

diary 24 Sep



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 September 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: JCS Meeting, 1400, Friday, 24 September

Present: Admiral Moorer, Chairman
Admiral Zumwalt
General Palmer
General Meyer
General Davis
Lt. General Vogt

1. The Chairman welcomed Ambassador Popper and stated that the Chiefs were delighted to have him there to give them a rundown on the current situation in Cyprus. Ambassador Popper expressed his pleasure in meeting with the Chiefs and said that Cyprus was certainly a sensitive place. He said that he would cover the problem areas as he sees them. He also pointed out that he was involved in the drug problem for the President and would be happy to comment on that area after they had discussed Cyprus if time permitted. With regard to Cyprus he said it has a unique position in the Mediterranean. It is the third largest island, which has some 650,000 people -- 4/5 Greek and 1/5 Turkish. It is only 40 miles away from Turkey and 500 miles from Greece. The root of the problem is that there is very strong Greek feeling on the island, and the Turks cannot accept domination by the Greeks. It was a British colony until 1960. Pointing to a map, he said that the Greeks inhabit the entire island, and that there is a pepper and salt scattering of Turks. He pointed out that in 1964 and 1967 the US played God to avert a full-scale civil war between the Greeks and the Turks. The people in the island have never forgiven us for intervening. This raises the question, "Can and should it be stopped again?" The Turkish Cypriots want partnership treatment, not 18% minority treatment. The Greeks do not want a state within a state. There is just no chance for simple agreement on this issue. The military in Turkey are justifiably concerned that Cyprus not fall into hostile hands. They are watching the situation very closely, and they might under certain conditions be tempted to take over part of the island. The present government there is very emotional.

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Complicating the problem is the fact that Makarios and the Greeks differ as to possible solutions. It is important to us as one element of strategic stability, and it is important as a base. It is also important to us as a communications center in many ways. It is in our interest to keep them talking and not let another crisis develop. We have got to find new procedures to keep them talking for 2 or 3 years. The Chairman then asked what about the British position. The Ambassador responded by saying that it is the same as ours with one exception. With the withdrawal of the British troops from the area the UK bases become more important. If the problem were settled the bases could then become the primary target. Consequently, the British are slightly less eager for a solution than we are, but, on the whole, their position and interests are the same as ours. The Chairman then asked about the impact of General Grivas. The Ambassador said we can't be sure since he turned up in Cyprus, but he was concerned since Grivas is a fool-hardy individual who almost single-handedly precipitated the 1967 crisis. The situation is different today. People have been living in peace for some time. That raises the question as to why he is there. One theory is that it might be a complicated ploy. The Greek government may be trying to put pressure on Makarios to get some kind of an agreement with him. The Chairman commented that Makarios doesn't seem to be too worried since he is coming to the UN. The Ambassador said, "No, he didn't think he was leaving -- the Foreign Minister would probably come to the UN." The Chairman observed that someone in Washington suggested that we invite Makarios over here. Would that be helpful? The Ambassador observed that it might be helpful but would be hard to control without antagonizing the Turks. Makarios' last meeting with the President did a lot of good, but, if you will recall, he also made a trip to visit the Soviet Union. He pointed out that as a result Soviet-NATO naval operations were mentioned in indirect terms. The Ambassador pointed out that there is a well established Communist party there. Thirty per cent of the Greek people are Communists or Communist sympathizers. It is a large, well-disciplined group and probably building up for a distant day. The Chairman then asked who is the leading Turk. The Ambassador said a Dr. Kuchuk. Admiral Zumwalt asked about the status of the UN peace-keeping force. The Ambassador said in 1964 they totalled about 7,000. They are now down to about 3,100. They have been very effective. They very effectively cope with 2 - 5 incidents a day. Their efforts have been to provide a catalyst to give the party in the wrong a chance to back off. They have been an essential element in perpetuating the peace, and they need to keep them there.

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Like the UN they are in trouble financially. General Palmer asked if there was any risk that we might wind up with a Malta-like situation. The Ambassador said, "Yes, there is a risk, but it would be different than the situation in Malta." In Malta we had the NATO aspects. The British have been very careful not to relate any of their bases with NATO -- CENTO yes, but NATO no. It is important to our side that there be no NATO overt presence in Cyprus. If they discover any visible presence of our forces in Cyprus the Soviets would probably take some action and we might find ourselves in an Egyptian-like situation. The Ambassador went on to point out that there is really no simple solution to the problem. All interests at the moment are checkmated. The least controversial action at the present time is to maintain the status quo. Each side runs their own parties pretty well. There is much to be said in favor of letting the situation drift along and trying to talk both sides down to realistic demands. The only promise for the future is to keep them talking. We have no way to put pressure on either side to get them to accept a half a loaf. Americans are better off over there than the Greeks or Turks. There are 320 Americans there, and the only problems have been the comments in the Communist press. The Chairman thanked him and the Ambassador departed at approximately 1450.

2. The Chairman was called out of the meeting to see Mr. Laird and returned at 1505.

3. The Chairman said he had talked to Secretary Laird with regard to General Weyand taking over the CORDS responsibility.

4. The Chairman said he would like to obtain the Chiefs' views on a paper on command and control. He reminded them of the old Packard paper on the subject and pointed out that he has been discussing this for a month to try to get it turned around. There have been quite a few changes, actually a reversal of the previous position. He said he was going to see Mr. Packard again at 1630. As the paper was distributed he pointed out that there had been limited staffing of the new Packard paper in OSD, and that he had no idea of the comments which came back to Mr. Packard. The Chairman pointed out that he and General Vogt had taken Mr. Packard's paper and gone through the past history of the problem and tried to correct the paper so that there would be no deviation from the law. Their effort was to make minimum changes so that Mr. Packard would not refuse the fixes.

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He said he wanted to go over the paper paragraph by paragraph. He pointed out that the first significant point was the new definition of the NCA. The NCA is not defined in law. It was coined by the Secretary of Defense in 1962. He pointed out that what had been done was take Packard's definition and work the Joint Chiefs back into the paragraph. After some discussion the Chairman suggested that the Chiefs go through the entire paper and see all of the changes; also, he was not sure that Mr. Packard would buy any of the fixes. General Vogt read a quote from Ike with regard to taking the Chiefs out of the chain of command. General Palmer observed that he was dated. With regard to paragraph 5, the Chairman said that he thought Mr. Packard was off the kick, that the Services do not need a center. He said he has finally convinced Mr. Packard that the individual Services do not issue orders to forces assigned to unified and specified commands. The Chairman pointed out that the ASD(I) was not aboard yet, and that they had taken out the thought of the ASD(I) developing requirements and changed his duties to one of reviewing requirements. The same change was made on page 8. They have also taken out the thought of the council monitoring the WWMCCS. The Chairman said that under his concept the civilian secretaries would work to fulfill the requirements established by the military; He observed that they always want to fight the strategy rather than provide the hardware. General Meyer commented on his experience while he was J-3 handling the ROLLING THUNDER project and mentioned the fact that the orders had been prepared and issued, and then the Chairman would get the information to the Chiefs at the first opportunity. The Chairman pointed out that he always tried to do that and cited the last strike in North Vietnam as an example. General Palmer observed that it was a mistake to go along with the new NCA definition. Admiral Moorer pointed out that the way it was written is really the way it works now. General Palmer said he agreed but technically the Chiefs have been in the act since 1962. General Davis asked if page 7 could be changed to show that actions were based on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. General Meyer observed that the principal concern was the execution of the SIOP. The Chairman said, "Yes, but Mr. Packard was concerned by too many nodes and too many people to deal with." Admiral Zumwalt read a quote from the statute with regard to the Joint Staff as a corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing a single command post, and then observed that the thrust of the revised paper seems to erode that position. He suggested putting a fix in on page 2 along the lines "... will provide a single and central command post for the transmission

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of strategic directions, approved by the Secretary of Defense, to the unified and specified commanders." The Chairman commented that Mr. Packard doesn't distinguish between planning and execution. The Chairman then read Senator Russell's comments that authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff an increase from 210 to 400 to handle operations. General Palmer commented that the revised paper was taking the Chiefs as a corporate body out of operations, while the intent of the Reorganization Act was to put them in. General Vogt called attention to the new words that had been inserted on page 1. General Palmer said that he didn't think they should agree to take the Joint Chiefs of Staff out of the NCA definition. The intent of the law was to keep the Chiefs in. In any event, they would have to consult Congress and, hopefully, the President before they made that change. He went on to say that the changes weaken the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Meyer said, "Can we find some words that would be acceptable to us? We have got to remember that the political climate is different. Mendel Rivers and Russell are no longer there." Admiral Zumwalt said, "What about the President?" The Chairman said he didn't know if he would get into it. Basically the problem was to either (1) try to work out some solution, or (2) to stone-wall them. General Palmer said he would stone-wall. Admiral Zumwalt asked what the Chairman's judgment was. The Chairman said that Mr. Packard has changed considerably. We have made a quantum jump toward the Chiefs' views. General Palmer said it is a mistake to take the Chiefs out of the NCA. Admiral Moorer said that he may agree to include the Chiefs, but you can't support that position based on the statutes. Admiral Zumwalt said that if we can include the Chiefs along with the changes made on page 2 it would be much better. He went on to say that, frankly, he didn't know how much leverage the Chiefs had and that the Chairman has the best feel for the problem. General Meyer said why not stone-wall for a starter and go up with these changes. General Davis said that if they take the Chiefs out of the NCA they are not violating the law. The Chairman said that is right. There is just no law that demands that the Chiefs be in the NCA, and then he read an extract from the Blue Ribbon Panel Report. General Palmer observed that it would be very dangerous to take the Joint Chiefs out of the NCA, but thought that was what they wanted to do -- take the Chiefs out. Admiral Moorer said that he did tell Mr. Packard that this was a fundamental issue, and the only leverage was to see the President or take it up with Congress. General Palmer observed that they haven't whipped us

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yet as long as the Chiefs stay together. There is no urgency on developing requirements. Mr. Packard should be told that the Chiefs don't understand why he wants to take the Chiefs out of the channel. The Chairman said that after his meeting with Mr. Packard perhaps a meeting with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs would be in order. General Palmer said you could argue that limiting the NCA to the Secretary of Defense and the President limits survivability. The NCA should be more than just two civilians. It should be broader than two when considering SIOP. Admiral Zumwalt said, "Would it help or hurt if the Chiefs stone-wall?" The Chairman said, "It doesn't make any difference to me. I will just tell him what you all had to say." General Meyer observed that if they had some different guys upstairs that he would start to worry. Admiral Moorer said that in the final analysis they can do it the way they want to. General Palmer said, "No sir, they can't; they will have to contend with Congress. They will be interested in why the change." Mr. Packard should be asked if he has read the minority report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Report, and asked where the system had failed. The Chairman reviewed the briefing that had been given to Mr. Packard on the WWMCCS, and Mr. Packard's comments that he was not going to tackle anything until he had the command system straightened out. He put a freeze on all actions, but we were finally able to break loose on the airborne command post. General Meyer commented that he wondered if there had been any talk with the leadership on the Hill. He had heard some talk that there had been discussions with Hebert. Admiral Zumwalt observed that Laird and Packard were a powerful combination in dealing with the Hill. General Meyer observed that if it ever gets to Congress the Chiefs will have a very difficult time making their case because so much depends on highly classified documents. General Vogt said that when he had talked to Mr. Packard on this subject he had focused on the NCA and had commented that both he and Mr. Laird thought the change in definition would result in a major confrontation with the Chiefs. General Vogt said the best words he could come up with after thorough study were on page 1. After all, the Secretary of Defense put the Joint Chiefs into the NCA in 1962, and "He that giveth can taketh away." General Davis commented that it would not be illegal to take the Chiefs out. Admiral Zumwalt said that they want the Chiefs out. General Palmer read another quote from the statutes, and said that the change would violate the intent of the law. Admiral Zumwalt said lawyers are very flexible. General Palmer said he wasn't sure of General Westmoreland's position, but he thought it would be worth a fight. The Chiefs ought to make them shove it

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down their throats." General Vogt said this is the first proposal. There have been some very significant changes and that Admiral Moorer was responsible for considerable progress. General Palmer said he sees this as an over-all game plan with the change in the NCA definition as a first step; the second step would be to establish a CMO, and the third step would be to put a civilian in charge, and that over-all it was not worth the risk. Admiral Zumwalt said with regard to paragraph 6b it would be a good idea to insert the thought "as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff." General Palmer thought that type of change would be good. Admiral Zumwalt asked if a footnote couldn't be added on page 1 along the lines of "acting for and keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed." General Palmer observed that there was something illegal about separating the Chairman from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Vogt observed that the Chairman didn't have a vote in the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations in 1952 and that was corrected in 1958. Admiral Moorer observed that they had the authority to make the change. He also said that they had looked and looked at the statutes and couldn't find anything that would forbid him from making the change. General Meyer observed that we would have to be careful to be sure that the Chairman doesn't wind up with two separate hats. He went on to ask what arguments would help to persuade Mr. Packard -- efficiency? He said Mr. Packard had the idea we would be fighting the next war using the flimsy, buff system. The Chairman observed there may be two different objectives. Mr. Packard wants to make WWMCCS work. Mr. Laird wants to move along the Blue Ribbon Panel line. General Vogt said that Mr. Packard had written this new directive himself. Admiral Zumwalt observed that was what worried him. If pressed too hard he may go back to his original position. The Chairman commented that he didn't think Mr. Packard would play General Palmer's game plan. General Palmer said he agreed with regard to Mr. Packard, but there are some other guys up there. The Chairman said that he would have to go up to the meeting and that there are two sides to the problem. We don't know the changes that the other side may be proposing. General Meyer said he didn't have too much trouble with the way it had been fixed, but he would go along with whatever the Chiefs wanted. Admiral Moorer suggested that they might insert the thought in the NCA definition along the lines, "... as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out their statutory responsibilities." General Palmer said, "That is a good idea."

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Admiral Zumwalt said, "Yes, and along with it add to the footnote on page 1 after the word 'absence' ...either of whom while so serving acts for the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." General Meyer commented that was not bad, but it looks like we are trying to sneak in in the fine print. However, he was not against trying. The basic problem of what we want to do is exactly opposite of what he wants to do. Admiral Moorer said, "OK, we can't do any more." Admiral Zumwalt said we have given more advice today than consent. General Meyer said this is better than some of the other papers. Including the Chiefs in the NCA would provide more continuity. General Palmer said, "My principal concern is the erosion problem." Admiral Moorer commented that as far as the council was concerned it was his idea to have the group. What he planned to do was take the requirements up to the council and obtain timely decisions.

5. The Chiefs went into executive session at 1620 to consider nominations.

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