

REF ID: A66018

RELEASED IN PART 25X6,1.4(D)



Department of State

000891
TELEGRAM

SECRET N00918


PAGE 01 STATE 285644 TOSEC 230171 Copy 1 of 15 copies

67
ORIGIN N005-00

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 1/2/2014 - Class: SECRET -
Reason: 1.4(D), 25X6 - Declassify on: 12/03/2025

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:JKALICKI/EA/K:JFORBES
APPROVED BY THE ACTING SECRETARY
EA: PHILLIPS CIA:DJRATED
S/P:FLORD S/S-OP:JOHNSON
C:JKELLY ACDA:AFLOYD
PM:GVEST ERDA:GHELFRICH
DES:MBENGELSDORF
EUP:AMANTAN
IN:RKRK ODD OSD/ISA:GHARLOW
NSC:DELLIOTTI / JTAYLOR (PHONE)



028593

O P 04151Z DEC 75 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
COMMISSION IAEA VIENNA
USOEL SECRETARY

S E C R E T STATE 285644 TOSEC 230171

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Lahiguera, Senior Reviewer

E.C. 11652:KGD3-3

TAGS: MNVC, PARM, KS, FR, CA

SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REFS: (A) STATE226011 AND 240692
(B) SEOUL 7642, 8278, AND 8458

1. WE HAVE CAREFULLY WEIGHED ROK REACTIONS AND EMBASSY
RECOMMENDATIONS DURING SECOND ROUND OF US EFFORTS TO PREVENT
SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 285047 TOSEC 280171

KOREA. ACQUISITION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT. DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO STRENGTHEN OUR OPPOSITION AND MAINTAIN OUR PRESSURE IN ORDER TO FORCE KOREANS TO FACE UP FULLY TO RISKS OF THEIR PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION.

2. YOU SHOULD ACCORDINGLY APPROACH PRIME MINISTER AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND STRONGLY REQUEST THAT ROKG REVERSE POSITION PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED BY ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, AS BEFORE, YOU MAY ALSO PURSUE APPROACH AT OTHER LEVELS OF ROKG LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO CANCELLATION OF FRENCH DEAL IN LIGHT OF FUNDAMENTAL MUTUAL INTERESTS AT STAKE.

3. IN ABSENCE OF FAVORABLE REPLY WITHIN ONE WEEK, YOU ARE TO CONVEY U.S. OPPOSITION TO PLANT DIRECTLY REPEAT DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT PARK. YOU ARE TO MAKE APPROACHES TO PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT IN NAME OF SECRETARY.

4. FYI. DEPARTMENT WILL MAKE COMPLEMENTARY, HIGH-LEVEL APPROACHES TO CANADA, FRANCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ROK IN WASHINGTON. WE WILL BRIEF THE CANADIANS ON OUR POSITION AND REQUEST THAT THE GUC UNDERTAKE PARALLEL APPROACH TO DISUODE ROKG FROM CONTINUING WITH THE PLANT. WE WILL INFORM THE FRENCH OF OUR RENEWED EFFORTS, EXPLICITLY ADVISE THEM WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE ROKG HAS EMBARKED ON A COVERT PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY, AND NOTE THE IMPORTANCE TO OUR EFFORTS OF THEIR CONTINUING TO REFRAIN FROM EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTRACT, PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. WE WILL AWAIT YOUR REPORT OF YOUR APPROACH TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND SUGGESTIONS OF WHAT MIGHT BE USEFULLY UNDERLINED IN WASHINGTON, BEFORE CONSIDERING CALLING IN AMBASSADOR HANN. END FYI.

5. IN REQUESTING PLANT CANCELLATION, YOU SHOULD SPECIFICALLY WARN THE ROKG THAT IF IT GOES AHEAD WE WILL WITHDRAW EX-IM BANK REQUEST TO CONGRESS FOR \$249 MILLION IN NUCLEAR CREDITS FOR KORI-2. YOU SHOULD ALSO INDICATE U.S. INTENTION NOT TO AUTHORIZE ROK REPROCESSING OF US-DERIVED NUCLEAR FUEL, AND INFORM ROKG THAT GOING AHEAD WITH REPROCESSING PLANT COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT FUTURE U.S. GOVERNMENTAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH ROK. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT A PERCEPTION THAT KOREA WERE IN A POSITION

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

~~PAGE 13 STATE 288647 TOSGC 03-131~~

TO PRODUCE, SEPARATE AND STOCKPILE PLUTONIUM INDEPENDENTLY COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS AND HAVE UNSETTLING REPERCUSSIONS IN THE REGION. FYI: IS NOTED IN REF (A), DIFFICULTY WITH ROK OFFER THAT US INSPECT REPROCESSING PLANT IS THAT PLUTONIUM CAPABILITY WOULD REMAIN. ENO FYI.

3. IN PRESENTING U.S. POSITION, YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS, AS WELL AS THOSE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED (PARTICULARLY (REF (A) EXPOSITION OF REASONS FOR U.S. CONCERN AND NATURE OF POSITIVE U.S. OFFER FOR FUTURE NUCLEAR COOPERATION):

-- MY GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SEVERAL REPRESENTATIONS EXPRESSING THE DEEP U.S. CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS OF A KOREAN DECISION TO ACQUIRE A NATIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITY. WE HAVE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO OUR PRIOR APPROACHES. SPEAKING AS LONG-TIME FRIENDS, WE WISH TO RESTATE OUR VIEWS BECAUSE WE ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE TO RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM, AND WE WISH TO BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION.

-- PERCEPTION THAT KOREA HAS IN A POSITION TO PRODUCE, SEPARATE AND STOCKPILE PLUTONIUM INDEPENDENTLY COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

AND HAVE UNSETTLING REPERCUSSIONS IN THE REGION. WHILE WE WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCES THAT KOREA WILL LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS, WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT ACQUISITION OF A NATIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITY, EVEN ONE RESTRICTED TO EXPERIMENTAL USES AND APPROPRIATELY SAFEGUARDED, WILL REINFORCE DOUBTS ABOUT ROK NUCLEAR INTENTIONS, GIVEN ITS INHERENT ABILITY TO PRODUCE MATERIAL DIRECTLY USABLE IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- BECAUSE OF THIS CONCLUSION, SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS INSTRUCTED THAT I REITERATE OUR STRONG REQUEST THAT YOU NOT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

25X6
1.4(D)



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 34 STATE 285648 TOS2C 230171

PROCEED WITH YOUR REPROCESSING AND RELATED PLUTONIUM PROJECTS UNDER YOUR FRENCH CONTRACT. AS I NOTED PREVIOUSLY, THE USG FULLY RECOGNIZES KOREA'S DESIRE TO REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ENERGY SOURCES AND THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF KOREA'S CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO THIS EFFECT. MY GOVERNMENT HAS FIRMLY SUPPORTED THIS PROGRAM AND WE WISH TO CONTINUE, AS WELL AS TO EXPAND, OUR ASSISTANCE. WE ALSO WISH TO BROADEN OUR COOPERATION WITH THE ROK IN OTHER SCIENTIFIC AREAS.

-- I HAVE DESCRIBED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT SOME OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENHANCE KOREA'S ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ROLE IN A LESS SENSITIVE AND, WE BELIEVE, MORE ECONOMIC AND EFFICIENT MANNER. THESE INCLUDE LOW-ENRICHED FUEL FABRICATION, INCREASED ACCESS TO NON-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, AND COMPENSATE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR KOREAN SCIENTISTS. WE WISH TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ENRICHMENT SERVICES AND TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH YOU IN EXPLORING HOW YOUR FUTURE REPROCESSING NEEDS CAN BEST BE MET. THIS WOULD INCLUDE AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF A MULTINATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANT TO BE LOCATED AT A SUITABLE SITE IN THE FAR EAST.

-- I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM YOU, HOWEVER, THAT IF YOU DECIDE TO PROCEED WITH YOUR PROPOSED REPROCESSING PLANT, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW ITS REQUEST TO CONGRESS FOR \$245 MILLION IN NUCLEAR REACTOR CREDITS FOR KORI-2.

-- WE ALSO ARE UNABLE TO AUTHORIZE ROK REPROCESSING OF U.S. DERIVED NUCLEAR FUEL IN A KOREAN NATIONAL FACILITY. MORE BROADLY, GOING AHEAD WITH THE REPROCESSING PLANT COULD ALSO SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR FUTURE GOVERNMENTAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

-- WE STRONGLY WISH TO AVOID THIS UNFORTUNATE RESULT. WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT YOU WILL SHARE OUR JUDGMENT THAT CANCELLATION OF THIS FACILITY WILL BE IN THE BEST INTEREST NOT ONLY OF OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BUT OF STABILITY IN THIS REGION AS A WHOLE. ROBINSON

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



National Security Archive,
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu