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Intelligence Report

No. 8021

June 1, 1958
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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JUNE 1958

ROMANIA APPLIES HARSH INTERNAL MEASURES LR FILE COPY
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Abstract

In recent weeks the Rumanian regime has intensified a series of harsh measures which were initiated by a Central Committee plenum of June 1958. These measures gradually have restored to the internal atmosphere some degree of the tension which existed in the Stalinist period. Among other things, the government has begun to confiscate the remaining land owned by "kulaks" or worked by hired labor and to clampdown on some of the country's most prominent intellectuals. Earlier in the year the arrests of clergymen, some Jewish leaders, and economic malfactors were reported, and numerous other persons are reported to have been arrested on various flimsy pretexts. While not unlike a similar tightening in certain other Eastern European countries, the current Rumanian drive is more intensive and covers more of the society.

* * * *

Recapitulation of Developments

At its meeting on June 9-13, 1958 in Bucharest, the Communist Party Central Committee adopted a series of measures aimed essentially at promoting greater internal political and economic efficiency. These measures involved: (1) a tightening of the legal structure through revision of the penal code, personnel changes in the courts, and creation of a lengthy series of secret and published laws; (2) an intensified campaign against embezzlement, blackmarketeering, and other endemic forms of corruption; (3) harassment and arrests of clergy, ethnic minority members, and foreign nationals; and (4) a

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vigorous campaign among the intelligentsia and youth against Western influences. The mounting series of pressures in 1958 have further intimidated potentially disloyal elements and restored to the Rumanian internal atmosphere some of the tension which characterized it in the Stalinist period.

The tempo of the clampdown has been steady. Immediately following the June plenum the penal code was revised to incorporate the "lessons" of the Hungarian Revolution and to codify the drive against corruption. Punishments for political and economic offenses have in some instances even the severity of the Stalin period, with 60-70% of those receiving the death penalty. Sentences for offenses involving calls for outside aid to sullying the flag have been tightened. The penalties for high treason, espionage, and instigation to civil war, formerly carrying a 5-year term, have become capital crimes. The code also contains provisions of Rumanian law such as death for threatening acts of violence against the state and for proposing to involve the country in a war of neutrality or war. Economic crimes have also been defined more exactly, with a graduated system of punishment according to the magnitude of the offense. Theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation of state property of over 100,000 lei (US\$17,000) are now capital offenses. Reportedly the death penalty has been invoked half the number of times in 1958.

At the same time, the regime has issued a series of decrees to strengthen political and security control and law enforcement. In the summer of 1958 the courts were reorganized by the addition of a greater number of professional judges and the prescribing of longer periods of service for people's judges (lay judges). "Councils of comradely judgment" (in which lay judges try minor offenses in state enterprises and cooperatives) were also reinforced. In the early fall regulations prohibiting the taking of photographs of important installations were tightened. More recently, a 1950 law prohibiting the possession of firearms and explosives was republished as a reminder. In the summer the regime took a number of measures to curb economic malfeasance and to secure better control over the economy. Special accounting bureaus were set up in the Ministry of Finance, regional people's councils were created to check on the multiple bookkeeping system, and new laws were issued on the formation and use of enterprise management committees. The system was revised so that officials may now receive bonuses for fulfillment of quarterly goals in terms of actual production rather than on fulfillment of monthly goals in terms of the plan. New labor cards were distributed to control

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free labor. The management of state farms was reorganized to give increased operational control to the Party, and halak and absentee property was ordered to be transferred to collectives in order to intensify the pace of socialization of agriculture.

The systematic tightening of internal controls has also been extended to those segments of society most likely to serve as channels of foreign influence, namely the church, ethnic minorities, and foreign nationals. An estimated 100 Orthodox clergymen were said to have been incarcerated either for having harbored disloyal elements in their parishes, on moral charges, or for other pretenses. In addition, some 100 persons connected with the German Lutheran Church were said to have been apprehended in late 1958. The head of the Lutheran Church in the city of Stalin is supposed to have been sentenced to death for high treason.

