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Draft

**National Military Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(NMS-CbtWMD)**



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Chapter 1

The Strategic Challenge

"The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. ...History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."¹

- President George W. Bush

We are a nation at war and face a diverse set of challenges.² Today, the greatest threats facing the United States, our allies and our vital interests are no longer posed by conventional forces. Rather, asymmetric methods may be employed to counter our traditional military superiority. The National Defense Strategy states, "The U.S. military predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the U.S. through *traditional* military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. While *traditional* challenges remain, an array of *traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive* capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests."³ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) may be used to counter our traditional military power and influence our behavior by instilling fear and attacking our political will.⁴ The challenges posed by WMD are categorized in the National Defense Strategy as *catastrophic*, but WMD in fact cut across all four challenge areas. Weapons of mass destruction could pose a variety of operational and tactical threats, and our armed forces must be prepared to fight and win under a wide range of WMD conditions.

Another challenge we face comes from a new breed of terrorists, whose goals may include removing U.S. influence in specific regions or reinventing the world in their own image. Many terrorist organizations consider WMD to be weapons of choice, and are actively attempting to acquire them weapons of mass destruction.⁵ When terrorists obtain WMD, terrorism becomes a truly catastrophic threat. Terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction must be prevented.

This is not an American conflict. WMD possession within a theater may affect the balance or power and lead to an increased arms race with in that region. It is a challenge to global order that requires a coordinated international response. Success will only be achieved by marshalling all the instruments of national and international power. International partnerships

¹ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, p. 1.

² The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, p. 2.

³ Ibid, p. 2

⁴ Weapons of mass destruction are weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. For the purpose of this strategy weapons of mass destruction are nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, and their means of delivery.

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will be crucial to achieving our goals and maintaining a stable world order. Without meaningful cooperation, the prospects for a truly devastating WMD attack against the United States, our friends, allies or interests are magnified.

Intent of the Strategy

The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CbtWMD) is an extension of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and supplements National level guidance to focus the Department of Defense's efforts to combat WMD. The NMS-CbtWMD is an ends, ways, means-based global strategy providing specific military insight to senior commanders executing combating WMD missions and developing combating WMD capabilities.

The NMS-CbtWMD supports the development of the Combating WMD CONPLAN and subsequent COCOM supporting plans, as directed by the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). COCOMs will embed the concepts, goals and frameworks of the strategy in their corresponding plans.

Military Strategic Goal
Through prevention, deterrence, and decisive operational capability, the United States, its forces, allies and interests are neither threatened nor attacked by WMD.

The NMS-CbtWMD provides overarching strategic guidance to organize and synchronize the military's combating WMD capabilities while leveraging other USG and allied capabilities to reach the strategic goal of ensuring the U.S. and its interests are neither threatened nor attacked by WMD. *Achieving this strategic goal rests on our combined ability to combat the proliferation and the use of WMD.* Our strategy is based on developing, operationalizing, and sustaining capabilities to *prevent, defeat and reverse* the acquisition of these weapons, related material and their means of employment. The Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility for integrating and synchronizing the Department's efforts to combat WMD to US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). USSTRATCOM will play an integral role in assessing current combating WMD capabilities, integrating and synchronizing applicable DoD-wide combating WMD efforts and will serve as a principal advocate for the rapid development and implementation of future capabilities.

Threat Considerations

The WMD threat to the United States has grown more complex and diverse over time. Today, both hostile state and non-state actors possessing WMD pose a significant challenge to the United States and its interests. Evidence indicates that some non-state actors are intent on obtaining and using WMD. Non-state actors of greatest concern include highly organized and networked terror organizations. Their WMD efforts may be facilitated by terrorist support entities, organized criminal organizations and illicit business enterprises that supply WMD materials, technology, and expertise – such as the international nuclear procurement network led by A.Q. Khan. In addition, some non-state actors may receive direct or indirect assistance from hostile WMD-capable states.

Although terrorist organizations pose the most likely threat of WMD use, we must be capable of defeating all WMD challenges posed by both state and non-state actors. State actors of greatest concern are “rogue” nations whose WMD activities threaten regional security and the global status quo. However, we must also consider potential challenges from “near-peer” nations with WMD – states with friendly regional and global interests whose stability is precarious. Furthermore, we need to engage states participating (knowingly or not) in illicit WMD or related materials trafficking. Both state and non-state actors are taking advantage of the continuing spread of technical know-how, materials, and sophisticated dual-use technology.

DoD Combating WMD Priorities

- Prevent terrorists from acquiring and/or employing WMD
- Rollback and protect against WMD possessed by antagonistic States
- Prevent WMD proliferation to nations that do not currently possess them
- Manage all other challenges posed by WMD.

Our top priority must be to prevent terrorists from obtaining and employing WMD. Protecting against the convergence of WMD and terrorism (see figure 1 below) requires, in part, aligning combating WMD objectives with the Global War on Terror. We must also reinforce technical and logistical barriers to WMD acquisition and use and increase the risks associated

with such activities. Finally, we must ensure that nation states do not actively support or facilitate WMD acquisition or use.

Preventing the Convergence of Terrorists & WMD




Figure 1

an example of WMD elimination operations conducted in a hostile or uncertain environment. The security environment will determine the level of military involvement for these predominantly civilian-led efforts.

An additional priority is to prevent proliferation of WMD to nations that do not currently possess them. This priority is exemplified by Iran, which seems intent on developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons. While diplomatic solutions may be preferred in these cases, more active measures may need to be considered.

Another priority is to rollback and protect against WMD possessed by antagonistic states. For example, North Korea appears determined to field a nuclear capability so we must be prepared to rollback that program using a cooperative threat reduction model or an “uncooperative” elimination model. The cooperative eradication of the Libyan WMD program is an ideal example of rollback using a cooperative threat reduction model. Elimination operations

executed in Operation Iraqi Freedom are

A final priority is to manage all other political and security challenges posed by WMD. The possession of WMD can destabilize key regions, even when not openly brandished or used. We must work to preclude the possibility of a regional WMD conflict between states friendly to the United States (e.g., India and Pakistan).

Each aspect of the WMD challenge merits appropriate strategic emphasis to ensure a response that remains effective over time. Different aspects of the threat will require different types and levels of resources and effort. A durable strategy to combat WMD will be grounded in a continuous, robust process that evaluates known WMD programs and emerging capabilities to produce WMD. This strategy must promote a common understanding of the WMD threat throughout the US government, and among our friends and allies.

National and Defense Guidance

The NMS-CbtWMD integrates the objectives and intent of National level guidance and provides military focus for the Department of Defense. Core guidance documents include: National Security Strategy, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Policy for Biodefense, National Response Plan, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. These documents highlight the unique challenges associated with WMD, and undergird DoD's strategic goal of ensuring that the U.S. and our forces, friends, allies and its interests are neither threatened nor attacked by WMD.

*The National Security Strategy of the United States*⁶ directs an active strategy to counter transnational terror networks, rogue nations and aggressive states that possess or are working to acquire WMD. It notes that the United States must advance this strategy through strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.⁷

*The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*⁸ articulates a proactive, comprehensive strategy to counter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. The three pillars around which specific strategy elements are organized are Counterproliferation, Strengthened Nonproliferation, and Consequence Management.⁹ Additionally, the strategy highlights several critical enablers: improved intelligence, research and development, strengthened international cooperation, and targeted strategies against proliferants.¹⁰

⁶ White House, September 2002.

⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁸ White House, December 2002. This document is an unclassified version of National Strategy to Combat WMD.

⁹ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

242 *National Policy for Biodefense*¹¹ is a tailored policy that integrates the sustained
243 and combined efforts of the U.S. government to expand the nation's response to
244 biological threats. It supplements and complements the National Strategy for Combating
245 WMD. It outlines the catastrophic nature of the BW threat and the framework to combat
246 that threat. For combatant commanders it emphasizes the need to improve and build
247 capabilities to detect, interdict and eliminate an adversary's BW assets and enabling
248 technologies and materials before they can be used.

249
250 The *National Response Plan*¹² is designed to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States;
251 reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and
252 minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It
253 establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management
254 across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. DoD
255 assets play key support roles across the range of responsibilities laid out in the plan. Combatant
256 commanders need to be aware of the potential resource impacts this plan may have on regional
257 plans.

258
259 The *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*¹³ outlines an
260 active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. It describes "our
261 highest priority" as dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the
262 United States directly, especially extremist enemies with WMD.¹⁴ It highlights the
263 troubling nexus of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek
264 WMD.¹⁵

265
266 The *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*¹⁶ provides focus
267 for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint-
268 operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify
269 desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses
270 risk. Noting the high risks associated with WMD threats, the strategy states that the
271 United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise
272 attack. It calls for a joint force capable of protecting against and defeating WMD-armed
273 adversaries.

274
275 The *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* outlines the active, layered,
276 defense-in depth that integrates the forward regions with the approaches with domestic activities
277 to protect the homeland. The key objectives of this strategy include achieving the maximum
278 awareness of potential threats, interdicting and defeating those threats at a safe distance,
279 providing mission assurance, support to civil authorities to deal with the consequences of a
280 CBRNE mass casualty attack and improving national and international capabilities for homeland
281 defense and homeland security.

¹¹ *National Policy for Biodefense*, 21 April 2004 and *Biodefense for the 21st Century*, 28 April 2004. The latter document is the unclassified version of the national policy.

¹² *National Response Plan*, December 2004.

¹³ Draft, March 2005.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. iv.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004.

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Chapter 2

Military Strategic Framework

The military strategic framework to combat WMD is an ends-ways-means approach built on a foundation of deterrence. It defines the role of the armed forces in combating WMD. Successfully executing the military missions outlined below will enable us to meet the strategic military objectives and achieve the desired end state.

Strategic Goal

Through prevention, deterrence and decisive operational capability, the United States, its forces, allies, and interests are neither threatened nor attacked with WMD.

Military Framework for Combating WMD




Figure 2

Supporting Military Objectives

Supporting military objectives define the ways in which the armed forces work toward the strategic goal. Objectives focus on countering the potential or actual *proliferation* of WMD and the potential or actual *use* of WMD.

Prevent, dissuade or deny the proliferation of WMD. This is the first line of defense. This objective is achieved through political and diplomatic means, security cooperation and alliance activities, creation and/or enforcement of effective treaties and agreements, and interdiction of WMD and related materials trafficking.

Combating WMD Military Objectives

- **Prevent, dissuade or deny WMD and related material proliferation**
- **Reverse or eliminate existing WMD**
- **Defeat WMD use**
- **Protect, respond and recover from WMD attack**

Reverse, reduce or eliminate existing WMD. This objective is achieved through cooperative efforts to reduce or eliminate WMD and associated activities, targeted rollback of WMD programs and capabilities, elimination of WMD programs and related materials in uncertain environments, and enhancements to the safety and security of WMD. The ultimate goal is that nations will take ownership and destroy their own but the U.S. remains committed to assist where appropriate to reduce these stockpiles.

Defeat WMD use. This objective is achieved through offensive operations and a robust active defense. Offensive operations leverage all means of delivering effects. Active defense is directed at all means of adversary attack in all operating environments.

Protect, respond and recover from WMD attack. This objective is achieved through passive defense and consequence management capabilities. With respect to passive defense, the principal military objective is to sustain combat operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments while protecting the force. With respect to consequence management, the goal is to minimize and manage the impact of an attack. The armed forces must also be prepared to support civil authorities in CONUS and overseas.

Military Missions

The National Military Strategy is operationalized through eight military missions. These missions encompass the spectrum of military tasks that support the national combating WMD effort. For planning and execution, they are mutually reinforcing and in some respects overlapping. Specific considerations and operational insights to support planning, execution, and resource allocation for the missions are discussed in Chapter 4.

- **Treaties and Agreement Support** – Activities that support U.S. and international efforts to prevent, dissuade or deny state and non-state actors from acquiring or proliferating WMD and to deny them access to WMD-relevant capabilities.
- **Threat Reduction Cooperation** – Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, emplace detection

equipment, reduce, eliminate, redirect and/or protect a state's WMD program and capabilities.

- **Interdiction** – Operations to stop WMD, delivery systems, and associated technologies and material from transiting between state and non-state actors of concern.
- **Elimination** – Operations to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or non-states actor's WMD programs and related capabilities (weapons, production key personnel, knowledge, and delivery means) in uncertain environments.
- **Offensive Operations** – Operations using kinetic and/or non-kinetic means to neutralize a WMD threat and, when necessary, respond to the use of WMD.
- **Active Defense** - Measures to prevent or defeat the conventional and unconventional delivery of WMD.
- **Passive Defense** - Measures to minimize the vulnerabilities and minimize the effects of WMD employed against forces, installations, and key infrastructure.
- **Consequence Management** – Activities to mitigate the effects of WMD use and restore essential operations and services.

Key Enablers

A number of cross-cutting capabilities and activities facilitate the military strategy and corresponding mission planning and execution. The National Strategy to Combat WMD highlights the following enablers: improved intelligence collection and analysis, research and development to create required capabilities and countermeasures, strengthened international cooperation, and targeted strategies against proliferants.¹⁷ Other important enablers include strategic communication and force projection.

Military Means

Resources used to execute this strategy are all the resources available to the Department through its geographic combatant commands, functional combatant commands, Services, and defense agencies. The level of military success in combating WMD is increasingly dependent on effectively leveraging interagency and host nation capabilities to prevent, reverse, and defeat WMD proliferation and use.

¹⁷ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 5-6.

Deterrence

Deterrence is a strategic effect to which all the mission areas contribute. The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD highlights deterrence as an important element of strategy, emphasizing the importance of a strong declaratory policy and effective military forces.

*The United States will continue to make clear it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options – to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.*¹⁸

The strategy further notes that the diverse and less predictable threats we face today require new methods of deterrence. Deterrence principles and concepts tailored to today's security environment are established in the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (SD-JOC).¹⁹

- Strategic Deterrence is the prevention of adversary aggression or coercion threatening vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision-making.²⁰
- The “center of gravity” for strategic deterrence is influencing decisively an adversary's decision calculus. There are three critical variables in this calculus: the perception of the *benefits* of a course of action, the perception of the *costs* of a course of action, and the perception of the *consequences of restraint* or inaction. Understanding how these factors interrelate to shape an adversary's thinking is vitally important to determining how best to influence his decisions and behaviors.²¹
- There are three ways to exercise such influence: by credibly threatening to deny the expected benefits sought; by credibly threatening to impose costs that are viewed as too painful to incur; and by inducing restraint by creating a positive incentive to refrain from certain actions. These are closely linked in practice and often overlap in application.²²
- Because the perceptions and capabilities of potential adversaries vary, the specific military means required to deter successfully may vary significantly from adversary to adversary, situation to situation.²³
- Reliance on overwhelming U.S. conventional force superiority (specifically, the ability to defeat adversaries through major combat operations) may not by itself provide effective strategic deterrence. Likewise, a deterrence posture that relies solely on the threat of counterstrike may artificially constrain the range of available deterrent options. There is a wide range of U.S. military actions and capabilities that can contribute to decisive influence over an adversary's decision making.²⁴

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 3

¹⁹ September 2004 (?)

²⁰ SD-JOC, p. 4.

²¹ Ibid., p. 10.

²² Ibid., p. 20.

²³ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

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437 All combatant commands must take account of deterrence objectives in their plans and
438 activities, to include Theater Security Cooperation Plans, CONPLANS, OPLANS, exercises and
439 Flexible Deterrent Options. Combatant commands are further required to identify capabilities
440 needed to deter adversaries from obtaining and employing WMD. These include all-source
441 strategic and operational intelligence; survivable collaborative decision making and decision
442 support environments; strategic communications and information operations; force projection
443 capabilities; kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic strike systems; active defenses;
444 passive defenses; adaptive planning capabilities (e.g., to support Global Strike); and unique
445 capabilities to support WMD interdiction and elimination.²⁵
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447 Additionally, deterrence depends greatly on a capability to attribute the source of WMD
448 attacks reliably and in a timely fashion. Deterrence is likely to be weakened if adversaries
449 believe they can execute or threaten an attack without leaving “fingerprints.” Attribution of a
450 WMD attack is likely to be a judgment or an inference based on forensic evidence and
451 intelligence. While DoD does not lead interagency activities related to WMD forensics and
452 attribution, it does support these efforts through technical expertise and capabilities.
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²⁵ See SD-JOC for a more detailed discussion of these and related capabilities.

Chapter 3

General Planning Guidance

Guiding Principles

The following principles underpin the military strategy and provide general guidance for planning activities. Integration of these principles into plans should be informed by operational judgment.

Active, Layered Defense-in-Depth. As the National Defense Strategy states, “the United States is committed to an active defense of the nation and its interests...allowing opponents to strike first – particularly in an era of proliferation – is unacceptable.”²⁶ Military strategy must be proactive in order to seize the initiative from adversaries and counter emerging dangers before they become major threats. Layered defense-in-depth requires bringing to bear all military capabilities and activities to support WMD proliferation prevention, deterrence, defeat and response; defending the homeland and our overseas interests; and working with international partners to establish and enforce an integrated set of barriers and responses to WMD proliferation and use (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative).

Parallel Operational Approaches. The WMD challenges we face are diverse and dynamic. In some cases it is unlikely that any single operational strategy will be sufficient to fully achieve combating WMD objectives. Instead, the armed forces will be required to execute a number of ‘parallel’ military strategies within and across the combating WMD mission areas. These parallel strategies will need to be fully integrated and synchronized with one another, and in some cases may need to be executed simultaneously.

Global Situational Awareness. There is an acute need for all senior leaders and all levels of command to maintain accurate, timely, global situational awareness to ensure that appropriate courses of action can be developed and executed. Particularly important is the improvement and integration of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence to provide early warning, anticipate adversary behavior, support the development of joint solutions and the execution of net-centric operations, assess the consequences of military action, and support resource planning.

Command and Control. All capabilities supporting the military strategy rely on robust, reliable, secure and survivable DoD-wide command and control that enables real-time collaboration and decision-making. This is particularly true for rapidly unfolding WMD

- #### Guiding Principles
- **Active, Layered Defense-in-Depth**
 - **Parallel Operational Approaches**
 - **Global Situational Awareness**
 - **Command and Control**
 - **Enabling Other Nations**
 - **Integration**

²⁶ National Defense Strategy...p. 1, p. 9.

contingencies that may require time urgent planning, tasking, and dynamic control. Any further developed combating WMD strategies and plans must include command and control considerations, to include metrics for assessing progress, methods to address the temporal challenges of combating WMD operations, and architectures responsive to the transformation of Service capabilities from larger to smaller, more deployable, matrixed units.

Enabling other Nations. Assistance from the international community is a force multiplier in the US effort to combat WMD. In many instances, significant improvements in global CbtWMD capability by providing relatively modest assistance or resources to other nations and international organizations. As much as possible, we must enable others to combat WMD.

Integration. Unity of effort is essential to success in combating WMD. Within the DoD, military and civilian organization must work together closely to support strategy and policy formulation, plans integration, requirements definition, resource allocation, and mission execution. The DoD must also leverage the full capabilities and expertise of the interagency community to combat WMD to ensure that all elements of national power are effectively deployed.

Military Assumptions

For planning purposes, commanders should assume the following:

- In the near-term, eliminating WMD proliferation entirely is not a realistic goal.
- Current international non-proliferation agreements will remain in place and could be strengthened, but hostile state and terror organizations will continue to pursue WMD and will exploit illicit procurement networks to acquire materials, technology, and expertise. The Proliferation Security Initiative will remain a critical means to interdict WMD trafficking.
- Some adversaries who acquire WMD may not easily be deterred from using them. Terrorist organizations are most likely to use WMD, and will seek to target the United States.
- Success in combating WMD on a global and regional scale requires strong partnerships with friends and allies the active support of other nations. Partner nations are critical because they provide unique access, information, and capabilities. They may also require U.S. material and other support. It will be difficult for some governments openly to acknowledge support from and cooperation with the United States.
- In some circumstances, the United States may be required to act alone or in conjunction with a limited number of partners. Partners may require U.S. material and other support.
- Long-term stability operations in states previously engaged in WMD proliferation may require specialized DoD expertise and units.

Capability Development

In determining and developing resources to support execution, this is a *capabilities-based strategy*. We must first understand our current WMD mission capability and our ability to accomplish our desired effects. It is essential to identify shortfalls and develop specific capabilities we need. Due to limited resources, we do not have the ability to fund every capability we might desire. We must also identify areas to assume risk, and prioritize resources accordingly. While some capability will be distributed to regional combatant commands, other resources will be based within CONUS and deployed as required.

After assessing their WMD missions, Combatant Commanders and the Services should identify capability requirements and communicate them through JCIDS, the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Program and Integrated Priority Lists (IPL). At the same time, Combatant Commanders should identify those areas where they might take risk and reduce resources. Due to limited resources, areas to take risk must be identified. If the decision where to take risk is not suggested by the WMD strategist or planner, there is a chance the best-informed decision will not be made.

COCOM Guidance

The Joint Staff will prepare a CONPLAN (to be delegated to STRATCOM at a later date) which guides the development of responsive supporting plans by Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Functional Combatant Commands (FCC). These plans will address operations and coordination efforts required to combat WMD.

While GCCs are the primary organizations to execute military combating WMD operations, FCCs have critical responsibilities as well. SOCOM will conduct specific Special Forces operations as directed. STRATCOM is the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing DoD-wide combating WMD efforts across the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum and serves as a focal point for integrating and synchronizing capabilities in support of GCCs. Additionally, STRATCOM is responsible for strategic communications and information operations, global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, nuclear deterrence, and global strike.²⁷ TRANSCOM will provide responsive lift and JFCOM will lead combating WMD capability development. In certain circumstances, FCCs will coordinate their efforts with the GCCs.

