

July 13, 1964

Background lunch with McGeorge Bundy
on 7th floor; Mr. ~~R~~ Friendly in chair:

Discussion centered on foreign policy implications of MLF,
plus these additional points--

Cuba: Private indications have been received that Castro will not act rash on overflights. Why wasn't Administration more responsive to his overtures about rapprochement in recent N.Y. Times interview? Impossible for Administration to do so in this election period, and Castro knew that for he mentioned it. Part of his ~~was~~ motive presumably was to offset impending action against him by OAS ministers. But Castro also obviously wanted to try to keep a line out toward us. Life has not been going to well for him. We know he was spanked by the Russians for his Venezuelan subversion venture. He also thinks what he inflatedly looks on as his Brazilian potentialities have collapsed. He would like more flexibility of maneuvering area in the world, less tied to Soviet umbilical cord. Told that U.S. reasons given for refusal to deal with Castro were not too logical, Mac retorted that they were convincing enough for "our constituency--the U.S. electorate," and that's what counts. Said would be insane to start anything with Castro in election period.

LAOS-VIETNAM- Said he could not confirm published report that N.Viets running air shuttle to Tchepone in Southern Laos and funneling troops and supplies from there to both Laos and S.Viet-Nam. Said air reconnaissance ~~is~~ of area is limited, and there is also problem of being unable to get accurate reconnaissance through foliage. Clear that ~~Tchepone~~ Tchepone is a supply point, but ~~is~~ extent unclear. Also, said he had seen nothing directly of Khanh report that North Viet battalions are moving into South.

CYPRUS- Still very ~~is~~ clouded, still concern about Greek-Turk buildup. Acheson still in early stages of his operation at Geneva, is supposed to see Greek there today or tomorrow.

POLITICS- Before going in to ~~lunch~~ ^{lunch}, said he believes Goldwater left his ~~is~~ position open to consider accepting security briefings from Administration if he is nominated. This will be offered again. Mac's own work, while keeping eye on Cyprus, SEAsia, etc., is centered on upcoming political campaign. President sees dirty campaign coming, platform assures that; lots of foreign policy in store, on basic simplicities rather than subtleties. Nuclear issue will get kicked around a lot, along with Berlin Wall, Cuba, S.E.Asia, etc. Mac, with many Republican friends, knows no one ~~is~~ venturing to defend Goldwater. He laughingly encouraged speculative stories about Goldwater's cabinet.

Soviet Peacekeeping Offer: Mixed views inside Administration on this ~~is~~ (actually more sharply mixed than he indicated) but Presidents position is that ~~is~~ it should be treated as opening move, as ~~is~~ Harlan Cleveland says, Soviets appearing over the horizon of negotiations. It is basic position in

Johnson

Bundy-2-July 13, 1964

this as in Kennedy Administration, in contrast to Dulles, that what the Sovs. toss up that contains in it any seeming ~~any~~ opportunity for serious discussions should be treated seriously, rather than being automatically ~~rejected~~ rejected because it includes some curves. This doubly so in this case as it was response, awaited for four months, to U.S. probe at U.N. (Interesting to note that President has taken Cleveland line ~~here~~ here, rather than ~~xxx~~ considerably harder line of most Soviet experts in State and also more tractable line than has publicly come out of either U.S. delegation at U.N. or out of London)

MLF: Discussions too extensive to recall or reproduce in detail, ~~xx~~ but highlights were:

Administration now firm on pressing ahead with MLF. Mac said ~~xxx~~ position has "evolved," when point was raised that Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration raised MLF only as a suggestion, and not as firm policy. Questioned on pros and cons, Mac ~~xxx~~ first said the fundamental issue is wrapping in Germans to head off any independent German nuclears. First he rather minimized military case for MLF, then tried to make that too. When it was pointed out that McNamara in past said no military requirement for MLF and that it was "political gesture," indicated that McNamara position has also intensified for MLF.

Agreed that "deep in their hearts" both German Erhard group and Socialists probably would prefer leaving nuclear situation as it is, in our hands, but need it as safety valve to head off danger of Strauss and his wing eventually taking separate course. No chance of French ever really sharing ~~xxx~~ nukes with Germans; Germans only would be in ~~xx~~ position of dependency on French.

Whole history of our postwar European policy has been based on tying Germans in to responsible role in Atlantic ~~xx~~ Community.

Said MLF is not becoming crux issue in our policy toward Europe, but agreed it was "about on a par with ~~xx~~ European Defense Community" debate of 1950s in its significance.

Minimized real ~~xx~~ Soviet concern about MLF; said that ~~xxx~~ view reinforced by private talks with some. Stuck to that when Marder noted that private Soviet line to other American officials is that Soviets ~~say~~ say ~~xxx~~ they agree with U.S. intention to tie in Germans and prevent nuclear proliferation, but disagree with U.S. assumption that it can work.

Mac sought to reinforce his position by stressing that no danger that U.S. ever would give nuclear capacity to Germans, if we wouldn't give aid to France. He indicated, however, more concern about East-West implications than he actually stated by saying he personally would favor--after German elections next spring--giving assurances ~~that~~ that Oder-Neisse dividing line would be maintained, to calm Polish ~~xx~~ fears of German ~~revanchism~~ revanchism.

Bundy-3-July13, 1964

Agreed under questioning that Sovs now can use Anti-MLF propaganda ~~to~~ to psychological advantage on Eastern Europeans to try to tighten its hold over them, based on their German fears. Conceded that this is a "minus," but one we can live with.

Disagreed that MLF proposal contradicts U.S. policy on advocating East-West freeze on nuclear production and delivery & systems. Said both can be ~~compatible~~ done.

Denied that MLF is nuclear "addition". Said we had to meet problem of Soviet MRBMS targeted on Western Europe, and this is efficient ~~way~~ way to do it, with additional boon of ~~not~~ getting Europeans to pay part of the cost.

Denied that we are doing what sovs. tried to do to us in Cuba, changing nuclear status quo; maintained that we are simply using means of meeting Soviet MRBM threat that exists in Europe.

Brushed aside argument that MLF may impel Sovs to ~~do~~ build seagoing nuclear force off our shores, by saying they have that capacity anytime.

Also brushed off alternative suggestion of ~~multilateralizing~~ multilateralizing ~~existing~~ some of existing Minutemen in U.S. with European participation to alleviate demands for voice in U.S. domination of Allied nuclear policy. Said for one thing, security requirements would prohibit that.

Said German participation in MLF could enhance, rather than inhibit, German position in bargaining over its fate with Soviets. Never fully developed this, but M seemed to be saying they might someday bargain out of MLF if advantageous. (??) When asked if he meant German reunification, smiled and said he was not one who sees that likelihood; said most he ~~can~~ can envision is East German regime and operation that West Germans could tolerate. (Assume that Mac, in part, here was alluding elliptically to fact that ~~none~~ none of Allies has real drive or desire for ~~reunification~~ reunification).

~~Mac said Administration is taking seriously British proposal for adding to MLF control the Pershing MRBM missiles and the planned British TSR-2 strike aircraft. When it was noted that while that is official U.S. position, many officials are highly suspicious of offer as a curve to put off the MLF, said he knew some difference of views exist here on it, but he thought best to treat it as serious offer.~~

He was fuzziest on key question of "evolution" of MLF. Said he does not know what it will evolve into, but was not fearful of outcome because any change would have to come back to Congress. ~~When~~ He sidestepped comment that different officials are saying different things; ~~some~~ some that it will evolve into European nuclear force free of U.S. veto, others saying they don't believe that will ever ~~happen~~ happen.

BUNDY - 4-July 13, 1964

When it was noted that Bob Bowie, one of architects of MLF, said logical conclusion is eventual withdrawal of American veto, M strongly dissented; said on that he completely disagrees with Bowie (yet that is exactly what many officials, including President himself, have implied).

M said we have ~~not~~ now gotten away from unfortunate "advertising council" kind of presentation of MLF that was going on in the spring. (meaning over-selling, arm-twisting, etc.)

At one point he indicated that most important thing/in this operation was to convince Germans that we tried our utmost to get MLF into the water, ^{to him} even if the plan collapses.

He specifically ducked discussing whether we would go ahead ~~with~~ without ~~Britain~~ Britain or Italy or without Britain and Italy. (official posture seems to be aimed at saying the former and ~~suggesting~~ suggesting the latter. ¶ As he was going ~~to~~ down elevator, Mac seemed to confirm that that is the ~~the~~ ploy, by saying he was aware of the danger of pushing present "year-end deadline" too far that it ~~is~~ could mean loss of a potential "major" participant. He earlier had said he saw possibility that British Labor Party could swing around to supporting MLF if they win election).

In summation, to me, Mac was dutifully arguing MLF case, but hedging his own bets on outcome.

Marder



National Security Archive,
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu