

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

CRYPTOLOGIC
INVOLVEMENT
IN
USS PUEBLO
INCIDENT

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-14-2012, FOIA Case # 40722

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

F04

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Memorandum

TO : [Redacted] P REP COMINT Compromise
Damage Assessment Task Group, PUEBLO Incident

DATE: 29 January 1968

FROM : PO4
W. D. Oppenheimer/3356-s

In reply refer to:
[Redacted]

SUBJECT: COMINT Compromise Damage Assessment relative to documents for which PO4 is
OPI (TECHINS 6002, 7010, 7011, 7013, 9003)

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

1. TECHINS 6002, SIGINT MINIMIZE PROCEDURES - Document is classified SECRET-HVCCO, and provides information in general relative to the type(s) of material/information generated within the NSE and forwarded electronically under normal circumstances but decreased in precedence or type forwarded by courier under MINIMIZE conditions. Its compromise would seriously affect the cryptologic effort except [Redacted]

2. TECHINS 7010, INFORMAL TECHNICAL NOTES - Document is classified SECRET-HVCCO and reveals general type information that cryptanalysts would expect to be exchanged between and among members of [Redacted] organization. Its compromise would not seriously affect the cryptologic effort.

3. TECHINS 7011, CRYPTOLOGIC INFORMATION PUBLICATION - Document is TOP SECRET with a CODEWORD Annex. It would reveal that such information is handled separately from normal SIGINT product and therefore of special interest to NSA. Its compromise would not seriously affect the cryptologic effort.

4. TECHINS 7013, STANDARD TRANSLITERATION TABLES - Document is classified SECRET-HVCCO and reveals that the NSE uses or has established standard methods for converting foreign languages (particularly cyrillic) to romanized form with morse equivalents. Such could be expected by any modern cryptologic organization and would, in part, be available from open sources. No serious damage would occur by this compromise unless nations changed procedures overall.

5. TECHINS 9003, CATEGORIZATION OF COMINT - Document is classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD and defines various categories of COMINT [Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 January 1968

b) (1)
b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

It is recommended that the matter be reported to USIB as well as LSIB.

Lawrence D. Terry
LAWRENCE D. TERRY
Chief, Operations Staff
Production

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

GROUP A

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~NOFORN~~

Group A Contact:
CHARLES R. LORD (A06)
X 4929s
22-890-6789

SUBJECT: USS PUEBLO Incident; Impact and Loss on Group A
Targets and Operations


(b) (1)
(3) -50 USC 403
(3) -P.L. 86-36

I. PREFACE:

A. The following constitutes an assessment of the impact on Group A SIGINT operations and targets resulting from the presumed compromise of those documents known to have been provided as support to the USS PUEBLO and which may have been on-board at the time of its capture. In the absence at this time of authoritative evidence regarding either (1) which Group A-related documents may have been off-loaded at [redacted] prior to departure on the last mission, or (2) which specific Group A-related documents on-board may have been destroyed by the crew of the USS PUEBLO, Group A has assumed that all pertinent documents provided as support to USS PUEBLO operations have been compromised. Additional support may well have been provided by other organizations (e.g. messages from [redacted] NOTAL DIRNSA) on which Group A is unable to comment. It may eventually prove feasible, subsequent to possible identification of off-loaded documents, to moderate our present assessment of damage.

B. Each technical support paper, selected TECHINS, or other document relating to Group A operations, has been reviewed and a precis has been prepared with accompanying impact statement. In instances in which essentially the same information is presented in several different forms (e.g. various sorts or reverse listings), the documents have been grouped together and a single assessment provided. A summary statement of overall impact on Group A targets will be provided as the final section of this report.

II. DOCUMENT EVALUATIONS:




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

(b) (1)
(3) -50 USC 403
(3) -18 USC 798
(3) -P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRAINING~~




~~TOP SECRET TRAINING~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - R.L. 86-36

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRAIN~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRAIN~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~




~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



I. Russian English Dictionaries

Title: SMIRNITSKIJ; Russian-English Dictionary
SEGAL; Russian-English Dictionary
MULLER; Russian-English Dictionary
MORSKOH SLOVAR' (Naval Dictionary)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Content and Impact: The Russian-English dictionaries and the Morskoj Slovar' are open source documents whose presence aboard the PUEBLO are of absolutely trivial significance in comparison with other documents aboard, and serve only to confirm our interest in Russian language material in general and, in the case of the Morskoj Slovar', Russian naval activities in particular. It is difficult to consider their loss as a compromise of any significance.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~


~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

A CONTACT OFFICER

CHAS. R. LORD

x 49293

22-890-6789



LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

50 USC 403

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

18 USC 798

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
11




~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 50 USC 798
E.O. 13526, B6-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET FRODO~~




~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

(1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET FRODO~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINITE~~




~~TOP SECRET TRINITE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINITE~~

(b) (1)
(b) (7) - 50 USC 403
(b) (7) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~ 16

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~




~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~




~~TOP SECRET~~ 18

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

~~TOP SECRET TROJAN~~




D

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TROJAN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~




~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~




~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(b) (3) -50 USC 403
USC 798
E.O. 12812, 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~




