASHEROCK was requested to go to the police station house at 138 West 30th Street to identify the body. At the station house, he was interviewed by Detectives WARD and MULLEE of the 11th Detective Squad. The detective asked him to turn out his pockets. LASHEROCK stated that among his papers there were airline tickets for the trips that he and the SUBJECT had taken within the past few days and a receipt on plain white paper for \$115.00 dated 25 November 1953 and signed by JOHN MULLHOLLAND. The receipt indicated "Advance for Travel to Chicago." There was also a post card with Colonel RUWET's address appearing as follows: "Vince Ruwet, 1004 Rosemont Avenue, phone Monument 3-3169." LASHEROCK said that his papers included some hotel bills and also a paper with the

3 December 1953

address of the Chestnut Lodge in Rockville, Maryland. This latter paper was retained by Detectives WARD and MULLEE. Among LASHEROCK's papers examined by the detectives, there was one which contained Dr. ABRAMSON's office and home addresses and telephone numbers.

LASHEROCK stated that this information was copied by Detectives WARD and MULLEE and they asked him who G.W., M.H. and J.M. were. He indicated that he preferred not to identify them because of security reasons and the matter was pressed no further by the detectives. LASHEROCK identified G.W. to the reporting agent as another government official. He said that M.H.

LASHEROCK identified J.M. as

During the interview by the detectives, LASHEROCK stated that he told them he was employed by the Department of Defense and exhibited his AGO card for identification. He said that the police requested no details concerning his superior or office location and that he volunteered none. He gave the detectives his California home address, 1115 Montrose, South Pasadena, which is where his parents reside, and his Washington, D.C., address, Apt. 109, 1833 New Hampshire N.W. LASHEROCK stated that he told the detectives that the SUBJECT was employed at Camp Dietrick, Frederick, Maryland, that Colonel VINCENT RUWET was the person there to be notified and that the SUBJECT came to New York with the knowledge of Colonel RUWET and SUBJECT's wife. LASHEROCK stated that he gave no details of SUBJECT's employment at Camp Dietrick. He indicated to the police that he, LASHEROCK, was stationed in Washington, D.C. LASHEROCK stated that the detectives indicated that he had been somewhat uncooperative when questioned by the police in his room at the hotel. LASHEROCK said that he explained to the detectives that because of the nature of SUBJECT's illness he

1 December 1953

At 5:00 p.m., Agent WALTER P.T., Jr., met reporting agent and ROBERT LASHEROCK at Pennsylvania Station at New York City. Pursuant to instructions, Agent WALTER P.T. accompanied LASHEROCK throughout the evening and reporting agent departed. LASHEROCK indicated that he would like to take a walk and go to a movie until his 9:15 p.m. appointment. After seeing "Cease Fire" at the Criterion (14th Street and Broadway) and dinner at Mc Ginnis's Restaurant (16th Street and Broadway), LASHEROCK and Agent WALTER P.T. walked to 133 East 158th Street, New York, N. Y., arriving there at about 9:15 p.m. Upon arriving there, they proceeded to Room 310. LASHEROCK indicated that he preferred to have the agent wait in the reception room while he spoke to Dr. ABRAMSON. LASHEROCK introduced the agent to Dr. ABRAMSON without the use of the agent's name and indicated that he was a friend accompanying him in an advisory capacity. While remaining in the outer office, Agent WALTER P.T. overheard a portion of the conversation between LASHEROCK and Dr. ABRAMSON. This conversation is summarized as follows:

Upon closing the door, Dr. ABRAMSON and LASHEROCK started a discussion relating to security. Dr. ABRAMSON was heard to comment to LASHEROCK that he was worried about him. LASHEROCK then stated that he thought it would be best if he dictated to Dr. ABRAMSON. Prior to his dictation, they listened to portions of a conversation which had been recorded. Although names were not mentioned, it is believed that the recording represented an interview between a physician or psychiatrist and the SUBJECT. Following this, LASHEROCK started to dictate to Dr. ABRAMSON concerning the SUBJECT. This related to LASHEROCK's observations of SUBJECT's behaviour prior to SUBJECT's demise. LASHEROCK told Dr. ABRAMSON that SUBJECT had told him that as far back as March 1953 SUBJECT's wife had suggested that SUBJECT see a doctor because of his depressed condition. LASHEROCK further stated that it was his impression that SUBJECT had delusions and was suffering from guilt and persecution complexes. LASHEROCK mentioned that SUBJECT thought he was stealing money from the government. LASHEROCK also indicated to Dr. ABRAMSON that SUBJECT had told him that he thought the agency group was putting benzedrine in his coffee to keep him awake. Toward the close of his dictation, LASHEROCK indicated that he had had dinner at the hotel with the SUBJECT at which time the SUBJECT had said to him, "I haven't felt better for a long time." Several times during LASHEROCK's dictation, the dictation was interrupted and he and Dr. ABRAMSON listened to portions of the tape recording.

Agent WALTER P.T. heard LASHEROCK and Dr. ABRAMSON leave the room closest to the outside office and enter another room. At this point, LASHEROCK and Dr. ABRAMSON were apparently having a drink. Dr. ABRAMSON was heard to remark to LASHEROCK that he was "worried as to whether or not the deal was in jeopardy" and that he thought "that the operation was dangerous and that the whole deal should be re-analyzed." LASHEROCK and Dr. ABRAMSON rejoined Agent WALTER P.T. in the outer office at about 10:30 p.m. Dr. ABRAMSON accompanied LASHEROCK and the agent to the street. On the way down, Dr. ABRAMSON spoke to LASHEROCK using medical terms which LASHEROCK apparently understood quite well. Agent WALTER P.T. got the impression that LASHEROCK is a doctor or scientist.

Agent WALTER P.T. and LASHEROCK took a taxi from 58th Street and Park Avenue to Pennsylvania Station where LASHEROCK boarded the 12:10 a.m. train for Washington, D.C., at 11:00 p.m.

On 2 December 1953, Agent JOHN D.P. obtained Certificate of Death relating to the SUBJECT from the New York City Department of Health, Bureau of Records and Statistics. This certificate is attached and marked Exhibit A.

On 2 December 1953, Agent JEREMIAH J.M. examined "WHO'S IMPORTANT IN MEDICINE," Second Edition, 1952, at the New York Public Library, 42nd Street and Fifth Avenue. This book contained the following information about Dr. HAROLD ABRAMSON:

"ABRAMSON, Harold Alexander, Physician; born November 27, 1899, New York, N.Y.; son of F. Samuel and M. Rose (Richard) Abramson; educated at Columbia Univ., AB 1920, MD 1923; married Barbara Howland Smith, June 26, 1933; Children - Alexandra Howland, Harold Alexander, Barbara Howland, Howland Wilson. Engaged in the practice of Medicine since 1925. National Research Council Fellow, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Phys. Chemistry and Electrochemistry, Berlin, 1926-27. Instructor in Medicine, John Hopkins University, 1929-31. Associate in Bacteriology and Immunology, Cornell University, 1931-35. Assistant Professor of Physiology, Columbia University, since 1935. Associate Physician and Chief of Allergy Clinic, Mt. Sinai Hospital. Discovered and developed electrophoretic and ultracentrifugal isolation of molecules causing hay fever; elec. charge of blood cells; electrophoretic (sic) skin tests and therapy with pollen extracts; mechanism of allergic skin reactions, nature of ionizing groups of protein surfaces. Initiated (1942) and

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directed penicillin aerosol therapy for lungs for Tech. Div., Chem. War Service, World War II. Assistant Chief and Chief, Defense Materiel. Fellow: N.Y. Academy of Medicine; American College of Allergists (Pres. 1951-52). Member: American Assn. for Advancement of Science; American Academy of Allergy; American Psychosomatic Society; N.Y. Academy of Science; N.Y. Allergy Society (Pres. 1951-52); American Society of Certified Allergists; American Society of Biological Chemists; N.Y. County Medical Society; Society for Experimental Biol. and Med.; Society for Investigative Dermatology; Alpha Omega Alpha; Epsilon Chi; Member, Board of Trustees, Biology Lab., Cold Spring Harbor, L.I. Awarded Meyerhof Prize, Columbia Medical College, 1921; Stevens Triennial Prize, Col. Univ., 1935; Legion of Merit, World War II. Member of Editorial Board: Annals of Allergy; Psychosomatic Medicine; Archives of Allergy and Immunology. Lt.-Col., Med. Corps Res. (inactive). Res: Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y. Off: 133 East 58 St., N.Y. 22, N.Y."

The MEDICAL DIRECTORY OF NEW YORK STATE, Volume XLIV, 1951, published by the Medical Society of the State of New York, 292 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y., indicates that Dr. ABRAMSON's practice is limited to Immunology and Allergy.

On 2 December 1953, Agent JAMES J. McC. contacted Detectives JAMES WARD and DAVID MULLEN at the 11th Police Precinct, 138 West 30th Street, New York City. Detective WARD made available the complaint report in SUBJECT's case which indicated the date and time as 28 November 1953 at 3:50 a.m. The case number was 125124 and the crime DCA (Death on Arrival). The place of occurrence was noted to be the Hotel Statler, Room 1018A, 33rd Street and Seventh Avenue, and the case was handled by Detective JAMES WARD, 11th Squad.

The details as reported by complainant Patrolman GUASTEFESTE, Shield #11626, described the SUBJECT as "unknown, M-W-42-5'10"-170 lbs.-blue eyes-blond hair-partly bald-wearing white underwear. Registered in hotel under name of FRANK _____ of Route #5, Frederick, Md. Jumped or fell through window in room at place of occurrence and pronounced DCA by Dr. DEMOSEMO of St. Vincent's Hospital. Deceased found by Assistant Manager FITZGERALD of Statler Hotel. Body to station house."

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Report of Investigating Officer dated 11/28/53 stated that the investigation was being conducted and that in view of the facts set forth it was requested that the case remain active.

A supplementary complaint report concerning the case indicated that the crime or offense reported was now listed as DCA (Suicide). The status of the case was indicated as Closed WR (with written report).

The report of the investigation dated 30 November 1953 reflected the following:

"SUBJECT-RE: INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED, IDENTITY OF DECEASED, CAUSE OF DEATH AND DISPOSITION OF BODY.

1. Upon being notified of this occurrence, immediately visited place of occurrence, Statler Hotel, where a thorough investigation was conducted. At this time, it was disclosed that the deceased had registered in Rm. #1018A on November 26, 1953, under the name of FRANK R. _____, Frederick, Md., with another person named ROBERT LASHEROCK, Washington, D.C., Apt. 109, who identified himself as a consultant chemist employed by the War Department, Defense Bureau, Adjutant's General's Office, Washington, D.C., under Serial #01168321829 also had picture on card with number 8244. LASHEROCK at this time disclosed that the deceased was one FRANK R. _____, Camp Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, a bacteriologist, employed by the same branch of the government as he (LASHEROCK). He further stated that the deceased with himself and a Colonel VINCENT RUWET, attached to Camp Detrick, Frederick, Md., came to New York City on November 24, 1953, for the purpose of having the deceased examined by a Dr. HAROLD AERINSON, 133 E. 50th St., N.Y.C. (PL 3-8338), as he was suffering from a mental ailment. They remained in N.Y.C. until the morning of November 26, 1953, registered at the Statler Hotel, during which time the deceased was examined by the doctor on two occasions and on the morning of November 26, 1953, LASHEROCK, with the deceased, returned to New York City and registered in the Statler Hotel. They again visited the aforementioned doctor and as a result of this visit the deceased was advised to enter a sanitarium as he was suffering from severe psychosis and illusions. At this time, arrangements were made for the deceased to enter the Chestnut Lodge, Rockville, Md., under the supervision of a Dr. FORT. On the evening of November 27, 1953, the deceased in the company of LASHEROCK had dinner in the Cafe Rouge of the Statler Hotel and returned to their room at approximately 9:30 p.m.

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looked at television for approximately 1 hour and then proceeded to go to sleep. At approximately 3:20 a.m. on November 28, 1953, LASHROCK stated that he heard a crash of glass which awakened him and upon turning on the light he observed that the deceased was not in his bed and that the window of the room leading out to 7th Avenue was broken. He then called the operator of the hotel and at this time he learned that _____ had jumped out of the window.

"2. The assigned immediately checked on the above facts related by LASHROCK and they were verified by Dr. HAROLD ABRAMSON and Colonel VINCENT RANET.

"3. Due to the importance of the positions held by the deceased and LASHROCK with the U.S. Government, the facts in this case were related to F.B.I. Agent GEORGE DALEI (by telephone).

"4. On November 28, 1953, autopsy performed on body of deceased by Assistant Medical Examiner DI MAIO and as a result of same it was disclosed that death resulted from multiple fractures.

"5. On November 28, 1953, body of the deceased claimed by his wife ALICE and delivered by Frank E. Campbell, undertakers, 1076 Madison Ave., under removal #87, for burial. CASE CLOSED."

This report was submitted and signed by Detective JAMES W. WARD, Shield #338, 11th Squad.

Before reviewing the report, Detective DAVID MULLEE, who had reported to duty on the evening shift a little earlier than Detective WARD, engaged in conversation with Agent JAMES J. McC. When MULLEE was contacted and advised that the agent was interested in obtaining the report concerning SUBJECT's case, MULLEE advised that he was Detective WARD's partner on the case. He stated that WARD was responsible for the report and he personally discussed the case and said that ROBERT LASHROCK, who was with the SUBJECT, had been quite uncooperative and he and Detective WARD had to bring LASHROCK to the station house before he would answer other questions. Detective MULLEE said that they were first very suspicious that LASHROCK and the SUBJECT might have been engaged in some homosexual affair and also were mulling over in their minds the possibility that the case was actually a homicide. He further stated that they were considering

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the possibility that SUBJECT and LASHROCK were involved in some committee hearing for they were aware that Sen. Mc Carthy's Committee was in town around this time. He stated that the case of DUGGAN of the State Department came to mind and as a result they called the FBI to see whether or not they knew anything about either LASHROCK or the SUBJECT. About this time, Detective JAMES WARD appeared and he more or less confirmed what Detective MULLEN had said. He advised that LASHROCK was un-cooperative and it was "like pulling teeth to get anything out of him." He said that they secured Dr. AERANSON's name from the hotel operator who apparently had intercepted LASHROCK's call to Dr. AERANSON and he continued by stating that he could not believe anything could be so secretive that LASHROCK would have been justified in being so un-cooperative. He advised that he had been in touch with an F.B.I. agent (whom Detective MULLEN thought was named Mc SHANE) whom he, Detective WARD, did not identify, and who was equally unbelieving and had expressed the opinion that he did not know of any government work so confidential as to justify a lack of cooperation with police officials.

After this discussion, Detective WARD made available report set forth above and when the report was returned to him, in answer to a query as to whether the FBI was still interested in the case he stated that he believed they were doing further checking into the background of LASHROCK.

Detectives WARD and MULLEN advised that the SUBJECT's case had been given little publicity but this was not because the reporters were not interested in the case at the time that it happened, but rather that none of the more important New York newspapers have been published since the incident occurred. They said that reporters had been around the station house trying to get details on the story on the day it happened but advised that after twenty-four hours news stories lose their value.

Detectives WARD and MULLEN were fully cooperative and advised that they would be willing to give further help if it were desired.

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SUBJECT: Chronological Relationship with Dr. Frank R. Olson

I first met Dr. Frank R. Olson at Camp Detrick during the month of May 1943 at which time he was a commissioned officer in the Army, assigned to the classified research project at this station. During the period of May 1943 to May 1944 I was also assigned to this project as a commissioned officer. Dr. Olson's work during this time was mainly in the field of aerobiology and was assigned to another division. I was not in close contact, in the above period of time, with Dr. Olson either professionally or socially.

From May 1944 to September 1945 I was assigned to the Vigo Plant, Indiana Chemical Corps Installation, during which time I had no contact with Dr. Olson.

My next contact was made after my reassignment to Camp Detrick in October 1945. From October 1945 to September 1950, Dr. Olson was assigned to the Aerobiology Branch in the Physical Defense Division of the CMLC Biological Laboratories. In that capacity he was not closely associated with me professionally; however, we had numerous social contacts.

In September 1950 Dr. Olson joined the newly formed SO Division of which I was Chief. His first assignment to this Division was to take charge of the planning, training and intelligence activities. On October 1952 I was transferred from the SO Division to the Director's Office. From October 1952 to April 1953 Dr. Olson assumed my duties in the SO Division. In April 1953 Dr. Vedun, Safety Director of the CMLC Biological Laboratories, recommended that Dr. Olson be relieved of his duties as Chief of SO Division due to his health (ulcers). Lt Col DeCarlo was then appointed Chief of SO Division and Dr. Olson assumed the duties as Chief of Plans and Assessment Branch. He continued this assignment up to the date of his death.

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SUBJECT: Chronological Relationship with Dr. Frank R. Olson (Contd) 2

Dr. Olson was considered as an authority in the field of aerobiology, a science which was developed considerably during the years 1943 to 1953 at Camp Detrick. Both his superiors and subordinates regarded him as a highly qualified scientist in this field.

During the years I have known Dr. Olson I have had numerous social contacts with him and his family, visiting often at his home. He was always extremely cheerful, more than willing to help anyone in distress, often times making it a point to cheer not only his friends but others who were in a depressed mood. Dr. Olson enjoyed an occasional alcoholic drink but did not indulge excessively. His general state of mind and outlook on life was always that of extreme optimism. Never was there any indication of pessimism.

Dr. Olson could be classified as a family man, taking great interest in his home and the activities of his family. He imbedded in the minds of his children the need of religion in life, making sure that they attended their Sunday School regularly and would also encourage his friends' children to attend with them.

My last personal contact with Dr. Olson was on November 11, 1953, at which time he brought his children to visit and play with my children. At this time he appeared normal in all respects and as cheerful as ever.

I had no personal contacts with Dr. Olson after the experiment. I had first learned on Monday, November 23rd, 1953, from Lt. Col. Vincent Ruzet that Dr. Olson had been exposed and was showing symptoms of reaction.

On Tuesday, November 24th, I was notified that Dr. Olson was being taken to New York City for treatment.

SUBJECT: Chronological Relationship with Dr. Frank R. Olson (Contd)

On Wednesday, November 25th, I was notified that condition was not serious and that recovery was expected.

On Thursday evening, November 26th, I was notified that Dr. Olson had returned to New York for further treatment.

On Friday, November 27th, I was notified that Dr. Olson was under treatment and that arrangements were being made for treatment at a private institution in this area. (Washington, D.C.-Frederick, Md.)

At approximately 3 a.m. on Saturday, November 28th, 1953, I was notified that Dr. Olson had leaped from the Statler Hotel.

At approximately 6 a.m. same date I received confirmation that the leap was fatal.

I HEREBY CERTIFY TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

W. L. L. Russell
Director, Biological Laboratories
Camp Detrick
Frederick, Maryland

OBSERVATIONS ON DR. FRANK OLSON - 1951 - 1953

I have been personally acquainted with Dr. Frank Olson approximately since September of 1951. The nature of my personal contacts with him have been at the level of collaborators in research activities of mutual interest to his group and mine. This period has been characterized, among other things, by three periodic meetings in secluded areas where the group involved in the meetings lived together for two or three day periods. At these meetings the writer had an opportunity to personally observe Dr. Olson in informal surroundings and during periods of time when he was not engaged in official scientific activities. The other contacts, which averaged about one every two or three months involved official visits either by me to his research facility or vice versa. I would estimate that the total number of contacts which I had with him during the period September 1, 1951 up to November 19, 1953 totaled thirteen or fourteen. Although the principal topic of conversation at these contacts was official scientific business, a fairly close personal relationship had also developed, and a minor part of the various conversations I had with him concerned personal matters, unrelated to our scientific or official relationship.

During this period Dr. Olson seemed to me to be a very effective research scientist, in excellent command of his field of experimentation and very devoted to the successful execution of his duties. He seemed to me a stable individual, not particularly given to making snap judgments and able to get along very well among his colleagues. It was made known to me on several occasions, through incidental remarks made either by himself or his colleagues, that he had been suffering from recurring trouble with a duodenal ulcer. I had no occasion to observe any instance when this interfered with his work.

Dr. Olson appeared to me to be very impressed by the importance of the security aspects of his job. Working in an installation where extreme security measures were in effect for the entire installation, Dr. Olson conscientiously accepted the added security burdens that his group's collaboration with my group entailed. He was not at liberty to discuss these areas of research with any individuals except perhaps six to eight of his immediate associates. Occasionally, areas of effort were developed in which he was at liberty to discuss certain information with only one other person at his research facility. He seemed to me to bear these various security burdens well.

During this period (from September 1951 to November 19, 1953) I had no occasion to observe aberrant or unreasonal behavior in any of my contacts with Dr. Olson.

The November 18 - 20 meeting between Dr. Olson's group and my own, at which 7 members of his group were present and three of mine, was concerned with routine matters of evaluating results of the past six months research and planning the next six month's work. Up to the time of the experiment, I observed nothing in Dr. Olson's behavior or actions which was different from that described above.

On November 20, the day after the experiment, I had occasion to observe Dr. Olson for about two hours in the morning, between 7 A.M. and 9 A.M. Aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed nothing unusual in his actions, conversation, or general behavior.

My next contact with Dr. Olson was on Tuesday November 24, just prior to his departure for New York with Dr. Lashbrook and Col. Ruwet. The meeting with Dr. Olson took place in my office between approximately 1:30 and 2:00 P.M. and lasted about ten minutes. I talked briefly with Dr. Olson about various scientific and personal matters. He seemed to me to be confused in certain areas of his thinking, particularly as regarded his feelings of incompetence in relation to his job and to the futility of trying to help him.

My last contact with Dr. Olson took place on Thursday, November 26 in Dr. Lashbrook's apartment, just prior to their return to New York to see Dr. Abranson. I was with Dr. Olson and Dr. Lashbrook approximately 1 hour, spending the last 30 minutes driving Dr. Olson and Dr. Lashbrook to the airport. During this period Dr. Olson seemed more disturbed and agitated than he had been the previous Tuesday. He talked in a clear enough manner, but his thoughts were confused. He again talked about his incompetence in his work, the hopelessness of anybody helping him, and the fact that the best thing to do was to abandon him and not bother about him. It seemed to me that he was very mentally disturbed at this time.



SIDNEY COTTLER

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placed both himself and Dr. Olson on orders and met me and the Chief of my Division in Washington. After a short discussion, Dr. Olson, the Chief of his Division, and I boarded a plane for New York and arrived at the New York physician's office about 1645. After a short conference with the doctor, Dr. Olson was left with him until about 1800.

From the time I saw Dr. Olson in Washington until I left him at the physician's office in New York, he seemed rather depressed, somewhat confused, and convinced he would never return to his home and job. These were quite different from the attitudes I had observed prior to the experiment.

At about 1900 Dr. Olson, his Division Chief, and I checked into the Statler Hotel, had dinner, returned to our room and watched television. From about 2100 to 2200 the New York physician visited the three of us in our hotel room. During the period covered by this paragraph, Dr. Olson indicated in my presence that he felt he had failed in his job, he was a disgrace to his colleagues, friends, and family, and that his memory and mental ability had failed. However, in the course of normal conversation, it was quite apparent that both his memory and ability to discuss scientific topics were excellent. Dr. Olson also indicated he was sleeping poorly, and said we shouldn't bother with him, we should let him just "disappear".

The following day (Wednesday) Dr. Olson again had a private session with the New York doctor (about 1600 to 1700). At the conclusion of this, the physician talked to the three of us, indicating Dr. Olson could go home for Thanksgiving (Thursday) if he desired, or he could accept his (the physician's) invitation to spend Thanksgiving and the week-end with the physician's family at his home at Cold Spring Harbor. Dr. Olson preferred to go home, and an appointment was made for Dr. Olson to see the physician the following Tuesday. Dr. Olson, his Division Chief, and I returned to the hotel, had dinner, then went to a play. At the intermission Dr. Olson became rather agitated, and said he wanted to leave. He and his Division Chief returned to the hotel.

The following morning (Thursday) when Dr. Olson's Division Chief and I awakened (about 0530), Dr. Olson was gone. We found him in the hotel lobby. He said he had left the hotel about 0400 for a walk, and indicated several things that had transpired. He felt his Division Chief had been talking to him. He said he had torn up his money, thrown it and several uncashed checks away (because he wouldn't need them anymore), and had thrown his wallet away, down a chute someplace. He said he felt his Division Chief was telling him to do these things. We then returned to Washington. However, we probably would not have returned had it not been that Dr. Olson never seemed to really believe that we would return home, and we had made it a point of honor that we would return if he wanted to (this was done after we had obtained the physicians' approval). We were met at the Washington Airport by a member of Dr. Olson's Division, and Dr. Olson and his Division Chief set off for their home town.

Shortly afterwards I received a call from the Division Chief, now on the outskirts of Washington. He said Dr. Olson had changed his mind, was quite agitated, and that he (the Division Chief) now felt Dr. Olson should be hospitalized and definitely should not return home. I told him to come to my apartment at once, meanwhile I contacted my Division Chief, who also set out for my apartment. When he arrived at my apartment, Dr. Olson appeared depressed and restless. He repeated his firm decision that he could not face going home. Dr. Olson's Division Chief then returned to his home town to explain to Mrs. Olson, and my Division Chief drove Dr. Olson and me to the airport, where Dr. Olson and I boarded a plane for New York. We met the New York physician at his Huntington, Long Island, office about 1600, and Dr. Olson was alone with him about one hour, followed by about 20 minutes with Dr. Olson and me. The physician obtained local lodgings for us, and Dr. Olson and I then went to a restaurant for a Thanksgiving dinner, after which we went to bed. During the period covered by this paragraph, Dr. Olson told me he felt he had cheated the Government in connection with his retirement from the Army, and that he should be punished for this. (I am not familiar with the details of what he was referring to, but both Dr. Olson's Division Chief and the New York physician had indicated to me that they could see nothing dishonest or morally questionable in connection with his retirement.) Dr. Olson said everyone, including me, was in a plot to "get" him; he said I and the others knew the master plan for the plot, and he wanted to know what it was. He said he had failed in his job, that he was so disgraced he could not face returning to his family. He said he felt he was guilty of security violations because he felt he on occasions had exceeded his interpretation of the need-to-know principle. Except in certain well defined areas he spoke intelligently and rationally, and he acted in a socially acceptable manner.


The following morning (Friday) we drove with the physician to his New York office. There we had a conference during which the physician told Dr. Olson that hospitalization would be in his best interests. After a while Dr. Olson agreed. Dr. Olson preferred some place near his home and friends, so after discussion and a telephone conference with my Division Chief, a private hospital near Washington was selected. The physician made arrangements with the hospital, but they had to prepare his room and could not take Dr. Olson until the following day (Saturday). Dr. Olson agreed he would be a voluntary patient (it was agreed he would not be formally committed).

We could obtain no reservations for a return to Washington that day, so we made reservations for Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. At this time and for the remainder of the evening, Dr. Olson appeared no longer particularly depressed, and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment, although he still maintained the various misconceptions I have mentioned before. He washed out his dirty clothing, and when I called his Division Chief to clear our proposed course of action with him, Dr. Olson talked to him in a

cheerful manner and happily anticipated meeting him at the Washington Airport upon our arrival there. On his own volition he telephoned his wife (this was the first time he felt he dared speak to her). At about 1830 we went to the hotel's main cocktail lounge and each had two martinis. At 2000 we entered the main dining room and had dinner, leaving for our room at 2200. At both the cocktail lounge and the dining room he was cheerful and appeared to enjoy the entertainment. He spoke freely of the hospitalization the following day, and indicated he wanted books from home to study, and other things he wanted to do while hospitalized. (The physician had assured him he could do this, and had said he would help outline some activities of mutual scientific interest Dr. Olson could work on.)

After returning to our room, we watched television for a while, then Dr. Olson suggested bed, saying he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since we came to New York. He asked the hotel telephone operator to call us at a specified time in the morning (so we could make our plane).. I would guess it was a little after 2300 when we retired.

Somewhere around 0230 Saturday morning I was awakened by a loud noise. Dr. Olson had crashed through the closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death from the window of our room on the tenth floor of the Statler Hotel. Later in the day I officially identified the body for the New York authorities.


ROBERT V. LASIER

7 December 1953

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Ruwot

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My name is Vincent L. Ruwot, a Lt. Colonel in the Chemical Corps. At the time of the death of Dr. Frank R. Olson I was assigned as Chief of Special Operations Division in which division Dr. Olson was a Branch Chief.

I first met Dr. Olson on the 1st of July, 1951, on which date I reported to the Division. From July, 1951, to January, 1952, we were in intimate contact professionally and on comparable levels professionally, that is, I was Assistant to the Division Chief and he was a Branch Chief. Also during that time we became very friendly socially and I saw a great deal of him and his family both at his home and they at my home.

In January, 1952, I left the Division to undertake the duties of Executive Officer of the Post at which time my daily professional contact was more limited but I did work with him on a liaison basis, particularly, with reference to matters pertaining to the mission of SO Division. Subsequent to that time in August, 1952, I became the Assistant Deputy Director of the Biological Laboratories and my relations with the deceased continued on about the same level. During this period we continued our social friendship on a very close and intimate basis.

In June, 1952, I was assigned as Acting Division Chief of SO Division in addition to my other duties. In October, 1953, I was appointed Division Chief, which fact seemed to please Dr. Olson, very much.

During the period just covered Dr. Olson was Branch Chief until October, 1952, at which time he was prevailed upon by Dr. Schwab and myself to become Acting Chief of SO Division by reason of the fact that Dr. Schwab had left the Division. Dr. Olson did this reluctantly since he said that he w

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adverse taking on administrative type of work and preferred closer touch with the laboratory bench. Dr. Olson carried on as Acting Division Chief until 1 March, 1953 at which time he was removed at his own request to revert to Branch Chief, his old job, and in addition to his other duties Special Assistant to the Division Chief.

During the period described above and before the experiment my estimate of Dr. Frank R. Olson is as follows —

His personality was that almost of an extrovert. He liked a practical joke, did not carry it to excess.

Socially, he was very popular, "life of the party" type. He was the first one on hand to assist anyone who might have troubles either professionally or personal. He and his wife were extremely popular persons on the Camp.

As a professional man my estimate of his ability is that he was outstanding. The extent of my contact with him has already been stated from October (professionally and at work) from July, 1951, to January, 1952, the contact was daily.

From January, 1952 to June, 1953, it was probably on the order of 2 or 3 times a week. From June, 1953, until his death the contact was daily. At all times from June, 1951, and until his death my social contact with him and his family was intimate.

For the period in which I have knowledge my estimate of the performance of his duties officially was satisfactory to outstanding. I would say that from the cumulative standpoint and in comparison with other scientists doing similar type of work he was outstanding.

During the period prior to the experiment my opinion of his state of mind

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was that I noticed nothing which would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind. He had the normal family worries, (worries that I consider to be normal). Occasionally he had trouble with his ulcers but was always reluctant to discuss personal troubles with anyone.

Professionally he was making very fine progress particularly in the last year and was most successful in the work he was doing.

I would further like to insert as regards to his personality or personal habits that he did smoke and did take social drinks but did not use either to excess.

The experiment took place Thursday, November 19th, 1953 in the evening. I saw Dr. Olson on Friday morning. We had breakfast and he appeared to be agitated and at the time I did not consider this to be abnormal under the circumstances.

Immediately after breakfast on Friday morning, November 20th, Dr. Olson came to me and had asked if I would object if he rode back to "home-station" with Mr. Chaplin. I stated, "Of course, not; that it was perfectly all right with me."

The next time I saw Dr. Olson was on Monday morning, 23rd of November, 1953. I came to work about 7:30 and Dr. Olson was waiting for me in his office. He appeared to be agitated and asked me if I should fire him or should he quit. I was taken "a-back" by this and asked him what was wrong. He stated that in his opinion he had messed up the experiment and did not do well at the meetings. I talked with Dr. Olson for about a half hour and further discussed it with him stating that in my opinion he had the wrong impression - that I thought he did very well at the meetings and in

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his participation in the experiment was above reproach. He appeared to be satisfied and relieved.

We attended two professional appointments together and I noticed nothing unusual except that he appeared to have some difficulty in concentrating. We also had lunch together on that date. He did not eat very well; I did notice that. We attended an official movie and meeting at 1530 that afternoon. He was riding home in a car-pool that night and immediately after the movie he said, "so-long," and ran to catch his car.

The next time I saw him was the following morning, Tuesday, 24 November, 1953, when he again was waiting for me in my office when I came to work, about 7:30 a.m. He appeared to be greatly agitated and in his own words, "all mixed up." He said he felt that he was not competent, that he had done something wrong. When questioned closely he could not say exactly what he thought he had done wrong. He made reference to the fact that he thought he should not have been retired for physical reasons but when this was pushed he shifted to the fact that he felt incompetent to the type of work he was doing - when this was pursued he seemed to look for something else which he had done wrong.

After about an hour of discussion it became apparent to me that Dr. Olson ^{but} needed psychiatric attention. I continued the discussion in such a way as to attempt to get him to suggest that he needed some help. This he did, finally. Dr. Stubbs, who was present, and I immediately agreed that this was our opinion also and I suggested to him that I call Mrs. Robert Lashbrook and arrange for such assistance. This he agreed to and said that he would go home at once and discuss the situation with his wife, which he did.

I immediately called Mr. Lashbrook and explained to him what the situation

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was and expressed the opinion that Dr. Olson was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention. Dr. Lashbrook said that he understood and would take immediate action. Meanwhile Dr. Olson had been discussing this with his wife. I received a call from his wife asking if she could come along and I told her that she could. We were to go to Washington, D.C. for further assistance.

Shortly after this Dr. Lashbrook called back and wanted to know what time we would be in Washington since he had arranged for an appointment in New York with a psychiatrist and that he would obtain air reservations for us to go to New York. About 5 minutes after that Dr. and Mrs. Olson arrived at the office. We went from there to my home where I changed from uniform to civilian clothes and we ^{were} driven from my home to Washington by Mr. John C. Malinowski.

En route Dr. Olson appeared to be greatly agitated, highly suspicious, and in his own words, "all mixed up." We stopped at the Hot Shoppe restaurant in Bethesda, Md., to have lunch. Dr. Olson ordered lunch but ate or drank very little. He appeared to be highly suspicious of food or drink. We then proceeded to Dr. Lashbrook's office. I went in and saw Dr. Lashbrook and explained the situation to him again. Dr. Olson stayed out in the car with his wife and Mr. Malinowski. I found out later that he had asked Mr. Malinowski to leave the car so that he could talk to his wife, which was done.

After about 15 minutes I came out and suggested to Mr. Malinowski and Mrs. Olson that they leave us there and that we would get to the air-port with Dr. Lashbrook who was going with us. We proceeded for the air-port and left for New York as I can estimate the time now, about 2:30 p.m. Nov. 24.

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During the trip Dr. Olson's condition appeared to be about the same. He was very anxious and he had the feeling that someone was out to get him. He didn't appear to be quite sure why, etc.,

We arrived in New York without incident, proceeded from LaGuardia Airport to Dr. Abramson's office; arrived there approximately 5 p.m. We left Dr. Olson with Dr. Abramson who requested us to come back in about 1 hour.

After an hour we came back and Dr. Abramson suggested that we go to a hotel and we told him we had reservations at the Statler Hotel. He stated that he would come up to our room about 10:30 with some sedatives and also suggested that we have a "high-ball." Dr. Olson, Dr. Lashbrook and I went directly to the hotel, sat and talked for a while, then went to the cocktail-lounge, had a Martini and then went to dinner. Dr. Olson drank a Martini but refused to drink a second one. He ate very little; still appeared to very suspicious, of Dr. Lashbrook and myself.

After dinner we went back to our rooms, discussed various things and Dr. Olson asked to talk with me alone. Again he appeared to very anxious, upset and kept asking, "What's behind all this? Give me the low-down; What are they trying to do with me; are they checking me for security, etc." I did my best to re-assure him and tried to show him wherein factually he was imagining these difficulties and thought I had convinced him, at least, he said that he thought things were clearing up and also he said that he thought Dr. Abramson could help him.

About 10:30 p.m. Dr. Abramson came and brought a bottle of bourbon and some "Nerbutal." for Dr. Olson. We sat around and had just a good, social discussion and a couple of "high-balls." About mid-night Dr. Abramson

5:3-286

said, "Well, it's time to go to bed." He suggested to Dr. Olson that he take a "Nembutal" which he did at that time and that Dr. Olson take another should he have difficulty sleeping. By the way Dr. Olson had complained to me from the start that he had not been able to sleep after Thursday. He said that he got no sleep. Dr. Olson fell asleep. The undersigned remained awake.

Dr. Olson fell asleep immediately after going to bed and I heard him get up about 3 to go to the bath-room. He came to bed but obviously could not fall asleep as he was tossing and turning and talking to himself. I don't remember what he was saying. I asked him about that time if he would take another Nembutal and he said no. Finally about 5:30 a.m. he appeared to be upset again and I suggested that he take a Nembutal; he agreed and took it. We started discussing the situation over again - the content of the conversation was almost identical to what it had been before. Then he went back to sleep, or I believe, at least rested until about 9:30 a.m. on the morning of the 25th of November, 1953.

At this time he got up, watched television and the three of us, Dr. Lashbrook, Dr. Olson and myself went to breakfast. He ate some breakfast and appeared to be a little better although he ^{was} still been in a rather anxious state in my opinion. We then accompanied Dr. Lashbrook, at Dr. Lashbrook's suggestion, on an official visit which he had to make. During this visit Dr. Olson again became highly suspicious and mixed up. When this became apparent we tactfully cut the visit short and left. We went from there to the doctor's office for the 4 o'clock appointment. We left Dr. Olson there and picked him shortly after 5 o'clock. Dr. Olson had requested that he return home for Thanksgiving dinner so that he could have dinner with his family.

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and this was agreed to by Dr. Abramson who suggested that we make an appointment to come back up on Tuesday, 1 December 1953. I asked at that time he would like to have me come with Dr. Olson or if Dr. Olson should come. He said this was entirely up to Dr. Olson - if he wished he could come and if he wished to have company it would be perfectly alright for me to come. Then we left Dr. Abramson's office; came back to the hotel and at my suggestion got tickets for a musical show, "Me and Juliet." We went out to dinner and from there to the show which started at 8:30 p.m.

Dr. Olson appeared to get upset during the first act and at intermission he was highly agitated and stated that he knew that people were outside waiting to arrest him on his departure from the show. I tried to reassure that I personally ^{would} ~~was~~ guarantee him that he will be in Frederick or at home the following morning and that he would be there with his family for Thanksgiving. He stated that he didn't believe me and I told him, "Well, he may so and that I would give him my word of honor that this would be so." I pointed out that we had the plane reservations. I suggested that maybe he didn't want to see rest of the show and that he and I talk and walk. To this suggestion he quickly agreed. We left the theatre with him and he was in a very anxious state. We walked back to the hotel from the theatre, talking all the while and by the time we arrived at the hotel he appeared to be more relaxed. He went back to the hotel-room, talked and watched television, discussed going home the following day, and Dr. Lashbrock ^{had} stayed for the remainder of the evening and came in about 11 or 11:30 p.m. We talked for a little while, called the desk to arrange for being called in time get out to the airport the following morning. The call was arranged for 5:30 a.m. I went to bed and unfortunately I fell asleep, did not hear anything until 5:30 when the phone rang. It

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the hotel operator waking us up. I flicked on the light; Dr. Olson was not in his bed and his clothes were gone.

I immediately informed Dr. Lashbrook who was in the adjoining room and we dressed, went down to the hotel lobby as speedily as possible and there we found Dr. Olson fully dressed with his over-coat and hat on sitting in a chair. He stated he was walking around in the streets and that in the process he had disposed of his identification button, his wallet and his money. He stated that he had done this because I had instructed him to do so since I was with him. I told him that I wasn't with him; he said, "Yes, that's right, I must have been dreaming." Since there was no time to ~~waste~~ ^{waste} we decided against looking for his wallet and identification badge, immediately went up to the room, shaved and dressed; Dr. Olson also shaved. We checked out of the hotel; got a taxi and went to LaGuardia Airport in time to make a 7:30 plane. Plane was delayed approximately one hour because of mechanical difficulties. We arrived in Washington; Dr. Olson appeared to be more relaxed at this time.

Dr. Olson ate on the plane and slept the entire trip, (1 hour). We arrived in Washington were met by Mr. Malinowski, Thursday, Nov. 26th, (Thanksgiving Day.) We got in Mr. Malinowski's car and headed for Frederick.

In north-west Washington on Wisconsin avenue Dr. Olson asked if we couldn't stop the car and talk this thing over and I asked him if there was anything wrong and he said, "Well, I would like to talk things over." We stopped in the parking lot at Howard Johnson's on Wisconsin avenue near Bethesda-Chevy Chase Woodward Lothrop store. He asked Mr. Malinowski to leave the car as he wanted to discuss something with me - Mr. Malinowski complied. He told me he could not go back to Frederick since he was so mixed up. He was ashamed to meet his wife and family, and requested to

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just to see him and would go off by himself. This told him I could not do. He then asked me to turn him over to the police since they wanted him anyway. We discussed this at considerable length and he appeared satisfied - that the police did not want him. I then suggested that maybe he would like to go back to see Dr. Abranson. He agreed to this suggestion.

I then called Dr. Lashbrook and told him what the situation was and he told me to take Dr. Olson to his apartment immediately. This was done. We decided to take Dr. Olson back to New York to see Dr. Abranson and it was decided that since Mrs. Olson was entitled to know what the situation was and because she was expecting him for Thanksgiving dinner I should proceed to Frederick to brief Mrs. Olson. Dr. Olson appeared to be very much upset and agitated. Again, all mixed up. This was the worst that I had seen him, since the experiment took place. This ^{was} the last time I saw Dr. Olson.


On Friday evening, approximately 10:30, November 27th, I received a call from New York from Dr. Lashbrook who stated that reservations had been made for Dr. Olson at Chestnut Lodge in Rockville, Maryland and that they had plane reservations for the following morning and were scheduled to arrive in Washington at 9:34 on the 28th of November. ^{He} ~~also~~ suggested that I meet the plane which I agreed to do. I then asked if Dr. Olson was still speaking to me in a rather joking manner. I heard Dr. Lashbrook ask him this question and his answer was, "Why, yes, let me have the phone." Dr. Olson appeared on the phone quite relaxed. He told me about the trip in the morning, about the fact that he had reservations at Chestnut Lodge. I told him that I saw the letter as Dr. Lashbrook had

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told me so. I also told him I would meet the plane. He suggested that I not do so since that day was Saturday and he knew that I probably had work to do around the house. I told him to think nothing of that and that I would meet him. He said, "fine. I'll see you in the morning." This is the last time I spoke to Dr. Olson.

At approximately 2:45 a.m. Sat. Nov. 28th, 1953, I received a call from Dr. Gottlieb with a message that Dr. Olson had died.

I HEREBY CERTIFY TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.



VINCENT L. HUSER
Lt. Col. G-1C
Chief, SO Division
Camp Detrick
Frederick, Maryland

53-291

291
4 December 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Investigative Division

SUBJECT : OLSON, Frank
No. 73317 - S.I.

1. Reference is made to our telephonic conversations on 2 and 3 December 1953 concerning Dr. HEROLD A. AERANSON.

2. Reference is also made to Report dated 1 June 1953, Case No. 74150. It will be noted that this report indicates that Dr. AERANSON was interviewed by Agent ILEFF of this office on 22 May 1953. A certificate in Dr. AERANSON's office indicated that he was an allergist. The report further indicated that Dr. AERANSON was engaged in psychiatric research testing the efficacy of a new drug under a grant by some foundation in Washington, D.C. This report further indicates that Dr. MARGARET W. FARMUSON, a psychiatrist, had been hired by Dr. AERANSON for work on this research project. Dr. FARMUSON advised Agent ILEFF that Dr. AERANSON is an allergist who is in charge of a series of psychiatric experiments. ?

3. Reference is made to our OCC report in Subject Case dated 3 December 1953. On pages 7 and 8 of this report there appears extensive information concerning Dr. AERANSON's professional qualifications. This information indicates that Dr. AERANSON limits his practice to allergy and immunology. It is to be noted that Dr. AERANSON is a member of the American Psychosomatic Society and a member of the Editorial Board of "Psychosomatic Medicine." The above information was taken from "Who's Important in Medicine," Second edition, 1952. Two reputable physicians consulted by the undersigned advised that this is an unofficial publication and that information contained therein is supplied by the doctor listed in much the same manner as "Who's Who." To this extent, it may therefore be considered as in the nature of a self-serving declaration. In this connection, it was pointed out by the two physicians consulted by the undersigned that if the doctor in question had formal or substantial psychiatric training, he would

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Case No. 73317

have listed it. There is no indication that Dr. ABRAMSON has ever held himself out as a psychiatrist.

4. On 3 December 1953, ALBERT A. SUCIENOLZ, New York State Education Department, Division of Professional Laws Enforcement, advised that any licensed physician may practice psychiatry without additional licensing. He stated, however, that it is usual for physicians who practice psychiatry to have some extra formal training in the field and to be certified by some organization such as the American Psychiatric Association or the American Board of Medical Specialists.

5. On 3 December 1953, two reputable physicians consulted by the undersigned advised that psychosomatic medicine relates to that medical theory which holds that some illnesses may be of psychogenic origin. They indicated that psychosomatic medicine is not a medical specialty in itself such as cardiology, immunology and allergy, etc. They indicated that to some extent the psychosomatic approach is used by all physicians in the treatment of their patients.

6. On 3 December 1953, a telephone call under suitable pretext was made to the American Psychosomatic Society, Eldorado 5-2799, 551 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. A woman who did not identify herself advised that formal psychiatric training was not a prerequisite for membership in the American Psychosomatic Society. She indicated that the membership represented all branches of medicine with a good proportion of psychiatrists and internists.

CIA Officer

Special Agent in Charge

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STATEMENT BY DR. HAROLD ABRAMSON, MADE SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1953

(Note: The dates and approximate times of visits to Dr. Abramson are added here to clarify Dr. Abramson's following statement.

Tuesday, November 24

- (a) With patient and two friends, in New York office, about 4:45 to 5:00 P.M.
- (b) With patient alone, in New York office, about 5:00 to 6:00 P.M.
- (c) With patient and two friends, in hotel room, about 10:00 to 11:00 P.M.

Wednesday, November 25

With patient alone, in New York office, about 4:00 to 5:00.

Thursday, November 26

- (a) With patient alone, in Huntington, Long Island, office, about 4:00 to 5:00 P.M.
- (b) With patient and friend, in Huntington office, about 5:00 to 5:20 P.M.

Friday, November 27

With patient and friend, in New York office, about 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 noon, and from about 2:00 to 3:00 P.M.)

Alison #5
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Again an attempt was made to have the patient state that he was the subject of a plot or was especially persecuted by his friends, but at no time did he speak of any but the highest regard for friends or family. He stated explicitly that he wished to go back home. I saw no way in which this could be prevented, but plans were made for further discussion.

November 26

The patient returned after an agitated trip to Washington and was seen at 4:00 P.M., Thursday, November 26. In this interview, for the first time, the patient showed that he had delusions of persecution. "I feel they were giving me dope to keep me awake." He said that for some weeks the CIA group had been putting something like benzedrine in his coffee. He pointed out he had heard voices the night before and that V's voice told me to "throw it away." (He had thrown away his wallet). His history definitely indicated he had been delusional at least for weeks, probably months, but that he had been able to operate fairly well, except in crises. It became apparent that hospitalization was required as soon as possible.

November 27

On Friday morning, November 27, the patient and a friend and the writer discussed in some detail the desirability of hospital treatment, to which the patient had finally agreed. He thought he would like to be near home, and for this reason a mental institution near Washington was chosen and a room reserved. The hospital could not take the patient that day, and arrangements were made for hospitalization the next day.

Conclusion

The patient has been, according to his own story, delusional for a long period of time, but operating well in his day by day work. His inordinate guilt feelings, as expressed to me, were specifically related to his pension and disability pay. For this he felt he had to be punished. He himself dated his difficulties to the time when he was retired. It was then that he recalls his extraordinary guilt feelings began, becoming progressively worse, with the specific delusional events occurring during the preceding months.

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4 December 1953

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Memorandum for: General Counsel

Subject: Observations on Mr. Frank Olson from 24 November through 27 November 1953

1. I understand that in connection with the submission of a claim to the Bureau of Employees Compensation, you wish a report on the events prior to the death of Mr. Olson from me. The following is submitted for your records.

2. I saw Mr. Olson in the company of Dr. Lashbrook and Colonel Ruwet in my office in New York City, 133 East 58th Street. I understood that he had been agitated for some time and that he had been making statements which appeared to be confused. I was asked to make further observations so that proper treatment for Mr. Olson could be instituted for Mr. Olson if any treatment was considered necessary.

3. On Tuesday, 24 November 1953, conversations were begun which centered mainly on our earlier meetings during the war in 1944 and 1945. Many older interests were recalled. We discussed construction of gas masks, filtration problems, our attitudes toward mutual friends, and many things which were most pertinent at that time. Our conversation at this point was on a social level in which the patient had, contrary to his later attitudes, an excellent feeling and memory for people, events and realistic aspects of these people and events. He did show that he was under strain by his mannerisms but at no time during his primary conversation did he appear to be definitely out of touch with reality. Dr. Lashbrook and Colonel Ruwet left the office and I spent about one hour alone with Mr. Olson. As soon as these gentlemen left, he showed greater anxiety about his sense of inadequacy with particular reference to the scientific performance of his duties. He was obsessed with the idea that his memory was poor, that his work was inadequate, and that he was failing to live up to expectations of his family and friends. He mentioned that he was dishonest because he had been retired from the Army for an ulcer and showed a certain amount of unrealistic but nevertheless anticipated guilt feelings about taking retirement pay. I attempted to confirm what I had heard that an experiment had been performed especially to trap him the preceding week but

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he emphasized that his present problem did not lay in that area and that his problem was his own ability to live up to his own concept of what his performance of his duties should be and his inability to attain the perfections necessitated by the needs of his work. He, himself, pointed out that when he was asked to take over more responsibility and head up a division he refused and went into a state of panic feeling that he could hardly, with his own growing feelings of inadequacy in his work, take over more responsibility.

4. That evening, in order to keep in contact with him and to accumulate more data, I went to the hotel and spent from 10:30 to 11:30 with Mr. Olson, Dr. Lashbrook and Colonel Fuzet. Again, Mr. Olson appeared to maintain an excellent relationship with all of us. Although apprehensive he apparently was much calmer and after a strictly social discussion said as I left, "You know, I feel a lot better. This is what I have been needing."

5. The next day Mr. Olson spent an hour with me in which he again appeared agitated. There was repeated discussion of his concern with the quality of his work, his guilt on being retired from the Army for an ulcer, and his release of classified information. He said that he had had these feelings for a very long time and that they had not started the week before when he participated in an experiment and that, indeed, in March of 1953 his wife thought that he was so depressed and agitated that she thought that he should see a doctor. He said that he had been sleeping poorly since March of 1953 and amplified his difficulties with regard to poor memory and poor work. However, I could not harmonize what he said about his job performance with the attitude of his superiors since he had been offered a division. Nor did this check with repeated questioning of past events. I again attempted to get further information in regard to his feelings of persecution but at no time did he speak of anyone but with the highest regard for both friends and family. He stated explicitly that he wished to go back home and that arrangements had been made. I saw no way in which this could be prevented but plans were made for his return and further discussion.

6. I understand that on his way home he became agitated, very confused, and insisted on coming back to see me. He arrived in my Huntington office about four o'clock and this time the pent-up feelings which he had successfully hidden burst out in the greatest detail. The patient explicitly stated that he had long felt that his inability to sleep was connected with his belief that the CIA group had been putting something

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like benzadrine in his coffee at night to keep him awake; that he had heard voices the night before telling him to throw away his wallet. His history now crystallized into a definite form, if we accept what he said that he had been delusional at least for weeks, probably months, but that he had been able to operate fairly well except in certain crises such as being offered more responsibility in taking over the division.

7. The diagnosis was quite clear of a psychotic state which seemed to have been crystallized by an experiment in which Mr. Olson participated the preceding week, apparently on a Thursday. He felt that his feelings during the experiment were like those of being overwhelmed by a mountain very much the same as he felt when he had to take over a new responsibility. Since the experiment he felt that he was not able to deal with his work as well as he had before and although he personally considered the experiment to be unrelated to his basic problem he has nevertheless felt worse since, and that the experiment might have intensified many of his problems.

8. With this information I recommended hospitalization at once and on Friday morning, November 27, Mr. Olson, Dr. Lashbrook, and I discussed in some detail the choice of hospital. Mr. Olson thought that he would like to be near home and for this reason a mental institution near Washington was chosen and a room was reserved. The hospital could not take Mr. Olson that day and arrangements were made for hospitalization the next morning.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Olson was in a psychotic state when hospitalization was decided upon with delusions of persecution. There are two aspects in regard to the relationship to the work in which he was engaged. It is well known that it is an occupational hazard to mental stability to be doing the type of work connected with his duties. Guilt feelings are well known to occur to a greater or less extent. Superimposed on these guilt feelings which are certainly an occupational hazard is his participation in an experiment wherein he felt that many of his feelings became overwhelming. It is well known that many drugs produce this effect. For example, I have had a patient of mine recently attempt suicide after taking one capsule of Nembutal. A capsule of Nembutal contains one and one-half grains. This is a therapeutic dose which is taken by thousands

To: Dr. Houston,
From: Clara P. Minulson

1. History obtained at initial examination and during the course of treatment.
2. His personal knowledge of the decedent, particularly his personality pattern prior to the acute illness.
3. Complaints and findings (subjective as well as objective), including laboratory examinations.
4. Clinical course of condition during the period of observation and treatment.
5. Diagnoses.
6. If this is an acute psychosis, opinion as to relationship, if any, to the work in which he was engaged. We should like a full and complete discussion of the situation, with reasoned explanation for any opinion expressed. If practicable, citations from medical literature in support of expressed opinion would be appreciated.
7. Any other information considered pertinent to the question of relationship between the work and the illness responsible for the death.
8. *Opinion as to mental competence in connection with VA*

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14 December 1953

Bureau of Employees' Compensation
Department of Labor
Washington-25, D.C.

ATTENTION: Mr. Clyde R. Middleton

Dear Sir:

This is to inform you that I wish to apply for the benefits due me under the provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act in lieu of the Civil Service Retirement Act.

Very truly yours,

Alice Wicks Olson

ALICE WICKS OLSON
R.F.D. #5
Frederick, Maryland

*Miss Wetzal of Civil Service
Com. (Case 171) (12/16/53)
says no claim for Civil
Service need follow with
which CSC will act
copy of this letter
sent*

CONVERSATION WITH GIBBONS:

1. Lovell has not heard anything from Gibbons.
2. Lovell reported that Quarles and George Marck were about to kill the Schwab activity at Detrick as "un-American". Is it necessary to take action at a high place?
3. Lovell knew of Frank R. Olson. No inhibitions. Baring of inner man. Suicidal tendencies. Offensive usefulness? HMC told Chef Edwards Saturday AM, the 12th.

*Chas. 15 Dec. in HMC's office -
 No act on HMC's part unless requested*

cc: McMahon

Phillips & Quarles at 12/12/46

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


302

9 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

SUBJECT : Frank R. Olson

I have compiled and reviewed all the information available to the Agency relating to the death of Dr. Frank R. Olson. It is my conclusion that the death of Dr. Olson is the result of circumstances arising out of an experiment undertaken in the course of his official duties for the U. S. Government and that there is, therefore, a direct causal connection between that experiment and his death. I have been authorized by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to state that this is the official position of the Central Intelligence Agency.



LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

pls. review
+ order call
Hurt
303

TO: Director of Security
FROM: Chief, Technical Branch, SO

This is to remind you that there will be
an RTICOM Conference on Thursday, 17 December
1953, at 2:00 PM in the SO Conference Room, 2065
I Building.

2. If you wish to put anything on the agenda,
present any special topic or require information in
connection with this Conference, please call Morse Allen
on Extension 3362.

[Redacted]

7 December 1953

CC: Deputy Director of Security
Chief, SRS, SO
ADSI, OSI
AD/ADSI, OSI
Chief, Medical Staff
Chief, PD, MS
Chief, TBS
Chief, CD, TSS

Cancelled

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Handwritten vertical text on the right margin.

14 December 1953

govt official
Smith?

CONVERSATION WITH GIBBONS:

- ✓ government official*
1. Lovell has not heard anything from Gibbons.
- Senior Government official advised that...*
2. Lovell reported that ~~Charles and George~~ *Charles and George* were about to kill the Schwab activity at Detrick as "un-American". Is it necessary to take action at a high place?
- Senior Govt. official*
3. Lovell knew of Frank R. Olson. No inhibitions. Baring of inner man. Suicidal tendencies. Offensive usefulness? HMC told Shef Edwards Saturday AM, the 12th.

*Nov. 15 Dec. in HMC's office -
no act = on HMC's part unless requested*

*Govt. official
Gibbons & ~~Smith~~ at cocktails.*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

(305)

TO : Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence

DATE: 16 December 1953

FROM : Chief, Operations Staff, O/SI


H. S. Y. M.

SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE

(added 2 170/SI info from ops file 6 June 1955)

In line with our conversation some days ago, I have talked to [redacted] about the designation of some one man in Medicine Division to act in a substantive support capacity to you in your participation in the ARTICHOKE Committee. We concluded, from a professional point of view, that the logical designee would be [redacted]. Unfortunately, [redacted] was not one of those that we had cleared for the project some months ago, so the matter of clearance might well be taken up by you with [redacted] and [redacted] at the meeting on Thursday. After clearance, [redacted] could draw on [redacted] and [redacted] for the specialized type of intelligence information on this general subject which they are following.

available in the Division




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Distribution: *Dist. by ops, 8 Nov. 1954*
Orig. & 1 - Forward

- 3 - Ops/SI
- 1 - Chrono
- 2 cpy destroyed, 8 Nov. 1954

meeting cancelled
pls copy Artichoke in my abs - including above -
office informed of your designation.
H. S. Y. M. 17 Dec.

file subject: Project ARTICHOKE




December 17, 1953

306

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Dr. Franklin J. Halpin, the Bureau's Medical Director, and I, have personally reviewed the classified records of the Central Intelligence Agency which contain all particulars of the circumstances leading up to and attendant upon the death of the decedent on November 28, 1953.

Such material is highly sensitive and is of a nature which if divulged might seriously affect the national security. Such information is found sufficient to show that the condition responsible for self-destruction was proximately due to conditions of his employment and the claim of the widow is allowed. This decision was reached after obtaining the oral opinion of Dr. Halpin that from a medical standpoint there was a very definite connection between the illness and the act of self-destruction.


Charles R. Middleton
Deputy Director

CRH:lc

EX-100

12 December 1953

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307

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Suicide of Frank Olson

1. Attached are the complete files on this case which have been compiled jointly by the General Counsel and this office. A review of these files plus our conversations with Dr. Marston, the psychiatrist involved in the case, and Dr. H. Marshall Chaddock, MD/PT, who received a full description of the case from Stanley Lovell, indicates certain matters that should be attended to before the case is closed. It further should be noted that on 17 December, some 20 days after the event, Dr. Gibbons and Col. Truss came to see the undersigned to report that Dr. Gibbons had just learned that Col. Truss knew of the experiment in advance and had given his approval to Dr. Jettleib to conduct it on an unwitting basis.

2. These conclusions can be drawn from the facts in this case:

a. The drug used has also been used fairly extensively in experiments and in psychiatric treatments conducted both for the benefit of the Agency and private practice.

b. The amount of drug used was only 1/7 of what has been used without ill effects.

c. Although Dr. Jettleib knew all of the individuals who received the drug, he obviously was not aware of their medical records. Therefore, only one individual was excluded from the experiment because of a heart condition. Jettleib was not aware that over a period of five years Olson had apparently had a suicidal tendency.

d. It is apparent that there is a strong possibility that the drug was a trigger mechanism precipitating Olson's suicide.

e. With the exception of the gaining of concurrence of the Deputy Chief of TCS, no mechanism was available or utilized for getting approval for an experiment in which human lives could possibly be jeopardized.

f. Uncontrolled experiments such as these conducted by TCS could seriously affect the record and reputation of the Agency.

g. Although there is an antichoke committee on which TCS, OSI and Security sit, this committee was never advised or consulted about this experiment.

h. Using employees of another agency could seriously jeopardize our relationship with that and all other agencies should this become known.

3. Recommendations:

a. There should be immediately established a high-level intra-Agency board which should review all TSS experiments and give approval in advance to any in which human beings are involved, and to all others involving matters of policy or large amounts of money.

b. The Deputy Chief TSS should be reprimanded for his poor judgment shown in this instance and consideration should be given as to whether this individual should continue in his present position.

c. Chief TSS should be admonished to exercise tighter supervision and control over the use of this drug and should render periodic reports to D/P on its use and the result.

Lyman Kirkpatrick
Director General

We concur generally in the above recommendations

nk
7-80

December 21, 1953

308

Mrs. Alice Wicks Olson
R.F.D. #5
Frederick, Maryland

Dear Mrs. Olson:

Reference is made to your claim for compensation on account of the death of your husband, Dr. Mark R. Olson.

The Bureau finds that you are entitled to \$525.00 per month, the maximum compensation that can be paid in any case, being \$280.00 on your own behalf plus \$245.00 on behalf of the three children on a share and share alike basis.

Compensation on your own account will be paid until your death or remarriage. Compensation on account of each of your three minor children will cease when they die, marry, or reach the age of eighteen.

The sum of \$525.00 is being certified to the United States Treasury for payment to you, representing compensation benefits, as explained above, covering the period from November 29 to November 30, 1953, inclusive. A check in this amount should be received by you within the near future. Payments for the period commencing December 1, 1953 will be in the sum of \$525.00 per month and should be received by you shortly after the last day of each month.

There is enclosed herewith a supply of claims for continuance of compensation, Form CA-12 for yourself and Form CA-13 on account of the children. You are requested to complete and submit one of each of the forms on the first day of each January and July to cover the six-month period immediately preceding such date.

In order that the burial allowance may be disbursed, the Bureau should be furnished with original itemized bills covering all burial expenses incurred. The bills should show the amount

Olson # 27
513-316

RFD 5
Frederick, Maryland
29 December 1953

Bureau of Employees' Compensation
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Clyde R. Middleton
Deputy Director

Gentlemen:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter—File No. X-866287 dated 21 December 1953. I wish to thank you for the prompt action taken on my claim for compensation on account of the death of my husband, Frank R. Olson.

I have obtained the required certified true copy of my marriage certificate and forwarded it to your office via separate cover and trust it has reached you by this time.

I also wish to inform you that I have not and do not intend to file claim with the Veterans Administration for death benefits. I also enclose a copy of a letter sent to the Retirement Division, U. S. Civil Service Commission informing them of the approval of my claim and requesting permission to withdraw the monies accrued under the Civil Service Retirement System.

Enclosed you will find the following:

- a. Completed copies of CAF 12 and CAF 13.
- b. Completed and notarized copies of CAF 42 and CA-43 together with and itemized bill for funeral expenses. I am told that these constitute a claim for reimbursement in the amount of \$494.00 to the undertaker in payment of a portion of the funeral expenses.

I again wish to express my appreciation for your interest,

Very truly yours,

Alice Wicks Olson

Alice Wicks Olson

Incls.

310

29 December 1953

Retirement Division
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Gentlemen:

This is to inform you that as the widow of Frank Rudolph Olson, a former employee of the Chemical Corps, Department of the Army, Camp Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, I have been accorded benefits by the Department of Labor under the Federal Employer's Compensation Act for the death of my husband.

I therefore wish to withdraw the sum due me under the Civil Service Retirement System and am attaching the required form hereto.

Yours truly,

Alice Wicks Olson

Alice Wicks Olson
RFD 5
Frederick, Md.

Incl—Form SF 100 in duplicate
1 copy of death certificate

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TO : Chief, Bio-Chemistry & Pharmacology Branch,
Medicine Division, OSI
FROM : Chief, Technical Branch, SO
SUBJECT: Attached

DATE: 15 July 1953

1 copy
7 copies

DOD

1. Returned herewith are the letters and enclosures of 19 June 1953, reference [redacted]. Also returned is the letter prepared over the signature of [redacted].

2. [redacted] and the writer have examined the letter very carefully and believe that it excellently states the position of this Agency and quite properly suggests a joint undertaking along the lines discussed.

3. Both [redacted] and the writer hope that OSI representatives (probably [redacted]) at the coming ARTICHOKE meeting tomorrow, Thursday, 16 July 1953, will bring this very interesting problem up for general discussion since in our opinion it is of extreme interest to ARTICHOKE.

4. The writer discussed with [redacted] the proposal of a Foreign team from the ARTICHOKE group to carry on the work with the [redacted] officials. The writer told [redacted] he felt that a team composed of [redacted] and [redacted] would be fully equipped to cover all fields and to lay on preliminary work and discussions with the [redacted] officials. [redacted] concurred in this view entirely. Foreign

[redacted]

[redacted]/Att.

[redacted]

Chief, Technical Branch

ARTICHOKE Conference, 18 June 1953

1. On Thursday, 18 June 1953, an ARTICHOKE Conference was held in the SO Conference Room, [redacted] from 2:00 to 4:00 PM. Present were [redacted] and [redacted] representing SO; [redacted] and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb representing TSS; [redacted] representing the Medical Staff and [redacted] representing the Director's Office and OSI. In addition, [redacted] who is special assistant to [redacted] attended the conference as a special representative from DDP. a4,5 ✓

Copy of [redacted]

2. [redacted] opened the conference by introducing [redacted] as the representative from DDP.

3. A discussion was then held concerning the "Plastic" case in which [redacted] explained in general the details of the case to those present not familiar with it and brought the matter up to date insofar as ARTICHOKE interest was concerned. It was agreed the case had not been properly handled and that, in the future, important developments such as the "Plastic" case should be handled with great speed and, if necessary, a representative of the ARTICHOKE program should proceed to the area to obtain as soon as possible the best available information.

4. [redacted] then reported on the work being done in the field of narcotic and toxic mushrooms. [redacted] advised in this field there were very strong indications that certain mushrooms definitely affected the human mind and from a scientific point of view there was very little factual information available. [redacted] explained that arrangements had been made for the collection, cultivation, propagation and testing of certain poisonous and narcotic mushrooms by different agencies both governmental and private.

