Intelligence Estimate
U.S. COAST GUARD

(U) National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment

NOTAL SECTION REDACTED

Product Date	07 January 2008
Information Cutoff Date:	05 December 2007
Product Number:	**CG-HSEC-006-08**
Prepared by:	USCG Intelligence Coordination Center, Washington DC
Coordinated with:	See Product Information

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Estimate
Intelligence Coordination Center – Washington, D.C.

(U) **National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment**

(U) Prepared by the USCG/Intelligence Coordination Center in coordination with the DHS/Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)

(U) SCOPE NOTE

(U) This National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment addresses terrorist threats to the US maritime domain, and it meets USCG and IC intelligence requirements levied as part of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. Additionally, this comprehensive analysis of maritime terrorist threats serves to pass along critical information to those charged with providing security for components of the national maritime infrastructure.

(U) Although UNCLASSIFIED (U), this information may potentially aid those seeking to harm the United States. This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) and contains LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES) information; its dissemination should be strictly limited to those organizations and individuals with a verifiable need-to-know and in no manner should be given to members of the general public, media, or others not serving in an official security or law enforcement capacity. Violations of these requirements are subject to prosecution under existing laws and statutes governing the protection of U//FOUO or U//LES information distributed by the US Government.

- (U//FOUO) This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY as a stand-alone document. If combined with any operationally significant or derived data, then the classification guidance document for OPERATION NEPTUNE SHIELD applies.[A]

- (U//FOUO) This product contains US Person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It has been highlighted in this document with the label **(USPER)** and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and information handling procedures. Other USPER information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized USPER information, contact the DHS/I&A PM at **IA.PM@dhs.gov**.

- (U) The "Not All" (NOTAL) dissemination portion of this product was redacted. This information is limited to designated agencies or representatives within the law enforcement intelligence community.

(U) The information used in this assessment is current as of 05 December 2007.

[A] (U//FOUO) For additional information, please refer to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Security Classification Guide DHS SCG USCG 001.1 (PWCS), published 28 February 2007.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Estimate

CG-HSEC-006-08

(U) **KEY FINDINGS**

- (U//FOUO) *Al-Qaʻida leaders and supporters have identified and approved Western maritime assets as legitimate targets.* We are highly confident al-Qaʻida-inspired extremists have a strong intent to eventually attack additional Western maritime targets. Further, this intent appears genuine and unmitigated by deception.[B]

- (U//FOUO) *The maritime attack capabilities of al-Qaʻida supporters have declined since 2002; however, the same cannot be said for other groups such as Hizballah.* We are moderately confident al-Qaʻida's maritime capabilities to strike the Homeland have continued to atrophy since the USS COLE (2000) and M/V LIMBURG (2002) attacks, although they maintain sufficient capabilities to conduct limited attacks overseas.[C]

- (U//FOUO) *Al-Qaʻida-inspired operatives are most likely to use vehicle bombs to strike US cargo vessels, tankers, and fixed coastal facilities such as ports.* Based on our analysis of past attacks, ideological statements, and disrupted plots, we have a high degree of confidence in this assertion. Near-simultaneous attacks involving boat, car, and truck bombs—possibly combined with small arms assaults to overcome the target's physical security—represent the most probable attack scenarios.

- (U//FOUO) *Smaller bombs—possibly dispatched by suicide operatives—will likely be used by al-Qaʻida operatives seeking to maximize casualties on vessels such as ferries and cruise ships.* Attacks against these targets will most likely involve near-simultaneous bombings, such as the attacks against the mass transit systems of Madrid and London— possibly combined with small-arms attacks. Our analysis of ideological statements, past attacks, and disrupted plots gives us a high degree of confidence in this assertion.

- (U//FOUO) *Al-Qaʻida's potential exploitation of maritime commerce—infiltrating terrorists or smuggling advanced conventional weapons or WMD into the Homeland— remain a primary concern.* We are highly confident extremists of all types will continue to exploit maritime commerce for smuggling and illegal migration. Although we are less confident the group would use containerized cargo for smuggling WMDs, we are moderately confident extremists view other maritime means—such as bulk cargo shipments and smaller vessels—as viable options for getting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials to the Homeland.

[B] (U) Descriptions of the confidence levels used in this assessment are contained in appendix B.
[C] (U//FOUO) However, the ability of small, committed groups to potentially develop more complex plots "in plain sight" is aided by the presence of ideological supporters throughout the United States (an unquantifiable presence factor that decreases our confidence in this assessment).

- (U//FOUO) *We are highly confident al-Qaʻida does not posses bonafide combat swimmer capabilities nor has it conducted underwater attacks. However, its supporters may further develop basic diving capabilities and effectively conceal these efforts from law enforcement or security officials.* Al-Qaʻida has sought to develop these capabilities since at least the late 1990s; however, there have been many setbacks since then. Nonetheless, extremist adherents are committed to eventually obtaining an advanced combat swimmer capability.

- (U//FOUO) *Cyber attacks—regardless of the motivation—will continue to represent a serious threat to highly-automated ships and port facilities in the United States.* We are highly confident that maritime information technology systems are vulnerable to technically-sophisticated extremists, or disgruntled or alienated employees, and could wreak havoc on sensitive, computerized systems. We base this assertion on our analysis of vulnerability studies, interview comments by maritime security professionals, and the ever-increasing sophistication of criminal and extremist hackers.

- (U//FOUO) *With the exception of homegrown Islamic extremists, domestic terrorists have rarely threatened maritime sector targets, and we don't anticipate any change.* Environmental and animal rights extremists, such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), have not seriously threatened maritime targets. However, Islamic extremists—many recent prison converts or other disenfranchised and angry members of society—may be used by overseas groups such as al-Qaʻida or Hizballah to attack Homeland targets.

- (U//FOUO) *Lone offenders will continue to represent a threat that will remain hard to interdict.* We remain concerned that fringe elements of extremist groups, those radicalized by jihadist propaganda, recently-terminated employees, or even mentally unstable individuals may choose to conduct independent, maritime-related attacks to support their cause or to avenge their grievances.

(U) **ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS**

(U//FOUO) **Alternative Assessment: Al-Qa'ida's Maritime Attack Capability Remains Constant**

(U) Alternative analysis is a systematic approach that considers other explanations and outcomes for a particular intelligence issue or problem.

(U//FOUO) A decline in successful al-Qa'ida maritime attacks since 2002 does not necessarily translate to a decrease in its operational capabilities. Al-Qa'ida's maritime attack capabilities may remain the same because its adherents have access to potential overseas targets and they are capable of constructing and transporting maritime weapons in these foreign locales.

(U//FOUO) Gaining a coastal safehaven would allow al-Qa'ida to regain lost operational maritime capabilities. Its present stronghold and gradual increase in training, money, and communications in the remote tribal areas of western Pakistan is indicative of this possibility. Gaining control or increasing influence over the vast network of cells worldwide would further increase the probability that a maritime capability could resurface with little or no warning.

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida's maritime attack capability depends on cells and cell members that are geographically dispersed and operationally emergent, and maritime expertise will vary depending on the dynamics of these clandestine groups. Furthermore, the difficulty in determining the overall likelihood of a terrorist attack within the US maritime domain is chiefly due to the uncertainty regarding specific plot details. Historical terrorist activity is not necessarily a reliable predictor of potential preoperational indicators; moreover, the ongoing motivations, capabilities, and plans of terrorist groups are not usually given with any specific detail.[I] Additionally, most terrorist groups have a baseline skill set that enables them to construct lethal improvised explosives from commonly available materials; no matter where in the world they decide to strike. Much of this knowledge can be easily communicated via the Internet. This enables operatives to anonymously attain an uncertain but potentially deadly level of capability to attack the Homeland.[II]

(U//FOUO) There remains a significant threat from a small boat attack. Since 2000, al-Qa'ida has used explosive-laden small boats as weapons against two vessels and has conducted combined-arms attacks against coastal oil facilities in or near the Arabian Gulf. Each year, thousands of boats are bought and sold in the United States. Moreover, most recreational boaters require minimal training and licensing, and registration requirements vary across the country.[III] Extremists have also used boats and ships for shipping weapons and contraband, as well as transporting operatives. Furthermore, many of the environmental conditions, shipping, recreational boat traffic levels, and operational constraints encountered in these foreign locales are similar to many of those found in the Homeland.

[I] (U) CRS Report for Congress; Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli; Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities; pub 09 JAN 2007; page 24; ref 10 DEC 2007; CRS Report from the Resources, Science, and Industry Division; (UNCLASSIFIED)
[II] (U) Internet Article; Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State; CIA Chief Say Al-Qa'ida Remains Significant Threat to U.S.; page 2; pub 24 FEB 2004; www.cryptome.org/cia022404.htm; ref 09 DEC 2007; CIA Director George Tenet Testimony before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee; (UNCLASSIFIED)
[III] (U) Online publication; James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.; The Heritage Foundation; Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea; pub 11 JUN 2007; pages 1,3,4; www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/bg_2041.pdf; ref 04 DEC 2007; Homeland Security Policy Study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) **ANALYTIC ASSUMPTIONS**

- (U//FOUO) The open sources primarily used in this assessment are unclassified and publicly available; however, the information was corroborated, whenever possible, with information available to law enforcement agencies. Although any open-source reporting contains inherent biases and other credibility detractors, we believe the information used in this assessment is the most credible and reliable available.

- (U//FOUO) This threat assessment uses the USCG Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) methodology. Within MSRAM, threat is defined as an adversary's intent, capability, and presence. Our assessment of threat examines many subcomponents of each of these three variables; most of which are subjective, non-measurable, and highly dependent upon the knowledge provided by law enforcement, the intelligence community, and experts in the public and private sectors. The MSRAM-derived threat judgments for this assessment are primarily focused on terrorist threats directly posed to the US maritime domain during the next two years.[D]

- (U//FOUO) The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has forced al-Qa'ida to restructure itself from a somewhat hierarchical organization to an amorphous movement whose primary purpose is to promulgate its extremist, global ideology—encouraging other like-minded groups to join its jihad against apostate governments, Zionists, and the West.[E] However, al-Qa'ida's primary operating area—assessed to be the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border—does not provide an environment conducive to developing maritime capabilities and greatly inhibits its operational effectiveness.[F,G,H]

- (U//FOUO) Our assessment on the intent and capabilities of international terrorists armed with a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is based on the collective judgments of experts in the shipping and maritime industries. Terrorists' inability to maintain positive control of a cargo shipment (such a WMD inside a shipping container), other potential disruptions, or interdiction vulnerabilities makes this mode of transporting a WMD to the Homeland improbable.

[D] (U//FOUO) Descriptions of the three MSRAM threat factor levels—capability, intent, and presence—are in appendices A and B.

[E] (U) In the unclassified annex to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland* (July 2007), the National Intelligence Council (NIC) assessed that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa'ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 11 September. These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since then.

[F] (U//FOUO) While some al-Qa'ida-affiliated groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah—the group responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings—and others, may have some limited maritime attack capabilities. We assess they are not strategically targeting Western maritime interests.

[G] (U) Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. According to the July 2007 NIE, the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.

[H] (U) A summary of al-Qa'ida maritime attacks and the planning cycle is in appendix F.

(U) **Alternative Analytical Assumption**

(U//FOUO) Gaining a coastal safehaven would allow al-Qaʻida to regain lost operational maritime capabilities. Its present stronghold and gradual increase in training, money, and communications in the remote tribal areas of western Pakistan serve to demonstrate this possibility.[I] Gaining control or increasing influence over the vast network of cells worldwide would further increase the probability that a maritime capability could resurface with little or no warning.

[I] (U) Internet Article; Spencer S. Hsu and Walter Pincus; Washington Post; U.S. Warns of Stronger Al-Qaeda; pub 12 JUL 2007; para 4; www.washingtonpost.com; ref 06 DEC 2007; News Article with Statements from CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, John A. Kringen; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

(U) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS

(U//FOUO) *While several extremist groups espouse anti-American rhetoric, al-Qa'ida and its cohorts tenaciously pursue attacks against Western maritime interests—particularly those engaging in the Middle Eastern or African oil trade.*

(U//FOUO) Successes in the GWOT have constrained the ability of al-Qa'ida and its supporters to attack the US Homeland. Consequently, terrorist groups now perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike post-11 September 2001.[1] Counterterrorism operations against al-Qa'ida have fractured the capabilities of the organization to export terrorism to the Homeland—forcing the group to become a series of smaller, independent entities.[1,2]

(U//FOUO) A body of publicly-available reporting continues to support our assertion that al-Qa'ida-inspired extremists have the intent and essential capabilities needed to strike Western interests overseas. Moreover, they will continue to aspire to more ambitious attacks against Homeland targets of economic and symbolic significance—including components of the maritime infrastructure.[3]

- (U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida attributes Western exploitation of Muslim wealth to the oil trade. This long-standing grievance resonates in militant jihadist rhetoric—along with the imposition of undesirable cultural influences and illegitimate rulers. Facilities and ships associated with the export of oil from the Middle East and Africa evoke particular contempt as symbolic proof of these injustices.[4]

- (U//FOUO) On 24 and 26 February 2006, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published two statements claiming the successful small arms and car bomb attack on the Belay oil facility (24 February) in eastern Saudi Arabia. The attack was part of the "war against the Crusaders and Jews, to put a stop to their robbery of Muslim's wealth, and win the project to expel the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula."[5]

- (U//FOUO) In his militant jihadist manifesto, *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance*, al-Qa'ida ideologue, 'Umar 'Abd al-Hakim (a.k.a. Abu Mus'ab al-Suri) provides the justification for attacking Western maritime interests throughout the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Maghreb.[J,6] Almost all ships or maritime infrastructure components in the petroleum industry represent an exploitive, foreign economic

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) **al-Hakim**

[I] (U//FOUO) Former CIA Director Tenet stated to Congress in 2004, "successive blows to al-Qa'ida's central leadership have transformed the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that operate autonomously." He further added the group is "not without effectiveness in carrying out terrorist attacks." Additionally, he stated smaller local groups are developing overseas to work with international terrorist groups in their respective countries. (US State Department Web site)

[J] (U) The Islamic Maghreb includes Andulus—an area that includes most of southwestern Europe (modern-day Spain and Portugal) and parts of northwestern Africa.

system, according to al-Hakim. This system steals the wealth of the Muslim world, therefore, attacking it is a sacred duty.[K,L]

- (U//FOUO) Much of the extremist rhetoric surrounding the failed 2004 attack against the Saudi oil refinery in Yanbu suggests Israel, with American complicity, orchestrated the unsuccessful operation.[7]

(U//FOUO) ***Ports, bridges, tunnels, tourism, and mass transit systems—regardless of the fact that Muslims may also die—are high on al-Qa'ida's target list.***

(U//FOUO) Analysis of past attacks and threat reporting supports our assertion. Any al-Qa'ida-inspired plot against maritime infrastructure would have the primary goals of causing widespread economic losses or significant casualties.[8]

- (U//FOUO) The disrupted 2005 plot to attack an Israeli cruise ship in Turkey with Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs) met several of al-Qa'ida's stated goals. The target represented a chance to simultaneously strike Israel and its citizens, a symbol of immorality and corrupting Western influences, and the means of financial support for an "apostate" regime.[M,9]

(U//FOUO) ***Al-Qa'ida's operatives have baseline maritime attack capabilities that remain lethal—posing an enduring threat to Western ships and a myriad of fixed maritime facilities <u>overseas</u>.***

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida's maritime attack capability incurred a major setback when Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri (a.k.a. The Prince of the Sea) was captured in Aden, Yemen, shortly after the M/V LIMBURG attack. Since 2002, the group has yet to fully reconstitute its capabilities—forcing operatives to shift to land-based tactics to attack Saudi and Yemeni coastal targets. The decline in capabilities also contributed to the failure of an attack plot on an Israeli cruise ship three years later.[N,O,10]

[K] (U//FOUO) Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, an al-Qa'ida suspect arrested in connection with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, published *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance* in 2004. It is assessed to be one of al-Qa'ida's most influential jihadist doctrinal publications, and it is widely available on the Internet.

[L] (U//FOUO) In October 2007, al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algeria-based, Sunni extremist group, issued a recommended reading list of 26 publications of interest and significance to the jihadists and supporters of al-Qa'ida. Some of the publications discuss jihad, the means to support it, and incitement writings to urge Muslims to join the convoys of jihadists. Others covered religious rulings on dealing with the apostate Arab regimes and their supporters, according to extensive OSC analysis. (GMP20071102342009, 30 October 2007)

[M] (U//FOUO) At least seven cruise lines provide service to and from Israel; more information is available online.

[N] (U//FOUO) Two oil facilities have been attacked in eastern Saudi Arabia: Yanbu (in the summer of 2004) and Baqayq (in February 2006). Four coordinated martyrdom attacks were also conducted against oil facilities in Hadramut, Yemen (in September 2006); furthermore, the will of suicide operative Shafiq Ahmad Umar Zayd was posted to the Internet on 07 November 2007—extolling the virtues of attacking "the oil centers belonging to the Zionist-American enemy and the apostates who have accepted them." These attacks—none of which were significantly successful—primarily involved the use of suicide operatives and VBIEDs.

