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ADMIRAL MOORER'S DIARY

FRIDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 1971

my

0807 Arrived at the Pentagon.

0832 Chairman's Briefing - NMCC

0908 Received a telephone call from Admiral Zumwalt regarding the MSC/MTMTS hearings. He said that he had heard that I was back on to testify at the Lennon Committee and that Packard was going also and wondered if that was correct. I said that they were still fighting it out and that apparently Laird had made some arrangements with Hebert and at the same time Lennon's Committee was making other arrangements and it is obvious they are not talking with each other.

Zumwalt said he had met yesterday with Shillito and Charlie Ill and tried to bridge the differences, but they were not going to back down on procurements. He said Shillito and Company would not accept any rational argument and it's obvious they do not want to be embarrassed by changing their position. Apparently the argument over the hearing is the Army taking over the booking and telling us what spaces they need in both peace time and war time and the Navy can then provide support.

Zumwalt said that Charlie Ill was with him and that Zumwalt is going to take the position that he can not control Gralla and that he is fanatically convinced that this change is bad for the country.

I pointed out that it is strictly a face-saving thing as far as they are concerned. Of course, it irks me that it got into the Baltimore Sun before anyone talked about it originally. Zumwalt said that Kaputo has been leaking things to the Baltimore Sun for years and that Helen Bentley will confirm that because he used to leak things to her when she wrote for the Baltimore Sun.

I told Bud that I was waiting to hear from Rady Johnson as to what I was expected to do in these hearings. I said if I go up with Packard it will be something like the meeting I had with Packard and the President on the Southern Command. Zumwalt agreed with what he says, but all I can do is tell him what the Chiefs position is. Zumwalt felt it might be useful if he, Packard, Shillito and I could get together and show Packard how simply we could solve it. (This proposition is to let MTMTS take over all the books for transportation and lay on MSC the requirement for the spaces.) Zumwalt thinks we should try one more super-human deed before the testimony.

I commented that the FOX had gotten no reaction to speak of from the Russians -- not even a farewell buzz. Zumwalt felt that John Warner would be disappointed.

0915 Met with RADM Donaldson and he briefed me on the weekly intelligence breakfast. He mentioned the fact that DIA discussed the closing of Attache Posts and originally planned to close 10, but now is only going to close 2. Packard

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commented that he did not think that the JCS should have the power to close such stations. Bennett referred to a JCS paper objecting to the closing of 10 Attache Stations. (NOTE: This paper does not exist and the subject has not been addressed by the Chiefs.)

The intelligence board is the only group that has addressed the thought of closing the Attaches; not the JCS. This appears to be an end run by DIA to do as he desires in spite of the JCS.

Donaldson said they also discussed the SIGINT support for the South Vietnamese along the lines of my discussion with VADM Gayler the other day.

1102 Called VADM Weinel on the telephone and asked him if he knew anything about a JCS paper dealing with attache offices and the closing of these offices. I also asked if the JCS had ever taken a position on this. Blackie said that the JCS had not addressed it in the last year. I said I do not remember if Bennett asked if he could open or close an attache office. Blackie agreed, he could not recall either.

1008 Called VADM Weinel on the telephone concerning the British bases in the Persian Gulf. I said that now the British are withdrawing it looks to me if we should take a look at the minimum facilities we require in Bahrein, for example, maybe a warehouse, pier, comm station -- look at what we might want. This is coming up in a NSSM shortly. Blackie said he knows exactly what we want -- he had been working on the problem two years ago when he was in OPNAV. He said when you say you are going to talk to the Brits too early, you might speed up their withdrawal". Blackie said he would get me the plan talking about Bahrein with the warehouses, deep-freezes, etc.. and he assures me that it is 100% on track. I asked him to give me a status report so I will know when to discuss this with Kissinger and Johnson and what time we want to move on this. Blackie said they have already had discussions with the Brits and that he would get a status report. I said that I felt it was going to cost us money. Blackie did not think so -- he thinks their country is so rich that it will be a nominal charge if any and likely money will not be mentioned.

1028 Met with LTGEN Knowles concerning the Command and Control Wiring Diagram which General Vogt had given me this morning. General Knowles had re-worked the diagram and come up with some additional proposals, for example, eliminating the CMO, which I agreed with. We agreed that there should be an Assistant to the Chairman for strategic operations, but not a Deputy.

I said first off we should change the title to Command and Control for the SIOP Execution. Knowles pointed out that the Director for the Joint Staff was on the wrong side of the chart and he was not in the chain of command should be off to the side rather than where he was located. Knowles felt that if we put into the plan moving the operational staff to the Rock it could be run by a director who would work directly with the Assistant to the Chairman

for nuclear force control. We hashed the problem around at length and drew many lines, renamed boxes, etc. and finally came up with some guidelines to follow. I directed that we form a council for Command and Control composed of Deputy SECDEF Packard as the Chairman, myself, ASD(I), DDR&E and ASD(C). The council would review the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and make quick decisions and maybe avoid us having to wait a year to get an answer.

1109

Received a telephone call from Alexis Johnson returning my previous call. I told him that I wanted to thank him for his support on the FOX transit. He wondered how the trip went. I just called his attention to the fact that she saw many merchant ships who dipped-the-flag but there was very little reconnaissance. The aircraft stayed out of visual range and there were no surface trailers. In short there were no incidents whatsoever. Johnson said we have established a precedent now, but we do not want to push too hard. We were both very happy that it went so well.

1110

Met with VADM Weinel regarding the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. I told Blackie that I would have to be testifying before long and that I needed some rationale and a spring board to talk about the TTPI negotiations. I pointed out that I thought we could live with the Okinawa Reversion if we could acquire suitable facilities in the Pacific. I think this fits into the program that Ambassador Williams is proposing and will serve to balance out the loss of Okinawa. I need to know what we are doing. I mentioned that when Speaker of the Japanese House, Nakada Funada, was here he mentioned that they had to pass some 6,000 laws to execute the take-over. Everything from traffic to legal laws to financial problems, etc.. I want to know about the base rights that we will have remaining on Okinawa and what the money exchange is going to be after reversion. Blackie indicated that they have this information already and everything is pretty well on track.

I think State was a little too quick and that we did not get an adequate quid-pro-quo on this reversion. I think that Congress really did not want to give it back. Initially the play was to help keep Sato in the Japanese Government, but it's backfired and he will be on his way out soon. Blackie said that there will be no hearing on this subject for at least a month.

Blackie brought up the Bahrein situation again and said that Bahrein said we could have whatever we want as long as we keep it fairly well in one spot so we do not spread over a lot of different locations throughout the country. CNO is working up the needs with State and OSD coordination. Brits are out by the end of the year and their facilities will still be useable.

I said that I think we need new ships in our Persian Gulf force. The old seaplane tender is getting tired. I think we are going to have to pay more attention to the countries in that area, for example, Bahrein and Uhlman. Uhlman has vast oil resources off shore and we have not done much to develop our relations or to help in developing their oil resources. I said that when our ships call we socialize with the

Brits instead of the Natives, which is not too good. Chinese are also looking at Uhlman and the surrounding area and its time we move in.

Regarding the closing of Attache offices Blackie said we did not direct the closing. I said that I was very unhappy that someone was trying an end run and using the JCS' name in their attempt to do it.

I asked Blackie what use we were making of Bathel Bell in the TTPI. He pointed out that this was a Marine Operation entirely.

I mentioned that there was a slightly jurisdictional dispute between Admiral McCain and Admiral Zumwalt regarding the Navy's position on port security when Russian ships visit US ports. I said that the Navy was the principle interested party, and is the executive agent for it. Blackie agreed, but felt that the JCS should be involved in this and was working on this problem.

I showed Blackie a copy of the Command and Control Diagram which General Vogt had brought me this morning. Blackie already knows all about it. I told him that we were thinking about moving the planning staff back to Washington and he asked would that mean only leaving the SAC installation at Omaha to which I answered affirmative. I told Blackie about the fact that Starbird has been requested by Secretary Packard to run the Command and Control Study, but that he had turned Packard down on it; which I think is good. I think the fly in the ointment is Cook -- he was on both the Partridge Panel and Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Blackie doubted that Cook was that sharp to work it around the way this was being worked -- he thinks Cook is a pretty straight arrow. I said that Packard thinks the SIOP execution should go straight from the NCA to the operating forces and he is in favor of a deputy middle man to cut down the number of clearance points. I mentioned that I thought we might have to make a director of hardware and a director of control. Blackie mentioned the same thing which I have been advocating all along, but the big problem is getting the decision in the first place. Once we have the decision, executing it is fairly simple. Blackie felt very strongly that the Air Force will fight any move of the JSTPS and will claim that they are saving money by double hatting people so this will greatly increase the expense of the move.

It is necessary to work this wiring diagram so its very cosmetic and the lines are direct, however, include something the Chiefs can live with. I am proposing a Command and Control council for the WWMCCS, satellite communications control, the Airborne Command Post and the equipment; leaving the Operations and Plans in another place. It is necessary to separate the technology and the procedure. I intend to throw them a bone upstairs and see if we can not solve this thing without a study. I said undoubtedly Holloway will fight it, but the original decision to give JSTPS and the targeting to SAC was because they had the computer capability originally.

Blackie felt that putting the JSTPS on the Rock was a very good idea and we both agree that the Airborne Command Post would be the most survivable; that we will need a Polaris reload and that we will need a survivable dedicated reserve of sub-

marines that are going somewhere to get reloaded and will be available for a re-strike. I told Blackie that Dr. Teller had discussed this with me and one key point was that it is a waste to use a Polaris submarine for an ASW platform after the first nuclear exchange. No question about it, he should reload.

Blackie said they were in the middle of re-writing the NSTAP document now and were putting in more options, for example, WARSAW Pact Countries, NATO Options, plans including no PRC or USSR targeting. The only need for a dedicated reserve is that it survive so that it can be used as the JCS determine. We need something like 10 Polaris Boats to survive after the initial exchange.

- 1148 Called Ambassador Shen, the Chinese Ambassador, and asked him if he would like to play golf with Secretary Laird and General Lai and myself, 1330 Thursday afternoon, 16 September at the Burning Tree Country Club. I said General Lai was going to be at Quantico that morning, but we would get him back in time for the 1330 T-off time. Ambassador Shen said he would be delighted to be there. He also thanked me for inviting him.
- 1150 Met with LTGEN Knowles again regarding the Command and Control diagram at which time he suggested that we use the copy which I have attached hereto. We felt this incorporated my ideas and would satisfy the OSD people with a direct shot to the operating forces and that I would take this diagram and address it with the Chiefs in this afternoons meeting.
- 1208 Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephone and discussed some of the changes we had made including what recommendations he would have for some officers to run this directorate of equipment at the Rock. I felt that it should probably be an Air Force officer directing that operation. I said I know that some people are pretty high on Jimmy Lassetter, but I did not know if we could spring him or not. Vogt felt that Jimmy was certainly knowledgeable and has an excellent background because he had just come from Offut. Vogt mentioned that we may want to adjust it and have either an Air Force or Navy guy at the Rock as long as the two services handled the jobs because the Army does not have any claim to these jobs. I agreed with this whole heartedly. Vogt said we should make it clear the SIOP guidance would continue to work the same way it is now. I agreed and said they would be following the policy then. We both agreed that we would have to make it crystal clear that they had to follow the procedure or the Chiefs would be in difficulty.
- 1217 Received a courtesy call from MGEN Dettre, the new Deputy Director J5, Regional.
- 1241 Time out for a short swim.
- 1458 Met with Admiral Zumwalt, General Ryan, General Chapman, General Palmer, LTGEN Vogt and LTGEN Knowles in my office in lieu of a formal JCS Meeting in the Tank. We discussed the Command and Control for the SIOP execution. I distributed the latest revision of the chart which General Knowles and I had generated. There were several modifications proposed which are covered in the MFR (attached). We also discussed the testimony on MSC/MTMPS to the Lennon Sub-committee and several other items. The MFR forwarded by the

CM addresses the details of the meeting (copy attached).

- 1617 LTGEN Vogt and LTGEN Knowles remained behind following the JCS meeting and we re-hashed the meeting and discussed the various versions of the Command and Control chart.
- 1629 Called RADM Donaldson on the telephone and we re-hashed the closing of the Attache offices again. I pointed out that I was not happy about the JCS being used for an end run. If this were what was happening.
- 1710 Met with LTGEN Knowles for the final time today concerning the Command and Control chart. This time he had incorporated the changes recommended by the Chiefs and a copy of the final product is attached. What I plan to do is hold this chart and the plan that will accompany it and see what OSD or Secretary Packard does as his next move and have this ready to head them off at the pass.
- 1816 Departed the Pentagon for Quarters SIX.

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