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March 12, 2019

John Greenewald
[REDACTED]

NARA Case Number: **NW 51079**

Dear Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.:

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for access to records in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Our office received your request for records relating to a June 3, 1980 event on September 12, 2016.

The Department of Defense (DOD) declassified four documents totaling thirteen pages.

We have enclosed copies of this material for your convenience. These records are also available for research use in the research room at the National Archives at College Park.

This concludes the processing of your request. If you have any question about the way we handled your request, or about our FOIA regulations or procedures, please contact Victoria Otero at victoria.otero@nara.gov or (301)837-1774.

Sincerely,

for:
DAVID FORT
Supervisory Archives Specialist
National Declassification Center

Did you understand our response to your inquiry? If not, please tell us why so we can improve our responses.

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT PROCESSING RECORD

CONTROL NUMBER

2374

DATE RECEIVED

19 Sep 80

RETURN TO: OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS-ROOM 2E865, THE PENTAGON

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DJSM 1835-80

DATE OF DOCUMENT

19 Sep 80

SUBJECT

False Missile Alert Operational/Procedural Actions (U)

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION.
THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
	CHAIRMAN, JCS	00	<p>NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF <u>NO RAD</u> DATE: <u>10/10/80</u></p>
5	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	02	
4	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	03	
3	THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN	01	
2	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	01A	
7	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04	
	DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04A	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MEMBER	01B	
1	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MEMBER	01C	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MEMBER	01D	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MEMBER	01E	
	LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT	01F	
6	SPECIAL ASSISTANT	01G	
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS	01H	
	ARMY AIDE	05	
	MARINE AIDE	05A	
	PROTOCOL	06	

803 - NO RAD

FILE 0
19 Sep 80
RWH

Declassified Case: NW# 51079 Date: 03-12-2019

~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

2374

TO: DJS <i>ACJCS</i>	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTOR/TATE ISM 1574 '80 19 SEP 1980		
THUR: <i>PH Hawley 9/19</i>	DJSM NO. 1835-80	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE		
	DJSM DATE 19 Sep 80			
SUBJECT: False Missile Alert Operational/ Procedural Actions (U)	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
	X	X		

REMARKS

1. ~~(S)~~ The attached memorandum for ASD C3I is the weekly report on the 3/6 June missile warning incident.
2. (U) The only information included in this memorandum is that which was not included in the previous reports.

Classified by Director, J-3
 Review on: 17 September 2000
 Extended by Director, J-3
 Reason: 5200.1R, para 2-301c6

ACTION OFFICER R. E. Bernd Col, USAF Strat Ops Div J-3, X78508	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3	<i>[Signature]</i>	56243	C3S	<i>[Signature]</i>	
DATE OF PREPARATION 17 Sep 80						



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

19 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, C3I

Subject: False Missile Alerts - Operational/Procedural
Actions - Informational Memorandum (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ The following summary of actions, taken in response to the 3/6 June 1980 false missile events, is provided for your information. Ongoing actions referred to in previous reports will not be listed unless any changes have been effected.

2. ~~(S)~~ There were five Missile Display Conferences (MDC) during the week under the following circumstances:

a. ~~(S)~~ On 13 September at 0138 hours EDT DSP-East detected an SSN-8 launch from the Kuril Island area impacting in Cheshskaya Bay. The missile was processed as a threat since the DSP launch fan cut across a portion of Alaska. NORAD passed an assessed confidence of NO, one minute after DSP detection.

b. ~~(S)~~ On 13 September at 0517 hours EDT DSP-East, DSP-West and DSP-Augmentation detected an SSN-8 launch from the Kuril Island area impacting in Cheschkaya Bay. The NORAD Minimum Essential Back-up Computer (MEBU) processed the DSP-East report as a threat to the United Kingdom, hence the MDC was convened. A NORAD assessed NO was passed within one minute after the conference was convened.

c. ~~(S)~~ On 15 September at 2215 hours EDT an MDC was convened when DSP-West detected a scheduled domestic launch of a MINUTEMAN I from the Western Space and Missile Center (WSMC). A NORAD assessed confidence of NO was passed at 2217. The MDC was terminated and then reconvened at 2224 when PAVE PAWS Pacific data from the MINUTEMAN launch was processed erroneously as a threat event by a new CCPDS software version. The erroneous processing displayed over 4000 threat SLBMs at both NMCC and ANMCC and a single threat SLBM at SAC. The incorrect threat information was immediately recognized and no force reactions occurred.

Classified by: DJS
Review on: 17 September 2000
Extended by: DJS
Reason: 5200.1-R, para 2, 301c6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Emergency action procedures currently in effect take into account the fact that the PAVE PAWS system is new and may on occasion produce incorrect data. SAC, as the resource manager, is currently refining the PAVE PAWS software to eliminate incorrect reporting.

d. ~~(S)~~ On 16 September at 0100 hours EDT an MDC was convened because DSP-West detected and properly tagged a space reentry approximately 60 miles southwest of Panama City, Florida. The reentry was the rocket body of COSMOS 549 which was launched on 28 February 1973. A NORAD assessed NO was passed approximately five minutes after the MDC was convened.

e. ~~(S)~~ On 17 September at 1001 hours EDT an MDC was convened because DSP-West detected a scheduled domestic launch of a MINUTEMAN III from the WSMC. PAVE PAWS Pacific reported two non-threat missiles. A NORAD assessed NO was passed within one minute after the MDC was convened.

3. (U) Cyclical Redundancy Check (CRC) testing was completed at NORAD with a final demonstration on 16 September with all users. It is anticipated that CINCNORAD will request permission through the Joint Staff for resumption of normal NORAD Computer System (NCS) operation early next week.

4. ~~(S)~~ There were two commercial power failures in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex during the week causing a breakdown of the NORAD Computer System (NCS), MEBU and Communication System Segment (CSS).


a. ~~(S)~~ On 12 September a lightning strike caused commercial power failure, with back-up diesel power being available in 18 minutes; however, since the computer system went off line there was a total of two hours and 40 minutes where the warning function was handled by voice tell procedures and by direct sensor data to SAC, NMCC and ANMCC.

b. ~~(S)~~ On 15 September another commercial power failure occurred due to a short circuit at a transformer site. Diesel power was brought on line in 17 minutes; however, restoration of the entire computer system took 47 minutes. Direct sensor data and voice tell procedures were used for the primary warning function.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

c. (S) There is currently an Air Force engineering team on site to determine what is needed to make the diesel generators totally responsive to Cheyenne Mountain power requirements in the event of commercial power failure. The on-site portion of the engineering evaluation is expected to be completed by the end of next week.



JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

file

1 Aug 80

Declassified Case: NW# 51079 Date:
03-12-2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, C3I

Subject: False Missile Alerts - Operational/Procedural
Actions - Informational Memorandum (U)

1. (U) The following summary of actions, taken in response to the 3/6 June 1980 false missile events, is provided for your information. Ongoing actions referred to in previous reports will not be listed unless any changes have been effected.

2. ~~(S)~~ There was a Missile Display Conference (MDC) called on 28 July for a pre-announced domestic missile launch from the Wallops Island launch complex. The MDC was required because PAVE PAWS Atlantic tracked twelve objects emanating from the launch and characterized these objects as threat SLBMs. No force movements were made or contemplated. Ratheon Corporation who is the prime contractor for PAVE PAWS has made two Engineering Change Proposals that would effect software changes to correct such erroneous launch and impact predictions. The Air Force (ESD, SAC and NORAD) will meet on 5/6 August to consider these proposals.

3. ~~(S)~~ On 31 July at 2303 hours EDT another MDC was convened because of a DSP-East detection of an SSN-18 launch from the White Sea area. The missile impacted in the Kamchatka Peninsula missile range but was characterized as a threat missile due to the DSP fan crossing the northwestern US, Canada and all of Alaska. There were no force reactions and a NORAD assessed NO was received at 1 minute 10 seconds after the MDC was called.

4. ~~(S)~~ A NORAD briefing was given to the Joint Staff on 31 July concerning the progress of those technical modifications which should effect an eventual return to normal NORAD Computer System (NCS) operation. The Director for Operations tasked several agencies to further analyze additional proposals prior to making a final recommendation.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

NORAD

DATE: 16/6/87

John S. Pustay
JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

803 NORAD

Pustay memo file

file Aug 80
R

CLASSIFIED BY: CJCS
REVIEW ON: 31 July 2000
EXTENDED BY: CJCS
REASON: 5200.1R, para 201c6

~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: ASST TO CJCS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE 131-130480 01 AUG 1980	
THRU: DJS <i>Hanson</i> THOR HANSON VICE ADMIRAL, USN DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF	DJSM NO. 1522-80	ODJS. SUSPENSE DATE	
	DJSM DATE 01 AUG 1980		
SUBJECT: False Missile Alerts Operational/ Procedural Actions	ACTION		
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION
	X	X	

REMARKS

1. The attached memorandum for ASD C3I is the weekly report on the 3/6 June missile warning incident.
2. The only information included in this memorandum is that which was not included in the previous reports.

Regraded Unclassified
when separated from
Classified enclosure

ACTION OFFICER R. E. BERND COL, USAF StratOpsDiv, J-3 X78508	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3	<i>R. E. Bernd</i>	56243	C3S		
DATE OF PREPARATION 31 July 80						

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT PROCESSING RECORD

CONTROL NUMBER

2961

DATE RECEIVED

26 Nov 80

RETURN TO: OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS-ROOM 2E865, THE PENTAGON

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Memo to Multi (CJCS) from Senator Stennis

DATE OF DOCUMENT

24 Nov 80

SUBJECT

Letter to SecDef regarding Armed Services Committee Report on False Missile Alerts

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

002 - SENATE (STENNIS)

TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
	CHAIRMAN, JCS	00	J-2
5	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	02	S2
4	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	03	KHN-1
3	THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN	01	
2	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	01A	
7	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04	G
	DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04A	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MEMBER	01B	
1	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MEMBER	01C	Em
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MEMBER	01D	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MEMBER	01E	
	LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT	01F	
6	SPECIAL ASSISTANT	01G	MW
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS	01H	
	ARMY AIDE	05	
	MARINE AIDE	05A	
	PROTOCOL	06	

DJS - info
 J3 - info
 C3S - info

28 November 1980

1. INFORMATION - SHOW.

2. Senator Stennis asked SecDef to provide to the SASC the USAF & OSD review of missile warning system support and procedures. He also requested that DoD review the management of the system and furnish a report by 15 March, remarking that "it is hard to understand how such a...system can function efficiently with responsibilities for it so fragmented."

Em
 CAPTAIN McVADON

File O
3 Dec 80
AWH

Declassified Case: NW# 51079 Date: 03-12-2019

UNCLASSIFIED

CJCS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROUTING SLIP		ACT COPY TO	INFO COPY TO	TO		ACT COPY TO	INFO COPY TO
	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		✓		ADVISER FOR NATO AFFAIRS		
	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		✓		ATSD (Atomic Energy)		
	THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT		✓		ATSD (Legislative Affairs)		✓
	SECRETARY OF THE ARMY				DIR, NET ASSESSMENT		✓
	SECRETARY OF THE NAVY				DEF ADV RSCH PROJ AGENCY		
	SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE		✓		[REDACTED]		
	CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF		✓		DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY		
	UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY		✓		DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY		
	UNDER SECRETARY FOR RSCH & ENGR		✓		DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		
	ASD (Comptroller)		✓		DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY		
	DASD (Administration)				DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY		
✓	ASD (Comm, Command, Control & Intel)				DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY		
	ASD (Health Affairs)				DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY		
	ASD (International Security Affairs)				NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY		
	ASD (Manpower, Res Aff & Logistics)						
	ASD (Program Analysis & Evaluation)		✓				
	ASD (Public Affairs)						
	GENERAL COUNSEL						

ACTION REQUIRED

✓	PREP OF REPLY FOR SEC OF DEF SIGNATURE		COMMENTS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS
	PREP OF REPLY FOR DEP SEC OF DEF SIGNATURE		COORDINATE REPLY WITH LA, SAF
	REPLY DIRECT (Fwd cy of reply for Sec of Def records)		
	APPROPRIATE ACTION		
	INFORMATION AND RETENTION		

REMARKS

CONGRESSIONAL

THE ATTACHED CORRESPONDENCE REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DATED 27 MARCH 1969, SUBJECT, "CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE."

THIS IS AN - ACTION COPY ADVANCE ACTION COPY INFORMATION COPY

ACTION DUE NOT LATER THAN DEC 4 1980 ROUTING DATE 26 NOV 1981 OSD CONTROL NUMBER 33244

SD FORM 1 NOV 77 14

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN
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HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.
HARVEY P. BYRD, JR., VA.
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ROGER W. JEPSEN, IOWA

FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

1980 NOV 26 PM 1:33

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 24, 1980

Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:


Following the incidents on June 3 and 6, 1980 of false alerts in the nation's missile attack warning system, Senators Hart and Goldwater were requested to look into the matter on behalf of the Committee. They have completed their investigation and on October 9, 1980 filed a report of their findings with the Committee.

Their excellent report contained several recommendations which need to receive further consideration and possible action. First, we are informed that the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are reviewing the support provided to and the operational procedures used in performing the missile warning function. This is to request that the results of this review be forwarded to the Committee as soon as they are available.

The second area of concern is the organization and the management of the missile warning function. Senators Hart and Goldwater found that management of the system is divided among four major commands within the Air Force. It is hard to understand how such a complex and technically sophisticated system can function efficiently with responsibilities for it so fragmented. The report recommends that resource management be consolidated under one commander. Further the report concludes we should keep separate the operational responsibility for determining the existence and extent of an attack from the responsibility of responding to an attack.

In accordance with the recommendations of the report, this is to request that the Department of Defense review this issue and provide a report of the assessment of the costs and benefits of consolidating the management of the missile warning function under one commander. It is further requested that such a report include the future plans for this organization and be provided by March 15, 1981 so it can be explored during the Department of Defense authorization hearings next year.

