

**ADVANCING EFFECTIVE U.S. COMPETITION WITH
CHINA: OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES, AND NEXT
STEPS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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JULY 22, 2020
—————

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CONTENTS

	Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho	1
Prepared Statement	3
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey	5
Biegun, Hon. Stephen E., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC	8
Prepared Statement	11

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez	55
Personal and Official Use Social Media Handbook—August 13, 2019	63
Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Cardin	74
Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions Submitted by Senator Edward Markey	76
Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz	77

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 2020

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m. in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Johnson, Gardner, Romney, Barrasso, Portman, Young, Cruz, Perdue, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, and Booker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Thank you all for coming today, and I want to thank all of you for being here. It is our honor to have Deputy Secretary of State, Steve Biegun, here today to testify on U.S. policy regarding the People's Republic of China.

I had originally planned to hold this hearing back in March. However, the need to focus on COVID-19 prevented us from doing that. Even as we continue to address the pandemic and its impact on U.S. citizens, it is important that this committee continue its work on the world's most pressing foreign policy challenges. Obviously, China is one of those.

This is especially the case for the topic we are discussing today. As the Trump administration has correctly recognized, China is a strategic and global competitor of the United States. It will be the greatest foreign policy challenge the United States faces in the decades to come. The policies of the Chinese Communist Party undermine U.S. interests and values, including those we share with allies and partners around the world.

COVID-19 has brought this challenge to the forefront of American life. We now know just how much the Chinese Communist Party's decisions and actions directly affect U.S. citizens, our allies and partners, and the entire world. And we know that not even a global pandemic will stop China's aggressive behavior, whether that is in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, or the Indian border.

Over the last 3 years, the Trump administration has taken numerous steps to put the United States on a stronger path to competing with China. Last week I was glad to see long overdue sanc-

tions on Chinese Communist Party officials for human rights abuses in Tibet and elsewhere.

I was also pleased that we declared China's claims in the South China Sea as unlawful and deployed two carrier battle groups there for exercises. And after the Chinese Communist Party crushed Hong Kong's autonomy, the President made the tough but necessary decision to end certain types of special treatment for Hong Kong.

In May, the Administration published a report on the implementation of its China strategy that goes into more detail.

So this is a good time for this committee to conduct oversight regarding our objectives, what we have done, and where we go from here.

This is also an opportunity to discuss China legislation put forward by members of this committee and others. This week, I introduced the Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives concerning China, or the STRATEGIC Act. It is a comprehensive approach to China with concrete policies in several key areas of the competition. I will describe some of them briefly.

We must continue our focus on China's anti-competitive economic policies. The Chinese Government engages in intellectual property theft and massive financing of Chinese companies and the most abusive anti-free market tactic of forced technology. This is a horrible practice, forced technology transfer. It is reprehensible. These policies are designed to push others out of the market and create monopolies. Innovative American companies like Micron Technologies based in my home state of Idaho know these challenges well. Their intellectual property was stolen by a Chinese company who then patented that technology in China and sued Micron.

The STRATEGIC Act authorizes new tools for U.S. companies to address the harms caused by such policies, among several other provisions. To maintain our economic and technological edge, it is not enough to just push back on what China is doing.

We also have to strengthen and invest in ourselves. In other committees, I have focused on this issue by supporting legislation promoting U.S. manufacturing of critical technologies, fortifying cybersecurity for our infrastructure and small businesses, and strengthening our technology workforce. The STRATEGIC Act focuses on increasing technology collaboration with allies and partners.

America is the world hub for innovation, and we can boost that innovation further by working with our highly capable partners. If we do, we will all be in a better position to develop the technologies of the future and ensure they are used to uphold individual freedom, human rights, and prosperity.

Finally, I want to stress the importance of deterrence. The United States, of course, does not seek any sort of military confrontation with China. However, China's military is getting bigger, more capable, and becoming more aggressive. In the Indo-Pacific region, we should all be a lot more worried about the Chinese Communist Party's plans for Taiwan, given what it just did to Hong Kong. In addition to the South China Sea, Japan faces almost daily incursions and pressure in the East China Sea. Beyond the region,

China's Belt and Road Initiative is also helping the Chinese military expand its presence.

We have to make it completely clear to the Chinese Communist Party that we are willing and able to defend our interests. That means we are affirming our commitments to our Indo-Pacific allies even as they need to take on a larger role in defending the interests we share. The STRATEGIC Act focuses on key steps for advancing defense cooperation with our allies, including advocating for several difficult but important policy changes.

I want to stress that this bill that I have introduced does not—does not—seek to block China. Rather, what it does is it offers prosperity. It offers an invitation to join the international community and operate under the rule of law and under international norms. If that happens, we all will prosper. We should not miss the bipartisan opportunity that we have today to address these things.

I will close with a note about bipartisanship. Time and time again on everything from human rights to investment screening, the Senate has worked across the aisle on China. Unfortunately, in recent months, that has become a lot harder. We have a long road ahead of us in this competition. We cannot allow partisanship to get in the way even in an election year. Whatever happens in November, China will remain an issue. If we do not work together, the United States as a whole will be weaker.

I introduced this bill to push forward a serious and bipartisan conversation about the Senate's role in advancing an effective strategy of competition. I want to thank several of my colleagues on this committee from both sides of the aisle in joining me on that effort. There is both Republican and Democrat input into this bill not only from this committee, also from the think tanks around Washington, DC, including Democrat think tanks. And I hope this will be the start of more cooperation to come. When we get to a final bill, I am very hopeful that that bill will contain items that everyone has an interest in.

There has been a number of people that have introduced bills. I know the ranking member is about to introduce a bill. I have no doubt that there will be things in there that we can all embrace, and I hope as we get to a final bill, we will have things that we can embrace on a bipartisan basis.

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Senator Menendez.

[The prepared statement of Senator Risch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Thank you all for coming today. It is an honor to have Deputy Secretary of State Steve Biegun here today to testify on U.S. policy regarding the People's Republic of China. I had originally planned to hold this hearing back in March. However, the need to focus on COVID-19 prevented us from doing that. Even as we continue to address the pandemic and its impact on U.S. citizens, it is important that this committee continue its work on the world's most pressing foreign policy challenges. Obviously, China is one of those.

That is especially the case for the topic we are discussing today. As the Trump administration has correctly recognized, China is a strategic and global competitor of the United States. It will be the greatest foreign policy challenge the United States faces in the decades to come. The policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) undermine U.S. interests and values, including those we share with allies and partners around the world.

COVID-19 has brought this challenge to the forefront of American life. We now know just how much the CCP's decisions and actions directly affect U.S. citizens, our allies and partners, and the entire world. And we know not even a global pandemic will stop China's aggressive behavior—whether that's in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, or along the Indian border.

Over the last 3 years, the Trump administration has taken numerous steps to put the United States on a stronger path to competing with China. Last week I was glad to see long overdue sanctions on CCP officials for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet. I was also pleased that we declared China's claims in the South China Sea as unlawful, and deployed two carrier battle groups there for exercises. And after the CCP crushed Hong Kong's autonomy, the president made the tough but necessary decision to end certain types of special treatment for Hong Kong.

In May, the Administration published a report on the implementation of its China strategy that goes into more detail. So this is a good time for the Committee to conduct oversight regarding our objectives, what we've done, and where we go from here.

This is also an opportunity to discuss China legislation put forward by members of this committee and others. This week, I introduced the Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives Concerning China Act (STRATEGIC Act). It is a comprehensive approach to China with concrete policies in several key areas of the competition. I'll describe some of them briefly.

We must continue our focus on China's anti-competitive economic policies. The Chinese government engages in intellectual property theft and massive financing of Chinese companies, and the most abusive anti-free market tactic of forced technology transfer. This is a horrible practice—it's reprehensible.

These policies are designed to push others out of the market and create monopolies. Innovative American companies like Micron Technologies, based in my home state of Idaho, know these challenges well. Their intellectual property was stolen by a Chinese company, who then patented that technology in China and sued Micron. The STRATEGIC Act authorizes new tools for U.S. companies to address the harms caused by such policies, among several other provisions.

To maintain our economic and technological edge, it's not enough to just push back on what China is doing. We also have to strengthen and invest in ourselves. In other committees, I have focused on this issue by supporting legislation promoting U.S. manufacturing of critical technologies, fortifying cyber security for our infrastructure and small businesses, and strengthening our technology workforce.

The STRATEGIC Act focuses on increasing technology collaboration with allies and partners. America is a world hub for innovation, and we can boost that innovation further by working with our highly capable partners. If we do, we will all be in a better position to develop the technologies of the future, and ensure they are used to uphold individual freedom, human rights, and prosperity.

Finally, I want to stress the importance of deterrence. The United States, of course, does not seek any sort of military confrontation with China. However, China's military is getting bigger, more capable, and becoming more aggressive. In the Indo-Pacific region, we should all be a lot more worried about the CCP's plans for Taiwan, given what it just did to Hong Kong. In addition to the South China Sea, Japan faces almost daily incursions and pressure in the East China Sea. Beyond the region, China's Belt and Road Initiative is also helping the Chinese military expand its presence.

We have to make it completely clear to the CCP that we are willing and able to defend our interests. That means reaffirming our commitments to our Indo-Pacific allies—even as they need to take on a larger role in defending the interests we share. The STRATEGIC Act focuses on key steps for advancing defense cooperation with our allies, including advocating for several difficult but important policy changes.

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Time and time again—on everything from human rights to investment screening—the Senate has worked across the aisle on China. But unfortunately, in recent months, that has become a lot harder. We have a long road ahead of us in this competition. We cannot allow partisanship to get in the way, even in an election year. Whatever happens in November, China will remain an issue. If we do not work together, the United States as a whole will be weaker.

I introduced this bill to push forward a serious, and bipartisan, conversation about the Senate's role in advancing an effective strategy of competition. I want to thank several of my colleagues on this committee, from both sides of the aisle, for joining me in that effort. There is both Republican and Democrat input into this bill, not only from this committee, but also from think tanks around Washington, DC, including Democrat think tanks. And I hope this will be the start of more cooperation to come.

When we get to a final bill, I'm very hopeful that that bill will contain items that everyone has an interest in. There's been a number of people that have introduced bills. I know the ranking member is about to introduce a bill—I have no doubt that there will be things in there that we can all embrace. And I hope that as we get to a final bill, we will have things that we can embrace on a bipartisan basis.

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Biegun, my thanks for joining us here today, especially as it has been so long since we have had a senior administration witness before the committee.

As you and I have discussed in the past, I think the Administration is asking the right questions about China and the U.S.-China relationship. Unfortunately, however, I find that the Administration's strategies and policies fall well short of answering the enormity of the challenge. We need instead, as the title of this hearing suggests, an effective China strategy.

The China of 2020 is not the China of 1972 or even the China of 2000 or 2010. China today is challenging the United States across every dimension of power—political, diplomatic, economic, innovation, military, even cultural—and with an alternative and deeply disturbing model for global governance.

China today, led by the Communist Party and propelled by Xi Jinping's hyper nationalism, is unlike any challenge we have faced as a nation before. Emboldened by the retrenchment, shortcomings, and sometimes enablement of the Trump administration, China today is more active and more assertive in the region and in the international community than ever before.

Indeed, just since this past March, China has increased its patrols near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, as well as its coercive activities in the South China Sea, conducted air and maritime patrols intended to threaten Taiwan, clashed with India along the actual line of control—the People's Liberation Army's first use of force abroad in 30 years—continue to implement a morally repugnant campaign of genocide in Xinjiang, its cruel oppression of the Tibetan people, and the crushing of its own civil liberty.

Just yesterday I released a report, the New Big Brother, looking at how China has stepped up its game in seeking to export a new model of digital authoritarianism and manipulate new technologies to control its own citizens and people worldwide.

But aside from bluster rhetoric and some hastily written sanctions, what has the response been from the Administration? The Administration is now taking strong action on Hong Kong, but for months when the people of Hong Kong needed us, the President was silent and complicit in China's erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy, happy to trade Hong Kong for his so-called trade deal.

Along with the chairman, I welcomed regular freedom of navigation assertions and the Administration's recent clarification of our approach to claims in the South China Sea, but the reality is that over the past 3 years, China's aggression and coercion in the South China Sea has continued completely unchecked.

The United Kingdom's change of policy on Huawei, while welcomed, was I would suggest, despite us not because of us.

And on trade and economics, this Administration has walked away from building regional architecture, embraced a so-called phase one trade deal which seemingly achieves nothing. Certainly it does not address the core structural issues in the relationship and leaves us, in the words of your own U.S. Trade Representative, wondering what the end goal of your trade policy is. If he does not know, then we all have a real problem.

On Taiwan, I note that in every year of the Obama-Biden administration, Taiwan was invited to the World Health Assembly. In no year of the Trump administration has that been the case. And I could go on.

In short, I am deeply concerned that the Administration's approach is one which labors under the mistaken belief that just being confrontational is the same thing as being competitive. And that is my question, in fact, about the action announced today in Houston. I am all for safeguarding our national security. I understand the importance of being tough with China, but being tough as the means, not the ends. So while there may be reason for taking this action—and I look forward to a briefing on it in an appropriate setting—I want to understand better not just the tactical considerations, but how this measure advances our strategy. What is the effect we expect this to have on China's behavior? When China retaliates, as they have said they will, what will be our next move and our next after that? I am obviously not asking you to disclose specific actions, which I know you will not and should not, but this is not a simple two-step dance. So help me understand where you think this is all going.

I ask this because there should be little doubt that we are, indeed, in a new era of strategic competition with China, and the United States needs a new strategic framework and a new set of organizing principles to address the challenges of this new era. So far, and despite all the bluster, that effective new strategy has been utterly lacking from this Administration.

One of the core organizing principles I would suggest is the importance of working in close coordination with our allies and partners to develop a shared and effective approach to China. And I have to say, Secretary Biegun, that the Administration's disastrously wrong-headed, alienating, and attacking approach to our alliances has been one of the most disheartening to witness these past several years. Our alliances, our partnerships, and the shared values on which they stand and our reliability in the face of adversity are our special source for effective global leadership. This value-driven diplomacy is one of the reasons why Senator Rubio and I have joined colleagues around the globe to form the International Parliamentary Alliance on China, IPAC, to provide the vision and leadership and build the relationships needed for our strategic success.

I know you argue that this President and the Administration have been uniquely successful with China, and I know you are good at your job. But facts are indeed stubborn things.

Now, before the hearing devolves into a hearing bashing China and the World Health Organization for the COVID pandemic, let me assure you, one, I stand second to no one in this body regarding concerns over how China's paranoid totalitarianism contributed to its spread. But blame game politics will not save American lives. Instead of relying on science and knowledge, the Administration has spent its energy towards finding fault and racially inflammatory rhetoric that both threatens the safety and well-being of Asian Americans and further alienates us on the global stage, including at the G-7 and the U.N. Security Council.

If the Administration is truly concerned about China's malign intent at the World Health Organization and elsewhere, there is a simple solution: show up, take action. If the U.S. leads, others will follow. If we leave the field open, if our own country cannot develop the serious strategy at home, others like China are only too eager to step into the vacuum.

I know the chairman, as he has mentioned, has introduced legislation today on China. I welcome his effort. As I mentioned at another hearing this morning, I am also working with colleagues on a bill to create a comprehensive China strategy, cross cutting jurisdictions beyond, including this committee, including trade and economic issues and investments here at home, which we plan to shortly introduce. Given the shortcomings of the President's bluster and tactics but no strategy approach to China, a comprehensive and integrated approach is needed. I suspect there will be many areas of agreement between my bill and the chairman's, and so I look forward to working with him on a combined approach.

And it is in this spirit, Mr. Secretary, that I implore you today beyond this hearing in a genuine conversation with us about how we work together to develop a comprehensive approach to China, to reset our strategy and our diplomacy, to reinvest and replenish the sources of national strength and competitiveness at home, to place our partnerships and allies first that reflects our fundamental values as Americans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Menendez. I think in comparing our two statements, we have much to agree on, and overall I think we both agree that this comprehensive strategy is needed as we go forward. And I can assure you when you do get that briefing on the closing, you certainly will agree that the closing was appropriate under the circumstances.

So with that, I want to turn to our witness. The Honorable Stephen Biegun was sworn in as Deputy Secretary of State in December of 2019. Immediately prior, he served as U.S. Special Representative for North Korea. Mr. Biegun has three decades of experience serving in both the executive and legislative branches, including a stint as Chief of Staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Deputy Biegun, we appreciate your being here today, and I invite you to have the floor.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

If I may ask for my full statement to be submitted to the record. I would like to give a shorter version in order to leave maximum time for members' questions today.

The CHAIRMAN. That is certainly agreeable, and we will include your full statement in the record.

Mr. BIEGUN. Again, thank you both for the invitation to testify today. It truly is a pleasure and I am pleased to be back. As you both pointed out, this is an important moment in U.S.-China relations, and the Secretary and I appreciate your serious focus and that of the whole committee in trying to shape a bipartisan approach to this vital policy matter. We recognize that to be successful, U.S. policy towards the PRC must be grounded in consensus across our governing institutions and across our society.

Mr. Chairman, for this reason we welcome the legislation you introduced today, and Senator Menendez, we look forward to seeing yours as well. These are designed to frame the U.S. strategic approach towards the People's Republic of China, and this, along with all the other recent legislation passed by the Congress, have provided us with crucial tools to advance our policies against the challenges that we face.

Across multiple administrations, the United States has supported China's entry into the rules-based international order in hopes that China would be a partner in upholding international law, norms, and institutions, and that the United States and China could develop a friendly relationship with reciprocal benefit. Over more than three decades, U.S. policies towards the PRC have advanced that goal through a massive outpouring of international assistance and lending through foreign investment, facilitation of Chinese membership in global institutions, and the education of millions of China's brightest scholars at our best universities.

Where this Administration diverges from previous administrations is in the will to face the uncomfortable truth in U.S.-China relations, that the policies of the past three decades simply have not produced the outcomes for which so many had hoped, and that the United States must take decisive action to counter the PRC at this moment.

As stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, despite the huge dividends to the PRC in terms of prosperity, trade, and global influence that the United States supported and its engagement had delivered, Beijing has instead chosen to take increasingly a hard line and aggressive actions both at home and abroad. And China has emerged as a strategic competitor to the United States and to the rules-based global order.

We find the China-U.S. relationship today weighed down by a growing number of disputes, including commercial espionage and intellectual property theft from American companies, unequal treatment of our diplomats, businesses, NGOs and journalists by Chinese authorities, and abuse of the United States' academic freedom and welcoming posture towards international students to steal

sensitive technology and research from our universities in order to advance the PRC's military capabilities.

It is these factors which has led the President to direct a number of actions in response, including yesterday's notification to the PRC that we have withdrawn our consent for the PRC to operate its consulate in Houston, Texas.

There is also growing alarm around the world about the dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy, liberty, and democratic institutions, the arbitrary mass detentions and other human rights abuses in Xinjiang, efforts to eliminate Tibetan identity, military pressure against Taiwan, and the assertion of unfounded maritime claims in the South China Sea. Other areas of concern include China's increasingly assertive use of military and economic coercion and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns including, among others, against India, Australia, Canada, the UK, ASEAN members of the European Union, and several other European countries.

At the Department of State, both Secretary Pompeo and I are involved day to day in the full range of policy matters related to the PRC, an issue that touches upon every dimension of the Department of State's work. The Department has launched a number of diplomatic and economic policy initiatives described in more detail in my written testimony to uphold and defend our interests and those of our friends and allies in areas such as global infrastructure development, market access, and telecommunications security. Much of what we are doing would serve our global interests under any circumstances, but the unfortunate trends we see in China make our actions all the more urgent.

We have organized internally, through the leadership of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, along with the Directors of Policy Planning and our Global Engagement Center, to align internal policymaking in virtually every single bureau and office in the Department. We are likewise organizing our diplomats to focus on competition with China around the world.

As part of a comprehensive approach, we are engaged with allies and partners in the G-7, the G-20, and NATO to highlight the threat that the PRC poses not just to the United States' interests but also the interests of our allies and partners. We are broadening partnerships across the transatlantic community, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and the western hemisphere.

Across the Indo-Pacific region, the United States is deepening relationships with the countries that share our values and interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific. Last September, we held a ministerial level meeting of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan marking a new milestone in our diplomatic engagement in a new Indo-Pacific Quad in the region.

We are enhancing our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, which have helped sustain peace and security for generations, and we are furthering our cooperation with ASEAN, an organization central to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Our security assistance to South China Sea claimant states and our recent rejection of the PRC's maritime claims helps partners protect their autonomy and maritime resources.

We are working with the Mekong countries to ensure sustainable development in energy security, and we have doubled development assistance to our Pacific island partners through the Pacific Pledge.

On the other side of the world, China has increasingly become a topic of transatlantic and Five Eye discussions. The Secretary recently announced that the United States has accepted the EU's proposal to create a U.S.-EU dialogue on China to discuss our common concerns about the threats that the PRC poses to our shared democratic values. Similarly, the PRC is a core topic of our security dialogues with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

In our hemisphere, the United States is working with neighbors to reaffirm the region's longstanding dedication to free societies and free markets. We are working on improving the investment climate for all types of infrastructure, including energy, airports, ports, road, telecom, and digital networks. In addition to USAID development and humanitarian assistance, we expect the United States International Development Finance Corporation to deploy \$12 billion to the western hemisphere in the coming years, all towards this effort of making a priority of promoting transparency and privacy in particular in the digital economy.