Regional plans should:

- Identify requirements to ensure a high degree of WMD situational awareness in the area of responsibility (AOR).
- Assess the WMD threat in the AOR and associated strategic and operational risks.
- Integrate all elements of national and military power to create an environment hostile to WMD in the AOR.
- Ensure effective mechanisms for interagency coordination across the combating WMD mission areas. Coordination with the Department of State is particularly important for

²⁷ These four mission areas were assigned to STRATCOM in Unified Command Plan – Change 2.

certain activities (e.g., consequence management and enabling functions for military operations).

- Identify the unique requirements for WMD deterrence in the AOR.
- Define the range of military operations to combat WMD proliferation and use.
- Develop and implement an exercise program to support planning and preparations for these operations.
- Integrate regional partners into combating WMD activities and operations.

All combatant commands should identify required Combating WMD capabilities through the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and DOTMLPF processes. The Integrated Priority List (IPL) should be used to identify the most important operational capability needs. In assessing and prioritizing these needs, combatant commands are required to identify areas where the United States should either reduce or assume greater risk.

Chapter 4

Implementation Guidance

Success in combating WMD requires adopting a complete system perspective, one that takes account of the entire proliferation life cycle from acquisition of equipment to production of materials to achievement of weapons capability. We must understand the interconnected elements of WMD programs in order to target the critical nodes with the right tools to achieve the greatest effect on the WMD system as a whole.

Planning approaches should focus on accomplishing the desired strategic goal through courses of action that will change enemy behaviors and encourage or compel them to comply with our will and that of the international community. Changes in adversary behavior will be the result of effects generated by the military capabilities and other instruments of power and influence represented in the eight combating WMD mission areas. At the operational level, the coherent application of national and coalition elements of power—diplomacy through application of decisive force—should be planned using the Joint Forces Command effects-based processes.

To ensure sustained focus on the WMD challenge the Joint Staff will support the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD in developing a strategic plan to combat WMD and a global information operations campaign aimed at further de-legitimizing WMD proliferation and use.

The strategic objective, supporting tasks and performance measures for each mission area are outlined below. Tasks and capabilities required for one mission area may overlap or mutually reinforce those for other mission areas.

Treaties and Agreement Support

Prevention is the first line of defense and is achieved through active proliferation diplomacy, security cooperation and alliance activities, and international treaties and agreements. National strategy emphasizes the importance of policies, concepts and capabilities that can address WMD challenges before they mature into serious threats. The investment of resources, expertise, and political capital into proliferation prevention can have a significant payoff for national and international security.

Treaties and Agreement Support
Activities that support U.S. and international efforts to dissuade or prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring or proliferating WMD and to deny them access to WMD-relevant capabilities.

Prevention efforts must be global, regional, and country-specific, directed at shaping international opinion on WMD, stigmatizing proliferation, influencing the decisions of those seeking, possessing, or supplying WMD, and closing off proliferation pathways. Military activities must be closely integrated with and supportive of interagency efforts. Security cooperation is often vitally important in shaping proliferation incentives and fostering cooperation in prevention efforts. Treaties, agreements, and international resolutions establish

norms of international behavior and can provide a legal basis for military action (e.g., sanctions enforcement) to enforce compliance or punish non-compliance. Treaties also often provide for intrusive inspection regimes in which DoD plays a significant role.

Strategic Objective. Ensure that WMD and WMD components are not produced by or transferred to proliferating states or terrorists. Encourage cooperative rollback or elimination and non-transfer in those instances where is already are being produced and/or stockpiled.

Supporting Military Tasks

- Provide military support to assist in the enforcement of agreements, resolutions, treaties, and export control regimes.
- Cooperate with international organizations charged with implementing and verifying multilateral nonproliferation agreements.
- Conduct information operations to support prevention as well as other mission areas.
- Identify allied strengths and capabilities in this arena and seek to incorporate them into WMD plans, exercises and operations.
- Increase security cooperation with allies in areas that will strengthen our ability to prevent or deny proliferation.
- Ensure the ability to conduct interdiction operations, to include support of joint and combined PSI activities.
- Ensure planning for interdiction activities includes command and control planning for cross-COCOM operations
- Incorporate regional country boarding agreements into interdiction planning, to include planning for PSI missions.
- When tasked, support the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.²⁸
- Through robust, fully coordinated Theater Security Cooperation plans, actively influence nations to forego WMD and to support prevention and other combating WMD objectives.
- Ensure the ability to assist or lead elimination operations in each COCOM AOR when tasked.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- Emergence of a strong global alliance against the pursuit, possession, and use of WMD.
- Containment of proliferation pressures in key regions. Countries with WMD programs elect to terminate and eliminate those programs.
- Rollback of nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.
- Strengthened non-proliferation treaties and international controls on WMD materials, technology, and expertise.
- Enhanced regional partner capabilities and willingness to assume responsibility for non-proliferation enforcement.
- Terrorists are denied access to WMD materials, technology, and knowledge.

²⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted on 28 April 2004, requires all states to take measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and to prevent the proliferation of such weapons generally.

714
715 **Threat Reduction Cooperation**
716

717 Threat Reduction Cooperation addresses
718 a number of proliferation challenges. One is the
719 physical security of weapons, supporting
720 materials, and critical technologies, and the
721 expertise of a highly skilled scientific and
722 engineering cadre. When these are poorly
723 secured, there is a significant proliferation risk
724 that must be mitigated proactively. This type of
725 proliferation challenge is best exemplified by the

Threat Reduction Cooperation
Activities undertaken with the consent and
cooperation of host nation authorities to
enhance physical security, emplace
detection equipment, reduce, eliminate,
redirect and/or protect a state's WMD
program and capabilities.

726 post-Cold War situation in the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics. There are
727 several major programs in place designed to assist Russia and other states to dismantle the
728 industrial scale WMD programs developed in the last century, enhance the physical security and
729 accountability of weapons and related materials, find productive non-military work for scientists,
730 and help prevent trafficking of WMD materials. These programs span the Departments of
731 Defense, State and Energy. The principle purpose of these programs is to deny rogue states and
732 terrorists access to weapons, material, and expertise. Other states may need assistance for more
733 discrete requirements to dismantle or destroy WMD in excess of defense needs, to comply with
734 international treaty obligations (e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention), or to improve export
735 control, border control, law enforcement, and anti-smuggling capabilities.

736
737 Threat Reduction Cooperation also responds to opportunities to rollback or eliminate a
738 state's WMD programs and capabilities on cooperative terms. A good example is Libya's
739 decision to voluntarily dismantle its WMD programs, which will be implemented under the
740 auspices of the United States, the United Kingdom and relevant international nonproliferation
741 bodies. Another challenge for Threat Reduction Cooperation concerns the safety and security of
742 WMD inventories of friendly or non-hostile states. Security arrangements in some states may be
743 viewed as inadequate to prevent theft, sabotage, or accidental release. While we may prefer to
744 see these inventories eliminated, we have a strong interest in ensuring that weapons are as secure
745 from theft and diversion as possible given terrorist interest in acquiring WMD.

746
747 Threat reduction cooperation occurs in a permissive environment, and while not primarily
748 a Combatant Commander responsibility, COCOMs must maintain visibility into these efforts to
749 ensure theater security cooperation plans and security measures are consistent with threat
750 reduction initiatives.

