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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2122

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PASS OOE/ISA - UPCHURCH

E.O. 12865: ROS-1 6/29/79 (FRIEDMAN, ABRAHAM S.)
TAGS: PARM TECH MNUC PK FR
SUBJ: (S) INTELLIGENCE DISCUSSION ON PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Class. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
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Class. C - Caption and Custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: *[Signature]*
Date: *6 Nov 19 89*

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1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS WERE HELD AT FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND MATTERS (SEPTEL). IN THE FIRST MEETING, THE FRENCH WERE REPRESENTED BY LEYGOISE (ACTING SECRETARY, NUCLEAR POLICY COUNCIL), COL. ROBERT BLIN AND GENERAL MONTRELAY (GENERAL SECRETARIAI FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE), FRANCOIS BEBILLEAU (CEA) AND GOTTLIEB (DEPUTY TO LOUET). THE US DELEGATION INCLUDED FRIEDMAN (SCICONS), GALLUCCI (S/P), AND LOCKE (PM/NPP). IN THE SECOND MEETING, THE FRENCH DELEGATION ALSO INCLUDED COATES (CEA) AND THE US WAS REPRESENTED BY KRATZ (OOE/ISA), VANSTRUM (UAR RIDGE) AND GRAHAM (ACDA/NP).

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin Russell, Senior Reviewer

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3. IN THE FIRST MEETING, THE FRENCH BEGAN BY REPEATING THE INFORMATION PROVIDED REPTEL ON THEIR BELIEF THAT PAKISTAN IS USING MARAGING STEEL RATHER THAN ALUMINUM FOR CENTRIFUGE ROTORS AND THEIR BELIEF THAT MARAGING STEEL HAD BEEN IMPORTED FROM THE NETHERLANDS. DURING THE AFTERNOON, THE FRENCH SAID THAT THEY BELIEVE THE ENTIRE CENTRIFUGE, END CAPS, BELLUMS AND ROTORS, WAS MADE OF MARAGING STEEL. THEY MENTIONED A TWO ROTOR MACHINE BUT DID NOT REAFFIRM THE STATEMENT DURING DISCUSSION. THE GOF CONCLUDED THIS FROM ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE FRENCH COMPANY CALORSTAT (SEE PARA 4) AND FROM THE FRENCH KNOWLEDGE OF URENCO TECHNOLOGY.) IN RESPONSE TO FRENCH REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ABOUT ENRICHMENT SITES IN PAKISTAN, GALLUCCI BRIEFLY DESCRIBED STATUS OF PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN THE SAME TERMS USED IN INFORMAL MEETING IN VIENNA THE PREVIOUS DAY (SEPTEL). FRENCH INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT THE GOF HAS INFORMATION THAT THE KAHUTA CENTRIFUGE FACILITY WOULD "START UP" WITHIN A MONTH. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT EXACT MEANING, I.E. WHETHER CONSTRUCTION OR OPERATION OF CASCADES WOULD START UP, THE FRENCH SIDE WAS UNSURE. THEY RECOGNIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS INFORMATION AND PROMISED TO FOLLOW UP. IN ADDITION THE FRENCH PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE EXPORT OF SAFEGUARDED AND UNSAFEGUARDED URANIUM TO PAKISTAN FROM NIGER. SAFEGUARDED URANIUM WAS SENT TO PAKISTAN IN 1977 (50 TONNES), JUNE 1978 (50 TONNES), MARCH 1979 (ABOUT 10 TONNES). IN ADDITION THE FRENCH SAID THAT NIGER SENT UNSAFEGUARDED URANIUM TO PAKISTAN BY AIR THROUGH LIBYA UNDER PAKISTANI GUARDS. ACCORDING TO FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, SHIPMENTS OF UNSAFEGUARDED URANIUM WERE MADE IN 1978 (15 TONNES), JANUARY 1979

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(150 TONNES), AND MARCH 1979 (150 TUNNES). THEY BELIEVED THAT THE URANIUM WAS IN CONCENTRATED FORM. THE FRENCH STATED THAT THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHERE THE URANIUM WAS BEING CONVERTED TO UF6.

4. IN THE AFTERNOON, THE FRENCH PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON COOPERATION BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE FRENCH COMPANY CALORSTAT. PRIOR TO JULY 1977, THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY IN BONN CONTACTED THIS FRENCH COMPANY AND REQUESTED IT TO MANUFACTURE BELLOWS. PREVIOUSLY THIS COMPANY HAD NOT WORKED ON ANY PART OF THE FRENCH CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM, BUT IT HAD WORKED ON "SOME OTHER NUCLEAR PROJECTS." INITIALLY, WHILE UTILIZING EXISTING TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT, THE FRENCH COMPANY COULD NOT PRODUCE BELLOWS TO MEET THE PAKISTANIS' NEEDS. AFTER THIS TIME THE PAKISTANIS PROVIDED THE COMPANY WITH DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE BELLOWS. IN JUNE 1977 THE FIRST CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN BONN AND CALORSTAT WAS SIGNED

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FOR THE PRODUCTION OF AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF BELLOWS. BETWEEN JUNE 1977 AND SEPTEMBER 1978, 20 PROTOTYPE BELLOWS WERE PRODUCED AND DELIVERED TO A MR. BUTT AT THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN BONN. (THIS IS PRESUMABLY SHAFIQ AHMAD BUTT, SCIENTIFIC MINISTER-COUNSELOR IN PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN PARIS.) IN SEPTEMBER 1978, AN ADDITIONAL 20 BELLOWS WERE PRODUCED AND DELIVERED TO THE SAME PERSON. IN OCTOBER 1978 AN ORDER WAS PLACED WITH THE SAME COMPANY THROUGH THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY IN FRANCE TO PRODUCE 10,000 BELLOWS. THESE BELLOWS WERE TO HAVE BEEN PRODUCED WITH NEW BELLOWS FORMING EQUIPMENT. THIS NEW BELLOWS FORMING EQUIPMENT WAS MANUFACTURED BY CALORSTAT ACCORDING TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY THE PAKISTANIS. AFTER THE CONTRACT WAS SIGNED, 2 PROTOTYPE AND THEN 18 BELLOWS WERE PRODUCED AND DELIVERED. IN FEBRUARY 1979, 200 BELLOWS WERE PRODUCED AND DELIVERED. IN MAY 1979, 600 BELLOWS WERE DELIVERED TO PAKISTAN. THIS LAST SHIPMENT WAS IMPROPERLY MARKED TO AVOID FRENCH CUSTOM CONTROLS. THE FRENCH HAVE ADDED BELLOWS TO THEIR EXPORT CONTROL LIST AND HAVE TOLD THE COMPANY THAT IT MUST NOT SHIP ANY BELLOWS OR BELLOWS FORMING EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN.

5. DURING THE AFTERNOON SESSION, THE FRENCH STATED THAT THEY HAD NO DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN HAD ACTUALLY

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MADE ANY ROTONS OUT OF MARAGING STEEL, BUT THEY BELIEVE IT TO BE THE CASE BASED ON THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDED CALORSTAT AND THE GOF KNOWLEDGE OF URENCO DESIGNS. DURING THAT DISCUSSION, THE FRENCH STATED THAT THEY HAD "A COPY OF A URENCO DESIGN," WHICH THE US DELEGATION BELIEVED WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE PAKISTANI DESIGN. THE FRENCH ASKED THE US TO PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH HAD LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PAKISTANIS ARE USING A DESIGN WITH "FOUR ALUMINUM TUBES SEPARATED BY BELLONS AS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TOLD US." THE US DELEGATION COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AT A LATER DATE. IT WAS STATED THAT THE PAKISTANIS COULD BE UTILIZING MORE THAN ONE DESIGN.

6. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION PROVIDED BY INM/STA, THE FRENCH STATED THAT CALORSTAT HAD NOT SENT ANY BELLONS

FORMING EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS FLUM TURNING EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN. THE FRENCH BELIEVED THAT THE PAKISTANIS COULD IMPORT EQUIPMENT FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND SUCCESSFULLY MAKE BELLONS. WHEN ASKED WHY THE PAKISTANIS CHOSE TO PURCHASE BELLONS FROM FRENCH COMPANY, GOF OFFICIALS STATED THAT PAKISTAN HAD IMPORTED BELLONS BECAUSE "IT WAS EASIER." IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT A SHORTAGE OF SKILLED TECHNICIANS IN PAKISTAN WOULD MAKE THE PRODUCTION TASK DIFFICULT EVEN THOUGH THE TECHNOLOGY WAS AVAILABLE. THE FRENCH ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE PAKS COULD MANUFACTURE STEEL ROTORS. THE FRENCH IMPLIED THROUGHOUT THEIR DISCUSSION THAT PAKISTAN WAS CONTINUING TO RECEIVE HELP FROM INDIVIDUALS

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WHO ARE ASSOCIATED WITH URENCU.

8. THE FRENCH ASKED WHETHER ACCESS TO ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WOULD HELP THE PAKISTANIS TO PRODUCE A "LOWER TECHNOLOGY" CENTRIFUGE. US INDICATED THAT SOME TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE WOULD BE GAINED, BUT THAT MISTAKES COULD BE MADE IN MODIFYING TECHNOLOGY, WHETHER INCREASING OR DECREASING ITS SOPHISTICATION. THE FRENCH ALSO ASKED WHY CERTAIN FIBER AND RESIN MATERIALS WERE NOT ON THE US LIST. WE ANSWERED THAT SOME FILAMENTARY MATERIALS WERE ALREADY UNDER CONTROL BECAUSE THEY WERE ON THE COCOM EMBARGO LIST.

9. DEPT MAY WISH TO REPEAT THIS CABLE FOR AFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AND AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD.
HARTMAN

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