Though the PRC has made extensive inroads across Africa over the past decade, encouragingly some African governments have begun to monitor Chinese projects, require Chinese firms to employ more African labor, and demand protection of Africa's fragile ecosystems. Our diplomatic engagement on the continent will continue to highlight the perils of opaque and unsustainable PRC lending practices.

In the Middle East, we have successfully engaged with partners to recognize the core costs that come with certain commercial engagements with the PRC especially telecommunications infrastructure.

And finally, we are working with allies and partners to prevent the PRC from undermining international organizations through undue influence.

Mr. Chairman, consistent with the priorities of your legislation, I should also underscore that engagement between the United States and China remains of central importance in managing tensions and exploring areas of mutual interest where efforts might align. But we will only make a difference if our engagement produces real progress on the many issues that I have enumerated today.

Last month, I joined Secretary Pompeo in Hawaii to meet with our Chinese counterparts. In the 2-day discussion, the Secretary stressed that deeds, not words, were the pathway to achieve mutual respect and reciprocity between our countries across commercial, security, diplomatic, and people-to-people interactions. He made clear our determination to push back against Beijing's efforts to undermine democratic norms, challenge the sovereignty of our friends and allies, and engage in unfair trade practices. But at the same time, he outlined areas where the United States and the PRC could cooperate to solve global challenges.

Among the issues that we could start with are strategic stability around nuclear capabilities and doctrine, coordinated efforts to

identify the origins and spread of COVID-19, a denuclearized North Korea that ensures peace and stability for all who live on the Korean Peninsula, peace-building in Afghanistan, international narcotics production and trafficking, and as evidenced by the phase one trade deal earlier this year, balanced and reciprocal economic policies that will benefit both countries. The United States also welcomes people-to-people exchanges, including the hosting of each other's students, provided that they are here exclusively for the purpose of study.

We would also welcome Members of Congress from both sides of the Capitol and both sides of the aisle to not only work in partnership with the executive branch, but to also extend your own engagement to better understand the aspirations of the Chinese people. Of course, this includes meeting with your Chinese Government counterparts, but it must also include reaching out to the many voices of China that are found outside of China, those not free to be heard at home and therefore requiring our assistance to be heard.

Let me be clear. The United States supports the aspirations of those Chinese people who seek to live in peace, prosperity, and freedom. Secretary Pompeo has met with pro-democracy leaders from Hong Kong, with Chinese dissidents and survivors of repression in Xinjiang, and last month I was honored to present the International Women of Courage Award to the Mothers of Tiananmen. The bravery of many Chinese people who seek to advance human rights and universal freedoms inspires us all in our work.

Mr. Chairman, we are urgently taking the necessary steps to defend the interests of the United States. As we seek to correct the imbalance in our relations with China, we must address today's realities while, at the same time, leaving open tomorrow's possibilities. With our friends and allies, we are standing up for universal rights and the rules-based international system, the system that has provided the world's collective peace, security, and prosperity for generations to the benefit of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the entire world.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Biegun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. BIEGUN

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez, Members of the Committee, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify today regarding United States policy towards the People's Republic of China, or the PRC. This is an important moment in the U.S.-China relationship, and the Secretary and I appreciate the serious focus that your Committee is taking to shaping a bipartisan approach to this vital policy priority. As the Secretary has said, China is the first foreign policy challenge he thinks about each morning, and every one of us at the Department of State is focused on succeeding in this critical effort.

I want to begin by restating what Secretary Pompeo made clear in October. He said, "We have a long-cherished tradition of friendship with the Chinese people. We continue to do so today. We have a Chinese-American community here in America that we love and treasure . . . The Chinese Communist Party today is not the same as the Chinese people." Let me be clear: the United States supports the aspirations of those Chinese people who seek to live in peace, prosperity, and freedom.

Over the course of many years and across multiple administrations, in our relations with Beijing, the United States has sought to spur China's integration into the rules-based international order by strengthening, not undermining, international law, norms, and institutions. Over more than three decades, U.S. policies towards

China have been aimed at that goal—by supporting China’s economic development through the massive outpouring of international assistance and lending to develop infrastructure and economic institutions; by beneficial trade treatment and robust foreign investment; by facilitation of Chinese membership in global institutions such as the World Trade Organization; by development and humanitarian assistance, by the education of millions of China’s brightest scholars at our best schools; and by intensive commercial diplomacy to address strategic and sectoral economic concerns. We anchored economic and diplomatic policies toward China in the expectation that they would produce the gradual but eventual opening and liberalization of China and its peaceful rise in a manner that would enhance stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, increase the freedoms of its own people, and expand global prosperity in a mutually beneficial manner.

Where this Administration diverges from previous Administrations is in the will to face an uncomfortable truth in the U.S.-China relationship—the policies of the past three decades have simply not produced the outcome for which so many had hoped. As stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy: “(f)or decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s world-class universities.”

As further stated in the National Security Strategy, “(a)lthough the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to further its political and security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.”

Secretary Pompeo summed up this strategic shift in his October 30 speech: “It is no longer realistic to ignore the fundamental differences between our two systems and the impact that . . . the differences in those systems have on American national security . . . Today, we are finally realizing the degree to which the Communist Party is truly hostile to the United States and our values.”

An honest assessment of trends in the U.S.-China relationship suggests that re-consideration of U.S. policy toward China is urgent and overdue. The United States must respond with the full toolkit of policy instruments. These instruments will be adapted to defend against PRC efforts to undermine U.S.-supported institutions, respond to actions that encroach upon the sovereign interests of our allies and partners, hold the PRC accountable for its human rights violations and abuses, and respond to Chinese policies that fail to provide reciprocal opportunities for equivalent U.S. entities.

Concerns about Beijing’s policies are fueled by a growing number of disputes and areas of concern. These longstanding areas of concern include intellectual property theft and commercial espionage (including through cyber-enabled means), unequal treatment of U.S. diplomats, exporters and investors, non-governmental organizations, social media companies, and traditional media outlets and journalists in China, as well as the abuse by PRC security services of the United States’ open and welcoming posture toward Chinese students and researchers. Additional areas of concern include the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy, liberty, and democratic institutions, military pressure against Taiwan, arbitrary mass detentions and other human rights abuses in Xinjiang, efforts to eliminate Tibetan identity, and the assertion of unfounded maritime claims in the South China Sea. Finally, there is growing alarm in the United States and around the world with the Chinese government’s use of military and economic coercion and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns against the United States and our allies and partners, including, among others, India, Australia, Canada, the European Union, and several individual European governments.

United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China roughly falls within five broad areas:

- First, using the full toolkit of United States foreign policy instruments including diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, commercial diplomacy, trade law, law enforcement, export controls and sanctions, and military deterrence;
- Second, steady application of pressure to push back the PRC's attempt to change and replace the U.S.-led free and open international order in areas of dispute or competition;
- Third, reciprocal and transparent treatment of PRC institutions and organizations commensurate with PRC treatment of equivalent U.S. entities;
- Fourth, close cooperation among all U.S. stakeholders in the relationship with the People's Republic of China, including bipartisan engagement, Congressional-Executive coordination, the expert and think tank community, academia, business and civil society;
- And fifth, strengthening international cooperation with allies and partners on shared concerns with the conduct of the Chinese Communist Party, with special emphasis in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States and the PRC are likely for the foreseeable future to remain competitors, but this does not mean our two nations need to be enemies. As the Administration has reiterated, we seek a constructive and results-oriented relationship with Beijing, and we will cooperate with China where our interests align. U.S. policies are designed to protect our interests, we do not envision a zero sum game as long as China abides by the key principle of reciprocity and transparency. Indeed, we want to see a prosperous China that is at peace with its own people and with its neighbors. Historically, in shaping the U.S.-China relationship, numerous Presidents have engaged with China's leaders in direct diplomacy and held any number of strategic dialogues, sectoral dialogues, and security dialogues over the past several decades to resolve problems and advance mutual interests.

While the days of high-level ceremonial dialogues that didn't produce concrete results are over, we still continue to advance our own interests by remaining directly engaged at every level with the PRC from the President on down, under the principle of reciprocity and transparency. Such engagement remains an important means to manage tensions and explore areas of mutual interest where cooperation might flourish. Among the issues that we could start with are strategic stability around nuclear capabilities and doctrine; coordinated efforts to identify the origins, and spread of COVID-19; a denuclearized North Korea to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; peace building in Afghanistan; efforts to stem international narcotics production and trafficking; locating and returning the remains of our service members from the World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War; and, as evidenced by the Phase One trade deal agreed earlier this year, balanced and reciprocal economic policies.

USING THE FULL TOOLKIT

The China challenge is serious and of grave consequence to the United States. Government leaders are therefore responsible for explaining to the American people the key aspects of the threats posed by the PRC to our freedoms and democratic way of life. Initiated by Secretary of State Pompeo, the senior-most U.S. officials, including National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and Attorney General Bill Barr, delivered a series of important speeches on this topic. Tomorrow, Secretary Pompeo will continue the series in a China policy address at the Nixon Library to rally the American people to confront the daunting threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

As Secretary Pompeo will detail, the U.S. approach utilizes the full toolkit of United States foreign policy instruments to push back the PRC's attempt to export its Communist model of governance. The United States is actively pursuing our policies through diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, export controls and sanctions, countering disinformation and propaganda, foreign assistance, commercial diplomacy, trade law, law enforcement, and military deterrence.

The core of our diplomatic work is to reinforce the principles of democratic governance, the rule of law, and sustainable development, including by shining a spotlight on PRC behavior that is out of line with internationally recognized norms, standards, and best practices. Too often, the PRC, through its state-owned enterprises, has enabled corruption, eroded good governance and the rule of law, weakened labor rights, and damaged the environment. We are working with allies and partners to

press Beijing to meet high standards in terms of transparency, adherence to the rule of law and anti-corruption practices, debt sustainability, labor rights, environmental best practices, and the concerns of local communities.

Attorney General Barr and FBI Director Wray have been active in leading our efforts to counter PRC malign actions here at home. They have recently outlined for the American people their China Initiative and are raising awareness of the threats we face from CCP activities.

An integral component of this global effort is on the economic front, where the PRC has leveraged its state-led economic model to undercut fair competition and advance its own goals. Beijing's statist model and massive corporate subsidies mean any economic initiative, such as the PRC's One Belt One Road initiative, will have distorting effects while also potentially advancing malign PRC political objectives. Further, the PRC's billions of dollars of opaque loans to emerging-market economies undermine the governance and autonomy of vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and autocratic behavior in struggling democracies.

The United States has been on the forefront of raising global awareness about the dangers of PRC lending and investment. Untrusted PRC telecommunications vendors such as Huawei and ZTE benefit from substantial market distorting subsidies and are beholden both legally and extra-judicially to the PRC. The President recently released the National Strategy to Secure 5G outlining lines of effort the United States is taking both at home and in its engagement overseas. The State Department is implementing the national strategy through the Clean Networks initiative to address the threat posed to the United States, our allies, and partners by untrusted vendors including to critical infrastructure, privacy, security, and human rights. Under the umbrella of our related Economic Prosperity Network, the United States is advancing initiatives to promote the principles of trust, reciprocity, accountability, integrity, and respect among a voluntary coalition of partner countries, companies, and civil society organizations. Some key initiatives include:

- *Clean Networks*: This is a comprehensive effort by a coalition of like-minded countries and companies to secure their critical telecommunications, cloud, data analytics, mobile apps, Internet of Things, and 5G technologies from malign actors by relying on only trusted vendors who are not subject to unjust or extra-judicial control by authoritarian governments, such as the Chinese Communist Party. Clean Networks consists of multiple lines of effort all rooted in Digital Trust Standards.
- *Investment Screening Outreach*: The Department of State, together with the Department of Treasury, works closely with foreign governments to encourage the adoption and full implementation of factually rigorous, transparent, and national security focused investment screening mechanisms.
- *Deal Teams*: Through the Deal Team initiative launched by the Departments of State and Commerce in February, we helping U.S. firms more effectively compete and win projects abroad.
- *Strategic Infrastructure*: The Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN) is a great example of a specialized deal team in action. This group of 11 agencies has identified and advanced more than \$125 billion in infrastructure deals in the Indo-Pacific. Alongside partners such as Japan and Australia, we are providing credible, collective alternative to Beijing's One Belt One Road offerings.
- *Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership*: The Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership is a whole of government effort to promote a vibrant digital economy in developing countries, based on transparency and privacy. This initiative is a direct challenge to Chinese government's efforts to export its authoritarian approaches to internet governance.
- *Blue Dot Network*: The Blue Dot Network, launched at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in November 2019 with Japan and Australia, is a multi-stakeholder initiative to certify quality infrastructure investment projects. The Blue Dot Network is another example of how we use a positive approach to show case the infrastructure investment best practices employed by the United States and our partners.
- *Debt Service Suspension Initiative*: With like-minded partners, the World Bank, and the IMF, we are leveraging the G20-Paris Club Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to increase debt transparency and address opaque and unsustainable PRC lending. The United States is faithfully implementing the DSSI by suspending official bilateral debt payments from the poorest countries to year-end 2020, providing those countries fiscal space to fund social, health, and other measures to respond to the pandemic.

The UK's recent commendable decision to ban Huawei gear from its 5G networks is an indication of a growing international consensus that PRC government control over all aspects of society—including private industry—is a security risk. The UK joins the United States and many other democracies in putting in place strong measures to mitigate the security risks posed by untrusted suppliers. In the same way, many major telecom companies like Spain's Telefonica and Japan's NTT have committed to only using trusted vendors. We are glad to see that many of our allies and partners, including the UK, recognize this threat.

On April 29, Secretary Pompeo announced that the Department of State will require a 5G Clean Path between the United States and U.S. diplomatic facilities for secure 5G standalone end-to-end communications so that they do not use any transmission, control, computing, storage equipment, or services from an untrusted 5G vendor, such as Huawei or ZTE. A number of countries such as Poland are joining us in requiring a clean path for their own diplomatic facilities.

Further, the Peruvian government's recent decision to select the UK as Peru's Infrastructure Delivery Partner to rebuild facilities damaged by El Nino—excluding the PRC by default because it couldn't meet international standards—is an excellent example of how our promotion of international standards is being adopted by countries around the globe, even when the United States is not directly involved.

STEADY APPLICATION OF PRESSURE

We at the Department of State are working hard every day to counter Beijing's threatening and malign activities around the world. Put simply: we are holding the PRC to its commitments, both to us and to international law and standards. We are challenging PRC behavior and we will call Beijing out publicly when it falls short. We will defend our interests and those of our friends and allies when they are threatened.

The past few weeks alone have seen particularly egregious examples of PRC dangerous and malign actions: violence on the border with India; aggressive moves in the South China Sea and around Taiwan and the Senkakus Islands; and the unilateral imposition of draconian "national security" legislation on Hong Kong, in clear violation of its treaty law obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Contravening the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of which the PRC is a signatory, the PRC has perpetuated a years-long brutal campaign of repression against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, including arbitrary mass detention, forced labor, coercive family planning practices, and restrictions on cultural and religious expression, reminiscent of its longstanding mistreatment of Tibetans.

On July 13, Secretary Pompeo announced an important step to strengthen U.S. policy on maritime claims in the South China Sea. That announcement made clear: Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them. We are standing with Southeast Asian coastal states to uphold their sovereign rights under international law. We welcomed your bicameral joint statement on the South China Sea, Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Menendez, reflecting American resolve in clarifying the United States' position that the PRC's maritime claims in the South China Sea are unlawful.

The Department of Defense is actively continuing to sail, fly, and operate wherever international law allows. In the South China Sea, Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian coastal states, bully them out of offshore resources, assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with "might makes right." Beijing's approach has been clear for years. In 2010, a senior PRC official told his ASEAN counterparts that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact." The PRC's predatory worldview has no place in the 21st century.

Countries large and small, such as Australia, Canada, the member states of the EU, Vietnam, and others, are standing up to PRC tactics. In retaliation for Australia's strong push back on PRC actions, Beijing has taken to imposing punitive tariffs on Australian exports to the PRC, and "warning" Chinese tourists and students to avoid Australia for fabricated reasons. Shortly after Canadian police arrested Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. arrest warrant in December 2018, Beijing detained two Canadian men on politically motivated security charges. Last month, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau rejected a call to swap Meng for the two Canadian citizens held by Beijing, saying such a move would set a bad precedent and harm Canada.

The PRC has been particularly aggressive in using U.S. academic freedoms to co-opt U.S. expertise and steal intellectual property. This is a key aspect of its Mili-

tary-Civil Fusion strategy that includes a campaign to acquire sensitive U.S. technologies and intellectual property to bolster its military modernization efforts. To protect the integrity of our open and collaborative research system and ensure that the United States remains the global leader on cutting-edge research, last month President Trump issued a proclamation suspending the entry of graduate and post-graduate students and researchers associated with entities that support the PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy.

The Department of Justice and FBI continually announce new cases involving investigations and indictments of Chinese nationals attempting to steal U.S. technology, trade secrets, and even individuals' personal data. This week's indictment of Stanford researcher Song Chen, who lied about her status as an active member of the PRC military, is but a latest example. As FBI Director Christopher Wray said earlier this month, if you are an adult U.S. citizen, it is more likely than not that the PRC has stolen your personal data, and the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours.

A key element of the PRC's strategy is to provide political, technological, and economic support to those who are willing to turn a blind eye to the PRC's lucrative deals at the expense of the citizens of developing nations, thereby enabling the rule of autocrats and kleptocrats globally. Specifically, the PRC exports technological know-how that can help authoritarian governments track, reward, and punish citizens through a system of digital surveillance. We have seen more than a dozen nations in Africa alone import Huawei's AI surveillance technology that can reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of authoritarianism. Moreover, we are carefully tracking a sweeping economic and security partnership between China-Iran that, if finalized and funded, could enable Iran to expand funding to its nuclear and military ambitions and malign activities in the Middle East region.

The United States has steadily applied pressure to prevent and respond to the full range of PRC malign actions as part of our systematic realignment of the relationship. For example, on June 26, Secretary Pompeo announced visa restrictions on Chinese government officials who have undermined Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and liberty. On July 9, the Secretary imposed visa restrictions on three senior PRC officials and their immediate family members for their role in human rights abuses in Xinjiang; in parallel, the Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on those officials, one additional official, and the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. And on July 15, the Secretary announced visa restrictions on certain personnel from Chinese technology companies, such as Huawei, which provide material support to regimes perpetrating human rights violations globally. These and other measures demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect our interests and uphold our values.

RESTORING RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP

A key principal underpinning international relations is reciprocity between nations. For many years, the United States tolerated imbalance in its relationship with Beijing. While the space for U.S. diplomats and journalists to engage with civil society and local leaders in China has decreased, PRC diplomats continue to have access to all levels of U.S. government and educational institutions. As U.S. companies operating in China face unfair and discriminatory treatment, PRC state-owned and private companies continue to invest in the United States. As part of our strategy to achieve more reciprocal relations and ensure that U.S. interests are safeguarded, we are pressing Beijing to reverse these trends and increase access for U.S. companies, media outlets, and diplomats.

The PRC's abuse of public diplomacy programs is particularly egregious. Last year, Senators Portman and Carper completed an in-depth study of this imbalance in public diplomacy, and we welcomed the bipartisan Congressional call for more reciprocity in the U.S.-China relationship. In most countries around the world, a U.S. ambassador would be welcomed on a university campus, usually with quite a bit of fanfare. The story is quite different in China, where the Communist government fears a free exchange of ideas. While Chinese professors and students might seek to engage with China-based foreign diplomats, Chinese authorities often make such engagements difficult or impossible. The PRC has increasingly impeded U.S. access to segments of Chinese society, including in academic settings. In contrast, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States and Chinese diplomatic staff regularly address U.S. audiences, including on university campuses, free from obstruction by the U.S. government.

At the height of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, the PRC used government-controlled media outlets to sow propaganda and disinformation. China expelled respected independent journalists from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post at precisely the moment when the world most needed ob-

jective reporting. While Beijing has imposed increasingly harsh surveillance, harassment, and intimidation against American and other foreign journalists operating in China, it fashioned its media presence in the United States and abroad into propaganda outlets that have operated with free rein. To reflect these institutions' actual relationship with the state and to gain greater insight and visibility into Chinese propaganda operations in the United States, since February the United States has designated the U.S.-based operations of nine PRC propaganda outlets—including Xinhua, People's Daily, and China Global Television Network—as foreign missions. This decision officially recognizes these outlets for what they are—entities under Beijing's control and outlets for Chinese propaganda. It also makes clear to ordinary Americans what they are not—independent media.

In March, the United States clearly communicated the severity of our concern about the abusive, unfair, and non-reciprocal treatment of international press in the PRC. We capped the number of Chinese citizen personnel allowed to work for U.S. offices of four of these designated PRC propaganda outlets. The number of Chinese personnel allowed now more closely matches the number of American journalists that Beijing allows to operate in the PRC. This long overdue step towards achieving greater reciprocity with the PRC is designed to spur Beijing to adopt a more fair and reciprocal approach to U.S. and other foreign independent press in China.

Reciprocal treatment is also a challenge for non-governmental organizations. In China, a 2017 Foreign NGO Management Law required foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security and to find a state-sanctioned sponsor for their operations. NGOs that fail to comply face possible civil or criminal penalties. Not surprisingly, the number of foreign NGOs operating in China has dropped sharply. In contrast, in the United States we recognize that NGOs, think tanks, and other organizations are vital to a vibrant civil society. Our regulations are designed to facilitate and support their formation.

