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PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 191930Z FEB 91

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE  
TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

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PER E.O. 13526  
2009-0723-MR  
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TEXT>ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS  
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR CHARLES POWELL, FROM  
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1991

CHARLES --

HERE IS THE TEXT OF A GENERAL LETTER TO THE COALITION PARTNERS  
WHICH WE DISCUSSED A FEW MINUTES AGO.

BRENT

BEGIN ATTACHMENT:

DEAR

I WANTED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS  
AND MORE GENERALLY ON WHERE WE STAND. I FIRST HEARD FROM PRESIDENT  
GORBACHEV YESTERDAY, FEBRUARY 18, ON THE VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN  
MINISTER AZIZ TO MOSCOW. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WROTE ME THAT HE HAD  
PROPOSED TO THE IRAQIS A PLAN IN WHICH IRAQ WOULD ANNOUNCE THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT BY A DATE CERTAIN, TO BE  
FOLLOWED BY A TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND, THE NEXT DAY, BY THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS THEMSELVES. IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A  
GUARANTEE THAT ITS TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED AND  
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. PRESIDENT  
GORBACHEV ALSO DEPICTED A LARGE ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,  
BOTH DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND, IN A MANNER THAT  
RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LINKAGE.

I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S LETTER,"  
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THAT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BE  
UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 660. I  
NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF THE IRAQI  
WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTING THAT IRAQ SHOULD BE PERMITTED NO MORE THAN  
26 HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS TASK. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY  
FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS  
AND EXCHANGE ALL POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD  
AGAINST THEIR WILL. LAST, I UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD NOT BE DRAWN  
INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL.

I HAVE SINCE SENT A SECOND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ONE THAT  
REFLECTED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS LETTER BY ME AND MY MOST  
SENIOR ADVISORS. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE THEMES OF MY  
EARLIER COMMUNICATION, I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT  
THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM  
KUWAIT WAS UNDERWAY AND NO CESSATION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF

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HOSTILITIES UNTIL THAT WITHDRAWAL WERE COMPLETED. ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD RISK THE LIVES OF COALITION FORCES. I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES; AT THE SAME TIME, ANY IRAQI BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS WOULD BRING INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE. THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. FINALLY, THE IRAQIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT ANY USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THEIR PART WOULD TRIGGER NOT ONLY A MASSIVE COALITION MILITARY RESPONSE BUT WOULD AFFECT THE COALITION'S TREATMENT OF IRAQ IN THE WAR'S AFTERMATH.

IN SHORT, AND AS I SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS DOES NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS; THAT SAID, WE ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON DIPLOMACY. THE IRAQIS KNOW AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WHAT THEY MUST DO. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE CONTINUING WITH OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREPARATIONS. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS; AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME ABOUT ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

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