751
752 **Strategic Objective.** Dismantle and eliminate WMD programs and capabilities on cooperative
753 terms. Assist states to enhance protective measures to prevent theft, diversion, unintentional or
754 inadvertent discharge, unlawful export or smuggling of WMD or related materials and
755 technology.

758
759 **Supporting Military Tasks.**
760

- 761
- 762 • Support initiatives that secure current WMD, related materials, and delivery systems
763 from theft, sabotage or unauthorized use, and that improve accountability. Provide
764 specialized expertise as appropriate.
 - 765 • Support efforts to promote the safety of WMD and delivery systems from accidental or
766 inadvertent release. Provide specialized expertise as appropriate.
 - 767 • Maintain global situational awareness of WMD safety and security issues, including the
768 identification of intelligence indicators. Assess associated risks. Communicate concerns
769 to senior leaders.
 - 770 • Integrate regional COCOM safety/security concerns and threat prioritization with
771 national level guidance.
 - 772 • Assign component responsibilities for Threat Reduction Cooperation and coordinate
773 efforts with other commands.
 - 774 • Be prepared to provide short-notice support to cooperative WMD threat reduction efforts.

775 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:
776

- 777
- 778 • Terrorists do not acquire WMD or associated materials once in the custody of existing
779 WMD states.
 - 780 • Continued progress in dismantling and securing WMD and associated materials in the
781 former Soviet Union.
 - 782 • Opportunities to reduce or eliminate state WMD capabilities on cooperative terms are
783 successfully exploited.
 - 784 • States develop effective programs to secure WMD and prevent unauthorized export or
785 smuggling.
 - 786 • No theft or loss of accountability for WMD, WMD components or materials.
 - 787 • No successful export of unauthorized WMD, WMD components or materials.
 - 788 • No significant unintentional or inadvertent discharges of weapons of mass destruction.

789 **Elimination**
790

791 Cooperative WMD threat reduction
792 models are not applicable to the urgent
793 requirements of an uncertain political and
794 military environment. The United States may
795 conduct military operations within the territory
796 of a WMD possessor state or against terrorist
797 programs operating within a state.
798 Conventional air or artillery campaigns against
799 WMD targets may be viewed as carrying
800 unacceptable humanitarian and operational risks. Expedient elimination operations may be
801 required to ensure the safety of troops, secure freedom of action for combat operations, or to
802 protect non-combatants. These operations must focus initially on the immediate tasks of (i)

Elimination
**Operations to systematically locate,
characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy
a state or non-states actor's WMD programs
and related capabilities (key personnel,
weapons, production and delivery means) in
uncertain environments.**

security (i.e., securing sites and preventing the looting or capture of WMD and related materials) and (ii) disablement or destruction of weapons, materials, agents and delivery systems that pose an immediate or direct threat to forces and the civilian population. The next priority is to begin exploitation (for intelligence purposes) of program experts and previously secured weapons and material; secure, exploit, and disable WMD production capabilities to advance the elimination process prior to transitioning elimination operations to an international or host-nation body. The armed forces must be prepared to conduct elimination operations until senior leaders determine that such a transfer of authority is warranted.

The Department must begin to develop and institutionalize a uniformed capability to eliminate WMD in uncertain environments. This will require integrating the elimination mission into strategy, intelligence, planning, doctrine, training, and programming processes, supported by standardized definitions and terms of reference. Additional considerations for uncertain environments include site and hazard identification, chain of custody and other legal considerations, and procedures for elimination during combined operations.

Strategic Objective. Seize, secure, remove, disable or destroy a hostile state or non-state actor's WMD capability, to include weapons, facilities, delivery systems, infrastructure and key personnel.

Supporting Military Tasks.

- Plan for joint, combined WMD elimination operations in each AOR.
- Identify intelligence needs that will allow planners to anticipate elimination requirements and maximize operational readiness for elimination operations.
- Ensure plans address capabilities to secure, render safe, exploit (characterize weapons, sites, personnel, and documentation), and dispose (disable, destroy, neutralize and/or transfer).
- Ensure plans address early arrival of elimination assets and associated HQs into theater and provide for supporting assets.
- Maintain continuity of WMD elimination command and control and ensure unity of command throughout the spectrum of conflict.
- Develop information operations to encourage key personnel to come forward with WMD-related information prior to or during the initial stages of conflict.
- Identify and integrate allied capabilities (military and civilian) to support elimination operations.
- Conduct joint-combined WMD elimination exercises to include reach back procedures with supporting civilian and military expertise.
- Based on lessons learned from exercises and operations, advocate the refinement of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, and the acquisition of required capabilities (equipment, technology, specialized personnel).
- Focus research and development in this area on detection, exploitation, neutralization and security technologies that can decrease elimination timelines and reduce manpower requirements.
- Ensure planning and R&D efforts maximize benefit to other mission areas.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- The establishment of adequate forces trained, organized and equipped to support COCOM WMD elimination operations.
- The integration of WMD elimination operations in all applicable war plans.
- The integration of WMD elimination in military concept development, doctrine, training, tactics, techniques and procedures.
- The integration of allied and civilian capabilities into plans, exercises and operations.
- Acquisition of needed capabilities to improve WMD elimination operations.

Interdiction

WMD interdiction has emerged as a significant element of national combating WMD strategy, so much so that it is now codified in a separate Presidential guidance document.²⁹ A more systematic approach to interdiction is a response to the growing volume and complexity of the trade in WMD materials and technologies. Without a sustained effort to track and disrupt this trade, the U.S. and its security partners will miss critical opportunities to reduce the threat and call to account proliferant nations and their suppliers. A comprehensive approach to interdiction has a strong interagency dimension that reflects the intelligence, diplomatic, legal, military, and technology considerations shaping policy and action. There are new interagency structures to review intelligence assessments, develop courses of action, and assess political, legal and operational issues. The goal is to develop a capability to quickly prepare recommendations to decision makers in response to unfolding interdiction opportunities. Clearly, this enterprise is critically dependent on timely and credible intelligence. The Intelligence Community has been tasked to develop a strategy to focus its collection and analysis efforts to better support interdiction.

Interdiction
Operations to stop WMD, delivery systems,
and associated technologies and material
from transiting between state and non-state
actors of concern.

The new approach to interdiction has taken shape through a number of initiatives, most prominent of which is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Under the PSI, a growing coalition of like-minded nations is now planning, exercising and executing interdiction operations aimed at disrupting WMD related dual-use technology proliferation. The PSI has developed in a coordinated fashion based on routine interaction with participating states, but has not yet been the focus of deliberate planning or concept development in DoD. Equally important, planning is not yet informed by a comprehensive review of the full range of activities that comprise the interdiction mission area.

Interdiction may occur at sea, on land, or in the air. Military commanders must be prepared to coordinate with other agencies and international partners to execute and support interdiction operations in their AORs. Commanders must also assess the range of capabilities required to conduct interdiction operations in all operating environments.

²⁹ National Security Presidential Directive.

Strategic Objective. Shipments of WMD, delivery systems, related material, technologies and knowledge are detected and interdicted. States and non-state actors of proliferation concern are denied access to these materials and expertise. Proliferation networks are disrupted and disbanded. Access to WMD related material, technologies and expertise is more difficult and/or costly.

Supporting Military Tasks.

