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JAN 2 6 2019

Ref: 18-F-0666

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Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is the final response to your March 14, 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. We received your request on March 14, 2018, and assigned it case number 18-F-0666. We ask that you use this number when referring to your request.

The Joint Staff, a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), conducted a search of their records systems and located one document, totaling 95 pages, determined to be responsive to your request. This information is appropriate for release in its entirety, without excision.

This constitutes a full grant of your request, and closes your case file in this office. There are no assessable fees associated with this response.

I trust that this information fully satisfies your request. If you need further assistance or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please do not hesitate to contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Bethlehem Addis, at bethlehem.addis.civ@mail.mil or (571) 372-0424. Our FOIA Public Liaison is also available to assist you and may be reached at (571) 372-0462.

Sincerely,

for Adrienne R. Gastes

Stephanie L. Carr
Chief

Enclosures:
As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
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Joint Publication 3-13.2

Military Information Support Operations

21 November 2014

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of military information support operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the US. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13.2, DATED 07 JANUARY 2010 (INCORPORATING CHANGE 1 DATED 20 DECEMBER 2011)

- **Eliminated generic discussions of planning and employment contained in other joint publications.**
- **Modified the discussion of planning to better follow Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning.***
- **Expanded the discussion of the military information support operations process to include core tasks.**
- **Modified the definition of civil authority information support.**
- **Deleted the following definitions: joint military information support task force, military information support operations impact indicators, psychological action, psychological objective, and propaganda.**
- **Replaced "psychological objective" with "military information support operations objective."**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

- Introduction I-1
- General I-1
- Legal and Policy Considerations I-3
- Military Information Support Operations Across the Range of Military Operations I-4
- Key Considerations for Effective Military Information Support Operations I-5

CHAPTER II
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS

- General II-1
- Roles and Responsibilities II-1
- Relationships II-5

CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL

- General III-1
- Organizing Military Information Support Forces III-2

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

- Joint Operation Planning and Phasing IV-1
- Planning Considerations IV-8
- Guidance IV-14
- Support of Irregular Warfare IV-16

CHAPTER V
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROCESS

- General V-1
- Planning: Phase I V-1
- Target Audience Analysis: Phase II V-4
- Series Development: Phase III V-4
- Product Development and Design: Phase IV V-5
- Approval: Phase V V-6
- Production, Distribution, and Dissemination: Phase VI V-7
- Assessment: Phase VII V-7

CHAPTER VI
ENABLERS

- Intelligence VI-1
- Communications System VI-2
- Logistics VI-3

APPENDIX

A Legal and Policy Considerations A-1
B Capabilities B-1
C Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to a Joint Operation Plan ..... C-I
D Military Information Support Operations Program Format D-1
E References E-1
F Administrative Instructions F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions GL-4

FIGURE

IV-1 Military Information Support Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations IV-9
IV-2 Examples of Joint Military Information Support Operations Activities Across the Range of Military Operations IV-13
V-1 Relationship of Military Information Support Operations Process Phases and Military Information Support Operations Core Tasks V-2
VI-1 Military Information Support Operations Logistics Requirements VI-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Presents an Overview of Military Information Support Operations (MISO)**
- **Covers MISO Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships**
- **Addresses Command and Control**
- **Describes MISO Planning**
- **Explains MISO Process**
- **Discusses MISO Enablers**

Overview

Military information support operations (MISO) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.

Military information support operations (MISO) are designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups' attitudes and behaviors. MISO can also degrade the enemy's combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and increase the population's support for operations. MISO provide joint force commanders (JFCs) with ways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the operational environment (OE) that may be as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation focused solely on enemy and adversary military capabilities. Target audiences (TAs) are individuals or groups selected for influence, and may include enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral groups or populations.

Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships

Secretary of Defense

Approves all MISO programs submitted as part of a combatant commander's (CCDR's) theater campaign plan (TCP) and operation plan (OPLAN).

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Approves and oversees all MISO policy and programs not delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

Oversees MISO integration within Department of Defense (DOD) including overseeing joint operations, force development, and programming and budgeting.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Provides a unified, prioritized list of MISO intelligence and counterintelligence requirements to meet the needs of the CCDRs, Joint Staff, and Services. Ensures integration of MISO into military planning.

Combatant Commanders

Plan and execute MISO in support of theater military missions to achieve CCDR objectives. Identify, develop, and submit MISO requirements for authorities, forces, and resources through the Joint Staff.

Commander, United States Special Operations Command

Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), is the designated joint proponent for MISO, responsible for leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the MISO capability across DOD. Other CDRUSSOCOM responsibilities include:

- Provides trained and ready military information support (MIS) forces to support Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the other CCDRs.
- Supports the MISO planning, coordination, synchronization, execution, and assessment efforts of the geographic and functional CCDRs.
- Develops and validates priorities for training, intelligence, and military requirements and provides these to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support Service, combatant command (CCMD), and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to MISO.

Military Departments and Services

When directed by SecDef, provide global force management of MIS forces (not assigned to CDRUSSOCOM or under the operational control [OPCON] of a geographic combatant commander [GCC]) to support the MISO plans, programs, and activities of the CCMDs and other United States Government departments and agencies.

Relationships

The JFC may leverage information-related capabilities (IRCs), to include MISO, to create a desired effect in support of operational objectives. Because public affairs and MISO are each distinct activities, commanders should

ensure that there is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communications effort. MISO are coordinated with other IRCs to ensure that deconfliction processes are in place. Information operations planners ensure that IRCs are coordinated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose to achieve the objectives established during planning.

Command and Control

Organizing Military Information Support Forces

Control should favor centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution.

If the JFC determines that MISO planning and execution requires control by a component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests establishment of a joint military information support task force (JMISTF) or MIS task force. JMISTFs can serve as a component or staff element of the JFC, or as a subcomponent or staff element under an existing component such as a joint special operations task force. MIS forces conducting peacetime shaping operations in support of the Department of State at a US embassy remain under command and control of military commanders. OPCON of Army Active Component MIS forces is usually exercised by a theater special operations command. OPCON of Army Reserve Component MIS forces supporting GCC TCP exercises and activities is exercised by the supported GCC. The requirements for chief of mission concurrence for MISO execution are identified within the TCP, OPLAN, or MISO program that guides these operations. United States Air Force assets, leaflet canisters, and the aircraft to deliver them typically remain under OPCON of the Air Force component commander. US Navy assets normally remain under the OPCON of the Navy component commander.

Planning

Joint Planning

Joint planning integrates US military operations with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to attain specified end states. MISO planners should be integrated into all phases of planning to ensure that MISO are synchronized to support the commander's objectives.

MISO Program

A program is the basic plan for the execution of MISO. MISO programs include at a minimum objectives, product approval authorities, themes to stress, themes to avoid, TAs, attribution, means of dissemination, a concept of operations, and funding sources.

Planning

MISO planning identifies desired target audience behavioral changes and end states, along with the specific messages and actions to effect those changes.

MISO planners, like all other functional planners, participate in the joint operation planning process and contribute to the development of the overall plan during deliberate or crisis action planning. At the outset of contingency planning, development and submission of a MISO program may be required to create requisite authorities for MIS forces to execute missions. On the other hand, to facilitate joint task force operations and tactical execution may not require the submission or modification of a program, but will instead continuously be bounded by the authorized program.

Planning Considerations

MISO planners should possess joint operation planning skills, with knowledge of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure, and a thorough understanding of the customs, morals, and values of the foreign TA. Planners should understand communication synchronization as a means to advance national interests and objectives synchronized with other instruments of national power. In addition, they coordinate and synchronize MISO with other IRCs to ensure that consistent messages are communicated to TAs.

Military Information Support Operations Process

The MISO Process

The MISO process is used to develop and deliver influential messages and coordinate the execution of actions to affect the behavior of selected TAs. The process is built on the core tasks of advise, plan, develop, deliver, and assess. MISO core tasks are planned and executed across seven MISO process phases.

Planning: Phase I

Planners devise programs to support both the GCC's objectives in the region and the embassies' country plans. Programs should be submitted with the TCP. Stand-alone programs may be submitted to the Joint Staff for review, but they must be thoroughly integrated with the overall TCP.

Target Audience Analysis: Phase II

During target audience analysis (TAA), designated elements analyze approved foreign groups and individuals by following the MISO-unique TAA model. Foreign groups or individuals are examined carefully for their ability to be influenced and their ability to achieve objectives.

Series Development: Phase III

The MISO core task of development encompasses both phases III and IV, to include overall series development and individual message development as well. In developing series, MIS personnel design multiple actions and messages, determine the appropriate mix of media, and develop an execution plan. Each series focuses on a single supporting MISO objective and TA combination.

Product Development and Design: Phase IV

The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases is vital for designing individual products. There are three types of products—visual, audio, and audiovisual—depending on the TA.

Approval: Phase V

Series are approved at the lowest level of command authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

The commander of the MIS unit producing the series is the first level of authority in the approval chain. Once approved by the MISO commander, the series is formally submitted through an established staffing chain to obtain final approval for production and execution. As the series passes through the required staff sections, action officers responsible for obtaining approval at each echelon monitor progress until returned to the originating unit.

Production, Distribution, and Dissemination: Phase VI

MIS units may deploy with organic production assets or utilize reachback to coordinate for in-theater or regional support. Once production is complete, products are distributed to the disseminator. Products are distributed by air or ground transport, or transmitted digitally through secure or multiple means to the forward location where they will be delivered to the TAs.

Assessment: Phase VII

The impact of MISO is assessed within the context of competing information and influence efforts, spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that shape TA behavior. Unanticipated and spontaneous events can potentially influence a group's behavior and contribute to or undermine objective accomplishment. Series assessment assists in focusing TAA and provides the basis to adjust or maintain series.

Enablers

Intelligence Intelligence analysis, capabilities, and processes are necessary for gaining an appreciation of those aspects of the OE that can affect TA behavior. Further, assessing MISO effectiveness requires tailored, continuous intelligence support for the duration of the assessment.

Communications System Communications between commands that plan and execute MISO is vital for the effective employment of capabilities. A well-written joint MISO communications plan ensures that systems are compatible and adequate.

Logistics The CCMD or appropriate Service component staff integrates MISO logistic support into planning. MIS units are dependent primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, and dissemination contracting support.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of MISO across the range of military operations.

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

"In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon."

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945

1. Introduction

a. Military information support operations (MISO) are designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups' attitudes and behaviors. MISO influence foreign attitudes and beliefs about US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power and resolve. MISO can also degrade the enemy's combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and increase the population's support for operations.

b. Across the spectrum of conflict, MISO are integrated with chief of mission (COM), US ambassador, and geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) theater-wide priorities and objectives to shape the security environment to promote bilateral cooperation, ease tension, and deter aggression. MISO plans support a GCC's regional and theater priorities and objectives and are consistent with the priorities and objectives of the COM's mission strategic resource plan.

2. General

a. The global information environment is complex and fluid. The United States Government (USG) integrates and synchronizes the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. Recent operations have focused on the population as a center of gravity. To address this, the Department of Defense (DOD) engages local, regional, and global audiences. MISO provide joint force commanders (JFCs) with ways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the operational environment (OE) that may be as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation focused solely on enemy and adversary military capabilities. JFCs should integrate and synchronize MISO with broader USG actions and messages to ensure that they are mutually supportive and achieve unified action.

b. DOD is a key component of a broader USG communication synchronization effort. DOD communication synchronization efforts and the separate and unique capabilities of MISO and public affairs (PA) (to include visual information) address a variety of specific target audiences (TAs). DOD activities can be used to inform, direct, or persuade TAs. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts should support the overall legitimacy of USG activities.

See Chapter II, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships," for additional clarification of DOD information activities.

c. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. TAs are individuals or groups selected for influence, and may include enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral groups or populations. Military information support (MIS) personnel follow a deliberate process that aligns commander's objectives with an analysis of the OE. The process identifies relevant TAs; develops focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employs appropriate media delivery means; and produces observable, measurable behavioral responses. **It is important not to confuse the psychological impact of other military operations with MISO.** Many actions of the joint force, such as air strikes, have psychological impact, but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the attitudes, rules, norms, beliefs, and subsequent behavior of a TA. However, the psychological impact of such events can significantly enhance or undermine program effectiveness and is considered during planning, execution, and assessment. Regardless of the circumstances, all MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities. MIS officers advise the commander and operations officer on the possible psychological impacts of all actions and ongoing operations.

d. MISO contribute to the success of offensive, defensive, and stability operations as well as to the success of all activities conducted throughout the conflict continuum.

(1) During phase 0 (Shaping), MISO are planned and integrated to further national defense strategies through the GCC's theater campaign plan (TCP). Combatant commanders (CCDRs) integrate MISO programs into the broad range of activities required for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. For example, in support of TCPs, MIS units support counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense (FID), or security assistance programs.

(2) MISO reinforce US policies to prevent hostilities and advocate peaceful resolutions. MISO advance US efforts to deter aggression and contribute to the JFC initiatives to shape the OE. MIS units communicate messages to TAs to clarify intent, prevent escalation of tension, ease concerns, and mitigate the potential effects of enemy and adversary information capabilities and activities.

(3) When diplomatic, informational, and economic measures fail to deter conflict, and the USG employs military capabilities, MISO can set conditions for the insertion of combat forces by assisting efforts to neutralize threats, contain conflict, stabilize the operational area, and hasten the return to diplomacy, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. MISO can inform, direct, educate, and influence TAs to increase US combat power by decreasing enemy aggression. Integration of MISO may also reduce operational risk and collateral damage, as well as help to reduce military and civilian casualties.

(4) MIS forces also provide civil authority information support (CAIS). CAIS is defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) activities conducted under a designated lead

federal agency or other US civil authority to support delivery of public or other critical information during domestic emergencies.

3. Legal and Policy Considerations

a. Legal Considerations

(1) DOD MISO are conducted in accordance with applicable US law, regulations, and DOD policy, and in accordance with applicable international agreements and customary international law that is binding on the US. The JFC's staff judge advocate advises the JFC and staff on legal authority and constraints on all operations. Although the following list is not all-inclusive, consideration should be given to the following specific legal issues when planning and conducting MISO:

(a) The authority and permission to communicate the messages and actions that support approved themes to TAs.

(b) Compliance with US copyright law, Federal Communications Commission broadcasting regulations, and other statutes and regulations.

(c) Compliance with international law, such as the Hague Conventions, which prohibits treachery or perfidy.

(d) International agreements with host nations (HNs) (e.g., status-of-forces agreements) may limit the activities of MIS units.

(2) MIS units are employed during military operations as well as operations led by civilian agencies. They can be a vital asset to other USG departments and agencies in many situations when DOD is not the lead. The legal authority for MISO allows this DOD capability to be integrated with national-level strategies and support other USG departments and agencies.

b. Policy Considerations

(1) Executive-level policies reflect US law and provide USG departments, agencies, and activities with guidance requiring the coordination of MISO and CAIS-related policy, plans, and programs in support of US national security strategic objectives. Collectively, these policies assign MISO responsibilities, guide the planning and execution of MISO, and prompt action to integrate MISO into military operations and other USG activities.

(2) Military leaders and planners interpret both broad and limited policies that affect national security. These policies focus on countering issues such as terrorism, trafficking of illegal drugs, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. MISO are integrated with other US capabilities to help achieve US objectives that address these and other global issues.

c. **Strategy.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on providing strategic direction to execute MISO in support of national strategies. CCDRs' analyses of national strategic objectives are critical to determining MISO requirements. Other USG departments' and agencies' approaches to implement national strategies are also important to determine how MIS units will be employed.

d. **MISO Programs.** Staffs prepare MISO programs during operation planning. Programs may be an element of joint force or Service operations, in support of other USG departments' or agencies' operations, as planned in a GCC's TCP, or executed independently. An approved program alone does not necessarily constitute execution authority. Execution is initiated through a MISO-specific execute order (EXORD) or in support of an EXORD for an operation.

See Appendix A, "Legal and Policy Considerations," for additional clarification of legal and policy matters.

See Appendix D, "Military Information Support Operations Program Format," for information on MISO programs and their content.

4. Military Information Support Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

MIS forces provide the President, SecDef, JFCs, and, when directed, COMs with an influence capability to support requirements across the range of military operations.

a. **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** MISO support activities such as humanitarian demining assistance, disaster relief, humanitarian and civic assistance, and counterdrug operations. During peacetime, MISO allow GCCs to shape the OE and help them achieve US objectives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). Peacetime MISO activities should be planned in conjunction with, fully integrated into, and submitted as part of the GCC's TCP. MISO can contribute to the success of the following activities:

(1) Support to USG country team or HN civil programs (e.g., counterdrug, demining, health and sanitation awareness, security sector assistance, ethnic tolerance, and reconciliation).

(2) Special operations (e.g., FID, counterinsurgency).

(3) Foreign humanitarian assistance.

b. **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations**

(1) MIS forces are often critical to success in contingency operations. Activities include providing the CCDR with joint military information support task forces (JMISTFs) capable of producing audio, visual, and audiovisual media.

(2) MISO can magnify the effects of diplomatic activities, military operations, and economic sanctions. To maximize the effectiveness of messages and actions, they are

carefully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized with the actions and messages of other information-related capabilities (IRCs), as well as other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and international organizations, as part of the JFC's communication synchronization efforts. MISO support JFC's objectives by bolstering HN and US embassy programs and supporting the legitimacy of foreign institutions.

c. **Major Operations and Campaigns.** MISO enhance the effectiveness of other combat capabilities in large-scale military operations. MISO potentially reduce casualties (enemy, friendly, and civilian) by making combatants aware of opportunities to cease hostilities. MISO can also help the JFC to build popular support by informing civilians of US intentions, objectives, areas to avoid, and programs designed to assist the population.

d. **DSCA.** CAIS elements can assist a lead federal agency by delivering public information and safety messages within the US and its territories. This is typically conducted during natural disaster relief or national security actions following domestic incidents. MIS forces executing CAIS during a domestic crisis are not executing MISO, which is by definition directed against foreign TAs.

5. Key Considerations for Effective Military Information Support Operations

a. Early Planning and Sustained Employment

(1) MISO are integrated at the initial stages of planning. This enables the JFC to shape the information environment for initial and subsequent military engagement activities. This also allows the commander to consider the potential psychological impacts of other lines of effort. Early planning of MISO and employment of MIS forces increase the potential to influence foreign TAs within the area of interest.

(2) MISO require sustained application as part of broader USG communication synchronization efforts. Effective MISO are proactive and help the JFC set conditions for achieving subsequent phase objectives. MISO may be executed in all phases and, in some phases, may be the JFC's main effort.

b. **Unified Action and MISO.** JFCs should plan, synchronize, coordinate, and integrate MISO with other USG and multinational partner communication efforts. Synchronization of MISO with other actions precludes DOD messages or actions, and other agencies' messages and actions, from contradicting or weakening each other.

c. **Use of Nonorganic Assets.** Planners consider the use of nonorganic resources to mitigate constraints, increase TA receptivity, increase credibility, and reinforce legitimacy. Typically, organic MISO assets are required for joint force operations. However, limitations such as denied areas, logistics lines, and personnel caps may constrain or negate their use during specific phases or entire operations. Partner nation (PN) and commercial assets outside the operational area may mitigate some of the limitations. Indigenous resources, including production, distribution, and dissemination assets, may increase TA receptivity to messages, reduce military footprint, increase credibility of products, and reinforce the legitimacy of the HN government, allies, and other agencies.

d. **Command Emphasis and Resourcing.** Commanders emphasize the importance of MISO. The commander's intent, lines of effort, and allocation of resources convey this importance. Examples include prioritization in the time-phased force and deployment data, the allocation of resources in the sustainment plan, and allocation of network resources. When wargaming courses of action (COAs), MISO are emphasized by determining potential psychological effects of operations and using those effects as criteria in selecting COAs. Commanders emphasize MISO by including information requirements in the commander's critical information requirements.

e. **Responsive MISO Approval Process.** An uncomplicated, rapid product approval process is crucial to providing responsive MISO. SecDef normally approves the program as part of the CCDR's operation plan (OPLAN) or TCP. Approval of the program, execution, and series approval authority is issued to the CCDR in the EXORD. The CCDR delegates approval authority to the lowest practical level in accordance with SecDef's guidance. Once approval authority is delegated to a subordinate commander, the approval process belongs to that commander. The delegated commander's internal staffing process should be comprehensive without including extraneous staffing requirements that make the process cumbersome, delaying approval.

f. **Assessment**

(1) Quantifiable and timely assessment criteria, to include measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs), are required for every program. Assessment criteria should be established early during planning, included in the overall collection plan, evaluated often, and adjusted as necessary throughout operations to meet the JFC's objectives.

(2) To measure effects on human behavior, commanders and planners include information and intelligence collection requirements for MISO and other IRCs in the collection plan.

g. **Media and Delivery Options.** Technological advances continue to provide innovative media and delivery methods to convey messages to the TA. Planners identify the appropriate media and delivery methods to successfully influence specific TAs. Planners include the dissemination means and media choices in the program. Planners should clearly articulate any gaps in existing policy or authorization for emerging or new medium types or delivery methods in order to facilitate the authorization and approval process.

CHAPTER II
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS

"Psychological warfare has always rested as an uneasy activity in democracies, even in wartime. It is partly to do with the suspicion that using the mind to influence the mind is somehow unacceptable. But is it more unacceptable to shoot someone's brains out rather than to persuade that brain to drop down their weapon and live?"

Dr. Phillip M. Taylor
***Munitions of the Mind*, Manchester University Press, 1995**

1. General

The Unified Command Plan (UCP), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide direction and guidance to CCDRs on joint operation planning and their respective responsibilities. The roles, responsibilities, and relationships delineated in this chapter reflect general guidance derived from this strategic guidance as well as directives, instructions, joint and Service doctrine, and current practices within the MIS community.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Secretary of Defense

(1) Approves all MISO programs submitted as part of a CCDR's TCP and OPLAN.

(2) Through an EXORD, delegates series and product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for operational- and tactical-level products during contingency and major operations.

b. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])

(1) Provides strategic MISO advice to USG departments and agencies and multinational partners.

(2) Approves and oversees all MISO policy and programs not delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]).

(3) Delegates product approval and dissemination authorities to the appropriate level for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence programs.

(4) Retains approval authority for all programs not submitted as part of a plan.

(5) Coordinates MISO policy, plans, and programs with other USG departments and agencies.

For a full description of MISO program and series approval authorities, see the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3110.05), Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. **ASD(SO/LIC)**

(1) Acts as principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to USD(P) on MISO matters.

(2) Oversees MISO integration within DOD including overseeing joint operations, force development, and programming and budgeting.

(3) Develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy for MISO.

(4) Reviews, evaluates, coordinates, and oversees plans, programs, and resources to ensure adherence to approved policy and planning guidance.

(5) Provides policy guidance and recommendations for MISO during deliberate and crisis action planning.

(6) Makes recommendations to the USD(P) for all matters concerning the CCDRs' MISO plans, programs, activities, and requests for forces.

(7) Ascertains where shortfalls in intelligence support to MISO exist and recommends activities to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence that support the capabilities and plans of DOD components.

(8) Represents the USD(P) and SecDef in interagency deliberations and international negotiations dealing with MISO, as required.

(9) Establishes standing departmental and interagency working groups, as appropriate, to facilitate the conduct of effective MISO.

d. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs** reviews plans and programs, and provides recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC) on programs affecting the combatant commands (CCMDs).

e. **CJCS**

(1) Advises the President, SecDef, and National Security Council on all MISO matters.

(2) Represents SecDef in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Psychological Operations Working Group and in other multinational military forums.

(3) Coordinates and directs the preparation of multinational MISO plans and US participation in multinational MISO training programs.

(4) Provides MISO representation to interagency organizations and their working groups.

(5) Provides guidance for MISO conducted by the CCDRs.

(6) Prepares strategic guidance and issues policy for the use of MISO.

(7) Provides for the preparation and review of MISO aspects of plans to ensure that they conform to policy guidance from the President and SecDef.

(8) Advises SecDef on the priorities of MISO requirements identified by the CCDRs.

(9) Prepares integrated logistics and mobilization guidance for MISO capabilities.

(10) Provides a unified, prioritized list of MISO intelligence and counterintelligence requirements to meet the needs of the CCDRs, Joint Staff, and Services.

(11) Ensures integration of MISO into military planning.

f. **CCDRs** have the following responsibilities:

(1) Ensure that staffs and subordinate components have sufficient representation and working proficiency in the planning and execution of MISO.

(2) Designate specific staff responsibility to maintain MISO planning capability to integrate MISO into concept plans, OPLANS, TCPs, and supporting plans.

(3) Develop plans and programs to achieve CCDR MISO objectives.

(4) Identify, develop, and submit MISO requirements for authorities, forces, and resources through the Joint Staff.

(5) Conduct MISO analysis and assessment.

(6) Plan and execute MISO in support of theater military missions to achieve CCDR objectives.

(7) Coordinate MISO with other USG departments and agencies, and COMs within the GCC's AOR.

(8) Recommend theater-specific MIS forces training requirements to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

(9) Prepare program and budget input to fund approved MISO programs. Coordinate with the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and the other CCDRs to ensure that all MISO and support requirements are addressed.

g. **Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM),** is the designated joint proponent for MISO, responsible for leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the MISO capability across DOD. CDRUSSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed under the CCDR responsibilities above:

(1) Provides trained and ready MIS forces to support SecDef and the other CCDRs.

(2) Performs as joint proponent for development of MISO joint doctrine; training and education for individuals and units; joint capabilities; universal joint tasks; and identification of critical individual skills, training, and experience.

(3) Prepares and provides assigned MIS forces to the other CCDRs and USG lead agencies, when directed by SecDef.

(4) Supports the MISO planning, coordination, synchronization, execution, and assessment efforts of the geographic and functional CCDRs.

(5) Develops joint MISO programs of instruction, and when directed, trains DOD and foreign military personnel in MISO and influence techniques and procedures.

(6) Recommends MISO policy guidance to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and US military commanders, as required.

(7) Develops and validates priorities for training, intelligence, and military requirements and provides these to the CJCS to support Service, CCMD, and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to MISO.

(8) Provides visibility of MISO issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels.

(9) Coordinates with the Joint Staff and other CCDRs to integrate MISO into joint training and concept development plans and programs.

(10) Develops concepts to support national security objectives, reviews Service doctrine development for consistency with joint doctrine, and ensures that joint and Service MISO training supports national objectives.

(11) Observes and evaluates MIS forces in exercises to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(12) Manages the MISO Studies Program and coordinates MISO input to the Defense Intelligence Production schedule.

(13) Coordinates and synchronizes transregional MISO when directed by SecDef or CJCS.

(14) Coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning, equipping, and providing sustainment of MIS forces assigned to the other CCDRs.

h. **Military Departments and Services.** When directed by SecDef, provide global force management of MIS forces (not assigned to CDRUSSOCOM or under the operational control [OPCON] of a GCC) to support the MISO plans, programs, and activities of the CCMDs and other USG departments and agencies.

See Appendix B, "Capabilities," for further detail concerning Service MISO capabilities.

i. **JFCs Serving in Multinational Commands**

(1) Implement multinational MISO plans to the extent consistent with international law, including the law of war, and treaty/international agreement obligations in relations with the governments of countries where US forces are assigned.

(2) Request guidance from SecDef on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate.

(3) Coordinate joint MISO planning with appropriate multinational and PN force commanders.

j. **Other USG Departments and Agencies**

(1) During peacetime, the COM provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interagency activities in a particular country. The COM may restrict MISO within specific countries or areas.

(2) Interagency coordination of DOD responsibilities is accomplished by the CJCS in the National Security Council system. As the principal military advisor to the President, the CJCS represents the CCDR's requirements and interests at the National Security Council Principals Committee.

(3) Other USG departments and agencies impacted by MISO, including peacetime activities, may provide recommendations to joint planners to facilitate unity of effort.

3. Relationships

a. **General.** The JFC may leverage IRCs, to include MISO, to create a desired effect in support of operational objectives.

(1) Because PA and MISO are each distinct activities, commanders should ensure that there is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communications effort. To this end, **it is critical that all DOD information activities are conducted in a manner that reinforces the credibility and legitimacy of DOD and USG activities.**

(2) PA and MISO are separate and unique activities that are governed by policy and practice in terms of audiences, focus, and scope. DOD communication synchronization

integrates various instruments of national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes, messages, images, and actions. DOD communication synchronization supports the continuity of DOD strategic- and operational-level messages and actions with overall USG policy and themes.

b. **MISO and Communication Synchronization**

(1) Communication synchronization consists of a focused USG effort to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

(2) MISO are a key capability that support joint operations by influencing foreign audiences in support of US objectives. Given its focus on foreign TAs, MISO training provides personnel with an understanding of the language and culture of the TA. This knowledge is utilized in the preparation of messages and actions.

c. **MISO and Information Operations (IO)**

(1) IO are the integrated employment of IRCs during military operations, in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. MISO are coordinated with other IRCs to ensure that deconfliction processes are in place. IO planners ensure that IRCs are coordinated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose to achieve the objectives established during planning.

(2) IRCs are integrated and synchronized into the joint operation planning process (JOPP) by an IO cell. The IO cell chief convenes the cell periodically, to integrate IRCs. Within the IO cell, the MISO representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes MISO with other IRCs.

For further information regarding IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(a) **MISO and Cyberspace Operations.** Cyberspace operations support MIS forces with defensive cyberspace operations to protect MISO and offensive cyberspace operations to deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade, destroy, exploit, and/or control enemy command and control (C2) systems. Cyberspace operational coordination with MISO is also essential for protection of MISO information sources and is a key element of CCMD operations security (OPSEC). MISO can support cyberspace operations with messages to deter TAs from intruding into DOD cyberspace.