~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-E.O. 12958-1

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET FRODO BAGGINS~~


USS FURLO INCIDENT


IMPACT AND LOSS ON GROSS & TARGETS AND OPERATIONS

~~TOP SECRET FRODO BAGGINS~~


~~TOP SECRET FRODO BAGGINS~~

~~TOP SECRET FRODO BAGGINS~~






(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: North Korean Naval Manual Morse Message Formats (~~SECRET//SAVEN~~)




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-E.O. 13526




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-E.O. 13526



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-E.O. 13526



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


TITLE: B11 Working Aid #3-67, NSA Standardized Abbreviations, 9 November 1967, (SS)

CONTENTS: This document contains extracts from TECHINS 1001 and is used to standardize certain abbreviations for English terms.


ASSESSMENT: No damage would result from the disclosure of this document.



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36






(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-E.O. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 793
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: TECHINS 2020 - TEXTA Manual

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


TITLE: TECHINS 1055 - SIGINT Activities Directory



TITLE: TECHINS 1043 - NSA Forwarding Directive



TITLE: TECHINS 2020 - TEXTA Manual



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

2001

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) (1)
(E) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1003 - Radiotelephone Recording Transcriptions Procedures

[Redacted]

TITEE: TECHINS 1007 - Morse General Search Cover and Reporting

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1019 - Machine Intercept Analysis Report (MIAR)

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1042 - Instructions for Preparing and Packaging for Forwarding of Intercept Traffic and Related Material

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1044 - Instructions for the Selection and Forwarding of Product DDI's, Selection of Messages, Administrative and Operational Delivery Distribution Indicators (DDI's)

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 2003 - Instructions for Preparation of Daily Technical Summaries (TECSUMS)

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 4001 - Serialization of SIGINT Product

CONTENTS: Acts as a working aid in allowing the reader to have a rapid assessment of the content of a given report/translation. Otherwise no intelligence value.

TITLE: TECHINS 4010 - SIG Publ Manual (formerly TECHINS 4010)

[Redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

SECRET

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


TITLE: TECHINS 4011 - SIGINT Support to Unified and Specified Commands and other Overseas Consumers



TITLE: TECHINS 7010 - Informal Tech Notes (ITN's)



TITLE: TECHINS 7014 - Procedures for Providing Information Support to U.S. SIGINT Field Units



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

GROUP K


[K

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHINS 1056 (Collection Management Procedures) (U)



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 793
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHINS 1001 (Standard Intercept Symbols and Abbreviations) (U)



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHINS 1021 and changes thereto



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHINS 1003 (Radiotelephone Recording and Transcription Procedures (U)



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(1)
(3)-50 USC 403
(3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: TECHINS NO. 1037, Equipment and Facilities Standards for Intercept Stations ~~(C)~~




~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: TECHINS 1005 (Radio Printer
Coll Procedures (C))



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: EL2 Impact Statement on the Loss of the USS Pueblo

CONTENTS: The following messages were aboard the USS Pueblo and our assessment of their compromise is listed below:

- a. Two USN-467Y messages of 22 Jan (SECRET SAVIN) were tech reports for the period 12-22 Jan 68. These messages contained the specific COMINT and ELINT frequencies monitored during that period. This information shows the capability of the on-board equipment and provides insight into the U.S. targets of interest. The address lists also associate the ship with NSA and other SIBINT and command units.
- b. CDRGPACFLT msg 191920Z Jan proposed to CDRPAC the patrol during which the PUEBLO was captured. The message contained objectives for the patrol and, by the addressee list, associated the ship and patrol with NSA and various command units.
- c. DIRNSA 122009Z Jan (EL2-36) to the PUEBLO and BARNER advised of technical support packages being forwarded. This message shows direct NSA involvement with the ship.
- d. CTF 96 110042Z Jan advised of PUEBLO sailing delay and through the addressee list associated NSA and other commands with the ship.
(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 403
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
- e. CDRGPACFLT 052157Z Jan, same as d. above.
- f. [] (USS BARNER) 050710Z Jan, same as d. above.
- g. DIRNSA message of 4 Dec (A/518) to various SIBINT addres discussed the tech support arrangements for the PUEBLO and BARNER. The message clearly associates NSA with these ships.
- h. CTF 96 050512Z Jan contained PUEBLO sail orders and associates NSA with the patrol through the addres list.
- i. USN-467Y (PUEBLO) 030116Z Jan provided the operational schedule for 3rd quarter FY68. The message shows U.S. interest in specific operating areas. The message also associates these activities with cryptologic elements, including NSA.
- j. JCS 021615Z Jan approves requested TRS and special surface operations submitted by CINCNAVY and CDRPAC. Although the specific operations are not identified, the addressee list contains the names of all the U.S. technical research ships, the AGER's, NSA, other cryptologic elements and command units. The associations are obvious.
- k. CDRPAC 292111Z Dec 67 discusses the use of a SECRET Codeword to be assigned for WPACTAF ADR operations as intelligence collection ships including SIBINT material and personnel support". The addres list associates NSA and other cryptologic units with these activities.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

