

DIRNSA | Chief of Staff |

# Strategic Communications Enterprise Communications

<b>Quick Links</b>
<a href="#">Format For Print</a>
<a href="#">Agency All Request</a>
<a href="#">Posts 2000</a>
<a href="#">Previous Page</a>
<a href="#">Director's Messages</a>
<a href="#">Exec Messages</a>
<a href="#">ODNI Messages</a>
<a href="#">CoS Messages</a>
<a href="#">Campaign Update</a>
<a href="#">Search Postings</a>

Posted on: January 31, 2000 11:35

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

## (S [redacted]) Message from the Director re: MAJOR SYSTEMS FAILURE

**Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force**

**POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk\_dirnsa@nsa]**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S [redacted]) By now most of our SIGINT LANs are fully operational. Our technical personnel have been working hard to restore our computing capabilities and I thank them for their commitment and tenacity to correct this situation. Likewise, our analysts have been working around-the-clock to act on the data that was stored in buffers since last Monday evening. I'd like to tell you what has transpired and where we currently stand.

(S [redacted]) Recapping the events leading up to this situation: last Monday evening, NSA experienced a major systems failure at approximately 1830 caused by a software anomaly [redacted]

[redacted]

(S [redacted]) [redacted]

Very little data was lost. Regarding

[redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b)(1)

(S [redacted]) Our Y2K contingency planning helped us determine the

Approved for Release by NSA on 01-18-2012. FOIA Case # 59324

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 403  
(b)(3)-18 USC 798  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

8/31/2009

order for restarting our systems [redacted] We resumed [redacted] operating capability as of late Friday, and analysts immediately began processing the backlog of data. Their tireless efforts have allowed us to sift through the buffered data while keeping abreast of current developments. A great deal of work remains to be done, and I am highly confident that our world-class analysts will rise to the challenge.

(S) [redacted] As I stated in my address to the work force last week, we need to reflect on the learning experiences we can gain from this event. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Honorable George J. Tenet, is tremendously supportive and assured our highest government officials of NSA's ability to correct this situation. He and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General John A. Gordon, USAF, visited us late last Friday to thank you all for your effort.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] Our situation, (or at least parts of it), became public knowledge when ABC broke the story Saturday night. I spoke on the record with John McQuethy a few minutes before he went on the air.

[redacted] I also spoke with key members of our oversight bodies in Congress, last week. They have been universally supportive.

(U) As many of you resume your routine mode of operations, I encourage your feedback via talk\_dirnsa and insights regarding all aspects of this situation. Let's take a strategic look at lessons to be learned from this event.

(U) In closing, I would like to thank everyone for their compliance in handling this matter with extreme caution. Your patience enabled our technical personnel to remain focused on the task at hand. I commend the entire NSA work force for your unselfish sense of duty that provides security for this great nation.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

NOTE: (U) NSA released the following press statement on 29 January:

**NSA Processing Affected Due to Computer Problems**

The National Security Agency Headquarters suffered a serious computer problem at 7 p.m. EST on Monday, 24 January 2000. This problem, which was contained to the NSA Headquarters complex at Fort Meade, Maryland, did not affect intelligence collection, but did affect the processing of intelligence information. NSA

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

systems were impacted for 72 hours.

Contingency plans were immediately put into effect that called on other aspects of the NSA system to assume some of the load. While intelligence collection continued, NSA technicians worked to recover the IT infrastructure. That effort comprised thousands of manhours and an investment of \$1.5 million. The backlog of intelligence processing is almost complete, and NSA is confident that no significant intelligence information has been lost.

NSA is currently operating within the window of normal operations.

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2  
Dated 24 Feb 1998  
DECL ON: X1

Listing of Past Mailings:  
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998  
Agency Mass Mailer

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2  
DATED: 23 February 1998  
DECLASSIFY ON: X1



(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b)(1)

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



8/31/2009