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**Report to the Director
of Central Intelligence**

**DCI Task Force
on
The National Reconnaissance Office**

Final Report

APRIL 1992

(With Cover Letters)

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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

May 19, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DCI Task Force on the NRO - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Attached is the final report of the Task Force on the National Reconnaissance Office commissioned by the Director of Central Intelligence on March 5, 1992. We in the NRO greatly appreciate the work of Bob Fuhrman and his task force--it was a brilliant effort done on a tight time line.

The Task Force provided me and other senior NRO managers ample opportunity to express our views, and we did so with candor. Nevertheless, it was clear from the start that the Task Force would come to its own conclusions. The enclosed final report contains their views. I agree with most, although not all, of their findings.

Based on the presentation of the Task Force results to you and our conversation on March 23, and a similar presentation to and discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence on March 20, I am taking action to implement a functional ("INT") realignment of the NRO as directed by the President in NSD-67. I am also planning to collocate most elements of the NRO in the Washington, D.C. area as soon as practical if Congressional concurrence is obtained. An implementation team is in place, and within the next few weeks I will formally change the NRO organizational structure and the reporting chains for individual program managers. We hope to begin collocating elements of the NRO this summer, first by establishing new programs here in the Washington area, and eventually by 1996, almost the entire NRO is planned to be collocated at our new Westfields facility near Dulles Airport. We will continue to inform appropriate executive and legislative elements as we move through the restructure process.

I am implementing several other recommendations of the Task Force. I have adopted a new NRO Mission Statement. I have initiated a study and directed preparation of an implementation plan on how to declassify the "fact of" and other key facts

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about the NRO, as well as studies of what further product or system information can be disseminated outside compartmented channels. When a Director of the new Central Imagery Organization is named, I will initiate action to expand membership of the National Reconnaissance Review Board (NRRB) accordingly.

Some of the Task Force recommendations are not within my decision authority and would have significant impact on other organizations. I don't plan to take any action in these areas unless directed by you and the Director of Central Intelligence. These recommendations include:

- a. A more proactive role for the National Foreign Intelligence Program in supporting operational military users to lower echelons of command.
- b. Merger of the National Reconnaissance Program, the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program, and the Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program into a single Overhead Reconnaissance Program.
- c. Specific changes in the Intelligence Community requirements processes for systems acquisition and for tasking. The intelligence reorganization the Director of Central Intelligence has underway will make some of these changes.
- d. Incorporating operational issues into the NRRB mandate.

I believe the changes that are being implemented will provide for an NRO that is strong, efficient, and effective.

Martin C. Faga
MARTIN C. FAGA

1 Attachment
Final Report
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THIS SAME MEMO, WITH APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE CHANGES, WENT TO THE DCI.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DCI Task Force on the NRO

Attached is the final report of the Task Force on the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) commissioned by the Director of Central Intelligence on March 5, 1992. It updates the preliminary findings and recommendations briefed to you by Marty Faga on March 23, 1992. Our recommendations are unanimous.

Our Task Force reviewed prior studies concerning the NRO, especially those in the 1988-89 time frame, and used them as a point of departure. Some of our recommendations flow naturally from the actions taken as a result of those studies.

At the time of our deliberations, another task force was considering the management of imagery within the Intelligence Community. We assumed the creation of an Imagery Authority (IA) responsible for top-level management of the total Community imagery effort and for establishing standards and protocols.

Our key recommendations for the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the NRO (DNRO) include the following:

- Retain the NRO as the single US government organization for development, procurement, and operation of overhead intelligence collection systems.
- Organize the NRO along functional ("INT") lines.
- Collocate the NRO in the Washington area by the end of 1993.
- Affirm a proactive role for the Intelligence Community in responding to operational as well as national needs. Adopt a new NRO mission statement reflecting this role.
- Combine the three budget Programs currently managed by the DNRO into a single, integrated Overhead Reconnaissance Program.
- Strengthen the Intelligence Community's requirements process for system acquisition and for tasking.
- Declassify the "fact of" the NRO.

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- Review the classification guidelines for NRO system characteristics and related intelligence products to improve the flow of information to those who need it.
- Encourage operational users and the Intelligence Community to employ actual overhead systems in realistic exercises.
- Strengthen the National Reconnaissance Review Board and include operational issues in its mandate.

Members of the Task Force are grateful for having the opportunity to participate in this decision process.

/S/

ROBERT A. FUHRMAN
Chairman
DCI Task Force on the NRO

1 Attachment
Final Report (S [redacted] TK); [redacted]

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DCI Task Force
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Final Report

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
FINAL REPORT: DCI TASK FORCE

ON


THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

I. INTRODUCTION


A. MEMBERSHIP. This DCI-appointed Task Force consisted of six members and two advisors. The two advisors acted as integral members of our team. Ours is a unanimous report.




Mr. Robert A. Fuhrman
Task Force Chairman
Former President and COO,
Lockheed Corporation




Mr. R. Evans Hineman
Former Deputy Director for
Science & Technology, CIA
Former Director, NRO Program B




Dr. Solomon J. Buchsbaum
Senior Vice President,
AT&T Bell Laboratories




Maj Gen Ralph H. Jacobson (USAF, Ret)
President and CEO,
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
Former Director, NRO Program A




Lt Gen Lincoln D. Faurer (USAF, Ret)
Former Director, NSA



Mr. John P. Devine
Deputy Director for Research
and Engineering, NSA



Lt Gen Edward J. Heinz (USAF, Ret)
Former Director,
Intelligence Community Staff



Mr. Leo Hazlewood
Director, National Photographic
Interpretation Center

B. PURPOSE OF THE TASK FORCE. The Terms of Reference (Attachment 1) asked us to advise the DCI concerning the future of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), specifically including issues related to current studies concerning reorganization of the US Intelligence Community (IC). The fundamental question we addressed was a simple one: How should the US government organize to acquire and operate overhead reconnaissance systems?

C. **TASK FORCE APPROACH.** The NRO has served the nation well for some 30 years. Its streamlined management approach to acquisition and the dedication and creativity of NRO personnel have built a record of unparalleled success. We attempted to make recommendations not only to preserve the effectiveness of the US overhead reconnaissance program but also to enhance its ability to meet challenges of the future.

D. **TASK FORCE METHODOLOGY.** We reviewed the current status of the NRO and its programs, examined the most recent studies concerning the effectiveness and operations of the NRO, and conducted in-depth interviews with the Director of the NRO (DNRO), the Deputy Director of the NRO (DDNRO), and Deputy Director for Military Support (DDMS); the Directors of Programs A, B, and C; and the Director of Plans and Analysis. We also discussed issues with the Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and with staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Additionally, individual Task Force members contacted a number of past and current officials of the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community in the course of considering specific issues. Administrative support and research into specific questions were provided by an NRO team headed by Colonel [REDACTED]

E. **ASSUMPTION: CREATION OF AN IMAGERY AUTHORITY.** Because there was another task force studying imagery issues, it was necessary to make a basic assumption that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the DCI would establish an Imagery Authority (IA) to adjudicate and prioritize imagery requirements and to establish standards and protocols.

F. **ARRANGEMENT OF THIS REPORT.** This report consists of 9 Sections and 4 attachments:

SECTIONS

- I. Introduction
- II. Need for the National Reconnaissance Office
- III. The NRO Mission
- IV. NRO Organizational Structure
- V. The Intelligence Community Requirements Process
- VI. Program and Budget Issues
- VII. Security and Classification Issues
- VIII. The National Reconnaissance Review Board (NRRB)
- IX. Operation of Satellite Reconnaissance Systems

ATTACHMENTS

- 1. Terms of Reference
- 2. Criticisms of the NRO
- 3. Recommended Intelligence Community Requirements Process
- 4. Summary of Recommendations

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II. NEED FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

A. CONTINUING NEED FOR THE NRO. Our review convinced us that there is a definite and continuing need for a single, centralized, specialized organization for development, procurement, and operations of complex and sophisticated overhead intelligence collection systems, all tightly linked to the intelligence tasking and exploitation functions. This organization, and its contractor teams, must be fully responsible from birth to death—specifically including research into technology, system design and development, deployment and operations, and eventual phaseout of the particular programs. Because of the need to respond to rapidly changing intelligence collection requirements, the organization must utilize a streamlined acquisition process, with carefully controlled external interfaces.

RECOMMENDATION #1. The NRO should be continued as the single US government agency responsible for the centralized development, acquisition and operation of overhead intelligence collection systems (other than organic assets of the Department of Defense (DoD)).

B. CRITICISMS OF THE NRO. We examined some of the criticisms frequently levied on the NRO. We attempted to identify the real problems and to recommend concrete actions to address them. We also recommended changes in classification rules to permit a better understanding of the NRO and its systems by a broader audience. Attachment 2 reviews and comments on these criticisms.

III. THE NRO MISSION

A. NATIONAL vs OPERATIONAL. The NRO was initially established to meet the needs of the "national" or "strategic" users. Over time, overhead systems have improved in timeliness and flexibility, becoming more capable of meeting the needs of operational military users down to the tactical level. The distinction between "national" and "tactical" intelligence—a distinction that is artificial when applied to today's overhead capabilities—has become increasingly counterproductive. The distinction limits the Community's ability to conduct realistic cross-system trade-offs and causes unwarranted concerns about the availability of NRO support in crisis or war. We believe that this is an appropriate time for the DCI to commit the Intelligence Community to a proactive role in satisfying the intelligence needs of both national and operational users.

RECOMMENDATION #2. The DCI should commit the Intelligence Community to a proactive role in satisfying the intelligence needs of both national and operational users.

B. NEW NRO MISSION STATEMENT. The current NRO Mission Statement ("The NRO is responsible for the research, development, acquisition, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems for the collection of intelligence from denied areas") has served the nation well for many years. We believe that the statement should be modified to make it more outward looking, emphasizing both the NRO's responsibilities and its continuing commitment to technical excellence.

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RECOMMENDATION #3. The NRO should adopt the following mission statement:

"THE NRO MISSION: To ensure that the US has the technology and overhead assets it needs to acquire superior worldwide intelligence in war and peace. To this end, the NRO is responsible for conducting research and development, and for acquiring and operating overhead systems for the collection of intelligence."

C. AN INTEGRATED OVERHEAD PROGRAM. At present, the DNRO manages three interrelated programs, as shown in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1. PROGRAMS CURRENTLY MANAGED

We believe that the current program structure perpetuates the artificial distinction between national and operational intelligence. The DRSP in its present form implies that support to the "tactical" users is not a core NRO mission, but is more an afterthought—once the system is designed, DRSP will modify or augment it to meet the needs of tactical users. In terms of aircraft, we do not recommend including organic assets of the DoD within the NRO structure, but believe that future national aircraft programs may be executed by the NRO if desired by the DCI and the SECDEF. The current three-program breakout matches "constituencies" to a certain extent, but at the expense of mission clarity and good system design practices. We recommend merging the three programs into a single program of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), as part of the DCI's commitment to satisfying the intelligence needs of both national and operational users.

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RECOMMENDATION #4. The DCI and SECDEF should merge the three programs managed by the DNRO (NRP, DRSP, and ARSP) into a single NFIP Program, defined as follows:

"Overhead Reconnaissance Program (ORP): A single program designed to meet the intelligence requirements of the nation that can best be satisfied by overhead reconnaissance. This program will be responsive to and will provide services to all levels of the government, including operational military organizations. The ORP does not include organic assets of the DoD."

IV. NRO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. TOP-LEVEL NRO MANAGEMENT:

We recommend that the DNRO continue to have a second "hat" as an Air Force official in order to facilitate coordination of the many Air Force-NRO interactions. In light of the high priority of the NRO mission and the DNRO's need for frequent and direct contacts with the many Air Force functional elements directly supporting the NRO and with the DCI, the SECDEF, and other cabinet-level officials, that second hat should be as Under Secretary of the Air Force.

RECOMMENDATION #5. The DNRO should continue to have a second "hat;" it should be as Under Secretary of the Air Force.

The NRO must have a full-time Deputy Director, because the DNRO has an important second position. A career CIA official is appropriate, since the CIA is a primary contributor of resources to the NRO.

The Deputy Director for Military Support (DDMS) should continue to have a "second hat" in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) structure. Assisted by a Military Support Staff reporting directly to him, the DDMS provides connectivity to the JCS and other operational users, and acts as the focus for NRO efforts to improve their understanding of overhead intelligence. The DDMS draws on the entire resources of the NRO in carrying out this work.

B. RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE CHANGES:

We concluded that the current NRO line structure, involving three acquisition elements (Programs A, B, and C) organized by government agency affiliation (Air Force, CIA, and Navy) does not enhance mission effectiveness. Rather, it leads to counterproductive competition and makes it more difficult to foster loyalty and to maintain focus on the NRO mission. In order to foster an improved NRO corporate spirit, and to better serve the intelligence needs of the nation, we are recommending a restructure of the NRO based on intelligence discipline (IMINT and SIGINT) lines. We recognize that such a restructure will lessen competition between NRO program offices as a driving force for creativity, but believe that the DNRO will be able to find other and more effective ways of eliciting the most creative and effective ideas for meeting the nation's intelligence needs.

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Specifically, in addition to retaining the Office of Plans and Analysis (P&A), recommend the formation of three line acquisition/operations organizations within the NRO: IMINT, SIGINT, and COMMS & LAUNCH, as shown in Figure 2 below.





Figure 2. RECOMMENDED NRO STRUCTURE

The IMINT and SIGINT organizations should each have a career NRO officer¹ as Director; well qualified Deputies should be appointed from the Imagery Authority and the National Security Agency (NSA). (This structure is expandable if additional "INTs" are identified in the future.)

We observed that the NRO has two significant services of common concern: launch services for all its satellites; and data communications, including relay satellites. We recommend they be placed in a separate Directorate, with Career NRO Officers as Director and Deputy. The placement of communications reflects our belief that the communications architecture should include the needs of both the IMINT and SIGINT satellite systems. The placement of Launch responsibilities reflects the need to support both SIGINT AND IMINT launch integration, and to provide a single NRO Mission Director for all NRO launches.

¹ A Career NRO Officer is a DoD or CIA Officer who has spent the majority of his or her career in NRO work.

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On a related point, we believe that a single Air Force organization should be responsible for acquisition and launch of complex, sophisticated satellite boosters (in much the same way as the NRO is the single organization responsible for acquisition and operation of reconnaissance satellites). Therefore, we urge the DNRO to influence Air Force decisions to this end.

The NRO Office of Plans and Analysis (P&A) performs a number of valuable and necessary functions and should be retained. Its Director and Deputy should be chosen on a "best qualified" basis from the total pool of available personnel in the NRO and the Intelligence Community. With the restructure of the NRO along "INT" lines, P&A would concentrate on strategic planning, cross-INT analysis, advanced technology efforts, and development of analytical tools.

An NRO Staff with traditional staff functions (Inspector General, Budget, Legal, Legislative Liaison, Personnel, Policy, and Security) should be retained. All "housekeeping" support (facilities, logistics, graphics, administration, etc.) should be provided by a Management Services and Operations (MSO) function. Other necessary elements and functions (Security Center, the NRO Operations Support Facility, Exercise and Training Support, etc.) should be located within the structure at the discretion of the DNRO.


The Defense Support Project Office (DSPO) should be disestablished. This recommendation is tied to our recommendation for consolidating the DRSP into the ORP, and the recommendation later in this report concerning declassification of the "fact of" the NRO. This change emphasizes the importance of military support in the NRO by focusing on the DDMS with a supporting staff. Again, we believe that military support should be an integral part of the NRO mission and organizational structure, not something "added on."

Separate Air Force, CIA, and Navy organizational elements would no longer exist within the restructured NRO. Nor do we believe that the NRO should foster rivalry or "separateness" between the new line elements. We recommend that the DNRO actively encourage a "one NRO" view of the organization at every opportunity. The senior member of each agency within the NRO would be responsible for recruiting highly qualified personnel and for monitoring the career development and training of all personnel from that agency.

In keeping with the change in the NRO Mission Statement and our recommendation that the DCI commit to supporting the operational users, the Program Office for the Defense Dissemination System (DDS), used to transmit overhead imagery to military combatant commanders worldwide, should be transferred from the Air Force Space Systems Division into the Communications & Launch organization of the NRO.

C. IMMEDIATE TRANSITION STRUCTURE. We envision the structure changes outlined above being accomplished in a two-phase process. The first phase, which can be accomplished immediately, involves re-subordinating the existing NRO elements (and the DDS Program Office) along the lines indicated above. The new line Directorates would be established in the same facility as the NRO Headquarters and P&A, and the old Programs (A, B, and C) would be disestablished. System program offices would not immediately relocate. This first

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phase would have the immediate benefit of reducing counterproductive competition between program offices and permitting easier trade-offs between systems in the same "INT."

RECOMMENDATION #6. The DNRO should take immediate action to realign existing NRO elements along INT lines. At the same time, the old Program Designations (A, B, and C) should cease to be used within the NRO.

D. COLLOCATION:

The NRO has been protecting an option for full collocation of all NRO elements to a single location in the Dulles Airport area. We believe it is time to resolve the issue. Full Collocation implies that all NRO program offices and NRO management are located in a single facility (or a few very close facilities). [redacted] and the NRO would continue to maintain a Pentagon office. An NRO interface for launch vehicle programs would remain collocated with the responsible Air Force organization. Security or customer support requirements might require that a few specific functions be separately located, but the intent of full collocation is that essentially all NRO research, development, and acquisition would be managed and executed from one place.

Collocation is driven by a number of imperatives. The primary one is that collocation is necessary to permit efficient management of an NRO restructured along INT lines as recommended above. Without collocation, each of the three line acquisition organizations would contain program offices on both the East and West coasts. Even with modern transportation and communication, this is not an effective management arrangement. Additionally, collocation will put all the programs closer to their customers. In time, this will have a positive effect on the Intelligence Community's requirements process, and also on user perceptions concerning the NRO. With all program elements in close proximity, it will be much easier to accomplish long-term planning, budgeting, and NRO studies.

While collocation will have some disadvantages—temporary disruption of many lives, possible short-term loss of momentum for certain programs, and loss of some key talent—we believe the advantages of a well-managed collocation effort far outweigh the disadvantages. By the end of 1993 or as soon as possible, the NRO should physically relocate all the existing program management offices intact to the Washington area. If a single facility cannot be made available in time, a few interim facilities, very closely located, would be acceptable, with the goal that each line organization has all of its elements in a single building.

RECOMMENDATION #7. By the end of calendar year 1993 or as soon as possible, the NRO should complete full collocation within the Washington area.

We are concerned, however, about the "Service Mix" issue. We believe that the military services provide an important source of skill and experience in acquisition, development, and operation of complex space systems. Active duty military personnel also bring insight into DoD requirements and are much more readily accepted by the combat forces than civilian intelligence personnel.

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RECOMMENDATION #8. The DNRO and DCI, with SECDEF support, should take action to ensure that a continuing mix of intelligence civilians and military people--particularly those with expertise and experience in the development, acquisition, and operations of space-based intelligence collection systems--is assigned to all levels in the NRO.

V. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

A. **BACKGROUND.** In our discussions with Intelligence Community personnel and our review of various criticisms about the NRO, two consistent themes emerged:

First, the NRO is tasked to meet the needs of a wide range of customers and users. In this process, the NRO is asked to do "all things for all users."

Second, the Intelligence Community requirements process has been unable to provide validated, prioritized, cross-discipline collection requirements with any sense of fiscal reality for use by the NRO in developing future systems. While we fully appreciate the difficulty of forecasting collection requirements and of arbitrating the many different users' needs, the Community at large needs to find a way to give the NRO a solid statement of requirements. Without solid requirements, the NRO cannot develop the most capable systems within available funding, and it becomes virtually impossible to support the systems in the budget process.

B. **REQUIREMENTS: DEFINITION of TERMS.** Within the context of this report, we have adopted two definitions concerning intelligence requirements. The term "systems requirements" is used to denote those long-term intelligence requirements necessary for the acquisition process--to build new collection systems or significantly modify existing systems. We use the term "tasking requirements" for those current intelligence needs against which current collection assets are tasked for near-term operations. While similar Intelligence Community mechanisms are used for validating and prioritizing system requirements and tasking requirements, the end objective and the time frames within which the processes occur are significantly different.

C. **NRO CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS.** We believe that the NRO's relationship to its customers and users needs to be better defined. Our approach, shown in Figure 3, identifies four agencies as the customers of the NRO and a wide range of organizations as users of intelligence products based on NRO collection. The NRO should work to understand both its users and its customers; but formal requirements come only from the customers.




Figure 3. NRO CUSTOMER AND USER RELATIONSHIPS

RECOMMENDATION #9. The DCI should emphasize the importance of users working through the Intelligence Community processes on collection requirements and their satisfaction. NSA should be the single focal point for validated SIGINT requirements, and the IA the single focal point for validated IMINT requirements.

D. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROCESSES. Figure 4 outlines the process we recommend for handling requirements within the Intelligence Community. Attachment 3 describes the process in detail. Key to the process are two new Intelligence Community functions: a requirements rationalization function to assess and prioritize all-source intelligence requirements and assign them to the various INTs for collection, and an evaluation/feedback function to assess the performance of the INTs against the requirements and ensure proper feedback to all agencies and users. The requirements rationalization function and the evaluation/feedback function should be accomplished annually in conjunction with and in order to support the budget process. Our approach would be to establish specific intelligence-wide committees to accomplish these important functions.

RECOMMENDATION #10. The DCI should establish a requirements rationalization function and an evaluation/feedback function, embodied in specific intelligence-wide committees, and linked to the budget process.

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


Figure 4. Proposed Community Requirements Process

E. SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS. When the process shown in Figure 4 assesses the long-term needs of the Intelligence Community, the result will be two baseline documents for system acquisition, each taking into account resource limitations:

- (1) A SIGINT systems requirements baseline prepared by NSA and the NRO, change controlled by NSA.
- (2) An IMINT systems requirements baseline prepared by the Imagery Authority and the NRO, change controlled by the Imagery Authority.

RECOMMENDATION #11. The DCI should direct a system of baseline systems requirements documents as outlined above between NSA and the NRO and between IA and the NRO.

With the DCI's commitment to support operational needs, it will be important that exploitation and dissemination be considered in the system design process—for SIGINT as well as IMINT. To do this effectively, dissemination requirements must be included with the intelligence information requirements as they are processed through the Intelligence Community processes, and the validated dissemination approach and requirements must be included in the

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baseline requirements documents. The NRO must then consider dissemination during design and acquisition.

RECOMMENDATION #12. Exploitation and dissemination of intelligence data should be considered during the requirements process, recorded in the baseline documents, and considered during the NRO design process.

F. TASKING OF OVERHEAD SYSTEMS:

Under current procedures, any individual or organization requiring intelligence derived from overhead systems must communicate the requirement to the appropriate collection committee within the Intelligence Community Staff. That committee prioritizes the requirement, and levies it upon the appropriate collection asset. The user is confronted with the decision of which intelligence discipline can best meet his requirement, and is faced with a myriad of different formats, data elements, and procedures in order to submit the request. There are many gaps in the feedback mechanisms providing the status of the request or an indication when the requirement has been fulfilled. On balance, the current procedures for tasking overhead systems are cumbersome, inefficient, and not well understood among many of the users of intelligence.

We believe that a tasking approach along the lines of Figure 4 would significantly improve the situation. It would provide not only for a allocation of requirements among the various intelligence disciplines, but also for continuous evaluation of the process and better feedback concerning collection results. Attachment 3 provides the details.

RECOMMENDATION #13. The DCI should add the requirements rationalization function and the evaluation/feedback function to the Intelligence Community's collection system tasking process.

VI. PROGRAM AND BUDGET ISSUES

A. RELATIONSHIP TO REQUIREMENTS. A clear understanding of the systems requirements is needed to effectively program and budget for the NRO. Our recommendations in the previous section are intended to improve the Intelligence Community's requirements process and thus provide better information for NRO decisionmaking.

B. TRADITIONAL BUDGET PRIORITIES. Typically, the NRP budget priorities have favored the maintenance of existing capabilities and ongoing initiatives, as opposed to new ideas. One reason is that there are established constituencies in the Intelligence Community who use the current systems effectively and support them strongly. Users, in general, are not willing to trade current collection for a future capability.

C. NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH. The current NRO collection capability is the strongest it has ever been, but it will decline as recent budget decisions begin to reduce the on-orbit constellations. Current systems are highly capable and have proven effective in peace, crisis, and war, but the world is changing rapidly, and there must be a mechanism within the NRO to foster new and creative approaches to current and future intelligence problems. In a period of

declining budgets, we cannot continue past practice of allowing new ideas to compete only for new money. Instead, we need a method within the Community to allow new ideas to compete on their merits with baseline programs and ongoing initiatives.

D. REPRIORITIZING BASELINE PROGRAMS. Our recommendation to overcome the present "tyranny of the baseline" is an annual community reprioritization of all baseline programs throughout the NFIP, together with consideration of new initiatives. The new Community Management Staff would lead this effort, which would require not only highly qualified staffing but also strong DCI support. The end result would be a DCI/SECDEF approved ranking that would drive the NFIP Program Managers' budget processes. We recognize this is not a trivial task, but it should be pursued with vigor. At the least, it should be applied to the individual NFIP programs, and specifically to the ORP.