For further details concerning cyberspace operations, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

(b) **MISO and Space Operations.** Space operations support MIS forces with delivery assets and the capabilities to deny or degrade an adversary's ability to access, report, process, or disseminate information.

For further details concerning space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.

(c) **MISO and Military Deception (MILDEC)**

1. MIS forces provide the JFC capabilities that can deceive the enemy and facilitate mission accomplishment. MISO create and reinforce actions to deliberately mislead enemy decision makers about US military capabilities, intentions, and operations. Synchronized MILDEC operations and MISO can influence the adversary to take specific actions or inactions.

2. MISO support to MILDEC operations are carefully considered by the commander and staff, weighing the likely benefits of a deception operation against a potential short- and long-term loss of credibility with the media and local and regional audiences.

For further details concerning MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(d) **MISO and OPSEC.** MISO plans and messages are protected prior to execution through the proper use of information security, cybersecurity, physical security, and OPSEC. USG contracts for MISO undergo OPSEC review prior to release to the public to avoid revealing critical information or indicators of friendly operations.

For further details concerning OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(e) **MISO and Electronic Warfare (EW).** EW platforms provide a means of disseminating MISO messages and shaping the information environment through the electronic delivery of MISO messages. When appropriate, EW platforms can also prevent or disrupt adversary and enemy forces' dissemination of information. MISO and EW planned frequency use should be deconflicted when developing the joint restricted frequency list.

For further details concerning EW, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

d. **MISO and PA**

(1) MISO are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of foreign TAs in a manner favorable to US objectives.

(2) Military PA forces plan, coordinate, and synchronize public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in DOD. Through timely dissemination of factual information to international and domestic audiences, PA puts operational actions in context, facilitates the development of informed perceptions about military operations among information consumers, and undermines adversarial information efforts.

(3) PA and MISO activities are separate and distinct, but they should support and reinforce each other. This requires coordination, synchronization, and occasionally deconfliction. These planning activities are generally accomplished in the IO working group, the IO cell, or other planning groups. Regardless of whether formal planning groups

EXPLOITING THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Military Information Support Task Force—Afghanistan (MISTF-A) electronic warfare (EW) operators executed EW missions, delivering military information support operations (MISO) products over insurgent communications systems, to disrupt the insurgent narrative while promoting the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). MISO personnel leveraged the electromagnetic system to broadcast messages to target audiences using various multinational ground and airborne platforms to deliver audio products to adversary target audiences. These platforms deliver tactical communications (TC) messages directly into the insurgent's command and control radio networks, thereby denying enemy capability.

By monitoring insurgent networks, the MISTF-A was able to capture live responses from the insurgent audience. These responses indicated that MISTF-A messages increased confusion among the target audience. Insurgents discussed the messages amongst themselves, attempted to talk back to the products, changed frequencies, and attempted to over-broadcast the MISO products to prevent the dissemination. Several products elicited responses from listeners, such as insurgents attempting to call back on the frequency to speak after the broadcast. On one occasion, the Afghan Local Police reported the "surrender of six Taliban with 25 expected to follow suit," after hearing messages from an unknown origin that said to "stop fighting" and that "GIROA was too strong." This indicated that the message was heard and influenced the insurgents to discontinue their operations.

The daily use of EW capabilities has enabled the MISTF-A to provide support to dynamic events in the operational environment. While broadcasting a routine message in eastern Afghanistan, MISTF-A supporting aircraft were diverted to support troops-in-contact. The MISTF-A retasked an EW asset and provided support to the troops-in-contact by broadcasting a TC message on the enemy's active command frequency, disrupting the insurgent's command and control network. Unable to communicate, the insurgents withdrew their attack, while allowing the coalition forces on the ground time to properly defend their operational area.

The emergence of MISTF-A messaging via EW capabilities has proven to be an effective means to communicate to target audiences at the tactical level throughout Afghanistan.

Various Sources

are established, PA and MISO planners conduct informal coordination for their respective capabilities as well as with other related capabilities. JFCs should coordinate MISO and PA activities to maintain consistency with the DOD principles of information.

For further details concerning PA and the principles of information, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL

"As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them."

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini
***Summary of The Art of War*, 1838**

1. General

a. Operational planning for MISO resides at the CCMD. The theater special operations command (TSOC) or Service component usually exercises OPCON over their respective MIS forces when they are attached to the GCC. The TSOC commander may become the principal advisor to the supported CCDR for MISO. When a CCDR establishes a subordinate joint task force (JTF), MISO positions are allocated to the TSOC or JFC's staff. The inclusion of these positions on the JFC's staff ensures nesting of supporting MISO plans with the CCDR's plan. When approved by the GCC, the JFC can direct the establishment of a JMISTF to plan and conduct operations within the theater. Requests for MIS forces are staffed to SecDef in the same manner that other forces are requested.

b. Subordinate commanders identify MIS force requirements to the JFC. Depending on mission requirements, MISO staff support may be provided to the commander of a subunified command, JTF, or component command to enhance planning and coordinating capability.

c. During planning, CCDRs identify the capabilities required to execute their assigned missions. CCDRs establish subordinate joint forces and designate the required subordinate components. The requested MIS force size and planned disposition may exceed the C2 capabilities of the joint force components. In these cases, the CCDR may identify the requirement to establish a JMISTF or military information support task force (MISTF) as a component of the joint force. The CCDR may decide to establish the MISTF or JMISTF as a component of an existing joint force component such as a joint special operations task force or special operations task force. MIS forces may be organized as large as a battalion-sized JMISTF, or as small as a MIS team. The CCDR may delegate OPCON of all assigned MIS forces to the JMISTF commander, or may exercise OPCON of specified MIS forces through the commander of the units or components to which they are attached or assigned.

(1) The JMISTF integrates MISO into joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels. During planning, the JMISTF coordinates with applicable Service, functional components, and staff elements to determine MISO requirements. During execution, the JMISTF continues this coordination. The JMISTF commander may request direct liaison authority to coordinate and synchronize operations with other USG departments or agencies, or multinational officials.

(2) The JMISTF deconflicts all MISO that occur under the JTF and other commands as designated by the establishing authority. Deconfliction is accomplished

through the MISO approval process, direct coordination lines, liaison, and the synchronization conducted by IO staffs. In the absence of a MIS component, the requirement to deconflict MISO is executed in the same manner as all operations are, in the operations staff sections.

(3) Mission requirements dictate the JMISTF organizational structure and the functions conducted. It also may be organized as a multinational or combined JMISTF if multinational partners provide MIS staff personnel and forces to support operations.

(a) A multinational or combined JMISTF supports multinational military operations, as well as operations involving intergovernmental and regional organizations.

(b) SecDef typically delegates MISO message and release approval authorities to the supported GCC in the EXORD. The GCC may further delegate MISO series approval authority on a case-by-case basis, as specified in the MISO EXORD. If US MIS forces are under the OPCON of a non-US commander for the sole purpose of developing multinational messages, MISO series approval authority remains with the GCC, and may be delegated to the senior US military officer involved in the operation, or be delegated to the non-US commander, with SecDef approval.

d. An order (e.g., EXORD, operation order [OPORD], or fragmentary order) often provides additional guidance for MISO series approval and delivery/release procedures. The MISO scope is defined by specific approved objectives, and delivery means may be limited to certain types. The approval of sensitive message content may be restricted to specified levels of command. In all cases, the risk of unintended effects is weighed with ensuring that there is a responsive approval process for commanders.

2. Organizing Military Information Support Forces

a. If the JFC determines that MISO planning and execution requires control by a component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests establishment of a JMISTF or MISTF. JMISTFs can serve as a component or staff element of the JFC, or as a subcomponent or staff element under an existing component such as a joint special operations task force. **Control should favor centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution.** Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required coordination. Considerations for MISO may dictate that control be at high national levels.

(1) Dissemination assets, primarily from Army units, may be attached in the continental United States (CONUS) to deploying units, attached in theater based on mission requirements, or deployed with the JMISTF, and remain in support of the entire joint force.

(2) An Army MIS battalion has C2 and product development capability. These assets may be attached in CONUS to deploying units, attached in theater based on mission requirements, or deployed with the JMISTF, and remain in support of the entire joint force.

(3) Retaining OPCON of the JMISTF at the JFC optimizes interaction with other operational activities and streamlines the approval process.

(4) Factors that affect the size and composition of the MIS force include, but are not limited to:

(a) Capability required.

(b) Scope and duration of the operation.

(c) Policy, funding, and foreign or HN restrictions and their impact on other CCMD and supporting component objectives.

For more information on joint force organizational options, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, *or JP 3-33,* Joint Task Force Headquarters.

b. MISO planning and execution requirements can be accomplished by augmenting the JFC's staff with a task-organized unit. The joint force MIS officer will work through the various staff sections to maintain awareness of MISO capabilities, staff support requirements, and the operational integration of planned MISO.

c. MIS forces conducting peacetime shaping operations in support of the Department of State (DOS) at a US embassy remain under C2 of military commanders. OPCON of Army Active Component MIS forces is usually exercised by a TSOC. OPCON of Army Reserve Component (RC) MIS forces supporting GCC TCP exercises and activities is exercised by the supported GCC. The senior DOD official normally exercises tactical control for force protection. The requirements for COM concurrence for MISO execution are identified within the TCP, OPLAN, or MISO program that guides these operations.

d. When deployed in support of joint operations, EC-130J Commando Solo is normally OPCON to the GCC, with tactical control delegated to a component, if required. United States Air Force (USAF) assets, leaflet canisters, and the aircraft to deliver them typically remain under OPCON of the Air Force component commander. USAF MIS personnel assigned to an Air Force air operations center (AOC) plan activities intended to produce psychological effects and coordinate those efforts with the JMISTF. Coordinating authority is granted between component commanders and the JMISTF commander to facilitate MISO dissemination.

e. US Navy assets include the capability to broadcast on ultrahigh frequency, very high frequency, and high frequency; leaflet/handbill reproduction capability; and leaflet canisters, with the aircraft to deliver them. US Navy assets normally remain under the OPCON of the Navy component commander.

For further detail, refer to Appendix B, "Capabilities."

f. The high demand for MIS forces to support worldwide operations makes reachback a critical component for MISO success. Reachback assets should be considered during planning to minimize transportation requirements and provide flexibility to support future operations. Improvements in technology will continue to increase the ability of MISO to support multiple geographic areas with limited assets. The Active Component Media

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND COMMANDO SOLO

"We have an EC-130 aircraft that is rigged out as a broadcasting studio. And it broadcasts—...we were broadcasting in Afghanti—in the various languages with Afghan music intermittently to put on a five-hour radio program covering all of Afghanistan in theater. We were running two five-hour broadcasts per day out of this aircraft, short wave and AM. The leaflet drops—...from 14 October to 21 October, the B-52s, which obviously dropped other things, dropped over 10 million leaflets across Afghanistan. And our MC-130s also were dropping leaflets there. The 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group [Airborne] that you mentioned is down at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and it's a very unique operation of video, graphics arts, printed media, some very good professionals down there that work on the PSYOP themes that are approved here at national policy, at the State Department, et cetera."

Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) Defense LINK News Transcript, 12 December 2001

Operations Complex, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is capable of providing multimedia reachback support to deployed MIS forces.

g. MIS units apportioned for theater planning purposes are identified in the Apportioned Force Tables in Section IV of the current Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

"...Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between."

Robert Gates
22nd United States Secretary of Defense
26 November 2007

1. Joint Operation Planning and Phasing

a. General

(1) The GEF and the JSCP set priorities for activities undertaken in the near term, which is usually the period covered by budget execution (present through two years). The GEF is used mainly by the CCDRs and those who support them to guide the development of plans. The JSCP specifically tasks CCDRs to develop plans consistent with the GEF. These plans define how GCCs conduct all DOD activities within their AOR.

(2) Joint planning integrates US military operations with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to attain specified end states. MISO planners should be integrated into all phases of planning to ensure that MISO are synchronized to support the commander's objectives. This chapter focuses on security cooperation and joint operation planning. Joint operation planning includes deliberate and crisis action planning and can result in campaign plans, contingency plans, OPLANs, or OPORDs, depending on the scope and complexity of the situation. Joint operation planning and planning for a campaign are not separate planning types or processes; rather, campaign planning represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. MISO have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary and taking away its ability to muster popular support.

For additional details on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

(3) MISO planning identifies desired TA behavioral changes and end states, along with the specific messages and actions to effect those changes. In planning MISO, the following terms are used:

(a) **MISO Objective.** A MISO objective is a general statement of measurable response that reflects the desired behavioral change of foreign TAs. For example, a supported commander's critical task may be to "Create a safe and secure environment in Country X." A corresponding MISO objective would be "Decrease violence in Country X," which clearly describes an intended direction of behavioral change. MISO objectives are usually broad in scope. They are approved at the USD(P) or SecDef level.

(b) **Supporting MISO Objective.** Supporting MISO objectives are specific observable and measurable behavioral responses desired from the TA to accomplish a given MISO objective. Supporting objectives are written using a "subject – verb – object" structure. The subject is always "TA." TAs are not specified in the supporting objective because often multiple TAs are targeted to accomplish the desired behavioral change. The "verb – object" combination describes the desired behavioral change. For example, if the MISO objective is "Increase support for the provisional government," the supporting MISO objective might be "TA reports insurgent activity to local authorities."

(c) **MISO Program.** A program is the basic plan for the execution of MISO. MISO programs include at a minimum objectives, product approval authorities, themes to stress, themes to avoid, TAs, attribution, means of dissemination, a concept of operations (CONOPS), and funding sources. A MISO program supports military objectives and is approved by SecDef or USD(P). In general, each distinct campaign or contingency plan contains one or more programs, under which all MISO are executed. Approved programs provide the framework for the execution of MISO in the range of military operations. At minimum, MISO programs include objectives, product approval authority, themes to stress, themes to avoid, TAs, attribution, means of dissemination, and a CONOPS. Changes to programs (objectives, TAs, etc.) can be made only by the original approving authority.

(d) **MISO Series.** A MISO series consists of all messages and actions developed for a single TA, to achieve a single supporting MISO objective. As an example, a supporting objective of "TA utilizes reporting hotline to report crime" might employ a variety of actions and products such as "wanted" posters, informational "tip-line" cards, radio broadcasts, and direct appeals to community leaders. All of these would be considered part of the same series.

(e) **TA.** An individual or group selected for influence. TAs can be very broad (e.g., all the people in Country X) or very specific (e.g., prominent citizens in Village Y), or even tangential to the supporting objective (e.g., key spiritual or cultural figures that hold sway with another TA).

b. **Planning.** MISO planners, like all other functional planners, participate in JOPP and contribute to the development of the overall plan during deliberate or crisis action planning. They consider the impacts of other joint force functions on MISO and conversely the impacts on the planning and execution of all elements of the operation. Planners should be cognizant that JOPP is conducted at different levels to operationalize strategy and to generate tactical-level orders. Considerations and procedures may be different given the level at which JOPP is conducted. At the outset of contingency planning, development and submission of a MISO program may be required to create requisite authorities for MIS forces to execute missions. On the other hand, to facilitate JTF operations and tactical execution may not require the submission or modification of a program, but will instead continuously be bounded by the authorized program. The following planning steps provide some considerations for what may be important to the MISO planner.

(1) **Step 1, Planning Initiation.** Integration of IRCs into joint operations should begin at step 1, planning initiation. Key staff actions during this step include the following:

(a) Review key strategic documents.

(b) Monitor the situation, receive initial planning guidance, and review staff estimates from applicable plans.

(c) Identify current and planned operations or activities within the operational area.

(d) Gauge initial scope of MISO required for the operation.

(e) Identify information required for mission analysis and COA development.

(f) Identify planning support requirements (including staff augmentation, support products, and services) and issue requests for support according to procedures established locally and by various supporting organizations.

(g) Validate, initiate, and revise priority intelligence requirements and requests for information, keeping in mind the long lead times associated with satisfying MISO requirements.

(h) Provide input and recommendations to COAs, and provide resolutions to conflicts that exist with other plans or lines of operation.

(2) **Step 2, Mission Analysis.** Based upon guidance received from the JFC or higher, staffs conduct mission analysis and develop the MISO staff estimates. This estimate identifies how MISO support and impact the overall JFC mission.

(a) Assist the joint staff's operations and intelligence directorates in identifying friendly and adversary center(s) of gravity and critical factors (i.e., critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities).

(b) Identify relevant aspects of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions (whether friendly, neutral, adversary, or enemy) of the information environment.

(c) Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.

(d) Identify facts, assumptions, and limitations affecting planning.

(e) Develop and refine proposed priority intelligence requirements, requests for information, and friendly force information requirements.

(f) Conduct initial MISO-related risk assessment.

(g) Develop MISO mission statement.

(h) Begin developing the initial MISO staff estimate. This estimate forms the basis for recommendations to the JFC concerning which COA it can best support.

(i) Conduct initial force allocation review.

(j) Assist in the development of the JFC's mission success criteria.

(k) Identify TAs.

(l) Develop MISO objectives. If an operational approach had previously been developed, the MISO objectives should support the lines of operation, lines of effort, tasks, effects, objectives, and end state of the operational approach.

(m) Develop approval authorities.

(n) Identify themes to stress and avoid.

(o) Identify attribution posture(s).

(3) **Step 3, COA Development**

(a) Identify desired and undesired effects that support or degrade JFC's objectives.

(b) Develop MOEs and MOPs and relevant indicators.

(c) Develop tasks for recommendation to the J-3, operations directorate of a joint staff.

(d) Recommend IRCs that may be used to accomplish supporting MISO tasks for each COA.

(e) Recommend MISO-specific supplemental rules of engagement.

(f) Identify additional operational risks and controls/mitigation.

(g) Develop the MISO CONOPS narrative/sketch in the staff estimate for each COA.

(h) Continue update/development of the staff estimate.

(i) Prepare input to the COA brief.

(4) **Step 4, COA Analysis**

(a) Analyze each COA from a MISO perspective.

(b) Identify key decision points.

(c) Provide MISO-focused data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decision-making tool.

(d) Identify MISO portions of branches and sequels.

(e) Identify possible high-value targets relevant to MISO.

(f) Recommend commander's critical information requirements.

(g) Revise MISO staff estimate.

(h) Assess risk.

(5) **Step 5, COA Comparison**

(a) Compare each COA based on mission and tasks.

(b) Compare each COA in relation to MISO requirements.

(c) Prioritize COAs from a MISO perspective.

(d) Revise the MISO staff estimate.

(6) **Step 6, COA Approval.** Like other elements of the JFC's staff, the MISO staff provides the JFC with a clear recommendation of how MISO can best contribute to mission accomplishment in the COA(s) being briefed.

(7) **Step 7, Plan or Order Development**

(a) Refine tasks from the approved COA.

(b) Facilitate development of supporting plans by keeping the responsible organizations informed of relevant details (as security access restrictions allow) throughout the planning process.

(c) Advise the supported commander on MISO issues and concerns during the supporting plan review and approval process.

(d) Participate in time-phased force and deployment data refinement to ensure MISO supports the OPLAN, concept plan, or OPORD.

(e) Develop the MISO tab (Tab A [MISO] to Appendix 3 [IO] to Annex C [Operations]) of a joint plan.

c. **Phasing.** Phasing is a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing unity of effort during execution. Integration of MISO into JOPP determines what MISO objectives will best contribute to success as the joint operation progresses. Some activities and objectives are relevant to all phases of a joint operation, while others are better suited to specific phases.

For additional information on phasing, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, *and JP 3-0,* Joint Operations.

d. MISO tasks that may occur in all phases, include the following:

(1) Increase support for the US, HN, and participating nations' actions.

(2) Decrease combat effectiveness of adversary or enemy forces.

(3) Conduct continuous assessment of MISO.

(4) Counter enemy or adversary information activities.

(5) Mitigate unintended or negative effects of multinational or JTF operations.

(6) Illustrate the legitimacy and credibility of joint force and HN actions.

(7) Lessen external support for an enemy or adversary.

(8) Reduce interference with friendly operations.

(9) Reduce casualties and collateral damage.

(10) Exploit tactical and operational successes on the battlefield.

(11) Highlight enemy atrocities to reduce populace support.

e. **Shape (Phase 0).** Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. During this phase, MISO tasks may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) Identify objectives, supporting objectives, and potential TA.

(2) Develop MOEs, MOPs, and concept of assessment.

(3) Approve MISO program or plan.

(4) Increase support for US activities and operations.

(5) Deploy MIS forces.

(6) Establish relationships within the JTF or country team.

f. **Deter (Phase I).** The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is not successful. During this phase, MISO tasks may include, but not be limited to:

(I) Support to flexible deterrent options.

(2) Deterring acquisition, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.

(3) Deterring aggression and armed conflict.

g. **Seize Initiative (Phase II).** JFCs seek to seize the initiative through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations, this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination, and setting the conditions for decisive operations. During this phase, MISO tasks may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) Prevent armed involvement by neutral or hostile neighboring states.

(2) Prevent interference by civilians during military operations.

(3) Degrade enemy combat power by encouraging desertion, surrender, malingering, and creation of dissension in the ranks.

(4) Prepare the OE for US and multinational force operations.

(5) Create tension and stress within enemy TAs in anticipation of combat.

(6) Reduce the enemy TAs' will to resist.

(7) Degrade an enemy's decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness.

(8) Create the element of surprise and combat initiative for friendly forces.

(9) Protect key infrastructure critical to achieving military objectives.

h. **Dominate (Phase III).** The dominate phase focuses on breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the OE. During this phase, MISO tasks may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) Reduce interference with US and multinational operations.

(2) Create tension and stress within enemy forces in anticipation of combat.

(3) Reduce the enemy TAs' will to resist.

(4) Degrade an enemy's decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness.

(5) Create the element of surprise and combat initiative for friendly forces.

(6) Reduce casualties and collateral damage, and hasten a transition to post-conflict operations.

i. **Stabilize (Phase IV).** The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing

multinational organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or USG department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. During this phase, MISO tasks may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) Gain acceptance of friendly forces in the operational area.

(2) Increase rejection of enemy presence and activities by the local populace in stabilized areas.

(3) Increase support of US efforts and military activities in the operational area.

(4) Increase support and viability of the HN government.

(5) Isolate adversary, enemy, and criminal elements capable of destabilizing the area.

j. **Enable Civil Authority (Phase V).** This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. During this phase, MISO tasks may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) Enhance and reinforce professionalism within HN military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces.

(2) Promote support for HN government and institutions.

(3) Reinforce HN efforts to physically and psychologically isolate internal defense threats from the population.

(4) Reinforce HN respect for human rights and compliance with international law.

(5) Assist in the development of HN infrastructure for executing information-related activities.

(6) Publicize the USG's and HN's narrative and objectives.

(7) Gain and hold the population's trust and confidence in HN military and paramilitary forces.

(8) Deter interference with HN security operations.

2. Planning Considerations

a. **General.** MISO planners should possess joint operation planning skills, with knowledge of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure, and a thorough understanding of the customs, morals, and values of the foreign TA. Additionally, planners should review after-action reports and other lessons-learned analysis during the planning process to ensure that they benefit from experience. Planners should understand communication synchronization as a means to advance national interests and objectives

through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other instruments of national power. In addition, they coordinate and synchronize MISO with other IRCs to ensure that consistent messages are communicated to TAs. Lessons learned in planning MISO include:

(1) Integrated planning occurs at the onset of the planning stage of operations and continues throughout the remaining stages to mitigate the effects of potentially rapidly changing political and diplomatic circumstances. For examples of MISO planning considerations, refer to Figure IV-1.

(2) Information should be shared between agencies and with multinational partners so that MISO are part of a well-orchestrated influence effort that generates consistent messages across multiple sources, platforms, and media outlets.

Military Information Support Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations

- Plan for the early conduct of military information support operations and, if required, use of host-nation resources and nonmilitary information support operations, military assets for media production, and dissemination of military information support operations products.
- Assist multinational military and/or civilian governmental organizations in developing coordinated military information support operations programs.
- Use host-nation and US country teams to gain local support.
- Maintain the capability to accomplish US-only objectives when military information support forces and capabilities are provided to multinational commands.
- Consider the effects of terrain, weather, and other environmental factors on forces, equipment, and the planned method for dissemination of military information support operations products.
- Coordinate plans with staff elements or agencies involved with public information or other information-related capabilities.
- Integrate tactical exploitation of national capabilities and assets before and during mission execution.
- Establish a military information support operations reporting system to provide relevant information about:
  - Enemy and adversary influence efforts.
  - Measures of performance and effectiveness of military information support operations.
  - Any anticipated changes to ongoing activities.
- Consider preparation of military information support operations to counter the effects of enemy and adversary influence efforts.
- Synchronize actions and military information support operations messages.

Figure IV-1. Military Information Support Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations

b. **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence**

(1) Peacetime MISO are conducted in accordance with DOD issuances, applicable policy documents, and approved MISO programs. MISO conducted in support of other USG departments and agencies require interagency coordination. Activities that can be applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives and can employ joint MISO include FID, security force assistance (SFA), humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN PERU

Military Information Support Team (MIST) Peru has been employed in various military operations, including stability and counterterrorism operations, security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, and counter-illicit trafficking. Under the delegated operational control of United States Special Operations Command South, the MIST, with the support of the Cultural Intelligence Center analysts from 1st Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne), has worked to enhance regional stability by assisting the Government of Peru in dealing with internal and external threats to security.

In the past, the MIST has aligned with the Peruvian military, law enforcement, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies to craft a variety of informative and persuasive messages. One of the overarching themes was to change the negative perceptions of the Peruvian government. Messages were crafted in Spanish and in Quechua, a native language spoken in the Andes of South America, to publicize the government's efforts to support impoverished communities. Messages imprinted on novelty and utility type items were left behind after Peruvian-sponsored humanitarian assistance projects in 2012 and 2013. Messages were disseminated on radio, handbills, and posters to inform the populace of dates and times of future humanitarian assistance to supplement the leave-behind products. These messages demonstrated the Peruvian government and nongovernment entities' resolve to assist the challenged communities as they faced financial hardships.

Another example of the messages conveyed to target audiences with a measurable effect was the correlation between the drug trade and associated violent crime committed by terrorists. The messages urged the public to make the community safer for their families and children by reporting terrorist crimes to the local authorities and potentially receiving a monetary reward for information. Posters, handbills, flyers, leaflets, newspaper inserts, and radio messages advertising rewards were delivered by the Peruvian National Police and military throughout the interior and coastal areas of the country. During several rewards-for-information payments, informants reported print and radio messages encouraging them to call the police about narcoterrorist-type activities as the reason they provided information.

A third example of messaging appealed to members of the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Spanish, SL sympathizers, and illegal traffickers. The SL is the largest terrorist organization in Peru. A wide variety of radio, television, newspaper, military and police community outreach events and print products conveyed the stiff price one will pay for engaging in terrorism.

During 2012-2013, as a result of the combined efforts of the MIST, the Peruvian military, and the Peruvian law enforcement, several terrorists were captured or killed in Peru, rendering the SL faction in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) ineffective. Notably, the Regional Commander of the SL in the UHV, Florindo Eleuterio Flores-Hala, aka "Artemio," was captured by authorities for crimes of terrorism in February 2012, subsequently sentenced to life in prison, and ordered to pay 500 million Peruvian Nuevo Soles for civil reparations. A few months after the capture of Artemio, his successor was also captured. The capture of several leaders within its organization severely degraded the SL in the UHV.

Various Sources

(2) Security cooperation strategies and implementation plans integrate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Based on guidance from SecDef and CJCS, and intergovernmental coordination guidance, the CCDRs develop plans and employ forces to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives. Generally, the CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies develop or update security cooperation strategies annually. The Services and DOD agencies coordinate their strategies with the CCDRs to ensure that they support and complement the CCDRs' strategies and implementation plans.

(a) MISO programs require approval by the USD(P) prior to execution. CCDRs submit programs to the Joint Staff as stand-alone documents or as part of a TCP or other plan. Programs contain, at a minimum, a listing of the proposed objectives, TAs, themes to stress, themes to avoid, means of dissemination, attribution, and a general CONOPS, to include a concept for assessment. Examples of MISO in peacetime military engagement activities include supporting and executing military-to-military programs, support to combating terrorism and counterproliferation activities, humanitarian demining assistance, SFA, and supporting security cooperation objectives.

(b) Peacetime programs must be approved by the USD(P) before execution. MISO are coordinated with interagency organizations to maintain consistency with other USG efforts.

For further details concerning security cooperation planning, refer to the GEF, the JSCP, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, *and JP 5-0,* Joint Operation Planning.

c. **Crisis Response and Limited Contingencies.** A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation, or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration, involving combat. The associated general

strategic and operational objectives are to **protect** US interests and/or **prevent** surprise attack or further conflict. MISO complement and enhance joint and multinational activities conducted during crisis response and limited contingency operations, to include strikes and raids, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, recovery operations, homeland defense, and DSCA, noncombatant evacuation operations, or other flexible deterrent options, as directed. In operations involving the use or threat of force, MISO offer SecDef or JFC options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Examples are shown in Figure IV-2.

