



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

W 13 September 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: JCS Meeting, 1500, Friday, 10 September 1971

Present:	Admiral Moorer	General Chapman
	General Ryan	Lt. General Vogt
	Admiral Zumwalt	Lt. General Knowles
	General Palmer	

1. The Chairman opened the meeting by passing out a copy of a letter he received from Congressman Lennon asking the JCS to testify on September 20. The Chairman pointed out that Congressman Lennon is the Chairman of a Special Subcommittee on Transportation and that he is operating independently. Mr. Laird has talked to Hebert who is trying to turn this off. However, the Chairman pointed out he wanted to alert the Chiefs because they would be under the gun if Lennon has his way. Admiral Zumwalt asked when we would know. The Chairman responded that Hebert is out of town, but we should find out sometime on Monday. He also pointed out that Mr. Laird does not want the Chiefs to appear before any committee of Congress without a member of OSD present. He said he would keep the Chiefs advised. General Ryan said that he had warned General Meyer to be prepared to attend, if required, since General Ryan would be in Honolulu on that date. The Director pointed out that he had information that Shillito may back off on the entire concept, since it is becoming nonproductive.

2. The Chairman said that he would like to discuss the command and control problem which he had mentioned at the last meeting. Mr. Packard talked to General Starbird and showed him the wiring diagram. General Starbird told Mr. Packard that it would not work and talked himself out of being assigned to head up a task force to study the problem. The Chairman then passed out a chart showing one version of

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how the problem might be solved. He said he wanted to discuss this version. He said that it was an idea to give the people in OSD the feeling at least that they would have direct access to the forces. He suggested that they take a minute to study the chart. He went on to say that at the top of the chart is a requirement element in OSD. He said that overall this was his idea to get Mr. Packard to agree. Mr. Packard has the impression he'll get everything done if he has one guy that he can turn to. The Chairman said it was his idea to have him chair a group; we could then take command and control problems to this group and obtain decisions in concert and thereby avoid the tendency to bury requests and proposals in the Staff. The Chairman went on to point out there is no change with regard to JCS proper and how they function. However, for the SIOP execution, he has eliminated the "nodes", as Mr. Packard calls them, and the execution message would go straight from the JCS to the delivery forces and simultaneously to the CINCs who would follow up with appropriate action. The Chairman said it was his idea to get a sharp, three-star guy who would be called the Assistant to the Chairman for Nuclear Force Control. This officer would use the Joint Staff. There would be no separate J-2 or J-6. Then, for support, he would have the JSTPOS located at Fort Ritchie. This would be a slow transition. If we had an attack, the Soviets would use sub-launched missiles initially. The "Rock" is secure against them but not against SS-9s. Consequently, we would buy some time. Under this concept, a two-star guy would be Director for Command and Control Systems. Requirements developed would be dealt with by the Council shown in the right-hand corner. All other matters would be handled normally with no change in the method of handling plans and policies. The Chairman pointed out that we have looked at the equipment that we have in-being today, and we really cannot go directly to the forces. We've got to have another relay in the vicinity of the forces. Overall, we need a lot more communications facilities. A proposal such as this could cut them off at the pass. Another course of action would be to stone-wall and wait until Mr. Packard comes up with something or, as mentioned before, take the initiative and present something like this. Basically, Mr. Packard wants direct access to the forces, and he wants to eliminate the nodes. Admiral Zumwalt said that the virtue of this proposal would give him one guy to deal with -- the Chairman; it answers his requirement. The Chairman then said the JCS will be right there with their strategic direction which is required by law.

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What we really need is a sharp, young officer as Assistant to the Chairman -- someone like Jim Eade. "I thought I'd get a reaction on that one." General Chapman said that the requirement for the CINCs to approve was built into the system. The CNO said: "You need an airborne command post in the vicinity of Washington to make the concept work, and if we had such a system, we would always have a decision-maker aboard in order to get the execution decision out." The Chairman said it would be hard to get the President out of the Washington area in a crisis. However, if we had him at Fort Ritchie, that would be regarded as in the Washington area. The idea would be to have an airborne command post as part of the overall system. He went on to point out that we had already selected airfields in the vicinity of Washington where NEECAP could land and pick up the President.

General Chapman: I understood you to say that the Director of the Command and Control Systems and Facilities would be a requirements man only. I visualize him being more of a message center chief.

Admiral Moorer: That's what he is. He really is manager of systems rather than a developer of equipment requirements only.

Admiral Zumwalt: That's the wisdom of making the group in the upper right-hand corner a Council.

General Vogt: It looks like Packard has Hall lined up for the ASD for Intelligence.

General Ryan: Nothing wrong with going directly as shown on this chart, as long as the execution message also goes to the CINCs simultaneously. With regard to the JSTPOS, initially I thought that the move to the "Rock" would be good. Now I'm not so sure it's a good idea. In order to keep systems analysts' hands off, it's better if they are far away. Moreover, if you move them to the "Rock", you'd have a gap of two years. Also, if you move them, you'd have to triple the size. Many of the people out there have double hats.

Admiral Moorer: You're right about the dual hats -- 167 out of the 332 have jobs at SAC.

General Palmer: This looks all right if you are sure about Mr. Packard's goal. I think they want to take over all

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forces; they would regard this as a first step, and then they'd ask themselves 'why not take over the rest of the forces?' It could work to the disadvantage of the JCS.

Admiral Moorer: What is the alternative?

General Palmer: Put the onus on them but don't help them.

Admiral Zumwalt: This could head off a bad decision.

General Palmer: But there are two big stumbling blocks to what they want to do -- Congress and the White House: the overall concern of the man on the white horse.

Admiral Zumwalt: But it's hard to argue against the logic of saving four or five minutes.

General Ryan: We should have changed the procedures four or five years ago.

General Palmer: We could work out procedures to save the time without changing the organization.

Admiral Zumwalt: This would get Packard aboard.

General Ryan: This is really a way to get the word out quickly.

General Palmer: This is the first step towards a super SAC. This is a phased way to do it.

General Ryan: The only time it would be used is when you execute the SIOP. The minute you do that there'll be some significant structural changes that will automatically take place in Washington. We would use the same equipment we have now. We would save four to five minutes in getting the word to the missiles but would still have to go through TACAMO to get to the submarines.

Admiral Moorer: Also, the message would go through the regular route.

General Palmer: I prefer General Chapman's wiring diagram.

General Ryan: John Meyer also expressed the same concern, Bruce.

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General Palmer: The people upstairs want the Chiefs out of the picture.

General Ryan: Yes, and they can take them out any time they want.

General Palmer: No, there are some key blocks.

Admiral Moorer: My thought would be that we would meet with him and show him this concept and tell him this is as far as we would go.

General Palmer: Suppose he doesn't accept this? The danger is that they might put a civilian in the box where you show the new Assistant to the Chairman.

Admiral Zumwalt: Then we'd tell him 'F you' (laughter).

Admiral Moorer: I don't disagree with you, Bruce, but feel we can stop them upstairs for the time being. I would not agree with anything going further than this.

General Chapman: This would only be used in an emergency.

General Vogt: Part of the problem is they think that all of the actions that go through the Joint Chiefs go through the flimsy-buff-green process.

General Chapman: As a matter of fact, there's merit to showing the Joint Staff out on the side -- then have a single box for the Chairman and the JCS.

Admiral Moorer: Why don't you draw that up, Chappy?

General Palmer: This is just for execution. Why move the JSTPOS out to the "Rock"?

Admiral Moorer: Well, first of all, we've changed the title as you will note, also to keep the "Rock" going, and they will be the planners and estimators for the new equipment. They'd work on the formats and the procedures, and it would be more effective to keep these two groups together.

General Vogt: It's now planned that they would send a 14-man team to the "Rock" in an emergency. We do this now for exercises.

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General Palmer: I see -- they become the supervisors once you decide to execute.

General Ryan: If they survive and can get to the "Rock", it will be very useful.

General Palmer: Did the civilians buy the idea that they'd have nothing to do after the execution message goes out?

Admiral Moorer: ~~Yes~~, Packard ~~has~~ ^{believes AS I DO THAT} and it might evolve to what amounts to a protracted nuclear war.

General Ryan: We could lose two hundred million people and still have more than we had at the time of the Civil War.

General Palmer: We'd have to phase the move of that outfit over a period of time.

Admiral Moorer: It would take a long time. I don't think we'll get the 747s until some time in 1975. O.K. -- let me draw this up again and we'll give the move to the "Rock" more study. Packard's right -- there are a lot of nodes but they are all up in Foster's office. That's where the foot-dragging takes place. If we could get Packard to make prompt decisions, it would help.

General Ryan: With this new Starbird concept, we'd build one B-1, test it for two years, and then if it worked out, we would start the procurement program.

General Palmer: Shown on this chart, the NMCC works for the Assistant to the Chairman. It should also be working for the Director.

Admiral Moorer: No, that's a liaison line.

General Palmer: I think it would be clearer the way General Chapman has drawn it.

General Chapman: Doesn't my chart fix both points?

General Palmer: Yes.

Admiral Moorer: This chart doesn't mean that this is all he does. I've got additional jobs. We deliberately portray this as SIOP execution and could have put in Command and

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Control for Military Operations, but I'm trying to limit this.

General Palmer: Maybe we should take the other CINCs out.

Admiral Moorer: We want to pass the word to them, but they could be taken off the chart. We are trying to make it clear that the right side of the chart applies to all operations.

General Palmer: What you really have is two separate staffs, both using the same execution means.

Admiral Moorer: Matter of fact, we have two choices -- to surface something like this or let them make the first move.

General Palmer: What rank would you have in mind for the Assistant to the Chairman and the Director?

Admiral Moorer: Both three-stars.

General Palmer: That's an additional two.

Admiral Moorer: No, just one. Currently the ^{DEPUTY} Director of the JSTPOS is a vice admiral. Also, I have deliberately made this guy an assistant to me rather than a deputy. That's so that people won't get the idea that he would take over in my absence. Actually, the Acting Chairman would carry out my responsibilities.

General Ryan: I think the first thing to do is to clean up the execution procedures first -- set it up so that we can go directly to the forces and simultaneously to the CINCs and then wait and see what happens.

General Vogt: We've already told them we could go directly to the forces, but they are still holding up approval to some of our requirements in order to look at the organization.

3. The Chairman then showed two new charts -- one showing how it would operate from an airborne command post today and the other showing what it would look like in the future.

General Vogt: Packard definitely wants to go directly to the forces.

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General Ryan: Technically, it's not possible to do that today.

Admiral Moorer: What I think we can do is to change the procedures so that things go directly without changing the overall organization. We can draw up a couple other versions. I think Packard is adamant on having someone to talk to.

General Chapman: There's merit to having a manager.

Admiral Zumwalt: Tom was talking about a guy with substance like Jim Eade -- someone who would always be in town.

Admiral Moorer: He'd also be available to the Acting Chief. You know, the guy who really determines requirements is the guy that draws the line through the line items in the budget.

General Ryan commented on the current budget exercise.

Admiral Moorer: I'm going to ask General Vogt to get the Op Depts together to work on this some more and clean it up.

General Ryan: Are we working on one problem or two? Are Mr. Laird and Mr. Packard together on this?

Admiral Moorer: I think we're working on two different problems.

General Ryan: Yes, Mr. Packard is trying to make it work, and Mr. Laird is trying to take over control.

Admiral Moorer: I agree with Bruce but I don't think that they can get away with it.

General Chapman: I think there is merit in letting them take over.

Admiral Moorer: We'll get the blame if anything goes wrong and we'd better have some way to influence the situation.

General Vogt: If they took it over, they would write the SIOP and the various options.

General Palmer: They could make your assistant a civilian.

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Admiral Moorer: I'd tell them to get another boy.

General Ryan: What's behind this? We've had nuclear weapons in the hands of the military since 1945.

Admiral Moorer: Probably better jobs and more prestige.

General Palmer: It's the old syndrome that the military is stupid.

Admiral Zumwalt: This approach will eliminate the one solid argument that they have: the need to save time.

Admiral Moorer: Well, we'll have the Op Deps consider it. When we presented the briefing to Packard, we showed on the screens in the NMCC that we have eight letters upstairs on this subject and have received no answers.

General Voigt: We've been trying for three years to get the basic directive changed and have still received no answer.

General Palmer: They don't like the reorganization action.

Admiral Moorer: Also, they don't understand the problem.

4. The Chiefs adjourned at about 1620.

PM
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