RECOMMENDATION #14. The DCI should initiate an annual Community-wide reprioritization of all NFIP baseline programs, with explicit consideration of new initiatives.

E. FENCED FUNDING FOR NEW IDEAS. In order to ensure that new ideas can be studied and designed to a point sufficient to allow them to compete against baseline programs, the DNRO needs a "fenced" funding line dedicated to new ideas. This would be in addition to today's Reconnaissance Technology/Advanced Development (RT/AD) lines, and would be used for new starts up to the demonstration or prototype stage to get them ready for the Community reprioritizing process. Plans and Analysis would provide corporate NRO oversight for this program, in consultation with the NRO's customers.

RECOMMENDATION #15. The DNRO, with support of the SECDEF and the DCI, should establish a separate, fenced funding line dedicated to new ideas.

F. NEED FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING. The ability to select the new ideas that should be supported is strongly dependent on the availability of a long-term Strategic Plan. The NRO has a strategic planning process already, with mechanisms to link the overall strategic plan to individual INT roadmaps and eventually to budgets. We believe the NRO should retain and strengthen its strategic planning process and carry that process through to completion of a Strategic Plan that should be updated at least every two years and promulgated.

RECOMMENDATION #16. The NRO should retain and strengthen its internal strategic planning process and carry it through to completion of a written Strategic Plan.

VII. SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION ISSUES

A. BACKGROUND. The Task Force reviewed current security and classification guidelines for the nation's satellite reconnaissance efforts, which are based largely on National Security Directive (NSD) 30. These guidelines, which require that the existence of the NRO be protected within Sensitive Compartmented Information channels and drastically restrict the discussion of space-based intelligence capabilities outside of those channels, have long historical precedent. Changes over the past few years convinced us that serious study with an eye towards

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significant modification of these guidelines should be conducted. We see the need to review the guidelines in three areas: the covert nature of the NRO, and the amount of information about satellite capabilities releasable at non-compartmented levels, and the amount of product releasable at non-compartmented levels.

B. RATIONALE FOR AN OVERT NRO. While current guidelines require the existence of the NRO to be maintained within SCI channels, the fact of an NRO is an "open secret," with many references in open literature. We believe that attempting to preserve such "open secrets" without strong and compelling rationale is inconsistent with the DCI's push for greater openness, weakens the case for preserving "real" secrets, and needlessly angers congressional and other critics. By admitting the "fact of" the NRO, we remove many needless points of controversy. Of course, simply admitting "fact of" without providing additional information accomplishes little. Rather, we believe that certain "facts about" should be declassified to improve the NRO's ability to interact with customers and users. These would include items such as:

- Mission Statement
- Names of DNRO, DDNRO, DDMS
- Fact of joint DoD and Intelligence Community staffing
- Headquarters Locations

C. IMPLEMENTING AN OVERT NRO. Detailed study and a comprehensive implementation plan are imperative before any public announcement about the NRO is made. Appropriate coordination with the Departments of Defense and State would be required, as well as Presidential approval to modify NSD 30. A support staff must be ready to handle inquiries at the Pentagon, and revised security guidelines must be made available to SCI-briefed personnel worldwide. Ongoing projects must be reviewed to ensure that the transition to an overt NRO will not endanger any current or future sources or methods. Of course, critical details on NRO system development and capabilities should remain within SCI channels.

RECOMMENDATION #17. The SECDEF and the DCI should direct the DNRO to begin the process of declassifying the "fact of" the NRO and certain additional information by conducting a detailed study and developing an implementation plan.

D. NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION OUTSIDE SCI CHANNELS. While proper protection of sources and methods is an unarguable priority, our Task Force concluded that many NRO customers and users perceive that security unduly constrains the flow of intelligence to policymakers and military commanders, and impedes the basic understanding and utility of overhead systems.

Our Task Force found evidence that current security practice impedes the flow of needed intelligence information to current and potential users. In some cases, the existing guidelines permit material to be decompartmented and distributed—but only after a conscious decision by an appropriate SCI authority in the field and removal of certain markings and data. In practice, the field personnel need simplified guidance, encouragement, and the resources to make and implement the declassification decisions. We believe that an effort to improve the flow

of intelligence product throughout the user community is appropriate and are recommending a study to that effect. The study should also address methods and resources for improving the flow of intelligence information to coalition forces, in the event that policymakers determine that such dissemination is needed in crisis or war.

RECOMMENDATION #18. The DCI should direct a joint study by NRO, NSA, and IA to determine how to disseminate more product from overhead systems to appropriate users worldwide, particularly at the non-compartmented SECRET level.

Particularly within DoD, the need to store and discuss information about overhead systems characteristics and capabilities only within SCI areas seriously limits training and education of key personnel and the active consideration of those capabilities during mission planning. We believe that a determined effort should be made to describe the basic system characteristics and products to customers and users at a security level they can comfortably work with. Our assessment is that the proper level is SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL, not requiring SCI handling.

RECOMMENDATION #19. The DCI should direct a study by NRO, NSA, and the IA to determine what overhead system characteristics and capabilities can be released outside SCI channels, with the goal of significantly increasing the amount of system capability information available at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level.

E. OUTREACH PROGRAMS. The Task Force is concerned that current and potential NRO users are not adequately familiar with NRO capabilities and products, and thus do not make full use of what is available. This is particularly a problem in the DoD, especially at the lower operational command levels. We believe that expanded outreach program by NRO (led by the DDMS), NSA, and IA should be instituted, with the following specific elements:

Create and maintain a cadre of SI/TK cleared personnel, fully trained on overhead system capabilities and tasking. These personnel should be located at levels consistent with DoD operational concepts and doctrine.

Encourage IA to assign "resident experts" to operational military commands, as NSA currently does.

Undertake routine briefings on overhead system characteristics and products to key flag officers and civilian officials.

Make a joint DCI-SECDEF commitment to use actual overhead systems (including the tasking and dissemination mechanisms that would be used in wartime) in realistic military exercises.

RECOMMENDATION #20. The DCI and the SECDEF should direct expanded outreach programs to current and potential users of overhead intelligence products, with special emphasis on operational military needs. This initiative should include use of actual NRO satellite collectors in realistic military exercises.

VIII. THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE REVIEW BOARD (NRRB)

The NRRB, established by the DCI in October 1989, includes key members of the Intelligence Community and the Vice Chairman of the JCS. The NRRB has been a valuable asset for the National Reconnaissance Program, providing sound and timely advice to the DCI, the SECDEF, and the DNRO on future overhead intelligence requirements, policy issues, major resource requirements, and counter-intelligence issues. It also helps in clarifying Community requirements and priorities, and in obtaining Community consensus on critical issues. The NRRB is an important resource, and it should be retained and strengthened. When established, the new IA should be added to the NRRB. We believe that the NRRB mandate should be expanded to include the entire range of overhead reconnaissance issues, including data dissemination.

DDCI (NRRB Chairman)
ASD/CI
CIA/DDI,
Vice Chairman, JCS
Director, DIA
Director, NSA
Asst SecState (INR)

Figure 5. NRRB MEMBERSHIP.

RECOMMENDATION #21. The NRRB mandate should be expanded to include the entire range of overhead reconnaissance issues, including data dissemination. The Director of the IA should be made a member of the NRRB.

IX. OPERATION OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS

We understand that the argument has been made for US Space Command to operate NRO satellites. We strongly disagree. NRO space systems conduct intelligence collection missions supporting a wide range of users throughout the US government and should be operated by organizations under the auspices of the DCI.

results in highly effective and efficient operations characterized by prompt response to changing requirements and outstanding crisis and wartime support.

Finally, the overhead system complexity, long on-orbit lifetime, and rapidly changing collection requirements demand cradle-to-grave management, with a single organization fully responsible for system acquisition and day-to-day operations.

RECOMMENDATION #22. The NRO should continue to operate the intelligence collection space systems it builds.

4 ATTACHMENTS

1. Terms of Reference
2. Criticisms of the NRO
3. Recommended Intelligence Community Requirements Process
4. Summary of Recommendations

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

DCI TASK FORCE ON THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

PURPOSE: Advise the DCI on issues attendant to the future of the National Reconnaissance Office, including those raised by The Senate "Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992" (S. 2198) and House "National Security Act of 1992" (HR 4165).

MEMBERS: Mr. Robert A. Fuhrman, Chairman
Dr. Solomon J. Buchsbaum
Lt Gen Lincoln D. Faurer (Ret USAF)
Lt Gen Edward J. Heinz (Ret USAF)
Mr. R. Evans Hineman
Maj Gen Ralph H. Jacobson (Ret USAF)

ADVISORS: Mr. John P. Devine
Mr. Leo Hazlewood


ISSUES:

- How should the USG organize to procure and operate overhead reconnaissance systems?
 - Should there be a central organization, ie, an NRO? If there should not be a central organization, how should procurement and operation of overhead systems be distributed in other organizations?
 - How to avoid duplication of effort?
 - How to create synergies among overhead systems?
 - How to provide common support (eg., launch, on-orbit support, personnel, logistics)?
 - How to accommodate cross-program, cross-INT fusion?
- If there should be a central organization, how should it be organized?
 - Director. Full time? Dual/multi-hatted?
 - Deputies. How many? What functions? Full time? Dual/multi-hatted?



Attachment 1

- Program Offices. Organized by organizational affiliation? How many?
- Business Centers. Organized by product (SIGINT, IMINT) and/or platform regime (high, low orbit)? How many?
- To what degree should the central organization be collocated?
- What, if any, unique aspects of the NRO should be protected (eg., streamlined management, focused mission)?
- How should a central organization relate to its customers and its superiors?
- Is the NRO efficient? How could it become more so?
- Is the NRO responsive to intelligence requirements? To operational military needs? To Intelligence Community desire to participate in the NRO decision process?
- Are NRO systems too expensive? Can the NRO systems be procured more cheaply through the use of small satellites or other architectural changes or by changes in procurement methods?
- Is NRO security excessive resulting in limitations in utility or excessive costs?
- Does the NRO produce new concepts, technologies, and systems?



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CRITICISMS OF THE NRO

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1. Criticisms of the NRO. The Task Force reviewed a number of criticisms of the NRO as expressed by elements of Congress, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Defense. While many of these criticisms are not new, there are elements of truth in most, as well as many misperceptions regarding the NRO. In the course of our review, we tried to sort out the perceptions from the realities, to make specific changes to address real problems, and to enable improved communications to help alleviate the misperceptions. We looked specifically at the following criticisms:

- The NRO is not satisfying intelligence requirements.
- NRO support to military operations needs to be improved.
- The Intelligence Community does not participate fully in NRO decisions.
- The NRO method of design and acquisition is inefficient.
- NRO-developed systems are too expensive.
- The NRO will not consider small satellites.
- The NRO has no new ideas.

2. Satisfying Intelligence Requirements. Many users believe that overhead systems are not meeting all of their intelligence requirements. In many instances, these perceptions are correct. Overhead systems gather vast amounts of data, operating under strict priorities established by the Intelligence Community committee structure—not by the NRO. US intelligence requirements continue to grow in an unconstrained fashion, and "old" requirements are not phased out as new demands for collection are approved. Our Task Force found that the Intelligence Community's requirements definition and trade-off process has many long-standing weaknesses. Our recommendations include steps the DCI can take to address those weaknesses.

3. Support to Military Operations. A common criticism is that NRO support to military operations needs to be improved—and we agree. However, it is important to distinguish between real problems and those based on misunderstandings. Our Task Force examined this area in some detail.

- a. Historically, the NRO has a long tradition of supporting military operations.

[REDACTED] As overhead systems became more capable of providing real-time support to operational commanders in the field, special mechanisms were established to emphasize this support. The DSPO, the DRSP, and the NRO Deputy Director for Military Support are good examples. Specialized systems like the [REDACTED] were developed to improve support to far-flung military units. The value of these preparations was proven during Operation DESERT STORM. However, DESERT STORM also highlighted some long-standing deficiencies in overhead systems [REDACTED]. In addition, there has been a sense that support to military operations has been handled as a last-minute add-on to overhead systems, rather than

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an integral mission element. For that reason, we recommended an explicit DCI commitment to providing operational support; and a merger of ARSP, DRSP, and the NRP into a new "Overhead Reconnaissance Program" to include operational support.

b. Military users are concerned that peacetime priorities will carry over into crisis or wartime situations, with the result that they will not receive the intelligence data they need. Two factors mitigate against this situation. Once a decision is made to consider a military option in a given crisis, national and operational requirements and priorities tend to converge.

[REDACTED]
thus ensuring mission support to operational capabilities. A review of previous crisis situations would suggest that the problems encountered in providing support to operational activities from NRO assets were related more to system constraints [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] than to conflicting priorities. We have recommended that the requirements process be improved to ensure that the requirements for operational support be made an integral part of the NRO developmental and acquisition process. Further, we have recommended that outreach programs by the NRO be established to enhance the understanding of NRO systems and to exercise the tasking of actual NRO assets in realistic military exercises.

c. A more serious concern is that the tasking system itself tends to be cumbersome and not well understood. It is also not exercised frequently by many DoD organizations. The Requirements Management System (RMS) is an ongoing initiative to improve imagery tasking, and we have recommended improved training and realistic exercises of the entire intelligence process using actual NRO assets.

d. Current overhead systems are not fully optimized for support to military users. For example, Community requirements [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The NRO has offered several alternatives for pursuing this shortfall and is actively studying others. In the end, it will be up to the IC to decide whether or not to pursue any of these collection alternatives. There are also serious concerns about dissemination of intelligence to the military in the field. Although this latter is now the responsibility of DoD rather than the NRO, the concern is real. We have recommended transfer of the Defense Dissemination Program Office from DoD to the NRO and a requirement to consider tasking and exploitation in all NRO system design efforts.

4. IC Participation in NRO Decisions. In the past, NRO customers and users have not fully participated in NRO decisions. The DNRO has recognized this problem, and established mechanisms to enhance participation. At the working level, NRO Plans and Analysis includes more than 30% IC staffing, and conducts its business with emphasis on Intelligence Community participation. At the top level, the National Reconnaissance Review Board provides a forum for top IC managers and the Vice Chairman, JCS, to advise the DNRO, the DCI, and the SECDEF

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concerning NRO projects and related collection requirements issues. We have proposed changes in the requirements process to provide for greater community participation in systems requirements development.

5. Efficiency of NRO Acquisition. Many personnel outside the NRO believe that the NRO's acquisition practices are wasteful, that satellite costs are too high, that the NRO does not compete enough contracts, and [redacted] is too expensive. Again, we found both fact and fiction in our review.

a. The streamlined management practices used by the NRO are effective and efficient. By using highly qualified personnel, the NRO is able to minimize the size of its management structure and make rapid, well-informed decisions. While the NRO uses the Federal Acquisition Regulations for all of its procurement, it takes care to avoid creating bureaucratic and administrative requirements. The Packard Commission incorporated many aspects of NRO acquisition practice into its recommendations on DoD procurement.

b. The NRO does compete procurement when appropriate. Every major system new start in the history of the NRO has been competed, and NRO prime contractors conduct an aggressive subcontract competition effort.

c. NRO satellite cost issues are discussed in Paragraph 6 below.

d. [redacted] costs have historically been quite high. The new [redacted] Security Center has improved clearance processing, and standardized security criteria, resulting in significant cost savings. Ongoing studies of classification guidelines, as well as those studies proposed by this Task Force, also have potential for reducing the overhead associated with [redacted]. However, it is imperative that sources and methods be protected, and the related costs must therefore be paid.

6. Cost of NRO-developed Systems. NRO satellites are expensive. But "too expensive?" Here are some of the considerations:

a. NRO systems are built against difficult requirements sets, and these requirements drive system size, complexity, and cost. [redacted]

b. Consolidation of requirements and the basic initial cost for getting to orbit leads satellite designers to fewer, larger, and more capable systems. To keep total costs within limits, the on-orbit constellation size is small. The Intelligence Community and national-level policymakers have come to rely heavily on constant flows of high-quality data from these systems, so high reliability is essential. Because intelligence collection requirements and adversary practices change constantly, it is not possible to buy large blocks of satellites at a time. All these factors

lead to high cost per satellite. Nevertheless, the cost per unit of intelligence information delivered is minimized with these systems, and we believe that is the proper measure of merit for baseline intelligence collection.

c. The NRO does operate [redacted] and the NRO constantly challenges costs and uses incentives to move contractors to reduce costs. Past NRO initiatives, [redacted] have yielded large dollar savings. And almost all NRO programs have found ways to increase on-orbit lifetime at minimal cost.

d. We agree that the cost per spacecraft is high, but believe that the Community's requirements are being satisfied in a cost-effective manner.

7. Small Satellites and the NRO. Many people believe that the NRO is prejudiced against small satellites. This perception is not accurate. The NRO does not consider SMALLSATs as an end or an objective, but rather as an approach to solving intelligence problems.

a. Many of the requirements levied on the NRO necessitate large satellite systems. [redacted] On the other hand, there are some requirements that are quite suitable for SMALLSAT accomplishment, and the NRO [redacted]

b. The NRO continues to actively investigate SMALLSAT alternatives. More than a dozen SMALLSAT studies have been conducted since 1988 alone.

8. New Ideas in the NRO. This criticism tends to focus on the fact that there have been no successful new program starts in the NRO during the past few years, and then extends to an assertion that there is no innovation in the NRO and that no investments for the future are being made. We agree with the concern about new program starts, but are less concerned about the others.

a. In the past five years, [redacted] started and then canceled. In each case, the NRO had initiated the program in response to valid requirements, only to have the program canceled by a decision of the Intelligence Community and/or the DoD in response to budget cuts. A key element in each decision was the "tyranny of the baseline;" users in general were unwilling to give up current capabilities in order to fund future improvements. Certain of our recommendations specifically address this problem area.

b. This does not mean that there is a lack of innovation. Overhead systems are being constantly improved to meet evolving requirements. [redacted]

[redacted] show that innovation is alive and well in the NRO. There is no lack of new ideas either. The NRO is constantly faced with far more good ideas than it has resources to investigate or support.

c. The NRO does maintain a vigorous R&D program, with aggressive work on new technologies [REDACTED]. Additionally, the NRO has excellent working relationships with DoD agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to ensure that technology information is effectively shared. Additionally, reorganization and collocation of NRO elements should foster technology exchange.

d. Our recommendations related to this issue include fenced funds for nurturing new ideas until enough information is available to determine where they fit in the overall approach to intelligence collection, and an NFIP-wide annual reprioritization of baseline programs and new initiatives.

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(1) The Requirements Rationalization Committee (RRC) would take all-source intelligence requirements from the various intelligence agencies and assess them for prioritization and consistency with top-level guidance; the RRC would then assign each validated requirement to one or more specific INTs along with an indication of priority. The RRC would also provide requirements information to the new Evaluation Committee.