1. DIRNSA 292017Z Dec 67 (K12-1266) contains NSA secondary collection requirements for the PUEBLO operations in the KOROKH area. These requirements show specific knowledge of and interest in the following SIGINT targets:

- (1)
- (2)
- (3) North Korea Air Force activity on specific frequencies
- (4) North Korea Army activity in specific frequency ranges
- (5) North Korea Navy activity in specific frequency ranges
- (6) Cruise missile emitters at a specific location
- (7) Other ELINT emitters at a specific location(s)

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

m. CINCPACFLT 172154Z Dec 67 was the same proposal as contained in b. above.

n. CNO 151410Z Dec 67 advised the fleet commanders of expanded AGER operations and requested the assignment of new codewords for use in their operating areas. The addie list associates NSA with these operations.

o. DIRNAVSECORU 021912Z Jan advised DIRNAVSECORUPAC that the PUEBLO should take DIRNSA K12-1266 (see 1. above) for action. This associates NSA directly with this patrol.

p. DIRNAVSECORUPAC 032144Z Jan tasked the PUEBLO with the NSA requirements contained in K12-1266.

q. CINCPACFLT 290226Z Sep 67 assigned the cryptologic designator USN-467X for use by the NAVSECORUDET aboard the PUEBLO. The message also outlines command reporting responsibilities for the OIC of the detachment. NSA is associated through the message addie list.

r. CINCPACFLT 290111Z Sep 67 outlines command and control relationships applicable to the NAVSECORUDET. Among these is the statement "E. Technical direction over SIGINT functions is vested in DIRNSA,....".

s. DIRNSA 251330Z Aug 67 (R72-003) proposes TDY for two NSA civilians to visit the PALM BEACH and PUEBLO in connection with equipment installation matters.

t. NAVSHIPSYSOCOM HQ 161456Z Mar 67 associates NSA, LTV ElectroSystems at Bremerton, Washington and Sylvania Electronic Systems with the PALM BEACH and PUEBLO.

2. Several other messages noted in the K1 files were not specifically commented on. These messages associated NSA with the PUEBLO through the message addie list. Although the message text was not particularly compromising.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

ASSESSMENT: As viewed by the messages discussed above, and without regard for the impact statements being prepared elsewhere, the following compromises are evident if the messages were not destroyed prior to the capture of the PUEBLO:


- a. DIRNSA is associated directly with the activities of the USS PUEBLO.
- b. DIRNSA provided specific collection requirements for the PUEBLO.
- c. The NSA requirements identify specific U.S. SIGINT interests.
- d. The addressee lists permit an insight into U.S. cryptologic command and technical relationships.
- e. A listing of surface SIGINT technical research ships is given. Contact Mr. Richard Harvey, K12, on extension 3891/5385s for further information.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~NOFORN~~


(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TEXTA (Technical extracts of Traffic Analysis) KCN, KCA, KCM.



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TEXTA MANUAL (TECHINS 2020)



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

FROM :

SUBJECT: TECHINS 1043 (Forwarding Directive)

[Empty rectangular box for memorandum content]



~~SECRET SAVIN~~


Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 1055

(SIGINT Activities Directory)




~~SECRET~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-1B USC 79B
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 1019

(Machine Intercept Analysis Report) -MIAR



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: IFL

Nonagram Scale

Sonagraph Scale

Signal Diary Cards (Blank)

NMSDB Operators Cards (Blank)

ASSESSMENT: Possession of the above by the North Koreans or any other potential enemy would have no serious impact since no information of SIGINT value could be obtained from these items. The signal diary and NMSDB operators logs, if filled in,

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~

TITLE: NMSDB Working Aid for AGER Operations

TECHINS 1007

TECHINS 1012


TECHINS 1016

TECHINS 1030, Annex BRAVO

TECHDOC 106

TECHDOC 107


(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: FIF (Frequency Index File)
T-1021 (Classification System for Radio Signals)
NMOSAH (Non-Morse Operators Signals Analysis Handbook)



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: PUEBLO Equipment Assessment



~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHDOC 137 (~~SECRET-IVCOE~~)

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1312 v/changes (~~SECRET-SAVIN~~)

- #1 dtd 3 Nov 65, cy 275
- #2 dtd 30 Nov 65, cy 274
- #4 dtd 11 Jul 66, cy 172
- #5 dtd 21 Dec 66, cy 96
- #6 dtd 9 Feb 67, cy 135
- #7 dtd 28 Jul 67

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1030, Annex Bravo (~~SECRET-SAVIN~~)

[Redacted]

TITLE: NM3DB Working Aid for AGER Operations

[Redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1316, dtd 7 January 66, cy 344 with Change #1, dtd 30 Mar 66. (~~SECRET-SAVIN~~)

[Redacted]

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~


~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: TECHDOC 136




TITLE: TECHINS 137



TITLE: IFL - International Frequency List drawn up by the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) (U)


TITLE: Signal Diary Cards



TITLE: NMSD Operators Log, Form M8275, classified "CONFIDENTIAL - UNTIL FILLED IN".



TITLE: Frequency Index File



~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~


~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: Memos for Holders of GM/ESV/SP Telemetry Beaconry Intercept Operators Handbook, dated 31 Mar 1966, 19 Dec 1966, and 11 Apr 1967



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: Memos for Holders of GM/ESV/SP Telemetry
Beaconry Intercept Operators Handbook, dated 31 Mar 66,
19 Dec 66, 11 Apr 67.



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: DIA EOB Volume 3, dated 1 October 1967




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: PACOM Electronic Equipment Reference Manual (PER-2), dtd 1 Jun 67




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: PER-3, Collection Requirements, dated 1 Mar 67 (with changes)



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET FRODO~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: working copies of ELINT Parameter List




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: SEDSCAF Guides

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36




(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: NSA ELINT Reference Manual



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-10 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~SECRET~~

TITLE: NSA ELINT Parameter Limits List, 1 Oct 67/1 Jan 68



(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~


TITLE: Standard ELINT Data Systems Codes and Formats Manual (SEDSCAF),
dated 1 Jul 67



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: SEDSCAF Guides (para 2.B.2 of ref message)



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: Working Copies of ELINT Parameter List (para 2.B.1.A-D
of ref message)



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHINS 1302, ELINT collection and Data Reporting Procedures
for SCA Facilities, dated 1 September 1966.



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHDOC 102, Groundbased ELINT Collection Operations, dated 25 July 1966.



(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

O : DADPM

DATE: 31 January 1968

KOM : ADP

SUBJECT: Classified Material Aboard USS PUEBLO (USN-467Y) ~~(S)~~

1. Reference is made to your request for identification of the technical support materials which were aboard the PUEBLO, and a brief assessment of the impact on the SIGINT capability due to the possible compromise of these materials. (Task #13, dated 27 January 1968)

2. The attached information was prepared by the various offices of primary interest within the Production Organization (A, B, K, and P04). The assessments were made on an inventory of SIGINT materials known or suspected to have been on board at the time of the incident. These assessments represent an all-inclusive evaluation based on available information, and should provide an overall indication of impact on the SIGINT effort. It is believed that the impact reflected in these attachments is not likely to be seriously altered by later information concerning other SIGINT materials aboard the ship.

3. Special materials have been forwarded under separate cover.

4. This memorandum may be downgraded to SECRET HVCCO upon removal of inclosures.

Oliver R. Kirby
OLIVER R. KIRBY
Assistant Director, NSA
for
Production

Incl:
a/s

cc: P04 ←
P2
A
B
K
M55
D12
D33

~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Potential Losses to the SIGINT Effort

On the basis of available information, the overall loss and the long term effects on the U. S. SIGINT effort, was reported to the SSO Defense Intelligence Agency on 24 January 1968. The overall loss was assessed to be very severe. This was based on preliminary information that some 33 Naval Security Group personnel, and four ships officers, all cleared and indoctrinated for Category III COMINT, were aboard the USS Pueblo. It was further noted that several of the NSG personnel aboard were knowledgeable in various compartmented problems.

It was noted in general that the Naval Security Group personnel aboard the ship were fully qualified signals intelligence technicians and that their past assignments covered a wide range of geographic areas and targets. Collectively, these men could be expected to be completely knowledgeable of the state of the art in the fields of SIGINT collection, processing, reporting techniques, and successes on a world-wide basis. In addition, the entire U. S. SIGINT collection processing and reporting procedures would be compromised through the depth of the technical support material carried. These documents expose our SIGINT objectives and techniques in attacking these objectives. The results (at least in part) of our years of effort, provide a broad insight into the entire operating structure of the U. S. and some allied SIGINT establishments, and the intelligence interests of the U. S.

The preliminary assessment filed electrically on 24 January 1968, has been substantiated. A more definitive list of COMINT knowledgeable personnel has since been produced. It has been determined that of the 83 persons known to be aboard the USS Pueblo, the following constitute the COMINT knowledgeable aboard:

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Operations Officer
Communications Officer
Officer-in-Charge, NSG Detachment
27 Navy enlisted
2 U. S. Marine Corps enlisted

(The remaining 49 personnel are not known to have had any access to SIGINT information.) (See Tab M for a consolidated listing by name.)

In summary, with the total data presented by the capture of the USS Pueblo, the North Koreans, alone or in concert with other communist nations, could reveal the extent of the U. S. worldwide SIGINT and various other intelligence operations.

(The message reporting the preliminary assessment of the USS Pueblo loss is attached hereto as Tab L. Tab M is a consolidated listing of those COMINT knowledgeable personnel known to be aboard the USS Pueblo. Tab N is composed of individual statements of known duties, access, and previous assignments of these 34 personnel.)

0

L

0

May Reporting Preliminary
Assessment of U.S. Puerto Rico

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF COMINT INDOCTRINATED PERSONNEL

<u>Name</u>	<u>Special Access</u>	<u>Previous Assigns</u>
CDR Lloyd M. Bucher ✓		
LT Edward R. Murphy, Jr. ✓		
LTJG Frederick C. Stammacher ✓		
Ensign Timothy L. Harris ✓		
LT Stephen R. Harris ✓		
CT3 Paul D. Bruenahan ✓		
CT3 John A. Shilling ✓		
CT3 Anthony A. Lannetta ✓		
CTSM Steven J. Robin ✓		
CT2 Wayne D. Anderson ✓		
CT2 Charles R. Sterling ✓		
CT2 Elton A. Wood ✓		
CT1 Francis J. Ginther ✓		
CT3 Rodney H. Duke ✓		
CT1 James A. Shepard ✓		
CT3 Sidney J. Karnes ✓		
CT3 Earl M. Kialer ✓		
CT2 Donald R. McClarren ✓		
CT1 Don Earl Bailey ✓		
CTC James F. Kell ✓		
CT1 David Lee Ritter ✓		
CT3 John White Grant ✓		
CT2 Peter M. Langenberg ✓		
CT2 Michael W. Alexander ✓		
CT3 Ralph (n) McClintock ✓		
CT3 Bradley Reed Crowe ✓		
CT3 Charles W. Ayling ✓		
CTC Ralph Dalton Bouden ✓		
CT1 James D. Layton ✓		
CT3 Angelo S. Strano ✓		
CT1 Donald R. Peppard ✓		
SOT Robert J. Hammond ✓		
SOT Robert J. Chioce ✓		
CT1 Michael T. Barrett ✓		

Commander Lloyd Mark BUCHER, USN

Present Duty: Commanding Officer, USS Pueblo

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Clearances: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT



Access: Commander Bucher's specific access to SIGINT is not known. It is expected to be minimal due to his previous assignments, none of which were in the SIGINT community.

HAG: Unknown, to be established by the Department of the Navy.

Previous Duty
and Assign-
ment: No previous SIGINT assignments.

LT Edward Renz MURPHY, Jr., USN
LTJG Frederick C. SHUMACHER, USNR
ENS. Timothy Leon HARRIS, USNR

These officers are assigned various duties as ship's company aboard USS Pueblo. They were indoctrinated for access to Category III COMINT. Their access to classified matter in the NSG Detachment is expected to be minimal.

None of the named officers is known to have had any previous assignments involving access to SIGINT.

CTC Ralph Dalton BOUDEN, USN, 369 90 36

Present Duty: CT 'M' Branch
General Maintenance Supervisor

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT

Access: Bouden's specific access to classified information is not known at this time.

During a previous assignment to the National Security Agency, Bouden was assigned to a group of engineering technicians who were responsible for the maintenance

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It can be assumed that the use to which this material was/is put by an analyst was known to Bouden.

Bouden's tour of duty with NSA ended in June 1959. His access can be expected to have increased correspondingly since his departure.

HAG: A HAG expiration date of 19 December 1971 has been established for CTC Bouden

Previous Duty and Asgts:

[REDACTED]
Naval Security Station, Washington, D. C.
ADNSO, Fort Meade Maryland (NSA)

[REDACTED]

In his previous duty assignments, Bouden has been assigned duties in the maintenance of Electro-Mechanical Cryptographic Equipment (TSEC/K147); DF NCO/AMCO Computers (AN/GYK-3, CP 813, FSQ 59) and related equipment.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CTC James Francis KELL, USN, 470 06 36

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
ELINT Supervisor (Kell is on temporary additional duty (TAD) from [redacted])

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Kell has extensive NAVSECGRU experience. He is aware of the [redacted] and the mission of the [redacted]. He is familiar with [redacted] transits. He is very familiar with [redacted] collectors on board [redacted], the platforms utilized, and the geographical areas of interest. Kell is not however, familiar with mission results. He was the training CPO at [redacted] for personnel deploying on [redacted] missions with [redacted] capability. In the wideband operations area, Kell is probably aware of DF capabilities, but not familiar with results currently being obtained. In the sensitive analytical fields, Kell has an intimate knowledge of all aspects of [redacted] Phase I, and a slight knowledge of analytical procedures in Phase II. He has a detailed knowledge of [redacted] collection procedures and some knowledge of analysis and results obtained. Kell also has a detailed knowledge of all aspects of radioprinter [redacted], including analytic procedures, [redacted] and others. He is aware of the [redacted] but is not knowledgeable of methods of recovery or progress.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asgmts:

[redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

In these previous assignments, Kell was assigned duty as Non-Morse Systems Operator and Supervisor, and General Search Operator

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CTI Don Earl BAILEY, USN, 494 99 84

Present Duty: CT '0' Branch
 Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic
 Equipment Operator (Bailey is on Temporary Additional
 Duty (TAD) from [redacted])

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
 [redacted]

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Access: As a communicator, Bailey is intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and all other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. His only association with sensitive operations is that of handling the communication traffic. While he probably knows generally of the [redacted], wideband operations, restrictions on certain radioprinter analysis and processing and reporting efforts, it is considered he has no specific knowledge of current progress being made in these areas.

HAG: A HAG expiration date of 6 August 1968 was established based on the [redacted] clearance. Subsequent to this expiration, a HAG of one year from date of last exposure will be assigned.

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

**Previous Duty
 and Asgts:**

[redacted]

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

USNS Valdez

During these previous assignments, Bailey was assigned duties as a communications operator, Wideband HFDF Systems, and as a General HFDF communications operator.

CTI Michael Thomas BARRETT, USN, 489 55 24

Present Duty: CT 'I' Branch
Russian Translator/Analyst/Reporter

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Barrett's specific access to classified information is not known. It is expected that, due to his clearance and duties, he could well be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.


HAG: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty and Asgmts:



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

NSA, Washington, D. C.

During these previous assignments, Barrett was assigned duties as a Morse Intercept Operator, Traffic Analyst, and 

While at the National Security Agency, Barrett completed the RS-450 course, designed to teach



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798

CTI Francis John GINTHER, USN, 588 74 46

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
 Watch Supervisor, General Operations

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
 [REDACTED]

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403

Access: Gintner can be expected to have gained access to operations areas, the COMINT product, therein, and the technical support material available at his duty stations. He is known to be knowledgeable of [REDACTED] and can be expected to have gained extensive knowledge of non-morse intercept operations due to previous assignments.

HAG: Gintner's present HAG expires 24 April 1970, based on [REDACTED] access. This HAG will revert to one year after that date.

Previous Duty and Asgmts:

[REDACTED]

NSA, Washington, D. C.

In these previous assignments, Gintner has been assigned duties as a Technical Search Operator in Research and Development; as a Wideband HFDF Operator; and a General Search Operator; Non-Morse Systems.

When assigned to NSA, Gintner completed the SA-100 course. This is the basic 10 week course taught by the Agency to train Non-Morse Search Operators, as well as operators in the fields of ELINT, Telemetry, and other types of non-literal signals. The course includes training in the methods of, and analytical procedures to be used, in attacking various forms of signal modulation.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CTL James Dewar LAYTON, USN, 533 22 39

Present Duty: CT 'R' Branch
Manual Morse Intercept Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT

Access: Layton's specific access to classified information is not known. Due to his previous assignments, it is expected that Layton would be intimately familiar with DF activities in the NAVSECGRU. In view of his present duty and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: A HAG expiration date of December 1968 was established based on the clearance. After expiration of this date, a HAG of one year from date of last access will be established.

**Previous Duty
and Asgmts:**

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During his previous assignments, Layton has been assigned duties variously as HFDF Operator (AM/GRD series), HFDF Operator - Wideband Systems, DF Net Control, and DF Contact Screener.

CTI Donald Richard PEPPARD, USN, 476 91 85

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Present Duty: CT 'A' Branch
 General Administrative/Personnel Duties

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
 It is possible that Peppard possess an extremely limited knowledge of [REDACTED], due to having processed crypto accountability records for that compartmented operation.

Access: Peppard's specific access to classified information is not known. Due to the nature of his duty title, it may be expected to be substantially less than that of the other crew members.

During a previous tour of duty at NSA, Peppard was assigned to S33. His duties involved the receipt, control, storage, inventory, distribution and destruction of all COMSEC materials processed by S3. Due to this assignment, he became knowledgeable of S3's distribution and accounting system, and the crypto accounts serviced and maintained within the central office of record. Peppard was also directly engaged in programming of an IBM 1401 machine accounting system. The latter is not the system in current use.

During a subsequent assignment at [REDACTED] Conn., Peppard probably became aware of the [REDACTED] in general and some of its specific detachments.

HAG: One year from date of last access.

Previous Duty & Asgmts:

[REDACTED]
 NSA, Washington, D. C.

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CTI David Lee RITTER, USN, 588 10 65

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Non-Morse Systems Operator
(Ritter is on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from
[redacted])

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
[redacted]

Access: Ritter is aware of the [redacted]
He has been on TAD on [redacted] and
is familiar with the [redacted]. He has also been
indoctrinated for [redacted]. Although not deployed
with a [redacted] mission, Ritter is briefed on the program
and has been exposed to the schedule for the first
half of 1968. Ritter is not familiar with wideband
operations. In the sensitive analytical fields,
Ritter is intimately knowledgeable of [redacted]
Phase I, having worked in this project for six months.
He has been indoctrinated in [redacted], and is very
familiar with collection procedures, but his knowledge
is limited in processing. In the field of non-morse
search and development, Ritter has a detailed knowledge
including all Soviet systems and technical signals. He
has a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of radioprinter
operations. Although familiar with Soviet callsign
systems, Ritter does not have a working knowledge of the
[redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asgmts: [redacted]
USS Liberty

In his previous assignments, Ritter was assigned
duty as an ELINT Technical Search Operator

CT1 James Antwyne SHEPARD, USN, 533 21 36

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
ELINT Technical Search Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
SPO [REDACTED] E, granted at [REDACTED]
(debriefed 19 Feb 1965)

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Access: Shepard's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible Shepard could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty & Asgmts:

[REDACTED]

During these previous assignments, Shepard was assigned duties as an ELINT Analyst, and ELINT Watch Supervisor.

CT2 Michael William ALEXANDER, USN, 391 34 83

Present Duty: CT 'R' Branch
(Alexander's specific duty is not known. He is on
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from DIRNAVSECGRUPAC)

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Alexander's access to classified information is not
known. In view of his clearance, it is possible he
could be knowledgeable of any of the technical support
material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

**Previous Duty
and Asgmts:** DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During these previous assignments, Alexander was
assigned duties as an HFDF Operator (GRD/TRD Series),
and as an Operator, DF Net Control.

CT2 Wayne Drexel ANDERSON, USN, 795 71 30

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Anderson's access to classified information is not known. Due to his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible that he could be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

**Previous Duty
and Asgmts:**



During this previous assignment, Anderson was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CT2 Peter Morton LANGENBERG, USN, 777 84 82

Present Duty:

CT 'I' Branch

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Clearance:

Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearance

Access:

Langenberg's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his duties and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG:

One year from date of last access

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Previous Duty and Asgmts:

[Redacted]

During this previous assignment, Langenberg was also assigned duty as an [Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CT2 Donald Raymond MC CLARREN, USN, 917 18 66**Present Duty:**

CT 'O' Branch
Teletype and Teletype-associated Crypto-
graphic Equipment Operator

Clearance:

Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access:

As a communicator, McClarren is intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and all other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. His association with other sensitive phases of NAVSECGRU operations is not known; however, it is possible McClarren could have become knowledgeable of any message processed during his tour of duty.

HAG:

One year from date of last access

**Previous Duty
and Asgts:**

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During this previous assignment, McClarren was assigned duty as a CRITICOMM Technical Control Operator and as a General HFDF Communications Operator.

CT2 Charles Ray STERLING, USN, 319 79 48

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Signal Analyst, Non-Morse Systems, Non-Morse Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Access: Sterling can be expected to have gained extensive knowledge of COMINT operations due to his many previous assignments. He is known to be knowledgeable of [Redacted] and can be expected to have gained extensive knowledge of non-morse intercept and processing.

HAG: A HAG of one year is being assigned, from date of last access.

Previous Duty & Asgmts:

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

NSA Washington, D. C.

Sterling's previous duty assignments included duties in Non-Morse collection, Technical Research Operator in Research and Development, Wide Band HFDF Operator, and HFDF Operator (AN/GRD series).

While assigned to the National Security Agency, Sterling completed the SA-100 course. This is the basic 16 week course taught by the Agency to train Non-Morse Search Operators, as well as operators in the fields of ELINT, Telemetry, and other types of non-literal signals. This course includes training in the methods of analytical procedures to be used in attacking various forms of signal modulation.

CT2 Elton Allen WOOD, USN, 391 34 67

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Operator, Non-Morse Systems

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Wood's access to classified information is not known.
Due to his clearance, it is possible Wood could be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty and Asgts:

[REDACTED]

During his assignment at [REDACTED] Wood was also assigned duty as an Operator, Non-Morse Systems. His access during this assignment is not known.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CT3 Charles William AYLING, USN 772 97 62

Present Duty: CT 'M' Branch
Maintenance, General Electronic Equipment
Maintenance, TSEC/KW-37 Revr, TSEC/KW-7, and
TSEC/KW-11,

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Ayling's access to classified information is not
known.

HAG: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty
and Asgmts:



During this previous assignment, Ayling was assigned
duty in the maintenance of TSEC/KG-11, and TSEC/KW-36
Revr/XMR.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~CT3 Paul David BRUSNAHAN, USN, 917 59 00

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Brusnahan's specific access to classified information is not known. It is possible that he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asgts: (b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Brusnahan's previous duty assignment was also as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

~~SECRET~~

CT3 Bradley Reed CROWE, USN, 916 63 37

Present Duty: CT 'R' Branch
Morse Intercept Operator

Clearances: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT

Access: Crowe's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last exposure.

Previous duty and assignments:



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During this previous assignment, Crowe was also assigned duty as a Morse Intercept Operator.

~~SECRET~~

CT3 Rodney Harteman DUKE, USN, 918 56 75

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
ELINT Technical Search Operator

Clearances: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
SPO (SECRET, E) granted at [redacted] (b)(1)
(Debriefed 18 March 1967) (b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Access: Duke's specific access to classified information is not known,
In view of his duty assignment and clearance, it is possible
he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical
support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last exposure.

Previous Duty and Assignments: [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

During this previous assignment, Duke was assigned duty as
a Non-Morse Systems Operator and Technical Search Operator.

CT3 John White GRANT, USN, 984 38 99

Present Duty: CT 'I' Branch

[REDACTED]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-E.O. 11652

Clearances: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT

Access: Grant's specific access to classified information is not known. It is possible that he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

Grant was noted to be on temporary duty at the National Security Agency in March 1967. At this time, Grant was given three specialized operational training, in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

HAG: One year from date of last exposure.

Previous Duty
and Assign-
ments:

No previous SIGINT assignments.

CT3 Sidney Jerry KARNES, USN, 697 58 88

Present Duty: CT 'O' Branch
Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic
Equipment Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Karnes' specific access to classified information is not known. As a communicator, it is expected that he would be intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. The opportunity also exists for a communicator to become knowledgeable of virtually any message transmitted or received during his tour(s) of duty.

HAG: One year from date of last access.

