

Notes from SADS Meeting, December 28-30, 1967, F. A. Long

The group met in the House of Sciences in Moscow, starting December 28. The US group was Doty, Wiesner, Rathjens, Long, Ruina, Kissinger and Brown. The USSR delegation was large. It consisted of Schukin, Kapitza, Emelyanov, Vinogradov, Blagonravov, Khvostov, Arbatov, Karentinkov, Millionshchikov, all of these on the first row. In the second row was Gryzlov, Sokolov, Vashleusky, Menshikov, Selnzev, Shelepin and Korneev. Our guide and secretary was Porchatalin.

Millionshchikov, co-chairman along with Doty, started the meeting by noting that they were in general agreement with the US draft agenda that had been forwarded, that from their standpoint they saw some six items to be discussed, the first three of which formed a group: analysis of strategic security; nuclear freeze and cutback; holding ABM to a "thin" deployment; how to end the Vietnam war; how to make progress on non-proliferation; improvement of US-USSR relations. We agreed that the first session would involve submission of ideas on the first cluster of topics, that on Friday we would devote our time to non-proliferation and Vietnam, and that on Saturday we would try to return in a specific way to the first three.

Doty then led for the American group by giving an analysis of what he thought was the current situation in strategic balance. He noted that it was his impression we had been working for some time on the concept of a stable mutual deterrence wherein each side had a substantial second strike capability, but not a first. The question of course is, is new technology eroding this stability? ABM now looks feasible. There has been accelerated

buildup of the USSR forces, technology of multiple warheads is on the wings, Chinese nuclear forces have built up rapidly and new systems, including mobile ballistic systems in the Soviet Union and FOBS, as well as proposed new US systems have been discussed.

The impact of these various changes is an acceleration of the arms race and as far as can be ascertained, an enhanced degree of uncertainty. Since most of us now realize that nuclear weapons are impotent for use in normal foreign policy affairs, i.e. to the real problems of a nation, the question is, should we not view this with alarm? Doty posed two questions in conclusion. The first is, do we agree that an arms race, with more resultant uncertainty, is imminent? And second, what are the requirements of security? These summarized in the third question, how can we stop and reverse this arms race?

Jack Ruina underscored and gave detail to several of the points Doty made. In particular he discussed the characteristics of the US thin ABM system, which consists essentially of quite long-range radars and missiles, with an exo-atmospheric interception. Since it is comparatively small and simple and clearly is penetrable by Soviet missiles, the question then is, why do it? We stated that it is in response to a Chinese threat. Ruina advanced the personal belief that, to some extent, it was a political response to the USSR deployment. In fact he went on to propose that matching of weapon system for weapon system is likely to be very common. Ruina went on to note that the US, as a response to the Soviet activity, is working on penetration aids, including such things as decoys and multiple warheads. His fundamental conclusion was that offense and defense cannot be separated and must be thought of as each counter to the other.

Millionshchikov underscored this last point and insisted that we must explore both parts fully if we are to do something about the arms race.

Wiesner analyzed minimum deterrence. As a preliminary he made a specific proposal that perhaps we should attempt to develop our thoughts with sufficient clarity so that we could write a joint confidential letter to our governments suggesting things for them to do. He then went on to analyze the question of minimum deterrence. He noted that the US is eager to start the proposed official talks on control of strategic systems and hopes that the official talks can start soon. He recalled also how, in the earlier days, that inspection had been troublesome and noted that as far as he was concerned, almost the only feasible inspection concerns inspection by numbers. The question then is really how do you count and how be persuaded your count is reasonably accurate and how do you rate the effectiveness of the items counted? It was because of uncertainties in counting and in verification that had led Wiesner earlier to propose a minimum deterrence force of 100 or so missiles. He still thinks this is a good idea. At the same time, he notes that if one has a very substantial missile defense system, another possible stable situation is to reduce the offensive missiles to zero, with the expectation that the defense system would then give security against the few clandestine. He noted that this might well be academic, but it represented one way to reconcile missile defense and minimum deterrence.

This discussion continued with points made by Rathjens, Long, Schulin, and Wiesner. One item discussed was the question of mobile missiles and why it was that they represented an additional problem. The Americans stressed both that there is a response and counter-response between offense and defense. They also speculated on how one could, in the light of ABM, best proceed to decrease offensive systems.

Khvostov stated that he was pleased that the US had re-evaluated its thinking. He wondered what was deficient in the USSR proposals as earlier advanced and thinks that if it is concrete proposals we are looking for, we should turn to the Soviet draft treaty on disarmament which was submitted in Geneva. There was some discussion of what was in the Soviet draft precisely and this was brought to a head by Millionshchikov, who suggested that we all try to bring in concrete proposals for Saturday morning. He summarized this part of the discussion by noting that there was little chance for progress unless there was an atmosphere of confidence between the US and the USSR and he noted from this standpoint that the war in Vietnam is a calamity.

Doty interceded to urge that we try to return to the agenda and specifically turn to an analysis of what are the security requirements on the two sides, what technical analyses are needed to understand the situation and finally, what steps can be taken when. He hoped we could have some concrete ideas from the USSR on what we might do post-Vietnam. Wiesner noted that some more consideration on an effective international organization ought to be part of the discussions and Long noted that more specific analysis of what is the role of nuclear weapons would be useful.

Discussion then turned to the non-proliferation treaty. Long distributed copies of the UN Association article to the Soviet. Emelyanov started the discussion by noting that the entire obstacle is in Article III and the fundamental objection appears to be to use of IAEA. He is at a loss to understand what other international group could be developed in the light of the existence of this one and thinks as scientists we should put on pressure for the acceptance of IAEA. Emelyanov vehemently subscribed to the

utilization of IAEA, insisted that only West Germany was, as usual, causing trouble, that there was very little time left and that it was of the greatest urgency that we get a decision soon. Wiesner, Long and others noted that the problem, especially between the US and its allies, was whether one absolutely settled on IAEA now or whether one merely settled on "international safeguards" and ironed out the details later. We in effect pleaded that the USSR should assist here in making it easier for the US to complete its arguments and hoped that the treaty be signed now with these small points to be settled later. Other contributions were made to this argument but all agreed in emphasizing the importance of getting a treaty soon. It was agreed that the US and USSR were very close and had common interests. Each side pressed the other to yield the last inch to permit a treaty to be signed and go ahead. Along the line, there were, however, discussions of the difficulties which were in store in persuading many nations to sign, an example being India, which has now become very reluctant; the other point being some real doubt about durability of a treaty if the US and USSR continued a vigorous rivalry and an arms race. Soon after these points had been made, the session terminated.

The second session of the discussion had almost the same Soviet group. Dubrinin came along for the first time. There was also a pleasant man who stated he was Director of the Institute of Asian Studies.

Paul Doty was in the chair for this session. The topic was Vietnam and Doty noted that there really were three wars under way or three separable components. One was the guerrilla war with the NLF. The second was main force North Vietnamese units fighting in South Vietnam, principally with US units. The third component was the bombing in the North. In a somewhat

parallel way, Doty went on, one should think of three different US attitudes. One was the attitude of the group of US participants in this meeting. A second, and not necessarily similar attitude, was that of the US government. Still a different attitude is that of the US public, an important point being that this group of participants does not necessarily reflect the average US opinion. Doty then turned the meeting over to the Soviet comments. These came from almost every one of their participants: Millionshchikov, Kapitza, Vinogradov, Emelyanov and Arbatov. As a group, the Soviet were restrained and careful in their remarks. On the other hand it was clear that their state of indignation and apprehension was very high.

Millionshchikov led off by asking, when will the US end this senseless and dreadful war? The US, in his view, must withdraw. He felt that the war is causing a sharp decline in US prestige, it casts a dark shadow over US-USSR relations, and, among other things, greatly inhibits positive steps toward arms control and disarmament. The obstacle to negotiations is the bombing of North Vietnam and this must be stopped by the US. Millionshchikov especially wondered whether the recent NFL political program is known and publicized in the United States. He thinks this was a most constructive step and represents a proposal from which negotiations would be possible.

During this discussion a number of specific questions were asked by Soviet participants. These included, what does Westmoreland mean by victory? What is the aim pursued by the US in the Vietnam war? Will there be continuing expansion of it? Does the US see a permanent role for itself in Southeast Asia? Is it trying to replace the United Kingdom as a colonial power? Is there a new rigidity in the US position? And if not, why are they unprepared to stop the bombing?