For further details concerning crisis response and limited contingencies, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

d. **Major Operations and Campaigns.** When required, the US national leadership may conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goals are to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the US, and its multinational partners. MISO contribute to the establishment of these conditions by influencing TAs' attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior in a manner favorable to US objectives. Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases. CCDR activities, including MISO, executed during the shape phase assist in determining the character of future operations. A MISO program conducted as part of a major operation or campaign may assist the JFC to quickly prevail against the enemy by degrading the enemy's combat power, reducing civilian interference, minimizing collateral damage, and increasing the population's support for the operation or campaign.

e. **Interagency Coordination**

(1) Military operations are synchronized with the operations of other USG departments and agencies as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations for the purpose of accomplishing objectives. Success depends on the ability to integrate and engage all instruments of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of power as well as the efforts of NGOs and IGOs. Successful interagency coordination enables agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

(2) MISO should be coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; International Broadcasting Bureau; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard.

(3) Interagency coordination of MISO occurs at all levels of warfare to synchronize activities intended to influence TAs. Strategy and policy integration at the strategic level is accomplished through high-level interagency coordination committees and working groups. CCDRs link national policy to the tactical and operational levels of military operations by

Examples of Joint Military Information Support Operations Activities Across the Range of Military Operations

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

- Influence the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and partner capabilities.
- Support the peacetime elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy.
- Support the geographic combatant commander's security cooperation objectives.
- Support the commander's objectives to include support to military deception and operations security.
- Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between host-nation armed forces and the civilian populace.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

- Mobilize popular support for US and partner military operations.
- Gain and sustain popular belief in, and support for, US and partner political systems (including ideology and infrastructure) and political, social, and economic programs.
- Attack the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political systems.
- Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary.
- Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to the friendly powers.
- Deter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the US, its partners, or the conduct of friendly military operations.
- Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transitions to post-hostilities.

Major Operations and Campaigns

- Explain US policies, aims and objectives.
- Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for or against a military operation.
- Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary.
- Undermine confidence in the adversary leadership.
- Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary soldiers.
- Increase the psychological impact of US and partner combat power.
- Support military deception and operations security.
- Counter adversary information activities.

Figure IV-2. Examples of Joint Military Information Support Operations Activities Across the Range of Military Operations

using their joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), the US country team, and subordinate joint force headquarters as coordinating staff sections. Planners responsible for coordinating multiple USG messages spanning multiple CCMDs are synchronized and deconflicted by coordinating with the appropriate staff elements, such as the JIACG. MISO

and IO staff planners provide the JIACG with timely information to assist in the coordination process.

(4) **Civilian and Military Operational Planners.** The JIACG assists the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying forward to the JTF location or by providing a reachback point of contact at the GCC location. MISO planners at the JTF level should coordinate with other government departments and agencies through the JIACG or designated staff organizations. The JIACG does not veto or approve plans but provides input and assists with coordination of those plans.

(5) **DOS.** DOS's Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) engages audiences on issues of foreign policy, society, and values to help create an environment receptive to US national interests. IIP contributes to USG diplomatic efforts by interacting with foreign opinion makers and others through a wide range of print and electronic media in their local languages. Coordination with DOS should include policy bureaus, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the United States Agency for International Development, and other bureaus addressing conflict resolution. IIP also provides information outreach support to US embassies and consulates in more than 140 countries worldwide. The office's products and services are uniquely designed to support DOS's initiatives, as well as those of other US foreign policy organizations. It also manages information resource centers overseas and offers reference specialists based in Washington, DC, to answer specialized information queries from abroad.

f. **Multinational Operations.** When US forces are integrated into a multinational command structure, MISO should be coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. However, US MISO are usually approved in US channels, regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command.

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

3. Guidance

The following guidance is provided for the development of MISO tabs for all plans and orders.

For further information on the MISO tab format, see Appendix C, "Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to a Joint Operation Plan."

a. **Research and Analysis.** Research is conducted and requisite information and relevant data are collected and analyzed to plan MISO. The intelligence, information, and data are further assessed to determine competing and complementary US objectives and strategies, and the supportability of COAs to achieve these objectives from a MISO standpoint. The planner determines key questions about friendly, neutral, and adversary intentions, capabilities, and activities, which can be used to develop requirements for intelligence collection and analysis.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA

During June and July 2012, a five-person military information support team (MIST) from the 1st Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne) began military information support operations in Guatemala, during Operation MARTILLO, in support of Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, a component of the United States Southern Command. The MIST was composed of four soldiers and one civilian Cultural Intelligence Center Analyst. Operation MARTILLO was a cooperative military and law enforcement effort among the United States (US), Guatemala, and several other partner nation countries, to halt the flow of illicit cargo, drugs, and weapons through Central America and into the US. Operation MARTILLO aimed to stifle the drug proceeds of Central American cartels.

The MIST, along with three US Marines from the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC), augmented Operation MARTILLO's efforts in Guatemala with the planning and development of five radio messages. Radio is an important communication medium in Guatemala and throughout Central America to broadcast positive government messages to the masses, as nearly every household owns a radio. Radio messages were disseminated over several radio stations, including Emisoras Unidas, one of the most popular radio stations for news and entertainment in Guatemala.

The radio messages were developed to inform the population in and around the coastal areas that the governments of the US and Guatemala were working together to deter criminal organizations' ability to utilize Guatemalan shipment routes for movement of narcotics, weapons, and other contraband. The radio messages conveyed the international ties between the US and Guatemala and their commitment to end the narcoterrorists' threats to national, regional, and international security. Indirectly, the radio messages also served to nullify previously disseminated opponent propaganda that attempted to convince Guatemalans that the US military was there to invade Guatemala, not to support regional security.

Successfully planned and executed radio messaging during Operation MARTILLO was a key element to the success of increasing the stability and security of Guatemala and Central America. Positive effects from the messaging were seen within weeks of the radio dissemination. Citizens within Guatemala and the coastal areas of Central America were alerted to the ongoing operations connected with Operation MARTILLO, triggering a pattern shift of the drug smugglers through Central America and a decrease in propaganda against the US. Additionally, Operation MARTILLO fostered a positive relationship between two US Services to win the information fight; JIATF-South, in conjunction with partnered forces, intercepted several fast boats, bulk cash, and multiple tons of cocaine destined for the US.

Various Sources

b. **Development.** The perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular TAs are continuously assessed. Both the sources upon which particular TAs rely and the US ability to influence those sources should be determined. TA information interests and activities need to be identified. Information and indicators that should be conveyed and denied to TAs to reinforce desired attitudes and beliefs are ascertained. Execution means and methods to convey or deny information and indicators have to be selected. A plan supporting all phases of a CCDR's operation or campaign should address TAs and include theater- and national-level objectives. Planners should identify the assets necessary to execute the plan and list them in the OPLAN time-phased force and deployment data; otherwise, it may become difficult to obtain these assets in time to execute the plan. Planners should also develop a tracking mechanism to monitor the dissemination of products.

c. **Production Requirements.** The forces, assets, and capabilities needed to develop and produce messages, products, and actions are analyzed and determined during plan development. These factors are compared to the forces assigned or available for planning and, if the commander has insufficient resources, a request for forces will be submitted. Tasks for available MISO resources, including specific requirements, are also provided to the Joint Staff on the request for forces or request for deployment order (DEPORD) for approval. Requirements for resources in excess of those available to the CCMD should be forwarded to the Joint Staff.

4. Support of Irregular Warfare

a. **General.** Irregular warfare (IW) is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force.

b. **MISO and IW.** The ideological and political factors associated with IW create opportunities and necessity for the execution of MISO. Examples of applications to selected activities within IW are:

(1) **FID/SFA.** MISO that support FID center on enhancing an HN's ability to appropriately and effectively integrate legitimate security or military forces with other national-level capabilities to eliminate internal threats and prevent the emergence of new threats. The same is true when conducting SFA in support of foreign security forces. MISO are employed to prepare key audiences for US FID/SFA operations and to directly assist the HN in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability and security through democratic systems. MISO increase HN support for programs that provide positive populace control and protection from adversary activities. MIS forces advise, train, and assist HN counterparts and government agencies to develop and implement effective information activities.

For further details concerning FID/SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

(2) **Counterterrorism (CT).** MISO are an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, in particular in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which violent extremist organizations operate. Terrorist groups have gained sympathy and support of moderate audiences through disinformation partly by activities focusing on miscues of the friendly forces. In CT operations, TA identification and the use of MISO to influence the TAs' behavior are important. Within an operational area there may be several TAs and multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. MISO in CT operations shape and influence the terrorist network's informational environment.

For further details concerning CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

(3) **Stability Operations.** Successful execution of stability operations tasks depends on informing the local populace and influencing attitudes to secure the trust and confidence of the population. MISO can be used to connect populations to relief organizations, etc. MISO can provide public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order.

For further details concerning stability operations, refer to JP 3-07, Stability Operations.

(4) **Counterinsurgency Operations.** MISO can influence the attitudes and behavior of a population to obtain compliance or noninterference with US military operations or interim military governance. In addition, MIS units conduct activities to legitimize an HN government directly supported by US military forces, in order to establish and maintain popular support for HN institutions, programs, and activities. At the same time, MIS forces will conduct activities that delegitimize the insurgency and decrease popular support for the use of violence to solve political grievances. In addition, MISO can provide information to support joint forces or HN humanitarian activities to ease suffering and restore or maintain civil order.

For further details concerning counterinsurgency operations, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations.

(5) **Unconventional Warfare (UW).** UW consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force. The UW focus on populations and their connections to the insurgency makes MISO a vital component of any UW operation. MISO are conducted to undermine the legitimacy of a hostile regime while simultaneously building the legitimacy and credibility of the resistance. By engaging the population, MISO develop and maintain the capability and capacity of all three components of an insurgency—the guerrilla force, the underground, and the auxiliary.

For further details concerning UW, refer to JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare.

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CHAPTER V
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROCESS

"Successful development of the approach requires continuous analysis, learning, dialogue, and collaboration between commander and staff, as well as other subject matter experts."

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*

1. General

a. The MISO process is used to develop and deliver influential messages and coordinate the execution of actions to affect the behavior of selected TAs. The process is built on the core tasks of advise, plan, develop, deliver, and assess.

b. MISO core tasks are planned and executed across seven MISO process phases. The MISO process phases are shown in Figure V-1. MISO core tasks address important considerations and include activities to integrate MISO with the CCDR's military strategy and mission. Figure V-1 depicts the relationship between the MISO process phases and the MISO core tasks.

c. MISO are continuously refined, based on the changing OE. MISO planners advise, plan, and assess throughout the process. Planners also advise the supported commander or COM about how best to align MISO with his or her intent. Planning occurs continuously, both internally in the MISO process and to integrate MISO with the supported unit's or organization's plan. Assessment occurs simultaneously, using MOPs or MOEs to determine the effectiveness of the MISO and, if necessary, to refine MISO activities.

2. Planning: Phase I

a. CCDRs are required to obtain approval prior to conducting MISO. To gain approval, the CCDR submits a proposed program(s) through the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for interagency coordination and SecDef approval. CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,* contains a list of programs approved for use by the CCDRs for SecDef-approved missions, operations, and UCP-directed activities. These programs include security sector assistance and operations such as maritime interception, noncombatant evacuation, counterdrug, and foreign humanitarian assistance.

b. MISO planners advise commanders, COMs, and staffs to increase situational awareness and understanding of the effects individuals and groups have in the OE. They evaluate the psychological effects of military actions and country team or PN influence efforts to maximize effectiveness and minimize adverse impact and unintended consequences.

c. TCPs reflect national security and defense strategies and planning guidance, and focus on the GCC's ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation,



Figure V-1. Relationship of Military Information Support Operations Process Phases and Military Information Support Operations Core Tasks

deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. Planners devise programs to support both the GCC's objectives in the region and the embassies' country plans. Programs should be submitted with the TCP. Stand-alone programs may be submitted to the Joint Staff for review, but they must be thoroughly integrated with the overall TCP. The Joint Staff forwards proposed programs to the Office of the ASD(SO/LIC) for review, interagency coordination, and USD(P) approval, and CCMDs receive approved programs from the Joint Staff to execute. MIS forces routinely conduct operations that support and complement other USG departments and agencies, such as DOS. USSOCOM provides MIS units to the CCMDs to operate at US embassies. These units conduct activities to convey the USG's narrative in a defense support to public diplomacy role. MIS personnel provide USG departments and agencies and country teams with recommendations concerning:

(1) Effective means to deliver messages and information to TAs to influence them in desired ways and create specific psychological effects.

(2) Cultural and environmental conditions that may be significant to the HN government and populations.

(3) Development of MISO programs such as support to CT, counterdrug, mine awareness, and combating trafficking in persons.

d. CCDRs should submit programs as part of their overall plans. After review, the Joint Staff forwards all plans to OSD for review, interagency coordination, and execution authority. ASD(SO/LIC) reviews and staffs the MISO portions of the plans through the interagency coordination process. SecDef normally approves the program as part of the CCDR's plan. An EXORD is sent to the CCMD, containing approval for the program, execution authorities, the approval authority for messages and actions, and other related guidance. If there is a need to conduct MISO prior to gaining approval for a plan, the CCDR submits a stand-alone proposed program in accordance with the procedures used for TCPs.

e. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, UCP, GEF, and the JSCP provide guidance to the GCCs to devise theater strategies. MISO planners on the GCC's staff devise specific MISO programs and objectives that support the achievement of the objectives in the theater strategy.

(1) A program describes these in conjunction with establishing the appropriate authorities and guidelines that precisely reflect national policy objectives and the CCDR's intent and objectives. In addition to objectives and themes, national policies for execution include the attribution method the USG takes in acknowledging origination or responsibility for messages and actions.

(2) US attribution can be immediate, delayed, or non-attributed, as authorized within the approved program. MISO may be attributed to the US, or concurring friendly and allied nations, or acknowledged as soon as operationally feasible.

For additional information on attribution, see CJCSI 3310.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

f. A program provides the required SecDef guidance for execution. All messages and actions for psychological effect are required to comply with the stated parameters in the approved program.

g. The goal of planning is to integrate MISO into the commander's vision and CONOPS. Programs are initiated as a result of the first phase of the MISO process. These programs are developed by the executing element and continue through subsequent phases. Staff planners adjust the plan to achieve the commander's objectives.

h. Programs become part of the TCP or OPLAN. Further planning is based on the commander's objectives and takes into account the key components of an approved program, including objectives, approval authorities, potential TAs, themes to stress and themes to avoid, the appropriate attribution method, the delivery platforms for messages, and the choices of media authorized.

i. Military operations are conducted in areas that often include friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy civilian populations, as well as military and government organizations. It is important that JFCs understand how TAs and populations are affected and influenced by military operations. MIS personnel advise Service component and joint component commanders and staffs on informational and psychological aspects of the OE, to include:

(1) Planning military operations that influence the attitudes and behavior of selected TAs and populations.

(2) Targeting with messages and actions to create psychological effects.

(3) Determining the best means to deliver messages to individuals and populations in the operational area.

(4) Measuring the effectiveness of MISO.

(5) Assessing adversary and enemy information capabilities.

(6) Assessing the potential effects of adversary and enemy information activities.

