
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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

7 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OSA

Deputy Assistant Director, OSA

SUBJECT

: Summary of OSA Activities for Week Ending 5 June 1963

OXCART

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1. The investigation of the Aircraft 123 crash continues. Headquarters has granted permission to employ hypnosis and sodium penothal on the pilot in an effort to assist him to recall exactly what actions were taken during the emergency which preceded the accident. The Accident Board concludes that inflight fire and structural failure did not occur, that flight controls and hydraulic systems were operable up to the time of impact and were not a contributing factor in the accident. They also agree that oxygen and pressurization systems were operable up to the time of ejection and were not a factor in the crash. With regard to fuel systems, the group concluded that fuel system icing did not occur and that fuel used was within specification limits and that the fuel system operated normally during flight and was not a factor in this accident. No mechanical failure was found in the engines. It has been determined, however, that a blockage of the pitot line feeding the air data computer would cause the mach and air speed indication to remain constant as long as altitude is held constant. If the pitot system is thusly blocked and a climb is initiated to 38,000 feet (as described by the pilot), the altitude would read correctly while the mach and air speed readings would be erroneous. This blockage might have been due to a malfunctioned switch or perhaps trapped frozen moisture. As an interim conclusion, the Board feels that a blockage of the pitot system could have caused the erroneous readings. The Maintenance and Records Group of the Board is still investigating procedures used in replacement of the air data computer amplifier prior to the flight of 123.

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Minneapolis-Honeywell is still investigating the possibility of erroneous readings due to air data computer internal malfunction. The Board has recommended that Lockheed provide heat for the approximately ten feet of pitot tubing to the air data computer on aircraft 121, 122 and 124. (Aircraft 125 and up have heated nose which regates this requirement.) (It should also be noted that a check of Aircraft 124 pitot and static drains was made with no trapped moisture being found.) The Board will make its final report after the aforementioned debriefing of the pilot is completed.

2. The FOD Control Group met on 6 June at to review 25X1 actions taken on aircraft 122 prior to authorizing engine run-up. All FOD modifications and special inspection requirements had been accomplished. In addition to the previously recommended anti-FOD procedures, compressed air (at 125 PSI) was directed into all corners and crevices of the engine inlet structure and a "hand feel" inspection was accomplished. This additional procedure yielded a significant amount of miscellaneous "junk" from the left nacelle. No material was found in the right nacelle, however. This air pressure technique will be incorporated into the airframe FOD prevention procedure and will be used on all newly delivered engines for external cleaning prior to installation in the aircraft.

3. A draft of the OXCART Contingency Staging Plan was forwarded through the D/FA/OSA to the AD/OSA on 29 May.

4. On 5 June, the AD/OSA released all A-12 aircraft from the grounding imposed after the crash of aircraft 123. It was subsequently stipulated, however, that no flying would be accomplished until the emergency packet is securely sewn into the pilot's flight suit or a special pocket provided for it.

5. Considerable discussion has evolved concerning the necessity for inclusion of a crash recorder in the A-12. The AD/OSA has asked for recommendations on this subject from Lockheed

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PURCELL PANEL

Meetings of the Purcell Panel were held in the DD/S conference room on 4 and 5 June 1963. Dr. Purcell is preparing a paper on the meeting, which will be coordinated with the panel members before a final report is written.

IDEALIST

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2. A study into the feasibility of U-2 carrier operations continues jointly with OSA and Lockheed. The DAD/OSA headed a survey party to Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida on 4 June to inspect the USS Lexington, an improved Essex class carrier. Another trip is planned for the week of 10 June to inspect the Independence, a Forrestal class carrier.

OSA

The OSA/NRO operating budget for FY 1964 was forwarded to the -25X1 DDR on 7 June for submission to the D/NRO.

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