Sincerely,


John C. Stennis
Chairman

33244

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT PROCESSING RECORD

CONTROL NUMBER

1719

DATE RECEIVED

23 Jun 80

RETURN TO: OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS-ROOM 2E865, THE PENTAGON

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Ltr to SecDef from Senator Hatfield

DATE OF DOCUMENT

18 Jun 80

SUBJECT

Computer Error resulting in False Alarm

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

002 Senate (HATFIELD)

TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
	CHAIRMAN, JCS	00	Jrs
5	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	02	T
4	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	03	M/24
3	THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN	01	J
2	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	01A	J
7	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04	G
	DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04A	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MEMBER	01B	
1a	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MEMBER	01C	/
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MEMBER	01D	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MEMBER	01E	823
1	LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT	01F	Ally K
6	SPECIAL ASSISTANT	01G	NW
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS	01H	
	ARMY AIDE	05	
	MARINE AIDE	05A	
	PROTOCOL	06	

DJS - Copy
J-3 - Copy

23 Jun 1980

1. INFORMATION - SHOW.
2. Senator Hatfield (R-OR) writes SECDEF regarding Soviet nuclear attack false alarms. He wants unclassified descriptions of actions taken or to be taken to avoid similar future incidents.

Miller
COLONEL MILLER

*File
25 Jun 80
per*

Declassified Case: NW# 51079 Date: 03-12-2019

UNCLASSIFIED

CJCS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROUTING SLIP		ACT COPY TO	INFO COPY TO	TO	ACT COPY TO	INFO COPY TO
	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		✓			ADVISER FOR NATO AFFAIRS
	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		✓			ATSD (Atomic Energy)
	THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT		✓			ATSD (Legislative Affairs)
	SECRETARY OF THE ARMY					DIR, NET ASSESSMENT
	SECRETARY OF THE NAVY					DEF ADV RSCH PROJ AGENCY
	SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE					DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY
	CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF		✓			DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
	UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY		✓			DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
	UNDER SECRETARY FOR RSCH & ENGR					DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
	ASD (Comptroller)					DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
	DASD (Administration)					DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
✓	ASD (Comm, Command, Control & Intel)					DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
	ASD (Health Affairs)					DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
	ASD (International Security Affairs)					NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
	ASD (Manpower, Res Aff & Logistics)					
	ASD (Program Analysis & Evaluation)					
	ASD (Public Affairs)		✓			
	GENERAL COUNSEL					
ACTION REQUIRED						
	PREP OF REPLY FOR SEC OF DEF SIGNATURE					COMMENTS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS
	PREP OF REPLY FOR DEP SEC OF DEF SIGNATURE					COORDINATE REPLY WITH <i>LA, Spec Asst</i>
✓	REPLY DIRECT (<i>End cy of reply for Sec of Def records</i>)					
	APPROPRIATE ACTION					
	INFORMATION AND RETENTION					
REMARKS						
<i>See OSD 19755, 22290</i>						
CONGRESSIONAL						
THE ATTACHED CORRESPONDENCE REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DATED 27 MARCH 1969, SUBJECT, "CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE."						
THIS IS AN -						
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION COPY		<input type="checkbox"/> ADVANCE ACTION COPY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION COPY		
ACTION DUE NOT LATER THAN	ROUTING DATE	OSD CONTROL NUMBER				
<i>11 JUN 27 1980</i>	<i>20 JUN 1980</i>	<i>20618</i>				

1980 JUN 20 PM 1:53

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 18, 1980

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS.	MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.	MARK O. HATFIELD, OREG.
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WIS.	TED STEVENS, ALASKA
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII	CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
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DALE BUMPERS, ARK.	
JOHN A. DURKIN, N.H.	

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In February and March of this year, I wrote you concerning the computer error last November which resulted in a false alarm of a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. In your April response to my letters, you stated that "we have altered our test procedures and initiated acquisition of an off-site computer test facility in order to avoid circumstances that might conceivably lead to a similar incident in the future."

The events of recent days make it apparent that similar accidents can and do continue to occur, with serious consequences. According to press reports, the recent false alerts led to higher states of readiness for strategic forces, and an airborne command aircraft was launched. Both the Soviet Union and our allies have expressed grave concerns about these events, and the implications for the integrity of our command and control systems.

I believe those concerns are legitimate, and should be addressed by effective corrective action. As I have discussed in the past, these computer errors take on more ominous significance in the years ahead as both the U.S. and the Soviet Union deploy weapons, particularly on submarines, capable of a first-strike counter-force assault.

In light of these concerns, I would appreciate your providing me, to the greatest extent possible in unclassified form, a description of the actions you have taken and will take to correct these problems and fulfill your earlier pledge to avoid circumstances that might conceivably lead to a similar incident in the future.

Best regards.

Sincerely,



Mark O. Hatfield
United States Senator

MOH:jrr

20618