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DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:JLHIRSCH:MGK APPROVED BY NEA:NAVELIOTES S/S-O : DASANDBERG INR:RSPIERS S/S:LPBREMER, III.

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3 6/16/11 (STOESSEL, WALTER)

TAGS: PEPR, US, IS

SUBJECT: EVRON-VELIOTES DISCUSSION OF IRAQI NUCLEAR ISSUE

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING THE DELIVERY TO THE WHITE HOUSE OF BEGIN'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, EVRON, ACCOMPANIED BY NEHUSHTAN AND BENTSUR, MET WITH VELIOTES AND HIRSCH ON JUNE 16 AT 5:30 P.M. MAIN TOPIC OF THE MEETING WAS ISRAELI PERCEPTION OF HOW THE U.S. MEDIA WAS PLAYING THE U.S. AND ISRAELI EVALUATIONS OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY,

AND STRESSED THAT OUR DECEMBER 17, 1980 ASSESS-MENT RELATED TO ONGOING ACTIVITIES AT THE IRAQI FACILITY AND CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OF THE PROGRAM BUT NOT TO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 JUN 2011 DATE/CASE ID: 23 JAN 2006 200304282

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#### UNCLASSIFIED ANY DEFINITIVE FINDING ON LONG TERM IRAQI INTENTIONS. THESE EXCHANGES COULD NOT BE USED TO JUSTIFY ISRAEL'S ACTION. END SUMMARY.

5. VELIOTES SAID THAT EVRON'S IMPRESSION OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH OUR OWN. WE HAD MADE CLEAR, BOTH IN THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS AND IN OUR BRIEFINGS TO THE CONGRESS, THAT WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRAQI PROGRAM IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. IT IS SIMPLY UNTRUE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO HIDE OR DISTORT OUR CONCERNS.

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6. VELIOTES THEN TURNED TO SIGNIFICANCE OF LEWIS' STATE-MENT TO BEGIN LAST DECEMBER 17 THAT OUR ASSESSMENTS OF THE IRAQI PROGRAM ARE VERY CLOSE. LEWIS HAD INDICATED THAT OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS ACTUALLY HAPPENING AT THE PRESENT TIME AT THE REACTOR SITE WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE ISRAELI ONE. WE ALSO HAD EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT -THE POTENTIAL OF THE IRAQI PROGRAM. BUT WE HAD NEVER REACHED A DEFINITIVE CONCLUSION ABOUT IRAQ'S LONG TERM INTENTIONS. THESE EXCHANGES, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE USED TO JUSTIFY THE ISRAELI ACTION. (INEARLIERMEETING WITH NEHUSHTAN, SPIERS MADE SAME POINTS.)

7. VELIOTES CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN IN WASHINGTON AT THE ISRAELI SURPRISE ACTION IN DESTROYING THE NUCLEAR FACILITY.

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8. EVRON ASKED FOR A READOUT ON THE SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HOW THE U.S. WOULD VOTE. VELIOTES SAID THAT A NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WAS UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON. AT THE SAME TIME, WE UNDERSTOOD THAT NEGO-TIATIONS WERE CONTINUING IN NEW YORK ON THE TEXT. WE HAD MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR. WE WOULD VETO ANY RESOLUTION SEEKING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS. BUT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI ATTACK.

9. BEFORE GETTING INTO THE DISCUSSION ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, EVRON ASKED FOR OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE TOWARD THE HABIB MISSION AND ITS PROSPECTS. NEHUSHTAN COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SEEN A SAUDI EDITORIAL

SAYING THAT THE MISSION WAS NOW USELESS. VELIOTES SAID THAT WAS NOT AT ALL THE SAUDI ATTITUDE. THE SAUDIS HAD TOLD HABIB THAT THEY SHARED OUR GOAL OF FINDING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, AND WANTED THE MISSION TO CONTINUE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON THE IRAQI FACILITY HAS COMPLI-CATED THE SITUATION. VELIOTES SAID WE DID NOT YET HAVE A REPORT OF HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS IN DAMASCUS. HE WOULD-BE MEETING WITH BEGIN EITHER JUNE 17 OR 18. WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HABIB'S SECRET

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EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON PROBLEM.

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