UNITY AT HOME

We recognize that to be successful, U.S. policy towards the PRC must be grounded in shared commitments across our society. In short, we as a nation must be unified in purpose and coordinated in our efforts to address the challenges posed by Beijing. Congress is essential to building this shared approach. Mr. Chairman, for this reason, the legislation you introduced this week designed to frame the U.S. strategic approach to China is very important and we look forward to working with you and this Committee.

Today's hearing is a good opportunity for further dialogue as we look to strengthen unity of purpose between the Executive Branch and Congress. Beijing's recent decisions to restrict visas on some members of this Committee and the China Commission is an example of how the PRC is seeking to divide us and target those who might speak up about issues like human rights. Since its inception, Congress has led the way in advocating and reflecting the values of the American people. An essential component of U.S. policy towards the PRC is upholding the rights and freedoms the United States has always stood for, whether by exposing human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, fighting for press freedom, or supporting the rights of peaceful protesters and democratic institutions in Hong Kong.

Recent bipartisan legislation is crucial to calling out and combating Beijing's predatory actions. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) expanded the authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States' (CFIUS), better protecting national security by allowing for a review of non-controlling investments that involve critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data, and certain real estate. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA), Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA), and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act underscored to Beijing the U.S. Government remains united with respect to our human rights concerns. And Senators Gardner and Markey's Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) is an important bipartisan framework for U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific.

Our unity of approach also relies on our thought leaders and their ideas and engagements. The foreign policy think tank communities in our country, and around the world, are engaged in open debate on the future of China. Many of our keenest foreign policy observers and China experts are asking probing questions about the PRC's goals and ambitions and what they mean for the United States. We welcome this dialogue as we build an American consensus about U.S. policy towards China.

U.S. non-governmental organizations are similarly grappling with the PRC's increasingly assertive actions around the globe. This spring, I asked two leading democracy NGOs on each side of the U.S. political spectrum to share their thoughts on the state of democracy around the world in the wake of the initial COVID-19

shock. Not surprisingly, many of their concerns and recommendations centered on China and what the U.S. should do to shore up democratic principles globally. As one of the organizations recommended, the PRC must be held to account for hiding data, silencing internal critics, and engaging in a disinformation campaign. The other organization suggested creating programs to promote transparency by aggressively supporting local independent media, citizen bloggers, and watchdog groups to identify CCP propaganda and disinformation. While these organizations represented different U.S. political views, their commitment to supporting American policies that counter the PRC's growing disinformation and propaganda efforts were remarkably like-minded. The Department and USAID are doubling support for American and local NGOs to strengthen the voice of civil society and independent media, demand transparency and accountability, and combat disinformation.

The business community remains a lynchpin of an effective U.S.-China policy. We are consulting with U.S. business and taking a range of actions designed to right the distorted economic relationship that has deteriorated over time. While so-called "decoupling" of the relationship is a false choice, there is much room to demand fairness from China, to diversify supply chains, and protect sensitive industries. On July 1, Secretary Pompeo announced the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, which highlights the risks for businesses with supply chain links to entities complicit in forced labor and other human rights abuses in Xinjiang and throughout China. The Phase One trade agreement with Beijing aims to resolve some of our longstanding and significant structural concerns related to agriculture, technology transfer, intellectual property, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange, while also committing China to make significant new purchases of U.S. exports. It also includes an unprecedented enforcement mechanism. It does not resolve all of our key concerns with the PRC's non-market economic system, including state industrial policies, excess capacity, and unfair subsidies that harm both the U.S. and global economies. Tariffs on \$370 billion in Chinese products will remain in place as we pursue resolution of outstanding issues in a second phase of negotiations.

BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

At the Department of State, our China strategy is not just the work of a single office or bureau, but rather part of a comprehensive approach across the Department and our embassies and consulates around the world. The United States is working with governments to create a common understanding of the PRC's actions, to build a unified response, and to shape a long-term approach. This foundation is key to the growing recognition of Chinese actions that undermine global institutions and shared values; manipulate international organizations and silence of critics abroad; surreptitiously acquire high technology to further its military and economic ambitions; and spread of disinformation.

Our dialogue and engagements take many forms, but all benefit from the fact that many states are waking up to the reality that economic opportunity with China over the past decades has come at significant cost and risk.

The Indo-Pacific is our primary region of competition with the PRC. Across the region, the United States is deepening relationships with the countries that share our values. In September 2019, the first ministerial-level meeting of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan at the Quadrilateral Consultations marked a new milestone in our diplomatic engagement in the region. Our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have helped sustain peace and security for generations. ASEAN is central to our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our security assistance to South China Sea claimant states helps partners protect their autonomy and maritime resources. Together with USAID, we are working with the Mekong countries to ensure sustainable development and energy security, even as the PRC continues its extensive dam building and threatens the food security of its downstream neighbors along the Mekong River. The United States doubled development assistance to our Pacific Island partners through Pacific Pledge.

On June 25, the Secretary announced the United States has accepted EU High Representative Josep Borrell's proposal to create a U.S.-EU Dialogue on China—a new mechanism for discussing the Transatlantic community's common concerns about the threat the PRC poses to our shared democratic ideals. We anticipate it will be action-oriented and lead to more coordinated policy outcomes that will advance our shared interests. The United States is engaged with allies and partners in the G7, the G20, and NATO, and we are broadening partnerships across the Transatlantic, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemi-

sphere. Similarly, China is a core component of our security dialogues with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

Beijing's growing assertiveness also shows in its military actions, and we are collaborating with countries around the world to deter Chinese military expansion. Beginning in May 2020, new PLA incursions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh led to fatal clashes between India and China. Beijing's actions along the LAC are part of a broader, disturbing trend of aggressive PRC behavior throughout Asia. We are working with India on increasing information sharing and bilateral defense cooperation, including through rapid completion of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on geo-spatial information sharing. Our governments share a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, offering security and prosperity for all.

In our own Hemisphere, the United States is working with its neighbors to reaffirm the region's longstanding dedication to free societies and free markets. We are working with like-minded democratic partners to strengthen governance that is inclusive, responsive, and transparent; generate prosperity and economic development; and ensure respect for human rights—the values that define our hemisphere. In December 2019, the White House launched an expanded initiative called Growth in the Americas. This whole of government initiative aims to catalyze the private sector as the primary engine of growth to develop infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean. The focus is on improving the attractiveness of the investment climate for all types of infrastructure including energy, airports, ports, roads, telecom, and digital networks, among others. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is a critical tool in these efforts. We expect the DFC to deploy at least \$12 billion in financing in the region. We are also expanding the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership to the region, modeled on the work it has already done in the Indo-Pacific.

China has made extensive inroads across Africa over the past decade. However, this does not mean that African leaders are oblivious to the risks of partnering with the PRC. Some African governments have instituted review panels to monitor Chinese projects while others are requiring Chinese firms to hire more African laborers and provide protections for Africa's fragile ecosystems.

In the Middle East we similarly continue to engage countries to recognize the costs that come with certain engagements with China—costs to their own sovereignty, costs to regional stability, and costs to the rule-based international order that has provided security and prosperity for decades. A few recent decisions reflect this growing consensus. In Oman, Ericsson signed a Letter of Award with Vodafone Oman on May 21 to be its sole operator for Oman's radio, cloud, and core networks, reversing an earlier decision to award the contract to Huawei. Kuwait's recent reversal of its decision to award a Kuwaiti National Guard network infrastructure contract to Huawei is a first step despite Huawei's continued key role in Kuwait's commercial network. Israel's June 15 decision to bar Huawei from its 5G network is also welcome, as is Israel's decision to award a \$1.5 billion tender for a water desalination plant to Israeli firm IDE Technologies on May 26, instead of Chinese firm CK Hutchison Holdings.

We are also working with allies and partners to prevent the PRC's growing influence in international organizations. U.S. efforts to counter the PRC's moves to assume controlling positions to advance its parochial interests in these multilateral fora have accelerated over the past several years. Our efforts have included close cooperation with allies and partners around the world in the World Intellectual Property Organization's leadership election and shared interests in rejecting Beijing's efforts to insert language promoting the PRC's foreign policy and its core communist ideology into U.N. documents. The United States will also continue to pursue reforms that promote good governance, accountability, and transparency, which have the added benefit of making the U.N. more resilient to the PRC's malign influence.

Finally, let me highlight the importance of Taiwan, an example of freedom and democracy for all Chinese people and the world. On May 20, Secretary Pompeo sent an official congratulatory message for Taiwan President Tsai's inauguration. We and our allies and partners will continue to vigorously support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations, especially where public health, safety, and security are concerned. Taiwan's commendable COVID-19 response demonstrates it has much to offer to the global community. On July 9, the Administration formally notified Congress of a defense arms sale to Taiwan. The sale, worth an estimated \$620 million, is for the recertification of Taiwan's existing Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile capability. This is just one recent example of how, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), we will continue to provide Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The U.S. commitment to implementing the Taiwan Relations Act

is firm, as is our commitment to the U.S. One China policy, including our insistence that cross-Straight issues be resolved peacefully and without coercion or intimidation.

FINDING COMMON GROUND WHERE WE CAN

Even as we build a unity of action and purpose here at home and with our allies and partners to push back firmly and consistently against challenges from China, we also seek to maintain communications with Beijing and welcome PRC cooperation where we can find common ground. Chairman Risch, your legislation calls for a prioritization of cooperation and that is welcome guidance that remains the central pillar of the U.S. approach to China.

The United States has publicly welcomed Beijing to engage in arms control negotiations. It is time for dialogue and diplomacy between the three biggest nuclear weapons powers on how to prevent a new arms race. As such, the next prudent step is face-to-face meetings between the United States and China. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control Marshall Billingslea has invited the PRC to join in good faith negotiations in Vienna. The United States also recommends that China meet with Russia at an early date to consider next steps for trilateral arms control negotiations. While we will all bring different perspectives and objectives to the negotiating table and will surely have disagreements, we believe this strategic dialogue is essential, as the consequences of a miscommunication between the three major nuclear powers would be catastrophic for humanity.

One issue that can be a continued area of cooperation between the United States and China is North Korea. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs undermine our shared strategic interest in peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China agrees that diplomacy is the preferred approach to resolving the issue of North Korea's denuclearization. While there is much more China could do to enforce binding sanctions and prevent sanctions evasion—and we will continue to engage the Chinese on that issue—China has also drastically reduced trade with North Korea and has made efforts to urge North Korea to engage with the United States on a diplomatic process to bring peace and prosperity to all who live on the Korean Peninsula.

We also seek common ground with Beijing in our efforts to combat the opioid crisis here in the United States. The United States welcomed the PRC's regulatory action in 2019 to class schedule all fentanyl-related substances. This action, combined with heightened U.S. regulatory and enforcement efforts, has decreased the amount of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues coming directly from China into the United States. The PRC's November 2019 prosecution of an international fentanyl trafficking ring, after a joint U.S.-China investigation, was another positive step. However, our job is far from complete. Significant amounts of chemical precursors used to produce illicit synthetic opioids and methamphetamine that kill Americans continue to originate in China. Since the PRC's class scheduling of all fentanyl-related substances, there have been several shipments of illicit synthetic drug precursors from China to cartel-controlled entities in Mexico, indicating a pronounced shift in how fentanyl is trafficked from China into the United States. Cooperation to address emerging aspects of the problem, including more strict regulation of China's chemical and pharmaceutical industries, will mark the next phase of bilateral and multilateral effort. President Trump is unequivocal on the need for China to take a more proactive role in disrupting the flow of illicit fentanyl trafficked globally—even as the PRC's role in the problem has evolved.

BUILDING TIES WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND SUPPORTING THE CHINESE PEOPLE

The United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, of opinion and expression, and of peaceful assembly and association. Unfortunately, today no Chinese citizen is able to practice religious beliefs freely, speak opinions freely, or peacefully seek changes from the government. Secretary Pompeo has prioritized support for representatives of the Chinese people seeking freedom and democracy by meeting with Chinese dissidents from the generations of the 1979 Chinese Democracy Wall movement, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and the 2019 Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. He has also met the survivors of repression in Xinjiang and the Tiananmen Massacre.

Despite the obstacles, American diplomats continue to meet and engage with a broad cross-section of the Chinese population through a variety of programs, both in U.S. diplomatic facilities and outside them. Last month, I was honored to present the honorary Women of Courage Award to the Mothers of Tiananmen. On June 4, 1989, thousands of brave Chinese citizens gathered in Beijing's Tiananmen Square,

calling for freedom, democracy, human rights, and a corruption-free society. Their peaceful calls for change came to a violent end when the Chinese Communist Party sent the People's Liberation Army into Tiananmen Square armed with tanks and guns. Thirty-one years later, the United States continues to honor the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement and its legacy of peaceful advocacy. The bravery of the many Chinese people who seek to advance the cause of human rights and universal freedoms inspires us.

The United States remains committed to active support for the Chinese people. To raise awareness of human rights abuses in China, the United States regularly holds public events highlighting the abuses committed by the PRC and the bravery of human rights defenders. For example, the President chaired a global call to action on protecting international religious freedom at the 74th U.N. General Assembly; the past two Ministerials to Advance Religious Freedom have shone a spotlight on egregious conditions in China; a side-event at the U.N. General Assembly drew attention to abuses in Xinjiang; and a survivor of the detention camps in Xinjiang was recognized as an International Woman of Courage.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, consistent with the priorities in your legislation, I should underline that engagement between the United States and China remains of central importance in managing tensions and exploring areas of mutual interest where efforts might align or cooperation might flourish. But we will only make a difference if our engagement produces real progress on the many issues of concern which I have enumerated today.

Current trends in U.S.-China relations do not seem promising. Many Chinese officials continue to be trapped in a mindset that shapes its narrative of China as victim at the hands of foreign powers, thus requiring China's hardline actions in response. This despite decades of efforts by the United States and our allies to bring China into the global community. Through trade and participation in the World Trade Organization and through increased engagement, we have sought to smooth China's rise in the global system. Unfortunately, while some in China wanted to be seen as a responsible great power, the realities of China's rise are not that of responsible global leadership.

Last month, I joined Secretary Pompeo in Hawaii to meet with our Chinese counterparts. In the 2-day discussion the Secretary stressed that deeds, not words, were the pathway to achieve mutual respect and reciprocity between our two countries across commercial, security, diplomatic and people-to-people interactions. He made clear our determination to push back against Beijing's efforts to undermine democratic norms, challenge the sovereignty of our friends and allies, and engage in unfair trade practices, but at the same time, he outlined the areas where the United States and the PRC could cooperate to solve global challenges, including those I have enumerated today.

We would also welcome members of Congress from both sides of the Capitol to not only work in partnership with the Executive Branch but to also extend your own engagement to better understand aspirations of the Chinese people. Of course this includes meeting with your Chinese government counterparts and other officials, but as much as possible it must also include reaching out to the many voices of China that are found outside China; those not free to be heard at home and therefore requiring our assistance to be heard.

Beyond government-to-government interactions, the United States also maintains the goal of expanded trade and investment with China provided it is conducted on a fair and reciprocal basis. We welcome people-to-people exchanges, including hosting of each other's students, provided that they are exclusively for purposes of study. As we seek to correct the imbalance in our relations with China we must address today's realities while at the same time leaving open tomorrow's possibilities.

The United States is urgently taking the necessary steps to defend our security and long-term economic well-being. With our friends and allies we are standing up for universal rights and the rules-based international system that have provided for the world's collective peace, security, and prosperity for generations. This is the foundation for the peace and stability that has allowed the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the world to advance toward ever greater peace and prosperity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

With that, we are going to do a round of questioning. I am going to reserve my time. Senator Menendez, I will turn it over to you for a round of questioning.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I said earlier, I welcome the Administration's clarification of our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South China Sea. But as you know, international law is not self-enforcing. And having now taken this position, it is critical that we give reality to our legal position or we may find that a gap between rhetoric and reality produces counterproductive and destabilizing.

So what does the Administration intend to do to implement this new approach?

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

So as you are aware, the United States had for some time rejected Chinese claims without endorsing alternative claimant positions, but in the recent iteration, Secretary of State Pompeo at the direction of President Trump has declared the United States to not recognize Chinese declarations, and in fact, we would seek to uphold the rulings of international tribunals that have determined that China's maritime claims in the South China Sea are improper.

You know, I harken back to 2015 when President Xi Jinping, standing at the White House with President Obama, announced that China had no intention to militarize the South China Sea. Just recently I typed into the search engine on my computer the words "Chinese bases, South China Sea" and looked at the images of what has grown up in the South China Sea in the corresponding 5 years. It is an astonishing military buildup that China has undertaken, and China is currently in the midst of major military exercises in the region as well. They have completely militarized the South China Sea.

For our part, sir, we will continue our freedom of navigation operations, which are continuing on an ongoing basis. We are providing assistance, including security assistance, to many of our friends and allies in the region. We are making this a subject of discussion in our alliance relationships in the region, not just the South China Sea I might add, but the East Sea as well where there are also Chinese claims on the territory of other countries. We are providing substantial security assistance to many of our partners in the region, and we are working very hard to find a common position with our friends and allies in the region, most recently successfully overcoming some of the differences we had with the Government of the Philippines in order to reach common cause with the Philippines as well as with many other countries in ASEAN to push back decisively against Chinese claims.

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. Thank you very much.

So I am looking forward to hearing further discussion of what are the consultations you had with partners and allies on their statements and actions. You just mentioned the Philippines is one of them.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) so-called national security law for Hong Kong, which undermines Hong Kong's autonomy, encourages the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters and effectively ends its one country, two systems policy, recently went into effect. Along with my colleagues on both sides of this dais, I introduced the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, which would provide those Hong Kongers who peacefully pro-

tested Beijing's corrupt justice system and could have a well founded fear of persecution to be eligible for priority to refugee status.

What efforts other than some harsh words and criticism aimed at the CCP for their erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy is the State Department actively pursuing?

Mr. BIEGUN. So, Senator Menendez, as you are probably aware, we have used the existing authorities we have in the Department of State under the Immigration and Naturalization Act to impose visa restrictions against some of the leading actors who have played a role in imposing the National Security Act upon the people of Hong Kong in order to strip them of their democracy.

Likewise, we have suspended the extradition treaty that we had with Hong Kong in recognition of the fact that the rule of law is unlikely to be found any further under the legislative authorities that the Chinese put in place.

We are comprehensively reviewing benefits that are extended to the region of Hong Kong to assess whether or not those should be continued. They are not in a single place in law. They are sprinkled across U.S. code, and we are taking a comprehensive look at all those benefits as we go forward.

And finally, as you may know, the President has also extended refugee quota to any travelers coming out of Hong Kong who are fleeing the repression there.

The Secretary had a chance himself to meet with Joshua Wong in London just yesterday where he had a good discussion about the current state of affairs in Hong Kong, and we will continue to press very hard in order to preserve the democratic voice of the people of Hong Kong.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I hope the refugee status that the legislation that we have bipartisan support for is something the Administration will support.

A final question. We have seen authoritarian nations such as China and Russia utilizing emerging technologies in new ways to surveil and repress both domestic and foreign populations, as well as manipulate democratic elections. Now these countries are spreading their models of digital authoritarianism to other countries who may be attracted to these new modes of social control.

What is the Administration's strategy to counter the spread of digital authoritarianism and the malign use of digital products and services? And how are we engaging our allies in that context?

Mr. BIEGUN. The same technologies that are being used to repress populations are also used in many countries in the world in order to conduct routine screening and security. And so it is a very thorny and complicated issue to sort out the use issues.

One of the first and positive steps we have taken is in relation to Xinjiang where Chinese companies who have, in fact, provided those tools to the Communist Party in order to be used to enforce the Chinese repression against the Uyghurs are now sanctioned under U.S. law and unable to do business with the United States or with United States companies. We will continue to extend that kind of protections when we see these technologies used for repressive purposes, but it is an important and worrisome area of technology and one of many that we are having to grapple with in the

world in which social media, telecom, and new technologies challenge freedoms around the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Gardner.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Biegun.

Since 2015, I have had the privilege of serving as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, where Senator Markey and I have led efforts to shape a new policy toward the Indo-Pacific region, including through the passage of the landmark Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) in December of 2018.

As part of our work in the 115th Congress, the East Asia, Pacific Subcommittee also held a three-part series of hearings titled “The China Challenge,” which examined in a comprehensive manner how the United States should respond to a rising China that seeks to upend and no doubt supplant the U.S.-led liberal world order in their minds. Our first two hearings focused on security and economic aspects of China’s authoritarian rise, including China’s debt trap diplomacy and military modernization programs. Our third hearing focused on democracy, human rights, and rule of law, values that have been fundamental to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy for generations.

Our witnesses testified that we were in the midst of the so-called authoritarian closing that under President Xi Jinping has resulted in an unprecedented and intensifying crackdown on civil society, ethnic minorities, and religious freedom in China. We found that the mass concentration camps for Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region shocks the conscience and necessitates a serious response from the United States and the international community, including sanctions against top officials.

We found that the crackdowns in the Tibet Autonomous Region are intensifying while Beijing continues to refuse negotiations with the Central Tibetan Administration.

We found that human rights defenders in China are routinely jailed, tortured, and otherwise deprived of liberty.

We found that genuine freedom of speech and assembly are nonexistent, that corruption and abuse of power are rampant. Just look at Hong Kong and the violations of international agreements registered with the United Nations and the lengths that the Communist Party in China will go to deprive its people of what China itself not too long ago had agreed to.

And now in the midst of the unprecedented outbreak of COVID-19 coronavirus, the Communist Party of China continues to hide and obscure critical information that has imperiled a truly global response to the crisis.

This is the China that we must deal with not just now but for the long run as well.

I look forward to hearing from Deputy Secretary Biegun today on how we can best address the China challenge together in a series of questions.

I want to talk about the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act and what it means to the framework as you identify in your opening statement, but just a few quick questions.

Is China torturing the Uyghur Muslim population in China?

Mr. BIEGUN. I am sorry, Senator. Could you repeat the question?

Senator GARDNER. Is China torturing Uyghur Muslims in China?

Mr. BIEGUN. We certainly believe that there is a severe mistreatment. In fact, we and many other countries are demanding access to Xinjiang and—

Senator GARDNER. You are not willing to say whether or not they are torturing?

Mr. BIEGUN. Torture is a legal definition, and I do not simply have the evidence available to me to make that statement as a legal matter. I do believe they are severely mistreating those people and—

Senator GARDNER. And you would agree there have been public reports that Uyghur populations have been tortured.

Mr. BIEGUN. I certainly find it believable, sir.

Senator GARDNER. Is China disappearing scientists and dissidents, scientists dealing with the coronavirus, dissidents speaking out against Chinese repression?

Mr. BIEGUN. China has been arresting dissenting voices for my entire career, but in recent months, we have seen in particular this focus has turned against those who spoke up particularly early on regarding the COVID virus in Wuhan. Absolutely.

Senator GARDNER. Is China stealing U.S. coronavirus research?

Mr. BIEGUN. As the Department of Justice unveiled in two of its indictments yesterday, we have firm evidence to suggest that Chinese hackers, working in close association with Chinese national security institutions, have in fact been trying to steal information related to the development of technologies to treat the coronavirus.

Senator GARDNER. Is China breaking the Rose Garden promise of no militarization of the South China Sea?

Mr. BIEGUN. As I mentioned in my earlier comments, one only needs to type into your search engine on your computer “South China Sea military bases,” and you will see how substantial China has broken the pledge that President Xi Jinping made to President Obama.

Senator GARDNER. Is China persecuting other religious minorities like Christians?

Mr. BIEGUN. Absolutely.

Senator GARDNER. Is China breaking international agreements in Hong Kong?

Mr. BIEGUN. They have broken their international agreement in Hong Kong.

Senator GARDNER. This obviously is something that must be dealt with swiftly, strongly, and not just by the United States, but global condemnation and actions subsequent to that condemnation that will show China and the Communist Party of China that their actions are unacceptable if they wish to be deemed or seen as a responsible nation.

The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which passed in 2018, sets a framework. In your testimony, you state that the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act is a framework for U.S. leadership in the Indo-

Pacific. It is based on the National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy.

Just out of curiosity, how can we use ARIA, that framework, to address the challenges and the consequences of the actions China has taken as it relates to the questions you just answered?

Mr. BIEGUN. Similar to what we welcome in Chairman Risch's legislation, laying out a strategic framework and knowing that it is creating a space for us to make proposals here to Capitol Hill on budgets and priorities is very helpful. The authorizing committees do play an important role in telegraphing to the entire Department set of professionals the space that we can move into as we go annually through our budgets and staffing issues. Your legislation, which has already been in place for several years, was very useful in that regard. We have seen a complete reorientation of U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific, consistent and even in some ways through the openings that were suggested in the ARIA legislation. The more focused efforts on China are going to likewise need close congressional and executive cooperation, Senator. And I want to thank you and members of the committee for a number of pieces of legislation that I highlight in my written testimony that have come out in recent years.

Senator Risch, if I may also for a moment. I misspoke a moment ago. It was not Joshua Wong that the Secretary met with. It was another brave democracy activist named Nathan Law that he met with in London yesterday, and I just wanted to correct that for the record.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gardner.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Biegun, thank you for your service. We appreciate it very much.

There is a common theme from all of us. We get 5 minutes and we cannot list all of our concerns about China in 5 minutes. There are so many issues of major concern.

But I want to follow up on Senator Gardner's point that we need a global response, at least a regional response. The Trump administration—one of the first policies it initiated was to pull out of the TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a trading bloc that was to stand up in some respects against the economic power of China on a regional basis.

The President then initiated trade policy talks with China that were unilateral with the United States and China, not engaging our other trading partners. And as those discussions have taken place, it is becoming a concern to many of our trading partners that the United States is looking for an agreement where they can point to some progress on specific commodities rather than dealing with the fundamental problems of the Chinese economy, the fact that it is government controlled, that it steals our intellectual property, that it manipulates currency, that there is government control, and the list goes on and on and on.

So can you share with us what steps you are taking to develop a regional approach so that we have support from other countries to deal with the malignant activities of China?

Mr. BIEGUN. Yes. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

The United States is collaborating very closely with countries in the Indo-Pacific for a regional approach and globally. As I mentioned in my testimony, we have initiatives that have been launched in every continent of the world, even in the Arctic. The United States is actively advancing a strategy to pursue our interests. Secretary Pompeo today is in Denmark meeting with our allies there to discuss those very issues.

Specifically in relation to the Indo-Pacific, we are working very closely with our ASEAN partners. We have launched a robust cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Quad with India, Japan, the United States, and Australia.

Senator CARDIN. Explain to me what the focus of that partnership is as it relates to China. What strategic actions are we planning as a regional approach to counter China?

Mr. BIEGUN. We undertake military exercises together. We train for worst case scenarios and include deterrence in the suite of our strategies. We collaborate very closely on combating disinformation campaigns out of China. In fact, we have a regular coordinating discussion between me and my Indo-Pacific counterparts. We started, in the early stages of the COVID crisis, a weekly conference call with deputy-level officials in the foreign ministries of six other Indo-Pacific countries, along with the United States all towards both sharing best information on the challenges posed by China and providing support for efforts to comprehensively combat it.

Of course, our Five Eyes intelligence coordination is a key part of this, along with our military alliances.

We are every day, Senator, working in close cooperation with allies in the Indo-Pacific. And the central issue that all of them are considering in that relationship is China.

Senator CARDIN. Let me sort of challenge that and ask that you keep us informed on it because I hear messages coming out from the White House, but it does not seem to be coordinated with any of the other countries that are allied with us in that region.

The One Road, One Belt policy of China is aimed at exercising its economic power globally.

Senator Menendez talked about Hong Kong and our major concern in Hong Kong are the rights and freedom of the people of Hong Kong. And it is very clear to many of us that China has violated that agreement, and the special status that we give that territory should be reviewed and seriously consider eliminating their special status.

One of the reasons why Hong Kong was given that status was not just to respect the human rights of the people that live there, but to develop a more market economy in that region, which was the hallmark of Hong Kong.

Are we now in jeopardy of seeing Chinese influence, as is shown in Hong Kong, to try to dominate with government-controlled economies rather than allowing more market-driven economies?

Mr. BIEGUN. I would say that most of China's economic policies are in fact incompatible with a rules-based market economy. There are some dimensions of the market that one can find in the Chinese economy and in other countries where China operates. The essential factor that made Hong Kong distinct from the remainder of

China is the economy was governed under the rule of law with an independent court system in which fair justice could be applied. The two have to move hand in hand together.

China is dismantling the democratic government and eliminating the rule of law in Hong Kong in manner that not only is eliciting a reaction from the United States and, by the way, many other countries around the world, but it is actually eliciting a reaction from many of the investors and businesses that chose to operate in Hong Kong as well. They are there because of the rule of law. They are there because of democratic governance, and the absence of that is going to do more damage to the fabric of Hong Kong's economy than any sanctions that we could conceive of.

Senator CARDIN. And I would suggest, just in closing, that there is an area where the U.S. in leadership working with countries of like mind should have a common response to what is being done by China in Hong Kong, a very definitive, strong response. That is where I think the U.S. would show its leadership and effectiveness in dealing with what China is doing.

Mr. BIEGUN. So in the near term, Senator, under the presidency of the United States, the G-7 has released a coordinated statement on exactly that.

Senator CARDIN. A statement or action?

Mr. BIEGUN. Well, the G-7 statement is a commitment to action.

But what we are doing in the State Department is outlined in more detail in my written testimony. I will not go into significant detail, but the economic policy network that we are coordinating with many of our Indo-Pacific allies is intended to address these issues across the region in exactly the manner that you are describing.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Mr. Biegun, welcome to the committee.

China has combined taking advantage of a mercantilist economic approach, sometimes predatory economic policies, a strong position in a growing level of influence within development banks and international regulatory organizations with its Made in China 2025 initiative to create what seems to be a pretty potent economic statecraft arsenal. This is going to have long-term consequences for many countries around the world, but especially the United States as it relates to our relationship to allies and partners, as it relates to our own economic policies, our own good faith development efforts, and the future of American innovation and expertise. So it is really impacting so much of our own foreign and domestic policy.

Having laid that foundation, how is the Department of State thinking about the issue of decoupling with China?

Mr. BIEGUN. So our goal with China is not decoupling. Our goal is to present a set of pressures on China that has not lived up to the expectations that the world laid out two decades ago when China was welcomed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the years since when they were welcomed into full partnership with many countries around the world in economic relations. That is, that China becomes a net contributor and a responsible stakeholder in upholding global rule of law and institutions. China's ef-

forts have been by design aimed at dismantling that consensus in a manner that has created huge imbalances in the global economy and has led to a number of predatory behaviors as you describe.

I would not say that it is to our advantage to decouple from the Chinese economy, and that is not our specific policy goal. Our goal is to see China resume a full commitment to the path that they were on 20 years ago when they were trusted by the global community.

Senator YOUNG. Understood. I regret I have some follow-up questions and I have 3 minutes left.

Mr. BIEGUN. I am sorry.

Senator YOUNG. No. That is fine, sir.

So just very briefly, you mentioned China's entry into the WTO. Is it pretty clear to you and to the State Department generally that China has not followed the commitments, either the letter or the spirit of the law as it relates to their commitments, as a WTO member nation?

Mr. BIEGUN. China severely abused its membership in the WTO, and more importantly, it missed an important moment to pivot in the Doha development round when it could have been an advocate for improving and strengthening the global trading system. It is to all of our detriment that they chose to take that role, but they did it to preserve the singular benefit that they derived from entering the WTO as a poor country, despite the fact that they are now one of the two largest economies in the world.

Senator YOUNG. Do you and should we envision a future in which countries are forced to choose between an alliance, or a strong partnership, with China on one hand or with an American-led system on the other?

Mr. BIEGUN. That is not our intention, nor are we going to apply that litmus test to our relations with other countries. What we are going to do is seek to educate them on the challenges that come from an economic relationship with China and suggest and coordinate with them prudent steps in order to limit China's ability to disrupt the technology, privacy, or safety of their own citizens.

Senator YOUNG. Would it give the United States more leverage if our government invested in large-scale innovation efforts to ensure American leadership in key technologies, perhaps partnering with our allies and strong and trusted partners?

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, I know that you are one of the several members of this committee who have worked with our Economic and Business Affairs Bureau on the global economic security strategy that is designed to do just that. We cannot be strong abroad if we are not strong at home, and we have to design our own strategies within our economic traditions within the free market to allow our innovators and our companies to produce the best and most competitive outcomes.

I am confident we can do that. That has been one of the enduring strengths of the United States of America. We just have to recognize that we are doing it in an environment now where we have a near-peer competitor that is seeking to undermine the very ecosystem in which that economic progress was made.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you.

With 30 seconds left, in summary fashion can you assess for me Xi Jinping's current standing within the Chinese Communist Party?

Mr. BIEGUN. In taking power, one of the first things he did using an anticorruption initiative was to eliminate nearly all competitors inside the party. While I do not know the bona fides of those individuals or whether they were in fact involved in corruption. I can say that the selective prosecution of those individuals eliminated all significant political challenges. And I think he has a strong hold on power in China.

More worrisome to us is the decision of the Chinese leadership also to dissolve a customary two-term limit on Chinese leaders which now leaves them potentially with a leader for life, which is problematic for any system. That means that any challenge to the decisions of the government is an existential threat to the leadership because of the absence of turnover, because of the absence of elections, and because of the absence of a rotation at the top level of Chinese leadership. I am afraid many of the behaviors that we have seen can be directly attributed to that factor.

Senator YOUNG. So you have just identified an interesting paradox which we see play out again around the world and throughout history, which is if you eliminate opposing forces, those competitive power centers within your government, in a way that makes you stronger but also makes you far more vulnerable to blowbacks.

Mr. BIEGUN. There is a reason why democracy has served this nation so well for the last 240 years.

Senator YOUNG. Yes. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Young.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary Biegun, thank you for being here.

As you know, China's Belt and Road Initiative has allowed the Chinese to take a controlling stake in 13 European ports. Last year, we had a hearing before the Armed Services Committee where Admiral Davidson, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific command, testified that Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Maldives have all handed over control of their ports or territory to China. We know that 40 out of 55 African countries have gotten financing through the Belt and Road Initiative. More than 130 countries around the world.

So given the clear benefits, advantages that China is taking through that initiative and the challenge that that presents to the United States, help me understand the Administration's logic in cutting U.S. diplomacy and development funding for 3 consecutive years.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

The most important tools that we have to use against that are a combination of the resources provided to the International Development Finance Corporation paired with the strong U.S. international business community that is more than prepared to seek business opportunities in every corner of the world.

What we have tried to do in order to address the specific challenge to the Belt and Road Initiative is work on both ends of the equation. So not only are we seeking to provide more infrastructure

support and assistance and facilitate through the active cooperation of our embassies, which now maintain what we call deal teams which bring together the interagency components of U.S. commercial diplomacy in order to support American companies competing with Chinese companies, but also on the other end of the equation, we have created a program called the Blue Dot Network, which is basically a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval on major global infrastructure projects to make sure that they are done in a transparent and noncorrupt manner, that they are done with appropriate economy, and also that they are not financed in a manner that makes the recipient of the project fall into debt trap diplomacy, which China has used in several of the countries that you identified.

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree with that, but is it your contention that our efforts are as effective in terms of getting support from other countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, as the Chinese efforts?

Mr. BIEGUN. As I highlighted in my testimony and as we have seen in recent months, there has been quite a backlash against China's debt trap diplomacy. In fact, the United States and many other countries in the G-20 have strongly advocated debt relief at this point in order to help many of these countries that are severely impacted by the COVID-19 crisis. The Chinese Government has been foot-dragging and reluctant in many cases to allow that debt relief because it is a major tool of policy that they have used to assert their influence in those countries.

So I think the Chinese actually are facing a backlash, but I think our efforts are actually enjoying success as well. We are seeing business opportunities open up for the United States and our international trading partners in parts of the world that we had previously surrendered under the Belt and Road Initiative to China. And that no longer is the case.

Senator SHAHEEN. In the end of June, this committee held a hearing on the international aspects of the coronavirus pandemic. And one of the things that we heard from both minority and majority witnesses, so virtually everybody who testified before us said that it was a mistake to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO). And one of the reasons they cited was because it provided a vacuum that the Chinese have been filling in terms of providing assistance and guidance to countries who are affected by the pandemic.

Do you share that view?

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, the President made the decision to file notification of withdrawal from the World Health Organization. We have not withdrawn from the Health Organization and are not allowed to for a full year after notification is filed.

Senator SHAHEEN. No. I understand that. I am asking if you share the view that we heard from those witnesses that it would be a mistake for the United States to withdraw from WHO particularly at this time.

Mr. BIEGUN. So, Senator, let me tell you why the President made the decision, and I assure you that I have given the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State has given the President benefit of our perspectives on this.

Senator SHAHEEN. That is okay. I have read the reports on why the President made his decision. I happen to disagree with it, but you do not need to repeat it for me.

Mr. BIEGUN. But, Senator, let me also highlight that one of the roles I played at the Department because I have had lead responsibility for many of the international dimensions of the COVID-19 crisis is in marshalling the substantial foreign aid effort that the United States is undertaking.

But the debate over the WHO is a debate over less than 4 percent and really in the mandatory contribution, less than half of 1 percent of the entire budget the United States provides—

Senator SHAHEEN. I am sorry to interrupt. But the point that they were making was not just about the World Health Organization. It was about the failure of the United States to provide global leadership to respond to this pandemic. And I am not going to ask you to respond to that because I am out of time.

But I do want to point out something that I think is positive and note that I was very pleased to see the recent actions that the State Department took against Russia and its malign efforts. Last week's Magnitsky designations of subsidiaries of Russia's paramilitary arm Wagner in Hong Kong, in Sudan, and in Thailand I think were a very important step forward. And I appreciate that the State Department took those actions.

I wonder if you could clarify. Was that in response to any particular event that we have seen? Was it a response to the news or the reports that Russia had provided a bounty for the Taliban to kill American troops?

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, the recent steps that we have taken in relation to Russia are simply a part of our pushback against a long-standing pattern of behavior that has made it virtually impossible for us to make progress in any way, shape, or form with the Russians.

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Deputy Secretary Biegun, I appreciate the work that you and members of the State Department are doing to secure our interests as they relate to China. But I am concerned that we are using the traditional techniques that we have long had, we are using them in more aggressive ways than we have to push back against China and their ambitions. But they are not working.

China has not been diverted from the course that they are on. China is more assertive than I have ever seen in my life. During the years of Deng Xiaoping, he talked about keeping your head down and China would become stronger until the world was finally able to see how strong they were. Well, that has happened. They are not backing down. Look at what they are doing to the Uyghurs. Look at what they are doing with the South China Sea bases. Look at how they are cracking down on Hong Kong, how they saber rattle with regard to Taiwan. The Belt and Road Initiative. The number of ports they have and bases, extraordinary. The fact that the Philippines, the Solomon Islands are changing their course with regard to the relative relationship that we have had. Their cyber

theft. Putting people in our universities to steal technology. The list goes on and on. It is not working.

The normal approach that we take with countries that we are not happy with is not working. China represents a threat to freedom, to our economy, to our military capability, to our national security of an entirely different nature than what we have faced before. This is an extraordinary assault, and simply employing the normal techniques that we employ in normal circumstances is, in my opinion, not going to work.

And actually the United States flexing all of our muscles alone is not strong enough because we have 330 million people and they have 1.4 billion people. Their economy will be bigger. They are already procuring as much military hardware as we are. They are going to be an enormous powerhouse. They are blasting ahead, and we will increasingly be in the rear view mirror unless we combine with other nations that abide by the rule of law, unless we link arms in a very dramatic and aggressive way and lay out rules of the road that they must follow or they will find themselves disconnected, as Senator Young has described, disconnected from the economy of the rest of the world.

And we are not doing that. Instead we are saying America first, everybody go off and do your own thing. Great for Brexit. Let us blow up Europe. Everybody pursue your own interests. And America looks like we do not care about bringing the world together in a dramatic way.

I would suggest a summit of the leaders of the major nations of the world and laying out a process to approach China in a very dramatic way. It strikes me when it comes to China strategy, we are like the Titanic. We are all running around straightening deck chairs and playing the music as loud as we can. But we are losing.

And I look to you and ask am I wrong on that? Do we need to take a wholly different level of approach to combining with our friends around the world and confronting China to let them know they may not pursue the course they are on and continue to have free access to our marketplaces?

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

You are not wrong, and I agree with you and virtually every senior official in this Administration agrees with you on the magnitude of this challenge.

The one thing that I do not think any of us should expect are fast results. We are up against a generational challenge here. This is a formidable challenge in virtually every dimension of our economic, political, and social and military existence. We are up against a significant challenge in China.

You likened it to the Titanic, but I would liken it more to an aircraft carrier that slowly begins to turn and reorient itself in a different direction. And that is what I have seen in the United States of America myself over the course of the last 5 to 7 years, that is, that different sectors of the United States, our NGOs, our think tanks, our China experts, our businesses, our Congress, our executive branch have slowly begun to reorient on the issue of China. And it was not easy for us to do. We invested quite a bit in the last three decades in a very different outcome. And sometimes wishful outcomes are hard to let go of, and many still have not.

This Administration is equally criticized for moving too abruptly and too harshly against China or for precipitating a new Cold War. Not our intention.

So, Senator Romney, you are absolutely right. It requires every bit of our energy and every bit of cooperation we can get from other countries. And it also requires strong unity here at home. I hope through discussions like this we can not only converge our views and come to a common approach on our strategy, but also that we can take that same sentiment abroad to our friends and allies both from the executive branch and the Congress to impress upon them how important it is that we partner on this issue. We are doing quite a bit in that regard but we can do more.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Romney.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Menendez for this important hearing.

Deputy Secretary, thank you for your service and for your testimony today.

I will simply add to the conversation that has been going on about the significance of the challenge that China poses to our security, our prosperity, our place in the world, and the critical role of alliances and a strong and broad and sustained strategy. I want to commend members of this committee who have worked hard to develop legislation. I think there is an urgency about our developing a thoughtful and bipartisan approach to managing our strategic competition with China, to confronting its digital authoritarianism, and to strengthening our allies and our joint approach to China for the years ahead.

So let me move, if I could, to a question, Mr. Deputy Secretary. Earlier this month, the "Wall Street Journal" reported the Pentagon has presented the White House with options to reduce the American military presence in South Korea. This information comes as our President has also unnerved NATO and European allies and appeased Putin by deciding to remove a third of our troops from Germany.

You continue to serve, Deputy Secretary, as Special Representative for North Korea. You have experience working on the Korean Peninsula. I am interested in whether you have been a part of these interagency discussions and how you think China would view the removal of a sizable portion of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator Coons.