The detailed responses to this set of comments and questions was given by Kissinger. He first answered several of the questions. He

answered the question as to why was US public opinion more effective in influencing its government. Kissinger noted that in fact the US is strongly polarized and he recalled that in a recent poll, 58% of the US noted they wanted the US to "win the war." As to what was meant by a Westmoreland-type military victory, he noted that it is Westmoreland's view that if the organized military support in South Vietnam is destroyed, then the guerrilla effort will collapse. Parenthetically, Kissinger noted that as these troops in South Vietnam are pushed by the US toward the borders and toward the DMZ, there is increasing interest in "hot pursuit." As to why escalation continues, he noted there are two quite different explanations. One is the pressure toward victor as defined above. The second is out of frustration, i.e. if one simply doesn't know what to do, there is a tendency to increase the level of effort. As to the US aims, he thinks they are well stated as wishing to give the South Vietnamese a free choice of government, free from outside interferences. He notes the difficulty in interpreting these phrases but still thinks it needful. On the question of local war, Kissinger wished to avoid historical analyses but did very briefly note that one of the things which contributed to the situation in Vietnam was that the USSR under Krushchev argued that wars of national liberation were to be supported by them, and the United States felt that Vietnam was an example of this and hence had responded with countermeasures.

The significant question, however, is not how we got into the situation but where can we go from here? The fact that the United States has three years of commitment to the area is a serious matter. Even though what we would like is a rapid, honorable conclusion, it must be one which does not involve humiliation of the US. Ending of the bombing is certainly a rapid way to get talks started and get serious negotiations under way. There are many

reasons why the North Vietnamese and the US find it difficult to get together. Overall the US is strong while Vietnam is weak. The US has broad, world-wide obligations; Vietnam is necessarily only concerned with local. North Vietnam must also avoid losing support of China. The consequence of all this is that the manner in which negotiations are started is extremely critical, made the more so by the profound mistrust which the North Vietnamese understandably have.

A cease fire is a difficult item because there is not a clean geographic boundary. The situation is rather that there are areas which are held in the daytime by the South Vietnamese troops and at night-time by the Viet Cong. No boundary can adequately delineate this fact. With respect to the bombing, our position has been and is that we will end the bombing if this is followed by prompt negotiations. The North Vietnamese have in the past said rather similar things, which suggests that the two sides should be able to get together. This also implies there is a role for third parties and a particularly obvious third party from the standpoint of the North Vietnamese must be the USSR. This is almost self-evident, since Hanoi trusts the USSR and since to act as an unofficial intermediary it will be necessary for there to be a country with wider knowledge than North Vietnam alone has.

The specific assurances which the US has insisted on is that negotiations will start soon after a bombing cessation and that there be no increase in infiltration during the negotiations. There is no difficulty with respect to a continuation of the US presence since the US has publicly offered and expressed its willingness to withdraw all troops within 6 months after an agreement is reached. One point which does need to be made clear, however, is that the ultimate government should be established by free elections. We clearly need help in making this understood and ultimately carrying it out.



As a final point, Kissinger turned to the question of what is the "absence of humiliation." Essentially it means that the US will not accept a military defeat nor will it accept a new government imposed arbitrarily by force of arms. It would accept a Communist-dominated government for South Vietnam if it comes in by means of free political processes.

There was some discussion of these various points, some of it hinging on the question of what more needed to be said to make it clear that negotiation would follow a cessation of bombing. The answer was that North Vietnam always puts their position in the conditional case, i.e. they say that with bombing stopped negotiations "could" start. What we need is word from somebody that negotiations will start promptly. There was also some discussion of why the US feels strongly about infiltration not increasing and it was explained that if during a bombing cessation there is an increase in number of Americans killed, it is of great importance to the President that he be able to say firmly that this is not due to an increase in infiltration. Were this not possible, the bombing might necessarily have to be resumed.

There was also discussion of the possibility of war extending into Laos and Cambodia. The Americans admitted that this was entirely conceivable if the war goes on and if North Vietnamese troops use these countries as sanctuaries.

Millionshchikov commented that he still found these discussions a bit narrow. He remained interested in the broader questions of what are the goals of the war and do they stand on a priority level with many other problems like disarmament, USSR relations, etc. There were other points made on the Soviet side of this sort, Vinogradov stating with vigor that this

horrible war to him implied that the US must be planning to stay. Several Soviet also gave as their personal judgment that negotiations would surely start promptly if the bombing stopped.

There was also further discussion of the role of a third party and it was noted that, with respect to extension of war into Laos and Cambodia, the Soviet Union could help greatly in revitalizing the International Control Commission. This Commission in turn could, as it had been committed to do, patrol the Cambodia and Laos borders and be sure that these countries were not refuges for North Vietnamese troops.

The Russians did not respond to this directly but did emphasize that North Vietnam is a sovereign state and even though the Soviet might attempt to talk to them, they could not be sure of the answer.

This session terminated with the US on the one side saying that they would report back the very deep and wide concern of the Soviets about the war and will also take back all specific suggestions. In turn our request to the USSR was that they should consider playing a greater role as a third party in helping obtain successful negotiations and that they could also help by recommending the revitalization of the ICC. On his side Millionshchikov gave more explicitly the message which he would like to see us convey back. It was roughly as follows: The USSR feels it necessary to consider the view of all of the Vietnamese people, including the North Vietnamese and the NLF. He thinks that the new NLF program is democratic and progressive and ought to be appealing to the US. The USSR thinks the Vietnamese people are entitled to a peaceful settlement and one which involves no humiliation on their part.

Millionshchikov also pointed out that the successful role of Kosygin in Tashkent was not precisely parallel, simply because at Tashkent both the

Pakistanis and the Indians had a real full will to settle things. He is not sure whether the same will to peace exists in the US situation.

Kapitza made the final statement by noting that the US had helped settle the Russian-Japanese war in 1905 and that perhaps the USSR did owe a favor back and should attempt to return the favor by helping in the present situation.

During the evening which followed, Kapitza and Emelyanov both pointed out privately that this session had given them a good deal to think about and they thought a few more minutes on Vietnam the next morning would be desirable. This request was agreed to and the Vietnamese discussion went for almost an hour the next morning. Kapitza led off with a lengthy statement in which he argued that in a basic sense the United States has already been defeated in Vietnam and will never be able to obtain a true victory. He developed this point by discussing the analogy to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, where he won all battles but ultimately retreated in disarray, i.e. true victory means that one must succeed both at the military level and at the political level. He thinks that the US has been able to continue having military influence in Vietnam but that its political influence is steadily decreasing. Without both, there will be no true victory. He then went on to paint a gloomy picture of the impact of the war on the US. He suspected there will be further escalation but still with no victory. He feels that the military influence on US policy and programs will increase. There will be further deterioration of the United States economic position and specifically on its balance of payments. Kapitza used all this to argue that a crisis was rapidly approaching the US and that it will necessarily lead to the ending of the Vietnam war.

Arbitov made two interesting points. One was to ask Kissinger for specifics on what cessation of bombing would look like, i.e. whether there were any conditions. The second was to note that the North Vietnamese must be persuaded to negotiate even though they are very suspicious. This, he pointed out, would be very much helped by an act of good will on the part of the US. The US replied to the first question that there were no conditions on the bombing pause except for the expectation of prompt negotiations and no marked changes in the rate of infiltration. It was also pointed out that the US appreciated the mistrust which Hanoi has but commented that that is why an intermediary seems so important.

Millionshchikov pointed out that the main US point seemed to be a search for a third party. Look at from the standpoint of the USSR, he felt that the US must take some steps. It should stop the bombing and do some other de-escalation. So far private attempts on the USSR side to assist have failed. An intermediary can't help if the US does not have any will to change. That is why Tashkent is not an appropriate analog. An intermediary must be sure that a desire exists to meet the other side half way. This ended the Vietnam discussion.

A further discussion of strategic forces was initiated by Blagonravov who pointed out that an ABM defense was only partial and would probably remain so, whereas the offensive weapons were characterized by long-range, high precision. Furthermore, he felt technology would inescapably continue to improve both types of force. He saw no alternative but a freeze and cutback into which ABM as a complex had to be considered as a component. He felt that absence of trust was the most serious problem and felt that the important things to do to get more trust would be to obtain a settlement in Vietnam and to stop procrastination on the non-proliferation treaty. Shukin also spoke in favor of a coupling of ABM and offensive missiles for study. He felt that we needed more

detailed analysis and raised the particular question of whether ABM systems could be kept thin.

Khvostov turned to the brief discussion paper which Wiesner had written and which had been translated into Russian. The paper was one which simply raised the questions which would need to be looked at carefully if one were to get some kind of an arms limitation agreement on offensive and defensive strategic forces. The paper concluded with a set of four alternative directions we might go, ranging from doing nothing with an expected continuation and acceleration of the arms race, to focussing either only on offensive systems or only on defensive systems to a fourth alternative, which was to attempt to freeze and cut back on both offensive and defensive systems. Khvostov concluded that of these four, only the last was sufficiently interesting to be concentrated on. He also responded to a suggestion in the paper that sometime we should discuss verification procedures. His feeling was that we probably would to turn to this, but that it should be done last.

In two or three ways the US group attempted to press the Soviet to discuss what was the Soviet strategic concept and what kinds of numbers of delivery systems it felt were necessary. It was noted that the US has given information out rather fully, both on their offensive systems and on the character of the ABM which they expect to build. We have stopped building offensive systems, implying that for the time being we have a limit and the question is, is there a similar Soviet limit and when do they expect to arrive at it? There was no specific reply to any of the probings of this sort.

Millionshchikov responded in general terms, arguing that the USSR pursues peace and has given many indications of its desire for peaceful co-existence. He noted that in pursuing peace, the USSR differs from the Chinese, who "indulge in aggressive talk." Millionshchikov agreed that there should be a detailed analysis of the arms race. He said that we should attempt to develop specific questions which need answering and then should try to see how to conduct a study of these. He did, however, emphasize that the question of trust entered importantly.

The US group responded to some of these points by noting that trust is indeed an important ingredient, but that there were two others which needed consideration. One was the fact that the military groups would necessarily insist on the kind of security position which would not leave their countries exposed in case agreements went awry. The other point was that one needed to consider arms limitations from the standpoint of mutual benefit and this could be analyzed even in times of strain such as the present one.

In the ensuing rather general question, the Russians two or three times noted that we must look at the specifics and develop detail. The US agreed and at the same time noted that we are curious about what are the components of the problem which worry the Soviet. A particularly interesting point was made by Kapitza, who first noted that the efficiency and reliability of the missiles were critical components and might be of significant importance beyond their numbers. He then went on to point out that highly urbanized countries like the US were really more vulnerable to missiles and this was particularly aggravated in the US side because of its concentration of population. Since the US group had wished to make this point anyway, they heartily agreed.

The US group, particularly Rathjens, returned to the fact that our strategic forces have leveled off and the details of our ABM are clear; that in contrast we are exceedingly unsure of Soviet intentions. The US group pointed particularly to the FOBS development and the USSR announcement of an intention to develop mobile, land-based missiles. For example, the FOBS looks to us like a first strike weapon; what do the Soviet say about its uses. It was emphasized that the US and USSR must develop procedures for better communications.

In further discussions, the Soviet referred briefly to the fact that there is non-equality in that the USSR is surrounded by US bases. On the other side the US noted that critical question was how to maintain a reliable deterrence and pointed out that whatever other reasons there might be to have an ABM, it would necessarily confuse and complicate analysis of strategic deterrence, if for no other reason than the absence of communications, the military would almost surely adopt a most conservative position, i.e. would over-evaluate the opponent's capabilities. Even beyond this, the question of the "equivalence" of an ABM as compared with particular numbers of offensive nuclear delivery systems is difficult.

It was also noted by the US that the question of confidence on the extent of projected ABM is decidedly difficult, i.e. it is not easy to tell whether a particular buildup is one which will terminate or is one which is a prelude to a more extensive heavy force. The USSR responded by saying that this question of what can be done to restrict ABM to "thin" deployment was one of the points which they did want to discuss.

The question of equivalence of various kinds of forces was then discussed at greater length, especially by Long, who went explicitly through the kinds of forces which would need to be considered, i.e. ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, long range bombers, ABM systems, etc. He noted that from some standpoints

gross weight was a useful measure of and offered certain advantages over numbers in comparing capabilities of missile systems: Hence the question of this versus a simple number count needed serious exploration.

The ABM system however remained a somewhat confusing thing as the Soviet thought about it. They were willing to agree with some of the points the US had made. At the same time, there was a residuum of simple belief that "defense is good." The USSR group had not thought through the question of maintenance of assured deterrence on the one hand and the impact of development of defensive systems on the other.

All of this discussion culminated in a belief that what we had to do was to develop a list of quite specific questions which needed more careful analysis. It was agreed that the two chairmen would finalize such a list, but a number of people contributed to it. As somewhat broad questions, the following sorts of things were mentioned: What are the components of strategic balance? Is the concept of assured second strike of continuing relevance? If one has a limitation of weapons, based for example on numbers or gross weight, can there be any restriction on improvements within the agreed limitations? Also, can one make provision for confidence testing within the limitation? Must one consider ABM defenses at missile sites along with total ABM system or can they be treated separately? Of great consequence is the general problem of analysis of the equivalence of various delivery systems.

Further questions which were put on the list for consideration were: How does one limit ABM? How does the capabilities of other nuclear powers affect possible agreements between the US and the USSR? How can one bring these countries into agreements?



Millionshchikov emphasized that we must study what kinds of controls if any, will be needed and, in particular, stated that there must be a quantitative analysis with consideration of possible levels of freeze and cutback. Several of the Soviet noted that if one is going to get into these quantitative analyses, it is inescapable that one discuss the equivalence of different kinds of systems. During this discussion the question of a next meeting came up two or three times. With the many suggestions in hand, the co-chairmen agreed to develop the final list of questions for future discussion.

The final topic which was taken up by the group was Soviet-American relations. The Americans noted that we were conscious that the Vietnam war casts a shadow. On the other hand we noted that the United States had continued to press toward detente with the USSR and the President had urged more trade. In fact, some things had improved. Millionshchikov pointed out that the ease of bilateral relations between the US and the USSR is determined among other things by trade and that the US policy is one of discrimination. He noted that the questions of discrimination against Soviet use of harbors is also unfortunate. He thinks that the economic consequences are not truly major but still it is an unpleasant business and should be discussed. We noted that the trade embargo stems from the earlier, harder positions and that there had been a tendency toward softening but that unfortunately the large amount of Soviet supplies going to North Vietnam had come up and had hampered any further softening. We also noted that credits were somewhat difficult to get agreement on. On the Soviet side the conversation shifted from general trade problems and discrimination to the particular point of scientific apparatus, with the Soviet side arguing that to interfere with progress of science by this kind of restriction was a great shame. Artsimovich carried

this farther by noting that the Soviet scientists see trade restrictions specifically in terms of computers. He noted that some of the US computers could be of real help to their research, but they can't buy them and as a result, science is hampered. Kapitza picked this up and said rather broadly that science should be international and that scientific apparatus should be excluded from all kinds of restrictions of this sort.

Interspersed with this were some general remarks on Soviet-US relations. The US, for example, noted that we ought to try to have more long-range visits of people in each direction, to stay in each country for some months and study disarmament in more depth with groups of the opposite nation. There was general agreement to this. There was also some analysis of the concept of peaceful co-existence. Kissinger pointed out that the direction that bureaucracy took was sometimes a little tricky and he hoped that peaceful co-existence was not to be used as a tactic to inflict damage on opponents. He noted parenthetically that it was axiomatic that neither side could be destroyed without noticing it. In his view both sides needed to analyze world political problems and then cooperate in their solution. Arbatov answered this point by saying that in the Soviet view, peaceful co-existence is a shift of ideological struggle to emphasize the positive and that it is not really in any sense a threat but rather is an attempt to build further bridges.

In his final intervention, Paul Doty noted that one is never sure in a discussion like this whether the information exchanged has really been complete and accurate. As a further aid, he turned over translations of the Gilpatrick Article in the New York Times magazine of a few weeks ago and also the recent San Francisco and Detroit speeches of McNamara and Warneke respectively. He also noted that one of the world's basic problems is that the military developments come along pretty rapidly and that our meetings have been somewhat slow and at best can only act as a catalyst. He urged,

as had been done by two or three other US participants earlier, that each group should stress to their government the need for the official meetings which have been proposed for a discussion of strategic balance but which are still in abeyance.

Millionshchikov made a number of terminal remarks. He pointed to the question of the private character of the discussions and noted that he thought there should be no release to the press other than something to the effect that "the visit is for scientific purposes." He thought that it was not yet in order to develop anything formal to take to our government. [This was in answer to an early Wiesner proposal that we might prepare a paper for our governments]. Millionshchikov however felt that the meeting had been a good and businesslike one and that the next move would be for each side to take the questions that had been developed, study and do "homework" on them, and have another meeting soon. There was general agreement on this point. Several of the Soviet emphasized that the meeting had been very useful and that in particular, it had been much more helpful than the larger Pugwash conferences that some of them had had. Privately, members of the Soviet group made it clear that the various points of the discussion would be carried back to official Soviet channels.