

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD~~TOP SECRET~~

Subj: Meeting with DEPSECDEF, Monday, 6 September 1971 (Command and Control)

1. DEPSECDEF reiterated his previous position that he feels we should have a single manager--or commander--of the WWMCCS (World Wide Mobile Command and Control System) who would have the authority to plan and develop the command systems. He made the following points:

- We should designate a unit not a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system;
- Assign a top-level commander responsible for overall command of the WWMCCS;
- Delegate overriding authority over the CINCs in execution of the SIOP;
- Assign operational control of strategic forces to this central commander.

2. DEPSECDEF went on to say we must provide for three separate things:

- Better Centralization;
- Clarity as to who is responsible for what;
- Civilian Control.

He said that this commander must have more than simply authority to fire weapons--he must have authority to plan for equipment.

3. He further stated that we need one man responsible for communications--one man responsible for intelligence--and one man responsible for operations. He feels there are too many "nodes" and too many people involved in the decision process. He said he is looking for an expert to be assigned as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) who would be responsible for the hardware in the WWMCCS.

4. He then handed me a memorandum (a copy of which is attached). After glancing at it I said it contained nothing new; in fact, it is a rehash of the old PARTRIDGE Report on Command and Control issued in 1962 and warmed over by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report. I told him that the problem should be looked on as having two parts: (a) The decision-making process with respect to whether to fire nuclear weapons; when to fire nuclear weapons and how many weapons to fire at what targets. I pointed out that no kind of reorganization within the military will solve this problem which is the responsibility of the President or his successor; (b) The second problem is simply the physical act of getting the order to the executing commands. I told him that the big problem we have is in the Office of the SECDEF--that frequently in the past the Joint Chiefs can never get any action. I said I simply could not, after reviewing the history of the Defense Reorganization Act--and pointing up the safeguards which the Congress intentionally included in the Act--agree to a "Super" CINC. I told him that his proposal would cause a great fight across the board. I share his desire to improve the command and control system and, in fact, we have taken several actions since the issuance of WSEG 159, which is nothing more than a critique of a single operation. I told him I could see no difficulty in transmitting the execute signal simultaneously to the operating forces, provided that it was simultaneously sent to the CINCs; but, again, pointed out to him that the injection of the CINCs into the chain was intentional in order to provide one additional authentication step.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Once again he discussed the Information Centers maintained by the Services and still does not appear to understand that the Services do not have operational control over any forces.
6. He then questioned me as to what was the most survivable command and control system. I replied that no fixed system could be considered as survivable--if we are only to have one system then the Airborne system appears to be best; however, the ship system offers many advantages in terms of greatly increased capacity for communications, berthing spaces, computers, etc., which will permit long-term operations and is a long-term augmentor to the time-limited airborne post.
7. I emphasized the need for suitable communications over UHF satellite links and told him that no matter what kind of organization we might develop, the hardware that we had requested was still a hard requirement.
8. I agreed to study the question further with a combination Defense/JCS group, but told DEPSECDEF once more I simply could not agree with the establishment of what would amount to a "super" CINC. I simply could not see how it would work, particularly in situations where we are involved in a conventional war which escalated into a nuclear war.
9. It is clear that Dave PACKARD does not understand the Unified Command Plan system. He is frustrated over the difficulty in making these very complex decisions; and, somehow, feels that by reorganizing he can banish all the problems since then he would not have to coordinate, but simply talk to one individual. He does not seem to realize that such an individual would be forced to develop a tremendous staff and, furthermore, unless the Office of the SECDEF will approve the recommendations of this individual--whether in or out of the Joint Staff system--no progress can be made--and we would be back to square one.
10. It is clear to me, (while fully recognizing the inadequacy of our command and control system, together with the fact that the end of the world does not take place after the first exchange and, hence, considerable activity will follow requiring the use of an extensive command and control system,) that those who prepared the BRDP Report are still pecking away in their efforts to degrade and bypass the Joint Chiefs of Staff by excluding them from active participation in any part of an operation. I do not believe that Dave PACKARD prepared the memorandum attached to this sheet but, rather, I think it must have come from COOKE in ASD(A) or, perhaps, others who participated in the BRDP Report. It is not coincidental that COOKE also participated in the development of the PARTRIDGE Report.


T. H. MOORE~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

WWMCCS ORGANIZATION

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, previous WSEG reports, and WSEG Report #159, all support the finding that "the survival of Presidential Authority and its interface with WWMCCS cannot be assured in the event of a surprise attack.

This is a fatal weakness which in time completely negates the deterrence of our strategic nuclear forces which generate deterrence from their ability to respond with unacceptable destruction to an initial attack by the Soviets. This is the crucial fact that dictates the need to reorganize WWMCCS.

Although there are many detailed problems with WWMCCS, some of which could be improved by remedies within the existing structure, the major problems derive from the structure and management of the WWMCCS. It is abundantly clear from all recent studies of and experiences with the system that no satisfactory solution to the WWMCCS is possible without a complete reorganization of the system starting at the top and going down as far as is necessary. The steps necessary for an adequate military command and control system are as follow:

1. Responsibility for the overall management of the WWMCCS must be designated to one specific element in DOD. To preserve civilian control, this element must report directly to the Office

*Diary to Sept
Read from OSD at my
meeting with [unclear]*

2

of the Secretary of Defense. This element must have direct authority over all of those activities necessary for the efficient exercise of command. These activities include:

1. Authority over all command and control systems in DOD agencies and services to make sure these be integrated with and support the WWMCCS. This recognizes that all DOD activities exist to support the WWMCCS and the forces it commands, not vice versa as is the case today.
2. All communications necessary to support the Command-Control actions. Authority over communications must be both operational and planning for future requirements. This can be accomplished by making ATSD (T) a member of the military operations team and having DCA an operating element.
3. All intelligence necessary to support the Command-Control actions. Authority over intelligence must recognize the need of the local commanders to have adequate and timely intelligence as well as the national command authority including the President to have adequate intelligence for decision making. This can be accomplished by making the ATSD (I) a member of the military operations team and having DIA and NSA an operating element.

314


4. The command and control of the strategic nuclear forces is most important, particularly because of the recent nuclear parity which has been achieved by the Soviets. This strategic command must be able to assure the effective use of all strategic nuclear forces. It must be able to survive a surprise attack and command U.S. forces to retaliate. In case it is deemed necessary to have more flexibility in a nuclear force, retargeting to meet changing requirements, limited attacks, etc., the strategic command must have complete control of the situation at all times.

The crucially important requirement for a more effective strategic command is that this command be organized on the most streamlined, most efficient, base possible. The entire command must be under a single commander available and responsive to the Secretary of Defense and the President at all times. His control of and communications to all nuclear forces must be as direct and responsive as possible.

5. The control of conventional forces requires less time urgency than does the control of nuclear forces. The existing unified and specified commands, supported by the Service commands, can be made to function effectively when brought under the proper management and control of the WWMCCS. Steps 1-3 provide the basic restructuring necessary to bring the command to a state adequate for conventional forces.


6. The key element in making the improvements necessary in the operation of the WWMCCS is to put one commander in charge and give him the authority and responsibility directly from the Secretary with the support of the JCS, to develop, manage and maintain an adequate WWMCCS.

REORGANIZATION OF WWMCCS



SAC and appropriate Navy commands provide support for Strategic Forces but operational control is taken over by SC when forces deployed

REORGANIZATION OF WWMCCS



SAC and appropriate Navy commands provide support for Strategic Forces but operational control is taken over by SC when forces deployed

*PARTYIDGE
Report
BLUE R.P.*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 13526

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu