

#396-10

Date: 20021203

TO: ALEC

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS OF [ ] DECEMBER 2002 INTERROGATION SESSIONS WITH 'ABD AL-RAHIM HUSAYN MUHAMMAD 'ABDU NASHIR

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TO: PRIORITY ALEC INFO [ ] DIRECTOR.

FOR: [ ] (b)(1)  
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[ ] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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TEXT:

COMBINE: COMPLETE

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1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI. BASE WILL SUBMIT PARAS SEVEN AND EIGHT BELOW IN DRAFT INTEL FORMAT; DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR THE DISSEMINATION OF OTHER DETAILS BELOW.

2. SUMMARY: ON [ ] DECEMBER 2002, DAY 17 OF BASE AGGRESSIVE PHASE INTERROGATIONS OF SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE 'ABD AL-RAHIM HUSAYN MUHAMMAD 'ABDU ((NASHIR)), AKA MULLAH ((BILAL)) (SUBJECT), BASE

CONDUCTED ONE INTERROGATION SESSION WITH SUBJECT. DURING THE INTERROGATION, WHICH LASTED APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS, SUBJECT CONTINUED TO PROVIDE VAGUE AND OFTEN CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS, DESPITE INTERROGATORS' REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT ONLY IF SUBJECT PROVIDES ACCURATE, COMPLETE INFORMATION NOW CAN HE HOPE TO MAKE HIS LIFE MORE BEARABLE AT THE "MUCH WORSE" PLACE THEY HAVE ASSURED HIM HE IS GOING. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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4. SECURITY TEAM BACKED THE HOODED AND SHACKLED SUBJECT AGAINST THE WALLING PANEL WITH THE TOWEL/NECK RESTRAINT OVER HIS NARROW SHOULDERS. HVTI [REDACTED] AND LINGUIST [REDACTED] STRODE, CATLIKE, INTO THE WELL-LIT CONFINES OF THE CELL AT 0902 HRS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] DEFTLY REMOVED THE SUBJECT'S BLACK HOOD WITH A SWIPE, PAUSED, AND IN A DEEP, MEASURED VOICE SAID THAT SUBJECT - HAVING "CALMED DOWN" AFTER HIS (STAGED) RUN-IN WITH HIS HULKING, HEAVILY MUSCLED GUARDS THE PREVIOUS DAY - SHOULD REVEAL WHAT SUBJECT HAD DONE TO VEX HIS GUARDS TO THE POINT OF RAGE. SUBJECT, BLINKING IN THE FLUORESCENT LIGHT, DID A FEW CHARACTERISTICALLY FLICKS OF HIS TONGUE, REACQUIRED HIS NERVOUS TICK, AND IN A FRAIL, SQUEAKY VOICE, REPLIED: "NOTHING." [REDACTED] SLOWLY SHOOK HIS HEAD, SIGHED PATIENTLY, AND FIXED SUBJECT WITH A PIERCING GAZE. [REDACTED] TENSED, PEN AND PAD AT THE READY AND EAGER FOR THE BILINGUAL BLITZKRIEG TO BEGIN. IN A MEASURED VOICE, [REDACTED] TOLD SUBJECT THAT NOW, SUBJECT WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT ANYTHING ON SUBJECT'S MIND, BEFORE [REDACTED] WOULD ASK HIS OWN QUESTIONS, IN HIS OWN WAY.

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[REDACTED]

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SEEKING TO IMPRESS UPON SUBJECT

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THE SEVERITY OF HIS PREDICAMENT AND ELICIT MORE INFORMATION,

EXPLAINED TO SUBJECT WHY SUBJECT WAS ONLY MAKING THINGS HARDER ON HIMSELF. "YOU HAVEN'T GIVEN US ANYTHING THAT'S HELPFUL,"

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BEGAN. "SINCE THE MINUTE YOU STOPPED TALKING ABOUT PORT RASHID YOU HAVE GIVEN US NOTHING. YOU TOLD US A LITTLE ABOUT

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BUT WE HAD TO SQUEEZE IT OUT OF YOU," SAID, WRINGING HIS HANDS IN FRONT OF SUBJECT'S FACE. "YOU ARE EITHER PURPOSEFULLY TRYING TO

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CONFOUND US - WHICH WON'T WORK - OR YOU ARE JUST BEING IMPRUDENT. THIS PLACE YOU'RE GOING, IF YOU ACT THERE THE WAY YOU'VE BEEN HERE,

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THEY WILL TRASH YOU," EXPLAINED. "I WON'T BE THERE TO HELP YOU, BUT THESE MEN" -

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POINTED TO THE SECURITY TEAM - "WILL. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT "THIS IS NOT A JOKE, AND I'M NOT TRYING TO

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TRICK YOU. IF YOU PROVIDE INFORMATION I WILL HELP YOU, BUT IF YOU DO NOT YOU ARE HEADED FOR THE INNER RING OF HELL, AS MY FRIEND TOLD YOU

BEFORE." SUBJECT BEGAN TO PROTEST THAT HE HAD TOLD EVERYTHING HE KNEW IN DETAIL AND WAS "NOT RUNNING AWAY FROM THE SUBJECTS," BUT

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INTERRUPTED HIM, SAYING "THAT'S THE WAY IT IS. ACTING CONTRIVED OR UPSET WON'T WORK A BIT OUT THERE. THE ONLY THING THAT WILL WORK IS

MORE INFORMATION." INSTRUCTED SUBJECT TO TALK ABOUT THE MEN INVOLVED IN THE PLANS AT THE PORT OF JEDDAH.

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WHICH SUBJECT HAD CONSIDERED

"RIDICULOUS"; INTERRUPTED HIM AND SAID HE DID NOT WANT SUBJECT TO TALK ABOUT RIDICULOUS IDEAS, BUT TO TALK ABOUT REAL ONES.

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SUBJECT SAID THAT "OTHERS" HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT SURVEYING THE PORT OF JEDDAH FOR TARGETS THERE,

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TOLD SUBJECT TO GET BACK TO PORT OF JEDDAH,

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"LISTEN TO ME," SAID

FOR EMPHASIS, GRABBING THE TOWEL NECK RESTRAINT. "YOU PLAN OPERATIONS AGAINST MY COUNTRY, AND YOU JUST SAID THIS IDEA WAS USEFUL."

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SHOUTING NOW, CONTINUED, "I WANT TO KNOW YOUR REASONS FOR THIS." SUBJECT BEGAN BABBLING AGAIN, SAYING THAT HE HAD SEEN SOMEONE ONCE IN , BUT THE RELATION WAS NOT DONE (SIC).

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9. RELEASED THE TOWEL NECK RESTRAINT AND STEPPED BACK. "LET ME EXPLAIN YOUR DILEMMA," SAID. "WE WANT YOU TO GIVE INFORMATION, BUT YOU DRIBBLE IT OUT. BECAUSE OF THIS WE DON'T BELIEVE ANYTHING YOU SAY ANYMORE, OR ELSE WE OVER-INTERPRET WHAT YOU FINALLY DO SAY. THIS IS YOUR OWN FAULT, AND IT WILL HURT YOU. THE STORY YOU JUST TOLD ME IS, FOR THESE REASONS, HARD TO BELIEVE. YOUR STORY IS REASONABLE - BUT BECAUSE YOU ARE SO DAMNED DIFFICULT, WE CANNOT BELIEVE IT. WE ARE ASKING NICELY NOW, BUT WE HAVE TOLD YOU THAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO GO TO ANOTHER PLACE. YOU DON'T PROVIDE INFORMATION, AND IT IS GOING TO GET YOU HURT. I HAVE TOLD YOU I WILL NEVER LIE TO YOU, AND I AM NOT LYING TO YOU NOW."

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10. ONCE FINISHED TRANSLATING THIS WARNING, TOLD SUBJECT TO TALK ABOUT EVERYTHING HE KNEW ABOUT RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH.

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11. [REDACTED] WALKED AWAY AT THIS POINT AND CONVENED WITH [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PERSONNEL ABOUT SUBJECT'S STATEMENTS FOR A FEW MINUTES. WHEN HE  
RETURNED TO SUBJECT'S CELL, HE POINTED OUT THAT SUBJECT HAD NEVER  
BEFORE MENTIONED ANOTHER MEETING [REDACTED] TO WHICH SUBJECT  
REPLIED, "NO, BUT I WANTED TO." [REDACTED]

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12. SUBJECT ASKED HIMSELF ALOUD WHAT ELSE COULD BE SAID ABOUT  
RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH. SUBJECT OFFERED UP THAT HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED  
BIN AL-SHIBH TO BE REASONABLE, AND CALM. [REDACTED] REPLIED WITH ANGER  
IN HIS VOICE THAT THIS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] " [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT SUBJECT HAD TALKED ABOUT PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN HORMUZ, PORT RASHID, [REDACTED] A SURVEY AT THE PORT OF JEDDAH, AND AN OPERATION IN [REDACTED] AND ASKED TO WHICH OF THESE OPERATIONS WAS RAMZI BIN AL-SHIB REFERRING. "I DO NOT DISCUSS ANY OPERATIONS WITH BIN AL-SHIBH," SUBJECT SAID. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT SAID THAT ONCE HE HAD STARTED PLANS FOR THE HORMUZ OPERATION, HE HAD ONLY THOUGHT OF HORMUZ. TOLD TO SPEAK UP, SUBJECT SAID THAT AL-QA'IDA HAD "NO SPECIFIC PLAN" IN EARLY 2002, AND THAT HE HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY OCCUPIED WITH SUBSEQUENT PLANNING FOR AN OPERATION AT PORT RASHID, AND THAT HE HAD SPENT "A WEEK OR TWO IN SAUDI ARABIA" BUT HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL NOT TO TELL ANYONE ABOUT IT.

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[REDACTED] TOLD SUBJECT THAT HIS COMMENTS WERE CONFLICTING, AND MADE NO SENSE. HOW, SUBJECT WAS ASKED, DID HE EXPLAIN TRIPS TO SAUDI ARABIA, FREE TIME, AND VISITS WITH INSIGNIFICANT PEOPLE TO SEE HOW THEY WERE DOING IF, BY SUBJECT'S OWN ADMISSION, HE HAD BEEN CONSUMED WITH PLANNING FOR THE HORMUZ AND PORT RASHID OPERATIONS? "IT SOUNDS TO ME LIKE YOU ARE SAYING YOU WERE BREAKING CONTACT WITH PEOPLE WHO COULD HELP YOU," [REDACTED] SAID. SUBJECT SAID THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY MET WITH MANY MEN, WITHOUT

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SPECIFIC REASONS TO DO SO.

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15. "YOU ARE A HARD MAN TO BELIEVE," [REDACTED] SAID. "YOU CONTRADICT YOURSELF OVER AND OVER. HERE'S A CHANCE FOR YOU TO ACTUALLY BE HELPFUL." SUBJECT WAS ASKED WHAT HE KNEW ABOUT PLANS BY AL-QA'IDA OR GROUPS AFFILIATED WITH AL-QA'IDA THAT INVOLVED PEOPLE OR TARGETS IN [REDACTED]

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17. [REDACTED] TOLD SUBJECT THAT IF SUBJECT DID NOT BEGIN TO EXPLAIN THESE MATTERS IN A WAY THAT WAS TRUTHFUL AND MADE SENSE, [REDACTED] WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HELP HIM. "IT'S ALMOST AS IF YOU WANT TO GET INTO MORE TROUBLE," [REDACTED] SAID. "I'M GOING TO ASK YOU A FEW MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT JEDDAH, AND I EXPECT YOU TO DO BETTER. IF YOU DON'T, I'VE ALREADY TOLD YOU WHAT WILL HAPPEN." SUBJECT BEGAN TO PROTEST THAT HE HAD TOLD EVERYTHING HE KNEW, BUT [REDACTED] TOLD HIM THAT ON THE CONTRARY, "EVERY TIME YOU OPEN YOUR MOUTH YOU MAKE YOURSELF SOUND LIKE SOME STUPID LITTLE HELPER, THE SHAYKH'S LITTLE ERRAND BOY." [REDACTED] SAID NOBODY BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE, AND SAID SUBJECT WAS QUICKLY RUNNING OUT OF CHANCES TO HELP HIMSELF.

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19. INTERROGATION SESSION ENDED WITH [REDACTED] HARSHLY DELIVERING THE BRIDGE THAT SUBJECT HAD FAILED TO DISCUSS THE PEOPLE OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLANS FOR ATTACKS IN WHICH INTERROGATORS ALREADY KNEW HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED, DESPITE BEING FED INFORMATION FROM [REDACTED] TO PROVE THAT WE KNEW THIS WAS THE CASE. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT WHILE OTHER AL-QA'IDA DETAINEES HAD EITHER UNASHAMEDLY ADMITTED THEIR PLANS AND INTENTIONS, OR HAD TOLD INTERROGATORS THAT THEY WOULD NOT TELL WHAT THEY WERE, SUBJECT HAD CHOSEN TO LIE AND TO TRY AND BLAME ALL OF HIS OWN ACTIVITIES ON HIS SUPPOSED FRIENDS. SUBJECT WAS ASSURED THAT INTERROGATORS WOULD DO THEIR DUTY AND THAT SUBJECT WOULD PROVIDE THE INFORMATION THEY KNEW HE HAD, BUT BECAUSE OF HIS OWN CHOICES THIS WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR "THE HARD WAY." INTERROGATION CONCLUDED AT 1105

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END OF MESSAGE

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