[O] (U//FOUO) A December 2005 article in the US Navy magazine *Proceedings* highlighted the specialized training required to operate in the maritime environment. The article concluded that "developing the expertise to conduct a

- (U//FOUO) Spanish media reporting on al-Qaʻida's ability to attack maritime targets also suggests the reason no successful follow-on attacks have hit shipping is due to al-Nashiri's November 2002 arrest.[P,11]

- (U//FOUO) Authorities captured Luai Sakra (a.k.a. Ekrem Oezer) in August 2005, shortly after the building that housed his explosives cache caught fire—forcing his unsuccessful attempt to flee the country. Sakra is an al-Qaʻida-inspired terrorist arrested in Turkey for planning to conduct WBIED attacks against visiting Israeli cruise ships.[Q,12]

(U//FOUO) The importance of global maritime trade and naval power projection is not lost on the ideological enemies of the West, and we assess militant jihadists will remain committed to retaining at least a modest capability to strike ships in geographic choke points and lightly-defended harbor or port facilities.[13]

WORLD OIL CHOKE POINTS

Map by Ginny Mason, Congressional Cartography, Library of Congress, 2006

single maritime terrorism operation takes time, and no campaign is sustainable if the expertise developed explodes along with the delivery vehicle… navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling require specialized training. Terrorists not familiar with the sea or inland waters will have a greater degree of difficulty than would a seasoned mariner."

[P] (U//FOUO) On 25 January 2005, *El Tiempo*, a Spanish weekly, ran a feature article outlining al-Qaʻida's maritime capabilities. They listed al-Nashiri by an alias, Mullah Ahmed Belal, and stated that he was pursuing as many as a dozen separate plots prior to his arrest.

- (U//FOUO) Abu Mus'ab al-Suri called for attacks in regional geographic choke points including: the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandeb, and the Straits of Gibraltar, as the best way to sever the lines that allow for the exploitation of Muslim wealth. He goes on to suggest that, "this could be achieved by targeting American ships and ships of their allied countries. They could be closed through mining and sinking ships, or by threatening naval passage through martyrdom operations, hijacking, and by force if possible."[R,14]

- (U//FOUO) In February 2006, imprisoned AQAP cleric Abd-al-Aziz Bin-Nasir al-Rashid published a 63-page booklet detailing a justification for attacks on economic targets and oil installations in particular. He opined that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia fears attacks on oil production and export because it risks losing the confidence of the West, which might replace the regime to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.[15]

- (U//FOUO) The 2004-2006 attacks against coastal oil-handling terminals and processing facilities in Iraq and Saudi Arabia had limited success. However, these events demonstrate capabilities emphasizing combined-arms attacks using Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs, a.k.a. small boat bombs), Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs, a.k.a. car or truck bombs), and conventional small-arms.[16,17]

(U//FOUO) ***Al-Qa'ida's potential to bring a viable maritime attack capability to the Homeland has diminished. Challenging environmental factors, the group's inability to recoup lost expertise, and a sensitized American maritime community all contribute to reduce the likelihood of a successful maritime strike so far from familiar shores.***

(U//FOUO) Terrorist training and operations conducted in a harsh, and oft-times unpredictable maritime environment are fraught with peril, even if unopposed.[S,T]

- (U//FOUO) Practicing under realistic conditions is a hallmark of al-Qa'ida's preparation, and the training needed to perform a successful maritime attack is more complex than most land-based attacks. Additionally, such training probably would be harder to conceal from law enforcement or concerned citizens.[U,18,V]

[Q] (U//FOUO) In 2004, the British-owned Aegis Defence Service had predicted an attack against a significant maritime target the following year (2005); an assessment that was showcased in *El Tiempo's* January 2005 article regarding al-Qa'ida's maritime attack capabilities.

[R] (U//FOUO) We assess the mines suggested were smaller limpet mines that are typically placed by combat swimmers. We also assess Al-Qa'ida does not have the intent or capability to conduct more extensive mining, such as the laying of much larger moored, bottom, or floating sea mines.

[S] (U//FOUO) Our analysis of failed maritime terrorist attacks targeting the Levant (defined as the land mass that encompasses the modern-day countries of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) attributed most of these unsuccessful attempts to the uncertainties of weather, equipment failures and losses, and other environmental factors.

[T] (U//FOUO) The December 2005 *Proceedings* article stated several factors that need consideration when operating in the maritime environment: tides, currents, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land.

[U] (U//FOUO) Uncertainties in the maritime domain affect the desirability of an attack and would also act to offset a potential al-Qa'ida maritime attack. For instance, large public maritime events employ additional security. A

> (U//FOUO) **Alternative analysis:** *al-Qa'ida's potential to bring a viable maritime attack capability to the Homeland has remained the same.*
>
> (U//FOUO) A decline in successful al-Qa'ida maritime attacks since 2002 does not necessarily translate to decreased operational capabilities. Al-Qa'ida's maritime attack capabilities may remain relatively constant because its operatives are capable of constructing and transporting maritime weapons, and accessing maritime targets overseas.

(U//FOUO) *The threats posed by al-Qa'ida's potential exploitation of maritime commerce—infiltrating terrorists or smuggling advanced conventional weapons or WMD into the Homeland—remain a primary concern.*

- (U//FOUO) A disproportionate number of incidents involving Pakistani C1/D visa fraud by bogus mariners have occurred since mid-2006, according to a 2007 assessment published by the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC).[19]

- (U//FOUO) Record drug seizures involving containerized cargo shipments support the assertion that this smuggling method remains attractive to criminals. Concerns that terrorists could use a container to deliver a WMD to the Homeland have heightened since al-Qa'ida's 2003 fatwa, which authorized the use of these weapons against the enemies of Islam. However, we assess the group would not risk losing custody of such a valuable asset and avoid having to give up direct control of any WMD to a shipping agent and carrier.[W]

---

potential maritime attack would have to overcome these difficulties, in addition to the unpredictable nature of the maritime environment. (Heritage Foundation article June 2007)

[V] (U) America's Waterway Watch is a USCG-sponsored national awareness program that asks those who work, live, or recreate on or near the water to be aware of suspicious activity that might indicate threats to Homeland security. Americans are urged to adopt a heightened sensitivity toward unusual events or individuals they may encounter in or around ports, docks, marinas, riversides, beaches, or waterfront communities. Anyone observing suspicious activity is simply asked to note details and contact the National Response Center's Hotline at 877-24WATCH.

[W] (U//FOUO) Drug and human traffickers use a variety of conveyances and methods to smuggle narcotics or migrants into the United States. Although terrorists could solicit their assistance to move a WMD to the Homeland, analysis assesses this as highly unlikely. Profit-motivated criminals are judged to be unwilling to risk supporting such an apocalyptic terrorist plot. However, alien smuggling organizations would be amenable to bringing anyone who can pay into the United States, and they represent a continual border security concern. Additionally, interviewed shipping industry and security professionals generally agree that there are significant periods in the processing of containerized cargo where the control and responsibility of the movement and handling of the contents are strictly in the hands of the shipping agent or vessel employees. We assert that, with the possible exception that a WMD may be used to directly target the port and surrounding area, this loss of physical control would be unacceptable to terrorist operatives attempting to move such a valuable weapon to the Homeland. Nonetheless, it remains our primary low probability, high impact WMD attack scenario. (2007 Congressional Research Service study; interviews with maritime shipping industry)

- (U//FOUO) In 2004, the Israeli port of Ashdod—widely thought to be one of the world's most secure port facilities—was the scene of a small-arms and suicide bombing terror attack. Two 18-year-old Palestinians were hiding in a recently removed container when they attacked, resulting in a dozen deaths, including the two assailants.[20]

(U//FOUO) *Al-Qa'ida-inspired extremists long for a combat swimmer capability that continues to remain elusive. However, a diving capability could exist amongst small cadres of extremists.*

- (U//FOUO) Palestinian combat swimmer attacks of the 1970s and 1980s successfully caused a major shift in Israeli Defense Force operations.[X] These operations may inspire emulation, but they also require extensive planning and resources. These attacks were extremely vulnerable to mishaps and were largely unsuccessful against alerted or defended targets.[21]

- (U//FOUO) Information available to the law enforcement community supports our assertion of al-Qa'ida's long-term intent to pursue more ambitious tactics involving combat swimmers.[Y,Z] However, the success will likely be limited because an underwater attack requires specialized equipment and operational experience.[AA,22]

- (U//FOUO) Two brothers, Ahmed and Muhammad Bilal (**USPERS**), were arrested in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, after completing a scuba course in the Red Sea. On September 2003, the two plead guilty in US court on charges of conspiracy to aid al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan.[23]

[X] (U) A detailed description of maritime terrorism events directed against Israel is listed in the appendix E.

[Y] (U//FOUO) Our analysis of past investigations of suspected extremists and statements from key leaders reveals an interest in pursuing combat swimmer attack capabilities, which dates back to the late 1990s. Although none of these overly ambitious initiatives resulted in a bonafide operational capability, this intent seems to remain a persistent goal of younger extremists—spurred on by the jihadi warrior ethos—to equal or exceed the advanced capabilities of their adversary's military special forces.

[Z] (U//FOUO) The mastermind of maritime terrorist operations for al-Qa'ida (until his capture in Aden in November 2002) was Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri, otherwise known as the *Prince of the Sea*. Al-Nashiri intended to use divers and swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) to conduct attacks just before he was captured. Al-Qa'ida operatives would either plant explosives on the hull of a ship, try to sneak on board to hijack the ship for ransom, steer it as a floating bomb, or use the SDV loaded with sealed explosives to function as an "underwater suicide bomber" against ships or offshore installations. A further use of SDVs was to combine them with divers and to place sea mines in narrow chokepoints, according to a separate analysis conducted by Akvia J. Lorenz, a consultant for the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Web site; www.ict.org.il/apage/11847.php; *Al Qaeda's Maritime Threat*; Akiva J. Lorenz; 15 April 2007)

[AA] (U//FOUO) Since 2001, reports of extremist diving training have emphasized basic skills; however, we note that further development of these abilities could be easily hidden from law enforcement scrutiny. The detection and interdiction of small, self-initiated groups of extremists—as well as lone offenders—will present a continual challenge in our free, open society.

(U//FOUO) *Sunni extremists closely aligned with al-Qa'ida are attempting to add more innovative maritime tactics; however, they are having limited success.*

- (U//FOUO) Improvised mines have been used in Iraq's waterways with mixed results: typically, they support ambushes and harassment attacks against riverine patrol boats.[24]

- (U//FOUO) Information available to the law enforcement community indicates extremists are considering a wide range of potentially innovative attack options, yet none of these appear to have progressed beyond the conceptual stage. Furthermore, they are unlikely to become the focus of near-term operational planning.[25]

- (U//FOUO) Other plots involving the use of ships as kinetic-energy weapons against bridges and other fixed maritime infrastructure have been mentioned; however, past accidents involving vessel collisions would likely serve as a deterrent to these plots due to media coverage portraying the minimal amounts of damage and disruption caused.[BB]

(U//FOUO) *Other terrorist groups—Hizballah, Palestinian rejectionist groups such as HAMAS, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—have superior maritime attack capabilities to those of al-Qa'ida; however, nothing suggests they are planning attacks against US interests.*[CC]

(U//FOUO) Before the attacks of 11 September 2001, Lebanese Hizballah had killed more Americans than all other terrorist groups combined; however, the group has yet to strike the Homeland. Iran—a state sponsor of terrorism—reportedly supplies the group with equipment and advanced training that could support a range of combat swimmer and other maritime attack options. We do not assess this capability will be directed against American targets, unless the geopolitical situation dramatically deteriorates and makes Iran or Hizballah feel directly threatened by the United States.

- (U//FOUO) Though their primary adversary is Israel, Hizballah plotted to use small boat attacks against American warships during the 1990s. The group also has combat swimmers and the ability to target ships with anti-ship missiles and rockets.[DD]

- (U//FOUO) Hizballah also has experience in maritime smuggling. Since 1982, the group has used a variety of vessels to get weapons shipped from Iran to Lebanon.[26,27]

[BB] (U//FOUO) A large containership struck a piling foundation for the San Francisco Bay Bridge on 07 November 2007. The ship was damaged but did not sink; moreover, the bridge remained structurally sound. Additional information suggests that extremists monitor the media for possible attack plans; this collision demonstrates the survivability of the ship and the bridge to withstand a similar, yet deliberate event and might serve to deter potential emulation.

[CC] (U//FOUO) These groups do not have an adequate logistical support infrastructure or intent to export these capabilities to the United States. Their maritime capabilities are more indicative of their local operating environment.

[DD] (U//FOUO) During the Israeli offensive in the summer of 2006, Hizballah severely damaged an Israeli warship and sank an Egyptian merchant vessel using Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missiles.

(U//FOUO) Since the 1950s, Palestinian rejectionist groups have attacked Israel repeatedly from the sea. However, their overall capabilities have declined as Israeli coastal defenses have improved over the years.

- (U//FOUO) Palestinian groups typically refrain from directly attacking US interests, and little suggests that this will change anytime soon. However, fringe elements have called for targeting the United States due to its support of Israel.[28]

(U//FOUO) The LTTE[EE] is a secular group that seeks a separate Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. Given their maritime heritage and their island locale, LTTE Sea Tigers are judged to be the most capable seaborne terrorists. The LTTE has not attacked US interests and views much of the West relatively favorably—Tamil expatriate communities in the United States and Canada remain a primary source of ideological and financial support.[29]

- (U//FOUO) Sporadic media reports of Sea Tiger training and assistance to al-Qa'ida operatives have been unproven; moreover, nothing suggests future cooperation. However, the group's advanced and innovative tactics could inspire other extremists. The LTTE has repeatedly conducted sophisticated attacks against Sri Lankan Navy and merchant vessels and coastal targets using combined arms attacks, boat bombs, mines, combat swimmers, and even underwater "suicide" sleds.[30]

(U) **LTTE Vessels**

(U//FOUO) ***Globalization and extremist hackers represent a potentially devastating cyber threat to highly automated vessels and port facilities, particularly as hackers' skills grow in sophistication.***

(U//FOUO) The Internet provides an open forum for operational guides and instruction manuals for various terrorist and extremist groups.[FF] Publicly-available information indicates al-Qa'ida has emphasized the use of Internet propaganda to bolster its appeal for the global jihadist movement. In spite of recent setbacks in Iraq, translated texts of Usama bin Laden's and Ayman al-Zawahiri's speeches show the group continues to advocate the interests of the "Islamic Nation" over secular or tribal loyalties.[GG,31]

- (U//FOUO) Even from overseas locales, extremists have been able to usurp government computer servers for the posting of propaganda, and they frequently use a variety of computer fraud and identity theft schemes for money to support their activities.[32]

[EE] See Appendix J for more information.

[FF] (U) The Manchester Document is an 18-chapter manual providing a detailed window into al-Qa'ida's network and its procedures for waging jihad—from conducting surveillance operations to carrying out assassinations and working with forged documents. Police in Manchester, England, discovered the manual in 2000 while searching computer files found in the home of a known al-Qa'ida member and it has surfaced in various locations, including Afghanistan. (*DefenseLink News* article, 29 June 2005)

[GG] (U//FOUO) In the summer of 2007, Coalition forces captured Abu Shahed, the al-Qa'ida Minster of Information and envoy between Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and Usama bin Laden. This lead to the subsequent capture of multiple al-Qa'ida media cells throughout Iraq. (*Long War Journal* article, 28 October 2007)

- (U//FOUO) Analysts have observed a growing level of sophistication on the part of jihadists using the Internet for recruiting and propaganda purposes. Al-Qaʻida even has a separate media arm specializing in the production and dissemination of videos and speeches via the Internet – with an online presence of more than 5,000 Web sites.[HH,33,34]

(U//FOUO) On October 2005, police in Bosnia arrested Mirsad Bektasevic—a cyber-jihadist who called himself "Maximus." He and four others were later sentenced for plotting attacks against European landmarks.[35,36]

(U) **DOMESTIC EXTREMISTS**

(U//LES) *Homegrown extremists—inspired by international calls for violence—may be encouraged to act on behalf of international terrorists or a variety of overseas causes.[37]*

(U//LES) Reporting of details related to recent disruptions of homegrown extremist groups suggest these individuals are typically inspired by, but not directly affiliated with, al-Qaʻida or similarly-minded groups. Many in these small groups are motivated by jihadist media or Internet offerings, they are self-sustaining, and they frequently create closed social settings, such as encampments, self-regulated communities, or other ethnic or religious enclaves. Moreover, several of these groups include embittered expatriates or former prisoners that were radicalized while incarcerated.[II, 38, 39, 40, 41]

- (U//LES) In May 2007, the FBI arrested five individuals for allegedly plotting to "kill as many US soldiers as they could" at the Army's Fort Dix, New Jersey military installation. The plot involved extensive planning, including training, surveillance, and procurement of weapons.[42] The suspects attempted to buy three AK-47 assault rifles and four semi-automatic M-16s from a confidential government witness. Described as homegrown terrorists, a DVD in their possession contained footage of various jihadist images.[43]

- (U//FOUO) In June 2006, the FBI arrested alleged homegrown extremists who planned to attack the Sears Tower in Chicago. Group members were US citizens who adopted the global jihadist ideology and sought to plan attacks consistent with al-Qaʻida's goals, although none had any contact with international al-Qaʻida operatives.[44]

(U//FOUO) Islamic radicalization in prisons is increasingly of concern, and Muslim converts make up an estimated 20 percent of America's inmate population.[JJ,45,46]

[HH] (U//FOUO) According to the declassified portion of the National Intelligence Estimate (April 2006), "The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint."

[II] (U//LES) The Internet is extensively used by a myriad of radical and extremist causes as a "virtual recruitment and indoctrination venue"—inspiration and practical instruction can be found on more than 5,000 radical Web sites.

[JJ] (U//LES) The FBI, BOP, and a host of state and local law enforcement and correctional agencies are coordinating a national correctional intelligence program initiative to address the problems associated with extremist exploitation of the religious programs in the country's prisons.

- (U//FOUO) In July 2005, members of the Islamic radical prison group, Jam'iyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), planned to attack multiple targets including military recruiting stations and synagogues. This prison-based group recruited and became affiliated with individuals who had never been incarcerated.[47]

- (U//FOUO) Other cases in which terror suspects were introduced to militant Islam while in prison include: Richard Reid (convicted British "Shoe Bomber"), Jose Padilla (USPER) (alleged "Dirty Bomber"), and Aquil Collins (who attended an Afghan training camp with the men accused of killing reporter Daniel Pearl).[48]

(U) **Richard Reid: Convicted British Shoe Bomber**

(U//LES) In the most recent cases of homegrown extremist interdiction, the zeal of the group was more than offset by poor operational security (OPSEC), inexperience, and a paucity of resources.

- (U//LES) These would-be terrorists lack the experience and resources of more sophisticated groups, and this often detracts from the lethality of their attacks—frequently limiting their tactics to those involving small arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).[49,50]

- (U//FOUO) Highly motivated but poorly trained individuals often practice poor OPSEC—a factor that often leads to their interdiction. In the case of the Fort Dix plot,

the suspects came to the attention of law enforcement when local electronics' store employees reported their attempt to have a jihadist videotape copied to a DVD.[51]

(U//LES) ***In spite of their shortcomings, domestic extremists have greater access to weapons and Homeland targets. Foreign terrorist groups, such as al-Qa'ida, may eventually seek the support of sympathetic anti-government, racist, or religiously-inspired groups based in America.[52]***

(U//LES) Some white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups in the United States are anti-Semitic and distrust the US Government—sentiments that mirror those of most Islamic extremists. The affinity of some black separatist groups with jihadist causes could create opportunities for ideological collusion.

- (U//FOUO) During his videotaped appeal made with Ayman al-Zawahiri, Adam Gadhan (**USPER**)—an American al-Qa'ida convert possibly supporting the group's overseas efforts—encouraged African Americans and others to seriously evaluate their own status in American society, the actions of the US Government, al-Qa'ida's message, and the global jihadist cause.[53]

- (U//LES) The New Black Panther Party (NBPP), led by attorney Malik Shabazz (**USPER**), seeks to establish an independent homeland for African Americans, and has expressed solidarity with al-Qa'ida and Usama Bin Ladin.[KK,54] Over the past decade, it has become the largest anti-Semitic, black separatist group in America.

- (U//FOUO) The Nation of Islam (NOI), previously led by Louis Farrakhan (**USPER**), also has a black separatist ideology. Farrakhan is known for racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-gay remarks, and he has expressed support for the Iranian nuclear program. Since relinquishing control of the organization in early 2007, it is unclear if any NOI successors will continue to espouse Farrakhan's views.[55]

- (U//LES) In 2005, an Aryan Nations splinter group led by August Kreis (**USPER**) claimed that white supremacist cells are prepared to fight on behalf of al-Qa'ida.[56]

- (U//LES) Following the 11 September attacks, some right-wing extremist groups— including neo-Nazis—posted Internet messages of support for Islamic extremists.[57]

[KK] (U) On 31 October 2001, Shabazz called America and Israel, "The number one and two terrorists right now on the planet." Shabazz then added, "Zionism is racism, Zionism is terrorism, Zionism is colonialism, Zionism is Imperialism, and support for Zionism is the root of why so many were killed on September 11." When asked if he supported Usama bin Laden in the war against Americans, Shabazz responded, "We should stand by all freedom-loving (people)." He added that there is no proof that bin Laden or the Taliban had anything to do with the attacks of 9/11, but "there is solid proof that President Bush has inherited the staunch pro-Zionist, pro-Israel callous policy of the destruction of Palestinians." In 2002, Shabazz announced his interest in aiding Zacarias Moussaoui's defense— the French Moroccan indicted for conspiring with Usama bin Laden in the 11 September attacks.

(U//LES) *The greatest interdiction problem is identifying extremist individuals posing a terrorism risk—especially those not affiliated with any known extremist group.*

- (U//LES) The Internet has accelerated the radicalization process; its anonymity also complicates disruption of virtual recruitment and jihadist propaganda efforts. Further, this technology frequently circumvents traditional human contacts—complicating law enforcement detection and the interdiction of potentially dangerous individuals.[58]

(U//LES) *Albeit they are one of America's more pressing domestic terrorism concerns, environmental and animal rights extremists typically refrain from targeting port(s) or maritime-related facilities.*

- (U//LES) During the past two decades, radical environmental and animal rights groups have claimed responsibility for hundreds of crimes and acts of terrorism, including arson, bombings, vandalism, and harassment—causing more than $150 million in damage.[LL]

(U//LES) Historically, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) epitomized environmental extremism in the United States. FBI law enforcement investigations established a close working relationship and significant crossover in leadership between ALF/ELF—considering these extremists to be one of the most pressing domestic terrorism issues for the United States.[59]

- (U//LES) ELF and ALF members operate on an individual or small group (cells) scale without hierarchical structure and direction—providing little chance for law enforcement interdiction. However, in 2005 and 2006, member convictions led to a national decline in activity.

(U//LES) The animal rights organization Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) has emerged as a single-issue domestic extremist group that will shift to target anything that may embarrass or harass Huntington Life Sciences (HLS) or its clients.[MM,60]

- (U//LES) On 23 August 2005, ALF and SHAC elements claimed to have vandalized Long Island's Manhasset Bay Yacht Club because a yachtsman reportedly did business with HLS.[61]

[LL] (U//LES) Although rarely targeting the maritime sector, authorities convicted ELF members in January 2006 for plotting to bomb the Nimbus Dam and fisheries, located along the American River in Sacramento, California. Information from FBI press releases states the individuals conducted surveillance of the Dam and fisheries, noting the positions of surveillance cameras. The FBI arrested the members as they purchased items to construct explosive devices. (FBI Press Release, http://sacramento.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/sc092707.htm, 27 September 2007)

[MM] (U//LES) SHAC's singular objective is to put HLS, a UK-based pharmaceutical company that conducts product-testing on animals, out of business. (FBI Reporting)

(U) LONE OFFENDERS AND INSIDER SABOTEURS[NN]

(U//LES) *Lone offenders—frequently acting independently in support of an extremist cause or alleged injustice—will remain a persistent threat to all infrastructure components*.[62]

(U//FOUO) Persons with personal grudges, computer hackers, and disgruntled employees also fall into the lone offender category—including anyone associated with the port, its related facilities, or shipping agencies.

- (U//FOUO) In July 2007, Younis Tsouli, a London-based hacker also known online as "Irhabi 007" (which translates in Arabic to "Terrorist 007"), was convicted for using the Internet to incite terrorism. Acting alone from his basement, Irhabi hacked the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department Web site, transforming it into an al-Qa'ida message board.[OO, 63]

- (U//FOUO) On 28 August 2005, an explosion occurred on the Philippine inter-island ferry M/V DONA RAMONA. An IED, hidden in the galley, wounded at least 30 people. Although local authorities later blamed the blast on the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, the initial investigation also looked at the possibilities of extortion or retaliation as possible motives.[PP, 64]

- (U//FOUO) In 1995, authorities arrested Timothy McVeigh **(USPER)**, a sympathizer of anti-government and militia groups, who attacked the Alfred R. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma with a homemade ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) truck bomb. The attack killed 168 and injured more than 800 people—making it the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in the United States to date.[65]

(U) **The Alfred R. Murrah Federal Building**

[NN] (U//LES) The law enforcement community defines a lone offender as an extremist individual whose independent acts of violence have only tangential, if any, connections to established groups. For the purposes of this assessment, an insider saboteur is a current or former employee whose access provides the opportunity to cause harm to the employer, its affiliates, or its clients.

[OO] (U//FOUO) Tsouli not only acted as an al-Qa'ida Webmaster, but he facilitated communication between terrorist plotters in Canada, Denmark, Bosnia, and the United States. Using the Irhabi 007 alias, he hacked into servers worldwide to post thousands of files online—including videos of beheadings, as well as, detailed manuals for constructing car bombs and suicide vests. Additionally, Irhabi used phishing schemes to steal thousands of credit card accounts and charge more than $3 million for items to support the jihadist cause, such as from night vision goggles to GPS devices. (*Newsweek,* 16 March 2006; *Washington Post,* 05 July 2007 and 06 July 2007)

[PP] (U//FOUO) Follow-on investigations of the incident ruled out these two motives. As Abu Sayyaf did not claim responsibility for the attack, authorities suspect an unidentified individual was responsible.

- (U//FOUO) Theodore Kaczynski (**USPER**), a.k.a. *the Unabomber,* began sending letter bombs in 1978 but was not arrested until 1996. Kaczynski sent 16 devices, several of which malfunctioned and provided a body of physical evidence, but killed three and injured two.[66] However, Kaczynski's isolation kept him from being identified until his brother reported him as a possible suspect after the media published Kaczynski's "Unabomber Manifesto" in 1995.[67]

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) **Theodore Kaczynski**

- (U//FOUO) Neo-Nazi and white supremacist Joseph Paul Franklin (**USPER**) killed 20 people during his attacks and tried to incite a race war through a murder and arson campaign from 1977 to 1980. Franklin targeted biracial couples, Hustler magazine publisher Larry Flint (**USPER**), and National Urban League President Vernon Jordan (**USPER**).[68]

(U//FOUO) *An insider does not necessarily have to cause damage or disrupt port operations, but can provide useful information to an adversary trying to learn the operations—wittingly or unwittingly.*

(U//FOUO) Ships and ports have been an integral part of smuggling since vessels have been putting to sea. Criminal organizations will continue to seek those who can facilitate their criminal endeavors along the waterfront.

- (U//FOUO) "To control and dominate the New York/New Jersey waterfront and The Port of Miami," the Justice Department announced July 6, 2005, "the Genovese and Gambino families placed organized-crime members, associates and relatives into high-ranking positions on the International Longshoreman's Association's (ILA) governing executive council and into positions as trustees of ILA pension, welfare, and benefit funds." Former Brooklyn ILA boss Frank "Red" Scollo (**USPER**), indicted with Gambino capo Peter Gotti (**USPER**) and 15 others in June 2002, pleaded guilty to racketeering in 2004.[69,70]

(U//FOUO) *Disgruntled employees—especially those with privileged or administrator access to sensitive computers or automated systems like those found in most port facilities—may pose serious security vulnerabilities.[QQ]*

(U//FOUO) Computer sabotage is a major insider threat. Some organizations tend to forget to disable an individual's computer account when their employment is over, providing legacy access that can cause disruption or some other mischievous act via remote access.[71]

- (U//FOUO) During a November 2007 session of the Computer Security Institute, the threat of malicious software code was specifically discussed. Software designers or sophisticated hackers could destroy an organization's information, wipeout critical back-

---

[QQ] (U) A synopsis of USSS investigative findings dealing with computer sabotage is listed in appendix H.

up data, or create backdoors for the purpose of stealing or damaging data later on, according to Institute experts.[72]

- (U//FOUO) In early 2000, Vitek Boden hacked into the waste management computer system of an Australian province. He circumvented the alarm and communications systems and altered the pump station operations, unleashing more than 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into public parks and creeks. Though Boden wanted to use the incident to obtain an environmental consulting job, the spill caused more than $50,000 USD in damages and resulted in extensive pollution and fish kills.[73]

(U) **OUTLOOK**

(U//FOUO) We assess that terrorists would seek to avoid the use of containerized cargo shipments to move a WMD to the Homeland; however, this remains our top low-probability, high-impact terrorism scenario. The more likely terrorist tactics will continue to be variations of "tried-and-true" land-based attacks that rely heavily on guns and bombs. Of course, the development of terrorist capabilities that could support more sophisticated maritime tactics—such as small boat bombs, mines, or combat swimmers—will also require continuous monitoring and vigilance.[RR]

(U//FOUO) Over time, the maritime attack capabilities of our primary adversaries will incrementally improve—slowed only by successful interdictions of key operatives and the disruption of attempts to improve existing, rudimentary skills. Nonetheless, the threats posed by potential infiltrators, insiders, and a myriad of homegrown extremists currently represent a more immediate cause for concern.

(U//FOUO) Albeit inconclusive, our analysis of national Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) indicates the economic significance of the US maritime domain will continue to attract the attention of those seeking to harm the United States. In addition, others will continue to exploit our maritime industry to support their criminal enterprises—human smuggling and trafficking, illicit narcotics shipments, and other contraband smuggling.

(U//FOUO) Of the most likely targets within the Homeland Maritime Transportation System components, vessels such as cruise ships, ferries, and oil and gas carriers will remain at the top of the list. Other static maritime domain components are less likely to become targets; however, they remain somewhat vulnerable to extremely determined terrorist operatives.

[RR] (U//FOUO) Terrorism pre-operational indicator lists—swimmer/diver, small boats, and mines—are available through the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) or DHS representative; VBIED and swimmer/diver indicator lists are located in Appendix I.

(U) **GLOSSARY AND LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THIS PRODUCT**

1. ABOT – Al-Basra oil terminal
2. ALF – Animal Liberation Front
3. ANFO – ammonium nitrate and fuel oil
4. AQAP – Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
5. AQI – Al-Qa'ida in Iraq
6. AQIM – Al-Qa'ida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
7. CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
8. CMT2 – Combating Maritime Terrorism 2
9. ELF – Earth Liberation Front
10. DHS – Department of Homeland Security
11. DPV – Diver Propulsion Vehicle
12. EEI – Essential Elements of Information
13. FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Area
14. FOUO – For Official Use Only
15. FY – fiscal year
16. GAO – Government Accountability Office
17. GDP – gross domestic product
18. GWOT – Global War on Terrorism
19. HITRAC – Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
20. HLS – Huntingdon Life Sciences
21. HSTC – Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
22. ICC – Intelligence Coordination Center
23. IED – Improvised Explosive Device. A "bomb" created from readily available materials with the intent to cause severe destructive damage.
24. ILA – International Longshoreman's Association
25. JTTF – Joint Terrorism Task Force
26. ISPFS – International Ship and Port Facility Security
27. JIS – Jam'iyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh
28. KAAOT – Khor al-Amaya oil terminal
29. LES – Law Enforcement Sensitive
30. Levant – A geographical term used to define the land mass that encompasses the modern day countries of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.
31. LNG – liquid natural gas
32. Lone Offender – A person or group consisting of 1-3 individuals committing an act of terrorism or sabotage out of personal spite or in sympathy with a larger movement or organization.
33. LTTE – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
34. MIPT – Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
35. MSRAM – Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
36. MTS – Maritime Transportation Sector
37. MTSA – Maritime Transportation Security Act
38. NIC – National Intelligence Council
39. NOI – Nation of Islam
40. NBPP – New Black Panther Party
41. NIE – National Intelligence Estimate
42. ODP – Office of Domestic Preparedness
43. ONS – Operation Neptune Shield
44. OPSEC – Operational Security

45. OSC – Open Source Center
46. PIJ – Palestinian Islamic Jihad
47. PIRA – Provisional Irish Republican Army
48. PFLP – Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine
49. PFLP-GC – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command
50. PLF – Palestine Liberation Front
51. PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organization
52. PWCS – Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security
53. RORO – roll on/roll off
54. SAR – suspicious activity report
55. SDV – Swimmer Delivery Vehicles
56. SHAC – Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
57. TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
58. TEU – Twenty-foot Equivalent Units
59. TRANSCOM – US Transportation Command
60. TWIC – Transportation Worker Identification Credential
61. UBL – Usama Bin Laden
62. USCG – United States Coast Guard
63. USPER – A United States Person, defined by Federal Law as 1) a US citizen, 2) an alien lawfully admitted into the United States for permanent residence, 3) a corporation incorporated in the United States, or 4) an unincorporated association with a substantial number of members who are citizens of the US or are aliens lawfully admitted into the Unitized States for permanent residence.[SS]
64. USSS – United States Secret Service
65. VBIED – Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices. Examples of such a device would be an improvised bomb placed in a car, truck, or other land-based platform.
66. VLCC – Very Large Crude Carrier
67. WBIED – Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices. Examples of such a device would be an improvised bomb placed in a boat, jet ski, or other water-based platform.
68. WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

[SS] (U) This definition is found on the National Security Agency web site (www.nsa.gov/sigint/sigin00003.cfm)

(U) APPENDIX A:

(U) THREAT VERSUS RISK MSRAM PRIMER

THREAT (T) **Capability and Intent focused on a general or specific target well-informed by presence, activity, consequence, and vulnerability values**	*VULNERABILITY (V)* **Estimate of how easy or difficult it would be to successfully attack the asset and, in so doing, yield the most severe consequences**	*CONSEQUENCE (C)* **(a.k.a. Criticality)** **Estimate of what could happen to people, the economy, national psyche, or mission capability**

(U) *Introduction*

(U//FOUO) Risk management is a process of analyzing trends, threat and capabilities, vulnerabilities, and dependencies of systems and assets that support critical missions.[TT] The key principle is the ability to apply available resources to prioritized risks in order to maintain mission integrity and derive desired outcomes. The **Threat** component is the element provided by intelligence as part of the Risk Management equation (**Risk = Threat x Consequence x Vulnerability**).

(U//FOUO) The US Coast Guard (USCG) Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) is a field-level risk assessment and analysis tool that also supports risk management at the tactical through strategic levels. MSRAM supports the risk initiatives of the Department of Homeland Security, National Strategies, National Plans, and several Homeland Security Presidential Directives. MSRAM roles and mission are depicted in Table 1. MSRAM assessments involve modeling and simulation of more than 600 strategic and 18,000 operational and tactical scenarios.

(U) **Table 1**. **MSRAM Roles and Missions.**

Mission	MSRAM Supporting Role
Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States	Assess terrorist intent and capability to focus resources to deter and interdict attacks
Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism	Assess ability of owner/operator, local Law Enforcement, USCG, and other Federal agencies Security Systems to protect targets
Minimize the resulting damage if prevention fails	Assess ability of owner/operator, local Law Enforcement, USCG, and other Federal agencies to respond & minimize damage
Recover from attacks that do occur – Ensure economic security	Estimate the secondary economic impacts with the loss of the target considering recoverability and redundancy of the target
	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(U//FOUO) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recognize the MSRAM initiative as a proven government security risk management program. MSRAM data is an essential building block to several USCG programs, including Operation Neptune Shield (ONS), Combating Maritime Terrorism 2 (CMT2) and several DHS initiatives, to include the Port

---

[TT] (U//FOUO) US Army regulation 525-26 (AR 525-26), Infrastructure Risk Management.

Security and Ferry Security Grant Programs. MSRAM will directly support the development of protective strategies for maritime critical infrastructure/key resources (MCI/KR) by evaluating target-attack mode scenarios that pose the highest security risks to the nation's infrastructure and key resources.[UU]

(U) Figure 1. MSRAM Alignment with GAO Framework.

(U) *Intelligence Support to Risk Management*

1. (U//FOUO) **Homeland Security Mission**. Risk assessments provide an analytical approach to rate the likelihood that a specific threat against a defined target will prevent successful completion of a mission. Establishing a risk-based framework for developing intelligence assessments improves the intelligence support for national operations and plans. Intelligence support to risk management and the Homeland Security mission involves:

- (U//FOUO) Creation of more relevant intelligence judgments and analysis concerning the nation's infrastructure information.
- (U//FOUO) Development of persistent awareness of the nation's infrastructure.
- (U//FOUO) Enable timely decisions to protect, secure, analyze, and restore the nation's infrastructure.
- (U//FOUO) Enable informed actionable decisions to protect, secure, analyze, and restore the nation's infrastructure.

[UU] (U//FOUO) COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 071748Z AUG 07; FY-07 Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) Risk Validation Workshop Summary And Follow-On Tasking.

2. (U) **General Tasks for Intelligence**. The general tasks for intelligence support to MSRAM depicted in Figure 2 are:

- (U//FOUO) Identify potential threats defined in MSRAM scenarios (attack modes vs. targets).
- (U//FOUO) Assess the threats defined in MSRAM scenarios.
- (U//FOUO) Monitor and disseminate information to USCG commands and other agencies concerning threats defined in MSRAM scenarios.

(U) Figure 2. Intelligence Support to Risk Management Cycle

3. (U) **Specific Critical MSRAM Strategic Tasks for Intelligence Support**.

- (U//FOUO) Establish judgment framework for Threat that allows ability to quantitatively and qualitatively rate data elements for Capability, Intent, Presence, Activity, and Corruptibility or Exploitation of attack platforms and/or targeted facilities, vessels, special events, and high consequence hazardous transits.

- (U//FOUO) Develop framework that helps define scope, severity and probability of threats to USCG Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) facilities and vessels.

4. (U) **Specific MSRAM Analysis and Reporting Data Elements**.

(U) *Methodology for Intelligence Threat Assessment Support to Risk Management*

(U//FOUO) Risk assessments typically use a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments to identify security requirements, including historical analysis of past events, intelligence assessments, physical surveys, and expert evaluation. When the risk of hostile acts is greater, these analysis methods may draw more heavily upon information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies regarding the capabilities and intentions of the aggressors.

(U//FOUO) Judgments for MSRAM Threat ratings consider the following data elements in determining both qualitative and quantitative ratings:

- (U//FOUO) Where Capability or Intent is evident, verified or assessed based on available information?
    - Is it only evident or assessed outside of the United States?
    - Is it evident or assessed outside of the United States in other western countries, not normally considered countries of origin of terrorist or sponsors of terrorism?
    - Is it evident or assessed inside U.S. territories? In a specific city, port, facility?

- (U//FOUO) Confidence and Probability concerning the Capability and Intent ratings are based on:

    - (U) **Presence**
        - ♦ Where are potential adversaries located and does their location enable their capability to attack or exploit attack mode or targeted facility?
        - ♦ Where the potential adversary is located when they state intent to exploit/attack targets, exploit the vulnerabilities, and where is intended target(s) located?
        - ♦ Is there a terrorist infrastructure near to, adjacent, or at locations?
        - ♦ Is the presence mostly linked to criminal activity or intent?

    - (U) **Activity**
        - ♦ Is the activity mostly linked to criminal activity or intent? Does the criminal intent enable terrorism?
        - ♦ Is activity linked to know terrorism operatives or support infrastructure?

    - (U) **Corruptibility/Exploitability**
        - ♦ Any evidence attack mediums or targeted facilities corrupted or exploited, and by whom?
        - ♦ Are breaches, exploitations mostly criminal, such as smuggling?
        - ♦ Are criminals involved linked to any terrorists?
        - ♦ Any operational links to operatives or terrorist infrastructure?

(U) *Time Horizon of Intelligence Judgments Supporting Risk Management*

(U//FOUO) The time horizon of judgments needs to complement the operational planner's capabilities to apply available resources that are sufficient to mitigate an attack against a specific target or system.

(U) APPENDIX B:

(U) DESCRIPTION OF THREAT LEVELS FOR THREAT RANKINGS USED IN THIS ASSESSMENT

(U) According to the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) methodology, *threat* is a combination of *capability, intent, confidence levels, time horizon, and presence* within a defined geographic area. The confidence level for threat within a MSRAM scenario, which involves an attack mode used against a target category, includes the *presence, activity,* and *corruptibility* elements. This threat ranking process is an initial attempt to align our analysis within the MSRAM construct. Below are the confidence levels and definitions used for each of the three primary threat factors in these evaluations.

(U//FOUO) The <u>confidence levels</u> given to our assessment of these capabilities include the following:

- (U//FOUO) *Uncertain*: some evidence suggests Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) are available to address intelligence gaps related to a capabilities assessment; however, the paucity of information sources precludes assignment of a confidence level in the judgment.

- (U//FOUO) *Moderately confident*: we have some of the EEIs, yet critical ones remain unaddressed. The available information may be uncorroborated or may be based on statements that may be deceptive.

- (U//FOUO) *Highly confident*: we have enough information to address most of the critical EEIs needed to support a judgment. The source credibility is augmented by other source corroboration and there appears to be minimal evidence of deception.

(U//FOUO) <u>Capability</u>: an adversary's estimated attack, criminal, or foreign collection capacity, which takes into account operational experience, training, information or skill availability, research and inquiry, weapons or equipment acquisition, security, resiliency, and repeatability.

(U//FOUO) The levels of capabilities attainment include the following:

- (U//FOUO) *Low*: negligible adversary effort to obtain a capability, and no evidence suggests a bonafide capacity exists.

- (U//FOUO) *Medium*: the adversary has expressed an interest and is pursuing a capability by conducting research and training, obtaining materials and equipment, developing external expertise or recruiting experts; adversary is well positioned to further advance the capability.

- (U//FOUO) *High*: the adversary possesses the expertise, materials and equipment, and adequately trained or experienced operatives to use the capability.

(U//FOUO) <u>Intent</u>: the planning or desire to use a particular capability, as offset by any observable or suspected concealment and deception.

(U//FOUO) The levels of intent include the following:

- (U//FOUO) *Low*: no credible reporting concerns operational planning by an adversary and no evidence suggests concealment or deception.

- (U//FOUO) *Medium*: there is limited reporting from sources of unknown or questionable reliability, yet there is limited corroboration to suggest veracity regarding plots; there is motive, but there are limited opportunities or feedback to support sustained deception.

- (U//FOUO) *High*: there is reasonably reliable reporting from multiple forces.

(U//FOUO) <u>*Presence*</u>: can be described as the estimated level of potential support and known or suspected participation of adversaries in developing or exercising capabilities within a defined geographical area.

(U//FOUO) The levels of presence include the following:

- (U//FOUO) *Low*: there is little evidence to suggest significant adversary support or presence within the defined areas of concern.

- (U//FOUO) *Medium*: there is limited reporting and information to suggest some support or presence within the defined areas of concern; however, the locations are ill-defined.

- (U//FOUO) *High*: there is credible reporting and information that identifies areas of support and known or suspected presence within the defined areas of concern.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Estimate

CG-HSEC-006-08

(U) APPENDIX C:

(U) THE IMPACT OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY ON THE US ECONOMY[VV]

(U) The United States is a maritime nation; 361 US ports handle 95 percent of US commercial trade, and 99 percent of the nation's overseas cargo.[74] Depending on the individual port facilities, they may accommodate anything from recreational watercraft to barges, ferries, and ocean-going cargo and passenger craft. Overall, approximately 3,200 cargo and passenger facilities play a major factor in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States. Studies by the American Association of Port Authorities estimate that the top 50 US ports move nearly 93 percent of all US waterborne commerce in a given year.[75]

(U) *Cargo*
(U) US ports handle a variety of cargo:

- (U) *Bulk* – a commodity cargo transported in unpackaged large quantities. Bulk cargos are either liquid or dry.
  - ♦ (U) *Liquid bulk* – cargos can often be petroleum, liquid natural gas (LNG), chemicals, and liquid edibles (such as vegetable oils and fruit juices)
  - ♦ (U) *Dry bulk* – sample cargos include grain, cement, wood chips, sand, ores, and coal.
- (U) *Break bulk* – a packaged but non-containerized cargo. Break bulk cargo is shipped as a unit (bags, bales, pallets, etc.) and broken down for further shipment once it reaches its destination.
- (U) *General* – general cargo is primarily shipped in steel container boxes, which are measured in 20-foot equivalent units (TEU).
- (U) *Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO)* – the primary RORO cargo to the United States in automobiles. However, ports with RORO capabilities often support ferry operations that shuttle daily commuters across local waterways.
- (U) *Military* – the US military depends on numerous ports that have agreements with the federal government to deploy troops and

| (U) Summary of the National Economic Impacts Generated by the US Deepwater Seaports, 2006	
Jobs	
Port Sector	
Direct	507,448
Induced	630,913
Indirect	306,289
Subtotal	1,444,650
Importers/Exporters	
Direct, Induced/Indirect	6,952,651
TOTAL RELATED JOBS	8,397,301
Wages/Salaries (Billions)	
Port Sector	
Direct	$25.3
Induced/Consumption	$69.5
Indirect	$12.3
Subtotal	$107.1
Importers/Exporters	
Direct/Indirect/Induced	$207.4
TOTAL	$314.5
Economic Output (Billions)	
Port Sector	
Direct	$71.1
Local Purchases	$26.3
Subtotal	$97.5
Importers/Exporters	
Direct/Induced/Indirect	$1,879.0
TOTAL	$1,976.4
Federal/State/Local Taxes (Billions)	
Port Sector	
Direct	$8.3
Induced/indirect	$26.8
Subtotal	$35.0
Importers/Exporters	
Direct/Induced/Indirect	$67.8
TOTAL	$102.8
TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT = $2.44 TRILLION	

Source: American Association of Port Authorities

UNCLASSIFIED

[VV] Fiscal numbers are expressed in USD currency.

equipment in national emergencies. The military designated 16 ports as strategic ports of debarkation, and studies by the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) estimated sealift accounted for 84 percent of the cargo shipped for the first stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.[76]

UNCLASSIFIED

Top-10 US Container Ports by Traffic

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) *Economic Impact*
(U) A 2007 study examined the impact that seaports contribute to the local, regional, and national economy. Overall, US seaports and waterways handle more than 2.5 billion tons of domestic and international trade annually. In 2006, this trade amounted to nearly $2 trillion in economic output, over $314 billion in wages, and nearly $103 billion in Federal, State, and local taxes.[77] Furthermore, $21.4 billion of fiscal year (FY) 2006 Customs revenue is attributable to seaport activity. This constitutes approximately 70 percent of the total $30.5 billion collected Customs revenue.[78]

- (U) Additionally, port-related jobs employ 8.4 million workers. Every $1 billion in exports creates an estimated 15,000 new jobs. This number increases to 30,000-45,000 when taking into account jobs to support the personnel.[79]

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) *Definitions*

(U) **Direct jobs** are those jobs providing support services (terminal operators, longshoreman, warehouse operators) to the seaport. These jobs are dependent the port and would suffer immediate dislocation if the seaport activity were to cease.
(U) **Induced jobs** are jobs created throughout the local and national economy due to purchases of goods and services by those directly employed, such as restaurants, construction, and retail.
(U) **Indirect jobs** are those jobs generated in the national economy as the result of local purchases by the firms directly dependent upon seaport activity. These jobs include jobs in local office supply firms, equipment and parts suppliers, and other business services.
(U) **Related jobs** are with manufacturing and distribution firms, such as retail outlets and petrochemical firms, who move their items through the ports. Related jobs are not dependent upon the seaport marine terminals to the same extent as are the direct, induced and indirect jobs.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Along with international trade, the cruise ship industry is a major component of the US maritime economy. The Cruise Lines International Association estimates that cruise passenger embarkation at US ports totaled nine million in 2006, a four percent increase over 2005. The cruise industry extends well beyond the traditional South Florida base, and cruise ships depart from or call at 43 ports in North America.[80] The cruise ship industry generated $35.7 billion in gross US economic output and supported 348,000 American jobs paying $14.7 billion in wages in 2006.[81]

(U) Of the top-10 cruise ship ports in the United States, half are in the State of Florida, accounting for 56 percent of all US cruise ship debarkations in 2006, with California the next State with the most cruise sailings (12 percent of the US total). Texas has been one of the highest growth markets, driven by an increase in embarkations at the Port of Galveston and development at the Port of Houston. Additionally, Hawaii increased its share of the cruise industry's impact in the United States in 2006, increasing passenger embarkations by 34 percent. Globally, the cruise ship debarkations in the United States accounted for 75 percent of the global total in 2006.[82]

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Summary of the National Economic Impacts Generated by the US Cruise Industry, 2006

Cruise Industry Spending in United States (Billions)

| Cruise Lines	
Goods and Services	$11.08
Capital Equipment	$1.81
Subtotal	$12.89
Passengers and Crew	$3.48
Induced/Consumption/Indirect	$3.36
Taxes paid by cruise lines	$1.27
TOTAL U.S.-BASED SPENDING	$21 Billion

Wages/Salaries (Billions)	
Direct	$5.74
Induced/Consumption/Indirect	$8.99
TOTAL	$14.7 Billion

Cruise Industry Employment	
Direct	153,863
Induced/Indirect	194,103
TOTAL JOBS	347,966

Source: American Association of Port Authorities

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) 2006 Passenger Embarkations, by Top-10 US Cruise Ports (x1000)

Legend: Miami, Los Angeles, Port Canaveral, Long Beach, Port Everglades, San Diego, Tampa, New York, San Francisco, Jacksonville

Values: 536, 91, 130, 457, 180, 1890, 1145, 378, 1396, 592

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) APPENDIX D:

(U) HISTORY OF MARITIME TERRORISM WITH EVENTS TIMELINE[83,84,85]

(U) 1974, February – Hijacking of Greek Freighter *Vory* in Karachi, Pakistan
Extremists, claiming membership in the Muslim International Mujahidin, overtook the vessel and made threats to murder two hostages as well as blow up the ship unless two Arab terrorists held in Athens were set free.

(U) 1979, August – Bombing of Lord Louis Mountbatten's private Yacht in Mullaghmore, Ireland
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members remote-detonated a bomb attached to the *Shadow V*, killing four people.

(U) 1985, October – Hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* in Egypt
Four Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) members overtook the vessel en route to Port Said and sailed towards Tartus, Syria. The purpose of the hijacking was to coerce the release of 50 Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons. PLF members killed one American passenger.

(U) 1988, July – Hijacking of the *City of Poros* passenger ferry in Greece
Three gunmen, associated with the Abu Nidal Organization, boarded the ferry and once underway utilized automatic weapons and hand grenades to attack passengers. Earlier the same day an attempted car bomb was detonated pierside the *City of Poros*' berth. The attacks killed nine, although there were approximately 450 passengers aboard.

(U) 1992 - 1994 – Targeting of Nile River cruise vessels
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya members targeted at least four cruise ships in and around the Nile River region in order to undermine Egypt's tourism sector.

(U) 1996, January – Hijacking of Turkish passenger ferry
Nine Chechen rebels hijacked a passenger ferry in Turkey's northern Black Sea coast and held 255 passengers hostage for four days. Chechen rebels threatened to blow up the vessel in order to bring attention to the Chechen cause. Rebels, after several days, brought the vessel to Istanbul where they surrendered.

(U) 2000, January – Attempted Attack in *USS The Sullivans* in Aden, Yemen
Al-Qa'ida attempted to conduct a suicide bombing attack on the *USS The Sullivans* while it was refueling in Aden, Yemen. The attack was aborted when the boat used for the attack sank due to the weight of the explosives. The operatives later recovered the explosives and used them in the attack on the *USS Cole*.

(U) 2000, June – Suicide Bombing of Sri Lankan Naval Vessels
Black Sea Tigers, the naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked Sri Lankan naval gunboats in the waters off of the Vadamarachchi coast—killing 21 Sri Lankan sailors and 13 LTTE Black Sea Tigers.

(U) 2000, October – Bombing of *USS COLE* in Aden, Yemen
Al-Qa'ida utilized a suicide bombing attack on the *USS Cole* while it was refueling in Aden, Yemen. The assault involved 600 lbs. of C-4 explosives packed into a small boat. The attack killed 17 American sailors and injured an additional 39.

(U) 2002, January – Weapons transport by freighter *Karine A* in the Red Sea
Freighter *Karine A*, owned by the Palestinian Authority, was seized by Israeli Navy and Air Force in the Red Sea carrying an assortment of Russian and Iranian arms, including Katyusha rockets and anti-tank missiles, valued at $100 million USD. The weapons were linked directly to Yasser Arafat and were allegedly for use in attacks against Israeli targets.

