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PTQ7603

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 03524 080946Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	SAS-00	/020W					

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R 080915Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9405
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003524

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/10
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINT, ID, JA
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] SOEHARTO "OUT BY YEAR END"

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REF: TOKYO 1838

CLASSIFIED BY: NEIL E. SILVER, POLMINCOUNS, EMBASSY TOKYO.
REASON: 1.5(D).

1. (C) ON MAY 8, WE DISCUSSED THE INDONESIA SITUATION WITH

[REDACTED] SAID

HE WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE SCALE, FREQUENCY, AND COMPOSITION
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PAGE 02 TOKYO 03524 080946Z
OF THE ANTI-SOEHARTO DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 17 NOV 2006 200503180

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POTENTIAL CHANGE WOULD BE WHEN LARGE GROUPS OF NON-STUDENTS (HOUSEWIVES AND UNEMPLOYED MEN, PARTICULARLY) JOINED THE DEMONSTRATIONS; THIS WOULD LIKELY OCCUR, THOUGHT [REDACTED] WHEN THAT HAPPENED, THE DEMONSTRATIONS COULD QUICKLY REACH A CRITICAL MASS THAT WOULD PROMPT SOEHARTO TO ORDER THE ARMY TO CLAMP DOWN. THIS WOULD FORCE THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP, ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF A SPLIT ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION, TO DECIDE HOW COMMITTED IT WAS TO SOEHARTO.

B1

2. (C) THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF A BASIC SPLIT ON HOW TO HANDLE THE CURRENT DEMONSTRATIONS, SAID [REDACTED] COMMANDER IN CHIEF WIRANTO, ALREADY INSTRUCTED BY SOEHARTO TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE DEMONSTRATORS, WAS WALKING A TIGHTROPE. WIRANTO HAD SENT WARNINGS TO THE STUDENTS NOT TO TAKE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE STREET, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS TELLING THEM THE ARMED FORCES WERE NOT HOSTILE.

B1

[REDACTED] SAID HE HAD RECEIVED TODAY AN E-MAIL FROM JAKARTA REPORTING THAT WIRANTO'S DEPUTY, ARMED FORCES CHIEF FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS SUSILO BANBANG, HAD COMMENTED (NOT PUBLICLY) THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO CONVENE THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY TO DECIDE THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE (PRESUMABLY, BY REPLACING SOEHARTO). IF TRUE, PERHAPS THIS SIGNALLED THE INTENTIONS OF THE "WIRANTO WING" OF THE ARMED FORCES, THOUGHT [REDACTED]

3. (C) ON THE OTHER HAND, ARMY STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMANDER (AND SOEHARTO SON IN LAW) PRABOWO WAS DOING HIS BEST TO PREVENT DEMONSTRATIONS FROM GETTING OUT OF CONTROL IN JAKARTA, WHERE ANY "FINAL SHOWDOWN" WOULD TAKE PLACE. PRABOWO WAS ALSO ENGAGED IN A POWER STRUGGLE WITH WIRANTO, WHICH WOULD REACH A
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PAGE 03 TOKYO 03524 080946Z
"MOMENT OF TRUTH" WHEN SOEHARTO ORDERED AN ARMY CRACKDOWN IN THE FACE OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS. THE QUESTION WAS NOT IF THIS MOMENT WOULD COME, BUT WHEN, THOUGHT [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE GROUP HAD CONCLUDED RECENTLY THAT SOEHARTO'S REGIME WOULD NOT SURVIVE THE SERIES OF DEMONSTRATIONS THAT

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WOULD CONTINUE TO BUILD AND EXPAND IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS. THIS DID NOT MEAN SOEHARTO WOULD BE OVERTHROWN OR FORCED TO STEP DOWN IN THE NEXT MONTH OR TWO. BUT HE WOULD MOST LIKELY NO LONGER BE INDONESIA'S LEADER BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, THE GROUP CONCLUDED.

5. (C) AS IN REFTTEL REPORT, WE PROVIDE [REDACTED] COMMENTS AS THE VIEWS OF A LONGSTANDING ACADEMIC OBSERVER OF INDONESIAN AFFAIRS. LAFLEUR

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