- Develop requirements for improved intelligence collection and analysis to maximize visibility into suspect proliferation trafficking, including dual-use items.
- Develop means to disseminate intelligence in a timely way at appropriate operational levels to support planning and execution of interdiction operations.
- Ensure an effective degree of coordination through military-to-military and interagency contacts. Interagency considerations include intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement and financial/economic.
- Develop and execute robust information operations conveying U.S. and international interdiction capabilities as a means to influence the behavior of those trafficking in WMD materials.
- Maintain a robust joint-combined interdiction exercise program.
- Develop courses of action that encompass WMD interdiction across the spectrum of conflict using both conventional and non-conventional forces, to include support of joint and combined PSI operations. Plans should provide maximum effect to other mission areas.
- Ensure planning for interdiction activities includes command and control planning for cross-COCOM operations.
- Incorporate regional boarding agreements into interdiction planning, to include planning for PSI missions.
- When tasked, support the enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- Forces are trained, organized and equipped for WMD interdiction operations.
- Intelligence supports timely operations and targeting of key proliferators networks, materials and WMD.
- Illicit trafficking in WMD materials becomes less frequent as successful interdiction operations increases both the costs and risks to proliferators and suppliers.
- WMD interdiction concepts are embedded in doctrine, CONOPS, TSC plans, tactics, techniques and procedures, and requirements planning.
- Research, development and acquisition programs yield capabilities that improve the ability to successfully execute WMD interdiction operations.
- Interdiction activities positively affect other mission area objectives.

Offensive Operations

Offensive operations serve as a deterrent by demonstrating the capability to deliver strategic effects using kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic means. Offensive operations encompass the detection, identification, disruption and/or destruction of an adversary's WMD assets, means of delivery and associated facilities. This mission area also requires maintaining a capability to locate, secure and recover/destroy stolen WMD. Offensive operations against adversary WMD may be conducted at any time across the spectrum of conflict – from pre-emptive strikes to neutralize WMD before they can be used, to strikes concurrent with major combat operations, to punitive strikes in response to WMD use.

Offensive Operations
Operations using kinetic and/or non-kinetic means to neutralize a WMD threat and, when necessary, respond to the use of WMD.

High confidence in offensive operations requires possessing a portfolio of strike capabilities that can achieve desired effects against the range of adversary WMD anywhere, anytime. The hallmarks of future strike forces to combat WMD must be full-spectrum lethality, standoff access, and prompt response, supported by effects-based planning tools and adaptive planning methodologies. Strike systems must be capable of imposing a wide range of predictable effects from overwhelming to surgical throughout the depth of the adversary's territory, at distances ranging from close-in to global, in all weather conditions, and in some cases will need to do so very rapidly (i.e., in minutes). Strike systems must also provide national leaders with options to "change the character" of a conflict, especially in response to adversary attacks that escalate the level of violence, such as WMD use. Defeating WMD targets requires specialized capabilities and operational concepts that rely heavily on precise, persistent, and timely intelligence – to locate and identify targets, understand the characteristics of structures, optimize munitions delivery to minimize collateral effects, and assess combat effectiveness.

Strategic Objective. Disable or destroy an adversary's WMD and related capabilities prior to or after use. Deliver a decisive response to an adversary's use of WMD.

Supporting Military Tasks

- Develop plans and capabilities to prevent adversary employment of WMD through kinetic and non-kinetic strikes.
- Develop plans and capabilities to respond with an appropriate level of force in response to the use of WMD.
- Maintain and exercise appropriate forces.
- Where appropriate synchronize plans for offensive operations with those being developed to support the Global Strike mission.
- Identify and integrate allied capabilities into plans and exercises.
- Advocate for capabilities to fill recognized gaps in capability with respect to intelligence, lethality, long-range prompt strike, and effects-based planning tools.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- Adversary WMD targets at all ranges can be attacked quickly and effectively using regional or CONUS controlled capabilities.
- Collateral effects resulting from such strikes are minimal or non-existent.
- Initial or follow-on WMD attacks are deterred.
- Progress is achieved in addressing capability shortfalls.

WMD Active Defense

Active defense operations include but are not limited to missile defense (ballistic and cruise), air defense, special operations, and security operations to defend against conventionally and unconventionally delivered WMD. The goal is to achieve a layered capability to defeat the full scope of delivery means in defense of the homeland, expeditionary forces, and other assets and interests in forward regions. A layered, networked defensive capability will incorporate land, sea, air, and space-based systems, and will employ both kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g., directed energy) means of defeat. Systems in forward regions and those defending the homeland, enabled by robust command and control and battle management, should provide a seamless, mutually supportive network of global protection.

WMD Active Defense
Measures to prevent or defeat the
conventional and unconventional delivery
of WMD.

Active defense is an essential component of DoD transformation, and also contributes importantly to achieving defense policy goals. Active defenses are a potentially powerful means to reassure friends and strengthen alliance relationships. Active defenses support dissuasion efforts by neutralizing the investment adversaries make in advanced delivery means and demonstrating U.S. ability to prevail in strategic competition. Active defenses strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries the expected benefits of strategic threats and attacks. A growing number of nations are developing, acquiring, or expressing interest in active defense capabilities. Combatant command must integrate emerging concepts for global protection into their plans.

Strategic Objective. Successfully intercept, neutralize or destroy WMD being employed against the United States, its forces, interests or allies.

Supporting Military Tasks.

- Develop intelligence requirements for tracking and identifying all systems capable of delivering WMD.
- Disseminate intelligence in real-time to appropriate operational levels to ensure timely assessment of attacks in progress and initiation of active defense operations.
- Assess threats in the AOR that require the maintenance of active defense capabilities. Threat assessment should address comprehensively the range of possible delivery means.

- Integrate applicable active defense programs and capabilities into plans, exercises, and operational activities. Determine how various systems and capabilities are to be networked. Consider the potentially unique command and control issues associated with a distributed network of active defense systems.
- Assess the active defense requirements of host nations. Address these requirements in security assistance planning.
- Assess the active defense capabilities of regional partners and their potential contribution to common security objectives, future operations. Where appropriate, work to integrate partner active defense capabilities into U.S. concepts for global protection and associated cooperative activities.
- Develop plans to address unconventional delivery by state and non-state actors. Coordinate these plans with USSOCOM efforts to combat terrorist activities.
- Consider how certain active defenses (i.e., ballistic missile defense) can be integrated with other strategic missions.
- Enhance conventional force security operations to counter a WMD attack in progress.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- Deployment of a layered networked active defense capable of neutralizing all adversary means of delivering WMD.
- Adequate forces are trained, organized and equipped to support the WMD active defense mission.
- WMD active defense is integrated into all applicable war plans and operational planning systems.
- The active defense capabilities of regional partners are integrated into plans and operations, as appropriate.
- WMD active defense concepts are integrated into military doctrine, CONOPS, tactics, techniques and procedures.
- Development and acquisition activities yield capabilities to address the full range of WMD active defense requirements.

WMD Passive Defense

Passive defense measures protect the force and other essential personnel, operations and facilities from WMD, allowing operations to continue at the required tempo. Passive defense operations are addressed extensively in joint and service doctrine, and are organized around four key operational functions:

- **Sense** – The capability to continually provide information about the CBRN situation.
- **Shape** – The capability to characterize CBRN hazards to understand the current situation and predict future events.

Passive Defense
Measures to minimize the vulnerabilities and minimize the effects of WMD employed against forces, installations, and key infrastructure.