(U) *USS COLE* **after Attack in Yemen**

(U) 2002, October – Bombing of *M/V Limburg* in Mukalla, Yemen
Al-Qa'ida utilized a small boat packed with 220-440 lbs of TNT to ram into the side of the tanker while it waited for pilots assistance to approach the Ash Shihr Oil Terminal. The attack killed one crewman and spilled 50,000 tons of oil into the waters surrounding the vessel.

(U) *M/V Limburg* **burning off the coast of Yemen**

(U) 2004, February – Bombing of Philippine *Superferry 14* in Manila Harbor

The Abu Sayyaf Group bombed the *Superferry 14*— causing a conflagration that killed 116 passengers and sank the vessel. The IED incorporated 20 sticks of dynamite planted in a hollowed-out television set and made it the world's deadliest maritime terrorist attack.

(U) **Fire results from the attack on *Superferry 14***

(U) 2004, March – Suicide attack at Port of Ashdod, Israel

Two members of HAMAS and the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade were smuggled into Port Ashdod, one of Israel's busiest seaports, inside a commercial container. Once in the port, the suicide bombers went on a shooting spree before detonating their IEDs—killing 10 waterfront workers.

(U) 2004, April – Suicide attacks on Khor al-Amaya (KAAOT) and Al-Basra (ABOT) oil terminals in Iraq

Al-Qa'ida-linked operatives used small suicide crafts in an attack on Iraq's offshore oil infrastructure. The attack caused the terminals to shut down for two days and cost nearly $40 million USD in lost revenue. Two US Navy sailors and one US Coast Guardsman were killed.

(U) **KAAOT Oil Terminal Burning After the Attack**

(U) 2005, August – Rocket attack at Aqaba, Jordan
Al-Qa'ida-linked extremists fired three Katyusha rockets from a warehouse at two docked US Navy vessels. The rockets were fired from within the port and narrowly missed the *USS Ashland* and *USS Kearsarge*.

(U) 2005, December – IED attack against Algerian Coast Guard vessels at Dellys, Algeria
An Internet posting by the group Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb (then known as the Salafi Group for Call and Combat) stated the group successfully used two remote control bombs against Algerian Coast Guard vessels in the port of Dellys, Algeria. The group credited the success of their attack to subverting port security and surveilling the vessels.

(U) APPENDIX E:

(U) A SUMMARY OF MARITIME ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL[86]

(U) *Introduction*

(U//FOUO) Israel, the largest single victim of maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean, has suffered nearly 60 strikes by organizations such as HAMAS, Hizbollah, and the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The only two successful strikes and one unsuccessful attempt by al-Qa'ida were off Aden, Yemen.[87] Carrying out maritime terrorism requires considerable logistical support. In addition to operating in a harsh and often times unpredictable environment, terrorist organizations have to acquire appropriate vessels, basic seamanship, advanced operational skills, and expensive and specialized equipment. Proven land-based tactics provide more realistic targets for financially-constrained terrorist groups with limited resources

- (U//FOUO) Among the most experienced traditional terrorist groups that possess maritime capabilities are the Middle Eastern Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Lebanese Hizballah. Since the first recorded attempt to infiltrate Israel by sea on 14 April 1953, the country has accumulated a vast amount of experience in combating maritime terrorism.

- (U//FOUO) Over the past decades, according to a senior Israeli navy officer, Israel has detected more than 80 maritime terror plots. While most attacks have been foiled, innovative terrorist operatives have learned to adapt to this rapidly changing environment—a fact that was demonstrated when Hizballah successfully attacked the INS Hanit using a Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missile off the Lebanese coast on 14 July 2006.

(U) *Maritime Terrorism in Israel Timeline*

(U) *March 4, 1973 – Sinking of Charter vessel Sanya*
Black September and Fatah claimed responsibility for an explosive on Greek charter ship *Sanya* that detonated in Beirut harbor. The vessel was carrying 250 American tourists bound for Haifa, Israel. The explosive was timed to explode upon arrival in Haifa but detonated prematurely.

(U) *March 5, 1975 – Attack on Savoy Hotel*
Eight terrorists landed on Tel Aviv beach and took 13 hostages at the Savoy Hotel. Israeli commandos eventually stormed the hotel, killing seven terrorists and capturing one. Terrorists demanded the release of 20 Palestinian prisoners. The timing of the attack coincided with the visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

(U) *March 11, 1978 – Coastal Road Attack*
Thirteen terrorists set sail from Tyre, Lebanon in order to conduct a mother-ship supported raid on Tel Aviv. The terrorists landed at Maagan Beach and took over two passenger buses carrying approximately 70 hostages. Two terrorists and six hostages were killed during the firefight with police.

(U) *September 30, 1978 – Sinking of freighter Agius Demetrius*
Israeli Navy vessels intercepted and sunk the bomb-laden freighter *Aguis Demetrius* off the Sinai coast near Dahab. The freighter was an element in a plot to destroy oil tanks and pumping stations of the Eilat-

Askhelon pipeline by firing Katyusha rockets into the port of Eilat and ramming the TNT-filled vessel onto a crowded tourist beach. Seven terrorists aboard the vessel were captured before the vessel was sunk.

(U) *April 22, 1979 – Murder of Haran Family*
Four Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists landed on a Naharia beach in a rubber boat and killed a policeman and attacked an apartment building. Haran family members were killed in protest to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

(U) *September 25, 1985 – Seizure of Israeli yacht in Larnaca, Cyprus*
PLO Force-17 members seized an Israeli yacht in the harbor of Larnaca, Cyprus. PLO Force-17 members accused the hostages of being Israeli spies and demanded the release of 20 Palestinians being held in Israel. All three hostages were murdered before PLO Force-17 members surrendered to police.

(U) *October 7, 1985 – Hijacking of passenger vessel Achille Lauro*
Four PLF members seized Italian passenger vessel *Achille Lauro* shortly after leaving Alexandria, Egypt en route to Port Said. Hijackers demanded the release of 50 members of PLO Force-17. The vessel was routed to Port Said where after negotiations hostages were released. One American was killed.

(U) *April 25, 1988 – First maritime suicide operation*
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) conducted the first maritime suicide operation in the Lebanese area by routing a fishing vessel loaded with explosives next to an Israeli naval vessel and detonating. No casualties or significant damage was reported. From 1988 to 1997, five additional maritime suicide attacks against Israeli naval vessels were reported.

(U) *May 30, 1990 – PLF plan for maritime-based infiltration*
Israeli security forces foiled an attempt by PLF terrorists to infiltrate Israel from the sea near Gaash and Nitzanim. Sixteen terrorists departed from Libya on a Libyan vessel with plans to attack hotels and houses from the sea utilizing Katyusha rockets, cannons, and machine guns. Interrogation of captured members indicates the preparation for the operation had taken nearly three years and cost approximately 3 million dollars.

(U) *May 30, 1992 – Attempted PLF maritime-based infiltration*
Four PLF members swam five kilometers from Jordan to Eilat pulling rafts loaded with weapons. One raft sank but one reached shore and resulted in an unsuccessful attack against tourists that killed one unarmed Israeli security guard.

(U) *December 35, 1993 – Bombing of Israeli vessel Jrush Shalom*
Israeli vessel *Jrush Shalom* was bombed by Palestinian National Liberation Movement while docked in Eilat. No casualties were reported; however, 11 suffered injuries.

(U) *March 1997 – PLO attempted attack*
The PLO unsuccessfully attempted to attack an oil tanker in Eilat harbor with the help of European divers.

(U) *May 6, 2001 – Seizure of fishing vessel Santorini with weapons shipment*
Israeli naval vessels captured fishing vessel *Santorini* carrying weapons enroute from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip. The vessel was intercepted 150 miles west of Tyre in international waters with four members of PFLP-GC and waterproof barrels filled with weapons that were to be dropped for pickup. Three successful smuggling operations were conducted between November 2000 and May 2001.

(U) *January 3, 2002 – Seizure of freighter Karine A carrying weapons shipments*
Israeli forces seized the vessel, *Karine A*, 200 nautical miles off the Israeli coast carrying 50 tons of weapons including Katyusha rockets, mortar shells, anti-tank missiles, rifles, and diving equipment. Eighty waterproof crates with weapons were produced in Iran and designed to allow for easy water retrieval once dropped.

(U) *October 16, 2002 – Planned bombing of passenger vessel in Eilat*
Reporting indicated that the HAMAS military wing, Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigade, planned on sending a suicide bomber equipped with an explosive-laden video camera to attack a passenger vessel in the port of Eilat. Plans were disrupted while members attempted to purchase vessel tickets and collect intelligence on port and vessel operations.

(U) *November 23, 2002 – Suicide attack on INS Daboor*
Two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members attempted sailing an explosive-laden fishing vessel into Israeli patrol boat *INS Daboor* in Israeli-controlled waters off northern Gaza. The attack injured four sailors and responsibility was claimed by PIJ's military branch, the Al-Quds Brigade. A similar attack was attempted on *INS Daboor* in January 2003, but the vessel exploded before getting to the vessel.

(U) *May 20, 2003 – Interception of Egyptian fishing vessel Abu Hassan*
Israeli naval forces intercepted F/V *Abu Hassan* 100 nautical miles west of Rosh Hanika. The vessel contained rocket fuses, weapons, and bomb making components. Among the crew was a Hizballah bomb export that had in possession 36 CDs providing detailed instructions on manufacturing bombs.

(U) *March 14, 2004 – Suicide bombers at Port Ashdod*
Ten people were killed and 16 wounded in a suicide bombing by two Palestinians in the port of Ashdod. The two Palestinians hid in a 15-meter container and emerged wearing military uniforms once in the port facility. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack. Port of Ashdod was considered one of Israel's most secure ports and the container carrying the suicide bombers was screened through security at Ashdod and the Karni Crossing.

(U) *March 25, 2004 – Attempted nighttime combat swimmer infiltration*
Three armed HAMAS members attempted to enter Tel Katifa, at the northern end of the Gush Katif settlement. Two terrorists were killed and one wounded in a failed attempt to attack an army post in the area.

(U) *June 8, 2004 – Attempted nighttime combat swimmer infiltration*
Two combat swimmers attempted to infiltrate a naval control post in the northern Gaza Strip near Dugit. Combat swimmers planned to utilize fragmentation grenades and assault rifles. Similar attempts were made in August 2004 and November 2004; however, terrorists were spotted and subsequently killed in both instances.

(U) *August 2005 – Plot on Israeli cruise vessels*
Five cruise vessels carrying approximately 5,000 Israeli tourists were diverted from Turkish ports to Cyprus following the arrest of suspected al-Qaʿida (AQ) operative Luai Sakra. Sakra was planning on utilizing speedboats packed with explosives to attack the vessels while in international waters.

(U) *August 19, 2005 – Attempted rocket attack on USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge*
AQ in Iraq (AQI) attempted to strike two US warships moored in Aqaba, Jordan utilizing Katyusha rockets. AQI members rented a hilltop warehouse overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba. Two rockets overshot the warships; one hit a Jordan military warehouse and one landed in Eilat, Israel but neither caused any major damage.

(U) *July 12, 2006 – Rocket attack on Israeli vessel Ahi Hanit*
After declaring a state of war against Hizballah, Israeli Saar-5 class corvette *Ahi Hanit* was struck by antiship missiles fired from the Lebanese shore. One rocket misfired and struck an Egyptian merchant vessel in international waters that subsequently sank.

(U) APPENDIX F:

(U) A SUMMARY OF AL-QA'IDA MARITIME ATTACKS[88]

(U) *Introduction*

(U//FOUO) In recent years, many governments have faced an enemy that is best described as a loose cooperative of terrorist networks without the clearly defined, hierarchical structure and centralized control mechanism that characterized traditional terrorist groups. The largest alliance of Islamic groups is the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. A member of this alliance, al-Qa'ida (translated as "the base") movement was founded in 1988 under the leadership of Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to function ideologically and operationally at local, national, regional, and global levels. The al-Qa'ida movement was an offshoot of the Maktab al-Khidamat, MAK, (translated as "the services office"), which was co-founded in 1984 by UBL and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leader Dr. Abdallah Yousuf Azzam. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution (1979), the MAK recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign Sunni Islamic extremists to fight as *mujahadin* (holy warriors) in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Toward the end of the Afghan war, UBL, as other *mujahadin*, wanted to expand the struggle beyond Afghanistan. Through its widely disperse cells and affiliates, al-Qa'ida maintains a global reach in more than 60 countries.

(U//FOUO) Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the leadership of al-Qa'ida saw their mission as the training of as many operatives as possible and thus successfully staying beneath the radar of most intelligence agencies. However, al-Qa'ida had to adapt to the changes brought about by "Operation Enduring Freedom" (October 2001) and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida's horizontal network structure assured the continuation of what militant Islam views as defensive jihad. Although some operational capabilities were lost, UBL and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, continue to provide the ideological and religious inspiration, while their followers and affiliate terrorist groups carry out the actual terror attacks. The result is that today there are many al-Qa'ida-inspired cohort groups. These ad-hoc groups consist of like-minded individuals, often Muslim converts, with no prior involvement in terrorism. Noteworthy is the new trend of extremists with petty criminal records being involved in terrorist attacks, as was the case in the 2004 train bombings in Madrid. These adversaries are arguably more difficult to detect and to counter.

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida's core ideology is the notion of global jihad against "apostate" Muslim rulers, Crusaders, and Zionists. Their global jihad seeks the formation of a pan-Islamic Caliphate. UBL argues that jihad, as a divine command, is an individual responsibility incumbent upon every Muslim; "It is no secret that warding off the American enemy is the top duty after faith and that nothing should take priority over it." According to Bin Laden, the first phase of the jihad will occur in counties that are entirely Muslim with a foundation of radical Islamic ideas, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. Then, countries with large Muslim minorities, such as Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Europe would be targeted. Lastly, jihad will be delivered to the rest of the Western world. It is clear, therefore, that al-Qa'ida, unlike traditional terrorist groups, does not want to become part of today's international political system, but to replace it entirely.

(U//FOUO) To reach its followers and affiliate cells, al-Qa'ida uses the technological advances of today's globalized world. This is especially true regarding the Internet, which is used as a multimedia medium, not only allowing its top ideologues to conduct psychological warfare illustrating their propaganda in a

myriad of written statements and audio or videos recordings that are posted either on jihadist Web pages or blogs, but also to raise necessary funds and support for a continuous struggle.

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida sees this struggle not as one of weeks or months, or even years, but of decades. Therefore, its ideology is absolutist and non-negotiable. This reduces the possibility of finding a political solution to nearly zero. Al-Qa'ida's fatawas (translated as "religious opinions") call for total war, permitting the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons against their enemies. Their tactics typically make use of coordinated, near-simultaneous suicide attacks, using traditional means such as car bombs, to cause mass casualties. At the same time, it is an organization whose strategists often think outside the box, as seen in its transformation of hijacked airplanes into missiles in the 9/11 attacks. Since the assassination of Theo Van Gogh (November 2004) by a seemingly well-integrated Dutch and Moroccan citizen, Mohammed Bouyeri, who was radicalized by the propaganda of radical Islam, it has become clear that al-Qa'ida tries to exploit the sense of alienation, humiliation, and frustration experienced by Muslim immigrants in order to convince them to return to the values of Islam and rise up against their society. All of this points towards a change in the traditional strategies; now terrorists want not only "a lot of people watching," but also "a lot of people dead."

(U) **Wake-up call**
(U//FOUO) On 12 October 2000, the *USS Cole*, an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, was attacked by a small craft loaded with 600 lbs. of C-4 explosives while making a routine refueling stop in the port of Aden, Yemen. Steered by two Saudi suicide terrorists, Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al-Thawar, the small craft exploded alongside the USS Cole 47 minutes after the refueling was initiated, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39 more. This put the group on the map as having conducted the most successful maritime terrorist attack in history.

(U) **Analyzing the USS Cole Incident**
(U//FOUO) As noted above, al-Qa'ida has demonstrated its capabilities to successfully operate and attack maritime vessels. Similar to al-Qa'ida's carefully planned plot over several year to use airplanes to attack strategic targets that cumulated in the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the planning to attack maritime targets which resulted in the *USS Cole* bombing was put in motion as early as 1998 (the same year as the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania).

A. (U//FOUO) **Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri**
(U//FOUO) The mastermind of maritime terrorist operations for al-Qa'ida (until his capture in Aden in November 2002) was Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri, otherwise known as the Prince of the Sea. Born in Mecca on 5 January 1965, al-Nashiri left formal education after intermediate school to follow the footsteps of his cousin and uncles in pursuit of jihad in Tajikistan (1996). In 1996, he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he encountered UBL, who attempted to convince al-Nashiri to join al-Qa'ida's jihad against the Americans. Al-Nashiri, at this point, refused because he found the idea of swearing a loyalty oath to Bin Laden to be distasteful. Leaving Afghanistan, Nashiri returned to his native Saudi Arabia. He subsequently visited his home in Yemen. According to transcripts of his interrogation, it was there that al-Nashiri, eyeing the stream of American and foreign ships plying the waters along the coast of Yemen, conceptualized and developed the idea of using maritime terrorism. Returning to Afghanistan in 1997, al-Nashiri was still not willing to join UBL. Instead, he pursued a conventional jihad mission in fighting alongside Taliban forces against the Northern Alliance of Ahmed Massoud. During this time, al-Nashiri was also involved in the smuggling of four Russian-made Sagger anti-tank missiles from Yemen into Saudi Arabia which characterizes his metamorphosis towards al-Qa'ida.

(U//FOUO) Having witnessed the "martyrdom" of his cousin Mohammad Ali al Makki (Azzam) in the Nairobi embassy bombing, al-Nashiri finally joined al-Qaʻida in 1998. Shortly thereafter, al-Nashiri was tasked by Bin Laden to attack Western oil tankers off the cost of Yemen. Having difficulties finding appropriate targets along the western coast of Yemen, Bin Laden reportedly instructed him to shift his operational arena to the port of Aden and towards US Navy vessels. Realizing that the average refueling stop of a US military vessel in the port of Aden was just less than four hours (the window of opportunity) al-Nashiri highlighted the importance of a good intelligence system based on informers. These sources were working for the Aden harbor or were posted along the Read Sea. The result of his intelligence capabilities were the attempted attack on the USS The Sullivans (January 2000) and the successful attack on the USS Cole (October 2000) that brought al-Nashiri an elevated status within al-Qaʻida.

(U//FOUO) Later, al-Nashiri became chief of operations for al-Qa'ida of the Arabian Peninsula consulting with Bin Laden while keeping operational security in selecting operatives and the formulation of new attacks. According to Michael Richardson, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, al-Nashiri based his operation on four pillars:
- using a zodiac speed boat packed with explosive to ram warships or other ships;
- using medium sized boats as bombs to be blown up near slips or ports;
- using airplanes to ram boats; and
- having underwater demolition teams.

(U//FOUO) Until his capture in Aden on November 2002, al-Nashiri developed plans to attack US warships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gibraltar, to bomb the fifth fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and to crash a small aircraft into the bridge of an allied navy vessel docked in the U.A.E.'s port Rashid. Due to his involvement in the USS Cole bombing, al-Nashiri, was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death by a Yemeni court. Al-Nashiri is currently detained by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

B. (U) **Planning Cycle – Recruitment**
(U//FOUO) Soon after al-Nashiri became the operational commander for al-Qa'ida's maritime terrorism plot in Yemen (Spring 1999), Tawfiq Muhammed Salah Bin Roshayd Bin Attash (Khallad) wrote a recommendation letter to help al-Nashiri enlist local Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi (facilitator), and Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, to command logistics. Furthermore, al-Nashiri enlisted Saudis with Yemini background, Hassan Awadh al-Khamri (Hassan) and Ibrahim al-Thawar (Nibras), as potential future suicide bombers.

C. (U) **Planning Cycle – Preparation**
(U//FOUO) In early summer of 1999, Badawi leased, on behalf of al-Nashiri, a safe house for six months in a quiet neighborhood of Aden. To ensure privacy, the group installed a gate and increased the height of the fence surrounding the residence. Furthermore, on request of al-Nashiri, Badawi traveled to Saudi Arabia to purchase a boat large enough to carry explosives, and a trailer and truck to tow the boat from the safe house to the harbor. Then, the boat was filled with C-4 explosives and readied for transport.

(U//FOUO) On 3 January 2000, al-Nashiri and his team brought the boat to the harbor after receiving word of the arrival of the *USS The Sullivans*. Shortly after the launch, the boat steered by Hassan and Nibras sank in shallow water due to the large amount of explosives on board. On 4 January 2000, the group returned in order to salvage the boat and its precious cargo. The accident, thought to be al-Nashiri's most important lesson, was that a rehearsal is an essential part of the successful outcome of an operation. Rehearsal reveals logical problems (such as a boat being too heavy from too many explosives) and improves the speed, stealth, and the surprise factor in an attack.

(U//FOUO) After the failed attack on the *USS The Sullivans*, Quso and Nibras traveled to Bangkok, Thailand to meet with Khallad. Decision makers in Pakistan chose Bangkok in order not to arise the suspicion of intelligence services, Quso was directed to shave and wear western-style clothing. The men reportedly received approximately $36,000 from Khallad.

D. (U) **Planning Cycle – Procurement**

(U//FOUO) In the summer of 2000, Hassan leased a new safe house in Aden. As before, a fence was built to ensure privacy. Moreover, Hassan also leased an apartment overlooking the harbor to serve as an observation point. Al-Nashiri and Khallad traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Bin Laden and test explosives.

(U//FOUO) Over the summer, al-Nashiri and others refitted the boat and replaced the old explosives. In September 2000, Badawi trained Quso to operate a camera in order to film the attack. Khallad returned to Afghanistan while Bin Laden, in an interview with an Arabic language television station, called for jihad for the release of the "brothers in jail 'everywhere'." On 12 October 2002, after receiving news about the *USS Cole*, the group transports the boat to the launch site. Slowly approaching the USS Cole, Hassan and Nibras waved their hands in a friendly gesture. Shortly afterwards, their explosion left a 40-foot hole on the side of the *USS Cole*.

(U//FOUO) Quso overslept and did not make it in time to film the attack. This was a loss to Bin Laden because the film was meant to be distributed for propaganda purposes. In January 2001, Bin Laden celebrated the bombing of the *USS Cole* with a poem at his son's wedding:

"A destroyer: even the brave fear its might.
It inspires horror in the harbor and in the open sea.
She sails into the waves.
Flanked by arrogance, haughtiness, and false power.
To her doom she moves slowly.
A dinghy awaits her, riding the waves."

VII. (U) **Post-*USS Cole* Attack Schemes**

(U//FOUO) Following the successful bombing of the *USS Cole*, al-Nashiri planed to use the acquired and tested knowledge on maritime terrorism to expand his operations. Due to the highlighted force protection protocols of the US and other foreign navies, he focused on the Strait of Hormuz. According to his interrogation, al-Nashiri, planned to attack US Navy ships with several speedboats launched from a mother vessel traveling in restricted navigational channels. The plan was to detonate the mother vessel once it passed any possible target. After a final intelligence review, al-Nashiri deemed the success of such a mission was unlikely and aborted its operation.

(U//FOUO) This opportunity was not al-Nashiri's only shot, as he subsequently sent three Saudi nationals to Morocco to implement other maritime terrorist attacks. Moroccan security services arrested the three Saudi terrorists in June 2002. They were planning to attack US and British naval vessels with WBIEDs in the Straits of Gibraltar. The slow and careful planning, starting with the marriage of the terrorists to local women in order to blend into society, had the characteristics of an al-Nashiri operation similar to the *USS Cole*. Moreover, with the hardening and establishing of new security protocols for navy vessels against small boat attacks, al-Nashiri, shortly before his capture in November 2002, intended to use divers and swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) to attack Western maritime targets. Al-Qa'ida operatives would either

plant explosives on the hull of a ship, try to sneak on board in order to hijack the ship for ransom or to be steered as a floating bomb, or use the SDV loaded with sealed explosives to function as an "underwater suicide bomber" against ships or offshore installations. A further use of SDVs is to combine them with divers and to position sea mines in narrow chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal.

VIII. (U) *M/V Limburg* **Attack**

(U//FOUO) While al-Qa'ida, under al-Nashiri, constantly adapted to the changing tactical environment, the group shifted its focus towards attacking the global economy and the merchant fleet as its facilitator. On 6 October 2002, a small fiberglass boat loaded with 100 - 200 kg of TNT explosives guided by two Yemeni suicide terrorists rammed the French VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) *M/V Limburg*, killing one and injuring 25 crew members. The attack occurred 400 nm outside the port of Aden while the Limburg prepared to take on a pilot-assisted approach to the Ash Shihir terminal to load crude oil. Being leased to the Malaysian state petroleum company Petronas, the ship carried, at the time of attack, 400,000 barrels of crude of which an estimated 90,000 gallons spilled into the Gulf of Aden. As a direct result of the bombing, oil prices rose by $0.48 a barrel due to increasing insurance fees for ships calling in Aden. This premium fee, in turn, caused most ships to call in neighboring ports, resulting in an additional loss of $ 3.8 million USD in monthly port revenue and the loss of employment of as many as 3,000 employees. Al-Qa'ida's communiqués issued after the bombing read:

"We congratulate our Islamic nation for heroic and brave jihadi operations that were undertaken by its justified mujahideen sons in Yemen against the crusader oil tanker and in Kuwait against the invading forces and the American occupation. By hitting the oil tanker in Yemen, the mujahideen hit the secret line, the provision line and the feeding to the artery of the life of the Crusader's nation. They reminded the enemies of the heaviness of the blood bill and the enormity of losses, that they will pay a high price for the continuation of their aggression on our nation and their plunder of our goods and our wealth." "If a boat which didn't cost $1,000 USD managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude, imagine the extent of the danger that threatens the West's commercial lifeline, which is petroleum."

(U) APPENDIX G:

(U) A SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AND IMPLEMENTED MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES SINCE 9/11

(U) *Introduction*
Responding to terrorism and the threat to shipping has many aspects. New technologies have developed and new rules and regulations have been implemented and new standard operating procedures adopted. The focus has been on containerized shipping because the economic consequences to a disruption in the supply chain.

(U) *Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism*
The goals of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program is to improve security by the shipping companies while providing incentives and benefits to the companies by expediting the processing of the shipments.[89]

(U) *Operation Safe Commerce*
Operation Safe Commerce is a collaborative federal grant program that is administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and includes the three largest domestic container load centers, cargo and supply chain security solution providers, and various supply chain operatives (importers, carriers, terminal operators, etc.). The goal of this partnership is to develop, test, and share best practices in order to improve the security of containerized cargo movements.[90]

(U) *Container Security Initiative*
The Container Security Initiative is a government-to-government antiterrorism effort that allows governments to share information and target high-risk cargoes. The results of this collaboration by governments and the private sector include establishing best practices and determining immediate and future security standards, while securing global trade routes.[91]

(U) *Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002*
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 mandates that each United States Coast Guard Captain of the Port develop and implement an Area Maritime Security Committee. The Act provides for Port Risk Assessments, which include Vulnerability and Threat Assessments and a 96 notice of arrival for vessels arriving in the United States and tracking of high interest vessels. Finally, the Act calls for the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPFS) code. The code requires all ships and ports engaging in international trade to submit port facility and ship security plans to their home government.

(U) *Secure Freight Initiative*
The Secure Freight Initiative is designed to screen containers at select ports across the globe for nuclear and radiological materials to better assess the risk of inbound containers. Under the initial phase of this plan, radiation scanning equipment will be deployed to six foreign ports to scan inbound containers to the United States. In the case of a detection alarm, Homeland Security personnel and host nation officials will be alerted.[92]

(U) *Container Seals*
"Smart Box" technology is becoming available and more reliable and should be implemented to increase a company's ability to determine whether or not the container has been compromised while moving through the supply chain.[93]

(U) *X-ray Screening*
Currently Customs and Border Protection use VACIS machines to scan for contraband and illegal aliens. Approximately 6 percent of all containers are scanned or physical inspection.[94]

(U) *Radio-Frequency Identification Devices*
Radio-Frequency Identification Devices are instruments that are used to track, identify, or record product data. This helps companies track their commodities in the supply chain.[95]

(U) APPENDIX H:

(U) US SECRET SERVICE ANALYSIS ON COMPUTER SABOTAGE

(U//FOUO) The United States Secret Service (USSS) analyzed acts of insider sabotage on computer systems in critical infrastructure sectors during 2005 and found that the majority of insiders who committed the attacks were former employees, motivated at least in part by a desire to seek revenge and who were granted system administrator or privileged access when hired.

(U//FOUO) Between 1996 and 2004, 49 cases were examined across critical infrastructure sectors. These cases were purposely limited to those in which an insider's primary goal was to sabotage some aspect of the organization or direct specific harm toward an individual. The study revealed:

- (U//FOUO) A negative work-related event triggered most of the insiders' actions.

- (U//FOUO) About 62 percent of the incidents were planned in advance.

- (U//FOUO) Most of the insiders (around 80 percent) exhibited unusual behavior in the workplace prior to carrying out their sabotage activities.

- (U//FOUO) Many of the insiders exploited systemic vulnerabilities in applications, processes, or procedures, and about 39 percent used relatively sophisticated hacking tools.

- (U//FOUO) Several insiders compromised computer accounts, created unauthorized backdoor accounts, or used shared accounts in their attacks.

- (U//FOUO) Most incidents were carried out via remote access.

- (U//FOUO) Less than half of the insiders (43 percent) had authorized access at the time of the incident.

(U//FOUO) "The power of a terminated employee with system administrator access should not be underestimated," said Dawn Cappelli, senior member of the technical staff with CERT. "Some organizations completely neglect disabling access upon termination. Others go through the steps to disable access, but the insider is able to find that one access control gap that was overlooked."[WW]

[WW] (U) US Secret Service; DOC; PUB 11-05; (U) Secret Service and CERT Release Report Analyzing Acts of Insider Sabotage Via Computer Systems in Critical Infrastructure Sectors; 16 May 2005; (UNCLASSIFED).

(U) APPENDIX I:

(U) INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL VBIED AND SWIMMER/DIVER ACTIVITY

(U) **Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)**

(U) Considering the recent events in the United Kingdom and the implications for similar VBIED incidents in the United States, law enforcement and security personnel need to be aware of the following potential indicators.[96]

(U) Characteristics of a vehicle carrying an improvised explosive device:

- (U) Heavy or large payload capacity, such as tanker trucks.
- (U) Interiors whose contents are not visible (cargo vans).
- (U) Sufficient size to allow it to ram security barriers.
- (U) Access to high value symbolic or economic targets (limousines, buses).

(U) The public and first responders should be alert for vehicles that:

- (U) Can fit in parking garages (large sedan or SUV).
- (U) Have easy licensing procedures (based on size and purpose of vehicles).
- (U) Can typically remain stationary for extended periods without drawing suspicion (delivery vehicles).
- (U) Is a recognized entity by the public (company delivery van).

(U) Potential indicators of VBIEDs:

- (U) Erratic driving due to nervousness or noncompliant drivers.
- (U) Delivery vehicles that lack sufficient people for purpose of visit.
- (U) License plates that are inconsistent with vehicle registration.
- (U) Unusual vehicle modifications.
- (U) Fraudulent attempts to rent utility vehicles, vans, or moving trucks.
- (U) Rental of self-storage space for the purpose of storing chemicals, dangerous materials, or equipment that could support the construction of a bomb or similar weapon.
- (U) Delivery of chemicals directly from the manufacturer to a self-storage facility.
- (U) Theft of explosives, blasting caps, or fuses, or certain chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives.
- (U) Chemical fires, toxic odors, brightly colored stains, or rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotel rooms, or warehouses.
- (U) Small test explosions in rural or other remote areas.
- (U) Chemical burns, or other injuries, in which the victim's explanation is inconsistent with the injuries presented.

(U) **Swimmer/Divers**

(U//LES) Since the capture of al-Qa'ida's head of operations in Southeast Asia, Omar al-Faruq, in June of 2002, and his admission that he was reportedly planning scuba attacks against US ships in the Indonesian port of Surabaya, counterterrorism analysts have become increasingly concerned al-Qa'ida may be training for an underwater attack using dive equipment, motorized sleds, and human torpedoes. Terrorist divers also could plant explosives on hulls of ships, acting as seagoing suicide bombers.[97] Moreover, they could sneak limpet mines and cause major physical and psychological damage to a country and industries.[98]

(U) An attack from divers requires considerable training and skill to swim without detection. And, although there have been suspicious incidents involving divers in the United States, most of these have involved drug-smuggling activities—primarily using a vessel's sea chest or parasitic devices attached to their hulls.

(U) Potential indicators for Swimmer/Divers:

(U) The following indicators may point to possible terrorist planning. Alone, each indicator can result from legitimate recreational and commercial activities; however, multiple indicators combined with other information can possibly suggest a terrorist threat or impending attack.

(U) Unusual requests for training, as well as certain characteristics of training could represent potential terrorist interest in using diving to conduct terrorist activity. These indicators may include:

- (U) Requests for specific specialty training, including odd inquires that are inconsistent with recreational diving.

- (U) Requests to learn advanced skills that can be associated with swimmer attack training, including training with rebreathers, deep diving, conducting "kick counts," or receiving navigation training.

- (U) Rapid progression of diver training and certifications, particularly if the training is routinely attended by the same students.

- (U) Training routinely conducted between the same two or three individuals.

- (U) Training sponsored by groups or agencies not normally associated with diving.

- (U) Training given by instructors who do not advertise and appear to have little means of visible support, especially those with a history of extremist views.

- (U) Training conducted in remote or atypical locations or restricted areas.

- (U) Threats, coercion, or attempts to bribe trainers for certification.

- (U) Suspicious attempts to purchase specialized marine equipment may provide indication of pre-operational activity.

(U) Other indicators may include:

- (U) Individual purchases of common gear in excessive quantities.

- (U) Attempts to rent advanced gear without required certifications or attempts to rent gear that is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the diving report.

- (U) Volume purchasing inquiries related to Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) and Diver Propulsion Vehicles (DPVs).

- (U) Suspicious purchases of darkened gear or after-market painting.

- (U) Attempts to purchase large magnets, large diameter PVC pipe or empty compressed gas cylinders, or theft of same.

- (U) Attempts to purchase advanced gear, such as rebreathers or other equipment used in mixed gas diving, by individuals who appear to lack expertise in the use of the equipment.

- (U) Logistical planning for swimmer attacks may include characteristics such as:
  - (U) Groups of individuals, especially those with no visible means of support, sharing a common address near the water.
  - (U) Attempts to take diving equipment, particularly advanced gear, without the required certifications, on commercial flights.
  - (U) Cash purchase of small boats or personal watercraft from private individuals.
  - (U) Invalid or unusual explanations of visitor, employment, or student status.
  - (U) Employment attempts at diving equipment dealers or rental shops.
  - (U) Surveillance and proving of potential targets is consistent with known practices of terrorist organizations that seek to maximize the likelihood of operations success through careful planning.

(U) Possible indicators of surveillance may include:

- (U) Attempts to photograph or loiter near restricted areas or sensitive sites.
- (U) Unusual behavior or activity by employees, vendors, visitors, contractors at a sensitive site.