Last September the regime suddenly issued an ultimatum to foreign nationals to choose Rumanian citizenship or face expulsion, though foreign opinion forced withdrawal of the ultimatum. Bucharest responded to French, Italian, and Greek protests by retaliatory measures against individuals or employees of their missions. In September 1958 the regime relaxed emigration barriers in an attempt to export its Jewish problem. Though some 16-17,000 Jews managed to leave Rumania before protests from the Arab countries caused a reduction in the quotas in March 1959, many of them had to undergo pressures in the form of exorbitant taxes, confiscation of personal property and money, and other hardships.

Pressures have also been brought to bear on professional people, intellectuals, writers, and artists for greater conformity. In the fall of 1958 the regime took a number of measures intended to curtail sharply the private practice of medicine. Fiscal and administrative pressures were used to force doctors to close their private practices and work in pay clinics under state control. Many were reportedly arrested for not supporting the regime's decision. Intellectuals, too, have been scored for not participating in the glorification of socialism. For the past year critics, historians, editors, playwrights, and poets have come under almost daily censure in one regime-sponsored publication or another in language even stronger than that of the Stalin era. In April it was reported that 15 prominent intellectuals and artists had been denounced for anti-regime attitudes. One of them, a composer, was singled out by the Party and the press for having allegedly spoken openly against the regime. The episode represents the first known instance of repressive measures against prominent intellectuals during the present crackdown, though unsubstantiated rumors from Vienna last September claimed that arrests of numerous artists and intellectuals had taken place.

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In the drive for greater stability the youth has been the subject of considerable regime attention. Theorists believe that the younger generation, particularly in the universities, has not been steered in the battles for a socialist state. In line with their outlook, the regime began in the summer of 1958 to organize large-scale volunteer labor groups for work on pipeline construction projects, and public works in an effort to keep youth out of mischief and direct their attention to the building of the country. More recently, it has stepped up criticism of the ideological and practical training of youth in schools and universities. It has sent members, lecturing in the principal education centers, to deplore the lack of student interest in politics, poor understanding of Marxism-Leninism, and the continuance of Western influence and racial antagonisms. In March the Party reorganized procedure for admission to evening and correspondence schools in order to change the social composition of the student body and condition the eligibility of less brilliant students for secondary and tertiary education on prior performance in industry and agriculture.

Meaning of the Clampdown

The timing and motivation for the 10-month old clampdown were initially unclear. The most apparent explanation was the withdrawal in July-August 1958 of Soviet occupation forces of 35,000 men, in the country since World War II. It appears that the leaders of the regime, men who have never exhibited a lack of self-confidence despite the relative stability of their rule over the country, had deemed it prudent to take some precautionary security measures to strengthen their position over the population and to demonstrate convincingly to Moscow their control of the situation. At the same time, economic conditions such as embezzlement, bribery, and stealing had reached a level as to cause serious concern. The departure of the Soviet forces and the hardening line in Moscow afforded the regime an opportunity to eliminate sources of potential irritation and to step up measures to improve honesty and efficiency in the economy.

More recent statements by Party leaders have cast the clampdown in a new light. They have revealed that the Party intended at its Third Congress later this year and to launch at that time its Six-Year Plan (1960-65) during which the country would make progress toward socialism. The country by 1965 is to be ready to enter the actual building of socialism. Entry upon this path would imply prior elimination of private ownership in agriculture and the private sector of trade and production, socialist professions, and the elimination of class enemies who are

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
steps of the "class struggle." The accelerated drive toward socialism would presumably bring Romanian agriculture up to the level of collectivization of such countries as Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Bulgaria by 1965.

Course of Claspdown

The claspdown is likely to continue at its present pace at least until late 1959, when a Third Party Congress is presumably scheduled to meet. Present indications are that the regime's drive will facilitate a speed up of socialization of agriculture and the professions and lead to the end of the remaining private business. The tightening and more rigid enforcement of the penal code will certainly contribute to a reduction of theft and embezzlement, though not to its elimination for some time. Further, the measures will serve to cleanse the ranks of mass and Party organizations of disloyal elements. Greater ideological conformity may also be expected from intellectuals and artists and students, though it appears doubtful whether the regime can in the near future succeed in securing the full cooperation of this segment of society. On the whole these measures may be expected to assure increased obedience among the traditionally passive Romanians and further reduce their ability to resist by passive non-compliance, to retard the present accelerated rate of building socialism.

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in the number of the Party Party organizations, while about 11,000 Party members across the leadership of the various committees, about 2 percent of the Party members work in industry and agriculture. In August 1954 the Central Committee Party created a Party Party (APW) of 20,000 to 25,000 members.

In the report of the Party's Central Control Committee, delivered in Moscow Union, it was reported that a redistribution of cadres was planned in 1953, reducing top-heavy regional, Party and interlocking bodies of the unions and city committees. Party workers are now distributed as follows: Central Committee 5 percent, regional committees 17 percent, firm and city committees, schools, and local press 76 percent.

Membership figures for 1954 are estimated to be 125,000 Party members. During the 1953-54 reorganization process, a large number were also eliminated from the Party from 1953 to 1954. The following table shows evolution of Party membership since 1950, as officially given by the Party on several occasions.

Year	Party Membership
1954 (August)	1,000
1953	250,000
1952 (after ousting of Communist and Socialist Parties)	550,000
1950 (July)	720,000
1950 (December)	820,000

Current Party membership in these years 125,000 less than in 1950. As new members have been admitted to the Party since 1953, the number of members expelled must be much larger than the difference shown by the 1950 and 1954 official figures. Among those expelled since 1953 are probably elements considered "harmful" of the 1st Party faction. The purge was probably carried out chiefly in the spring of 1953. Gheorghiu-Budea declared in April of that year that new membership cards would be issued and each member's background would be checked.

4. Membership Committee Will Party. Gheorghiu-Budea stated that the Party since 1953 had improved the Party's social composition, increased revolutionary vigilance, reduced "bureaucratic" tendencies, and improved Party discipline. Actually, little change in the social composition of the Party is observable in the period 1953-54. The

July 1960 plenum of the Central Committee, finding that only 40 percent of the members were workers in 1947 and 42 percent in 1960, decreed that the percentage of workers in the next two to three years should increase to 60 percent. This was to be achieved by recruiting 80 percent of new members from among workers and only 20 percent from other social categories. At the congress Gheorghiu-Dej reported that the percentage of workers had increased from 37 percent in 1951 (indicating a decrease under the previous year) to 42.6 percent in December 1960, below the 60 percent envisaged in 1960. He further admitted that 47.9 percent, instead of 80 percent, of the new Party members admitted since 1962 were workers.

5. Worker Recruitment Aimed At. Henceforth, recruitment is to be mainly from among workers in heavy industry, particularly those working directly on machines. Other desirable elements are lea technicians, innovators, and rationalizers from industry, collective peasants, and "intellectuals of worth." Both Gheorghiu-Dej and Chisineschi, the Party's propaganda and agitation chief, emphasized the necessity for selection of new members on an individual basis, according to Party criteria, not according to "haphazard subjective" criteria such as friendship, kinship, personal devotion, etc.

6. Statutory Requirements for Party Membership. In the new statute, which is now an almost verbatim adaptation of that of the Communist Party, the requirements for Party candidacy are made stricter than in the old (1948) statute. First, a Party member now must be a Rumanian citizen, whereas the old statute made no such provision, because at that time Soviet citizens were undoubtedly members of the Rumanian Party. Candidacy is divided into the same three categories as in July 1960, but the period of candidacy is extended and six recommendations are required. The first category comprises workers with at least five years of continuous employment; the second covers other workers in industry, machine and tractor stations, farms, collectives, engineers, and technicians in shops and various enterprises; the third embraces other peasants, functionaries, etc. In 1948 the required duration of candidacy for all persons was three months; in 1960 this was extended for the three categories to 6, 12, and 18 months respectively. As provided in the new statute, prospects in the first category must be recommended by two members who have been in the Party at least three years; in the second, by three members who have been in the Party at least four years; and in the third, by four members who have belonged to the Party for six years, or more than previously. Those who at any time in the past had belonged to any other political (non-Communist) party can be admitted in exceptional cases upon recommendation of five Party members who have been in the Party at least eight years' standing and of two members belonging since 1944

of 18 to 20 years of age are admitted only if they are members of the
National Student Reliance Fund. This fund is a voluntary fund which
has been established to provide for the education of the
children of persons who are members of the Communist Party. The
fund is administered by the National Student Reliance Fund, Inc.,
which is a non-profit organization. The fund is open to all
members of the Communist Party who are parents or guardians of
children who are between the ages of 18 and 20. The fund is
open to all members of the Communist Party who are parents or
guardians of children who are between the ages of 18 and 20.

1. Party of People at Party School - According to the report,
and the Party members and non-Party activists are currently taking
part in the Party School. The Party School is a school for the
purpose of educating Party members and non-Party activists in
the principles of the Communist Party. The school is held at the
Party School, which is located in the City of New York. The school
is open to all Party members and non-Party activists who are
between the ages of 18 and 20. The school is held for a period
of one year. The school is held at the Party School, which is
located in the City of New York. The school is open to all
Party members and non-Party activists who are between the ages
of 18 and 20.

The following table shows the activities of Party members and
of Party members and non-Party activists from 1957 to 1960, as
by official sources.

Year	Party members	Non-Party activists
1957	1,000	2,000
1958	1,200	2,500
1959	1,500	3,000
1960	1,800	3,500

become the mainstay of the Party's efforts. The two most important Party schools
are the Stefan Stojanovich Higher Party School and the A.A. Shostakovich Higher
School of Musical Education. The Stefan Stojanovich Higher Party School is also a
non-profit organization. The Stefan Stojanovich Higher Party School is open to
all Party members and non-Party activists who are between the ages of 18 and
20. The Stefan Stojanovich Higher Party School is located in the City of New York.
The A.A. Shostakovich Higher School of Musical Education is also a non-profit
organization. The A.A. Shostakovich Higher School of Musical Education is open
to all Party members and non-Party activists who are between the ages of 18 and
20. The A.A. Shostakovich Higher School of Musical Education is located in the
City of New York.

2. Ideological Training Still Fealty. The discussions by Dej and Quina on Party schools and education dwelt on formal as rather than educational results. Qualitatively, the Party school courses have not fared well. They were completely reorganized 1950 and again in April 1953 for failure to carry out directive of Party education at the end of each year since 1953 have show ideological shortcomings. Gheorghiu-Dej complained of dogmatic, parrot-like mastery of Marxism-Leninism, and Chisinevski declared ideology and propaganda are not geared to concrete problems, the propaganda has caused confusion on many major problems, and the basic concepts have not been popularized.

3. Ideological Misconceptions Regarding Tactics. Chisinevski speaking of the fact that ideology takes on various forms for tactical and strategic reasons, declared that tactical shifts, as indicated "Geneva spirit," are not understood by the rank and file members of the general public and have led to the "opportunistic" conclusion that could be a detente in the class struggle, i.e., a peaceful conversion of capitalism into socialism. Speaking in the same vein, Gheorghiu-Dej declared that the present period is a fertile time for such deviations, because the "class enemy" is increasing its effort to undermine ideological work. Hence, Party propaganda must be permeated by a fighting spirit and intransigence toward any deviation from Marxist-Leninist theory.

4. Ideological Corrective Program. Apparently acutely aware of many factors tending to create ideological confusion in the Party, the Central Committee presented a program to overcome them. The program declared that regional, raion, and city Party committees will have greater responsibility for raising the ideological and political level of the Communists. A "relentless" fight will be waged against non-Communist ideas, "mysticism" (that is, religion), and philistine idealism (Western political theory, sociology, and history). Party cadres will prepare studies on the theoretical bases of government. Special Party studies will cover the role of heavy industry, light industry, artisans, and free peasantry. "Objective reality" will replace "subjective creation" in literature and the arts. The secondary school of history and the social sciences will be reorganized and level

5. Discipline and Measures to Improve It. The importance of discipline was one of the major themes of the congress. As Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it, victory of socialism is not possible without a Party that is strong through its cohesion and iron discipline. A. I. Kuznetsov, head of the Soviet delegation to the congress, warned the Rumanians that its success is dependent on its ability to combat deviant tendencies and enemies of the Party. The demands of all primary

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speakers for greater Party discipline were motivated primarily by a glaring lack of discipline in the economic sectors of the country, by ideological confusion, and by party ill-will and dissensions.

The new Party discipline is based on the new Party discipline which Party discipline is based on the new Party discipline which was almost ignored in the old statute. The new discipline with the obligations of members in regard to discipline and obedience is greatly expanded. Each member, as individuals, must set an example of discipline, collectively their supreme duty is to strive for "unshakable unity." The new statute does not permit factions and demands that Party members not only agree with but actively support Party decisions without reserve. The minority yields to the majority and does not oppose Party decisions "without condition."

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A. Internal Party Control Mechanism. The new statute deals in greater detail than the old with Party controls. The Central Committee is authorized to establish political positions and to appoint organizers in important economic branches. The Central Control Commission controls the observance of Party discipline and monitors members who violate the Party program and statute. The new statute also provides for the first time for the creation of regional, town, and village revision commissions for closer scrutiny of Party work. In addition, the statute grants powers to the basic Party organizations to educate Party members and other workers in the spirit of "revolutionary vigilance," to fight any remnants of bourgeois ideology, to bloc attempts of the "class enemy" to hinder the construction of socialism, and to wage war against "saboteurs, diversionists, and spies."

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IV. PARTY LEADERSHIP

It is noteworthy that, with minor exception, the CC made no change in the top Party leadership. The major purge was in May 1952, when Gheorgiu-Dej emerged as undisputed leader of the Party, the Party reorganization of April 1954, when the post-Secretary General was abolished and that of the First Secretariat the Central Committee created, and the reshufflings of Cotec had settled nearly all major leadership problems.

A. Politburo Virtually Unchanged

Prior to the convening of the congress the Politburo of nine regular members and three candidate members.¹ In 1952, all the old members were re-elected, and two candidates, Alexandru Draghici and Nicolae Ceausescu — were upgraded to membership. Three new candidate members were added — Leon Leonte Rautu, and Stefan Voitec. No changes were made in 1954 except that a new member, Ion Cosma, was added to it.² It is known of the composition of the Central Control Commission the convening of the Second Congress, except that its president, Constantin Pirvulescu, who retains the same position.⁴

B. Previous Central Committee

The Central Committee, as originally elected in February 1948 when the Romanian Communist Party absorbed the Social Democratic and assumed the name of the Romanian Workers' Party, consisted of 41 regular and 16 candidates. On the eve of the congress had an estimated total of 54 members, of whom 45 were regular members and 9 candidates. In the inter-congress period, six of the original members were removed — three by death and three by public expulsion, while 10 new members were added. Of the 16 candidates in 1948, seven were subsequently upgraded to full membership. Ion Basescu, was promoted from candidate to full member. His election as candidate member is not known.

1. For a report on the Party leadership on the eve of the congress see OLI/BR-No. 140, December 16, 1955, OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
2. For a list of the Politburo members see Annex I. All were prepared by OLI/BI.
3. For a list of the members of the Secretariat, see Annex II.
4. Ibid.

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If people recruited during this period... [The text is extremely faint and largely illegible, but appears to discuss recruitment and organizational efforts.]

The Party still continues... [This paragraph continues the discussion of the Party's activities and organizational structure, mentioning various groups and their roles.]

The basic and most glaring shortcoming of the Russian Party... [This section discusses the shortcomings of the Russian Party, particularly regarding its organizational structure and the role of its members.]

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ANNEX I

ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL EXECUTIVE BOARD

MEMBERS

Members - **CHEREMISIN, George**
STOICHI, Gheorghe
CHISINEVSKI, Boris
ARISTID, George
NOVICHOV, Alexander
RODOLPH, Emil
CONSTANTINESCU, Mircea
PIRVULESCU, Constantin
VIHTE, Ion
ROSCU, Alexander
STANESCU, Nicolas

Observers

CHIS, Daniel
BOLEA, Iordania
FRITU, Iordania
WITTE, Stefan

SECRETARIES

First Secretary - **CHEREMISIN, George**
Secretary - **CHISINEVSKI, Boris**
STANESCU, Nicolas
VIHTE, Ion
COSEA, Ion

EXECUTIVE BOARD COMPOSITION

President - **PIRVULESCU, Constantin**
Vice Presidents - **VIHTE, Ion**
CHISINEVSKI, Liuba
Secretaries - **DUDORAN, Stefan**
Members - **CHIS, Daniel**
ROSCU, George
RETRISOR, Alodia

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