- **Shield** – The capability to protect from the hazard.
- **Sustain** – The capability to continue to operate in a contaminated environment.

These capabilities are achieved through contamination avoidance (technical detection, surveillance, warning and reporting), individual protection (suits and masks), collective protection (shelters and filtration systems), decontamination/restoration, and medical countermeasures (vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics). Success in passive defense operations depends on the effective integration of equipment, trained personnel, and proven tactics, techniques and procedures. Training and exercising is essential. Passive defense capabilities are likely to be integral to the execution of other combating WMD mission areas, including interdiction, elimination, and consequence management. COCOM plans must reflect the cross-cutting nature of passive defense operations and the practical interconnections between these mission areas.

There are well documented shortfalls in passive defense systems and capabilities, and operational plans should demonstrate flexibility to work around possible capability gaps. Additionally, COCOMs must prioritize their needs to ensure effective advocacy and allocation of technology base and procurement resources. COCOMs should work through STRATCOM and, as needed, the established passive defense requirements generation and program execution process.

Cooperative activities with regional partners to improve their indigenous passive defense capabilities are an important contribution to common threat awareness, coalition building, and interoperability. Additionally, Combatant Commands must remain cognizant of relevant interagency activities, particularly in the area of medical defense.³⁰

Strategic Objective. Provide forces, key personnel and other assets with reliable warning and characterization of WMD attacks. Provide a range of protective measures to minimize the effects of WMD exposure and allow operations to continue with limited or no degradation.

Supporting Military Tasks

- Maintain continuous situational awareness of the operational threat from adversary WMD in AORs. Develop responsive passive defense plans to minimize vulnerabilities and operational degradation.
- Field WMD detection, surveillance and warning systems using appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures. Integrate contamination avoidance systems into existing command and control networks.
- Maintain a robust medical surveillance capability to supplement technical biological agent detectors.
- Field individual and collective protection equipment, decontamination systems and medical countermeasures, supported by appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures.

³⁰ For example, the Interagency Working Group on WMD Medical Countermeasures seeks to leverage the capabilities of several federal departments. It is co-chaired by Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Defense.

- Identify the passive defense requirements associated with other combating WMD mission areas.
- Assess the passive defense requirements of host nations and other existing or potential coalition partners. Address these requirements in security assistance planning and determine the degree to which these requirements could affect the execution of OPLANS if not met. Of particular importance are requirements for medical countermeasures to biological warfare threats.
- Continue to work with regional partners to improve passive defense capabilities. Continually assess these capabilities and their potential contribution to common security objectives and future operations. As appropriate, integrate these capabilities into operational plans and exercises.
- Identify passive defense programmatic requirements and advocate through USSTRATCOM.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- Forces, key personnel, and key facilities receive timely, reliable warning. Protective measures minimize the effects of WMD attacks. Operational degradation is minimal to non-existent.
- Adequate forces are trained, organized and equipped to support the WMD passive defense mission area.
- Passive defense operations are integrated into all applicable plans.
- Passive defense doctrine, concepts, training, and equipment keep pace with evolving threats and advances in science and technology.
- The passive defense requirements and capabilities of regional partners are assessed and factored into the plans and operations.

WMD Consequence Management

The Department of Defense provides consequence management (CM) support to the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The Department of Homeland Security is LFA for a CONUS WMD event and the Department of State (DoS) is LFA on foreign territory for coordinating responses to host nation requests for support. The principal exception is when the armed forces are conducting major combat operations. In this circumstance, DoD is responsible for foreign consequence management operations in the battle space. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the lead combatant command for a WMD event in the continental United States, and provides technical assistance to supported combatant commanders conducting foreign CM operations

| |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p><u>WMD Consequence Management</u> Activities to mitigate the effects of WMD use and restore essential operations and services.</p> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Currently, U.S. forces may conduct CM operations in a designated joint operations area to minimize damage from incidents involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRNE weapons or contaminants causing significant civilian casualties or damage to critical infrastructures. Foreign consequence management operations do not include operations

conducted by U.S. forces to prepare for, respond to, or recover from events occurring on U.S. installations abroad or involving only U.S. forces abroad. These operations are considered normal U.S. military force protection or disaster response operations.

The Department of Defense does not maintain dedicated consequence management forces. Any DoD response will be comprised of task-organized forces. Combatant Commanders must define a command and control structure to support and exercise designated response forces, including rapid reaction contingencies. Foreign consequence management operations are likely to require a significant coordination effort in the interagency and with local authorities. Combatant Commands must have in place effective coordination mechanisms.

Strategic Objective. Mitigate the effects of WMD use against U.S. territory, deployed forces, and allies. Restore essential operations and services.

Supporting Military Tasks

- Develop plans and tailored force packages to execute foreign consequence management to include command and control, passive defense elements, sample collection and packaging, health services, casualty management, humanitarian assistance, public affairs, civil affairs, *et al.* Decontamination capabilities (individual and large area/equipment) may be particularly important.
- Provide support to Lead Federal Agencies for consequence management operations in CONUS and overseas. Coordinate early with Department of State authorities to delineate roles and responsibilities for foreign consequence management.
- Develop procedures for exchanging support request between COCOMs, Department of State officials, and subordinate commanders. Integrate procedures into theater plans and documents.
- When assigned, support requests by affected COCOMs for consequence management forces and assets.
- Develop a command and control structure to support and exercise consequence management response forces. Integrate this structure into plans, exercises, and operations.
- Assess the contribution local militaries can make to foreign consequence management operations and integrate this into plans.
- Where applicable, preposition materials to support consequence management operations.

Performance Measures

- Plans and capabilities to support consequence management operations in CONUS or overseas across the spectrum of conflict are planned and exercised.
- Coordination mechanisms and procedures to support timely response to requests for consequence management support are in place and exercised.
- To the degree feasible, consequence management support equipment and materials are pre-positioned.
- WMD consequence management concepts are integrated into doctrine, training, exercises, and resource planning.

Chapter 5

Key Enabling Capabilities

Key enablers are cross-cutting capabilities that facilitate execution of the military strategy. Their impact is strategic in that they enhance the effectiveness and integration of combating WMD mission capabilities across the board, to include interagency and international activities. Commanders must continually assess enabling capabilities and identify required improvements.

Critical enabling capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, and Exploitation. A high degree of global situational awareness is a foundation and a goal of the combating WMD strategy. A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of WMD threats, proliferation activities, and trends is vital to developing effective near and long-term approaches to the proliferation challenge. Timely, actionable intelligence is indispensable to planning and executing all combating WMD missions, from political and diplomatic initiatives to offensive operations and recovery from WMD attack. Our goal is to establish a global common operating picture (COP) for combating WMD that will synthesize available knowledge and estimates for state and non-state actors and activities of interest, to include existing stockpiles, known and suspected WMD locations, operational capabilities, proliferation pathways, procurement networks, and key personnel.

The common operating picture must promote a comprehensive understanding of state and non-state actor WMD programs – not simply the individual program elements, but how they are linked internally as well as externally to the activities of other actors. Because WMD proliferation is a trans-regional phenomenon, the COP must provide meaningful links between Combatant Commands and the basis for collaborative assessments, plans, and operations. Further, because successful execution of the combating WMD strategy relies heavily on other U.S. government agencies and the support of allies, the means to fully integrate knowledge from non-DoD sources must be developed. Establishing protocols and methodologies for rapid information exchange is an urgent requirement.