(U) APPENDIX J:

(U) A SUMMARY OF THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EALAM (LTTE)[XX]

(U) *Introduction*

(U//FOUO) Formed on 05 May 1976, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakara, the LTTE has emerged as an organized and disciplined terrorist nationalist group seeking to form a separate state for Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamil people.[YY] Presently, the LTTE physically controls territory in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. In 1984, the Sea Tigers, an amphibious subdivision of the LTTE, were formed. The LTTE relies on a guerilla strategy and prefers to attack vulnerable government facilities then withdraw before reinforcements arrive.   According to the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), maritime targets comprise only 3 percent of LTTE's target list to date. [99, 100, 101] The group also times its attacks to take advantage of security lapses on holidays, at night, or in the early evening.[102] International contacts and large Tamil diasporas throughout the West provide money, weapons, communications, and bomb-making equipment.[103]

(U) *The Black Sea Tigers*

(U) The Black Sea Tigers[ZZ] pioneered a form of maritime suicide terrorism using small, locally made, low-profile fiberglass boats. These vessels are loaded with explosives and equipped with spikes on the bow to fasten the boat to the broadside of targeted vessels upon impact. Although predominantly focused on small boat attacks, the Black Sea Tigers have used innovative maritime techniques such as two-man underwater suicide sleds, covert infiltration of suicide divers, and one-man suicide torpedoes.[104]

(U) The Sea Tigers also own and operate merchant ships for legitimate commercial activities that are also employed to support acts of terrorism like hijacking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and transporting operatives. Freighters are used to support "underway replenishment" of ammunition, food, fuel, personnel, communications, spare parts, and terrorism-related materials to underway operatives.[105]

(U) LTTE ships frequent Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Africa, Burma, Turkey, Italy, and Ukraine to support arms procurement. The amount of explosives and mortars transported by the LTTE remains the largest quantity of armaments ever transported by a non-state armed group.[106] It also established a state-of-the-art boatyard that manufactures a dozen different boats.[107]

[XX] (U) The LTTE is a US Department of State designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
[YY] (U) LTTE supporters maintain a Web site at www.tamilnet.com
[ZZ] (U) The Black Tigers are LTTE suicide operatives; hence Black Sea Tigers conduct maritime suicide missions.

(U) PRODUCT INFORMATION

Requirement:	HSEC, TERR, WMDN, CYBR, CRIM
Product Number:	**CG-HSEC-006-08**
Date of Publication:	07 January 2008
Information Cutoff Date:	05 December 2007
Intelligence Valid until:	2009-12-20
External Coordination:	NCIS, FBI, USCG LANT Area, USCG PAC Area, NCTC, USCG CG-5, DHS, CBP, ICE

Author(s):

Brian Benassai
ICC Domestic Port Threat Assessment Team Lead
brian.d.benassai@uscg.mil
301-669-3771

Lee Ann Robbins
ICC Domestic Port Threat Assessment Team
leeann.a.robbins@uscg.mil
301-669-3362

(U) PRODUCT FEEDBACK

(U) This assessment was produced in coordination with the DHS HITRAC CITA. Comments or concerns related to its content should be addressed to the ICC's Analysis Division Chief or the Domestic Port Threat Assessment Team Lead.

Arthur F. "Butch" Miller; Chief, ICC Analysis Division; 301.669.2037; millerar@nmic.ic.gov; MillerAr@uscg.smil.mil; Arthur.F.Miller@uscg.mil

Brian Benassai; Domestic Port Threat Assessment Team Lead; 301.669.3771; benassb@nmic.ic.gov; bdbenassai@uscg.smil.mil; brian.d.benassai@uscg.mil

(U) **SOURCES**

[1] (U//FOUO) National Intelligence Council; http://www.odni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release_pdf; pub July 2007; *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (de-classified Key Judgments section)*; (UNCLASSIFIED); Key Judgments section; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 07 DEC 2007; Intelligence Estimate

[2] (U//FOUO) US State Department; www.state.gov/documents/organization/45318.pdf; pub 2005; Country Report on Terrorism; (U); Chapter 3; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 07 DEC 2007; US State Department assessment

[3] (U//FOUO) National Intelligence Council; http://www.odni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release_pdf; pub July 2007; *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (de-classified Key Judgments section)*; (UNCLASSIFIED); Key Judgments section; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 07 DEC 2007; Intelligence Estimate

[4] (U) Periodical; LTC Laurence A. Dobrot; Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War?; pub November 2007; page 6; http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=822; ref 07 DEC 2007; Strategic Studies Institute for the US Army War College; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[5] (U//FOUO) OSC; GMP20060227710011; pub 27 FEB 2006; DOI: 21 FEB 2006; Al-Qa'ida Claims Attack on Saudi Oil Plant; (U); para 3; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT monitoring of BBC broadcast (in English)

[6] (U//FOUO) OSC; FEA20070912315906; pub 24 MAY 06; The Call to Global Islamic Resistance; (U); p. 989; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posted translation

[7] (U//FOUO) OSC; SAP20040504000084; pub 03 MAY 04; US, Israel Behind Saudi Terror Acts, Work Against Muslim Unity; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT translation Rawalpindi *Nawa-i-Waqt* (in Urdu)

[8] (U) New York Office of Homeland Security; Focus Report: Maritime Terrorist Threat to US Ports; 02 JAN 2006; Focus Report: Maritime Terrorist Threat to US Ports; (UNCLASSIFIED); pages 4 and 16; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 29 NOV 2007; Maritime Study
(U) Periodical; James Jay Carafano; Small Boats Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea; pub 11 JUN 2007; http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/bg2041.cfm; ref 29 NOV 2007; The Heritage Foundation Web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[9] (U//FOUO) OSC; FEA20070912315906; pub 24 MAY 06; The Call to Global Islamic Resistance; (U); p. 994-996; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posted translation

[10] (U) News article, C. Onur Ant; Associated Press posting CBSNews.com; "Israeli Cruise Attack Plot Exposed"; pub 11 AUG 2005; entire article; http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/08/11/terror/main771152.shtml; ref 15 NOV 2006; online news article (UNCLASSIFIED)

[11] (U//FOUO) OSC; EUP2005125000283; pub 25 JAN 2006; Al-Qa'idah Planning Sea Attack; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posted translation of Madrid *El Tiempo* (in Spanish)

[12] (U//FOUO) OSC; EUP2005082207200; pub 22 AUG 2005; Asylum Seeker Sakra Reportedly Had Contacts With Al-Qa'ida Leaders; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posted translation of Hamburg *Der Spiegel* (in German)

[13] (U) Congressional Research Service; Paul W. Parfomak and John Fritelli; Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities; pub 09 JAN 2007; page CRS 23; ref 08 DEC 2007; CRS Report for Congress; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[14] (U//FOUO) OSC; FEA20070912315906; pub 24 MAY 06; The Call to Global Islamic Resistance; (U); p. 990; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posted translation

[15] (U//FOUO) OSC; GMP20060227710011; pub 27 FEB 2006; DOI: 21 FEB 2006; Al-Qa'ida Claims Attack on Saudi Oil Plant; (U); para 16; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT monitoring of BBC broadcast (in English)

[16] (U) News Article; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet Public Affairs; pub 24 APR 2004; "Two Sailors Killed in Arabian Gulf Oil Terminal Attacks"; entire article www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=12977; ref 15 NOV 2007; US Navy Web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[17] (U) Online Policy Analysis; Simon Henderson; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Al-Qaeda Attack on Abqaiq: The Vulnerability of Saudi Oil; pub 28 FEB 2006; entire article;

www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2446; ref 16 NOV 2007; Research and Analysis Think Tank; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[18] (U) Periodical; CAPT James Pelkofski, USN; *Proceedings*; "Al Qeada's Maritime Campaign"; pub 27 DEC 2005; entire article; ref 07 DEC 2007; Maritime periodical; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[19] (U//FOUO) Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center; www.icc.uscg.smil.mil/hstc/products/pakistani_c1/d/Pakistani_C1-D.pdf; Pakistani C1/D Crew Visa Fraud; (U//FOUO); pub 22 AUG 2007; entire article; ref 19 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); Intelligence Assessment

[20] (U) OSC; GMP20040729000086N; pub 29 JUL 2004; Israel: Indictment Reveals Details on Suicide Attack at Ashdod Port in March; (U); para 2; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 19 NOV 2007; OSINT posting of Tel Aviv Ha'aretz article

[21] (U//FOUO) OSC; GMP20071009739005; pub October 2007; Ramat Hasharon Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center; The Maritime Terrorism Threat to Israel; (U); entire document; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posting of Israeli think tank study

[22] (U//FOUO) OSC; GMP20071009739005; pub October 2007; Ramat Hasharon Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center; Al-Qaeda's Maritime Threat; (U); entire document; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posting of Israeli think tank study

[23] (U//FOUO) OSC; GMP20031208000121; pub 07 DEC 2003; No Terror Charges Filed Against US, UK Citizens; (U); para 1-2, 13; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 23 NOV 2007; OSINT posted Jeddah *Saudi Gazette* (English)

[24] (U) Internet Site; Public Affairs Office Camp Victory; Iraqi Army Soldiers Seize Explosives, Weapons During Maritime Operation in Western Iraq; pub 02 JUN 2007; www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12133&Itemid=128; ref 19 NOV 2007; Press Release; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[25] (U) Internet Site; The National Terror Alert Response Center; Attorney Assists Two USF Goose Creek Terror Suspects Seeking Release; pub 09 SEP 2007; www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2007/09/09/attorney-assists-two-usf-goose-creek-terror-suspects-seeking-release/; ref 19 NOV 2007; Counterterrorism web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[26] (U) US Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center; http://intel.socom.smil.mil/socjic/osec/weekly/02/0212/021220/021220tr10.htm; pub 18 DEC 2002; "Iran dealing with Fatah via Lebanon"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 19 NOV 2007; Short Report

[27] (U) Jane's Defence Weekly; www.ismc.sgov.gov/Reference/janes/display.html?nav=C_1&sn=jdw&ed=jdw2007&docid=a1adee17d6becf0937a11f262824f849; pub 03 JAN 2007; "Iran Replenishes Hizbullah's Arms Inventory"; (U); Para 14; (UNCLASSIFIED) ref 20 NOV 2007; Intelink Report

[28] (U) OSC; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2006/11/hamas_urges_att.html; pub 08 NOV 2006; "Hamas urges attacks on U.S. Targets"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Intelink posting of Associated Press article

[29] (U) US Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center; http://intel.socom.smil.mil/socjic/osec/operafrica/05/0511/051115/051115cr05.htm; pub 25 APR 2005; Maritime Piracy: The Maritime Threat; (U); Trends in maritime threats section; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Threat Assessment

[30] (U) Online Conference Transcript; Sri Lanka Minster of Foreign Affairs Hon Rohitha Bogollagama; The International Institute for Strategic Studies; Securing Regional Waters: How Much Progress?; pub 03 JUN 2007; entire transcript; http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/plenary-session-speeches-2007/fourth-plenary-session--rohitha-bogollagama; ref 20 NOV 2007; Speech transcript; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[31] (U//FOUO) Briefing; Homeland Security Threat Overview; HITRAC Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis; 2007; ref 07 DEC 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)

(U) News article; Bill Roggio; The Long War Journal; "US targets al Qaeda's al Furqan media in Iraq"; pub 28 OCT 2007; entire article; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/us_targets_al_qaedas.php; ref 07 DEC 2007; Counterterrorism new Web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) News article; Bill Roggio; The Long War Journal; "Osama bin Laden on the state of Iraq"; pub 22 OCT 2007; entire article; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/osama_bin_laden_on_t.php; ref 07 DEC 2007; Counterterrorism new Web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[32] (U) Internet Site; Breanne Wagner; National Defense Magazine; "Experts Downplay Imminent Threat of Cyberterrorism"; pub July 2007; entire article; http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2007/July/ExpertsDownplay.htm; ref 20 NOV 2007; Internet assessment; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[33] (U) Online Publication; Michael Scheuer; The Jamestown Foundation; "Al-Qaeda's Media Doctrine: Evolution from Cheerleader to Opinion-Shaper"; pub 22 MAY 2007; entire article; http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373417; ref 20 NOV 2007; Global Terrorism Analysis Web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[34] (U) Internet News Article; Fox News; Al Qaeda Use of the Web Spreading at an Alarming Rate; pub 05 DEC 2007; www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,315273,00.html; ref 19 DEC 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[35] (U//FOUO) OSC; EUP20070713167022; pub 18 JUL 2007; DOI 12 JUL 2007; "UK Commentary Explains Effectiveness of Internet as Vehicle for Jihadists"; (U); para 6; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 29 NOV 2007; OSINT posting of London *The Economist* (in English)

[36] (U) Internet News Article; Associated Press; CBC News; Bosnia Jails 4 in plot to blow up European Landmark; pub 11 JAN 2007; www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/01/11/bosnia-terror-070111.html; ref 19 DEC 2007; News article describing convictions; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[37] (U//LES) FBI; http://fbihq.adnet.sgov.gov/ctd/QTA_2003_4.pdf; pub April 2003; Quarterly Threat Assessment; (U//LES); page 4 para 4; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 13 NOV 2007; Threat Assessment

[38] (U) Press Release; FBI; FBI Website; Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Director Robert S. Mueller, III FBI, The City Club of Cleveland, Ohio; pub 23 JUN 2006; www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm; ref 01 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[39] (U) DHS; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_threatass/(U~~FOUO)_HSTA_-_Executive_Summary_08162007.pdf; pub AUG 2007; Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Executive Summary; (U//FOUO); pg 4, para 2; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 08 OCT 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[40] (U//FOUO) TSA OI; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upload/TSA/(U~~FOUO)_TSA_Special_Report_-_Speculative_Analysis-Terrorist_Cell_of_the_Future_09132007.PDF; pub 13 SEP 2007; Speculative Analysis: The Terrorist Cell of the Future; (U//FOUO); pg 5 para 5-6; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 09 NOV 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[41] (U) DHS; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_threatass/(U~~FOUO)_HSTA_-_Executive_Summary_08162007.pdf; pub AUG 2007; Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Executive Summary; (U//FOUO); pg 4, para 3; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) ref 08 OCT 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[42] (U) DHS/FBI; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_Foreign_relto/upl_Foreign_relto_NATO/(U~~FOUO)_JHSA-_Fort_Dix_Plot_Illustrates_Continuing_Threat_Posed_by_Homegrown_Islamic_Extremists_06042007.pdf pub 04 JUN 2007; Fort Dix Plot Illustrates Continuing Threat Posed by Homegrown Islamic Extremists; (U); pg 2 para 2; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 09 NOV 2007; Joint Homeland Security Assessment

[43] (U) News Article; DefenseLink Website; "Six Arrested for Plotting to Kill Soldiers at Fort Dix"; pub 8 MAY 2007; entire article; www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45946; ref 21 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[44] (U) DHS/FBI; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_Foreign_relto/upl_Foreign_relto_NATO/(U~~FOUO)_JHSA-_Fort_Dix_Plot_Illustrates_Continuing_Threat_Posed_by_Homegrown_Islamic_Extremists_06042007.pdf; pub 04 JUN 2007; Fort Dix Plot Illustrates Continuing Threat Posed by Homegrown Islamic Extremists; (U); pg 3 para 1; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 09 NOV 2007; Joint Homeland Security Assessment

[45] (U) Online Publication; The Center for Policing Terrorism; "Analysis: Militant Islam in U.S. Prison System"; pub 2005; page 2; www.cpt-mi.org; ref 14 NOV 2007; Analytical Report; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[46] (U) DHS; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_threatass/(U~~FOUO)_HSTA_-_Executive_Summary_08162007.pdf; pub AUG 2007; Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Executive Summary; (U//FOUO); pg 4, para 3; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY); ref 08 OCT 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[47] (U//FOUO) FBI; http://fbihq.adnet.sgov.gov/iaps/ia-ctd-20060908-snf.pdf; pub 08 SEP 2006; Identifying Homegrown and Self-Starting Islamic Extremists; (U//FOUO); pg 6-7; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 14 NOV 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[48] (U) Online Publication; The Center for Policing Terrorism; "Analysis: Militant Islam in U.S. Prison System"; pub 2005; page 2; www.cpt-mi.org; ref 14 NOV 2007; Analytical Report; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[49] (U//LES) FBI; fbihq.adnet.sgov.gov/iaps/ia-ctd-20070111-ules.pdf; pub 11 JAN 2007; The Threat Posed by Lone-Wolf Terrorists Sympathetic to the Palestinian Cause; (U//LES); pg 7 para 7-8; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 08 OCT 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[50] (U//FOUO) FBI/DHS; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_threatass/(U~~FOUO)_JHSA_Al-Qaida_Media_Campaign_and_Overseas_Activities_Sustain_Heightened_Threat_to_Homeland_09282007.pdf; pub 28 SEP 2007; Al-Qa'ida Media Campaign and Overseas Activities Sustain Heightened Threat to Homeland; (U//FOUO); pg 2 para 5; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 08 OCT 2007; Joint Homeland Security Assessment

[51] (U) DHS/FBI; www.dhs.csp.sgov.gov/upl_Foreign_relto/upl_Foreign_relto_NATO/(U~~FOUO)_JHSA-_Fort_Dix_Plot_Illustrates_Continuing_Threat_Posed_by_Homegrown_Islamic_Extremists_06042007.pdf; pub 04 JUN 2007; Fort Dix Plot Illustrates Continuing Threat Posed by Homegrown Islamic Extremists; (U); pg 2 para 3; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO) ref 09 NOV 2007 Joint Homeland Security Assessment

[52] (U//LES) FBI; Counterterrorism Division Intelligence Bulletin No. 192; http://wadsintel.mcchord.af.smil.mil/Documents/Library/Graham's%20library/FBI%20Alert%20on%20Domestic%20Terrorism.doc; pub 12 JAN 2006; Terrorist Tactics: Potential Links Between Islamic Foreign Terrorist Groups and Domestic Extremist Groups; (U//LES); Para 6; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 02 NOV 2007; Counterterrorism notice

[53] (U) US NORTHCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center; http://j2web.northcom.smil.mil/daily-briefings/2006/09/brief-2006-09-05-html; pub 09 MAY 2006; (U); Slide 2; (SECRET//NOFORN); ref 20 NOV 2007; Daily Briefing
(U) Internet Site; World Net Daily; "Blacks recruited for terror by Al-Qa'ida: Pitch to African-Americans invokes 'martyr' Malcolm X"; pub 21 MAY 2007; entire article; http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=55796; ref 21 NOV 2007; news article; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[54] (U//LES) FBI; Counterterrorism Division Intelligence Bulletin No. 192; http://wadsintel.mcchord.af.smil.mil/Documents/Library/Graham's%20library/FBI%20Alert%20on%20Domestic%20Terrorism.doc; pub 12 JAN 2006; Terrorist Tactics: Potential Links Between Islamic Foreign Terrorist Groups and Domestic Extremist Groups; (U//LES); Para 6; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 02 NOV 2007; Counterterrorism notice

[55] (U) OSC; Neil MacFarquhar; New York Times; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2007/02/nation_of_islam.html; pub 26 FEB 2007; Nation of Islam at a Crossroad as Leader Exits; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink posting
(U) OSC;; Middle East Media Research Institute https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2007/03/nation_of_islam_2.html; pub 23 MAR 2007; 'Nation of Islam' Leader Farrakhan Declares Support for Iran's Nuclear Program; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink posting
(U) News Article; BBC News; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6395931.stm; pub 26 FEB 2007; Farewell Appearance for Farrakhan; entire article; ref 23 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[56] (U//LES) FBI; Counterterrorism Division Intelligence Bulletin No. 192; http://wadsintel.mcchord.af.smil.mil/Documents/Library/Graham's%20library/FBI%20Alert%20on%20Domestic%20Terrorism.doc; pub 12 JAN 2006; Terrorist Tactics: Potential Links Between Islamic Foreign Terrorist Groups and Domestic Extremist Groups; (U//LES); Para 7; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 02 NOV 2007; Counterterrorism notice

[57] (U//LES) FBI; Counterterrorism Division Intelligence Bulletin No. 192; http://wadsintel.mcchord.af.smil.mil/Documents/Library/Graham's%20library/FBI%20Alert%20on%20Domestic%20Terrorism.doc; pub 12 JAN 2006; Terrorist Tactics: Potential Links Between Islamic Foreign Terrorist Groups and Domestic Extremist Groups; (U//LES); Para 6; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 02 NOV 2007; Counterterrorism notice

[58] (U) Press Release; FBI; FBI Website; Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Director Robert S. Mueller, III FBI, The City Club of Cleveland, Ohio; pub 23 JUN 2006; www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm; ref 01 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[59] (U//LES) FBI; http://fbihq.adnet.sgov.gov/ctd/threat.pdf; pub JAN 2003; The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland: An FBI Assessment; (U//LES); page 22 para 4; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 25 SEP 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[60] (U//LES) FBI; http://fbihq.adnet.sgov.gov/ctd/threat.pdf; pub JAN 2003; The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland: An FBI Assessment; (U//LES); page 23 para 2; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 25 SEP 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[61] (U) Congressional Testimony; FBI Website; Statement of John E. Lewis Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works; pub 26 OCT 2005; www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/lewis102605.htm; ref 19 NOV 2007; transcript of Congressional Testimony; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[62] (U//LES) FBI; http://fbihq.adnet.sgov.gov/ctd/threat.pdf; pub JAN 2003; The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland: An FBI Assessment; (U//LES); page 13; (UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE); ref 25 SEP 2007; Intelligence Assessment

[63] (U) FBI Website; Robert S. Mueller III, Director, FBI; Penn State Forum Speaker Series, State College, Pennsylvania; pub 11 JUN 2007; pg 3; www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller110607.htm; ref 20 NOV 2007; Major Executive Speeches; (UNCLASSIFIED)
(U) OSC; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2005/09/us_shaken_by_qa.html; pub 08 SEP 2005; "U.S. Shaken By Qaeda 007"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink Posting of Washington Post article
(U) OSC; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2006/03/hacking_for_ter.html; pub 15 MAR 2006; "Hacking for Terror?"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink Posting of Newsweek article
(U) OSC; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2007/07/uk_case_shows_.html; pub 05 JUL 2007; "U.K. Case Shows Link Between Online Fraud and Jihadist Networks"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink Posting of Washington Post article
(U) OSC; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2007/07/terror_webmaste.html; pub 06 JUL 2007; "Terror Webmaster Sentenced in Britain"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink Posting of Washington Post article

[64] (U) News article; News Balita PH; http://news.balita.ph/html/article.php?story=20050831004116346&query=ramona%2Bferry; 30 AUG 2005; Ferry blast too weak to be ASGs work; para 4, 8-9, 11; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Internet posting
(U) News article; Zamboanga Today; http://www.zambonews.com/index.php?/archives/138-MV-DOA-RAMONA-BLAST-No-threat-letters-from-Abu-Sayyaf.html#extended; 30 AUG 2005; MV DOÑA RAMONA Blast – No threat letters from Abu Sayyaf ; para 2-3; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Internet posting
(U) News article; Manila Times; http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=33359; 22 MAR 2006; UNSOLVED CRIMES: Who Bombed the MV DOÑA RAMONA?; para 1-2, 4, 8; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Internet posting at ABS-CBN Interactive
(U) News article; Jeannette Andrade; Manila Times; 23 MAR 2006; UNSOLVED CRIMES: 4th Witness's Death Dooms Probe; para 2, 7; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Internet posting at ABS-CBN Interactive
(U//FOUO) OSC; JPP20050828000013; pub 28 AUG 2005; DOI 28 AUG 2005; "Officials Say Blast in Philippines May Be Work of Al-Qa'ida-Linked Militants"; (U); para 15; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 29 NOV 2007; OSINT posting of Hong Kong *AFP* (in English)
(U) Online publication; Al Jacinto; Sunstar Zamboanga; "Task force to probe ferry bombing formed"; pub 30 AUG 2005; para 1, 4-5, 9-10; http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/zam/2005/08/30/news.task.force.to.probe.ferry.bombing.formed.html; ref 15 DEC 2007; Online News Article; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[65] (U) OSC; https://www.intelink.gov/hls/articles/2005/06/simplot_ends_pr.html; pub 23 JUN 2005; "Simplot Ends Production, Sales of Fertilizer Used in Explosives"; (U); paragraph 4; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 20 NOV 2007; Intelink posting of Associated Press article
(U) OSC; http://www.hls.osis.gov/reference_documents/UA%20OOB_Domestic%20Right%20Wing.pdf; pub 2007; "Universal Adversary order of Battle: Domestic Right Wing"; (U); pg 7, 10-11; (UNCLASSIFED); ref 23 NOV 2007; Intelink Posting

[66] (U) Online Article; Ted Ottley; CrimeLibrary.com; "Student of Destruction"; pub 2007; entire article; www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/kaczynski/1.html; ref 21 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED); Feature Story

[67] (U) STRATFOR Online publication; "The Challenge of the Lone Wolf"; pub 30 MAY 2007; paragraph 6; http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=289448&selected=Analyses; ref 13 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[68] (U) Ibid (67)

[69] (U) Online publication; Deroy Murdock; Deseret News; "Crime Ridden Unions Threaten U.S. Ports", 15 OCT 2006; entire article; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20061015/ai_n16781845; 08 NOV 2007; online posting of Deseret News; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[70] (U) Online news article; Associated Press; Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor Web site; "Arab companies? Feds Are Worried About the Mafia at Ports: Unions accused of being a 'vehicle for organized crime'"; 11 MAR 2006; entire article; http://www.wcynh.org/newspage12.htm; ref 8 NOV 2007; Local Port Authority Web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[71] (U) US Secret Service; www.secretservice.gov.ntac.shtml; pub 16 MAY 2005; "Secret Service and Cert Release Report Analyzing Acts of Insider Sabotage Via Computer Systems in Critical Infrastructure Sectors"; (U); entire article; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 25 NOV 2007; Internet posting

[72] (U) Online publication; Tim Wilson; Dark Reading; "Are your software developers sabotaging your company's application code?"; 05 NOV 2007; entire article; http://www.darkreading.com; Online repository of Intel on IT security; ref 25 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[73] (U) Internet Site; Ben Wyld; Computer Crime Research Center; "Cyberterrorism: Fear Factor"; pub 20 July 2004; entire article; http://www.crime-research.org/analytics/501/; ref 21 NOV 2007; news article; (UNCLASSIFIED)
(U) Internet Site; Gary Hughes; The Age.com.au; "The cyberspace invaders"; pub 22 June 2003; entire article; http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/06/21/1056119529509.html; ref 21 NOV 2007; news article; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[74] (U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "America's Ports: Gateways to Global Trade"; 2006; pg 1; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1022&navitemnumber=901; ref 08 OCT 2007; trade publication; (UNCLASSIFIED)
(U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "U.S. Public Port Facts"; 2006; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1032&navitemnumber=1304; ref 08 OCT 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)
(U) Web site; US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; "The Safe Port Act: Using the Latest Technology to Secure our Ports"; pub 21 NOV 2006; http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=opseds.details&oped_id=10&month=11&year=2006; ref 08 OCT 2007; US Senate testimony; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[75] (U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "U.S. Public Port Facts"; 2006; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1032&navitemnumber=1304; ref 08 OCT 2007; trade industry web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[76] (U) Web site; Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command; "Anchorage is named DoD's newest Strategic Seaport"; pub 17 AUG 2004; http://www.sddc.army.mil/sddc/content/pub/37165/nr-028-2004%20anchorage%20is%20named%20dods.pdf; ref 08 OCT 2007; military web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)
(U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "America's Ports: Gateways to Global Trade"; 2006; pg 3; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1022&navitemnumber=901; ref 08 OCT 2007; trade publication; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[77] (U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "America's Ports: Gateways to Global Trade"; 2006; pg 1; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1022&navitemnumber=901; ref 08 OCT 2007; trade publication; (UNCLASSIFIED)
(U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "The Local and Regional Economic Impacts of the US Deepwater Port System, 2006"; 2007; pg 6; http://www.aapa-ports-org/press/prdetail.cfm?itemnumber=3485; ref 08 OCT 2007; economic study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[78] (U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "U.S. Public Port Facts"; 2006; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1032&navitemnumber=1304; ref 08 OCT 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[79] (U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "America's Ports: Gateways to Global Trade"; 2006; pg 3; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1022&navitemnumber=901; ref 08 OCT 2007; trade publication; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "The Local and Regional Economic Impacts of the US Deepwater Port System, 2006"; 2007; pg 6; http://www.aapa-ports-org/press/prdetail.cfm?itemnumber=3485; ref 08 OCT 2007; economic study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[80] (U) Web site; American Association of Port Authorities; "America's Ports: Gateways to Global Trade"; 2006; pg 2; http://www.aapa-ports-org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber=1022&navitemnumber=901; ref 08 OCT 2007; trade publication; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[81] (U) Web Site; Cruise Lines International Association; "Study Results Detail Cruise Industry's $35.7 Billion Contribution to U.S. Economy"; http://www.cruising.org/cruisenews/news.cfm?NID=273; pub 29 AUG 2007; ref 08 OCT 2007; cruise industry web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) Trade publication; Cruise Lines International Association web site; pub August 2007; pg 2; http://www.cruising.org/press/research/2006.CLIA.EconomicSummary.pdf.; "The Cruise Industry: A $35.7 Billion Partner in U.S. Economic Growth"; ref 08 OCT 2007; Economic impact study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[82] (U) Trade publication; Cruise Lines International Association web site; pub August 2007; pg 4; http://www.cruising.org/press/research/2006.CLIA.EconomicSummary.pdf.; "The Cruise Industry: A $35.7 Billion Partner in U.S. Economic Growth"; ref 08 OCT 2007; Economic impact study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[83] (U) Online Risk Assessment; RAND Corporation – Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz; Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability; pub 16 OCT 2006; Pages 52-55; http://www.rand.org/pubs/mongraphs/2006/RAND_MG520.sum.pdf; ref 01 NOV 2007; Maritime Risk Assessment; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[84] (U) United States Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center; http://www.icc.uscg.smil.mil/PTA/hamptonroads/page1.htm; pub 29 MAR 2007; Port Threat Assessment: Sector Hampton Roads; (U); Maritime Attacks: Increasing Global Trends section; (SECRET//NOFORN); ref 01 NOV 2007; Port Threat Assessment

[85] (U) OSC; IAP20051229011030; pub 24 DEC 2005; Algerian Militant Group Claims Responsibility For Bomb Attack on Sea Port; (U); para 2-4; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 18 DEC 2007; Open Source Center translation of statement by the Salafi Group for Call and Combat

[86] (U) International Institute for Counter-Terrorism web site; Akiva J. Lorenz; The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel; pub 24 SEP 2007; entire article; http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=16357&str=lorenz; ref 14 NOV 2007; Think tank study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[87] (U) Internet Paper; B. Raman; www.saag.org; Strategic Counter-Terrorism; pub 23 NOV 2005; page 6; 20 DEC 2007; Paper submitted to the Task Force on Global Strategic Developments of the Government of India; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[88] (U) International Institute for Counter-Terrorism web site; Akiva J. Lorenz; Al Qaeda's Maritime Threat; pub 15 APR 2007; entire article; http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=11847&str=lorenz; Akiva J. Lorenz; ref 14 NOV 2007; Think tank study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[89] (U) Online publication; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; C-TPAT: Customs –Trade Partnership Against Terrorism; pub 09 MAR 2006; entire document; www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/commercial_enforcement/ctpat; ref 19 DEC 2007 (UNCLASSIFIED)

[90] (U) Online publication; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Operation Safe Commerce; pub 2005; entire document; www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/FY05_OSC_revised.pdf; ref 19 DEC 2007; government document; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) Online publication; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; C-TPAT: Customs –Trade Partnership Against Terrorism; pub 09 MAR 2006; pg 31; www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/commercial_enforcement/ctpat; ref 19 DEC 2007 (UNCLASSIFIED)

[92] (U) Web site; US Department of Homeland Security; www.dhs.gov; pub 07 DEC 2006; DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight Initiative; entire article; http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1165520867989.shtm; ref 21 DEC 2007; government web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[93] (U)Web site; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; www.cbp.gov; Technology adds some "smarts" to sea container; entire article; http://www.cbp.gov/xp/customstoday/2005/nov_dec/technology.xml; ref 19 DEC 2007; government web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[94] (U)Web site; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; www.cbp.gov; Advanced X-Ray System Arrives at Port of Charleston, S.C.; entire article; http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/full_text_articles/new_xray.xml; ref 19 DEC 2007; government web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) Web site; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; www.cbp.gov; Mobile X-ray services provide options for travelers; entire article; http://www.cbp.gov/xp/ customstoday/2001/april/custoday_xray.xml; ref 19 DEC 2007; government web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[95] (U) Web site; RFID.org; www.aimglobal.org/; Technologies link; pub 2007; entire article; http://www.aimglobal.org/technologies/; ref 19 DEC 2007; RFID industry web site; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[96] (U) Web site; Supply Chain Information Sharing and Analysis Center; Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices; pub 07 JUL 2007; entire document; https://sc/isac.org/ISACMemberHome.aspx; ref 26 NOV 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[97] (U) New York Office of Homeland Security; Focus Report: Maritime Terrorist Threat to US Ports; 02 JAN 2006; Focus Report: Maritime Terrorist Threat to US Ports; (UNCLASSIFIED); pages 3, 8, 12, 17; (UNCLASSIFIED); ref 29 NOV 2007; Maritime Study

[98] (U//FOUO) DHS Information Bulletin; 03 May 2004; Situational Awareness Regarding Naval Mines Tactics; (U//FOUO); pg 2-3; (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO); ref 14 NOV 2007; law enforcement awareness bulletin

(U) Online publication; Scott C. Truver; Center for Security, Strategies, and Operations; pub 07 MAY 2007; entire document; http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cash:bic95tb/1fkj:minwar.org/Meetings/2007_05/Presentations/W1130%2520Struver%2520MINEWARA%2520May%2520/; ref 14 NOV 2007; Strategic think tank study; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[99] (U) Internet Site; Global Security; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm; Reference material; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[100] (U) Internet Site; The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT); www.tkb.org; Group Profile of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); ref 27 DEC 2007; Databank of Global Terrorist Incidents and Organizations; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[101] (U) Internet Site; US Department of State Consular Information Sheet; Sri Lanka; pub 11 OCT 2007; travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1025.html; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[102] (U) Internet Site; Global Security; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm; Reference material; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[103] (U) Internet Site; Global Security; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm; Reference material; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[104] (U) New York State Office of Homeland Security; Focus Report; pub 21 FEB 2006; Maritime Terrorist Threat; page 8; (U) (UNCLASSIFIED); Report prepared by a senior intelligence analyst

[105] (U) New York State Office of Homeland Security; Focus Report; pub 21 FEB 2006; Maritime Terrorist Threat; page 8; (U) (UNCLASSIFIED); Report prepared by a senior intelligence analyst

[106] (U) Internet Site; Jane's Security News; Group Profile: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE); pub 27 MAR 2007; www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jwit/jwit070327_1_n.shtml; ref 27 DEC 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)

[107] (U) Internet Site; South Asia Terrorism Portal; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM#; ref 27 DEC 2007; (UNCLASSIFIED)