


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1145

Met with RADM Dan Murphy in my office.

WE first discussed the MACV proposal for the support of the 4-Thai SGU's operations in Laos which would require an 8 helo lift for 4 battalions. I explained the operation to Dan so he could brief Secretary Laird on it. I said that we should be conditioned for it if they are unsuccessful in their manuever in breaking through the enemy because this has happended before. Of course, I said, this depends on SECDEF's approval.

Dan Murphy pointed out that in this mornings briefing to SECDEF they had heard the CO's of the submarines debrief on operations which ~~were~~ extremely interesting and concerned their observations of the launch of the missiles from submerged submarines.

We then started discussing the strategic forces, C&C the Packard proposed new unified commander, which in effect cut the Navy out of the SSBN pattern. I said that the SSBN's must be very closely coordinated. I told Dan that we had met yesterday with DEPSECDEF Packard and went over the entire area of non-answers from his shop on questions of Command and Control for SIOP forces. This has been going on for the last year. Dan indicated that Packard was definitely not happy about this strategic warfare organization. We agreed that the major problem was the decision problem, not the execution problem once the decision was reached. As we know well they are preaching decentralization but are centralizing at every opportunity.

Dan felt that perhaps we should pull all our recommendations back and combine them under one heading. Packard considered our approach to be a bandaid solution to the problem. He would rather see it as one large package than picking at it gradually. Packard does not like the apparent SAC/NORAD duplication of effort.

I told Dan that we were going to be briefing DEPSECDEF on the WESEG 159 report, their analysis of the last High Heels exercise. I asked what the whole thing was really going to accomplish -- is it going to effect the JSTPS? Or the JSOP?

Dan indicated that Packard wants to clean up the line of communication from the President to the missile which he thought was what the CJCS was doing now.

It appears to me that DDR&E and SA are trying to raise their job status. Secretary Packard has no facts on which to base this recommendation.

This is not the first time, he also signed the MSC/MTMTS paper with no facts. We agreed that Packard was the type that was rather boyish; if he does not get his own way he would pack up his toys and go home.

I recommended that we have an airborne command post, launched from here and manned with a JCS team, continuously airborne. SECDEF gave the resources to SAC originally so it is easy for them to maintain a continuous airborne team. SAC has an aircraft over each launch site for positive UHF communications. One point to remember is that the SAC aircraft must be airborne.

They can not afford to gamble on a strike on their airfield. It is also noteworthy that there is no such thing as a first strike on the SSBN submarine. They are the most survivable system. I have briefed Secretaries Gates, McElroy, McNamara, and Clifford on the status of control over strategic commanders.

Concerning the SSBN's it is necessary to coordinate the launch platform with other Navy activities -- i.e. ASW and the submarines commanders must work very closely to prevent interference.

Dan Murphy pointed out that Packard had been working on his proposal for the new strategic unified commander for some weeks now.

As Dan was leaving I again mentioned the proposed helo support for the SRG's and pointed out that this was a CIA requested operation and I did not really care a lot whether SECDEF approved it or not.

1224

Received a telephone call from CNO. Admiral Zumwalt apparently received a debrief from Frank Vannoy concerning the discussions following the briefing that we had given Packard on the Command and Control of the SIOP forces. I indicated that it was not over yet. Bud volunteered his help.

I plan on talking to the Chiefs about this problem on Wednesday. I told Bud that he had ~~gotten gone~~ way back in history and was even referring to the Partridge report, an early study on the Command and Control dated in 1961. Dan Murphy said that Packard puts out fires that he creates in a face saving way because he is very petulant and hates to be wrong. I tried to tell Packard the problem was divided into two parts; (1) Getting a decision from the President. (2) What action he wants taken after this decision, and what he needs to get the word from here to the executing authority.

I kept asking him what the problem was and he would not tell me exactly. I told Packard what we needed to control all of our forces like SAC controls his forces. He had struck a sore point with me since SAC has 29 or 30 C-135s to do their airborne control job and CINCLANT has none. The real problem solution depends on who has the resources. He did not say anything to me about going back to the blue ribbon panel report or to the Partridge report, but told his people up there, OSD and the DDR&E types to not make any decisions, to freeze all decisions concerning Command and Control for 60 days. (This is no great problem because they have had some of our requests up there for over a year now.) We filled all the boards in the briefing room with decisions which had not been made by OSD. I really feel that it is some of Packard's underlings trying to revise the organization and enhance their own positions. I told Packard that we needed decisions on the hardware now. He reiterated that he was not making any decisions on hardware until he got the organization first. I again pointed out to him that no matter what kind of an organization you had you still needed the hardware and surveillance satellites; and the communications satellites, to permit UHF communications. I am going to go to the mat with him on these decisions and I would even

go talk to the President if necessary.

I said that since I had been Chairman every decision of an operational nature made by SECDEF has been on the air in two minutes, but the first wiring diagram he proposed left the Chiefs completely out of the pattern. He thinks we are bandaidding the problem and all I can say is they are trying to make a centralized operation if I have ever seen one. I told him the place to centralize was not the office of SECDEF. Zumwalt said cut them out and go from the Chairman to the President.

I said I told Packard we had one person, Jack James, in charge of the objective plans; and that he has been reading the Serendepity Report and the High Heels report of last year and that is why we are not going to have a High Heels this year. If you read these reports they read exactly like the report after a Fleet exercise when CARDIV or CRUDIV Commanders submit a list of nitpicks. This is the same as an IG report.

At any rate I said I was going to talk to Laird because I am sure that he does not know what is going on, at least Murphy says that he does not. One point that I do agree with is that JSTPS should be back here in the Pentagon. The reason SAC got it in the first place was because they convinced SECDEF that they had all the computers and it would not be necessary to buy any more. The Airborne Command 747 version should operate out of Andrews or some where in the vicinity, manned by a team from the Joint Staff instead of from SAC. This would make SAC just like any other unified commander. He has got to quit trying to solve problems by reorganizing.

Bud brought up the subject of MSC/MTMTS and said that Chafee had told him they were not going to change the MSC/MTMTS paper and were going to order all of us to get in line. Zumwalt told Chafee that Gralla was the one scheduled to testify and he could not keep him from giving his personal opinion, and that is "that it stinks". I pointed out that Gralla has nothing to lose. Bud said that may be right, but it is still a move to take Navy out of the game. Bud felt that we should talk to Helen Bentley again on the subject. This is another one that Laird has not been in on. I pointed out that Laird is aware of it and according to Dan Murphy every week we have to have a new crisis and come up with some means of solving it with a change that is not really a change. Zumwalt asked if I felt he should contact the President on the MSC/MTMTS problem. I said he should not because Packard was still looking around for a face-saving solution.

Zumwalt said Smith is worrying him in the SALT talks. Allison's message concerning the new accuracy is going to be a problem. He wants to keep going on both missiles and vote the ULMS instead of the EXPO missile. He is thinking in terms of two operational missiles-- both new that will have accuracy in line with the POSEIDON, but longer range. We could solve it if State did not get into the act. I asked him if SECDEF wouldn't buy the fact that they were not going to improve the accuracy. Zumwalt indicated that was a tough one. I said, "my answer to him would be yes". I said we had also received another one from Allison which

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