5. Following this, Dr. Gottlieb gave a very brief report on some of the activities of the special work carried on by [redacted] in California in which his division is materially interested and also commented on the work of the Army Chemical Corps in lines of interest to ARTICHOKE. a4,5 ✓

original

[redacted]

Co- [redacted]

6. ~~_____~~ commented concerning the fact that there are numerous drugs that affect the autonomic and central nervous system of the human being and suggested that it would perhaps not be wise to waste too much time in research along lines where there is little established information.

7. Following this, ~~_____~~ explained that the literature on mushrooms clearly indicated that the Russians had used mushrooms for centuries for their narcotic effect, that drinks made of mushrooms had been used to produce intoxication in Russia and possibly have been used for other purposes. ~~_____~~ also commented on the use of narcotic mushrooms by Mexican Indians in tribal ceremonies and in other interesting uses. Following this, there was a general discussion concerning mushrooms.

8. ~~_____~~ pointed out that the proposed experimental work to be carried on in ~~_____~~ had run into a security problem since one of the key men to be used in the project was involved in a current CMI investigation and that his office was bringing every pressure to bear on CMI to find out the results of their investigation and to find out whether we can use the individual involved ~~_____~~ ^{the US}

9. ~~_____~~ stated that his office was exploring the possibility of using similar setups or setups having good potentials. ~~_____~~

10. ~~_____~~ followed this up by stating that proposed work at ~~_____~~ was probably cut on Security grounds as one of the key figures involved could not be security cleared.

11. ~~_____~~ discussed the spreading out of the ARTICHOME work and the ways and means by which ARTICHOME was securing information and assistance. He stated at the present time we had cleared twenty to thirty top-level experts in certain scientific fields and perhaps thirty more were in the investigative mill that would be used in the future for contacts.


12. Following this, ~~_____~~ discussed the Valley Forge JGZ question and stated that nothing of ARTICHOME value had turned up at Valley Forge. He stated there was a chance ARTICHOME techniques could be brought to bear in the future on a few of the "hardcore" cases, but these few cases would be scattered over the United States and he personally doubted if ~~_____~~ would be interested in having these men handled by ARTICHOME methods. *they*

13. At this point, there was a general discussion concerning the so-called [redacted] and [redacted] reported that [redacted] and [redacted] of [redacted] and had obtained [redacted] from [redacted] all of the material which he then held. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was making every effort he could but, to date, [redacted] had been unable to obtain even the medical histories on the individuals involved and for this reason his work was proceeding very slowly. [redacted] stated that this represented a typical example of governmental red tape and the lack of action and co-ordination was possibly costing the United States Government a great deal of intelligence information.


14. [redacted] then stated that [redacted] report on certain victims of the poisoning whom he [redacted] had examined [redacted] was now in [redacted] office and [redacted] stated that after [redacted] had finished with the report, he would make it available to [redacted].

15. Following this, there was a discussion on the handling of the [redacted] and all hands agreed that one of the weaknesses of the Agency apparently was the fact that there was a great deal of difficulty in getting factual information quickly from all sources.

16. [redacted] reported on some of the botanicals that had been obtained by [redacted]. [redacted] stated that the first work on some of these botanicals had shown some good results but that considerable work was still to be done before positive results could be obtained.



18. [redacted] then commented on the Erves case which had appeared in the "U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT". [redacted] stated



that certain angles to the [redacted] and Hayes cases were similar in regard to their handling although they were handled thousands of miles apart. It seemed significant that both were forced to testify against their friends and in [redacted] opinion this indicates that similar patterns and procedures seem to be employed by the Soviets and their satellites.

19. Following this, [redacted] commented on the very interesting angle that interrogations of the individuals who had come out of North Korea across the Soviet Union to freedom recently had apparently had a "blank" period or period of disorientation while passing through a special zone in Manchuria. [redacted] pointed out that this had occurred in all individuals in the party after they had had their first full meal and their first coffee on the way to freedom. [redacted] pointed out that [redacted] was attempting to secure further confirmatory facts in this matter since drugging was indicated.

personality
Asian city

20. At this point, there was a general discussion in connection with the development of AMBUSH "Teams" and [redacted] explained that Team personnel were gradually being assembled. [redacted] pointed out that the chief of the team had been obtained for the [redacted] post. [redacted] then explained that a widespread effort was being made to find an especially equipped technician for the [redacted] post to team up with [redacted] who would be chief there. At this point, [redacted] asked for further clarification in regard to the teams and [redacted] then explained to [redacted] the composition of the teams and explained that the chief of the team or chief interrogator and the technician of the three-man team were to be furnished by SO and that the medical officer who is to be associated with the team is to be furnished by [redacted] as per prior agreement. [redacted] stated he did not know if [redacted] intended to draw up new medical officers for the teams or use medical officers in the field to associate with the team but that the doctors for the teams were now up to [redacted]

21. Following this, there was a brief discussion of the team proposal and [redacted] and [redacted] again discussed the entire overseas AMBUSH program including the uses of the teams and how the teams tied in with the work overseas.

22. At this point, [redacted] stated that he had given the whole matter of testing of new chemicals and new techniques and methods a considerable amount of thought and [redacted]

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED] stated that for a long time Security had felt that this procedure was too dangerous but with the drawing in of a number of men of great scientific capacity and with a record of very cautious work in the past, he felt this proposal could probably be successfully carried to the Director's Office. [REDACTED] suggested all members present consider this proposal and that it be discussed at the next meeting and suggestions and ideas along these lines be submitted. Following this, all hands agreed if it were properly controlled and very cautiously handled, this suggestion had a great deal of merit and that a discussion on [REDACTED] proposal would certainly be warranted at the next meeting.

24. At the conclusion of the conference, [REDACTED] discussed the problem of brain washing and its relation to the ARTICHOKE work. [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was making a certain exploratory effort in the overall field of "brain washing" and sources on brain washing material and in the near future we would have a report on that and its future relation to the ARTICHOKE work.

25. The meeting adjourned at approximately 4:00 PM after Thursday, 16 July 1953 had been selected as the time of the next meeting. The meeting will be held as usual in the SO Conference Room.

[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

AGENDA - ARTICHOKE MEETING
16 July 1955

1. Introduction - *New Agency Officer* ~~_____~~ as DD/P Representative to ARTICHOKE Committee.
2. ~~_____~~ - "Sidetone Delay" reports.
3. Discussion of pertinent news items.
4. Discussion of ~~_____~~ proposal 18 June 1955 meeting in regard to employment of ARTICHOKE techniques on trainees.
5. Distribution of Security Office paper with respect to review of ARTICHOKE.
6. ISS comments.
7. OSI comments.
8. Medical Division comments.
9. DD/P comments.
10. Director of Security comments.

[Redacted]

TO : ARTICHOKE Representatives

DATE: 16 July 1953

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE; Restatement of Program

1. Reference is made to attached SO memorandum dated 21 November 1952 addressed to the Assistant Director, OSI; Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief, OTS, the subject, "Project ARTICHOKE."

2. Reference is also made to the informal conference held Thursday, 9 July 1953 with [redacted] and the writer present.

3. At the above-mentioned conference held 9 July 1953, [redacted] stated he felt in view of the expanding work being carried out in all fields in the ARTICHOKE program and with the constantly enlarging numbers of contacts and consultants and the imminent possibility of experimental work being undertaken both in the United States and overseas, it would be well to redefine the specific interests and activities of all those working with the Project ARTICHOKE and bring up to date and set out for examination the present and future plans of each group engaged in this work. [redacted] said he felt that in order to prevent duplication of effort and to increase and stimulate interest and activity on behalf of ARTICHOKE, and particularly to bend every effort to find new methods, new techniques, new chemicals, etc. which would work to the benefit of this Agency, all parties interested should re-examine their work and understand clearly how each group would work with and support the activities of the others involved in the ARTICHOKE program.

4. The basic memorandum referred to in Paragraph 1 above very clearly sets forth in general terms the responsibilities of the Medical Staff, of OTS, OSI and of SO in connection with the ARTICHOKE program. This memorandum also affixes and assigns in general terms the various responsibilities of the participating groups and affirms that these responsibilities had been concurred in previously in a staff study dated 29 August 1952.

Card

53-183


5. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ further stated in the above-mentioned conference that there were many places where responsibilities would lie jointly between various participating groups and there would be a great deal of overlapping since it appeared obvious the field was tremendous and the effort now covered so many diverse activities.

6. It is felt that a restatement of the aims of ARTICHOKE is essential at this time. Briefly, these basic aims may be stated as follows:

- a. To perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis, and other elements for the extraction of information from individuals whether willing or not.
- b. To provide field teams for testing, experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new materials for the extraction of information from indigenous personnel under field conditions.
- c. In coordination with TSS and the Medical Staff arrange for research and experimentation within the facilities of those two components for the development of means for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not.
- d. Conduct liaison and initial research in fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of TSS and the Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
- e. Control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to the operational components in the use of such techniques.
- f. Explore means through indoctrination and training of preventing the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental capacities of Agency personnel.
- g. Serve as the coordinating element among all components for the Agency on these matters concerning the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
- h. Arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and development among those elements primarily concerned as OSI, TSS, Medical Division, DDP and Security Office.

1. Conduct authorized liaison with other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field and arrange for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.

7. It should be recognized that there are many facets of possible ARTICHOKE interest which have never been adequately explored from the standpoint operational ARTICHOKE use. TSS and the Medical Division will be expected, from the framework of their capabilities, to conduct the basic research as to whether or not such elements have any possible application to operational use for ARTICHOKE purposes. The introduction of new ideas and new techniques are the responsibility of all components concerned and should be presented by each component with as much background material as is possible. In this capacity the Security Office will maintain contact and liaison with scientific and technical specialists in these fields for the basic development of ideas and the suggestions of new means for possible use in ARTICHOKE. Such action will be conducted in full coordination with the other interested components to insure that there is no duplication of effort.


Colonel, GSC