

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS QUANTICO VIRGINIA

14 April 2020

HQ OSI/XILI Attn: FOIA Section 27130 Telegraph Rd Quantico VA 22134

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr. 27305 W. Live Oak Rd. Suite #1203 Castaic CA 91384 john@greenewald.com

Dear Mr. Greenewald, Jr,

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 16 December 2019 which has been assigned tracking number 2020-02087-F.

Information from OSI criminal investigative records are exempt from release under the Privacy Act, Title 5 United States Code (USC) Section 552a (j)(2). In order to provide you the maximum amount of releasable information, we are processing your request under the FOIA. Since portions of the information requested are also exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, we have inserted the exemptions below in the attached document(s).

- a. Exemption (b)(6) permits the withholding of all information about individuals in "personnel and medical files and similar files" when the disclosure of such information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
- b. Exemption (b)(7)(C) provides protection for personal information in law enforcement records the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

The authority for the exemptions used can be found in 5 U.S.C. §552, DoDM 5400.07, *Freedom of Information Act Program*, and DoD 5400.7-R_AFMAN 33-302. You can also access information on the Air Force FOIA program via the Air Force FOIA page at http://www.foia.af.mil/.

If you interpret my response as not fully complying with your request, you may appeal this decision with the Secretary of the Air Force by email to afosi_hq_foia_request@us.af.mil; mail to OSI/XILI, ATTN: FOIA Office, 27130 Telegraph Rd, Quantico, VA 22134; or fax to (571) 305-8229 no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Include your reason(s) for reconsideration and attach a copy of this letter.

You may also contact the Air Force FOIA Public Liaison Officer, Ms. Anh Trinh, concerning this final response at AF FOIA Public Liaison Office (SAF/CN), 1800 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1800, usaf.pentagon.saf-cn.mbx.af-foia@mail.mil or (703) 614-8500.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely

ROXANNE M. JENSEN Chief, Information Release Branch

Attachment:
Cy of Redacted Document(s)

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FILE NUMBER		AFOSI INVESTIGATIVE COMMUNICATION	DATE OF TRANSMITTAL 20180421	
3290517356125			20100121	
TO: Office of the Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301		FROM: AFOSI Detachment 334 1165 Air Force Pentagon, Room Washington, DC 20330	1165 Air Force Pentagon, Room 5E1037	
(0	BJECT (A. 1966) Air Force Office of Special Investigated 334, 12/17, Unauthorized Disclosure of Potential	tions Detachment 334, Case#: 3290517356125, Decernitially Classified DOD Videos.	mber 2017,	
REFERENCES				
	ITEM(S) CHEC	CKED ARE APPLICABLE TO ABOVE SUBJECT		
	1. INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN INITIATED AND REF	PORTS WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.		
√	2. THIS MATTER IS PENDING 🗸 0	CLOSED		
	3. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN (AFR 124	(4-4)		
√	4. NOTE RESTRICTIVE LEGENDS ON FRONT OF TH	HE ATTACHMENT(S)		
	5. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISPOSITION	OF EVIDENCE LISTED BELOW		
√	6. ATTACHED IS FORWARDED FOR INFORM	MATION		
	7. INVESTIGATION/SUMMARY ATTACHED			
	8. REQUEST STATUS OF THIS MATTER AND/OR D	DATE REPORT MAY BE EXPECTED		
		DER FOR INFORMATION OR ACTION IF NOT PREVIOUSLY RE	··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
√	10. WHEN ATTACHMENT(S) IS/ARE REMOVE RETAINED DOWNGRADED TO	ED, THE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL CANCELED	LL 8E	
	MARKS ASE AGENT: (U) SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) AFOS	61 Detachment (Det) 334 Pentagon, Washington, DC.		
BA	ACKGROUND:			
an cla	unidentified flying object (UFO) to the New Yor	Dec 17 following the 16 Dec 17 release of a video of toork Times news agency. The video in question πamed declassification authorization was gained prior to the re	"Gimble" was previously	
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) however, a short time later he disclosed his involvement (to				
several news outlets) with the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, which focused research issues on Unidentified Flying Objects.				
On October 2017, he submitted a request to have three classified videos downgraded via a DD Form 1910, "CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION," to Civ (b)(6): (b)(7)(C) Defense Office of Republication and Security Review, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. The videos were "GoFast," "Gimble," and "FLIR," all three videos were classified control. The downgrade request was submitted on 9 Aug 17, but there was no indication the request was ever granted. (Agent Note: The DD Form 1910 was the form provided, but was not a form used for the declassification process. The DD 1910 is used for the public release of DoD information.) The request for release there was no indication the videos would be release to any news media outlet. The reason for publication was listed as, "Not Applicable. Not for publication. Research and analysis ONLY and info sharing with other USG and industry partners for the purposes of developing a database to help identify, analyze, and ultimately defeat UAS threats." (b)(6): stated he would not have approved the videos for release to the media. Additionally, (b)(6): never received confirmation the videos were declassified.				
NAME GRADE TITLE AND SIGNATURE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SA, USAF Commander, AFOSI Det 334		ATTACHMENT(S) COPIES TO I - File I - USD		

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Intelligence, Pentagon, Washington DC for action.	Intelligence, Pentagon, Washington DC for action.					
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