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September 21, 1966

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO Strategy and Force Structure (U)

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I have reviewed NATO's forces, defense plans, and strategic concepts, and the implications of recent French actions. As a result of the ongoing NATO Force Planning Exercise we now have enough information to take certain initiatives with our Allies, and to define a framework for a major review of U.S. forces oriented toward NATO. There are serious imbalances in our Allies' present and planned forces, and we should make vigorous efforts to have these remedied. I also believe that some modifications are warranted for U.S. forces in Europe or planned to be deployed there. While this memorandum does not discuss the political tactics necessary to implement certain of the recommendations, these recommendations have been developed in light of the political factors within NATO which affect the feasibility of our achieving certain objectives. My conclusions regarding NATO strategy and forces, and my recommendations for modifications to them, are as follows.

With Respect to the Adequacy of NATO's Nuclear Forces. I believe that the external and theater nuclear forces available to NATO are now quantitatively adequate, and Working Group III of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers agrees with this conclusion. As discussed in my Memorandum on Theater Nuclear Forces, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A number of qualitative improvements in our [REDACTED] appear warranted, however; some of these are already being implemented, while further study of others is being conducted.

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With Respect to the Overall Adequacy of NATO's Nonnuclear Forces. NATO's forces are today, in my view, adequate in terms of manpower for the most likely nonnuclear threats, but a number of qualitative deficiencies in Allied forces require immediate attention. NATO force requirements have traditionally been based on large and sudden attacks, and I

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Attach 27  
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believe that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the size and capabilities of Pact forces relative to NATO units. Our Allies' attempts to meet the resulting large requirements with inadequate resources have produced serious imbalances in their forces. These imbalances have in turn lessened their forces' capabilities to defend against less extreme and more likely contingencies. We should accordingly reorient U.S. force planning and design for nonnuclear war, and if possible our Allies' force plans, away from emphasis mainly on massive attacks mounted with minimum warning and toward less extreme and far more likely nonnuclear contingencies, as I shall discuss later in more detail.<sup>1/</sup>

With Respect to Allied Force Plans. Our Allies' planned defense expenditures for the next five years are generally inadequate, and we should make every effort to persuade them to increase their contributions to the common defense burden. Even more important, we should press them to correct those deficiencies in their forces which prevent their very substantial defense expenditures from producing a fully effective contribution to the common defense. Our Allies' present and planned forces appear particularly inefficient in the following respects:

1. Some countries are planning excessive naval and air forces by comparison to their urgent needs for larger and better land forces.
2. Most countries are planning to emphasize the quantity of M-Day land force units at too great a cost both in M-Day combat capability, and in NATO's potentially large mobilization capabilities.
3. Most countries are not making provisions to ensure that the inherently large nonnuclear potential of NATO's tactical air forces can be realized.

These inefficient allocations have arisen for many reasons; I believe the most important of these has been the persistent gap between military estimates of the forces required and political decisions on resources to be made available, and we are taking steps within NATO to close this gap.

With Respect to U.S. Forces for Europe. The U.S. should revise its Europe-oriented forces to become more balanced with respect to the realistic limits of NATO's overall nonnuclear capability and those nonnuclear contingencies which are most probable. I recommend two immediate actions:

1. We should make logistics guidance for U.S. forces oriented toward Europe more consistent with the possible length of a conflict

<sup>1/</sup> The JCS do not consider that this shift in emphasis should be made.

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there; [as an interim objective I recommend 60 combat days' stockage in Europe and total procurement of 90 combat days' stocks for these forces.]<sup>1/</sup>

2. In our relocation from France we should substantially reduce that part of the sustaining support structure for our European land forces now in France [2] although we should maintain in Europe those personnel needed to accept augmentation forces from CONUS.

Two other modifications in our Europe-deployed forces are now under consideration, but further study is required before a detailed program can be prepared and its political implications assessed. These are:

3. We are now considering the advisability of making, over the next several years, substantial reductions - beyond those due to our withdrawal from France - in our European ground forces; personnel so withdrawn can, I believe, be flown back to Europe rapidly enough to meet the likely threats which would require their employment.

4. The Air Force is now considering alternative plans to return a substantial portion of our Europe-based aircraft to CONUS and "dual-base" these squadrons, while periodically exercising them to Europe. Such units would be so designed as to be capable of redeployment to Europe in a few days.

In future formal force commitments to NATO, the U.S. should ensure that these commitments accurately reflect the expected time-phased availability of our augmentation forces. In particular, we should continue to commit any aircraft squadrons which are dual-based, as well as Army personnel withdrawn from Europe and planned for rapid redeployment there.

Finally, in determining our overall general purpose force requirements, we should review the requirement for programming large CONUS-based land forces for reinforcement of Europe. [It is by no means clear that our current capability to reinforce Europe with 12-14 division forces within six months is warranted.] With respect to our tactical air forces we should carefully review over the next year what number of these aircraft should be specifically programmed against NATO requirements.

With Respect to Recent French Actions. The enforced withdrawal of U.S. and other NATO forces and facilities from France will involve substantial U.S. one-time costs. It will, however, be some time before we fully understand the military implications of the French position.

- [<sup>1/</sup> The JCS and Army recommend 90 days in Europe and 180 days in total; the Navy recommends 90 days in Europe.  
<sup>2/</sup> The JCS and Army disagree with this recommendation.]

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For a number of reasons, we need intensively to review all aspects of NATO this year: The French problem by itself calls for re-evaluation and will necessitate change; the NATO Force Planning Exercise and our continuing analysis have provided much improved information about our Allies' forces and plans; and action will have to be taken on 1970-72 force planning for the Alliance. In these circumstances it is appropriate to begin by reviewing our goals in Europe and the strategy we are using to achieve them.

The United States' overall military objective in providing forces to NATO has been and remains to make aggression at any level grossly unprofitable for the Warsaw Pact in NATO Europe. To accomplish this we have been providing very large strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces to the Alliance. Our political objectives in maintaining a U.S. military presence in Europe have been and remain as important as our military objectives. They include: (1) prevention of Soviet political pressure and blackmail in Western Europe; (2) maintenance of NATO's cohesion; (3) deterrence of any bilateral Soviet-FRG security agreement; and (4) discouraging the revival of German militarism.

Our external strategic forces - both missiles and bombers - deter the Soviet Union from undertaking general war; they also provide to some extent a "bonus" deterrent against large-scale aggressions, nuclear or nonnuclear, which stop short of nuclear attack on the CONUS; the Soviet Union can never be sure that we will not employ some of these forces in the event of large-scale aggression, even if the U.S. could otherwise remain a sanctuary at the outset.

As discussed in my draft Memorandum for the President on Theater Nuclear Forces, our theater nuclear forces are provided to extend our spectrum of deterrence to lesser conflicts. They make it unprofitable for the Soviet Union to initiate theater nuclear warfare, and they also provide a powerful deterrent against large nonnuclear aggressions.

Working Group III of the Special Committee has concluded in recent months that NATO appears to have a sufficient quantity [redacted]

[redacted] While these forces strongly deter a broad range of possible aggressions, in the U.S. view NATO also requires substantial nonnuclear forces, whose functions fall into three main categories: (1) To control, at the lowest possible level of force, unintentional or "accidental" incidents, and to prevent these situations from presenting the Soviet Union with the opportunity for quick and easy gains; (2) to show determination by parallel force build-up if a confrontation should arise over some issue, and (3) to help deter and,

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if necessary, defeat larger-scale aggressions which the Soviet Union might initiate in the belief that we would not resist or would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. This memorandum focusses on U.S. and Allied force requirements to meet these objectives; it is useful to begin by a review of the forces now available to each side.

## II. NATO AND PACT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

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Land Forces. We have somewhat improved our understanding of Pact land forces during the last year, but we still know less about the character and capabilities of these forces than about any other large element of the Pact's defenses, and this is the most difficult problem encountered in attempting to evaluate NATO's defensive requirements. Specifically, we know the overall size of Pact armies and the number of divisions they have available, but we know little about how well most of these divisions are equipped, the amount of reserve stocks maintained for them, the number and manning of combat and logistics support units available for the divisions, and the reliability of East European forces in various contingencies.

An additional problem is that there is no satisfactory way of comparing various countries' land forces. Counting divisions is deceptive because of great variations in size, <sup>1/</sup> and differences in non-divisional support. Firepower measurement, while widely used, is limited by the impossibility of reducing many different types of firepower to a common denominator, and also because firepower is only one of many factors which can greatly affect the combat potential of land forces. However, direct and indirect costs of manpower account for about 70-80% of the cost of our Allies' land forces. Accordingly, I will use manpower comparisons here, because they are a useful guide to what can be accomplished without major budget increases, but it should be understood that these conceal what may be important differences in training, equipment, and the type and efficiency of organization employed. The table on page 6 indicates that, while NATO's standing armies exceed the Pact's by about 400,000 men (including 337,000 French personnel), we would be outstripped in a simultaneous mobilization in the Central Region by M+30 2/ - although

<sup>1/</sup> For example, a U.S. division force in Europe contains 41,000 men in peacetime; a Soviet division force in East Germany has something less than 14,000.

<sup>2/</sup> Assuming French support of NATO, the Pact would have about 1.5 million men against 1.1 million for NATO. Considering that NATO would have both time to prepare defensive positions, and probably a substantial tactical air advantage, it is by no means clear that our defensive prospects at M+30 would be unfavorable.

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**NATO AND WARSAW PACT LAND FORCE STRENGTHS, MID-1966**  
(In Thousands of Men)

|                                    | NATO                   |                     |                         |               |             | WARSAW PACT            |                    |                         |                  |                     |                     |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                    | Active Army Personnel  |                     | Men in Combat-Available |               |             | Active Army Personnel  |                    | Men in Combat-Available |                  |                     |                     |
|                                    | World-Wide in Division | as Division Forces  | M-Day                   | M+30          | M+90        | World-Wide in Division | as Division Forces | M-Day                   | M+30             | M+90                |                     |
| U.S. Army                          | (1159)                 | (730)               | (205)                   | (275)         | (900)       | U.S.S.R.               | 1950               | 1400                    | Not Applicable   |                     |                     |
| U.S.M.C.                           | (201) <sup>a/</sup>    | (113) <sup>a/</sup> | (0)                     | (275)         | (900)       | (U.S.S.R.)             | Not Applicable     | Not Applicable          | 900              | 1061                | 1309                |
| TOTAL U.S.                         | 1360                   | 843                 | (205)                   | (275)         | 900         | E. Germany             | 90                 | 67                      | 67               | 98                  | 98                  |
| Belgium                            | 81                     | 39 <sup>b/</sup>    | 36                      | 184           | 115         | Poland                 | 225                | 128                     | 92               | 182                 | 266                 |
| Canada                             | 45                     | 20 <sup>b/</sup>    | 6                       | 11            | 75          | Czechoslovakia         | 175                | 122                     | 92               | 168                 | 252                 |
| Denmark                            | 31                     | 15 <sup>b/</sup>    | 15                      | 35            | 50          |                        |                    |                         |                  |                     |                     |
| France                             | 337                    | 110 <sup>b/</sup>   | 110                     | 200           | 390         |                        |                    |                         |                  |                     |                     |
| FRC                                | 300                    | 210 <sup>b/</sup>   | 210                     | 300           | 300         |                        |                    |                         |                  |                     |                     |
| Netherlands                        | 84                     | 42 <sup>b/</sup>    | 32                      | 90            | 110         |                        |                    |                         |                  |                     |                     |
| U.K.                               | 189                    | 58 <sup>b/</sup>    | 54                      | 125           | 430         |                        |                    |                         |                  |                     |                     |
| <b>TOTAL CENTRAL REGION (2427)</b> | <b>(1337)</b>          | <b>(668)</b>        | <b>(1120)</b>           | <b>(2370)</b> |             |                        | (2440)             | (1717)                  | (551)            | (1509)              | (1925)              |
| Northern Norway                    | 18                     | 8                   | 7                       | 110           | 130         | (U.S.S.R.)             | Not Applicable     | Not Applicable          | 92 <sup>c/</sup> | 136 <sup>c/</sup>   | 170 <sup>c/</sup>   |
| Greece                             | 115                    | 78                  | 57                      | 115           | 235         | (U.S.S.R.)             | Not Applicable     | Not Applicable          | 0                | 242 <sup>d/</sup>   | 88 <sup>d/</sup>    |
| Turkey                             | 362                    | 229                 | 166                     | 350           | 350         | Bulgaria               | 125                | 96                      | 76               | 140                 | 224                 |
|                                    |                        |                     |                         |               |             | Romania                | 175                | 81                      | 69               | 98                  | 168                 |
| <b>TOTAL SOUTHEAST FLANK (477)</b> | <b>(307)</b>           | <b>(223)</b>        | <b>(465)</b>            | <b>(585)</b>  |             |                        |                    |                         | (145)            | (480) <sup>d/</sup> | (480) <sup>d/</sup> |
| Italy                              | 324                    | 180                 | 132                     | 250           | 250         | (U.S.S.R.)             | Not Applicable     | Not Applicable          | 68 <sup>e/</sup> | 68 <sup>e/</sup>    | 68 <sup>e/</sup>    |
|                                    |                        |                     |                         |               |             | Hungary                | 100                | 50                      | 32               | 70                  | 112                 |
| <b>GRAND TOTAL NATO:</b>           | <b>3246</b>            | <b>1832</b>         | <b>1030</b>             | <b>1945</b>   | <b>3335</b> | <b>WARSAW PACT:</b>    | <b>2840</b>        | <b>1944</b>             | <b>888</b>       | <b>2263</b>         | <b>2755</b>         |

a/ Excludes U.S.M.C. personnel in air bases/wings and Navy units.

b/ Excludes some additional division force personnel, mainly in small units of questionable initial value.

c/ Soviet forces in Northwestern Military districts.

d/ Although Soviet, Bulgarian and Rumanian forces exceeding a million men could eventually be mobilized in the Southeastern Flank area, only about 450-500,000 land troops could be logistically supported against all of Greece and Turkey unless routes through Yugoslavia were used, in which case about 250,000 additional troops could be supported.

e/ Soviet forces in Hungary.

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are subtotals and should not be added in arriving at column totals.

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we would catch up by [M+90]- and if the Pact began mobilizing before NATO the disparity would be even greater. While CONUS-based forces would ultimately swing the balance in NATO's favor, today only [about 75,000] U.S. troops could be deployed to Europe and ready for combat by [M+30], although our rapid deployment capability is programmed to increase greatly in the next five years.

The real issue regarding NATO/Pact mobilization capabilities is not how many men could be placed in organized units with equipment of some adequacy, but what would be the comparative effectiveness of the resulting units. We are far from having a clear answer to this question for either the Pact or our Allies. While our Allies have very large numbers of reservists, most of them do not receive enough refresher training, there are too few reserve units, and most reserve units have obsolescent equipment and insufficient peacetime cadres. We are also extremely uncertain about the equipment, training and support of Pact reserve forces.

On balance, while the manpower data conceal a number of important factors, they show rough parity at M-Day (even excluding French forces) except in Northern Norway, but if all members of both alliances began mobilizing at the same time, NATO would fall behind in the Central Region and remain at a manpower disadvantage until perhaps [M+60]. As I will later discuss, it appears both possible and desirable to improve NATO's mobilization capabilities substantially, and so doing should not require large increases in our Allies' defense budgets.

Tactical Air Forces. Because tactical aircraft are much easier to count and evaluate than ground forces, we can make reasonably good comparative appraisals of NATO and Pact aircraft. My staff and the Joint Staff recently undertook such an analysis, based on expected 1968 forces. The key findings can be summarized as follows:

1. NATO and Pact aircraft in place in Europe will be, in 1968, about equal in number [4,060 NATO versus 4,080 Pact]. If both sides began to augment as rapidly as possible, the Pact could temporarily outnumber NATO by roughly 1,000 aircraft. By [M+30] NATO forces would be larger [5,850 versus 5,475] and eventually NATO could potentially commit about 50% more aircraft than the Pact [10,360 versus 6,760].

2. NATO aircraft cost, on the average, about 20% <sup>1/</sup> more than Pact aircraft, using the same prices; we believe that this increased cost

<sup>1/</sup> The individual aircraft costs used in this analysis were computed on the basis of producing the 300th aircraft in a series. The cost of the average aircraft in each force was obtained by weighting the individual aircraft costs by the number of each type of aircraft in the total force. Due to certain characteristics of the methodology used for estimating costs, the 20% cost differential cited herein is somewhat of an understatement.

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is in fact justified by a proportional, or possibly greater, effectiveness per aircraft. Pact aircraft have been designed mainly as interceptors and, as a result, have quite limited offensive capabilities for nonnuclear war. The higher average cost of NATO aircraft occurs because we have provided them with substantial capabilities [REDACTED] and multi-purpose non-nuclear operations. In particular, our aircraft can carry a much larger payload than Pact aircraft on a given mission. For these reasons, NATO training standards, and costs, are also much higher. **OSD 3.3(b)(5)**

3. Because U.S. aircraft are so well supported logistically, NATO aircraft taken as a whole are considered to have fewer logistics problems than the Pact's. Our Allies' practices in this respect, however, leave much to be desired, as I shall discuss later in this Memorandum.

4. Because NATO tactical air forces are numerically larger and better suited for multi-purpose nonnuclear operations, they could eventually be expected to achieve a commanding degree of air superiority and to provide much more close air support, interdiction and reconnaissance than Pact forces. For NATO to realize this potential, our Allies should correct a number of existing deficiencies in training, basing, and logistics support; this can be done relatively inexpensively. We also need a number of low-cost improvements to ensure that U.S. tactical aircraft programmed for European reinforcement can be rapidly deployed and effectively supported.

Thus we conclude that NATO has the basis for a large advantage in tactical airpower as compared to the Pact. This is quite different from the situation in land forces; there our measurement capabilities are relatively poor, but such measurements as we can make indicate rough overall equality in manpower, but with an advantage in favor of the Pact in terms of early mobilization capability. Having now considered the opposing land and air forces, let us consider some situations in which nonnuclear conflict might begin in Europe.

### III. NONNUCLEAR CONTINGENCIES IN NATO

In appraising NATO's present nonnuclear capabilities and possible changes in them, it is useful to consider four general types of contingencies:

1. Small-scale conflict, unexpected by either side, arising out of some incident or misunderstanding, perhaps one that initially involved neither U.S. nor Soviet forces.

2. Political-military aggression in which, as a result of tension or crisis, the Pact might undertake large mobilization and deployment of forces forward. This might occur, for example, in connection with an effort to restrict Allied access to Berlin.

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3. Deliberate surprise nonnuclear attack with limited objectives, e.g., an attempted "land grab" against Thrace, Hamburg, or Northern Norway.

4. Premeditated full-scale nonnuclear aggression, mounted with as little warning as possible, and aimed at major objectives, e.g., the seizure of West Germany, or possibly all of continental Europe.

While these are not the only situations which might require NATO conventional forces, they do cover the entire spectrum of general purpose land and air force requirements in Europe <sup>1/</sup>; by reviewing these contingencies we can determine the suitability of our present forces for each, and force changes which would improve that suitability. The following discussion concentrates on land forces because it is in this area that we encounter both NATO's greatest uncertainties as regards requirements, and the most obvious need for modifications. Requirements for and desirable improvements in NATO's tactical air forces are discussed later in the Memorandum.

Small Unexpected Conflicts. No nonnuclear conflict in Europe is likely today, but if one were to occur, its most probable cause would be some combination of a provoking incident and a misunderstanding by one side of the other side's intentions and degree of commitment. There is little basis for predicting the course of an incident in Europe that involves armed conflict, but our chances of preventing escalation improve to the extent that NATO's in-place forces are capable of making an adequate and controlled response. The conflict should not be allowed to develop in such a way that the Pact concludes that what began as a mistake now presents opportunities to make military gains.

The table on page 6 shows that in every theater except Northern Norway, NATO's immediately available land forces outnumber the Pact's, even if French forces are excluded. [But the lowest quality units in the Central Region are deployed in the most vulnerable sector, the North German plain, and some of them are far from their defensive positions.] Thus while force size is not a problem as regards this contingency, force quality and positioning may be matters for concern.

Crisis/Mobilization Contingencies. Despite our uncertainties as to the Pact's mobilization capabilities, the table on page 6 indicates that

<sup>1/</sup> The "war at sea" contingency (NATO/Pact conflict restricted to naval engagements) could have an important effect on U.S. and certain Allied naval force requirements. We do not yet understand the implications of this contingency sufficiently to warrant its inclusion in this Memorandum, but we are continuing our analysis.

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in a parallel mobilization and forward deployment by both sides, the Pact would be able to develop at the outset a much larger effective force than NATO in the Central Region and Northern Norway. Both sides' mobilization capabilities would be limited by the availability of adequate equipment, and we do not know exactly how many Pact units could be equipped, but the Pact forces postulated in the table could probably be provided with more or less adequate equipment. There is, moreover, an important difference between Pact manning practices for reserve units and those of our Allies. While our Allies could call up many hundreds of thousands of former soldiers in a few days, many of the units into which they would be organized are manned in peacetime with very small or non-existent cadres; such units could not be made combat-effective for two or three months. The Pact, on the other hand, maintains its divisions at graduated states of readiness. Soviet divisions, for example, vary from 90% manning (East Germany) to 15-20% (inside the USSR). A sufficiently large peacetime cadre exists to serve as an organizational nucleus for incoming reservists.

NATO could keep pace with the Warsaw Pact in a mobilization if our Allies planned and procured forces on this basis, because their reserves of trained manpower are very large. Improvements in equipment and reservist training could be achieved at relatively low cost compared to M-Day forces, and this would enable us to realize this potential.

It should be noted, however, that the probability of all NATO and Pact countries beginning rapid mobilization at the same time is very low. A more plausible scenario would be one in which only the U.S.S.R. and one or two other Pact nations initially started to mobilize on the one hand, and the FRG, U.S., and one or two additional NATO countries on the other. Depending on the exact assumptions used, it is easy to reach widely differing conclusions about relative NATO/Pact strengths at M-Day and any point thereafter. One can imagine situations in which the Soviets would receive no direct support from any Pact ally, and in which only the U.S. and FRG would take steps to match a Soviet mobilization.

Surprise Nonnuclear Attack. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has estimated the forces which the Pact might seek to assemble if they decided on a limited attack with no warning; 36 1/2 division forces (570-630,000 men) could be employed in the Central Region, and about three somewhat smaller division forces (35-40,000 men) against Greek or Turkish

1/ The Army considers that NATO would receive some warning of an attack of this size, and that probably only 20 divisions would be initially employed if the aim were to provide no warning at all.

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Thrace. Such an attack would presumably aim at a fait accompli, perhaps the seizure of Hamburg or an Aegean port. An undertaking of this type would seem to be very unlikely, because the Pact could not easily discount the possibility of a tactical nuclear response by NATO, but they might be more tempted, and more likely to misjudge our determination to defend, if our nonnuclear capabilities were obviously inadequate.

Our immediately available forces are today, however, large enough to make such a venture unattractive even without the threat of NATO initiation of nuclear war. The postulated Bulgarian foray toward the Aegean would be very unlikely to succeed, since the Bulgarian forces would be substantially outnumbered by Greek and Turkish M-Day units. In the Central Region, NATO's [668,000 men (558,000 without France)] in immediately available units would, if manpower alone were the determinant of combat capability, probably be adequate to repel an attacking force [of 570-630,000 men] and this estimate of Pact manpower is probably excessive for a no-warning attack. But many of these units are not fully effective, and our forces are not optimally deployed against the likely corridors of attack, particularly in Northern Germany. What is needed is - as in the case of the first contingency - a higher degree of quality in our Allies' land forces, plus some strengthening in Northern Germany. I believe that if our M-Day units were properly equipped and deployed, a NATO Central Region force of perhaps [500,000] men would probably suffice to deter the Pact from launching such an attack, since their numerical advantage would be much too small for them to have high confidence of a successful operation. Furthermore, a NATO force of this size would probably suffice to contain the aggression should it be launched.

Rapid Full-Scale Nonnuclear Aggression. The contingency which requires the largest M-Day NATO force is a "major" nonnuclear attack in which the Pact builds up its forces as rapidly as possible to an optimum size, without a concurrent NATO buildup, and then attacks. [DIA estimates that 50-60 division forces (875,000-1,050,000 men) could be assembled by the Pact in 21-28 days and could attack in the Central Region with 7-15 days' warning<sup>1/</sup>, supported by a 20-division theater reserve (about 280,000 men). In this contingency the Pact would have about 10-15 days' head start in mobilization and deployment before NATO received warning. In Greece and Turkish Thrace the striking force is estimated at about 16-18 division forces with 6-8 division forces in reserve.]

Estimates of the NATO forces which would be required to defend against this attack without using nuclear weapons have varied considerably for three main reasons. First, since there are great uncertainties regarding the exact character of Pact land forces and their effectiveness relative to NATO units, there is considerable latitude for judgment as to how many NATO divisions would be needed to oppose a given Pact force effectively.

<sup>1/</sup> The JCS and Services correctly observe that the effective warning time might be reduced from this estimate if NATO did not act decisively as soon as the threat buildup became evident.

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Second, even if we had perfect information on Pact land forces, conflict outcome would be very uncertain, because it depends on many factors besides the forces employed and their comparative capabilities. Thus there is room for judgment as to how much confidence of successful defense is appropriate. A posture which, for example, exactly matched the time-phased buildup of Pact combat potential might well suffice, but we would have appreciably less confidence in mounting a successful defense than if our forces were, say, 25% larger. The Soviets, however, would also be subject to such uncertainty and might be deterred from starting a war without a considerable measure of superiority.

Third, because of the uncertainty in estimating effects, recent military analyses appear to have taken no credit for NATO's inherent tactical air advantage in calculating land force requirements. This uncertainty is partly caused by our general lack of quantitative knowledge of the effects of air power on large scale land operations, and is increased by uncertainty as to how long the large Pact air defense forces might delay the impact of NATO air power on the land battle.

Because of these factors, estimates of the NATO M-Day and first echelon land forces (those available in 7-15 days) required for this contingency in the Central Region have varied from about 35 equivalent U.S. division forces (as suggested in last year's Memorandum on NATO Strategy and Force Structure) to about 50 (based on the "objective" forces set forth in the recent JCS "NAMILPO" study). The existing and planned NATO M-Day forces amount only to about 20-24 U.S. division force equivalents, based on firepower effectiveness indices given in the JCS' Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The additional cost to the U.S. to fill the gap between our Allies' planned forces and the JCS "objective" forces would be some tens of billions of dollars for land forces alone over the next five years, even assuming that our Allies equipped and supported their planned M-Day units effectively. Moreover, a major part of the increased U.S. force would have to be permanently stationed in Europe to provide the required M-Day capability. In view of these considerations, we must determine the importance to the U.S. of trying to make up for our Allies' deficiencies against this threat. To assess this we must ask whether such an aggression is at all probable, despite the fact that the Pact is capable of launching a sudden massive assault of this type.

In brief, I consider this the least likely of the four nonnuclear contingencies discussed above, for three main reasons. First, aside from the risk of general nuclear war, the risk to the Pact of a NATO theater nuclear response is enormous; our vital interests would clearly be at stake in such an attack, and the Soviets could therefore assume that we would take whatever defensive measures proved necessary. The Soviets recognize in their military discussions that such a response by NATO to a large Pact nonnuclear attack could be disastrous; not only would

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the attacking Pact forces be subject to rapid destruction but, even more important, they would lose much of their theater nuclear capability. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Soviets have optimized their general purpose forces for nuclear warfare; presumably they do not contemplate deliberate, large-scale attack on NATO using nonnuclear weapons only.

Second, I find it increasingly difficult to foresee circumstances in which the Soviets could persuade their Pact Allies to provide the wholehearted support necessary to such an adventure; East Europeans would certainly see their societies as being at risk, whereas they might expect the USSR to remain a sanctuary.

Third, NATO and Pact land forces are today too closely balanced in terms of manpower for the Soviets to be confident of the success of such an attack even if NATO did not respond with nuclear weapons. The Pact probably also recognizes the quantitative and qualitative advantage NATO would have in air operations, and must surely make prudent calculations about how NATO air superiority would affect the success of Pact land operations.

The Capability and Suitability of NATO's Land Forces. I believe we can summarize the capabilities of NATO's present land forces as follows. Except in Northern Norway, present forces are more than adequate to deal effectively with "small unexpected conflicts", even those which might involve as many as 20-25 Pact divisions in the Central Region, and even if we assume that France would not participate. If the Pact decided to expand the scale of the conflict beyond this point, however, NATO's prospects would not be so favorable. As for the "crisis/mobilization" type of contingency, if NATO had 60 days or more to mobilize and if all members used this time effectively, the resulting force would, I believe, at least deny any overwhelming Pact superiority and might reasonably be expected to mount a successful forward nonnuclear defense.

In the case of the "surprise nonnuclear attack" (i.e., 20-36 Pact divisions attacking in the Central Region without warning), NATO would have at worst something approaching rough equality in manpower, even without France, but qualitative weaknesses in Allied forces and, maldesployments, would lessen our prospects for successful forward defense. One cannot say with any confidence how such a conflict would develop, given today's NATO forces. Finally, in the case of "rapid full-scale nonnuclear aggression", NATO might well have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It should be noted, however, that under reasonable (but by no means provable) assumptions present forces might permit stabilization of the battle line at some point East of the Rhine without NATO's initiating the use of nuclear weapons.

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As regards suitability of Allied land forces, most M-Day units are not adequately equipped or supported; indeed, we could achieve a greater M-Day capability with a smaller number of higher quality, better supported units, and at the same or lower total cost. Moreover, through maldeployment we are losing much of the capability inherent in the size and cost of present Allied forces. And perhaps most important, our Allies have generally not spent the modest sums necessary to realize the great mobilization potential which is inherent in their large numbers of reservists. In short, NATO's land forces today are not optimally postured to deal with any of the four contingencies discussed above. We particularly need higher M-Day quality units for "accidental" conflicts, and a much greater mobilization capability for situations in which the Pact might mobilize and move units forward in order to exert political pressure.

Our Allies' land forces today are largely the result of an inefficient compromise between military and political estimates of the threat. NATO force goals have been designed with reference to an extreme case: the massive assault launched as rapidly as possible. But NATO's political authorities have, for the reasons discussed above, considered such aggression so improbable that they have been unwilling to provide the very large resources necessary for nonnuclear defense against it, and their 1970 force plans show no change in their view. In an attempt to meet the goals quantitatively they have sacrificed far too much quality, and because of the emphasis on sudden attacks they have largely ignored the need for a rapid and effective mobilization base.

[While in theory the U.S. could unilaterally undertake to provide NATO with a high-confidence nonnuclear defense against rapid and massive nonnuclear attack, very large and costly increases in U.S. forces would be called for if we attempted to make good the Allied deficit against this threat, and it is by no means clear that such an attempt could succeed. Our Allies might respond by reducing their forces. Because I believe that such an attack is already so highly deterred, I believe that the very large U.S. expenditures which would be incurred in an attempt to meet it are not warranted. This is not to say that we should permanently forego, as a long term objective, nonnuclear capabilities sufficient to repel any type of Pact nonnuclear aggression. If our Allies eventually agree to increase their nonnuclear capabilities sufficiently to counter all threats the U.S. should provide an appropriate share.]

But this increased Allied contribution is not now likely, and in its absence our near-term efforts should concentrate on using those resources we have efficiently with respect to the most likely threats. I will discuss in Section V some ways in which, by modification of their forces, our Allies could achieve a better return on their large defense resource commitments. First, however, a brief review of the French problem is in order.

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While we do not yet know the ultimate implications of France's recent change of status in NATO, a number of issues have been raised.

The main issue, of course, is what the French withdrawal implies for NATO's defensive prospects and requirements. Timely and complete French cooperation would be necessary in the event of a sudden and massive attack, both because of the importance of the large French forces in such an event, and the requirement for French airspace and terrain to provide depth in our defenses. Cooperation would not be so vital militarily in small-scale contingencies, nor during a prolonged mobilization; the manpower comparisons used above show that even without France, NATO forces are still very substantial relative to the opposing Pact forces. [While we do not yet know the circumstances in which we can be confident of timely French support, it now appears that we can probably count on France in those cases where her support would be vital - large sudden attacks - but in lesser contingencies she might well withhold both political and military support.]

[The withdrawal of U.S. forces from France will involve substantial costs. It does not now appear, however, that the loss of our rear base in France need result in any substantial degradation in the capabilities of our Europe-based forces to deal with the likely contingencies.]

[Both NATO and the U.S. are, of course, continuing to negotiate with France on the conditions of her participation in NATO, and on the possibilities for leaving some U.S. and other NATO facilities in France should this prove desirable. Within the next few months we should have a much clearer picture than at present of the possibilities in both of these areas.]

V. MODIFICATIONS IN ALLIED FORCES

I think we now know what general types of reallocations would be desirable in most Allied forces, and some specific changes which should be made, although many of the details remain to be worked out and are being analyzed further. As a result we have taken steps to raise these issues both within NATO-wide forums, and also in selected bilateral discussions.

Allied Land Forces. Our Allies need to equip their land forces much better than is typically the case today, but we need further study to determine how much equipment of what types is essential. The Soviet Union seems to "make do" with equipment that is both less complex and less frequently replaced than that in the U.S. Army.

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A critical weakness in our Allies' divisions is the shortage of non-divisional combat support - especially artillery and air defense units - and the inadequacy of logistics support forces. NAMILPO has identified a number of specific weaknesses, and further analysis will probably reveal more. We are intensifying our efforts to point out remedial measures to specific Allies, because a division without adequate combat support is of questionable initial value, and without logistics support it can only fight for 10-15 days. More support units are needed, and most of them must be manned at or near the same percentage of full strength as in the case of the division. A non-organic artillery battalion must be just as ready as the infantry brigade it supports.

I think, however, that peacetime manning for M-Day divisions and their necessary combat support units should be relaxed from the current SHARP standard of 100 percent of wartime strength to perhaps 85-90 percent. While this matter is now being studied in NATO, in my view an 85-90 percent level should be adequate to ensure both that the unit can be immediately committed to combat if necessary, (e.g., in a small unexpected conflict), and that if 7-15 days' warning is received, as would be true for a rapid full-scale attack, the unit can be brought to full strength. As for reserve units, while the optimum manning policy is not yet clear, it seems evident that the current second-echelon divisions - manned at 3-5 percent active personnel - would be of little use except with 60-90 days' warning, and I am accordingly requesting the JCS to evaluate alternative manning policies for Allied reserve units; it would appear that perhaps a 15-25 percent active cadre would be both efficient and feasible.

Another major weakness in our Allies' land (and air) forces is the lack of adequate balanced stocks. [While most countries have large stocks of small arms ammunition and, frequently, a great deal of artillery and tank ammunition for calibers now being phased out, they typically have an average of only 15-30 days' ammunition supplies for the modern weapons in their units.] (These ammunition shortages exist despite the fact that our Allies tend to have far fewer heavy weapons per division force than does the U.S. For example, the current FRG division forces contain only about one-third as many artillery pieces as a U.S. division force in Europe.)

Furthermore, specific shortages of key ammunition items are even more serious; the table on the following page shows the reported end-1965 ammunition inventory for selected Central Region Allies at U.S. rates.

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|             |                  |         |                    |                  |        |
|-------------|------------------|---------|--------------------|------------------|--------|
| FRG         | Recoilless Rifle | 34 days | U.K. <sup>1/</sup> | 8" Howitzer      | 2 days |
| FRG         | 175mm Gun        | 18      | U.K. <sup>1/</sup> | 5.5" Howitzer    | 20     |
|             |                  |         | U.K. <sup>1/</sup> | Medium Tank      | 26     |
| Netherlands | Light Tank       | 14      | Belgium            | Recoilless Rifle | 1      |
| Netherlands | Medium Tank      | 36      | Belgium            | Anti-Tank Veh    | 18     |
| Netherlands | Heavy Mortar     | 28      | Belgium            | Light Mortar     | 16     |

Equipment stocks to replace weapons and other equipment lost in combat are both small and obsolescent, and it is likely that the same situation obtains with regard to spare parts.

As a result the U.S. has proposed in NATO the adoption, as an interim target, of a capability to support the forces with complete balanced stocks in combat [for 45 days]. This appears a feasible goal for 1971-72, at least for most countries, and is surely a necessity if we are to have any confidence of mounting even a temporary defense. When this goal has been met we should proceed in balanced increments to increase our stocks. Until it has been attained we should discourage our Allies from what appears to be a rather haphazard approach of buying very large stocks of some items (e.g., the FRG has 165 days of rifle ammunition at U.S. rates) while stocking only 2-30 days of other, equally vital supplies.

As for how these improvements might be achieved, I think that we should first encourage our Allies to increase budgets sufficiently to bring their current M-Day divisions up to these standards, and to create adequate non-divisional support units as well. NATO's overall effectiveness can be increased by reallocations away from currently planned naval and air forces to land forces, if our Allies can be persuaded to do so. Where large national forces (those not committed to NATO) are maintained, additional resources may be available by reallocating away from them in favor of NATO-committed forces. But where these three sources are insufficient, quantitative reductions should be encouraged to the extent necessary to achieve adequate force quality.

If and when the M-Day forces can meet appropriate standards of quality, we should encourage our Allies to provide better mobilization capabilities by balanced increments of equipment, cadre personnel, and reservist training. This is desirable not only for the mobilization case, but is also an efficient step if our Allies ultimately agree to increase

<sup>1/</sup> These are the quantities maintained by the U.K. on the continent. Additional stocks of these items are probably maintained in the U.K., but we do not know their size and composition.

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their M-Day forces. Given such agreement, reserve units could rapidly be converted to M-Day status because the long lead-time item - the equipment - would already be on hand.

In summary, there is room for great improvement in our Allies' land forces without large increases in their defense budgets, manpower, or major combat units. While it would be naive to think that the U.S. can single-handedly persuade our Allies to make all these changes, I believe that our first need is for a clear understanding of which modifications are most urgently needed.

Tactical Air Forces. We should not attempt to influence our Allies to increase the size of their tactical air forces above present levels for two reasons. First, if we organize and use NATO's present air forces efficiently we can reasonably expect a substantial margin of superiority over the Pact, whereas the same is not true for land forces. The effect of this potential air advantage on the land battle in Europe is, however, highly uncertain. Until we are more confident of at least holding in the land war we should not devote additional resources to winning the air war beyond those required to eliminate current inefficiencies. Second, even were it desirable to increase NATO's air superiority further, it would be far more efficient for the U.S. to provide any increase, if our Allies put the resources saved into land forces. The basis for this is economic; it costs our Allies about as much as it does us to provide a given air squadron, but it costs them only about half as much (or, in the case of Greece and Turkey, only ten percent as much) for a given land force unit. The reason is that Allied manpower costs are far lower than ours, whereas their equipment-related costs are typically the same or higher. Equipment-related costs dominate total air force costs, whereas personnel-related costs dominate land force expenditures.

We should, however, encourage the planned modernization of existing Allied air units and, far more important, we should try to persuade our Allies to spend the relatively small sums needed to realize the substantial nonnuclear capabilities of their tactical aircraft.

Specifically our Allies need more air-to-ground ordnance, and much of it should be of the latest types.<sup>1/</sup> Furthermore, their pilots require

<sup>1/</sup> To illustrate, in recent months an average of 790 U.S. attack-capable aircraft in Southeast Asia have been delivering about 34,000 tons of nonnuclear munitions per month, (excluding about 8,000 tons per month delivered by our B-52 force). Our Allies have roughly 2,000 attack-capable aircraft, but their total stock of nonnuclear air ordnance is only about 60,000 tons, (i.e., about 3 weeks of supply at our Vietnam rate), and most of this ordnance is not of the latest types.

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more and better training in nonnuclear missions, since today the emphasis [redacted]. NAMILPO has recommended relatively low-cost modifications in Allied F-104Gs which would greatly increase their nonnuclear offensive capabilities. And perhaps most important, Allied air bases require passive and active defenses of the type we are programming for U.S. bases in Europe. Because of the fixation on [redacted] - a role which for the most part can better [redacted] external missiles - our Allies have generally not taken the relatively inexpensive measures needed to achieve a useful nonnuclear capability. We have already discussed these points in detail with the FRG, and I plan to raise them with other countries as well.

Allied Naval Forces. Considering the weaknesses in our Allies' land forces and the resulting uncertainty in NATO's ability to deal in all regions with full-scale land attacks, some of the money which our Allies are now spending on naval forces could be better spent on improving land forces. Many of the missions of these naval forces are of doubtful feasibility, and even if they could be carried out in many cases would contribute to the overall defense of the Alliance only marginally. Doubtful feasibility and marginal value especially characterize Greek and Turkish forces in the Black and Aegean Seas, German and Danish forces in the Baltic, Norwegian naval forces in general, and to a lesser degree, part of the Italian and Dutch naval forces.

Yet most of our Allies are now committing a considerable portion of their defense budgets to these forces (typically 10-20 percent), because they make naval force decisions more on the basis of tradition and politics than on relative military requirements. In these circumstances we have limited opportunities to influence Allied naval force plans, but some actions appear feasible and might somewhat improve the situation.

We have reviewed our Allies' specific ship procurement plans through the early 1970s, so far as they are known, as part of an overall analysis of NATO naval force requirements developed by my staff. Based on this analysis we have tentatively identified a number of Allied procurement plans which ought to be changed, as summarized in the table on the following page. After appropriate review, I plan to use this material in bilateral discussions with selected Allies.

#### VI. MODIFICATIONS IN U.S. FORCES FOR NATO

In their NAMILPO study the JCS have not only reviewed Allied forces and desirable modifications to them, but they have also made a recommendation as to those forces which the U.S. should program against European contingencies. Their specific recommendations are set forth in the

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHSDESIRABLE CHANGES IN NATO NAVY COUNTRY PLANS

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Naval Units</u> | <u>Action</u>      | <u>5 Year Cost Savings (Millions of \$)</u> | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|---|---|
| Belgium        | 1 DE               | Defer construction | 14.5  | To be commissioned in 1969 (WWII units with limited speed and ASW capabilities).  |
|                | 2 DE               | Retire             | <u>2.3</u><br>16.8                          |   |
| Denmark        | 2 DE               | Defer construction | 33.9  | Two to be commissioned in 1970. One to be commissioned in 1969 and one in 1970. Two to be commissioned in 1969.               |
|                | 2 CMC              | Drop plans         | 6.9   |   |
|                | 2 FPB              | Defer construction | <u>5.9</u><br>46.7                          |   |
| Germany        | 3 DDG              | Drop plans         | 190.5                                       | To be built in Germany.   |
|                | 10 DEG             | Drop plans         | 343.8                                       | To be commissioned from 1972 on.  |
|                | 12 SSC             | Drop plans         | 112.2                                       | Five to be commissioned in 1968; 5 in 1969 and 2 in 1970.   |
|                | 6 SSK              | Drop plans         | 108.8                                       | To be commissioned from 1969 on.  |
|                | 10 PTFG            | Defer construction | 87.1  | To be commissioned in 1968.   |
|                | 6 LSM              | Drop plans         | 32.8  | Three to be commissioned in 1969 and three in 1970.   |
|                | 6 DD               | Retire             | 17.6  | Retire 6 WWII units now instead of 3 in 1967 and 3 after 1970.  |
|                |                    |                    | <u>892.8</u>                                |   |
| Italy          | 4 DD               | Retire             | 4.8   | Retire WWII units now instead of 1970 or later. Retire WWII units now instead of 1970. Retire WWII units now instead of 1970. |
|                | 4 SS               | Retire             | 5.0   |   |
|                | 18 PCE             | Retire             | 10.2<br><u>(4 yr)</u><br>20.0               |   |
| Netherlands    | 1 CL               | Retire             | 12.5  | Obsolete.   |
|                | 4 DD               | Retire             | 1.2   | Retire WWII units now instead of 1967.  |
|                | 2 SS               | Return to U.S.     | 2.3   | Return WWII units now instead of 1969.  |
|                | 2 SSK              | Defer construction | <u>(3 yr)</u><br>36.9<br>52.9               | To be commissioned in 1969.   |

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NAMILPO-1971 goals, which are judged to be realistically attainable for our Allies. These goals call for the U.S. to continue, and in some respects to increase, its forces programmed for Europe beyond the currently approved Five Year Defense Plan.

In my view, however, those forces which the U.S. now has in Europe are excessive in certain respects, and I think our programs can accordingly be modified over the next several years. While a number of areas need further review before final details can be worked out, I believe that we can make some reductions in our Europe-deployed land and air forces. I also think that in determining overall U.S. general purpose land and air force requirements, we need a careful review of whether the very large reinforcing forces we are now capable of providing Europe are in fact required.

U.S. Land Forces. In considering possible changes in U.S. land forces for Europe it is useful to treat our Europe-deployed forces separately from our CONUS-based reserves.

1. U.S. Land Forces in Europe. [I believe that some reductions in our Europe-based land forces would serve to balance their capabilities both with respect to the most likely threats we face, and with Allied land forces' capabilities.] The reductions suggested below can, if properly timed, probably be accomplished with only limited political costs, and I plan to evaluate the appropriateness of this course of action over the next several months.

U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) now has about [205,000] men in its five division forces,<sup>1/</sup> including 30,000-odd personnel in "sustaining support" units (these are units needed if the division force is to maintain itself in combat beyond 60 days). Roughly 13,000 of these sustaining support personnel are now in France, with the remainder in Germany. Some of these men are necessary for peacetime support of USAREUR or to receive war augmentation forces; the remainder would not have to be in place in Europe until well after D-Day. We would incur a large investment cost (\$100-200 million) to relocate the 13,000 now in France elsewhere in Europe.

Our Allies cannot at present sustain large-scale combat for even 45 days (and this estimate is probably optimistic), so that the relevance

<sup>1/</sup> This number excludes about 20,000 additional Army personnel not attributable to the divisions or their support, e.g., U.S.A. personnel in SHAPE headquarters. Recently Vietnam drawdowns reduced our Army strength in Europe by about 15,000, but it should be back to programmed strength by December, 1966.

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of our sustaining support forces is far from clear. Moreover, with our growing ability to move large forces quickly, we should have adequate time to move sustaining forces from CONUS to Europe in any contingency where they would be required. I believe, therefore, that we should return sustaining support personnel to CONUS except for those needed for peacetime operations or for receiving war augmentation forces from CONUS. This should permit us to return to CONUS many of the sustaining support personnel now in France as well as some in Germany.

For similar reasons I recommend that war reserve stocks in Europe be maintained at 60 combat days (as opposed to the current 90-day authorization) for our forces deployed there plus those scheduled to be airlifted to Europe by M+30. (Stocks for our programmed sealifted forces are carried by ship with the forces.) Sixty days' stocks can be accommodated in existing European facilities at low cost, but for a 90-day level, we would have to spend some tens of millions of dollars on new depots and related facilities because of our need to evacuate facilities in France. A 60-day level, moreover, appears adequate to permit resupply in situations where resupply could be useful.

USAREUR today is by far the most combat-ready land force in Europe. Temporary Vietnam drawdowns will be made good by the end of the year. Its divisions and initial support units are programmed to be manned at 100 percent of wartime strength. In sharp contrast, the most fully-manned large land forces in the Warsaw Pact, the 20 Soviet division forces in East Germany, are manned at less than 80 percent of wartime strength and are still judged capable of immediate commitment to combat.

In addition, I am disturbed by estimates of the implied relative effectiveness of the U.S. and Soviet divisions. Despite the fact that the peacetime manning of a USAREUR division force is roughly three times that of a Soviet division force in East Germany, the Army's indices of comparative firepower used in JSOP indicate that the USAREUR unit has only about 75 percent more firepower than the Soviet unit. [This implies that the Soviets get as much firepower from a peacetime deployment of 24,500 men (1.75 x 14,000) as we do from 41,000, calling into question the value we receive from the 16,500 man difference.] Finally, USAREUR's high manning level poses a serious balance of payments problem, particularly since the FRG is finding it increasingly difficult to meet the full offset agreement.

I am, therefore, directing the Army to develop alternative plans for achieving various degrees of reduction in the size of USAREUR's current 41,000-man division force. Rather than making reductions in most or all individual units, it may be more efficient to withdraw entire units, such as battalions, and leave their equipment prepositioned in Europe so

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that they can be rapidly flown back in crisis of war. Before making any substantial reduction in our Europe-deployed land forces we will have to weigh political factors very carefully. But since the average U.K. and FRG division forces are manned at about 17,500, some reduction in our current 41,000-man division force should be politically acceptable.

2. U.S. Land Forces for Reinforcement of Europe. While we could today reinforce Europe with some 12-14 divisions over a period of four to six months, it is not at all clear that we should assume the need for doing so in computing total U.S. land force requirements. Most of these forces (including all reserve units) could not arrive in Europe before M+75, and a number of them probably would not arrive until M+120 or later. Indeed, these are optimistic estimates today; they will be realistic only around 1970-72, when the large programmed increase in our rapid deployment capability begins to occur.

But the need for large-scale U.S. reinforcement at M+60 and beyond should in theory be modest, thus calling into question the need to maintain U.S. reserve division forces for NATO. If all of our Allies were mobilizing as fast as possible, their reserve units would start to become combat-capable in large quantities starting at about M+60. DIA estimates that our Central Region Allies could, by M+90, increase their armies to a total of about 1,500,000 men in organized and equipped division forces, and substantial numbers of "fillers" to replace combat losses would also be available. The Pact might have about 2,000,000 men in division forces available by M+90 in the Central Region.

As mentioned earlier, the relative effectiveness of the mobilized NATO and Pact reserve forces is very unclear, but there is no reason to believe that one side's forces would have a substantial qualitative advantage over the other's. Accordingly, a U.S. force of only 500,000 men would still provide NATO with numerical parity relative to the Pact. Since NATO's land forces would be strengthened by prepared defensive positions, and would operate with the assistance of superior tactical air power, manpower equality would probably not be needed to mount an adequate defense.

On balance, in a contingency which produced both substantial time to mobilize and a concerted NATO response, if the U.S. were to deploy to Europe the three committed M-Day Army divisions in CONUS and fill out all eight division forces to 50,000 men each, providing a total U.S. force of 400,000 men, I see no reason to think that the Warsaw Pact would be in a significantly superior position to NATO.

In fact, if 60-90 days' warning were assumed, these three CONUS-based reinforcing divisions could presumably be largely or wholly in the reserves. There is, of course, a requirement for some rapid land force augmentation to provide, in time of crisis, clear and early evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe, but I believe that this would only require one U.S. division or perhaps less. Thus, the

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case for maintaining three active divisions explicitly for Europe rests on two main assumptions. First, conflict must begin with relatively little warning; second, the attack must not be so large that it overwhelms NATO's forces before the arrival of reinforcements. The realism of these assumptions and the military utility of early arrival need to be evaluated.

As regards U.S. reserve division forces, a case can be made that a number should be programmed for European reinforcement to hedge against the possibility that, in a crisis, some of our Allies might not mobilize or, in the case of France, might not even commit their peacetime forces to the common defense. If we had sufficient strategic warning to activate and deploy U.S. reserves, they could provide considerable insurance in this type of contingency.

On balance, the correct number and mix of active and reserve U.S. land forces for European reinforcement is far from clear, and the range of uncertainty is very great. Under some assumptions our present capabilities appear to be roughly the right ones; under different ones we may have far too little capability, or alternatively, far more than we need. At present I have considerable question as to the need for maintaining our present reinforcing capability, particularly since our Allies are generally not making efforts to provide rapid and effective mobilization capabilities. Thus, it is evident that over the next year we must develop a reasonably detailed set of European contingencies against which to program our reinforcing capabilities, and we shall make this a priority undertaking.

[With respect to our Marine forces, for political reasons we should continue our present commitment of two Marine division-wing teams to NATO's strategic reserve. These forces are, however, maintained on the basis of non-NATO contingencies and should not be considered as part of the cost of our commitment to the defense of Europe.]

Alternative U.S. Tactical Air Forces for Europe. The U.S. now has 33 squadrons of Air Force tactical aircraft (fighter, reconnaissance, and attack types) in Europe, comprising about 622 aircraft.<sup>1/</sup> Two squadrons of B/RB-66 aircraft and one RF-4C squadron formerly in France are being returned to CONUS. These will be replaced by two "dual based" squadrons, i.e., units which will normally be based in the U.S., but

<sup>1/</sup> In addition to these 622, the Navy has about 150 aircraft continuously in the Mediterranean on two aircraft carriers, and the U.S. has plans to deploy to Europe 45 Air Force tactical squadrons, two Marine Wings and eight carrier air wings, comprising some 1700 unit equipment aircraft. If necessary, these could be supplemented by another 1600 unit equipment aircraft.

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will periodically be deployed to European bases for training, and to evidence the continuing commitment of these aircraft to NATO. I believe that over the next several years it will be both feasible and desirable to return to CONUS and dual-base a substantial number - perhaps 10-15 - of our Europe-based squadrons, but no decision will be made until the completion of the Air Force dual-basing study which is now underway.

The main advantage in so doing is a reduction in gold outflow of roughly \$2-4 million per squadron per year. The military disadvantage of dual-basing is that if large-scale war begins without warning, we may lose the use of CONUS-based aircraft for a few days, but as discussed above, the occurrence of major conflict without warning seems highly improbable, and in a smaller conflict not all of our aircraft would be immediately required in theater. In addition, until we are able to provide our European airbases with adequate active and passive defenses, our Europe-based aircraft will be very vulnerable in their peacetime deployments to surprise attack, and dual-basing reduces this risk. The Air Force is now undertaking a comprehensive study of the advantages and disadvantages of dual-basing; when it has been completed we should be able to judge the extent to which this concept should be implemented.

As discussed above in my Memorandum on Tactical Air Forces, NATO now appears to outstrip the Warsaw Pact very substantially in tactical air power and this advantage should increase further by 1971, even though we expect our Allies' air forces to shrink during the period. And yet, recent analyses of NATO's defenses have generally ascribed little or no positive effect on the land battle to this major advantage in air power. For example, the NAMILPO study states that the primary determinants of land force requirements to defend NATO's Central Region are:

- Size and composition of likely opposing force;
- Probability or possibility of the attacker gaining surprise as to time and location of his attack;
- Terrain on which the battle is likely to be fought; and
- Defense frontage capability of NATO units.

But those U.S. forces which we could deploy to Europe under the current programs are, in conjunction with our Allies' forces, probably sufficient to destroy in all regions the Pact's offensive and defensive aircraft and ground-to-air defense system, and to provide substantial interdiction, close air support, and associated reconnaissance for up

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to 90 days' sustained operations. In addition, sufficient aircraft could be retained outside Europe for at least a holding action in Asia. If our only objective were to neutralize the limited offensive nonnuclear capability of the Pact air forces, NATO would need far fewer aircraft than it has available. Specifically, it appears likely that the roughly 4,000 aircraft NATO now has in Europe would suffice to achieve this objective; the 3,000-5,000 potentially available U.S. augmentation aircraft would not be necessary for this purpose. Our present force structure must therefore be justified on the basis of the need for these forces in other theaters, or on the basis of the as yet undemonstrated utility of superior air forces in nonnuclear war in Europe.

It appears to me that our present major offensive air capabilities ought somewhat to reduce the amount of NATO land forces required to provide a given defensive capability by comparison with an air force sufficient only to neutralize the Pact's limited offensive airpower. We need, therefore, a careful review of the benefit we receive from what appears to be our very large tactical air advantage.

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