

~~TOP SECRET~~

## ADMIRAL MOORER'S DIARY

THURSDAY 16 SEPTEMBER 1971

- 0811 Arrived at the Pentagon.
- 0813 Received a telephone call from Secretary Laird expressing his concern that Westmoreland had gone further than he thought on the MAAG/ARMIS Iran situation. (This was the General Twitchell and General Williams relief.) SECDEF said he was going to shut it off. I said he even has MacArthur sending messages now. SECDEF said he would stop it and I agreed.
- 0827 Called General Ryan on the telephone and thanked him for his letter concerning Walt Ratliff's selection to attend the National War College. I asked if he would select me a successor. General Ryan said he would send down some LTCOL/MAJ records.
- 0830 Chairman's Briefing - NMCC
- 0905 Met with LTGEN Vogt, LTGEN Knowles and LTGEN Zais. Apparently Dr. Kissinger is concerned about MR-I and the progress of LAMSON 810. General Zais said the Ashau Valley area seemed quiet. There is very little enemy contact in this operation. I suggested that they ask MACV's J2 for a sitrep.
- I told them I wanted to talk over the Command and Control problem. First I talked to Packard and he had talked to Vogt and asked if I agreed with Vogt. I said of course I agreed, and I felt that SIOP should be executed through the Chairman and that we should eliminate OSD in the chain, but go through ASD(T) as the OSD agent. Packard said he had not seen our information yet and that he wants someone to talk to his ASD(T) concerning the Command and Control. I said that we should touch base with him very early and bring him up to speed.
- Vogt referred to the December 1969 WWMCCS directive and Zais indicated that we were up-dating it now. I feel we should concentrate on this and press Jack James to complete the up-date. Vogt said there were a lot of changes requiring extensive rework.
- Packard was concerned, but we feel the CINCs requirement is over riding. Packard thinks WWMCCS is the primary problem and anything else is secondary. The new WWMCCS organization takes care of this. It is very important that we do not by-pass the CINCs. I said I explained to him the CINCs main purpose is to authenticate and act as a check and balance. I think the preliminary tension build up to any SIOP execution would have already alerted the CINCs.
- We agreed that SAC had a much easier time getting the authenticator word to the aircraft than the Navy in getting the word to the submarines. It is necessary that we review the authentication and drill and drill to ensure that the time is at a minimum and the reliability at a maximum. Vogt said this would be a good subject at the CINCs conference which I was interested in having; I agreed. When Oberbeck briefed me I told him

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that his report on the WWMCCS 159 report muddled the water and did not separate the hardware problems from the procedure. I said I wanted the system adjusted so that we would be able to separate hardware and policy. I want Jack Jones to recap where we stand and prepare a plan indicating the short range and the long range plan. Vogt thinks we need to go into the tank and work a full JCS approach on this now that we have made progress to this point. He thinks he has got the OPDEPS cooperating now on the latest revision to the Command and Control Diagram. There is no question that Packard wants one guy to be the controlling agent for the execution. They do not expect any opposition to it from the OPDEPS except from Stillwell who still seems to be fighting it a little. With the OPDEPS satisfied we should certainly be able to sell it upstairs now without any big problems. What we will have to do is spoon feed Packard on our progress as we go. Vogt said that Packard told him yesterday he did not want a civilian, for example DDR&E, in on the Command and Control problem. The only agent he wants in OSD is the ASD Intelligence and ASD Tele-communications. Neither one of these are on the operating side -- they will drift in and out and should provide no problem in coordination. At least Packard finally agreed that it was not necessary to provide a Deputy for Operations. I think now he sees the light that the turn-over in civilians is too high and we would lose the continuity that is so necessary to success. I think maybe we have him convinced that he and Laird are the managers and they can not delegate it.

0922

Received a telephone call from Secretary Laird and he asked if I could sound out General Abrams a bit on the replacement in the CORDS job. Laird feels that we should really come up with a civilian for that job and he is wondering what Abe thinks about Ambassador Cross who is in Singapore at the moment with a second option of Jacobson. General Cushman would be good in the number two spot under Jacobson. I asked if he meant Bob Cushman and SECDEF said yes -- the one down in IV Corps area. He does not think we should have only a civilian in the CORDS job, but Jacobson is now the Deputy CORDS and with Cushman backing him up it might work out alright to have a civilian as the front guy. I asked if Cross was his first choice. SECDEF replied that Cross is the first choice of the State people. Laird said that Cross had been up in I Corps in 68 and 69 and then he was back in the State Department and now Ambassador to Singapore. I said McCain knows him quite well. The third choice might be Johnny Van, but Laird thinks it would be a mistake to put him in charge of CORDS. I said they get some pretty strong pressure in that job. SECDEF thinks that he needs good support for Abe in the II Corps area and CORDS is the strongest man there. Laird wants me to sound out Abe. He does not want to do anything that might concern Abe because he knows that Abe has strong feelings about Cross. He will either be for or against and he does not know which. I said I would get a reading when he returned from Bangkok. SECDEF said that we just can not put Freddie Weyand in that job right now.

0925

Continued my discussions with LTGENs Vogt, Knowles and Zais. I told them about the proposed shift of Weyand to take over the CORDS job and mentioned the options that SECDEF had indicated. General Zais felt that Cross was very poor -- he was negative and a little pip-squeak. He obviously does not like him a bit. Vogt said he was particularly poor in Singapore.

I asked what they thought of Jacobson or Van. Zais indicated that Jacobson was a good man, confident, aggressive, smart, but he could have been there too long. I liked Jacobson fine and Van appears to be a name-dropper trying to impress people.

Knowles, of course, thought Weyand would be the best, but it may not be good for him because he may move up and relieve Abe. Vogt mentioned it would be very important to have a good man in CORDS because if we pull out he will be our only entre to many of the areas.

We all felt that a military guy would be the best in the CORDS job, but could probably live with a civilian if we got the right man. I concurred that Cross probably could not handle it and besides he was anti-military. I think what we need out there is a system like the Navy, if the Ambassador loses a country like a Captain loses his ship you court martial him.

Then I mentioned the problems with Thieu and the political aspects. We should have just said we were going in and made the country safe from aggression rather than point out that we were going to mold it in our own king.

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said we should work out the program and ask for the funds in the package. I said I will tell the Air Force they are going to buy a Command and Control aircraft we must add funds and request that the Air Force include it in their overall program. I directed that they work out a how-goes-it chart so we can keep track of Command and Control and keep Packard up to speed. Vogt will run it directly through the Chiefs and up to Packard. The basic document is 5200.3 and will clear through the OPDEPS and then the Chiefs. I think the way it is set up now will be OK. Vogt told Packard that we can not aggravate the Services now or we will lose. Packard agreed we could link it to the Chiefs via the Chairman and that if the Chairman is absent the Acting Chairman will be in control rather than a Deputy CJCS which the Services will not stand still for. Apparently Cooke promised yesterday he was going to get an answer down to General Zais. Vogt pointed out again that he does not think Cooke is as much involved in this Command and Control thing as he was before. Particularly since we caught his hand in the cookie jar.

0952

Received a telephone call from Admiral Zumwalt and he wanted to get the small carrier question directly from me. I said Dr. Kissinger told me that he was going to hold to the 80B budget level if he could just keep Schultz from kicking over the traces. Kissinger said that the President wants to do something about the Navy and during their conversation he brought up a small carrier option. The small ships for small nations idea. He knew that I did not agree with him (how did he ever get that idea). He wants to talk to you sometime about it.

I told Bud to give him the facts associated with the small versus large carriers, sea keeping qualittites, expense of operation, etc.. Regardless of the size of the carriers they require maintenance, radar, NTDS, spare parts and many similar items. We have looked at going back to something like the Essex and I think that is the right move for the S-3s or CVS. I am sure there has been work done on this concept and while we keep the big carrier as first choice we should examine what could be done with the smaller ones. Maybe we could make one with a little bit of everything -- little bit of air defense; some helicopters; amphibious assault for a small task force. HAK commented that maybe we should just build submarines and not carriers to which I responded that the nuclear submarine program is certainly vital but we have not had one submarine to speak of in Vietnam in 5 years. There is no way that you can handle the crisis in the small countries around the world with submarines. Zumwalt said the thing that worried him was that maybe the only carrier we would be able to get would be a small Essex class carrier, but this would put us in the hands of Proxmire and people who wanted to kill the F-14. I told Bud to concentrate on the big ones, and he wondered if we wanted to look at a conventional one. I said it could be either one of course, although it would be a mistake to go conventional. Actually cost wise for the life of the ship it is cheaper to go for the big one. Bud said he was going to limit it to two alternatives -- conventional carriers which can carry the F-14s, S-3s or anything else; and nuclear carriers showing the difference in life and cycle cost and comparing

it with the life cycle cost of say Wheelus or any AFB in Southeast Asia. I said we are on the way out of there as fast as we can. Bud said that he does not like the Essex class route. In my opinion you could say, for example, the big one can and the little one can not. You can mention the flexibility, run some studies on taking off airplanes, substituting Marines, but I think you should just make a strong case for the big ship and show the comparison between the small carrier, large carrier and the shore bases. Bud wondered if Henry was going to send over a paper where the Navy has to take a position against land based air. I could not answer that one. I felt that it would be best if I give it to Kissinger personally and told Bud to put an additional page or annex to the basic report and not send it in the regular mail. I would personally carry it over and talk to Kissinger on it. Bud asked if we should talk to the President on this. I will ask Kissinger if I can talk to him about it.

- 1002 Met with LTGEN Knowles and we discussed the CORDS Weyand problem again. If we were allowed to pick alternates I think the best choice would be Jacobson and number two would be Cushman. SECDEF will probably give full weight to my recommendations. Knowles felt that we should get a determination up on who we recommend in the event the decision was made to stick to a civilian. We would much prefer a military man and that may not happen.
- 1006 Called Mrs. Ni on the telephone - personal.
- 1020 Met with Captain Valentine concerning the Lennon subcommittee testimony on Monday. SECDEF and I may testify. Andy pointed out that maybe we would be able to have me testify first and then followed later by the Service Chiefs. Andy said they would probably cross examine everybody which would set a bad precedence. He strongly recommended against this. The Secretaries are really the ones who should appear to represent the Service views or maybe have the Chiefs and Assistant Secretaries from the subect area under consideration. We agreed that there is no doubt the Armed Services Committee should have special privilege and priority in our minds, but apparently Lennon told Andy he can subpoena the Chairman and all the Chiefs at the same time. Andy told him so can all the other committees if they want to. Herbert and Lennon apparently have agreed and of course they are aware they could subpoena but they do not want to do this. Packard has been pressing the requirement to get a decision on this since he is the one who generated it in the first place. Laird does not want to delay it now either he wants to get it over so that OSD can save face on it. Andy thinks we are heading on a collision course and airing it and Congress is not the best idea for an inter-service problem. Lennon told Andy that he was going to get a vote of the entire committee on whether they wanted us all together or not. I said we have never done it that way -- we have never gone over there together. Andy said we hope to have it fixed so that we would have a little separation between the Chairman and the Chiefs.
- I said to tell Rady Johnson we do not want to get involved in it and I still think it would have been nice if the Joint Staff or myself had been

consulted before that paper was forwarded. But if I go up I will tell them that I did not know, and that no other Chief was asked about it. Andy said that Shillito's letter made it a very hard position. He said he was going to do it anyway regardless of what the committee says. Andy promised to get the statements to me by Sunday and the back up book to take to Airlie House with me. I asked that he find out what the Navy is asking -- do they need money, people or what is the problem? I told Andy to tell RaGy that I am not going to fall on my sword. I do not want to enter the inter-service fight between the Army and Navy on MSC/MTMTS.

Lennon is apparently upset by Shillito's letter and says he is wasting his time. Andy says he denied any connection with this letter which is good. He told Norris that he does not want to pit the service elements against each other. I said the Joint Chiefs and myself have to take a united position and they can not agree on this. All they need over there is Zumwalt and Westmoreland -- they are the ones with the problem.

1042

Received a telephone call from Dr. Nutter. He wanted to know what was going on on this Iran situation with Twitchell and Williams. He said he had been getting one story from Westmoreland and a different one from Johnson. Johnson said that Westmoreland had been working on it for three or four weeks and was in direct contact with MacArthur. MacArthur told Johnson about it. Apparently this has all been going on for two or three weeks and no one knew anything about it, neither ISA, me, Secretary or you. SECDEF is interested in exactly how they have been corresponding, what channel they were using? I said mail -- I guess. Nutter said maybe back-channel, MAG channel, mail or something, but anyway DOD or Joint Staff should have been in on it. I said Westmoreland was wrong again just like he was on the Greek problem. Westmoreland claims to be straightening out a personnel problem so Twitchell would not resign and get out of the country before Williams went in. Williams threatened to resign if he was going to work while Twitchell was still there. Apparently working for the Shah posed no problem to Westmoreland and he was handling it as a single service personnel problem. Nutter did not agree with Westy. I said it was a national problem and not solely an Army problem. Nutter thinks Westmoreland was used by the State Department to get something done because when accosted with it Johnson pleaded the "I do not know" route.

Johnson knows better than that. I wondered who initiated the thought that Twitchell should work for the Shah. State says it was the Shah himself. Nutter said it will set a terrible precedent and all the Shahs, Sheiks and Kings around will be hiring the MAG Chiefs as they leave or retire. That is even worse than a contract office here in the building hiring the man whose been getting his contracts. Nutter said Johnson considered this, but the Shah was the one trying to get the MAG Chief himself and that is even worse. In any event he said SECDEF is adamant and it should not be done. No question it is bad and although not against the law it likely will be soon.

I said I thought it was terrible. Nutter said

State's position essentially is this -- MacArthur says it must be done to maintain relations with Iran and he will take it to the President. We hear the same thing from MacArthur with everything he is involved in. He has always been a prima donna. There is no doubt that if Congress gets ahold of it they will go straight through the roof. I asked if Mel was sending a message and Nutter said yes - definitely and will tell them it is unconstitutional conflict of interest etc.. (They are advising State.) The only danger is that if MacArthur finds out we are opposed to it he will lock in concrete with the Shah and then we will have trouble. Rogers is probably cut in too. Johnson said he was going to take it to the President or Rogers or somewhere. Nutter is not going to change his position. I indicated that I would talk to Westmoreland because there was no excuse for this.

Westmoreland is apparently very upset about it and told Nutter privately that he had received a cable from Laird which was a "very hard slap on the wrist" and he still thinks that he did nothing wrong. My response was that he should have referred it to me through the Secretary the first time it came up.

Nutter mentioned the problem he had in Greece previously and Westmoreland said "Oh yea, I made a mistake there". He seems to be trying to get Army officers established in posts that are not technically theirs.

Secretary Laird has directed that we brief all the other services so that we will not have a recurrence. I said I thought a written briefing would be adequate and ISA could distribute it. Westmoreland has been around the building long enough to know what he was doing and as Nutter says they may end up having their own way on it, but it would be very bad if they do. I said it presents us with a fait accompli. Westmoreland caught hell from me on the Greece thing and he gave me the French salute and said he did not do anything wrong. I do not blame Mel at all because there is a question of integrity involved here. Christ, I said, when Goodpaster retires he might end up the Prime Minister of Germany or something like that.

1104

Met with VADM Weinel and Captain Crowe regarding the TTPI negotiating team. I said that I wanted to touch base with Bill Crowe and see exactly what he was doing in his new job as Deputy to Ambassador Hummel. Crowe said that things were alright, but a little confused. Williams was in town last week and seems to be very friendly. He did request that Bill be the Defense representative on the negotiating group. There is going to be a 10-man negotiating team.

I said that our track record shows that the US is the worst negotiator in the history of man. We have been highly unsuccessful in Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and I can just predict that when the President visits China we will have to give up something -- stop the Taiwan Patrol and lower our visibility to please the CHICOMS.

The only place left to set up in the Western Pacific is the TTPI. I have talked to the President

twice and he feels very strongly about this. We should never give our negotiators a fall-back position because they fall back before the first shot is fired. The SALT talks are a good example. The main purpose of this negotiation is to protect the security of the United States not to negotiate as an exercise. We negotiated and managed to give away the Panama Canal and I hope we will not do the same thing to the TTPI.

Bill Crowe feels that Williams is a much harder negotiator and is much stronger on his position than State over all. Williams thinks more like Defense than State. He is definitely aware that the number one interest is the US Defense. It is unlikely that he will fall back to the status quo.

I told Bill that Secretary Laird came on very strong and was adamant that he<sup>(PH)</sup> would be the deputy or defense would not provide anyone.

I asked Bill if he needed a yeoman and he does. (NOTE: Navy has been contacted and they are providing a yeoman to Bill Crowe starting Monday on a TAD basis for about 6 months.)

The main problem is the land area, the eminent domain and unilateral termination claims can not be allowed to affect access to bases. Admiral Weinel mentioned there would be no problem with the eminent domain. The land requirements are absolutely solid and we will not fall off one acre. Bill said he would make sure Williams was aware of the firmness of the land requirements. He said they were meeting at Maui.

I suggested that they set up a private communications channel with us via CINCPAC or a courier. We agreed to set up a SPECAT system through Joe Vasey.

Bill said we have some allies in Congress. Williams called on several senators and on Congressman Aspinall and they can help on the eminent domain problem. Bill guessed that in the end TTPI would come in as an unincorporated territory. There is no anti-military feeling on Palau. Bill said the Mariannas would probably come with us. Williams was trying to get means or better machinery to carry the case to the people. He thinks he will get much better support in Palau this way, but the political situation is still very bad.

Bill thinks that our number one land proposal is going to surprise them because we are not asking for any land on Truck, Penelope and very little on Palau. Weinel said only 40 acres of land and all of that is fill that we are going to create ourselves. We also are looking for 35,000 acres on Bathalshop as a manuever area for the Marines. This will be strictly used for manuevers on an occasional basis. We planned on building a combined military/civilian development or we may improve the present field on Bathalshop.

Bill said that State was excellent at preparing for a conference and that interior can never do what State does in this field. I asked Bill if he needed any other assistance and he said he could use another officer and mentioned LCDR Knott or CDR Jim Elster, both of who would be

excellent and who are experienced in the TTPI. I re-emphasized to Bill that the President and I were behind him all the way and to call immediately if anything started going wrong. In this light Bill thought it would be helpful if Laird re-emphasized to Williams at lunch exactly what the Government's position was. Irwin is too soft on every issue so a little extra guidance may help.

I said again that this negotiation determines the US defense posture in the Western Pacific for the next 50 years. I pointed out that in Cam Ranh Bay we were giving away everything; that we had turned back Okinawa; we were decreasing emphasis in Taiwan; and we need a place that is US territory.

1204

Departed the Pentagon for Burning Tree for Lunch and a golf game with Secretary Laird, Ambassador Shen, General Lai and myself.

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