

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Session on Security Issues with
President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, The Secretary of State
William Perry, The Secretary of Defense
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Lynn Davis, Undersecretary for International
Security Affairs
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the
Russian Federation
Nicholas Burns, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs,
NSC
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russian,
Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC
Notetaker
Peter Afanassenko, Interpreter

Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian
Federation
Oleg Soskovets, Deputy Prime Minister
Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defense
Oleg Davydov, Minister of Foreign Economics
Trade
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Viktor Illyushin, First Assistant to the
President
Yuliy Vorontsov, Russian Ambassador to the
U.S.
Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 27, 1994; 4:35-5:35pm
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

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Minister Grachev: The cardinal issue is the new U.S. strategy, which I talked about with Secretary Perry yesterday. Nuclear security must be considered at the level of the Energy Department and MinAtom, too. So, before Vice President Gore's visit in December, we will work out an exchange on nuclear security by then. The second issue is nuclear security provided in terms of the START I and II Treaties. I informed Secretary Perry of all the issues of nuclear safety and security that were being implemented. Missiles are coming out of Kazakhstan and Belarus, warheads are being removed from Ukraine, all according to schedule. We are destroying strategic nuclear arms strictly according to schedule. There was a misunderstanding before this visit that we were stopping or slowing down. No. We showed Secretary Perry that we are on schedule. We have cut back 374 ICBMs, you saw 13. For submarines, we have cut back 184 compared to the 52 you counted. As far as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles on heavy bombers--both you and we have taken them all off. I'd like to propose that Perry come to one of our tactical nuclear handling sites when he visits in December, to see that safety is provided for. But we cannot destroy all the tactical nuclear weapons at once--unlike the United States, which is geographically in a more favorable position. You do not need them. But for us, within reasonable bounds we need some. There could be problems with some of the states to the south. They are contained now, but as a restraint to aggression some tactical nuclear weapons are needed. (S)

President Yeltsin: To be objective and fair, Pavel Sergeyevich, I cannot agree. I said this to him: let's just add them up. You say you want to keep tactical nuclear weapons more than strategic, OK, get rid of that many more strategic. Either we knock out all tactical nuclear weapons, or sum them up. (S)

Minister Grachev: We're asking that at the level of experts that we look at this question one more time. Here is another difficulty: We are cutting back strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with START I, but the Treaty is not ratified. Now START II is pressing us, with a date of 2003 to complete reductions. If you do not press Ukraine, then we will not be able to proceed with START II. (S)

President Yeltsin: What concerns Ukraine is START I, not II. START II is a matter between us. So we have to press Ukraine with all our might. (S)

The President: President Kuchma is coming here. You said that he is OK. So we need to press them to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the time of the CSCE Summit in Budapest, and we have to ensure they get some credit. (S)

The Vice President: We should urge President Kuchma together to satisfy this requirement by the time of the CSCE Summit. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, and Ukraine in general. We should bring all the pressure we have to bear. We signed the Trilateral accord, we three, so then what? I've got to visit Ukraine in November. I'm going to press Kuchma to the wall. NPT or they get no gas or oil! (S)

The Vice President: Don't be too hard on him. (U)

The President: I will tell him that we need to get NPT out of the way to bring START I into force and to ratify START II. Then we can begin to explore START III ideas. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, Kuchma is fine. I think it is very realistic to expect to be able to finish NPT by the end of the year. As Grachev here will tell you, we have got to get START II going. (S)

Minister Grachev: We are already beginning to think about it. The difficulty has been in getting all of the warheads out of those three countries. (S)

President Yeltsin: I propose so that we do not have any surprise misunderstandings, that every three months we exchange information on how much has been destroyed. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then our Ministers of Defense should sign on the bottom line, who has destroyed what, and where. (S)

Secretary Perry: To summarize what we and Minister Grachev have agreed: First, we will cooperate in ratifying START I and II and bringing them into force; second, once that is achieved, we will accelerate the pace of reductions, to go even faster by informal agreement, using Nunn-Lugar funds to do so. Third, we will start discussing what reductions will be possible under START III. And fourth, while we are discussing START III, each side will take unilateral reductions beyond START II. Each side will be taking unilateral steps toward START III (S)

The President: We have been doing some of that already? (U)

Secretary Perry: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: On the ratification of START I, that is fine, we are destroying all of those anyway. On the other points, let's do it this way: when START II enters into force, let us