WMD intelligence must not be simply a static input to plans. Rather, it must be tightly tied to active combating WMD operations, and intelligence personnel should be closely and continuously aligned with personnel engaged in such operations. One reason is that combating WMD operations are likely to yield new intelligence, and this must purposefully be captured and integrated into ongoing assessments and plans. Interdiction and elimination are good examples of combating WMD operations that can yield new intelligence. Robust real time connectivity between mission executors and the intelligence community is essential to mission success.

Intelligence must keep pace with the changing nature of the threat, national strategy, and the combating WMD mission space. Many intelligence techniques for monitoring WMD are well known to adversaries or not well suited to discovering hidden WMD activities. Fixing this problem requires developing new sources and methods, including those enabled by cost-effective improvements to data processing capabilities. New standoff and close-in surveillance

technologies are needed for persistent intrusive sensing that can offer a degree of visibility into WMD activities to support not only interdiction, elimination, and strike operations, but diplomacy and deterrence as well.

WMD intelligence must be responsive to the emphasis in national strategy on proactive measures and engaging proliferation challenges before they fully manifest as threats to vital interests. This will require improvements across a number of intelligence disciplines, to include enhanced exploitation of open and commercial information sources and improved means to track people and things of interest. Collection and analysis strategies that focus on key individuals, the finances of WMD programs, commercial transactions, and key transport means and nodes are particularly important. New missions such as interdiction and elimination may require new approaches and technologies for collection and analysis.

To address these and related issues, it is imperative that there be close and continuing interaction and strong working relationships between the intelligence and combating WMD communities.

Strategic Communications. The goal of our strategic communications effort is to create a global environment hostile to WMD proliferation and use. In this environment, there is a strong global alliance against WMD, reinforced global norms that further delegitimize WMD, and demonstrable will to act against those who violate accepted norms. Those engaged in proliferation must be led to conclude that WMD acquisition, possession, and use are detrimental to their interests and security. Making progress toward these ends requires the effective execution of the overall military strategy, but also sustained and sophisticated integration of diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations in DoD, across the interagency community, and internationally. Efforts under the International Activities mission will focus on this challenge.

A comprehensive combating WMD strategic communications strategy will have global, regional, and country-specific elements. It will seek to shape perceptions regarding the WMD challenge among governments, publics, and opinion leaders. It will be directed at both friendly states in order to strengthen international consensus, as well as hostile states in order to reinforce the costs and risks associated with WMD acquisition and use. It will leverage the full range of communications means available today and in the future and develop an integrated set of messages and media for consumption in a variety of languages.

Research and Development. The National Strategy to Combat WMD identifies research and development (R&D) as a critical integrating function.³¹ There is indeed a pressing need for leading-edge technology solutions across the combating WMD missions – to support enhanced remote sensing, detection and characterization; WMD safety and security; the unique requirements of interdiction and elimination; new strike capabilities; countermeasures development; recovery operations; attribution; data processing and analysis; strategic communications, and other analytic and operational requirements. All DoD components must work closely with the science and technology, acquisition, and requirements communities, OSD

³¹ National Strategy to Combat WMD, p. 6.

AT&L and J8 Joint Requirements office to identify high priority R&D initiatives and ensure appropriate investments are being made.

Beyond this, DoD requires a comprehensive R&D strategy to sustain the combating WMD mission over the mid- and long-term. The threat will not remain static, and in some important respects (e.g., biological weapons) the WMD offense will continue to dominate the defense. DoD's R&D strategy must consider both likely threat trends as well as non-linear, alternative, or counter-intuitive directions adversaries may take. It must facilitate a speedier "lab-to-field" transition for new technologies. Today, the process for bringing new products to the field is too slow. Finally, a DoD R&D strategy must support and complement a five-year comprehensive, national-level combating WMD investment strategy under consideration.

Strengthened International Cooperation. The National Strategy to Combat WMD highlights this critical enabler as well.³² As previously noted, cooperation from overseas partners and the international community is a force multiplier in the battle against WMD. International partners provide knowledge, information, access, political and material support, and operational capability. Combatant command Theater Security Cooperation plans provide a principal means to establish and sustain critical working relationships that can be leveraged to support the combating WMD mission. Likewise, intelligence-sharing arrangements are an important aspect of building a common front against WMD proliferation. And combatant commands must be prepared to develop, support, and participate in combating WMD activities by "coalitions of the willing." The Proliferation Security Initiative is a good example of such a coalition – like-minded nations working together to enhance collective combating WMD capabilities, prepared to act opportunistically against threats when they emerge.

Targeted Strategies Against Proliferators and Terrorists. The national military strategy recognizes that while the WMD threat represents a global danger, each WMD challenge is different and requires a tailored approach. As an example, focused diplomacy enabled by sound intelligence and political, military, and economic leverage has yielded the promise of a comprehensive rollback of Libya's WMD and missile programs. Whether this provides a model for disarmament in other states of concern remains to be seen.³³ And just as the National Strategy to Combat WMD provides the President with an expanded set of responses to complex strategic challenges, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD provides guidance to the armed forces for operational and resource planning. Neither document provides ready-made solutions for specific problems. Senior leaders and commanders, as well as planners and operators, must demonstrate flexibility in developing and executing situation-specific plans and options.

With regard to targeted strategies against WMD terrorism, the mechanisms, methods and lines of authority for dealing with terrorist organizations differ in nature from those used to deal with state actors. Clearly, if we are successful in reducing the terror threat, the prospects for WMD terrorism decline as well. At the same time, the potential linkages between state proliferators and terrorists interested in acquiring WMD carry such high risk that every effort

³² Ibid.

³³ See "Combating WMD: Challenges for the Next 10 Years," A Report of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, February 2005, p. 7.

1337 must be made to make the Global War on Terror and the combating WMD mission as mutually
1338 supportive as possible.

1339
1340 **Force Projection.** The ability of the armed forces to project power globally,
1341 deploy and sustain forces, and conduct effective operations is a key to success in combating
1342 WMD. This includes the capability to rapidly task organize required capabilities to project force
1343 and to deploy to multiple locations simultaneously. Some combating WMD contingencies will
1344 require rapid response to an unfolding situation. Combating WMD-specific capabilities must be
1345 part of our global force presence and our rapid response capability. Although combating WMD
1346 forces will generally make use of existing mobility force support, there may be unique mobility
1347 capabilities that need to be acquired.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The United States faces adversaries whose techniques are shifting away from challenging the U.S. through *traditional* military action to adopting asymmetric capabilities and methods. The threshold for WMD use has been lowered through world events over the past decade. Our adversaries may resort to using WMD to counter our military dominance or produce the mass casualties to support their ends. The Department of Defense must remain prepared to prevent and deny the proliferation of WMD and related material, reverse and eliminate existing WMD stockpiles, defeat WMD use and protect, respond and recover from a WMD attack. Should our adversaries choose to employ WMD then we will respond with overwhelming force to deter future use. The implementation of this strategy requires a DoD-wide effort to integrate and synchronize the eight combating WMD mission areas resulting in focused doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities for combating WMD. The effectiveness of this strategy is dependent on those charged with its implementation. In order to defeat our adversaries we must transform our capabilities and methods of employment. The nation depends on the successful implementation of this strategy – In that regard we cannot fail.