(2) The Evaluation Committee (EC) would compare the performance of the various INTs to the Requirements levied by the RRC and also examine the all-source picture. The EC would provide feedback to interested parties throughout the Community, from the DCI down to the user level. We further believe that there should be rotation between members of the EC and the RRC over time.

3. SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS. We believe that the Intelligence Community discipline should be improved to ensure that a consolidated, prioritized set of systems requirements is developed to support important acquisition decisions. The process we suggest is shown in Figure 4 of the basic report. Key features of this approach are:

a. Involvement of senior US government decisionmakers in providing top-level guidance concerning their need for intelligence information. In some ways, the recent National Security Review 29 exercise moved in this direction; more needs to be done and on a continuing basis.

b. The JCS, Unified and Specified Commands, Military Services, Federal Agencies, and Intelligence Organizations then produce written statements of their operations and policy information needs.

c. The Intelligence Agencies then translate those information needs into intelligence requirements—not on an INT-specific basis, but from an all-source viewpoint. Of course, they may suggest specific collection approaches that they know will do the job.


d. The Requirements Rationalization Committee will validate the requirements, assign an appropriate priority, apportion the requirements between the various INTs, and then provide a prioritized requirements list to each of the INT authorities. NSA, IA, and the organizations that acquire collection systems (e.g. NRO) will assist in this task and will examine affordability issues.

e. Each INT authority, with the assistance of the organizations that acquire collection systems, will then apportion the requirements to the various collection systems, current and projected. Thus each acquisition organization (e.g. the NRO) will receive a baseline systems requirements document from NSA and another from the IA. System specifications would remain the responsibility of the organizations acquiring the collection systems.

f. The Evaluation Committee, based on all the work done on the requirements side of the process and information from the collection system acquisition organizations, will evaluate the ability of current and planned INT systems to meet the future intelligence requirements. They should factor in issues of exploitation, analysis, and dissemination. They will then provide this information to the Intelligence Community and to DoD.

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4. **COLLECTION TASKING.** The handling of near-term requirements that result in the tasking of collection systems involves the same organizations as the systems requirements process described above, with a few key differences:

a. Intelligence requirements must be "tagged" as they enter the process and remain traceable throughout the process to allow information collected to flow back to the originator and to permit proper evaluation of the entire process.

b. The Evaluation Committee should not confine its activities to examining the formal requirements process or auditing data bases and paper trails. They should be chartered to visit and consult with intelligence agencies and users at all levels to determine whether the entire process—from first statement of need to actual delivery of the information—is working effectively.

c. Because of the rapid response required, there must be mechanisms to handle very flexible requirements and to respond in real time to changes in the world situation. Those mechanisms must permit the Evaluation Committee to determine what requirements were collected or displaced during quick-response situations.

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The NRO should be continued as the single US government agency responsible for the centralized development, acquisition and operation of overhead intelligence collection systems (other than organic assets of the Department of Defense (DoD)).
2. The DCI should commit the Intelligence Community to a proactive role in satisfying the intelligence needs of both national and operational users.
3. The NRO should adopt the following mission statement:

"THE NRO MISSION: To ensure that the US has the technology and overhead assets it needs to acquire superior worldwide intelligence in war and peace. To this end, the NRO is responsible for conducting research and development, and for acquiring and operating overhead systems for the collection of intelligence."

4. The DCI and SECDEF should merge the three programs managed by the DNRO (NRP, DRSP, and ARSP) into a single NFIP Program, defined as follows:

"OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM (ORP): A single program designed to meet the intelligence requirements of the nation that can best be satisfied by overhead reconnaissance. This program will be responsive to and will provide services to all levels of the government, including tactical military organizations. The ORP does not include organic assets of the DoD."

5. The DNRO should continue to have a second "hat;" it should be as Under Secretary of the Air Force.
6. The DNRO take immediate action to realign existing NRO elements along INT lines. At the same time, the old Program Designations (A, B, and C) should cease to be used within the NRO.
7. By the end of calendar year 1993 or as soon as possible, the NRO should complete full collocation within the Washington area.
8. The DNRO and DCI, with SECDEF support, should take action to ensure a continuing mix of Intelligence Community and military people—particularly those with expertise and experience in the development, acquisition, and operations of space-based intelligence collection systems—participate at all levels in the NRO.
9. The DCI should emphasize the importance of working through the Intelligence Community mechanisms on collection requirements and their satisfaction. NSA should be the single focal point for validated SIGINT requirements, and the IA the single focal point for validated IMINT requirements.

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10. The DCI should establish a requirements rationalization function and an evaluation/feedback function, embodied in specific intelligence-wide committees, and linked to the budget process.
11. The DCI should direct a system of baseline systems requirements documents between NSA and the NRO and between IA and the NRO.
12. Exploitation and dissemination of intelligence data should be considered during the requirements process, recorded in the baseline documents, and considered during the NRO design process.
13. The DCI should add the requirements rationalization function and the evaluation/feedback function to the Intelligence Community's collection system tasking process.
14. The DCI should initiate an annual Community-wide reprioritization of all NFIP baseline programs, with explicit consideration of new initiatives.
15. The DNRO, with support of the SECDEF and the DCI, should establish a separate, fenced funding line dedicated to new ideas.
16. The NRO should retain and strengthen its internal strategic planning process and carry it through to completion of a written Strategic Plan.
17. The DCI should direct the DNRO to begin the process of declassifying the "fact of" the NRO and certain additional information by conducting a detailed study and developing an implementation plan.
18. The DCI should direct a joint study by NRO, NSA, and the Imagery Authority to determine how to disseminate more product from overhead systems to appropriate users worldwide, particularly at the non-compartmented SECRET level.
19. The DCI should direct a study by NRO, NSA, and the IA to determine what overhead system characteristics and capabilities can be released outside SCI channels, with the goal of significantly increasing the amount of system capability information available at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level.
20. The DCI and the SECDEF should direct expanded outreach programs to current and potential users of overhead intelligence products, with special emphasis on operational military needs. This initiative should include use of actual NRO satellite collectors in realistic military exercises.
21. The NRRB mandate should be expanded to include the entire range of overhead reconnaissance issues, including data dissemination. The Director of the IA should be made a member of the NRRB.
22. The NRO should continue to operate the intelligence collection space systems it builds.

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

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