**Previous Duty
and assign-
ments:**



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During this previous assignment, Karnes was also assigned duty as a Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic Equipment Operator.

CT3 Earl Murray KISLER, USN, 914 48 32

Present Duty: CT 'O' Branch
Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic
Equipment Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances.

Access: Kisler's specific access to classified information is not known. As a communicator, it is expected that Kisler will be intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and all other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. His association with other sensitive phases of NAVSECGRU operations is not known, however, it is possible that Kisler could have become knowledgeable of any message processed during his tour of duty.

HAG: On year from date of last exposure.

**Previous Duty
and Assign-
ments:**

[Redacted]

During this previous assignment, Kisler was assigned duty as a General Communications Operator.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~CT3 Anthony Andrew LAMANTIA, USN, 793 40 66

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Lamantia's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his duty, previous assignments, and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

**Previous Duty
and Asgmts:**



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During this previous assignment, Lamantia was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CT3 Ralph (nmn) MC CLINTOCK, USNR, 693 00 93

Present Duty: CT 'R' Branch
Specific duty title unknown (McClintock is on temporary additional duty (TAD) from [redacted])

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: McClintock's knowledge is generally very limited. He has a general knowledge of the [redacted] but is unfamiliar with mission or location of detachments, or the results and areas of interest. He has a negligible, if any, knowledge of wideband operations. In the sensitive analytical fields, McClintock has a negligible, if any, knowledge of [redacted] [redacted] crypto recoveries, or other sensitive processing and reporting efforts.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asguts: [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

McClintock's previous duty title was Manual Morse Operator

CT3 John Allen SHILLING, USN, 776 40 13

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Shilling's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

**Previous Duty
and Asgts:**



During this previous assignment, Shilling was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CT3 Angelo Salvatore STRANO, USN, 915 41 50

Present Duty: CT 'M' Branch
Maintenance Magnetic Tape Records (all types)
Maintenance ELINT Equipment

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
SPO ~~XXXX~~, E, at [REDACTED]
(Debriefed 13 March 1967)

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Access: Unknown

HAG: One year from date of last access.

**Previous Duty
& Asgmts:**

[REDACTED]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

During this previous assignment, Strano was assigned duty in maintenance of SISS ZULU equipment.

CTSN Steven Jay ROBIN, USN, 772 04 86

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Robin's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible Robin could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty and Asgts:

[Redacted]

During this previous assignment, Robin was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Sgt Robert Joseph CHICCA, USMC, 204 76 22

Present Duty: Linguist - Korean
(Chicca is on temporary additional duty (TAD from
[redacted])

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
[redacted]

Access: Chicca has a general knowledge of [redacted] but is not intimately familiar with the mission or results of missions on specific deployments. Although briefed for [redacted] Chicca is probably unaware of the results of missions. His knowledge is characterized as general in that he knows of patrol areas of interest in the Pacific area, and the purpose of the patrols. His knowledge of [redacted] is negligible, if any. He worked in the [redacted] recovery section at [redacted] for approximately two weeks, gaining knowledge of methods of attack on this system, the progress of recovery and a general familiarization of other aspects of the system. While Chicca has a general knowledge of the [redacted] he is not informed concerning other sensitive operations.

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asgts:
[redacted]

Chicca's previous duty title was Manual Morse Intercept Operator

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Sgt Robert James HAMMOND, USMC, 2046801

Present Duty: Linguist - Korean
(On Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from [redacted]
[redacted])

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Sgt Hammond is generally knowledgeable of the overall Morse collection program. His detailed knowledge of sensitive areas is slight. He is knowledgeable of the [redacted] including missions and some results. Hammond has negligible, if any, knowledge of the [redacted] [redacted]. He probably has no information on details or results of wideband operations. In the sensitive analytical fields, he probably has no knowledge of [redacted] operations. He is aware that progress is being made on recovery of the [redacted] but has no knowledge of the progress or details of the recovery of the [redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asgmt: [redacted]

Hammond's previous duty assignment was as a Manual Morse Intercept Operator

LT Stephen Robert HARRIS, USNR, 638681/1615

Present Duty: Officer-in-Charge, NSG Detachment, USS Pueblo

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-E.O. 12958-1

Access:

Prior to reassignment to the USS Pueblo, LT Harris was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Director, Naval Security Group (ADNSG), with duty in GF3 at NSA, Fort Meade. In this assignment, Harris worked



_____). Harris is known to have been assigned as an OIC of a _____ He frequently visited spaces in A Group in connection with these duties.

He is known to be experienced as an Analyst/Translator - Processing and Reporting.

HAG:

A HAG of four years from date of last access has been established for LT Harris.

Previous Duty and Asguts:

LT Harris completed the Russian Language Course at the Defense Language Institute, West Coast.

~~TOP SECRET~~

B

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD



23 January 1968

SUBJECT: CRYPTOLOGIC DAMAGE ASSESSMENT - USS FUEBLO CAPTURE

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


1. On the assumption that the entire technical support package carried on the USS Pueblo for KDCOM targets may have been compromised, the following is considered a reasonable damage assessment:

a. The materials carried by the USS Pueblo consisted of the following:




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36