The Secretary of Defense actually made some public remarks yesterday addressing the exercise that they have been going through and looking at force structure in South Korea and other places around the world, but also was quite emphatic that he has made no recommendation to the President nor presented no particular proposal to reduce troops.

In general, the U.S. alliance on the Korean Peninsula plays an incredible role in anchoring our strategic interests in the region not only in relation to North Korea but also potentially in relation to the challenges that could emanate from the People's Republic of China. I will say that it is an alliance that I spend a lot of time engaged with because of my dual hat on North Korea policy, and

this is an issue that I had the opportunity to discuss with my South Korean counterparts just 2 weeks ago when I visited Seoul.

There is a consensus in both Seoul and here in the United States that we need to rejuvenate the alliance. The purpose of the alliance between the United States and South Korea has for 70 years been to enforce an armistice on the Korean Peninsula against a country, North Korea, of 25 million people and to defend South Korea, a country of 50 million people and a hundred times the economy.

Senator COONS. Is it your view, Mr. Deputy Secretary, that reducing troop levels would help rejuvenate that alliance or put it at some risk?

Mr. BIEGUN. I think what we need to do with the alliance, Senator Coons, is settle the issue of burden sharing and how we fund the alliance and then have also at the same time a strategic discussion to create a sustainable footing for that alliance for the next 75 years. If we were able to do so, I think a substantial presence in that region would strongly advance America's security interests in East Asia.

Senator COONS. Thank you. I have two more questions I want to get to quickly. So forgive me. I appreciate your answer.

I am deeply concerned about the Administration's consideration of deporting or refusing to allow the return of foreign students. And it was initially phrased as unless they are doing in-person classes. And I heard from presidents of every college and university in my State and regionally.

There are about 350,000–370,000 Chinese students in the United States. And I recognize the security risks associated with students from a range of countries, but much more broadly, the overwhelming majority of them have an opportunity to be exposed to our ideals, to freedom, to academic inquiry. And I think on balance they are an enormous contributor both to our academic enterprise and many take back to their home countries a view of the United States that is much more positive. Obviously, if there are cases where they abuse the privilege of our openness, they should be investigated, removed, or even prosecuted.

But I am concerned that the Administration will continue to flirt with blocking or deporting foreign students. You may well have influence over decisions on foreign students. But would you remind the Administration that our ability to persuade and attract other nations is a tool almost as valuable as our ability to compel?

Mr. BIEGUN. I could not agree more with you, Senator Coons. And in fact, we settled out in the right place on our policies. I have to say that there was a little bit of a turbulence there, and not surprisingly, many university presidents weighed in. I strongly agree with you on the importance of these student programs. And in fact, the State Department has made an urgent priority of not only administering where we have travel restrictions due to COVID still, the issuance of visas, but with the highest priority being on allowing student travel to be facilitated in order to get those young men and women here to the United States of America for the fall semester. So we very much welcome those students, and we welcome students from China too, as I said in my opening statement, although expressly for the exclusive purposes of study.

Senator COONS. There are reports China and Iran have reached a broad-based 25-year agreement which would allow China the opportunity to invest billions in energy infrastructure, provide them with reliable access to lower cost Iranian oil, and obviously then be a major challenge to the maximum pressure campaign.

Does the Administration have a coordinated strategy internally and with our allies to respond to deepening China-Iran ties and China's increasing influence as a result in the Middle East?

Mr. BIEGUN. So, Senator, the reports of that agreement are a little bit premature. Although the Iranians and the Chinese have been having a discussion for some time, there is no 25-year agreement in place at present. That is not to say that they could not possibly move forward. But at this point, they are closer to discussing it for the past 25 years than agreeing on the next 25 years.

I will say that one of the worrisome elements of China's behavior is it is willing to consort with undemocratic countries like Iran or adversaries of the United States, and that is a general worry that we have across the board. In the case of Iran, we have a comprehensive strategy toward Iran and that would affect China if China engages with Iran in economic activities that are in violation of U.S. law.

Senator COONS. Thank you for your answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coons.

Senator Barrasso.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you again, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate it.

I want to just tell you how much I agree with what Senator Romney had to say, the concerns about China, the cover-up and disinformation campaign on the coronavirus, destruction of Hong Kong's autonomy, unlawful military activities in the South China Sea, theft of American intellectual property, and then the terrible human rights abuses that we continue to see today against the Uyghurs and minorities across the country.

In terms of human rights, China is engaged in truly serious human rights abuses, including political, religious repression. These are attacks on human dignity, on religious freedoms. As Americans, we cannot tolerate this.

So recently the Administration has taken strong actions to sanction China for its human rights abuses. And I strongly support the efforts of the Administration.

Are there ways that we can better increase our support for the rights and the freedoms of the people of China along the line of democracy, opportunity, liberty, equality, the things that we hold dear?

Mr. BIEGUN. Yes, absolutely, Senator. And thank you very much. Again, I want to emphasize I agree with Senator Romney's characterization of the magnitude of this challenge as well.

In the case of repressions and human rights violations in Xinjiang, we actually used the Global Magnitsky Act, which many members of this committee contributed to its passage, and that provided us a very important tool that we could use in order to address those very specific human rights abuses that were identified in that legislation.

But more generally, I think we need more interaction with Chinese civil society. And here I emphasize the point I made in my opening statement that we have to talk to the Chinese outside of China, the ones who really need to be heard and give voice to the aspirations of the Chinese people. But we also have to use a lot of the tools we have at our disposal to reach the people inside China to communicate with them, and I think that ultimately will be to our benefit.

Senator BARRASSO. With regard to—moving to the next topic—stealing intellectual property, one on the list that I have talked about, China continues to infiltrate top U.S. companies, laboratories, universities. It seems their goal is stealing valuable American intellectual property, trade secrets, the Chinese Communist Party clearly attempting to surpass us in economic strength, military capabilities, and international influence. It is their game plan. They are funding criminal hackers to target U.S. research in sectors ranging from agriculture to COVID-19-related biomedical research.

Just yesterday—yesterday—the U.S. Department of Justice charged two Chinese nationals working on behalf of the Government of China with stealing trade secrets, hacking computer systems of companies who are working on a coronavirus vaccine. Just yesterday.

You know, the FBI estimates that they open a new China-related counterintelligence case not every 10 weeks or 10 months or 10 days. Every 10 hours they are having to open a new China-related counterintelligence case. So the FBI Deputy Director believes China's economic coercion is like that, he described, as an organized criminal syndicate.

So what steps must we as a nation take along with our international partners, as you have talked about an international group? What must we do to end China's economic espionage?

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

The State Department works very closely with the FBI. In fact, just before this hearing, I had a phone conversation with the individual who you quoted a moment ago, Deputy Director Dave Bowdich. We are doing an enormous amount to challenge this as we speak. The fact that those indictments were unsealed, as well as two others that were unsealed in the State of California just a few days before, are a suggestion of the degree of effort that we are applying to this. And I would not in any way dissociate the direction that the President gave to the Department of State yesterday to notify the PRC about the removal of diplomatic status of the consulate in Houston is very much related to this. You will be getting more briefings in a different setting on these topics, but suffice it, Senator, it is a set of challenges that we take very seriously and it is one that we and our domestic law enforcement partners are working very hard to address.

Senator BARRASSO. My final question has to do with Huawei. The Trump administration continues to raise the alarms with our allies and partners about the national security risks of Huawei and the Chinese Communist Party. To me, Huawei is a Trojan horse. Its deep links to the Communist regime are impossible to ignore. They are attempting to infiltrate communications networks around the

world and for no good. It poses a serious risk, I believe, not only to our national security, but also to privacy, to intellectual property, and to human rights.

You know, recently the United Kingdom recognized the serious security threat and is taking action to ban Huawei from their 5G networks. It sounds like Germany is going to make a decision. All eyes are on Germany with regard to what they decide on Huawei.

Is it your impression we are making some headway and that our allies are understanding the dangers that are posed by having Huawei and ultimately China so involved in their telecommunications infrastructure?

Mr. BIEGUN. Absolutely, Senator. We are seeing countries around the world recognize the risks of bringing unreliable technology like Huawei or ZTE into their networks. I know that Senator Menendez is a bit grudging about giving us credit for the decision of the UK, and I will give the UK Government first credit of course on this. But I can assure you, Senator, that decision was the product of lengthy and numerous discussions all the way up to the level of the President and the Prime Minister over the course of the last several months.

Just today, we saw France mirror the UK's decision. France has now announced that all Huawei technology has to be removed from the French telecom system by 2028, a year later but with the same effect. This technology will rapidly be removed from those networks because it will be obsolete. The systems will be obsolete if they incorporate it now in advance.

So we are seeing significant success in this effort, and we will continue to emphasize to partners around the world that we will not conduct secure communications on networks that are supplied by these Chinese technologies.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.

Senator Kaine.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Secretary Biegun, good to see you again.

I will start off by saying I think this is a very hard problem, and I also agree with both your opening testimony and Senator Romney's that there was a very well-intentioned strategy for the last three decades, really beginning with Nixon opening to China that we had every reason to try and hope it would work out. It had not. So that is unfortunate. I also do not give earlier administrations great credit for the way they handled this relationship either.

But I will tell you the three critiques that I have about the Trump administration policy with China, and I want to ask you about the third one.

Number one, I see a lot of action, but I sometimes have a hard time connecting the action to any strategy. So I mean, obviously, it is a massive relationship, so there is trade and there is diplomacy and there is human rights and there is military. There are a lot of things going on. But I have a hard time connecting the actions to a strategy.

Number two, I think the U.S. under this Administration has squandered a natural advantage that we have that China does not

have, which is a deep network of alliances, often by casting the alliances aside. I will go back to Senator Romney's point. When we want to confront China on trade, we cannot confront them one on one with the strength that we could confront them with if we linked arms with our allied nations that have the same concerns about China's trade practices as we do. So when the President started off with trade sanctions against Canada and Mexico and the EU, I think it made it much more difficult for us to try to go mano-a-mano against China. We should have been working with those strong allies to link arms and form a comprehensive strategy.

But what I want to ask you about is my third critique. My third critique is I think the President's foreign policy is often chasing our adversaries into each other's arms. Senator Coons asked about the reports that are in the news. There is a "Newsweek" piece today about Iran and China doing a negotiation for economic infrastructure and defense cooperation. We have seen Iran and China do joint military exercises in the Gulf. We have seen China and Russia do joint military exercises on their border in some ways that are troubling to me.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, we get briefings every year, and they are often classified so I will not give you the info. But what I can tell you is we tend to get briefings about U.S. capacity, and then we get briefings about the capacity of China and the capacity of Russia and the capacity of Iran. But those are all separate briefings about their separate capacities.

These are nations that have longstanding difficulties and challenges with each other. Iran has been in the revolutionary period very anti-great power, any great power. China and Russia have had a very, very difficult relationship. And President Nixon realized that and pretty much counted on the fact that they could not agree on anything. But as we see and in the article in "Newsweek" today, there is a Wilson Institute comment that says President Trump is driving our adversaries into each other's arms as they seek to amass power at a moment of apparent American indecision.

How much of the State Department are you guys looking at this question, the relationships between these adversaries, China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, whether they are getting closer, how much a combination of capacities, military, economic, diplomatic, pose a multiplied threat to the United States?

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

Just very quickly on your first two points. Let me assure you that we seek the same goals of a coherent strategy and closest possible cooperation with our allies. The United States is a big and sprawling democracy and occasionally we get in our own way on both of those. But it is our aspiration, and it is something that we work on at the State Department every day. And the President has given us clear direction on the China strategy that is going to help us move I think in a more orderly way across the Administration in that direction.

On your question, I have to tell you honestly we spend less time worrying about our adversaries working in concert with each other, although it is worrisome, and more about countries maybe in the middle. So it is inconceivable to me that we are going to have a cooperative relationship with a Venezuela ruled by Maduro, a Syria

ruled by Assad, unfortunately a Russia ruled by Putin, or an Iran ruled by the ayatollahs. It is the other countries, the Belt and Road Initiative countries that were previously mentioned and also countries that have been in discussions with the Chinese about military basing or presence, countries like the UAE or Djibouti where we really have to apply ourselves and we do.

As I mentioned, I did a weekly phone call with my Indo-Pacific partners, India, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, my counterparts. And one night after that weekly call—it happens late on Thursday evenings—I turned to my team and I asked do you suppose—what do you wonder what that call would have sounded like tonight if it was China, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, and Iran? I can tell you from our allies' point of view, it is a rich discussion anchored in historic shared interests and shared values that allow us to build natural cooperation, as long as we can get out of our own ways. And it is not just us incidentally. Many times our challenges come from our partners as well. But we work through those as friends and allies.

We have to do that with friends and allies. We have to do that with the countries in the middle. I am less optimistic that we are going to find common cause with the adversaries. Unfortunately, it is the case that they will find common cause with each other.

Senator KAINE. That is an illuminating answer. And I just would hope—and I do not need to ask it because I am sure you are doing it—as we watch these adversaries who have traditionally been opposed to each other get closer and closer and closer and do more and more together, we do need to be paying attention to them.

Mr. BIEGUN. We do. And just as our relationships are based upon shared interests and shared values, theirs are very transactional. The United States has been a longstanding partner of countries like Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea, and there is no doubt in the minds of those people what the long-term orientation of the United States is in our interests and values with them.

Russia and China, maybe not so much.

Senator KAINE. Thanks, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Senator PERDUE.

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary, thank you for being here.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a weather warning.

Senator PERDUE. That was Huawei checking in on our hearing.

[Laughter.]

Senator PERDUE. You know, I find myself always in these hearings, Mr. Chairman and Secretary, agreeing with my good friend from Virginia, Senator Kaine. We disagree on some things in terms of causative factors, but this is a very complicated relationship we have. We got it wrong for the last 30 years, 40 years really. I have lived over there. I have got a background, and I have watched this develop. Deng Xiaoping, I think, sold us a bill of goods. Michael Pillsbury has written a book, "The Hundred-Year Marathon," that acknowledges that we all got it wrong. All of us. It has nothing to do with policies or politics or anything else. It is just we got it wrong. We now see what they are trying to do.

And the vacuum that was created in the last administration frankly in foreign policy created a vacuum that he stepped into. The Chinese culture never tells you what they are going to do unless they have decided you do not have the wherewithal or the will to stop them. In 2013, they put out the Made in China 2025 where they told the world they are going to dominate us in 12 areas of technologies, and they are making huge investments to do that. They developed the Belt and Road Initiative. Why? Because there was a vacuum.

And I want to come back to the thing Senator Kaine talks about every time we talk about China, and that is allies. Senator Coons does the same thing. I think we all see this as our huge advantage. I want to talk about the Quad today, but before I do that, I want to make a comment.

If we sat here and worried about what China is doing, we would worry about the Shanghai Cooperative Organization where they have got four nuclear powers in a defense-type organization, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. Now, that is an odd group of partners there. So I do not really worry a lot about that.

What I am looking at is that the world has become very binary. You have state-controlled countries, Russia, China, Venezuela, Cuba, others, Syria, and you have the other countries of the world that are self-determinant. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore are all beginning to pay attention to what China's ultimate goals are, and that is to dominate the economic and political relationship. So they are very concerned about that. They are actually trying to turn back to us.

I do think, though, the Quad is a specific, targeted effort right now that we could put a lot of energy behind. I would like you to respond to this that Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. are beginning to look at how we might pull together.

Our economic value—and that is how we defeated the Soviet Union without firing a bullet was that we ground them into the dirt with our economy, I believe, and we bankrupted their ethos. We have the same opportunity here in that the economic power of China today is about \$14 trillion unadjusted. If you take just the Quad, it is over \$30 trillion of economic power. So we have the ability today to dominate the economic, military relationship just with those four countries. I am not including Europe or any of the other countries in Asia that are already beginning to lean our way.

How is the State Department looking at the Quad as an example of a relationship that we could build and actually encourage others to see how they might participate to stand up against the bully of the next 50 years?

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

If I could add your description of the global environment that we face to Senator Romney's description of the challenge we face from China, I think we would have a complete picture of what we see every day when we wake up at the Department of State.

I agree with you that the Quad is an incredibly important institution. The ministerial that we held last year marked a milestone in how we are going to approach organizing our security interests and other interests in the Indo-Pacific. India just recently invited Australia to participate in the Malabar exercises, which is now

going to allow all four members of the Quad to participate in a military exercise together that will be hugely beneficial to reinforcing the behaviors that are going to be necessary for us to defend our mutual interests.

Just stepping back, it is not quite your question and I apologize for using your time. But I see our policies successful if they stand on four pillars. First is unity at home. Second is close partnership with our friends and allies around the world. Third is effective military deterrence, and fourth is a powerful economic alternative to China. We have to work on all four of those together. But the part about international cooperation will be fundamental.

I actually think if we get all four of these right, we produce the best outcome with China as well because if China sees that that is how the world is aligned against its efforts, it will have the best incentive to change its behavior in a peaceful manner as well.

Senator PERDUE. Thank you.

I will yield my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

And I would just like to make a comment that I think this type of meeting with someone at this level in the State Department and in the Administration is so critical to have us develop more of a nonpartisan view of China that could transcend administrations. That is the problem with dealing with China. You cannot yo-yo your relationship with a country like that because they are going to be much more monotone over a longer period of time.

Thank you for having this hearing.

Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, could I just tell Senator Perdue that that noise was a flash flood warning that started just when he started to speak.

[Laughter.]

Senator Kaine. I do not know if there is any connection, causal—

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Fortunately, we are not on the ground floor. Thank you, Senator Perdue.

Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.

U.S. foreign policy for much of the last 40 years has been about studying the interactions of China, Russia, and the United States, and two of that three trying to play off one against the other.

I want to ask two questions today that get at what I think is a continued priority for this committee and this Administration to understand how that interplay works in modern times.

The first is this. You have laid out a series of actions that the Administration is taking with the hope of sending clear messages to China about the consequences of its actions especially when it comes to ways in which they infringe on the rights of the United States at home and abroad. But China does not pay attention only to the messages we send them. They also pay attention to the messages that we send to other nations. And Russia is at the top of that list.

I do not think we have gotten a chance yet to get a member of the Administration on the record with respect to very credible reports that suggest the Russian Government was paying what

would commonly be referred to as bounties for the murder of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. That, of course, crosses a line. It is a fairly unprecedented abuse of one Security Council permanent member by another. And thus far, the American public and the world have not seen any consequences, not even a public acknowledgement of that abuse having been committed against the United States. I worry that China watches that and takes signals from it.

So I wanted to just ask you to tell us for the record today whether any action has been taken or is planned to be taken with respect to these, I think we would all agree, very credible reports.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

I will answer your question, but I am also going to be mindful of the fact that the information that you are discussing comes from sensitive sources and methods.

But let me say this. Any suggestion that the Russian Federation or any part of the Russian Government is employed in providing resources to fighters from other countries to attack American soldiers will be met with the most severe consequences, including those individuals and their movements in the areas in which they are undertaking those activities. Were that to happen, they should expect a full and robust response.

I will also say that any such report that came into the United States of America would be treated in two manners. First, it would immediately be notified to the force commander and all necessary steps would be taken in order to protect U.S. soldiers anywhere in the world, particularly in a place like Afghanistan in which they serve every hour of the day in a hostile environment. But it would also be the subject of a conversation between very senior officials in both governments in no uncertain terms.

Senator MURPHY. I think the horse is out of the barn with respect to these reports being solely classified, and thus, while you may be suggesting that there are actions being taken that have not been made public, I think we are at the point where the world and this country wants to know what those consequences are. And I think it does have impact with respect to our relationship with other great powers.

Which leads me to my second question with respect to the interplay of the United States, Russia, and China, and that is with respect to the negotiation of an extension of New START. The Administration has laid down some priorities in order to get to a new agreement. One of them is the inclusion of China in those discussions and ultimately in a new agreement. Were we to all live in a perfect world, of course we would want China at that table. Of course, it is in our interest to have China right now before they acquire the same number of arms and warheads as the United States agree to some limitation. But it likely does not stand to reason that China is going to enter into those negotiations because they would likely want time to catch up before they sat at a table with us.

And so I think I would just love some assurance that we are not going to give China the veto power as to whether we engage in a renewal of an agreement with China that, I think we can all agree, the confines of that agreement has worked to limit the arms race. I just want to make sure that China is not going to be the one that

decides whether the United States and Russia decide to renew that agreement.

Mr. BIEGUN. I appreciate that take, and Senator, I think you can see the evidence in front of you. I know that our Special Envoy for Arms Control testified in his additional capacity yesterday as the nominee to be Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and also he was up here a few weeks ago I believe to brief members of the committee on the progress in our discussions with the Russians. Those are ongoing. We are imminently going to be dispatching the technical teams to continue a deeper level discussion in Vienna with the Russians, and that decision is ongoing.

There is still a seat at the table reserved for China, but those conversations between the United States and Russia are going.

I believe my colleague at the Department of State has emphasized this point in his discussions with you, but let me say it publicly as well. Russia has every reason to want China at those discussions as well. Russia faces a far more formidable challenge from China's presence on its southern border than the United States does.

And this goes to the transactional nature of the relationship that I think exists between the two countries. The history between Russia and China is one of significant tension, and the fact that it is papered over today because of a shared adversarial relationship with the United States is not an enduring basis for China-Russia relations. And I think many of the experts in Russia who work on these issues know full well that China should be at the table as well not only because of its potential strategic challenge that it could pose to the Russian Federation but because China as a P-5 member and is a recognized nuclear weapons state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is obliged to participate in good faith negotiations to reduce the level of nuclear forces that it holds. The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not say in proportion to other countries in the world. It says good faith efforts on reduction of nuclear forces, and that is what we are requesting of the People's Republic of China.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Murphy, for that line of questioning too.

Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for your testimony, Deputy Secretary.

The trade deficit between the United States and China has had a huge impact in transferring wealth and jobs from America to China, and in the course of that unfolding, we have watched in a short period of time China go from bicycles to traffic jams to bullet trains. It is not that many years ago that we had a congressional delegation go to China. They had their first bullet train, 200 miles, Beijing to Tianjin on the coast. Now they have 16,000 miles.

President Trump made this point, campaigned on this point, has continued to make this point, and yet between 2015 and 2018, our trade deficit increased over 14 percent in manufactured goods, in a higher level of disparity between the two economies.

Is this a topic that the team is deeply engaged in? Because here we are talking about the surging China, and yet it is the very policy of the United States that provided the economic foundation for that surge.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

Yes, this absolutely remains one of the President's top priorities and one that particularly our counterparts in our economic agencies pursue aggressively but also certainly remains a priority for the Department of State as well.

We have a lot of progress that we have to make in order to rebalance our trade relations. The phase one trade deal was just that. It was phase one. It was an early harvest. It was an attempt in a few sectors to begin to right the balance, but there is much, much more work that needs to be done in order to eliminate the structural impediments to a more balanced U.S.-China trade relationship, and we are committed to pursuing those.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. Well, I am glad you are committed to it. You are working on it. Mitt Romney proceeded to note that free access to our market has been a significant factor in China as well.

But here is the thing. The efforts proceeded in such a fashion that the trade deficit actually has grown in manufactured goods. A kind of chaotic throwing of rocks at China and then throwing rocks back at us does not get us to a reduced trade deficit. So it has to be a much more coherent, strategic strategy than the one we have seen so far.

I have been very concerned about China's enslavement of a million Uyghurs using all kinds of facial recognition technology, other IDs, surveillance, producing an enormous amounts of goods, many bound for the United States.

Should the United States completely end the ability of China to send goods manufactured under this slave labor strategy with a million Uyghurs to the United States?

Mr. BIEGUN. We should import no goods from any country, including China, made with slave labor. And, Senator, the recent series of sanctions that we imposed upon several Chinese companies operating in Xinjiang were precisely for that purpose.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, of course, it is not just Chinese companies. It is American multinationals as well that have operations in this area. It has been sometimes hard to get the clear facts. I understand it is difficult.

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, we have sent out a business advisory to the CEOs of the 500 major U.S. companies, as well as every business association in Washington, DC and specifically the ones operating in China, that they will be held accountable if materials or components made through forced labor or slave labor in Xinjiang appear in their products.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. I will say I was extremely disturbed to hear that President Trump had dismissed this slave labor, this enslavement of the Muslim community as unimportant in his conversations with Chinese leaders.

I want to talk about Taiwan. I do not think it has been discussed here today. We have had essentially a position going from our early opening of the relationship with China where we have accepted the

concept of their sovereignty over Hong Kong and over Taiwan. Well, they have now dramatically violated the terms of the agreement of two systems, one country for Hong Kong. And Taiwan has essentially been operating as an independent country for a very long time.

Is it time for us to start looking seriously at starting to treat Taiwan as a country, not an extension of China?

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, the policy of this Administration is to uphold the One-China policy, but consistent with that, also to fully enact the protections underneath the Taiwan Relations Act and the Three Communiqués.

In the case of Taiwan, we commend them for building a robust democracy. A recent election represented the true will of the Taiwanese people. And it is a tremendous accomplishment and it is a demonstration to the people of China that a Confucian-based society is capable of operating fully within democratic norms.

I will point your attention to a series of high profile public remarks that have been made by senior administration officials, including the Attorney General, the National Security Advisor. Tomorrow, Secretary Pompeo will be giving some remarks out at the Nixon Library in California, and he will be talking about some of these issues.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I really appreciate you being here, Mr. Secretary.

Like many here and in the Administration, I am very disturbed by the recent authoritarian turn in China from Hong Kong to the Uyghurs to Tibet and across their civil society.

And while this is happening, I am also deeply concerned about our own moral authority on these matters and it eroding here at home, limiting our ability to rally the world to put pressure on China, as many others have spoken about today. The sad fact is this Administration has taken a hostile attitude towards asylum seekers, separating children, some of them very young, from their families. They are doing it on purpose as a cruel deterrent to tell others to stay away from America when fleeing violence.

Last month, we saw the National Guard members using pepper spray, rubber bullets, and other blunt instruments against peaceful protesters in the streets of our nation's capital.

This week in Portland, camouflaged federal agents have been taking peaceful protesters into custody in unmarked vans and beating protesters, including a 57-year-old nonviolent Navy veteran.

These scenes echo those on the streets of Hong Kong. This is a moment that cries out for national leadership, but this President only offers unhinged threats of violence against Americans exercising their First Amendment rights. Many are increasingly concerned that the President's behavior and those of his loyalists creates divisions at home. This committee needs to consider how that weakens us abroad as well.

Let me be clear. We should oppose any such behavior from the Chinese or any government that represses their people. Their treatment of Tibet and the Uyghurs is in particular totally unaccept-

able. But authoritarian crackdowns here at home and the hawkish saber rattling are not going to help those in Hong Kong or repressed religious minorities. Sanctions have not worked in Cuba and they are unlikely to work with China. There is no good military solution here. Like with the Soviet Union, we can overcome repression with openness, welcome asylum seekers, foster freedom of speech, show a better example.

What has been the response of our adversaries and our allies to this Administration's actions like child separation, cutting off asylum, and now paramilitary crackdowns on mostly nonviolent protesters? How is that impacting our efforts to build coalitions to push back on China's authoritarianism, and are we facing more accusations of hypocrisy?

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, I generally am an agreeable person, but I have to say I cannot agree with nearly anything that you just laid out.

I think the type of protests that you see playing out in the streets of the United States of America within a democratic system with the rule of law and democratic rights guaranteed to all, the ability to choose officials who govern them and the responsibility of law enforcement authorities themselves to be answerable to the law represents an entirely different situation than what we are seeing play out in Hong Kong.

I understand the temptation, and certainly the Chinese—

Senator UDALL. How about the part where you have the President going for a photo op and clearing peaceful protesters? I mean, that does not sound to me like the America I know, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, I understand that this moment has excited strong emotions and some of them we see playing out in the streets, some in an orderly way, which is part of a robust democracy, and some of it in a disorderly way that does require some level of enforcement and authority in order to protect private property and the safety of individuals. That is the moment we are in.

But we are in that moment in a democratic society, Senator, in which you and I can have this discussion openly. And to suggest that there is any comparison with the environment in which we are having this discussion and the one that brave democracy leaders like Joshua Wong and Nathan Law face in Hong Kong is simply wrong. This is a moment that has excited a lot of passions here in the United States, and it is an uncomfortable moment for us because of that. But it does not indict our democracy. The resolution of these issues through the rights and liberties that all citizens in this country are guaranteed under our Constitution and by our courts is exactly how we move forward as a society. And we will.

Senator UDALL. One quick question on the health care front. Are the CDC, NIH, and others in the United States being allowed to share scientific information about COVID-19 with their respective Chinese counterparts?

Mr. BIEGUN. So, Senator, we are very interested—and I laid out in my opening testimony deeper cooperation with the health authorities in the People's Republic of China to understand both the origins and characteristics of the COVID-19 virus, as well as cooperation, as the President said, on potential areas of addressing or treating it.

I will say that it has been a stubborn resistance we have faced from the People's Republic of China dating back to mid-January when I was first engaged in this issue and the Chinese Government over several weeks refused to allow a WHO delegation into China in order to examine these very issues at the beginning of the crisis.

At present, we are now in an environment in which the World Health Assembly has overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for that exact kind of investigation under independent leadership. The WHO has appointed two respected leaders to lead that effort, and they are deeply frustrated by their inability to gain access to China in order to do the work that the World Health Organization has appointed them to do.

We would be prepared to have that kind of discussion, and I highlighted it in my opening testimony as one of the potential areas that we could potentially open some areas of cooperation with China that would be to the benefit of the entire world.

Secretary Pompeo likewise framed these issues with his counterpart in Honolulu approximately a month ago when we met there. Unfortunately, the Chinese have not taken us up on that proposal.

Senator UDALL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Steve, thank you for being here. When you decided to step up and come back into public service, I said this was an important time in our country's history. I was glad you were stepping up. I had no idea how important it would be.

So here we are talking about one of the great challenges we face now as a country with China having an increasingly aggressive posture toward us in so many areas. And I know this has been discussed today, certainly in trade where I am hopeful we can finish phase one, but phase two seems unlikely, and they continue to not play by the rules. Military adventurism in the South China Sea and elsewhere. The saber rattling we have seen recently vis-à-vis Taiwan and elsewhere. The human rights abuses as it relates to the Uyghurs. I was in Tibet a couple of years ago and got to see some of what goes on there. And then recent passage of this new national security law with regard to Hong Kong, I mean, so many troubling things.

And I am going to ask you about another one this afternoon which relates to China systematically targeting U.S. researchers and good research and then taking that research. And we have new legislation we just had marked up in committee today to combat that.

But with this long list, this sort of list of "horribles," tell me something good that is happening in respect to our relationship with China.

Mr. BIEGUN. An issue that I know is near and dear to you, Senator, and one that you have shown leadership in, the Chinese just in the past several days invited the DEA to establish a presence in one of our consulates in China in order to deepen our collaboration on fighting against not only the trade in fentanyl but the trade

in the precursors that we have seen being used to evade some of the restrictions that have been put in place. It is a small issue but it is one that we can potentially work on with the Chinese.

I stay in regular contact with my Chinese counterparts on North Korea. It is an important area of shared interest between the United States and China. I would not say that they are completely faithful in fulfilling their responsibilities under the international sanctions regime, but still they do generally push in the right direction and it is an area at least where we can have discussions.

We stay in close touch with the Chinese Government on the peace process in Afghanistan. Like many other countries in the region, China has a shared interest in a stable outcome in Afghanistan. Of course, we do not want to see the territory of Afghanistan surrendered to terrorist rule again and, frankly, neither does the People's Republic of China.

There are several areas that I highlight in my testimony where there are at least areas of potential cooperation between us.

I will say, Senator, that my 16-page testimony had to be cut back one-third, and in doing so, we had to remove a litany of the issues that you have raised and many of them still are enumerated there. It is a long list and a formidable challenge, a generational challenge that we face with China. And notwithstanding these smaller areas of cooperation that I have highlighted, we have an enormous task ahead of us to turn back the challenge from China.

Senator PORTMAN. I agree. The challenge is only growing every day, as I see it, and that is one reason I wanted to ask you about some of the positive lines of communication that we do have open with China. It is important to have that.

I believe that, with regard to the stealing of technology and innovation, that we are finally waking up as a country. I think that we typically tend to point the finger at China when in fact we need to get our own house in order in many respects, and one is not to be naive about what the Chinese have been up to through the Chinese Communist Party, which is really what is behind this, and their relationship with their own universities, their own research. For 20 years, as you know, for two decades, they have been systematically taking our good research, much of it paid for by the U.S. taxpayer, \$150 billion a year, and using it to help fuel their own economic rise and their military rise because some of it is military technology.

I think you are aware of the fact that we have legislation again that was marked up today in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. We have worked very closely with your people because one of the five major elements of this legislation has to do with the visa process and the ability to deal with the current loophole in law as it relates to export controls and as to being able to deny a visa based on somebody coming to this country in order to take some of our most sensitive information. So, one, I want to thank your people. They testified before us. They have worked closely with us. They have helped us to address concerns that some in the university community had.

But do you have any thoughts on this broader issue? Our legislation is called the Safeguarding American Innovation Act because that is what it is about. And again, there are several elements to

it, but one that is very important relates directly to your Department.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator.

First, we are in complete agreement on the gravity of the problem, and it has been a persistent problem ongoing for a very long time. We now have more tools that we can use to push back against it. And as I said earlier in the hearing, the State Department is working closely with our domestic law enforcement partners in order to address these issues.

In the coming days, you are going to be the recipient of some additional briefings on these matters related to some of the steps the President directed the Department to take this week, as well as some of the indictments that have been unsealed by the Department of Justice. I will only say that you will get more detail on the full effort that we have undertaken in order to push back against those predations.

Senator PORTMAN. That is great. Well, the indictments and the arrests have increased substantially since our report came out at the end of last year. And we called for DOJ and the FBI to step it up and they have, to their credit. But I think we have just seen the tip of the iceberg, including 54 scientists just being relieved of their duties at the National Institutes of Health. They are researchers they had been providing grant funding to; some had resigned and some were fired. We have countless examples now, including in my own state of Ohio of people who have, shall we say, a conflict of commitment, taking millions of dollars from China, taking millions of dollars from the U.S. taxpayer, not revealing the Chinese money, setting up replicate labs in China and taking the research, taking innovation, really leapfrogging us by taking advantage of our relatively open research enterprise.

So we appreciate your work on that, and again, thanks to the State Department visa folks working with us on an important element of that legislation to counter this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, these are very divided times for our country. I have to say just a few minutes ago, this committee heard a Democratic Senator compare federal law enforcement agents to Chinese Communist oppressors, silencing and brutalizing protesters in Hong Kong. Political disagreements are fine, but let me say for the record that comparison is obscene. It is false and it is grotesque.

I recognize we are 104 days out from an election, but last week the Speaker of the House tweeted out a statement calling federal law enforcement officers storm troopers, a term typically reserved for Nazis and other such oppressive thugs. She alleged that the storm troopers were kidnapping people on the streets. She described those people as innocent and peaceful protesters. Cops are not storm troopers. And an arrest is not kidnapping. And people who are engaged in violent acts of riot, who are assaulting innocent citizens, who are fire-bombing police cars, who are attacking federal buildings and courthouses, who are murdering police officers are not engaged in peaceful protests.

So I would just encourage members of this committee and Members of the Senate—you may not like the President. That is your prerogative in a democratic system, but slandering federal law enforcement officers for protecting courthouses and federal properties by calling them, analogizing them to Communist thugs, those are not comments befitting the Senate of the United States.

Now, Mr. Biegun, speaking of Communists, this morning it was announced that the State Department asked the Chinese consulate in Houston to vacate the premises within 72 hours. I was wondering if you could tell this committee what the reason for that was and what the basis was for it.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator Cruz.

In my earlier remarks, I highlighted three areas of particular concern the United States has that led the President to make these decisions.

One is the persistent theft of U.S. technology by Chinese Government representatives and agents.

The second is the degree to which that is being done through abuse of our student exchange systems.

And the third is the behavior of Chinese diplomats in the Houston consulate in a manner that it is incompatible with the standard practice of diplomacy.

There will be sensitive briefings given to members of the committee. They have been arranged now and our counterparts in domestic law enforcement have likewise been in touch with their oversight entities. I want to assure you that you will have more detail on this, but for purposes of an ongoing process and also an ongoing investigation, I would prefer to leave further detail for that discussion.

Senator CRUZ. And I have that classified briefing already scheduled this week. But I would encourage the State Department, to the extent possible and consistent with protecting sources and methods, to make the basis public. I think it is beneficial. I have no reason to doubt your representations that the personnel at the Chinese consulate in Houston were behaving in ways harmful to U.S. national security interests, but I think it is beneficial for both Americans and the world to understand some of the evidence about what those threats were.

Let us shift to a different topic and that is Taiwan and what the U.S. can do substantively and symbolically to emphasize support for our ally.

In 2015, the Obama administration responded to a request from China and banned Taiwanese officials and military members from displaying their flags or insignia on U.S. Government property and bases. I have introduced legislation that would reverse these guidelines. But that decision could also be made within the State Department by the Administration.

Can you speak as to how the Administration views this specific issue, whether Taiwanese officials should be able to display their flags and insignia, and also address more broadly the issue of supporting Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression?

Mr. BIEGUN. So on the specific question, I was unfamiliar with that policy pronouncement in the previous Administration, and it

is one that we are more than happy to take a look at with an eye toward reversing it.

Senator CRUZ. I would appreciate it.

Mr. BIEGUN. In regard to our broader relationship with the people of Taiwan, the Secretary commended President Tsai on her very successful election, as I said earlier, demonstrating that Chinese heritage, a Confucian society, is not incompatible with democracy, and we should never forget that. And we should only hope that the people of China can all enjoy the fruits of democracy.

In the meantime, the United States remains fully engaged in our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Three Communiqués. We are providing ongoing support for the defensive capabilities of the people of Taiwan and, in fact, just recently some additional sales on top of already the largest arms sale to Taiwan by any administration since the United States recognized the People's Republic of China.

We expect China to uphold its commitments to peacefully resolve any dispute with Taiwan, and we watch very closely over that fact.

We also believe that there is an important place for Taiwan, for example, in the World Health Assembly as an observer and participating in the global dialogue on protecting the international community from the ravages of pandemics like COVID-19. The Taiwanese authorities enjoyed tremendous success in containing COVID-19 because perhaps they, even more so than many of us, were aware of exactly what they were contending with, not just in terms of the virus but in terms of the country from which it originated.

So we have a very high esteem for Taiwan, and Senator, I will take a look at the issue that you asked us about.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cruz.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said a man must be judged by the passions of his time. And I would simply say that when we have federal agents sweep up innocent and peaceful protesters in Lafayette Park so that the President can have a photo op, it does not serve our cause of promoting in the world democracy and human rights as an example. And so I think that the Senator from New Mexico, as his last question, was pursuing that with the Secretary. And I think we could all agree there was a lot of silence when that took place. But I think we could all agree that is not in our collective interest.

Mr. Secretary, there are consistent reports that U.S. companies failed to undertake basic labor and human rights assessments in Xinjiang, in essence, willfully ignoring the horrific conditions of forced labor in Xinjiang. This is a particular problem for clothing and garment manufacturers, given that 84 percent of Chinese cotton comes from Xinjiang.

Further, recent reports have indicated that a wide array of U.S. companies, including Apple, Kraft, Heinz, Coca-Cola, and the Gap, among others, have sourced or continue to source from Xinjiang.

Other international firms with considerable U.S. presence also have operations in Xinjiang, including those who have partnerships with state-owned military contractors that manufacture and supply the Chinese Government with the mass surveillance tools it uses in its new digital authoritarianism and other tactics of repression.

So given the ongoing threat that the sourcing of goods and services produced by forced labor from Xinjiang poses to the global supply chain, what is the Department doing to make U.S. companies aware of the glaring human rights issues that they are contributing to by sourcing goods from Xinjiang?

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

I can assure you that we share 100 percent the concerns that you laid out and we are actively engaging with the private sector in order to ensure that they put in place the mechanisms to detect any entry into their supply chain of goods made in Xinjiang from forced labor, slave labor.

Senator MENENDEZ. How so?

Mr. BIEGUN. Just 2 weeks ago, the Under Secretary for Economics, Keith Krach, sent a personal letter to 500 CEOs across the country, as well as to every trade and business association operating in China, laying out the supply chain dimensions of this, how companies need to pursue and look at their own supply chains in order to determine to remove this.

It is not the first time we have confronted issues like this, Senator. I think you are well aware and you probably have also been supporter of initiatives like the blood diamonds restrictions or the conflict minerals out of the Great Lakes region. It requires steady pressure and a setting of the bar by the government, which we have done with these companies, and it will include enforcement, including using tools and mechanisms like the Security and Exchange Commission to hold companies accountable if they in fact do not expunge these goods from their supply chains. That is our clear message.

Senator MENENDEZ. What is the priority for the Department on this issue?

Mr. BIEGUN. Very high. One of the senior-most officials in the Department has taken the personal initiative to try to persuade companies around the country to take this action before enforcement.

Senator MENENDEZ. We look forward to continuing to engage with you on that, including with the private sector. They need to be responsible in this regard.

Mr. BIEGUN. I agree with you, and this conversation here hopefully will help further illuminate and create the expectations that those companies need to abide by.

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, last week the State Department released a 2018 diplomatic cable noting that the Wuhan Institute of Virology had “a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high containment laboratory.”

First, as you may be aware, I have been asking since March of this year repeatedly for these cables and for engagement and a briefing from the Department for this committee on the question of

COVID origins, a vital national security issue, to which I have received no response, no briefing, nothing.

Given all the statements by senior level administration officials on this issue, I find it perplexing that the Administration has been unwilling to engage with Congress as to these simple requests as I am sure you would were you still here as a senior staff member of this committee.

Can you pledge to me that the Department by the end of this week will schedule this long-requested classified briefing and discussion for the committee to take place before the end of this work period, which is ending in another 2 weeks?

Mr. BIEGUN. I will pledge to try, Senator. And I will be back in touch with your team through our Legislative Affairs to seek to schedule such a briefing. Certainly the level of safety at Chinese laboratories around the breadth of the People's Republic of China is an ongoing issue of concern. It has been written about extensively in any number of public journals, including a well-known Science magazine story about several cases in which viruses—

Senator MENENDEZ. I hope we can get the briefing so we can make an independent judgment of what you have or do not have. So I will look forward to hopefully getting a—this has been going on since March. Yet, I see Peter Navarro on TV, of course, the President himself, and other senior administration officials constantly refer to these things in public for the press, for the consumption. But members of the United States Senate and of this committee cannot get access to something as critical to understanding the nature of the veracity, the depth of the understanding, and whether or not this is the case that is being promoted by the President.