3. Target Audience Analysis: Phase II

a. An approved program contains a list of potential foreign TAs. During target audience analysis (TAA), designated elements analyze approved foreign groups and individuals by following the MISO-unique TAA model. Much of the data required to initiate and complete a thorough analysis of potential TAs derives from the supported commander's collection efforts. These requirements are determined early in planning as intelligence organizations and other enablers provide much of the necessary data and information. The data derives from a multitude of classified and open sources such as finished intelligence, unit documentation, and special studies; or through technological means and assessments.

b. During this TAA phase of the joint MISO process, foreign groups or individuals are examined carefully for their ability to be influenced and their ability to achieve objectives. This provides insights on how best to influence the TA to change its behavior to one that is more favorable to US interests. The results of TAA provide the foundation for the remaining process phases. Analysis does not stop but continues throughout the entire operation, updating information as it is learned, as the environment changes, and as new TAs are required or selected.

4. Series Development: Phase III

The information gleaned as a result of TAA is used to develop actions and messages. The MISO core task of development encompasses phases III and IV and includes overall series development and individual message development. In developing series, MIS personnel design multiple actions and messages, determine the appropriate mix of media, and develop an execution plan. Each series focuses on a single supporting MISO objective and TA combination. Series are reviewed for their suitability, length or duration, potential to

affect the TA, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior change, and the resources available to execute them.

5. Product Development and Design: Phase IV

a. The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases is vital for designing individual products. There are three types of products—visual, audio, and audiovisual—depending on the TA. Fixed and deployable US capabilities, PN capabilities,

DISRUPTING THE INSURGENT NARRATIVE

Military Information Support Task Force–Afghanistan (MISTF-A), assigned to United States Forces Command–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), was tasked with disrupting the insurgent narrative and promoting the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The MISTF-A planners and staff used the military information support operations (MISO) process to gain a clear understanding of the mission and to create a MISO plan to drive dissemination. The mission analysis resulted in a comprehensive information preparation of the environment that determined the insurgent narrative cycle, key insurgent themes and lines of persuasion, and key target audiences. The MISTF-A determined the insurgent's critical requirements as the perceived legitimacy of the insurgent narrative and the freedom of maneuver to disseminate towards that narrative. The MISTF-A developed a series execution matrix that required support from traditional MISO capabilities and precision information-related capabilities organic to the task force, as well as capabilities residing in outside organizations (maneuver forces, special operations forces, intelligence assets, and tactical military information support teams) not assigned to the task force. Message delivery in support of the program required integration and synchronization across the breadth and depth of the USFOR-A information battlespace.

The MISTF-A Commander led the operational planning team, which included planners from USFOR-A and key partner nations units, to ensure that operations were synchronized, integrated, and resourced prior to execution. Implementation of the plan was timed to coincide with the insurgent influence cycle. MISO and cyberspace activities eroded the legitimacy of the enemy message by pointing out discrepancies between the insurgents' words and deeds. The MISTF-A series was augmented by maneuver force and intelligence operations conducting tactical-level engagements and human interaction designed to expose the discrepancies between insurgent leaders and fighters through print, radio, and face-to-face dissemination. Electromagnetic spectrum broadcasts disseminated tactical communications products to adversary command-and-control radio networks. The previously unchallenged insurgent information environment was now challenged by blanketing the insurgent target audience with messaging aimed at questioning the legitimacy of the insurgent cause while also supporting GIROA legitimacy. Combined disseminations continued throughout the identified insurgent narrative cycle that further confused the insurgent target audience.

The advantage of assigning information-related capabilities under the MISTF-A Commander enabled USFOR-A to task a subordinate command capable of planning and executing the disruption of the insurgent narrative while messaging on the legitimacy of GIROA. The results included a well-synchronized and executed program leveraging several complementary capabilities, both within and outside the MISTF-A. The messaging executions were conducted in accordance with the plan and were reported directly to the USFOR-A Command Team. Over the course of the cycle, reporting showed confusion among the insurgent rank and file; many left the battlespace and chose not to fight, while others began to question the direction and legitimacy of the insurgent cause. The insurgent leadership executions changed from a proactive unified posture to a reactive and disparate posture. Inserting the MISTF-A products into the insurgent cycle and replicating the insurgent dissemination means, (web based, tactical radio, face-to-face, telephone, and terrestrial radio) resulted in the disruption of insurgent messaging, which diminished their freedom to influence and ability to give clear guidance to their target audiences.

Various Sources

and commercial vendors provide the technical expertise and tools to design and create all types. The applicable program lists the types of media, including the use of electronic messaging platforms that are approved for production and delivery.

b. During phase IV, evaluating the TA's understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a message is a key supporting task for the overall development task. Pretesting products helps establish a foundation for conducting post-testing of the series after delivery.

6. Approval: Phase V

a. A well-managed approval process for a series is fundamental to influencing TAs. During phase V, MIS officers and noncommissioned officers formally review series. The commander of the MIS unit producing the series is the first level of authority in the approval chain. The potential of the series to achieve the desired objective and the continuity of messages and media are judged. Once approved by the MISO commander, the series is formally submitted through an established staffing chain to obtain final approval for production and execution.

b. As the series passes through the required staff sections, action officers responsible for obtaining approval at each echelon monitor progress until returned to the originating unit. Series are approved at the lowest level of command authorized by SecDef. Approval authority may reside at the CCMD or maneuver unit commander's level. Approval is required before media production or the execution of actions for psychological effect can begin.

7. Production, Distribution, and Dissemination: Phase VI

a. MIS units may deploy with organic production assets or utilize reachback to coordinate for in-theater or regional support. They also have the ability to request other USG resources, or to use locally contracted resources within theater. Once production is complete, products are distributed to the disseminator. Products are distributed by air or ground transport, or transmitted digitally through secure or multiple means to the forward location where they will be delivered to the TAs.

b. TAA and intelligence about the operational area determine the appropriate and most effective delivery means. Radio and television (TV) broadcasts, the Internet, text messaging, leaflet drops, and loudspeaker operations are some of the means used throughout the world to deliver messages. Messages also are communicated through face-to-face contact with the local populace or with respected key communicators.

For further details, see CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

8. Assessment: Phase VII

a. Assessing the effects of messages and actions on TAs relies on impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. Initial assessment criteria are established in phase I and are refined in phase II. Assessment criteria support the commander's MOEs and MOPs, and help determine the effectiveness of an operation. Assessment criteria focus on TA achievement of supporting MISO objectives. Planners establish procedures to assess the effectiveness of influence efforts and continuously assess the effectiveness of MISO towards achieving the commander's objectives.

b. The impact of MISO is assessed within the context of competing information and influence efforts, spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that shape TA behavior. Unanticipated and spontaneous events can potentially influence a group's behavior and contribute to or undermine objective accomplishment. Series assessment assists in focusing TAA and provides the basis to adjust or maintain series. The results of the assessment are thus twofold, as they:

(1) Yield substantive information about the trends toward achieving the supporting MISO objectives.

(2) Contribute data that are relevant for the commander's overall MOEs, MOPs, and assessment.

c. Planners should consider a wide variety of information sources to assess the effectiveness of MISO. Taken together, information sources such as intelligence products, public opinion data, focus groups, open source data, and key leader engagements provide evidence of effectiveness and yield more valid conclusions than those based on single sources of information.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT TASK FORCE AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The Military Information Support Task Force–Afghanistan (MISTF-A) was a United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) subordinate unit that directly reported to the USFOR-A Deputy Chief of Staff for all guidance and product approval. MISTF-A's primary focus was on conducting theater-level military information support operations (MISO). MISTF-A was staffed with a distinctive section responsible for conducting assessments, called the Validation Testing Evaluation Detachment (VTED). The VTED was composed of social scientists, behavioral scientists, geospatial analysts, media analysts, cultural advisors, an operations research/systems analysis officer, and a MISO staff planner. These personnel formed the nucleus of the assessment team. It was a comprehensive organization of analytical tools and processes that enabled the VTED to continuously assess the disposition of both the population and the enemy in increments over an extended span of time, with deliverables organized around enabling agile reactions according to both event- and time-sensitive operational milestones.

MISTF-A operationalized the assessment process by developing a framework that combined both qualitative and quantitative opinion research of the populace and influence-oriented intelligence analysis of the adversary. Such analysis could not be undertaken without agreed-upon terms of measurement. However, even with a common lexicon for measurement, there was a necessity for a consolidated set of objectives that were specifically designed to be met via MISO and directed by a single commander. Starting from this set of objectives, the process began during operations planning and contributed to the knowledge of initial conditions, while enabling future targeting efforts as a result of changing conditions. Planners then investigated options for tasks designed to change the state of the environment. This required analysis of both the desired effects of the adversary, current attitudes of the populace in relation to the desired effects, gaps in both, and salient external factors that impacted the creation of desired friendly effects. Changes in conditions were monitored in conjunction with the delivery of messages, intelligence estimates, quantitative public opinion surveys, qualitative investigations of public opinion through news reports (looking for salient impact to capitalize on, as well as trends in reporting that affect the information environment for the target audience), focus groups, or in-depth interviews on narrow issues or anomalies in quantitative research, and, on occasion, intelligence gaps about the population. The analysis of this input required command ownership and staff integration in order to achieve comprehensive stakeholder understanding of changing conditions and an overarching view of MISO in the spectrum of the target audiences' menu of social influence.

Various Sources

CHAPTER VI
ENABLERS

"The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul."

Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
1847–1934

1. Intelligence

a. MIS personnel require an in-depth understanding of the behavior of select TAs and their behavioral motivation. Intelligence analysis, capabilities, and processes are necessary for gaining an appreciation of those aspects of the OE that can affect TA behavior. Further, assessing MISO effectiveness requires tailored, continuous intelligence support for the duration of the assessment.

b. TAA includes a thorough examination of the political, military, economic, cultural, religious, psychological, and social conditions that shape the OE and influence the behavior of the individuals and groups within that environment. This information derives from integration in the intelligence process, which provides the basis for common intelligence terminology and procedures. MISO planners identify information requirements and use the intelligence process to request needed information used in conducting TAA.

c. Intelligence plays a critical role in evaluation by providing input and data to assess MISO MOEs. These may include both quantitative and qualitative data such as changes in TA participation in the political process, increased surrenders or defections, or increased civilian cooperation with multinational requests or directives.

d. MISO intelligence requirements include strategic assessments, running estimates, background studies, and target folders. Current cultural information, including language, literacy, historical context, group membership, and normative affiliation, is another critical information requirements that may or may not be readily available from military intelligence sources. Information on taboos, traditions, venerated figures, myths, affiliations, and current attitudes assists in planning efforts, as well as developing assessment criteria for MOEs. Each command evaluates its assigned missions and operational areas and identifies MISO-focused intelligence needs. The thoroughness of this evaluation and identification will determine how well intelligence-gathering organizations can collect essential information and produce relevant intelligence products. **Development of MISO-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan** with specific collection requirements to utilize all available sources and techniques. It should include basic intelligence and country studies on foreign cultures and particular TAs, as well as current intelligence on foreign group capabilities, behavior, and motivation.

e. MIS units and staff planners identify and provide mission-specific requirements for raw intelligence and finished products to the intelligence community so that time-sensitive

requirements are prioritized, tasked, processed, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner.

f. **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** The theater ISR CONOPS fully integrates and optimizes the use of all national, multinational, allied, open source, and other requested ISR assets. MISO rely on theater intelligence products based on a whole-of-government approach that occurs within the intelligence community.

(1) These products are necessary to determine correlation, causality, and general effectiveness of MISO.

(2) Allocation of ISR to collect MOE/MOP data takes place during planning.

For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0 Series.

2. Communications System

a. Communications between commands that plan and execute MISO is vital for the effective employment of capabilities. A well-written joint MISO communications plan ensures that systems are compatible and adequate. Theater communications architecture requires plans for integration of MISO requirements into secure voice and data nets, satellite communications systems, and a capability to communicate with US national-level agencies, multinational organizations, and HN communications systems.

b. The MISO Cultural Intelligence Element (CIE) maintains a research database that is hosted on the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) SIPRNET [SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network]. The database supports MISO worldwide for the CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and other USG departments and agencies. It facilitates the research and analysis that underlie TAA, message development, finished MISO-focused intelligence production, special projects, and operational deployments by conventional forces as well as special operations forces (SOF). Users can draw on a number of different database collections:

(1) **DOD Message Traffic Archive.** The archive contains daily defense message system messages from different USG departments and agencies and military sources, including DOS, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center. The system has the capability to do full searches and retrieval from message traffic with a continuous real-time message feed and indexing. This feature allows the immediate retrieval of material to determine behavioral trends in selected TAs over time. The message archives are extensive, covering October 1989 to the present, and readily accessible.

(2) **MISO Study Collection.** This collection holds all existing MISO studies and assessments archived by the CIE. This collection contains the most complete archive of available MISO studies.

(3) **Radio and TV Collection.** This collection has statistics on radio and TV facilities in various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and frequencies. Users can search the collection based on facility characteristics.

3. Logistics

a. MISO execution during sustained operations requires logistic support. The CCMD or appropriate Service component staff integrates MISO logistic support into planning. MIS units are dependent primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, and dissemination contracting support. See Figure VI-1 for MISO logistics requirements.

b. MISO planners provide input to the supported unit on common and specialized sustainment requirements to help enable continuous, responsive, and effective MISO. The gaining unit forecasts procurement and sustainment. In addition, fixed-site facilities may also be required during extended operations to house and secure sizeable and highly technical equipment and electronic components used for large-scale production and dissemination of multimedia products.

c. There are three main categories of MISO support requirements:

(1) **Service Common.** MIS forces use a broad range of equipment that requires service with common expendable and major end-item components from across the classes of supply. These assets are generally acquired and sustained through normal supply channels.

(2) **Specialized Support.** When established, the MISTF can serve as a consolidated source of specialized repair parts and maintenance in theater.

(3) **Commercial Contracting.** MISO frequently utilizes commercial services for a wide range of requirements, including the production, distribution, and delivery of multimedia products; allocation of linguists, writers, and research and polling; or specialized MISO equipment repair. Early and accurate requirements identification is validated by the JFC's staff and passed to the supporting theater support contracting organization, or to rear-area supporting organizations for external contract support.

d. During planning, it is vital to consider the potential for MISO to rely on less sophisticated equipment found in various parts of the world. HN support may reduce the strain on US logistic systems. **Locally available resources for required supplies and services, whether through the HN government or commercial entities, are identified in advance.** Early identification of HN support is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for MISO.

Military Information Support Operations Logistics Requirements

Types of Supplies or Services	Examples	Sources	When Used
Service Common	Vehicle and generator repair parts; maintenance; batteries; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; tactical radio and communications equipment; ammunition; rations; water; clothing and individual equipment; medical, dental, and mental health; optics and night-vision; personnel services; and access to operational communications networks	• Supported unit • Service common supply chain	Upon formal attachment or designation of other support arrangement
Military Information Support Operations-Unique: Systems, Parts, Maintenance, and Expendable Supplies	• Radio and television broadcast systems • Audio-visual production systems • Broadband secure satellite transmission systems • Loudspeaker systems • Print and copier inks, cleaners, and maintenance • Digital media • Leaflet boxes and static lines • Specific weight bulk paper • PDU-5 leaflet canister	• Coordination through higher military information support operations component or headquarters • Parent unit (major end items) • Local contract for commercially available supplies and services	Throughout the operation
Base Support	• Access-controlled workspace for product development and storage • Climate-controlled work areas for print presses, production systems • Voltage-regulated power source • Classified material destruction • Billeting; morale, welfare and recreation; all other base services	• Supported unit	When conducting extended operations in a fixed site
Contract Support	• Local production of unclassified products (print, radio, video, web, etc.) • Polling to support measure-of-effectiveness analysis • Linguist support • Hiring of local writers, on-air personalities	• Supported unit • Higher military information support operations component or headquarters • Host or partner nations	As soon as operationally required or feasible

Figure VI-1. Military Information Support Operations Logistics Requirements

e. During multinational operations, US logistic systems, unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved OPLANs, support MISO integration and execution. HN forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported MISO activities may provide some level of logistic support and should be identified in advance.

APPENDIX A
LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Several legal and policy documents establish authorization to execute MISO.

1. Overview

This appendix contains the specific legal and policy authorities for the implementation of MISO in a theater of operations; and the integration, planning, and execution of DSCA. Commanders and their staffs should always consult the staff judge advocate to obtain the most current legal references and for expert interpretation of them.

2. International Conventions and Treaties

The US is a party to numerous treaties and agreements with allied and friendly nations around the world. In accordance with CJCS policies, all operational plans must conform to domestic and international law, including the law of war, laws recognized by the US as customary international laws, and international agreements that are binding for the US. The planning and execution of MISO is subject to these conventions, treaties, and laws. These include the Geneva Conventions and other agreements that relate to the law of war.

3. United States Law

a. **Title 17, United States Code (USC), Copyrights.** MISO use a variety of multimedia formats to influence foreign TAs. Music, symbols, graphics, and messages are commonly incorporated into products. It is important to note that the products are required to adhere to the laws that protect published and unpublished works in a variety of forms and formats. MISO message content and format are subject to copyright restrictions under Title 17, USC.

b. **Title 50, USC, Section 3093,** states that any activity of the USG to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the USG will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, is a covert action and is only authorized pursuant to a Presidential finding. This is considered during the identification of attribution requirements of a MISO program, and non-attribution and delayed attribution may be impacted. The law further states that traditional military activities fall outside of the statute.

4. United States Department of Defense Guidance

a. **JSCP.** The JSCP provides guidance to the GCCs and the Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities. It assigns strategic tasks and objectives and specific planning tasks.

b. CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.*

(1) This instruction provides the guidance from the CJCS to plan and conduct MISO across the range of military operations. This instruction provides strategic direction for inclusion of MISO within DOD's overall contribution to USG communication

synchronization efforts. CCDRs and Service Chiefs are responsible for incorporating MISO into their planning, as tasked by the JSCP and as outlined in this supplement. The MISO supplement to the JSCP provides explicit guidance and information for planning and execution in a theater: program authority and examples, message and action approval process, and authority.

(2) Approved programs constitute the authority to use the capability in theaters of operation. All messages, actions, and selected TAs must comply with the guidance established within the program. Authority of a program does not equal permission to execute. Execution comes in the form of an order from the CJCS, as approved by SecDef. A program is either a stand-alone document or it becomes part of the TCP or an OPLAN.

(3) To gain approval to execute MISO in theater, the CCDR submits a proposed program through the Joint Staff to the OSD for interagency coordination and, ultimately, for SecDef approval. A program contains the required SecDef guidance for execution. All messages and actions are required to comply with, and complement, the parameters of the approved program.

For further information on MISO programs see Appendix D, "Military Information Support Operations Program Format."

(4) CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,* outlines the processes for staffing and approval of programs and series. Included in this instruction are planning guidance and approved programs with standing objectives for short-notice contingency operations, humanitarian operations, and missions such as maritime interception operations. In addition, this instruction also provides the force with a potential TA list and general planning guidance for missions across the range of military operations.

(5) CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,* does not authorize covert MISO.

(6) CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,* identifies the USSOCOM as the joint proponent for all MISO. Specific proponent responsibilities assigned to CDRUSSOCOM are listed in Chapter II, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships."

c. **MISO and CAIS**

(1) CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,* authorizes the use of MIS forces and equipment in support of a designated lead federal department or agency during a natural disaster or security crisis within the US and its territories. Forces and equipment are requested and approved using the same processes as any contingency operation. The instruction specifies that the use of these DOD assets does not constitute conducting MISO. MISO programs are not developed for CAIS missions. The appointed lead federal agency is the source of themes and messages, and is the approval authority for all products conveying the lead agency messages.

(2) Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),* establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DSCA. It provides guidance for the execution and oversight of DSCA when requested by civil authorities or qualifying entities and approved by the appropriate DOD official, or as directed by the President, within the US and its territories. It authorizes commander's immediate response authority, as described in DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),* when requested by civil authorities in situations involving imminent risk of loss of life and/or destruction of property.

d. DODD S-3321.1, *Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War.*

(1) DODD S-3321.1 establishes the policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities for overt MISO conducted by DOD in peacetime military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities in theater. This document establishes the procedures for gaining approval from the OSD for executing MISO that are coordinated and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and interagency organizations.

(2) When MISO are employed in peacetime engagements, commanders and planners consult the GCC's TCP. DOS objectives and COM priorities for each country provide the necessary framework for MISO during peacetime military engagements. This critical information is presented in the American embassy's mission strategic and resource plan.

e. DODD 5111.10, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]).* This DODD establishes the position of the ASD(SO/LIC) and describes the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the position. It also directs the ASD(SO/LIC) to establish standing departmental and interagency working groups, as appropriate, to facilitate the conduct of effective DOD MISO. This directive mandates the ASD(SO/LIC) to develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy for MISO, and carry out the responsibilities assigned to the USD(P) in DODD S-3321.1. Roles and responsibilities assigned to ASD(SO/LIC) are listed in Chapter II, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships."

5. Authorizing Execution in a Theater of Operations

a. The President and SecDef approve the employment of MISO in a theater of operations. Without this approval, GCCs do not have the permission to execute MISO in theater.

b. **Plans and Orders.** The MISO tab (Tab A, Military Information Support Operations [MISO] to Appendix 3, Information Operations [IO] to Annex C, Operations) describes MISO integration to support the commander's intent and CONOPS. It synchronizes the execution of messages and actions in support of the commander's objectives. Plans and orders establish priorities of support to units for each operational phase, and synchronize MISO with the other IRCs and the commander's communication synchronization.

For further information on MISO tab to an OPLAN, see Appendix C, "Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to a Joint Operation Plan."

c. **EXORD.** The CJCS provides SecDef-approved execution authority to GCCs or JFCs through official message traffic in the form of an EXORD. The EXORD serves as the basis to begin mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment rotation, and demobilization activities in support of the OPLAN.

d. **DEPORD.** After the issuance of the EXORD, the CJCS, by the authority and at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues a DEPORD to transfer MIS forces to the GCC. The DEPORD specifies the authority a gaining CCDR exercises over transferred forces and is required for the deployment or redeployment of forces. It contains vital information for units, such as the mission, approved program, rules of engagement, funding, and required timelines.

APPENDIX B
CAPABILITIES

"To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities."

Sun Tsu
The Art of War

1. General

Each Service supports achievement of US national objectives by employing organic assets for production and dissemination of messages. Aircraft, ships, units, and military equipment can also affect TAs when used in operations specifically designed to influence behavior.

2. Studies Programs

a. The MISO CIE is an important source of finished analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire MIS force, the CCMD, and the intelligence community. Products are primarily designed to support the operational requirements of the CCMD and of MIS forces worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other organizations (e.g., DOS). Studies provide CCDRs with MISO perspectives on issues of direct significance to peacetime strategy, joint operation planning, and operational preparations. Studies on all topics of interest can be requested through a CCMD's MIS staff officer, or as a specific intelligence request to the information manager, who enters them into the community online intelligence system for managing intelligence production requirements.

b. MISO studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can contain similar information. In general, studies profile the significant features of a country and its people; provide an analysis of the influences that drive the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior of the different social, occupational, and ethnic groups; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to influence people.

3. United States Army Assets

a. **USASOC.** USASOC organizes, trains, equips, and deploys Army SOF MIS forces to the respective GCCs, TSOCs, select JFCs, US embassies, and other USG departments and agencies, per applicable deployment and execution orders. Subordinate units include a separate media operations battalion and two active duty MIS groups, each with three subordinate battalions and a cultural intelligence section. In addition, USASOC provides

each TSOC and select USSOCOM component command with a MISO planning and advisory team to plan, conduct, and support MISO. USASOC:

(1) When directed, conducts CAIS within the US and its territories during the initial stages of declared emergencies, until relieved by mobilized United States Army Reserve (USAR) MIS forces.

(2) When directed, provides MIS forces during contingency operations, until relieved by mobilized USAR MIS forces.

(3) Provides production and dissemination capabilities to MIS groups.

(4) Organizes and deploys MISTFs or equivalent-level, task-organized units capable of influencing foreign individuals and groups through MISO and other IRCs.

(5) Executes special operations and supports SOF.

(6) Provides equipment programs and budgeting requirements for active duty MIS forces.

(7) Prepares and submits force management feasibility assessments and force sufficiency requirements.

(8) Assists in the development and coordination of active duty MIS force requirements and activities.

(9) Operates the CONUS-based multimedia operations center.

b. **Army Active Component Groups.** The Active Component groups support JFCs and provide augmentation to GCCs for theater-level MISO support.

(1) Groups are capable of conducting the following tasks:

(a) Deploy/redeploy and sustain all assigned and attached forces.

(b) Execute MISO at the tactical level in support of rapid deployment forces and SOF.

(c) Organize and execute operational-level task forces in support of JFCs.

(d) Execute defense support to public diplomacy.

(e) Execute multimedia development, production, distribution, and dissemination.

(f) Produce special studies, analyses, and assessments of foreign TAs.

(g) Execute CAIS.

(2) A group contains the following organizations:

(a) **CIE.** The group manages the strategic and operational analysis efforts necessary for mission planning. The CIE is organized into regionally focused strategic studies teams composed of civilian analysts holding advanced degrees and regional expertise. Analysts specialize in a region and provide MISO-relevant information, strategic analysis, and advice during the planning and execution of missions. The CIE publishes and disseminates MISO studies. Additionally, CIE analysts provide reachback analytical support to deployed forces and can deploy to work with and provide analytical support to deployed MIS forces.

(b) **Regional Battalion.** The battalion is organized, trained, and equipped to provide supported commanders with planning, product development, production, and dissemination from operational to tactical levels. These battalion headquarters typically staff and serve as the C2 element of a MISTF. These battalions are regionally oriented and maintain a functional support relationship with their respective CCMDs and TSOCs. The battalions support other regions as directed.

(c) **Tactical Battalion.** The battalion provides tactical-level support to SOF and, when directed, to conventional forces deployed for contingency operations. The battalion's companies, detachments, and teams are the primary providers to deployed forces on the ground.

(3) The typical support relationships for tactical MIS forces are as follows:

(a) **Tactical Battalion.** Provide support to corps/Marine expeditionary force.

(b) **Tactical Company.** Provide support to division-sized units with each tactical detachment co-located with a subordinate brigade of that division. A company also provides support to a Special Forces group. The company headquarters and product development detachment remain with the division and provide support to the tactical detachments.

(c) **Tactical Detachment.** Provide support to brigade/regiment-sized units with OPCON tactical teams assigned at each subordinate task force/squadron. A detachment typically supports a special forces battalion.

(d) In general, the USAR MIS forces support conventional forces while active duty MIS forces support SOF.

c. **Media Operations Battalion.** The battalion provides MIS units with audio, visual, and audiovisual production support; product distribution support; signal support; electronic maintenance support; data and product archiving; and media broadcast capabilities. The battalion provides production support to MIS forces from the Media Operations Complex and, through teams deployed with MIS units around the world, is the media production and product archives hub for the MISO.

d. **United States Army Forces Command.** United States Army Forces Command functions are to:

(1) Assist in developing and coordinating RC MISO requirements, issues, and activities.

(2) Prepare and deploy RC MISO in support of GCC requirements.

e. **USAR Component Group.** The USAR groups organize, train, and equip assigned and attached forces to deploy anywhere in the world and conduct MISO and other specified activities in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency community, as directed by the President and SecDef. RC groups also organize and execute operational-level task forces in support of JFCs and provide augmentation to GCCs for theater-level MISO.

(1) The groups are capable of conducting the following tasks:

(a) Validate, deploy/redeploy, and sustain all assigned and attached forces.

(b) Execute MISO at the tactical level.

(c) Organize and execute operational-level task forces in support of JFCs, and provide augmentation to GCCs for theater-level MISO or MISTF support.

(d) Execute multimedia development, production, distribution, and delivery in support of operations.

(e) Execute CAIS.

(2) The USAR groups contain the following organizations:

(a) **Tactical MIS Battalion.** The battalion provides support to corps-level units and below. The battalion's companies are the primary providers of support to conventional forces and enhance the commander's ability to influence the behavior of TAs within the assigned operational area.

(b) **MIS Company—Dissemination.** This company provides limited tactical-level dissemination in the following areas: audio, visual, and audiovisual production; product distribution; electronic maintenance; and media broadcast.

f. **MISO Staff Planners.** The Army provides the preponderance of MISO staff planners assigned or attached to the joint force. Responsibilities include:

(1) Plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate MISO into operations to create effects required to meet the commander's intent and support achievement of objectives.

(2) Prepare the MISO portion of OPLANs and orders.

(3) Monitor status of all nonlethal effects, assets, and activities.

(4) Recommend employment of MISO capabilities to achieve objectives.

(5) Request, receive, and integrate MIS units and capabilities into operations.

(6) Recommend required changes or updates to existing approved programs to provide the capability with required authorities, as needed to meet the commander's intent.

g. In addition to dedicated MIS units, Army units can also support MISO. With routine interaction with TAs, they are in an ideal position to support delivery and collect MOE/MOP indicators.

4. United States Navy Assets

a. The US Navy does not have units whose primary function is to conduct MISO. It employs a wide range of dissemination assets, reproduction, translation, and language capabilities, and planning resources that can support joint and Service MISO. Navy ships and shore facilities can print documents, posters, articles, leaflets, and handbills. Most aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious warfare ships are capable of high-volume quality printing.

b. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with joint MIS personnel to identify maritime TAs, develop messages, and plan dissemination. Language/translation capabilities also exist within the fleet.

c. The Navy has surface, subsurface, and aviation assets with ultrahigh frequency, very high frequency, and high frequency broadcast capabilities to deliver messages to afloat and ashore TAs. Boarding parties can deliver products to crews of civilian vessels.

d. Several Navy aircraft have the ability to support MISO. The F/A-18 Hornet can drop PDU-5B leaflet canisters to disseminate print materials deep inland over hostile territory. The P-3 Orion is certified to drop the PDU-5B. Shipborne helicopters can provide leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. C-2A Greyhound transport aircraft can disperse a large volume of leaflets by static-line airdrops from the aft cargo ramp. The EA-18G Growler can jam adversary broadcasts and also transmit MISO messages on a wide range of frequencies.

e. The Navy employs a tactical loudspeaker system, the long-range acoustic device and conventional loudspeakers for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore audio transmission of messages.

f. The Navy has two combat camera units. These units can provide support to product development. The ships and aircraft of the fleet can also provide limited audiovisual production capabilities.

For additional information, see Navy Warfare Publication 3-53, Navy Psychological Operations.

5. United States Air Force Assets

a. Air Force MISO are focused on the employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities and IRCs as the primary means to prepare, shape, and exploit the cognitive dimension of the information environment. USAF MIS forces provide direct support to the CCDR with message distribution and dissemination and direct participation in the TAA process, and can serve as a liaison between the AOCs and other MISO entities such as a JMISTF. Additionally, USAF MIS forces provide support to the CCDR through the systematic use of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities and IRCs to disrupt, deter, shape, condition, and exploit the cognitive dimension of the information environment to optimize psychological impact on a TA and create behavioral change.

b. USAF MIS officers support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and activities. USAF MIS officers are located in AOCs and the joint AOC (if established) to assist commanders with MISO planning and the integration of IRCs to achieve objectives and ensure the synchronization of words and actions. AOC MISO staff planners have four primary responsibilities: develop and support JFC MISO objectives, coordinate objectives with appropriate CCMDs, serve as the joint force air component commander's (if designated) subject matter expert and advisor on the inherent psychological effects of airpower, and plan for the employment of airpower in traditional and nontraditional roles to optimize the psychological impact on TAs. MIS officers coordinate and liaise between the AOC and the JTF IO staff to use all-source analysis of an adversary's sociological, cultural, and demographic information to recommend effective MIS strategies.

c. USAF MIS officers fill individual billets on joint manning documents and are capable of providing support to units conducting MISO. With educational backgrounds in behavioral sciences and expertise in airpower, USAF MIS officers plan the employment and execution of IRCs to create desired effects and understand how it can support or detract from messages, programs, plans, and products.

d. Many USAF platforms can be used to execute missions in support of JFC MISO. EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft are equipped to broadcast radio and TV messages. Transport aircraft perform static line leaflet airdrop missions. Some USAF fighter and bomber aircraft can drop leaflet canisters, as well as create relevant effects through visual/audible presence. USAF cyberspace units support the JFC's MISO.

e. USAF MISO capabilities are growing beyond the traditional dissemination roles of airborne broadcasts and leaflet drops. USAF MISO officers within the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) contribute to all-source behavioral influences analysis (BIA) within existing guidelines and as determined by the NASIC Commander. BIA provides an analytical framework to facilitate understanding and exploitation of the perceptual and behavioral context of the OE. BIA directly supports TAA, providing in-depth assessment of TAs. Key BIA products include NASIC analysis reports, topics of analytical interest, biographies, individual/group/organizational behavioral profiles, and/or other agreed-upon products.

For additional information, see Air Force Instruction 10-702, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

6. United States Marine Corps Assets

a. The Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) possesses a MIS Company that supports Marine Corps operational requirements with expeditionary MIS elements and has an organic product development detachment. The MISO Company typically deploys expeditionary MIS teams in support of Marine air-ground task forces. The MCIOC, in conjunction with the MISO Company, provides reachback support to deployed Marine Corps MIS elements.

b. The MCIOC provides operational support to Marine forces and Marine air-ground task forces, as well as IO subject matter expertise in support of Marine Corps IO advocates and proponents, in order to enable the effective integration of IO into Marine Corps operations.

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APPENDIX C
CONSIDERATIONS FOR TAB A (MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 3 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO A JOINT OPERATION PLAN

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) for plans and orders.

1. Situation

a. **General**

(1) What is the situation relevant to MISO in the operational area?

(2) What are the approved programs?

(3) What are the significant OE factors influencing MISO execution?

(4) What are the potentially conflicting MISO objectives in the operational area?

(5) What are the MISO tasks to be accomplished?

b. **US (or US and Multinational) Perspective**

(1) How will the MISO tasks be accomplished?

(2) What resources will be used?

(3) What will be the general phasing of current actions with future actions?

c. **Neutral Perspective** (if applicable)

(1) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various circumstances?

(2) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions?

(3) What actions and behavior by the neutral population(s) support mission objectives?

(4) Which actions and behavior may interfere with mission objectives?

(5) What resources are available to execute alternative COAs?

(6) What objective and subjective factors could affect decisions and resource effectiveness?

(7) What are the characteristics of decision makers and their key advisors, major staff planners, staff sections (to include particularly influential individuals), and intelligence system analysts?

d. **Adversary Perspectives**

(1) **Decision Makers and Staffs**

(a) What COAs might affect friendly task accomplishment?

(b) What resources are available to execute each COA?

(c) Who are the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of resources to COAs pertinent to the task assigned?

(d) What are the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisors, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)?

(2) **Intelligence Systems**

(a) What are the intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs?

(b) What are the intelligence systems' capabilities pertinent to the situation?

(c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of information gathering resources?

(d) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(e) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful perceptions of each group?

(3) **TAs**

(a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in objective accomplishment?

(b) How susceptible are these groups to MISO?

(c) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to objective accomplishment?

(d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group?

(e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?

(f) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

(4) **Command Systems**

(a) What communications systems and command centers will be used to plan COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA?

(b) What is the purpose and what are the characteristics of each C2 communications net?

(c) What are the MISO-relevant targets for jamming, attacking, or protecting?

(d) When should MISO be executed to demoralize and disorganize opposing commanders?

(e) When should MISO be executed to reduce opposing operational effectiveness?

(f) When should MISO be executed to enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions?

(g) When should MISO be executed to support OPSEC to the maximum advantage?

2. Mission

Standard mission statement concerning the ways in which MISO contributes to the mission?

3. Execution

a. **CONOPS**

(1) **Overview**

(a) What is the commander's intent?

(b) What is the overall concept for MISO task accomplishment?

(c) Who will plan and conduct MISO in peacetime as part of preconflict deterrence options? Who are the supporting commanders?

(d) Who will plan and conduct MISO in support of sustained hostilities? Who are the supporting commanders?

(e) Who will plan and conduct joint MISO in support of operational COAs? Who are the supporting commanders?

b. **General Guidance to Units and Forces**

(1) What are the valid themes to promote strategic and theater objectives?

(2) What are the themes to be avoided? Include indications of specific foreign TA sensitivities and harm that might occur if TAs accept messages developed from these themes.

(3) What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and personnel behavior to promote valid themes?

(4) What is the guidance for avoiding military operations and actions and personnel behavior that would result in harmful foreign TA attitudes and behavior?

(5) What are the cultural and psychological characteristics of TAs that will aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs?

(6) **Enemy and Adversary IRCs**

(a) What IRCs will be directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area?

(b) What is the guidance for countering such adversary operations?

(7) **Outline of Each Planned MISO Program**

(a) What is the TA and set of MISO objectives, overall themes, subgroups (to include their characteristics), and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup?

(b) What are the provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and delivering MISO products and for measuring effectiveness?

(c) What are the command and staff arrangements? Who are the supporting commanders?

(d) What resources are required to plan and conduct MISO? Include civil capabilities and indigenous assets to support MISO.

(e) What are the logistical requirements? Include production, distribution, and stocking of MISO products, transportation of products and personnel to operational areas, and their basing and support while conducting MISO; provisions for the supply and maintenance of US and indigenous products; and fiscal and personnel matters.

(f) What are the requirements for implementing schedules and series control sheets?

(g) What is the OPSEC planning guidance? Include planning for, preparing for, and conducting MISO to maintain essential secrecy for the commander's intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive MISO COAs.

(h) What is the type of attribution that will be used? Depending on the type of attribution utilized, what is the acknowledgment plan?

(8) **Situation Monitoring**

(a) How will intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and assessment be provided?

(b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of TAs responsive to information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions?

(c) What resources are required? What is their availability?

(9) **Control**

(a) How will control be effected and implementation centrally coordinated?

(b) What are the coordinating instructions?

(c) How will implementation planning and supervision of the planned action be accomplished?

(d) What is the need for specific MISO?

(e) What coordination is required with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, to include US missions?

(f) What coordination is required with HN military units or HN civilian agencies?

(g) What coordination is required with MILDEC and OPSEC planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action; foreign humanitarian assistance; civil-military operations; detainees; command, control, and communications; legal; captured US personnel; and operations?

(10) **Tasks**

(a) What responsibilities must be assigned to implement the concept?

(b) Is designation of an executive agent to coordinate implementation among multiple organizations required?

(c) How will feedback be provided to measure MISO effectiveness?

4. Administration and Logistics

a. **Logistics**

(1) What is the guidance for stocking production supplies and finished products?

(2) What are the provisions for the maintenance of MISO-unique equipment?

(3) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials?

(4) What are the fiscal matters relating to special funds?

(5) What are the personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel?

b. **Administration**

(1) What are the requirements for special reports?

(2) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs regarding detainees?

5. Command and Control

Refer to appropriate sections of annex K (Communications System) and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan or annex K, to include the following:

a. What are the recognition and identification instructions?

b. What are the headquarters locations and movements?

c. What are the code words?

d. What is the frequency allocation?

APPENDIX D
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROGRAM FORMAT

References:

1. Situation

a. Enemy/adversary forces.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Ongoing military operations.

(2) Ongoing programs.

(3) Ongoing non-DOD activities relevant to MISO.

c. Attachments and detachments (if any).

d. Potential TAs.

(1) Authorized TA.

(2) Restricted TA (if any).

e. Potential for collateral effect and exposure to unintended audiences.

f. Assessment of the risk to DOD or USG by the execution of the planned MISO.

2. Mission

(Who, what, where, when, why.)

3. Execution

a. Intent.

b. CONOPS.

(1) General: (How does the commander plan to accomplish the mission, including, but not limited to, how the proposed program/series will influence TA behavior and the forces involved?)

(2) MISO objectives.

(3) Attribution plan.

(a) Source (US only, specify PN or organization).

(b) Timing (immediate and identify restrictions for use of delayed).

(c) Techniques.

(d) Non-attribution is/is not authorized.

(4) Dissemination methods and mediums. (Which are authorized, which are not?)

(5) Themes.

(a) Themes to stress.

(b) Themes to avoid.

(6) Concept of assessment.

(a) MOPs.

(b) MOEs.

(c) MISO objective 1: (separate explanation for each MISO objective). Indicator: (increase/decrease in…) (separate explanation for each indicator). Collection periodicity:

1. Collection source.

2. Collection method.

3. Reporting plan (by objective).

c. Tasks to units.

d. Coordinating instructions.

(1) Time or condition when program becomes effective.

(2) Commander's critical information requirements.

(3) Rules of engagement.

(4) Force protection.

(5) Proposed PA guidance.

(6) OPSEC planning considerations.

4. Sustainment

a. Support concept (to include funding).

b. Materiel and services.

c. Personnel.

5. Command and Control

a. Command.

b. Approval processes and authorities.

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APPENDIX E
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-13.2 is based upon the following primary references:

1. United States Laws

a. Title 10, USC.

b. Title 50, USC.

2. Executive Branch Documents

a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 2007, *Policy for Department of Defense (DOD) Interactive Internet Activities.*

b. Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities.*

c. National Security Decision Directive 130, *US International Information Policy.*

d. National Security Decision Directive 77, *Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security.*

e. National Security Directive 51, *US Government International Broadcasting.*

f. National Security Strategy of the United States.

g. Presidential Decision Directive 68, *International Public Information (IPI).*

h. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables.*

3. Department of State Publication

DOS Publication 9434, *Treaties in Force.*

4. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program.*

b. DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).*

c. DODD S-3321.1, *Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War.*

d. DODD 3600.01, *Information Operations (IO).*

e. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.*

f. DODD 5111.10, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]).*

g. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.*

h. DODD 5525.1, *Status of Forces Policy and Information.*

i. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements.*

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Manuals

a. CJCSI 3110.05E, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.*

b. CJCSI 3150.25E, *Joint Lessons Learned Program.*

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*

d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3210.01C, *Joint Information Operations Proponent.*

6. Joint Publications

a. JP I, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

b. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence.*

c. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

d. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations.*

e. JP 3-05, *Special Operations.*

f. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations.*

g. JP 3-13, *Information Operations.*

h. JP 3-14, *Space Operations*

i. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations.*

j. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense.*

k JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

l. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations.*

m. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs.*

n. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

o. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

p. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

7. United States Army Publications

a. Army Doctrine Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*.

b. Field Manual (FM) 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

c. FM 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*.

d. FM 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations*.

e. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

8. United States Navy Publications

a. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3434.1A, *Psychological Operations*.

b. Navy Warfare Publication 3-53, *Navy Psychological Operations*.

9. United States Air Force Publications

a. Air Force Doctrine Volume 1, *Basic Doctrine*.

b. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-05, *Special Operations*.

c. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-13, *Information Operations*.

d. Air Force Instruction 10-702, *Military Information Support Operations*.

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APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations,* 07 January 2010, incorporating Change 1, 20 December 2011.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//FMD-J9-D//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JED//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and inform the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance with DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification,* and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.*

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs obtainable on the JEL are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semiannually, and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOC	air operations center
AOR	area of responsibility
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
BIA	behavioral influences analysis
C2	command and control
CAIS	civil authority information support
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CIE	cultural intelligence element
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONUS	continental United States
CT	counterterrorism
DEPORD	deployment order
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EW	electronic warfare
EXORD	execute order
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual (Army)
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
HN	host nation
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IIP	Bureau of International Information Programs (DOS)
IO	information operations
IRC	information-related capability
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW	irregular warfare

JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JMISTF	joint military information support task force
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	joint task force
MCIOC	Marine Corps Information Operations Center
MILDEC	military deception
MIS	military information support
MISO	military information support operations
MISTF	military information support task force
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NASIC	National Air and Space Intelligence Center
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OE	operational environment
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PN	partner nation
RC	Reserve Component
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
SOF	special operations forces
TA	target audience
TAA	target audience analysis
TCP	theater campaign plan
TSOC	theater special operations command
TV	television
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USAF	United States Air Force
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USC	United States Code
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government

USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

civil authority information support. The use of military information support operations capabilities to conduct public information dissemination activities to support national security or disaster relief operations within the United States and its territories in support of a lead federal agency. Also called **CAIS.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

joint military information support task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

military information support operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **MISO.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE JP 3-13.2)

military information support operations impact indicators. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

propaganda. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance

- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)



STEP #3 - Approval

- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

STEP #2 - Development

- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF