

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL MOORER'S DIARY

THURSDAY 2 SEPTEMBER 1971

NOTE: Remained overnight at Memphis Country Club.

0840 Departed Memphis Country Club by sedan.  
0900 Departed Memphis International Airport by C-140 Jet Star, ETE 1+40 (lose one hour).  
1138 Arrived at Andrews AFB with immediate departure by UH-1 for Pentagon.  
1153 Arrived at the Pentagon Helopad with immediate departure by limousine for the building.  
1158 Arrived in Office at the Pentagon.  
1430 Met in my office with LTGEN Vogt, LTGEN Knowles, MGEN Seith, RADM James, Col Platt and LCOL Langlands to hear the Advanced Airborne Command Post briefing presented by LCOL Langlands.

The briefing pointed out that the logical Advanced Airborne Command Post would ~~not~~ necessarily be a C-5A or a 747. C-5A production line will close after the initial 80 aircraft, but the 747 line will be open through the 80's. It appears that the 747 would be the best vehicle for this Airborne Command Post. The purpose is to provide sustained communications to the outside world in the event of a nuclear attack.

I asked them if they were having any problems with electro-magnetic radiation and the accompanying shielding and they apparently are having problems.

Col Langlands said that there were two options: (1) selecting an L-10, L-1011 or a DC-10 type aircraft (2) selecting a C-5A or 747 type aircraft.

The JCS in both the JSOP and JFM have recommended selecting option two. The main problem with option one is that scheduled testing is still 5 years away. It is apparent that the need for the airplane is current. It was pointed out that we made a recommendation in August 1970 and it was 7 months until a reply was made on the Airborne National Command Center ~~or~~ WWMCS.

We hashed over the previous brief and it was apparent that DSD wants to control the management of SIOP from here in the Pentagon. We need satellite terminals in all of our delivery vehicles, concerned with either the control of missiles or aircraft. I pointed out that ~~we~~ Command and Control means <sup>not</sup> only the SIOP part, but we must also be prepared for post strike management. I feel that there will be a lot of repositioning of forces following the initial nuclear exchange.

1500 Received a telephone call from Dr. Tucker concerning SALT. I said that I had received his note about SALT and that it was fine except that his recommendation of a change which said "we would have to require the destruction

~~TOP SECRET~~

of land based ICBM's", ~~it~~ might be clearer if we said "we might have to require compensatory reductions of land based ICBM's." (I would not fall on my sword either way.) Dr. Tucker said that he felt it was a policy matter beyond the Back Stopping Committee; and that it would escalate to Dr. Kissinger in short order. He is preparing a note from SECDEF to Dr. Kissinger indicating concurrence. I agreed.

1510

The briefers departed but LTGEN's Vogt and Knowles remained behind to discuss the JTD for the Readiness Command. I indicated that the President had approved the Readiness Command but not the billets for it. Vogt said that we must now go to SECDEF to get the President to authorize a 4-star billet. In short, we had to start from the beginning. General Knowles concluded that we could not convert directly from the present billets without disestablishing STRIKECOM and re-establishing Readiness Command. I indicated this was bureaucracy at its best or worst as the case may be and that it was "a lot of horse shit." I could not understand why it was necessary to go through this drill just because there was a 3 and 4-star billet involved. General Vogt indicated that he would discuss it with the OPDEPS and let me know what they recommended.

1516

I called Dr. Cooke OSD (ADMIN) and told him that I understood he was having a little trouble establishing the Readiness Command to which he said yes, procedural problems. I said we would do the paper over just to formalize it but I wanted him to know that it was just "a lot of horse shit." He went on to say he agreed, but that it was backed up in a hell of a lot of other places and that technically we didn't change the name of the CINC. I said "the hell we didn't". He said we had reduced and disestablished the STRIKECOM and formed a new Readiness Command. I said that was his idea. Cooke tried to point out that the President approved the UCP paragraph 4 which stated that STRIKECOM would be disestablished and furthermore he approved paragraph 5 which said that Readiness Command would be established. I said that we would go ahead and send him a new paper and that he must be blessed by the Hammond Paper Company and electric typewriter companys both.

1517

Met with VADM Gayler, LTGEN Vogt, LTGEN Knowles and LTGEN Bennett regarding Admiral Gayler's latest suggestion on reducing US SIGINT capabilities in SEA by 6,000 spaces. Admiral Gayler started off by saying that we needed a decision whether or not we were going to support the SVN SIGINT intelligence until they can establish the capability. I cooled him right from the start and said that we were still planning some 8,000 TACAIR, 1,000 B-52 and other requirements through FY73 so that will answer Gayler's question on whether we need SIGINT.

I pointed out that we can not delete intelligence collection capabilities and it would be tough to do with the 127 men Gayler proposes to leave in-country, after he redeploys the 6,000. Gayler then mentioned that maybe we could have a pool in CONUS and rotate them with the thought of providing the VNAF SIGINT continuity and continue in supplementing their capability.

He said that the VNAF are approximately 20% capable of providing the needed support. I said we can not leave our troops uncovered. I said we should go to CINCPAC and see what he required in US Army based resources for this purpose. I wondered if we could expect the RDF and fragging capabilities to be effective with US front seat operators from Thai bases. Gayler indicated they must be Air Force people in the RDF front seat and there had been no priority given to trying the Vietnamese in this capacity. I went into the rationale on the problem to reduce to 60,000 troops by the end of FY72 instead of 90,000 as previously planned. It is absolutely essential that we provide SIGINT for these forces. We must insure the following three points: One - security of US ground forces; Two - support for US air activity; Three - support for VNAF forces. Abrams certainly wants SIGINT support.

Following was a little exchange between General Vogt and Admiral Gayler each indicating that the other was not keeping them properly informed. The end result was that Vogt indicated that he would keep Gayler informed and use his NSA REP, Buffum, who is in the Pentagon and Gayler would keep Vogt cut in.

We pointed out that in any event Laird indicated that he was going to have SIGINT support for the troops as long as it was needed. SIGINT was not reduced in any of the plans. Vogt indicated that it would certainly bring Gayler in after we have reviewed our intelligence collection capabilities. This would include the majority of the effective productivity of each type surveillance.

I asked if satellites permitted the reduction of fixed wing reconnaissance. Also proposed the thought that we might be able to reduce elsewhere in the world. Gayler indicated that the crypto logical talent was [redacted] of the total strength overseas.

[redacted] At any rate it was not a large percentage. Gayler felt that he might be able to reduce 10-15% in Europe if we could get two more satellites. He pointed out that the high frequency transmission is not too good in the satellite, but we could do the [redacted]

[redacted] Other functions required the aircraft to get very close to the transmitting source. Some VQ ACRB requirements could be pooled and perhaps replaced by U-2's.

Gayler said that he does not want NSA to grow in SIGINT size, but rather in efficiency. General Bennett thought that the purpose was not to cut overseas, but to do the best job anywhere as it is required. Bennett closed with the thought that we can not let up on the intelligence collection and evaluation and the R&D for improved systems.

1555 The conference ended and General Knowles stayed behind to mention the replacement of MGEN Brown as the JCS Representative to the peace conferences in Paris. He indicated that Brown was ready to quit at any cost and asked for a transfer so it was necessary for us to get a replacement as soon as we could. I asked how long Brown

had been there and he indicated only 8 months which I did not think was excessive.

1602 Met with Admiral Zumwalt in my office and discussed several personal matters.

1635 Met with LTGEN VOGT in my office for a general discussion.

1659 Met with RADM Donaldson as he came to escort me to the WARSHIP ANNEX to SM 701 briefing. I asked him what the briefing was all about and he filled me in on its purpose.

1705 Departed my office for the JRC Conference Room accompanied by RADM Donaldson to attend the WARSHIP ANNEX to SM 701 briefing.

1823 Departed the Pentagon for Quarters SIX.

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