So let me ask you this in the open, which is not a question of a classified. Does the United States Government have clear and convincing evidence that this pandemic originated in and was released from the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Mr. BIEGUN. Senator, like any matter that happens well outside the reach of our ability to see and touch and feel, there is some uncertainty around that matter. I have been part of the discussion on COVID-19 since mid-January. I have had the opportunity to discuss this very question with some of the leading experts in the United States, including fellow members of the Vice President's Coronavirus Task Force, such as Dr. Redfield, Dr. Fauci, as well as our own operational medical experts in the State Department. I will say that it is inclusive, but that only highlights the extreme urgency for the World Health Organization inquiry that was authorized at the World Health Assembly meeting earlier this year to be able to get on the ground in Wuhan, to have access to the Wuhan Virology Institute, and make that firm determination.

Senator MENENDEZ. So I hear you say that it is inclusive. I asked you whether there was clear, convincing evidence. You said it was inclusive. I share with you that we should have all of the facts, but until we do have all of the facts, making statements and assertions that are as if they were fact does not serve us well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

For members, the record will remain open until 5:00 p.m. on Friday for questions.

Secretary, thank you so much for being here. Thank you for being so generous with your time. I can tell you we sit through a lot of these, and I really appreciate your good faith effort to address the questions sincerely and as best you can.

So with that, the committee will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STEPHEN E. BIEGUN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENEDEZ

5G

One of the major issues playing out in public currently is how Chinese companies are playing an increasingly dominant role in development and implementation of 5G mobile communications technologies. We are increasingly seeing the implementation of products from companies such as Huawei around the globe, ranging from Europe to Asia to Latin America to Africa:

Question. What security concerns does the Administration see in the proliferation of Chinese made 5G technologies around the globe?

Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned about the dangers of networks that can be manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by authoritarian governments that have no democratic checks and balances and no regard for human rights, privacy, or international norms. U.S. security concerns are much broader than industrial and political espionage. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could provide the PRC's Communist Party-led, authoritarian government the capability and opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical applications and infrastructure or provide technological advances to the PRC's military forces.

Question. What is the Administration doing to counter this spread?

Answer. The Administration is taking strong action at home and abroad to confront this challenge. Domestically, President Trump signed an Executive Order May 15, 2019 entitled "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," and a national emergency continuation notice on May 13, 2020. The E.O. empowers the U.S. Department of Commerce to prohibit transactions involving information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and that pose an undue risk of sabotage or subversion to the U.S. information and communications technology and services.

Abroad, the Administration is implementing a coordinated set of measures to 1) encourage countries to put in place risk-based security measures that prohibit the use of untrusted vendors like Huawei and ZTE in 5G and other next generation networks; and 2) level the playing field for trusted vendors to compete and win.

Question. Have our efforts to pressure countries to not use Huawei products been successful in light of the fact that so many countries continue to integrate their technologies into their infrastructure?

Answer. Yes, we are seeing the tide turn against Huawei and untrusted technology vendors as additional countries put in place restrictions and a growing list of carriers choose to procure from trusted vendors. Australia and Japan were two of the earliest countries to put in place security measures to protect their 5G networks. Recently, a growing number of countries have likewise put in place strong security measures to protect their networks against untrusted vendors, including: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In addition, some of the largest telecom companies around the globe are also becoming "Clean Telcos" by choosing to work only with trusted vendors. We've seen this with Orange in France, Jio in India, Telstra in Australia, SK and KT in South Korea, NTT in Japan, and O2 in the United Kingdom. In June, the big three telecommunications companies in Canada decided to partner with Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung.

Question. How will a Chinese centric 5G ecosystem affect U.S. and allied security?

Answer. The risks from a PRC 5G ecosystem to the security of the United States and our allies and partners are numerous, including espionage, disruption, and/or manipulation of networks enabling critical infrastructure and services. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could provide the PRC's Communist Party-led, authoritarian government the capability and opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical applications and infrastructure or provide technological advances to the PRC's military forces.

Question. Did the President of the United States give a green light to the President of China to build his concentration camps?

Answer. More than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions, import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses. We will continue to call on the Chinese Communist Party to immediately end their horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask all nations to join the United States in demanding an end to these dehumanizing abuses.

Question. How has the Department engaged with the Indian government to develop a diplomatic strategy against Chinese efforts to violate the sovereignty of countries in South Asia?

Answer. The United States' comprehensive global strategic partnership with India is central to achieving our shared vision of a free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, in which the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected. The United States is deeply concerned by China's recent pattern of aggressive actions, including along the Line of Actual Control with India, and by predatory trade, investment, and lending practices that are undermining the economies and sovereignty of other South Asian nations.

We regularly engage with India at the highest levels regarding these concerns, including recently through Under Secretary for Political Affairs Hale's July 7 Foreign Office Consultations with Indian Foreign Secretary Shringla, through our Ambassador in New Delhi, who has met regularly with key Indian counterparts, and in our joint State-DoD 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogues.

We also work closely with our other partners in South Asia, maintaining strong lines of communication with government counterparts and underscoring U.S. support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

BELT AND ROAD

Question. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has made inroads into Europe and has even signed an MOU with EU member Italy. I applaud the recent work done by the Development Finance Corporation and Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the Elfasina Shipyard in Greece which I think shows how investment and diplomacy can be married to counter BRI. I don't however have a sense that there is an overall strategy to counter BRI in Europe, including working with Brussels and other key capitals across the continent. Do we have one? If so, what are its component parts?

Answer. As part of the Department's strategy to counter the People's Republic of China's (PRC) malign influence, we have stepped up cooperation with our European Allies and partners and implemented a number of initiatives aimed at addressing the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe. Over the last 2 years, our diplomatic posts and interagency partners have greatly expanded outreach on risks to critical infrastructure and provided support to European countries in establishing or strengthening existing investment review mechanisms. We are working with our partners in the Western Balkans and Eurasia to ensure all potential projects are vetted to ensure commercial viability, transparency and fairness, and that national security concerns are taken into account.

In February, Secretary Pompeo announced a commitment from DFC of up to \$1 billion to the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) Fund in support of energy infrastructure projects, made possible in part by Congressional legislation adding flexibility to the DFC's mandate and allowing it to operate in high income countries in Europe within the energy sector. The Three Seas Initiative is a partnership of 12 democratic nations in Central and Eastern Europe intended to improve energy, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure that bonds its members together and with the rest of Europe; the United States is a strong Three Seas supporter and partner, but not a member. The Three Seas Initiative is also designed to offer Western alternatives to infrastructure development that communist China might otherwise use to extend its malign influence via such projects.

As needed, we are prepared to use foreign assistance funding from the Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account as well as other accounts to assist our partners in resisting unsustainable investments and loans, disinformation, and other forms of malign Chinese activity. The Department is reviewing over 50 proposals to counter malign Chinese influence from U.S. Embassies for projects from the current Congressionally-mandated Countering Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF). Ongoing projects funded by AEECA are already beginning to address this issue in several arenas, including working with energy sector counterparts to provide technical assistance and facilitate access to finance for key interconnection projects; helping to promote cybersecurity capacity development as well as greater cyber critical infrastructure defenses; promoting alternatives to Chinese goods in 5G and other emerging technologies; and helping to strengthen cooperation on nuclear energy with several European allies, in the hopes of cementing commercial relations with U.S. or other western firms in lieu of significant reliance on Russian or emerging Chinese nuclear technology.

Question. The Administration reportedly is considering barring Communist party members and their families from getting visas. That might mean about 200 million people, some with important power with whom we need to interact and some just ordinary citizens. What is the logic of such a move? What do you hope the effect will be?

Answer. The Department refers questions about potential presidential actions to the White House.

TRADE POLICY:

Question. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Ambassador Lighthizer commented the other day that he has no idea what the end game is on China with this Administration's trade policy: Do you? And if so, what is it?

Answer. Under President Trump's leadership, the United States is confronting China's unfair and market-distorting trade policies and practices to achieve a fair and reciprocal trading relationship. Since negotiations with China began, the Administration has focused on concluding high-quality fully enforceable terms for trade between our countries. The Phase One Agreement concluded earlier this year is the first step in rebalancing our trade relationship. It incorporates meaningful, fully enforceable commitments to resolve structural issues, including those identified in the Section 301 investigation.

Many, but not all, concerns regarding China's problematic trade policies and practices could be resolved with full implementation of the Phase One Agreement. We continue to have outstanding concerns, including in the areas of technology transfer, non-tariff measures, intellectual property rights, and services. We will continue to urge China to resolve these issues in future negotiations. As we work towards this outcome, the United States is maintaining 25 percent tariffs on approximately \$250 billion of Chinese imports, along with 7.5 percent tariffs on approximately \$120 billion of Chinese imports.

Question. Can I have your word that you will not use and that you will tell Secretary Pompeo and others that you do not think it appropriate to use racially stigmatizing language when discussing this pandemic in public or private?

Answer. The United States condemns all forms of racial discrimination. State Department representatives speak out to condemn hate speech and to encourage other governments to do the same—while also promoting strong protections for freedom of expression. We continue working to counter racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance.

Question. What other tools does the Trump administration have to counterbalance China's growing influence around the world, including in contentious regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?

Answer. We have, and will continue to, increase pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect U.S. interests and values by imposing proportional costs when appropriate. In addition to publicly calling out malign PRC conduct, the United States has used visa restrictions under various authorities, financial sanctions, and policy announcements, among other tools, to address our concerns about Beijing's behavior. Additionally, the Department of State continuously engages with our partners and allies around the world to encourage them to take similar steps.

Question. The Administration has repeatedly touted the success of its "maximum pressure campaign" as evidenced by Iran's economic decline. Do you see this eco-

conomic devastation as making a partnership with China more appealing to Iranian leaders?

Answer. For the Iranian regime, a closer partnership with China is a partnership born of desperation. Because the regime has been severely weakened, in part by U.S. sanctions but also through its own mismanagement and corruption, it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for the Iranian people as long as the regime gains access to much needed capital. The regime has been reluctant to publicly share details of the agreement for this very reason. The Iranian people know this, and they are rightly outraged by this hypocrisy.

Question. What are your current bilateral and multilateral engagements with China regarding its potential investments and cooperation with Iran?

Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism. However, Chinese entities continue to provide financial support to the Iranian regime, including through the continued purchase of sanctioned Iranian petrochemicals and metals. We have made clear to the Chinese government that we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions regime with respect to Iran, including on Chinese individuals and entities that engage in sanctionable conduct. By allowing Chinese companies to conduct sanctionable activities with the Iranian regime, the PRC is undermining its own stated goal of promoting stability in the Middle East.

Question. Does an increased security relationship between Iran and China help or hinder American interests in both the Middle East and Asia?

Answer. In the near term, an increased security relationship between Iran and China would principally take the form of Chinese weapons sales to the Islamic Republic. As the number one state sponsor of terror and a key source of regional instability, no nation should be willing to provide Iran with even deadlier weapons until there is a fundamental change in the regime's behavior. Safeguarding regional security and the free flow of commerce is not only in the United States interest; it is a global responsibility.

Question. What is the U.S. Government position on the right of Tibetan Buddhists in selecting a future Dalai Lama without the interference of any government, and what is the plan to push back against the planned interference of the Chinese government?

Answer. The United States has made the promotion and protection of religious freedom a priority, especially in China, where people of all faiths face severe repression and discrimination. We remain concerned by the People's Republic of China's interference in the selection, education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. The U.S. government believes that Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all faith communities, must be able to select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders in accordance with their beliefs and without government interference. This human right to religious freedom dictates that the succession or identification of Tibetan Buddhist lamas, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, should occur without any external interference, in a manner consistent with their beliefs.

Question. Would you recommend and make sure that President Trump calls publicly on the Chinese President to address the legitimate grievances of the Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

Answer. The United States encourages the People's Republic of China (PRC) to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, leading to a negotiated agreement on Tibet. The Administration will continue to call on Beijing to ensure meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improve respect for their human rights, including religious freedom, and preserve their unique religious, cultural, and linguistic identity.

Question. At a time when the relationship is facing increasing friction and when the risk of conflict is rising, do we need such a process?

Answer. The Administration sees no value in engaging with Beijing in high-level dialogues when the PRC offers no prospects for tangible results or constructive outcomes. We remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and cooperation with the PRC government where our interests align, even as we continue to compete vigorously when necessary.

Question. Secretary Tillerson proposed a good framework at the beginning of the Administration, but obviously it has been abandoned. Why?

Answer. We will continue to engage with PRC leaders in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments.

Question. Given China and Russia's opposition to extending the U.N. arms embargo on Iran that it set to expire in a few short months, how do you see increased bilateral tension with China impacting its posture towards extending the arms embargo at the Security Council?

Answer. The United States has called for an extension of the U.N. arms embargo on Iran due to the Islamic Republic's behavior. The Islamic Republic has done nothing to deserve the lifting of the embargo and continues to send weapons to armed militias and proxies all across the region in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Combating Iranian malign influence in order to foster regional stability and safeguard the free flow of commerce is a global responsibility. Irrespective of differences that may exist between members of the Security Council, allowing Iran to purchase and proliferate weapons would be an abdication of the U.N. Security Council's mandate to maintain international peace and security.

Question. What are you doing to combat Chinese and Russian influence at the U.N. Security Council regarding Syria?

Answer. This year marks the 10th consecutive year of a conflict that has caused massive suffering for the Syrian people. Working with our partners and the United Nations (U.N.) in support of the Syrian people, the United States is combatting People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russian malign influence on three different fronts: political, humanitarian, and chemical weapons. Over eleven million people currently remain in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria, including 6.6 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs). However, Russia has used its Security Council veto to support the Assad regime no less than 16 times, including 10 occasions on which it voted jointly with the People's Republic of China. The Assad regime continues to commit mass atrocities, some of which rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Recent efforts have demonstrated that the Security Council is increasingly united in its support for the Syrian people, and in the process the United States and its allies are isolating both Russia and the PRC in their continued support of the Assad regime.

The United States continues to support the efforts of U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen in implementing a credible political process to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict in Syria as outlined in Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), and we welcome his plan to convene the third meeting of the Constitutional Committee in August. U.N. reporting continues to contradict the lies and propaganda of the Assad regime. The July 7 Commission of Inquiry notes the devastating impacts of assaults on Syrian civilians in Idlib Province by the regime and Russia, concluding that the attacks are responsible for 534 of the 582 confirmed civilian casualties and also finding numerous instances where attacks led to mass displacement. Working with interagency partners, the Department is aggressively implementing Caesar sanctions aimed at deterring malign actors who continue to aid and finance the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people while enriching themselves and their families. The Department also continues to combat the PRC's attempts to insert its ideology and references to the Belt and Road Initiative into U.N. Security Council resolutions.

With the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 2533 (2020), essential food, shelter, and medicine and supplies to prevent the spread of COVID-19 continue to flow to Syrians in need in the northwest. Resolution 2533 allows U.N. access to Bab al-Hawa for 12 months, a significant improvement to the Russian proposal of only 6 months. An overwhelming majority of the Security Council worked in good faith with Belgian and German drafters to overcome Russian and Chinese intransigence to adopt a resolution that would enable life-saving humanitarian assistance to reach those in need in Syria. Having provided more than \$11.3 billion in humanitarian assistance since the beginning of the crisis, the United States remains the world-leader in ensuring that life-saving assistance reaches all Syrians in need.

The 2017 attacks in Ltaminah make clear that the Assad regime will stop at nothing to pursue a military victory. As the Assad regime remains in non-compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Security Council resolution 2118, the United States continues to lead efforts making it clear that the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated and those who use chemical weapons will be held to account. To that end, the United States, along with its allies and partners, recently took strong action to address the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Investigation and Identification Team's findings. On July 9, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision de-

manding that Syria immediately cease its use of chemical weapons and requesting that Syria declare, among other things, the facilities where the chemical weapons used in the March 2017 attacks in Ltaminah were produced, stored, and deployed for delivery. Only Russia, the PRC and Iran voted against these findings, as all 29 other members voted in favor.

CHINA AND THE GULF

China has made significant investments into Arab Gulf countries with whom the United States has significant security relationships. Last month, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie stated: “We see China moving in, principally economically—but not completely—to establish a beachhead.”

Question. What are the implications of increased Chinese investment in critical infrastructure projects in the Arab Gulf States?

Answer. Over the last 2 years, one-fifth of global Chinese overseas construction projects took place in Arab Gulf countries as the countries looked to expand their critical infrastructure and diversify away from heavy reliance on hydrocarbons in their economies. Currently, roughly half of China’s oil imports come from the Middle East and North Africa, and prior to the COVID–19 pandemic, the International Energy Agency had predicted that imports from the region would double by 2035. The expansion of economic ties and People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned-enterprise involvement in large-scale, complicated infrastructure projects has allowed U.S.-sanctioned technology firms such as Huawei, Hikvision, Hytera, and others to gain footholds supporting these major investments.

Given Beijing’s increasing use of economic leverage to extract political concessions from—or exact retribution against—other countries, the PRC may attempt to convert its deep investments in critical infrastructure into undue political influence and military access, while the energy exporters who rely on sales to China will be at heightened risk of malign influence. As countries attempt to shore up their balance sheets in the aftermath of COVID–19, they may become more receptive to an expanded Chinese footprint within their borders. Ultimately, the resulting deeper economic ties will create future opportunities for PRC firms to gain influence. In response, the Department of State is engaging regularly with leaders in the Middle East on a variety of critical issues, including problematic Chinese investments.

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Question. Please describe your engagement with relevant leaders in these countries regarding Chinese investment.

Answer. The Department of State engages regularly with leaders in the Middle East on a variety of critical issues including problematic Chinese investments. Top Department leadership has traveled to the region in the last year to raise concerns about Huawei, high-tech acquisitions, and inroads in strategic infrastructure. Recently we have also increased our engagement with the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), including the redesignation of our Consulate General in Jeddah as our official representative to the OIC. We have also urged countries to protect their own sovereignty and security by enacting CFIUS-type measures to restrict foreign investments in local companies that might pose national security risks.

Question. In what areas do you see Chinese investment as presenting direct threats to U.S. interests or equities?

Answer. While many Chinese investments present risks to the host nation, not all Chinese investments directly threaten U.S. interests. Chinese investment that undermines a level playing field for U.S. companies or undermines the rules-based international order is of concern. Chinese investments in the Middle East that potentially threaten U.S. interests and equities include those that threaten the security of telecom networks by companies like Huawei, as well as investments into strategic industries such as energy, logistics, and defense. In response, we are leading efforts with our partners in the region to counter malign Chinese investments and to promote American or partner alternatives whenever possible.

Question. Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed or unarmed drones, been used by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have any of those uses resulted in civilian casualties?

Answer. China has sold multiple weapons systems to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, including armed drones to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. Available reporting suggests that Saudi Arabia employed its China-origin drones in Yemen, and the UAE used them in Yemen and Libya. Saudi Arabia has also reportedly employed Chinese artillery pieces in Yemen. We cannot establish if any of these reported drone or artillery strikes resulted in civilian casualties.

Question. Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed drones, been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have any of those uses resulted in civilian casualties?

Answer. No reports indicate that any Chinese-origin weapons have been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya.

Question. What steps has the U.S. taken to prevent the purchase of Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed drones by countries included in the NEA bureau?

Answer. The United States has urged countries to beware of unscrupulous actors like China offering deceptively cut-price defense systems and equipment. Such acquisitions are no bargain, and are often accompanied by the loss of sovereignty, resource extraction or debt-trap diplomacy, the signing away of rights to critical physical or IT infrastructure, or the exploitation of intellectual property due to espionage or outright theft. We have emphasized to our partners globally that acquiring these systems does not strengthen their security, but rather undermines their interoperability with U.S. forces, and should rightly be avoided. The United States will continue to offer assistance to allies and partners in need, and we will do so without those harmful strings attached.

Question. What steps did the U.S. take to try to prevent these and other countries from signing such a letter whitewashing China's crimes against its own Uighur population? What steps will the U.S. take to push these countries to recant their signatures and prevent future letters from being signed?

Answer. The United States consistently urges third countries to condemn the PRC's human rights abuses in Xinjiang. We will continue to publicly and privately call on the PRC to immediately end its horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask all nations, including Muslim-majority ones, to join the United States in demanding an end to these dehumanizing abuses. In September 2019, on the margins of the 74th General Debate of the U.N. General Assembly, the United States co-hosted a high-level event on the human rights crisis in Xinjiang with four allies, which was widely attended by member states from all regions of the world. In October 2019, we were proud to join a cross-regional group of 23 countries in signing a joint statement on Xinjiang in the U.N. General Assembly, which drew on the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to urge the PRC to reverse course in Xinjiang. The United States has been disappointed to see Muslim countries not respond when there are significant Muslim populations being impacted in western China, and we continue to urge them to take this on in a serious way.

SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNT WORKING GROUP

Last year, in February 2019, the State Department Inspector General revealed that more than 20 ambassadors were likely in violation of the State Department's social media policies. In addressing the Inspector General's recommendations from the report, the Department indicated it recently established a Social Media Account Working Group to reexamine the Department's policies, which I understand you lead. During your confirmation process last November, you made a commitment to review all allegations of potential violations of the Department's social media policies. You also indicated that the Department was in the midst of finalizing a standard operating procedure and a set of recommendations to assess and address potential violations. I understand that these recommendations are still currently awaiting your review, even as Ambassadors continue to post controversial and insensitive posts on both personal and official social media accounts. As such, please answer the following:

Question. Why has it taken the Department more than a year and a half to fully address the still outstanding Inspector General's recommendations from the February 2019 social media report?

Answer. The Department has implemented two of the three recommendations from the Inspector General's February 2019 report. We have clarified the social media use policy with specific examples and have sent reminders to all employees on the social media use policy on a regular basis. The outstanding recommendation asked the Department to develop and implement a review process for compliance with the social media use policy. The Department is working toward addressing this recommendation.

Question. When did the Social Media Account Working Group provide you with its recommendations on the Department's social media policies?

Answer. In July 2019, the Social Media Accounts Working Group provided Deputy Secretary Sullivan with an update on the progress for implementing the OIG recommendations. Following my confirmation as Deputy Secretary, in February of this year I was briefed on the work of the Social Media Accounts Working Group.

Question. Please provide an explanation as to why the Social Media Account Working Group's recommendations are still currently under your review, 7 months after your confirmation, and when the Department will implement changes to its policies.

Answer. The Department has already implemented two recommendations from the Inspector General's February 2019 report. The third recommendation is being addressed with the development and implementation of a standard operating procedure for reviewing accounts for compliance with the social media use policy (10 FAM 180). The development of the standard operating procedures required broad coordination and collaboration across the Department to include records management, legal, human resources, and other subject matter experts.

Question. How has the Department's enforcement of social media policies improved since February 2019?

Answer. Based on the OIG recommendations, the Department published the Personal and Official Use Social Media Handbook in August 2019. The handbook includes detailed information that is intended to assist employees in separating official and personal capacity communications on social media accounts. The handbook is routinely distributed to and discussed with participants in the Foreign Service Institute's Ambassadorial Seminar and in public diplomacy social media classes. The annual, and additionally as needed, publication of reminders on social media policies has been formalized and is managed by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs' Office of Policy, Planning and Resources.

[The information referred to above can be found at the end of this section.]

Question. What steps are you taking to hold all Department employees who run afoul of the Department's social media policies accountable?

Answer. The Department takes seriously any reports that Department officials may be in violation of social media policies. In cases in which the Department discovers a violation of any agency policy, including the social media policy, the Department may consider a broad range of disciplinary or other administrative actions. For reference, the Department's discipline policies for employees are described in 3 FAM 4100, 4300 and 4500, among others, and apply to violations of statutes, regulations, or Department policy, as stated in the FAM, Foreign Affairs Handbooks, Department notices or ALDACs, or bureau or post policy documents. The Department does not discuss individual personnel actions.



Social Media Communications at the Department of State: Personal and Official

This guidance is intended to help all Department personnel identify the types of communications that belong exclusively on an official Department of State social media account and to avoid any use of personal accounts for official communications. It is intended as a practical guide, and as such may not address all potential issues and questions related to social media usage. More detailed and comprehensive guidance can be found in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and in the reference materials listed at the end of this document.

Personal Use of Social Media by Department Personnel

In using social media, all Department personnel must comply with applicable ethics rules and restrictions on political activities, including under the Hatch Act, see [11 FAM 610](#), as well as the rules governing procurement, records management, the handling of classified information, and the use of social media for official and personal capacity public communications, see [5 FAM 792](#), [10 FAM 180](#) and [3 FAM 4170](#). For questions about the ethics rules and the Hatch Act, please contact EthicsAttorneyMailbox@state.gov.

Personal accounts must not be used for official communications. In this context, "official communication" means any communication that is made in a person's official capacity, or that in any way appears to represent the Department's views, as opposed to a communication made in a personal capacity as a private citizen.

Personal accounts and posts on such accounts also must not claim to represent the Department or its policies, or those of the U.S. Government, or use Department or other U.S. Government seals or logos ([5 FAM 792.2](#)). As described in [10 FAM 182](#) and [3 FAM 4176.1\(b\)](#), Department personnel may engage in limited forwarding, linking, or other reposting of already-released official content in limited amounts on a personal social media

account, but it must remain clear from the content, tone, and appearance of the account that the account is personal in nature. Official material can never be posted or released on a personal account before it is posted or released on an official account.

Personnel must be careful to avoid standalone commentary or added commentary that would be viewed as an official communication, and must avoid reposting official content in such a routine fashion that the personal account is a draw as an alternative source or location for official U.S. Government communications or views.

Relatedly, Department personnel may not use personal social media accounts to interact with official contacts on Department business. If an official contact privately or publicly messages an employee's personal account on any topic that is not clearly personal, the employee should capture the initial message in his/her Department email or an official social media account within 20 days, and respond from an official Department account.

In accordance with [10 FAM 182](#), personal social media accounts that have been used for official communications are considered Department accounts and may be retained by the Department for use by the next incumbent or retired in accordance with applicable records disposition schedules, as appropriate.

All Department personnel who engage in public communications on a topic of Departmental concern in a personal capacity are subject to the pre-publication review policies in [3 FAM 4170](#).

Aspects of Personal Accounts

Personal accounts and posts on such accounts must not claim to represent the Department or its policies, or those of the U.S. Government, or use Department or other U.S. Government seals or logos ([5 FAM 792.2](#)). In addition, a personal account should not give the appearance of being an official account. The following factors are relevant in determining if a personal account gives the appearance of being an official account: posting official content, using an official photo as the profile image, linking to an official government bio, or referencing the account holder's official title or position.

- Personal accounts should not resemble this hypothetical example:



Though this example expressly states that it is a personal social media account, the combination of the official portrait and flag imagery, link to official biography, and reference to ambassador status gives the impression that this is an official account.

- Department personnel may direct their personal social media followers where to find official content, so long as the personal account otherwise remains expressly and unambiguously personal, such as the following example:



Additional Guidance for Personnel with Responsibility for Official Communications

Certain personnel are responsible for official communications on behalf of the Department, and they must take extra care to ensure that there is a clear divide between their official accounts (and official communications) and their personal accounts. This section is intended to help such persons, including senior officials (e.g. Ambassadors, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, the Spokesperson, and other front office principals) and, per [10 FAM 180](#), others whose positions make it appropriate for them to engage in official communications on behalf of the Department over social media (all hereinafter referred to as “authorized official communicators”), to distinguish between official communications that belong on an official social media account and to avoid any use of personal accounts for official communications.

To engage on social media in an official capacity, an authorized official communicator must use an account created specifically for official use that is separate from an account used for private, personal use ([10 FAM 180](#)).

There are a range of legal concerns that can arise when official communications are posted to personal social media accounts, including compliance with the Federal Records Act and applicable ethics rules, including the rules regarding misuse of position.

Identifying Official Accounts

Official accounts should include the following information as shown in the example on the next page:

- Use official language in the profile to identify the authorized official communicator and his/her role at the Department
- Use the authorized official communicator’s name in the name field in the profile (e.g., Ambassador Sung Kim)
- Name the handle after the position, not the individual (e.g., @USAmbManila)
- Link to the relevant authorized official communicator’s official biography hosted on a .gov website



An official account must not link to any personal account.

Appropriate Use of Personal Accounts

Authorized official communicators can continue to use personal accounts (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram etc.) in addition to their official accounts but must draw a bright line between the two.

- Authorized official communicators may engage in limited reposting of content first released on an official account or platform. This may include a retweet or share of Department activities, without additional commentary that could be perceived as an official communication. The following examples are appropriate:





Inappropriate Use of Personal Accounts

Authorized official communicators cannot use their existing personal accounts to post official content that has not previously been released, or to engage on Department business with official contacts, including official partner organizations, grantees, partner academic institutions, host country government officials, and Department or other U.S. government officials, including Congress.

As stated above, when reposting content originally released on an official Department social media account, authorized official communicators must be careful to avoid

standalone commentary or added commentary that would be viewed as an official communication, and must avoid repeated or routine reposting of official content to avoid the personal account becoming an alternative source for official U.S. Government communications or views. While posting official content on any personal account puts the account in danger of retention by the Department per [10 FAM 182](#), this is particularly the case for senior officials who occupy positions of such heightened visibility that any expression of views on matters of concern to the Department will be assumed to represent the views of the United States. In addition, Department personnel posted abroad, in particular, senior personnel such as Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission, will generally have a more limited ability to engage in a personal capacity. (And as stated above, all Department personnel who engage in public communications on a topic of Departmental concern in a personal capacity are subject to the pre-publication review policies in [3 FAM 4170](#).)

Personal accounts should not resemble the hypothetical example on the next page.

In this example, the hypothetical authorized official communicator has posted official content, particularly information that appears to represent the U.S. Government's views on a foreign policy issue, on a personal account. Such messages belong on an official Department account. The authorized official Department communicator may, on a limited basis, retweet such messages from her personal account.



In addition, authorized official communicators cannot use their existing personal accounts to:

- Violate the ethics rules, including the rules prohibiting the use of public office for private gain. For example, Department personnel may not use Department resources or direct or ask a subordinate to support or create content for their personal accounts, or those of their spouses, children or animals. Keeping the content on a personal social account truly personal will help reduce the risk of a

violation of these rules. For questions about the ethics rules, please email EthicsAttorneyMailbox@state.gov.

- Engage in political activity that would violate the Hatch Act or the Department's policies on political activities. More information about how the political activities restrictions apply to personal social media usage can be found [here](#). For questions about restrictions on political activities, please email EthicsAttorneyMailbox@state.gov.
- Disclose procurement information in violation of 41 U.S.C. 2102.
- Disclose classified, sensitive but unclassified ([12 FAM 541](#)) or otherwise nonpublic information.

Appropriate Use of Official Accounts

Authorized official communicators must use an official account for any of the categories of official communication below. All of the examples below are real examples of acceptable use of official Department accounts – none of the examples would be appropriate on authorized official communicators' personal accounts.

- Authorized official communicators may ONLY use official accounts to interact with the press on matters related to the Department or foreign policy. Department employees may not use personal social media accounts to interact with press on such matters. Any engagement with U.S.-based media requires PA clearance or for personnel abroad the relevant Chief of Mission or designee.



THANK YOU for all your positive tweets and letters on my recent @Telegraph & @DailyMailUK op-eds on American agriculture. I'm excited about the bright future of U.S. & UK farming 🇺🇸🇬🇧

- Authorized official communicators may use ONLY official accounts to engage with official contacts including official partner organizations, grantees, partner academic institutions, host country government officials, and Department or other U.S. government officials, including Congress.



 **Jean Manes** 
@USAmbSV Follow

Replying to @StateDG @SecPompeo @StateDept

Congratulations Carol. Fantastic to have your vision and leadership as Director General at the State Department 🎉🎉

5:17 PM - 15 Mar 2019

 **Ambassador Hutchison** 
@USAmbNATO Follow

I met with the new #NATO Parliamentary Assembly President today. As a former Senator, I know the important role parliamentarians play in foreign policy and strengthening the Alliance. I greatly appreciate @RepMikeTurner @SenThomTillis & @SenatorShaheen leadership on these issues.




5:10 AM - 26 Sep 2018

24 Retweets 70 Likes     

1 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO US Mission to NATO and 4 others

- Authorized official communicators should use official accounts, not personal accounts, to foster conversations on foreign policy topics.



- Authorized official communicators may post relevant items of a personal nature on official accounts in order to relate to their target audiences, while remaining mindful of security concerns.
- Authorized official communicators must comply with other relevant rules that apply to official communications, such as the ethics rules and the restrictions regarding political activities. For example, Department authorized official communicators must avoid any use of an official social media platform for private gain. In addition, they must avoid including any partisan political content on such accounts in violation of the Hatch Act and Department policies. For questions about the ethics rules and the Hatch Act, please contact EthicsAttorneyMailbox@state.gov.

Additional Resources:

- [10 FAM 180 Official Communication Using Social Media](#)
- [11 FAM 610 Ethics and Financial Disclosure Programs](#)
- [18 STATE 97544 Dept. Policies on the Use of Social Media for Official Communications](#)
- [Social Media Policy for Ambassadors](#)
- [Transitioning Departing Principal Twitter Accounts](#)
- [1/ Ethics and Financial Disclosure Intranet](#)
- [Social Media Hub](#)

For additional questions, please contact JPSMS@state.gov.

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STEPHEN E. BIEGUN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN CARDIN

Question. What is the U.S. Government position regarding the right of Tibetan Buddhists to select a future Dalai Lama without the interference of any government?

Answer. The United States has made the promotion and protection of religious freedom a priority, especially in China, where people of all faiths face severe repression and discrimination. We remain concerned by the People's Republic of China's interference in the selection, education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. The U.S. government believes that Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all faith communities, must be able to select, educate, and venerate their religious

leaders in accordance with their beliefs and without government interference. This human right to religious freedom dictates that the succession or identification of Tibetan Buddhist lamas, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, should occur without any external interference, in a manner consistent with their beliefs.

Question. The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 established the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues within the State Department. It has remained unfilled throughout the Trump administration. What signal, if any, is the Administration sending by keeping this position vacant?

Answer. U.S. government policy on Tibet has not changed. Our longstanding concerns over Tibet have been shared by multiple administrations and are codified by law within the Tibetan Policy Act. We remain committed to supporting meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improving respect for their human rights, including religious freedom, and preserving their unique religious, cultural, and linguistic identity. We are carefully considering candidates to fill the role of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues at the Department of State.

Question. What is the plan to push back against the interference of the Chinese government in Tibet?

Answer. We remain committed to supporting meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improving respect for their human rights, including religious freedom, and preserving their unique religious, cultural, and linguistic identity. The United States remains concerned that People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities continue to take steps to eliminate this unique identity. We will continue to press the People's Republic of China to respect meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and to halt actions that threaten Tibetan culture and religious traditions. We also remain committed to enhancing the sustainable economic development, environmental conservation, and humanitarian conditions of Tibetan communities.

Question. Would you recommend and ensure that President Trump calls publicly on the Chinese President to address the grievances of the Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

Answer. The United States encourages the People's Republic of China (PRC) to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, leading to a negotiated agreement on Tibet. The Administration will continue to call on Beijing to ensure meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improve respect for their human rights, including religious freedom, and preserve their unique religious, cultural, and linguistic identity.

Question. What efforts or reforms is the State Department making to protect other participants in IVLP and other State Department exchange programs in authoritarian states?

Answer. Department of State is committed to the safety and security of more than 300,000 U.S. and foreign citizens who participate in exchange programs abroad and here in the United States each year.

Safety and security considerations are incorporated into every aspect of the development and implementation of our exchange programs. This includes the careful selection and screening of participants, program partners, host families, universities and schools, fellowship sites, and other stakeholders.

Furthermore, programs utilize pre-departure and arrival briefings, monitoring and oversight, health benefits programs, 24/7 assistance hotlines, and other tools to provide active and compassionate responses when emergencies arise.

Ensuring the safety and security of all exchange program participants—regardless of where the programs take place—is a weighty responsibility the Department takes very seriously. We understand it requires a collective and sustained focus as well as cooperation with others across the interagency. By working together, we will keep safety and security among our highest priorities and ensure the best experience for all exchange participants.

Question. What is your department's plan to effectively counter China's culture of high-tech authoritarianism that has been brought to bear in Xinjiang?

Answer. The State Department has taken concrete action and remains committed to combating the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang. The Department imposed visa restrictions on three senior CCP officials under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2020 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, for their involvement in gross violations of human rights and supported the Treasury Department's imposition of economic sanctions on the same; announced visa restrictions on PRC government and Chinese Communist Party officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the unjust detention or

abuse of members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang and on corporate officials in Chinese companies responsible for contributing to human rights abuses globally, including in Xinjiang; and issued a business advisory to caution businesses about the risks of supply chain links to human rights abuses, including forced labor, in and connected to Xinjiang. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses.

The State Department has also paid particular attention to the PRC's use of digital technologies to support repressive rule—particularly in Xinjiang. Many Department initiatives aim to address the increasing trend of authoritarian governments using new technology applications to violate or abuse human rights by imposing costs on repressive governments and promoting the development and adoption of norms in technology applications.

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STEPHEN E. BIEGUN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD MARKEY

Question. Have you been briefed on any transcript, diplomatic cable, or any other form of communication that supports media reports that President Trump gave approval, tacit or otherwise, to President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to construct mass internment camps to imprison Uyghur and other minorities in Xinjiang Province?

Answer. The Administration's actions to stop human rights abuses in Xinjiang speak volumes, and the President himself has personally heard from those affected, including Jewher Ilham, who is the daughter of prominent Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti, who was given a life sentence in 2014. More than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions, import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses.

Question. Do you have knowledge of any similar communications described in the previous question between U.S. Government officials other than the President and Chinese government officials?

Answer. More than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions, import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses. We will continue to call on the Chinese Communist Party to immediately end its horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask all nations to join the United States in demanding an end to these dehumanizing abuses.

Question. Has President Trump indicated to the Chinese government a willingness to refrain from commenting on or acting against human rights violations, including on a June 2019 call during which he reportedly promised President Xi that he would not speak out on China's response to pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong while trade talks continued?

Answer. More than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions, import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses. We will continue to call on the Chinese Communist Party to immediately end their horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask all nations to join the United States in demanding an end to these dehumanizing abuses.

Question. August 25, 2020 marks the third-year anniversary of the start of a systematic campaign by Burma's security forces that the State Department has referred to as the "ethnic cleansing" of the Rohingya Muslim minority. What additional documentation would be required for the State Department to reach the same genocide determination that the United Nations Fact Finding Mission (FFM), Fortify Rights, and the United States Holocaust Museum all separately reached in 2018?

Answer. The United States has repeatedly expressed its deep concern about the horrific violence against members of the Rohingya community in 2017 and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. Then-Secretary Tillerson determined in November 2017 that the atrocities against Rohingya constituted ethnic cleansing. We have taken strong actions to promote accountability for those involved in abuses

against Rohingya during the ethnic cleansing, designating top military leaders for their roles in serious human rights abuses under the Global Magnitsky Act and imposing visa restrictions for their involvement in gross violations of human rights under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. We also continue to support relevant multilateral investigative and justice processes.

Our top priorities on this issue are changing behavior and preventing additional atrocities. The Secretary has said that our actions will continue to be reviewed with these goals in mind.

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STEPHEN E. BIEGUN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

Question. In 2015, the Obama administration responded to a request from China and banned Taiwanese officials and military members from displaying their flags and insignia on government property and bases. This policy is described in the periodic memorandum entitled “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan.” I have introduced legislation mandating the reversal of those guidelines, the Taiwan Symbols of Sovereignty (SOS) Act, S. 3310. Nevertheless the guidelines can be changed unilaterally by the Administration in the absence of a Congressional mandate. I would like a commitment from the Administration to change those guidelines so as to allow members of the armed forces and government representatives from the Republic of China (Taiwan) or the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) to display the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the corresponding emblems or insignia of military units for official purposes: Can you commit to securing such changes?

Answer. As I said during the hearing, I am happy to review this policy in more detail. The key issue relates to the nature of the relationship between the United States and Taiwan, as defined by the Taiwan Relations Act. Within these guidelines, the Administration continues to take steps to deepen our relationship and broaden our support for Taiwan to reflect the deepening ties of friendship, trade, and productivity between the United States and Taiwan. However, inviting use of symbols of sovereignty, such as the display of the flags of the Republic of China (China) would not be consistent with the TRA. The Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan allow the Executive Branch to maintain a strong relationship with the Taiwan authorities consistent with that policy while avoiding activities that are inconsistent with the nature of this unofficial relationship.

Question. We have seen China systematically work its way through international organizations, in different ways. Sometimes they outright seize control of those organizations and subvert them. Other times they take a different route, pushing organizations to adopt technology from Chinese companies answerable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Earlier this year, the U.N. was planning to sign a contract with Tencent, a company that State Department officials have told Congress cannot say “no” when CCP officials come knocking. State Department officials have also named Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Baidu as other companies that are vulnerable to coercion by the CCP and constitute espionage risks: What is the State Department’s policy regarding international organizations that use such technology? How can the State Department use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to prevent such technology from being used by international organizations?

Answer. The State Department opposes international organizations using technologies that put users at risk from nefarious activities or could enable abuses or violations of their human rights. The U.N. Secretary-General recently announced that the U.N. would develop “system-wide guidance on human rights due diligence and impact assessments in the use of new technologies.”

The State Department was dismayed by the U.N.’s announcement of a partnership with Chinese media conglomerate Tencent to host global conversations related to the U.N.’s 75th anniversary on its web platforms. The United States communicated its concerns about this partnership and the manner in which it was formed directly to U.N. leadership.

Question. The U.S. has spent billions of dollars investing in research battling infectious diseases in Africa. Last year it was announced that China is funding and building the new African Center for Disease Control in Ethiopia. That Center will be the site where U.S. research from across the continent will be consolidated, ceding billions of dollars and many years of U.S. research and funding to the Chinese: What is the State Department doing to stop China from building this new

CDC? Do those activities include direct engagement with the Ethiopians on this topic?

Answer. We are deeply concerned about China's plans to build a new headquarters for the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The United States has supported the Africa CDC since it was established in 2017. We are directly engaging the African Union Commission, African Union member states, and non-African allies and partners on this matter in a robust diplomatic campaign to make our concerns clear and underscore that African Union member states should make important decisions about where institutions are based, through an open and transparent process. As I mentioned in my testimony, we will continue to highlight the pitfalls of Chinese funding in our diplomatic engagement with African countries. It is in the interest of the United States to strongly support a robust Africa CDC, free of malign influence, that can help prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats on the continent.

