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20-NOV-87 TOR: 03:06  
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHSR/AMEMBASSY USSR IMMEDIATE 0414  
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5635  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 3876  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 3625  
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 9067

**IMMEDIATE**

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 361806

EXDIS

DOS REVIEWED 18-Apr-2007: DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

FOLLOWING GENEVA 12223 DTD 18 NOV SENT ACTION STATE  
RPTD FOR UR INFO.

QTE:

S E C R E T GENEVA 12223

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ARMACOST PRE-SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS WITH VORONTSOV  
ON AFGHANISTAN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST MET NOVEMBER 17  
IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES WITH FIRST DEPUTY  
FOREIGN MINISTER VORONTSOV. THE MORNING SESSION WAS  
DEVOTED TO AFGHANISTAN, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND SOUTHERN  
AFRICA. ACCOMPANYING UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST AT THE  
MORNING SESSION WERE NSC COUNSELOR PETER RODMAN, P  
STAFFER STEVEN COFFEY, AND EUR STAFFER STEPHEN YOUNG.  
VORONTSOV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY V. M. VASEV, CHIEF OF THE  
THIRD AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA; A. M. KALUGIN,  
SECTOR DIRECTOR OF THE NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA  
DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA; AND VORONTSOV'S ASSISTANT Y. G.  
MUSIENKO.

3. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST,  
VORONTSOV INDICATED THAT A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF  
SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN WOULD EMERGE FROM A FINAL  
GENEVA ROUND IN EARLY 1988. HE CONFIRMED THAT MOSCOW IS  
INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL  
ARRANGEMENTS ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY CORDOVEZ, BUT  
WITHOUT YIELDING CORDOVEZ THE MEDIATOR'S ROLE. HE  
REAFFIRMED AGREEMENT THAT KING ZAHIR SHAH COULD PLAY THE  
CENTRAL ROLE IN CONVENING A "GRAND ASSEMBLY" OR LOYA  
JIRGA. HE DENIED THAT NEW DRA CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES  
REPRESENT BACKSLIDING ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION,  
CHARACTERIZING THEM AS TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ONLY.



S E C R E T

VORONTSOV EXPRESSED READINESS TO VISIT ISLAMABAD IN MID-DECEMBER TO "TRY OUT" THE TIMETABLE PROPOSAL AND DISCUSS INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS. HE CONFIRMED SOVIET INTEREST IN NEUTRALITY ARRANGEMENTS ALONG THE LINES OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY, BUT SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH THE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT. HE DEMURRED ON FORESHADOWING THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE, BUT BROADLY, HINTED THAT GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ON THIS TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE SUMMIT. FINALLY, VORONTSOV EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS THAT GO BEYOND CURRENT U.S. THOUGHTS OF CIVILIAN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS OR THE MODEST MONITORING FORCE CONTEMPLATED IN THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS.

4. AFTER WELCOMING FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER VORONTSOV AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION, UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS BY EXPRESSING THE NEED TO MOVE THE US-SOVIET DIALOGUE FROM A GENERAL DECLARATION OF VIEWPOINTS AND CONCERNS TO MORE CONCRETE OPERATIONAL WORK ON RESOLVING SOME OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS THEMSELVES. THIS NEED WAS PARTICULARLY FELT, HE SAID, IN VIEW OF THE UPCOMING SUMMIT. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS -- INCLUDING MAJOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. PROGRESS ON THE REGIONAL AGENDA COULD HELP CONSOLIDATE THE PROGRESS MADE ON ARMS CONTROL. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO DEMONSTRATE FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE REGIONAL ISSUES AS WE APPROACH SENATE CONSIDERATION OF INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

5. REFERRING TO THEIR DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN THE PREVIOUS EVENING (NOVEMBER 16) OVER DINNER, ARMACOST NOTED THAT HE AND VORONTSOV HAD AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--A PROMPT TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS IS ESSENTIAL TO A SOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN WAR; A TIMETABLE WOULD COMPLETE THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND COULD INJECT REALISM AND MOMENTUM TO DISCUSSIONS ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, BUT SHOULD NOT BE CONTINGENT ON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT (VORONTSOV REMARKED "THAT'S RIGHT").

--ANY INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL AS DECISIONS ON A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS ARE FOR THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE -- NOT OUTSIDE PARTIES; SOME OF CORDOVEZ' IDEAS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES ON INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE INTERESTING AND WORTH TESTING. (HERE VORONTSOV INDICATED AGREEMENT, BUT STIPULATED THAT THE IDEAS SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED BY CORDOTEZ, THAT THIS LIES OUTSIDE HIS MANDATE.)

S E C R E T STATE 361806/01



--FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH HAS A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THE FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH HE AND VORONTSOV HAD NOT DEFINED PRECISELY THE NATURE OF HIS ROLE. (VORONTSOV INTERJECTED THAT THE KING HAS NO AMBITION FOR ANY POWER AND OFFICIAL STATUS EXCEPT AS THE MAN WHO IS BRINGING THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TOGETHER. "THE PEOPLE IN KABUL" ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT HIM AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEY ALSO HESITATE TO GIVE HIM A POLITICAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE -- SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER OR PRESIDENT. HE CAN BE A FATHER FIGURE WITH THE IMAGE OF A "GREAT RECONCILIATOR" WHO BRINGS PEOPLE TOGETHER AND THEN STEPS ASIDE. KABUL AND THE KING ARE AGREED ON THIS.)

--ZAHIR SHAH COULD CONVENE AND PRESIDE OVER A LOYA JIRGA (VORONTSOV INTERJECTED THAT THAT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AND THAT THE LOYA JIRGA SHOULD BE HELD ON AFGHAN RATHER THAN PAKASTANI TERRITORY -- PERHAPS IN THE BORDER AREA ADJACENT TO PAKISTAN. PAKASTANI IDEAS TO HOLD THE LOYA JIRGA IN ISLAMABAD ARE REDICULOUS. THE AFGHANS ARE A PROUD PEOPLE.) VORONSTOV AGREED WITH ARMACOST'S SUGGESTION THAT THE LOYA JIRGA COULD BE HELD IN A BORDER AREA INSIDE AFGHANISTAN.

6. CONTINUING HIS RECAPITULATION OF APPARENT POINTS OF AGREEMENT, UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST NOTED THE DESIRABILITY OF NEUTRALITY ARRANGEMENTS ALONG THE LINES OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY. HE OBSERVED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION OF THIS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, THE US SIDE JUDGED THAT THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY MODEL IS CONSONANT WITH SOVIET THINKING. IN REPLY, VORONTSOV SAID THE AFGHANS (DRA) ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT; THEY WANT A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, FRIENDLY TO ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS. ARMACOST SAID THAT THE US SIDE LIKES THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY BECAUSE UNDER ITS PROVISIONS AUSTRIA DECLARED ITS NEUTRALITY AND THE GREAT POWERS ENJOINED IT. VORONTSOV REPEATED AGAIN KABUL'S RECEPTIVITY TO THIS IDEA.

7. ARMACOST INQUIRED WHETHER VORONTSOV HAD ANY IDEAS ON HOW TO INTRODUCE NEUTRALITY ARRANGEMENTS SINCE THEY ARE NOT PART OF THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS. VORONTSOV SAID THAT, WHILE ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED COULD BE CONSULTED, THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH THE NEW INTERIM COALITION GOVERNMENT. ARMACOST URGED VORONTSOV TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PAKS WHEN HE MEETS WITH THEM IN MID-DECEMBER.

8. AS A POSSIBLE FINAL POINT OF AGREEMENT, ARMACOST NOTED THE POSITIVE ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASSESSING RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS AND DETERRING BLOOD-LETTING AFTER A SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. ARMACOST SAID THAT THE US IDEA WAS TO HAVE VARIOUS UN ORGANIZATIONS (WHO, UNHCR, ICRC, ETC.) ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN ONCE THE SOVIET UNION HAD ANNOUNCED ITS WITHDRAWAL PLANS. WHILE ASSESSING RECONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS, THESE AGENCIES WOULD ALSO SERVE AS THE EYES AND EARS OF THE WORLD



SECRET STATE 351806/02

COMMUNITY. THIS WOULD ACT AS A DETERRENT TO INTERNECINE WARFARE, ALTHOUGH AFTER A CIVIL WAR OF 7-YEARS DURATION SOME SETTLING OF SCORES IS PROBABLY UNAVOIDABLE.

9. VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT QUITE GRASPED SECRETARY SHULTZ' IDEAS ON THIS, BUT HE (VORONTSOV) WONDERED WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE JUST OUTLINED WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO STOP THE SETTLING OF SCORES. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS MAKE PROVISION FOR A MECHANISM TO MONITOR THE WITHDRAWAL AND CEASEFIRE, BUT THAT THIS PRESENCE WOULD BE QUITE MODEST. WE WILL NEED, HE SAID, TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO STOP FIRING AT EACH OTHER. THE US SIDE AND THE PAKISTANIS, WHO HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE, SHOULD PERSUADE THEIR FRIENDS TO STOP SHOOTING AND START TALKING.

10. VORONTSOV SAID THAT, BEYOND THIS, SOME SORT OF GUARANTEES MAY BE NEEDED. THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS PROVIDE FOR THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BACK TO AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT THEIR WEAPONS, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT, HE SAID, TO ENVISION THIS HAPPENING. SOMETHING MORE BEYOND UN OBSERVERS MAY, THEREFORE, BE NEEDED. THE PAKS, DURING MEETINGS AT THE UNGA, HAD PROPOSED THE IDEA OF A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PLAYED WITH THE IDEA, BUT KEPT COMING UP AGAINST PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF WHERE TO PUT IT, ETC. VORONTSOV INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS FURTHER WITH THE PAKISTANIS, BUT THAT, MOST OF ALL, WE WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON PERSUASION TO CURTAIL THE BLOODLETTING.

11. ARMACOST ALSO EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. IN A

SECRET STATE 351806/02



SITUATION OF CIVIL STRIFE, SUCH FORCES CAN BECOME MAGNETS FOR THE FIGHTING RATHER THAN A BUFFER BETWEEN CONTENDING PARTIES. VORONTSOV REITERATED THAT THE FORCE OF 50-60 OBSERVERS ENVISIONED BY CORDOVEZ WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT AND SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THIS COULD BE BEEFED UP IF ADDITIONAL UN FINANCING WERE FOUND. A LARGER OBSERVER FORCE WOULD BE HELPFUL, HE SAID, BUT, IN ANY EVENT, THERE IS STILL TIME TO CONSIDER ALL THIS BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

12. TURNING TO AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, ARMACOST POINTED TO SOVIET FAILURE TO ANNOUNCE A TIMEFRAME FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THE DECISION IS UP TO YOU (SOVIETS), HE SAID, BUT THIS QUESTION IS CENTRAL TO US POLICY SINCE WE (THE US) ARE TO ACT AS GUARANTORS UNDER THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS. HERE ARMACOST PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR FRONT LOADING ANY TROOP WITHDRAWAL SO THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD PROVIDE AN EARLY ERNEST OF ITS INTENT TO CARRY OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS. UNDER THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS, THE US AND PAKISTAN WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH A SINGLE DECISION POINT (ON ENDING SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE), WHILE THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL WILL BE A PROCESS UNFOLDING OVER TIME. FOR THAT REASON, SAID ARMACOST, THE US COULD NOT SERVE AS A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS UNLESS THE CONCEPT OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL IS SPELLED OUT.

13. AFTER CLARIFYING THAT ARMACOST HAD IN MIND A CONCEPT WHEREBY A GIVEN PERCENTAGE -- 50 PERCENT WAS USED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES -- OF SOVIET TROOPS WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN BY A TIME FIXED IN A WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE, VORONTSOV OBSERVED THAT THIS GENERAL CONCEPT WAS ALREADY CONTAINED IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS. WE (THE SOVIETS) WILL ABIDE BY THIS, HE SAID. VORONTSOV DID NOT FURTHER ELABORATE, EXCEPT TO SAY THE SOVIETS WOULD ANNOUNCE A TIMETABLE DURING THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND, WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE IN JANUARY RATHER THAN FEBRUARY. WE WILL BE TALKING TO CORDOVEZ ABOUT THIS, HE SAID.

14. VORONTSOV REFUSED TO FORESHADOW TO ARMACOST WHAT THAT TIMETABLE WOULD LOOK LIKE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE PAKISTANIS FIRST. NOTING THAT THIS MIGHT OCCUR AFTER THE SUMMIT, ARMACOST OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD IF GORBACHEV WERE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS TIMETABLE WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE SUMMIT. VORONTSOV ASSURED ARMACOST THAT GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ON THIS ISSUE IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT.

15. AT THIS POINT, VORONTSOV PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON AFGHANISTAN. BEGIN TEXT OF UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION. "THE TWO SIDES UNDERLINED THE URGENT NECESSITY OF THE QUICKEST UNBLOCKING OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD ON THE BASIS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, OUTSIDE NON-INTERFERENCE, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN (OR SOVIET) FORCES. THE TWO SIDES DECLARED THEIR SUPPORT



FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, MR. CORDOVEZ, ON BEHALF OF A RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN."

16. VORONTSOV EXPLAINED THAT THE WORDS COULD DIFFER BUT THE GENERAL IDEA OF THIS LANGUAGE WAS TO GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND CONVEY ASSURANCES THAT THE AFGHAN PROBLEM IS BEING ATTENDED TO BY THE TWO NATIONS' LEADERS. CORDOVEZ WANTS THE TWO LEADERS TO GIVE THIS KIND OF ENCOURAGEMENT. ARMACOST OBSERVED THAT THE MOST CRITICAL THING FOR THE US IS THAT THERE BE AT THE SUMMIT SOME INDICATION THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WILL PROPOSE AT THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND A PLAN FOR THE SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL OF OUTSIDE FORCES. A SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE IS CRUCIAL FOR A COMPLETION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. GORBACHEV SHOULD BE ABLE TO SPECIFY THE TIMETABLE AT THE SUMMIT.

17. VORONTSOV INDICATED THAT GORBACHEV WOULD NOT RESPOND TO A REAGAN DEMAND ON THE TIMETABLE, BUT WOULD BE PREPARED TO VOLUNTEER SOVIET PLANS FOR A TIMETABLE. SAYING THAT HE HAD NO COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE TO PROPOSE ON AFGHANISTAN, ARMACOST ASKED VORONTSOV WHETHER THE SOVIETS INTEND TO DISCUSS THE TIMETABLE WITH THE PAKISTANIS PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT. VORONTSOV REPLIED THERE WAS NOT TIME LEFT TO CONSULT WITH THE PAKISTANIS BEFORE THE SUMMIT. YOU (THE US) SAY THAT PAKISTAN IS ON THE FRONT LINE. I AGREE, HE SAID, BUT WE WILL TALK TO YOU FIRST AND THEN THE PAKS.

18. ARMACOST EMPHASIZED THAT, WITH OVER 3 MILLION REFUGEES ON THEIR SOIL, THE PAKS WERE INDEED FRONT AND CENTER. THE REFUGEES WILL NOT RETURN UNLESS THEIR INTERESTS ARE ACCOMMODATED. THAT IS WHY, IN PREPARING

S E C R E T STATE 361806/03



AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP ARRANGEMENTS IN WHICH THE REFUGEES AND RESISTANCE WILL HAVE CONFIDENCE. IT IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT REASON FOR DISTINGUISHING IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PDPA AS A PARTY AND THE PDPA AS A GOVERNING ENTITY. VORONTSOV INTERJECTED THAT THE PDPA, AT ITS JUST CONCLUDED PARTY CONFERENCE, HAD AGREED TO THIS DISTINCTION, CHARACTERIZING ITSELF AS JUST ONE PARTY AMONG MANY. VORONTSOV URGED ARMACOST TO LOOK AT THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTY CONFERENCE. THE PDPA CLAIMED TO BE ONLY ONE PARTY, ONE ELEMENT, IN NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

19. ARMACOST DISPUTED VORONTSOV'S PORTRAYAL OF THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION UNDERWAY IN AFGHANISTAN, NOTING THAT THE PDPA PLANS TO ENHANCE THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY, INSTALL NAJIB IN IT, AND THEN CONVENE ITS OWN LOYA JIRGA IN NOVEMBER TO BLESS A NEW CONSTITUTION WHICH WILL ENSHRINE THE SPECIAL GUIDING ROLE OF THE PARTY. THIS WILL FORECLOSE, HE SAID, ANY POSSIBILITY OF GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

20. IN REPLY, VORONTSOV URGED ARMACOST TO LOOK AT THE CONSTITUTION. THE ARRANGEMENTS FORMALIZED IN THE CONSTITUTION ARE ONLY OF AN INTERIM NATURE. THE PARTY IS PREPARING ITSELF FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS MAKING A TRANSITION TO JUST THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. YOU (ARMACOST) SHOULD NOT WORRY TOO MUCH.

21. INDICATING THAT VORONTSOV HAD NOT ALLAYED HIS CONCERNS, ARMACOST NOTED THAT, IN HEADING INTO A PERIOD OF NEW GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS, ONE GROUP SHOULD NOT PROMULGATE A CONSTITUTION THAT MAKES RECONCILIATION HARDER, NOT EASIER. THE NEW CONSTITUTION SPELLS OUT A SPECIAL ROLE FOR THE PDPA AND SPECIAL POWERS ARE BESTOWED ON THE PRESIDENCY WITH THERE BEING EVERY INDICATION THAT NAJIB INTENDS TO OCCUPY THAT OFFICE. THIS IS NOT A FORMULA FOR ACCOMMODATION, SAID ARMACOST, BUT A FORMULA FOR CONSOLIDATING NAJIB'S POWER, THOUGH ON A NARROW POLITICAL BASE.

22. VORONTSOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NOW THE PDPA HAS THE "MENTALITY OF A RULING PARTY." THE PDPA HAS TO SHIFT, HE SAID, ITS MENTALITY TO THAT OF ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN A COALITION. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO CREATE THIS NEW MENTALITY. THERE REMAINS SOME DISTANCE FOR THE PDPA TO GO. THIS IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM. THEY SAY "WE WERE NOT DEFEATED. KABUL IS IN OUR POSSESSION, AS ARE VARIOUS PROVINCES. WHY DID WE MAKE THE REVOLUTION IF THE KING IS COMING?" WE (THE SOVIETS), SAID VORONTSOV, ARE HELPING THE PDPA TO MAKE THE TRANSITION FROM THE DOMINANT PARTY TO JUST ONE OF THE PARTIES. IT IS EASY TO TALK ABOUT ALL OF THIS IN WASHINGTON, BUT IN KABUL THEY ARE GOING THROUGH REAL CONVULSIONS.

23. ARMACOST SAID THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS



TO WHAT IS HAPPENING IN AFGHANISTAN. EITHER THE PDPA IS CONSOLIDATING ITS POWER IN PREPARATION FOR YOUR WITHDRAWAL OR SIMPLY AVOIDING THE HARD DECISIONS THAT MUST BE MADE. VORONTSOV INTERJECTED THAT "OTHERS" WERE NOT BEING HELPFUL. THE US WAS NOT TRYING TO CHANGE THE MENTALITY OF THE RESISTANCE LEADERS IN PESHAWAR. THEY SIT IN PESHAWAR WITH THE NICE LIFE AND CRITICIZE EVERYTHING. THEY COME TO WASHINGTON AND ARE PRAISED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR NOT ENGAGING IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION..

24. ARMACOST REPLIED THAT THE RESISTANCE LEADERS HAD BEEN PRAISED FOR FIGHTING FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY -- A NOBLE CAUSE. THERE HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE PROPOSAL THAT COULD ELICIT THE INTEREST OF THE MUJAHIDIN. YOU (VORONTSOV) DESCRIBED THE JULY OFFER (WHICH OFFERED THE OPPOSITION MANY PORTFOLIOS, BUT NO CONTROL OVER THE REAL INSTRUMENTS OF POWER) AS ONLY AN OPENING BID, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING IN IT FOR THE RESISTANCE AND THERE WAS NO FOLLOW-UP.

25. VORONTSOV RESPONDED THAT HE HAD SEEN NO PEACE PLANS FROM THE MUJAHIDIN. HE DISPUTED ARMACOST'S OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT PEACE PROPOSALS FROM THE RESISTANCE ABSENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF A TIMETABLE FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL, SAYING THAT THE RESISTANCE SIMPLY WANTS TO THROW OUT THE DRA AND TAKE ALL POWER FOR ITSELF.

26. NSC COUNSELOR RODMAN URGED THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN CONTACTS WITH THE RESISTANCE. THE US SIMPLY WANTS A PROCESS FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. VORONTSOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS DO HAVE THEIR OWN CONTACTS WITH THE RESISTANCE, BUT ARE NOT GOING TO REPORT THEM TO US.

S E C R E T      STATE 361806/04



27. AT THIS POINT, VORONTSOV PRESENTED ORALLY THE FOLLOWING "REPORT": ON OCTOBER 21, THE US AMBASSADOR IN PAKISTAN MET WITH THREE LEADERS OF THE RESISTANCE (HETKMATYAR, SAYYAF, AND RABBANI) TO DISCUSS CARRYING OUT PROPAGANDA AND MILITARY MEASURES DIRECTED AT COMPROMISING THE POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE AMBASSADOR PROMISED TO PROMULGATE A DIRECTIVE (A) WARNING AGAINST CONTACTS WITH THE KABUL GOVERNMENT UNDER PENALTY OF ISLAMIC LAW OR SHARIYA; (B) CALLING FOR PLACEMENT OF STINGER MISSILES AT AIRPORTS; (C) PLACING US ADVISORS WITH THE LARGEST DETACHMENTS OF THE MUJAHIDIN TO ADVISE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS; AND (D) GIVING CLARIFICATION TO RESISTANCE LEADERS ABOUT THE DELIVERY OF US WEAPONS, INCLUDING STINGER MISSILES. THE AMBASSADOR DECLARED THAT THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF WEAPONS TO BE DELIVERED WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY THE VARIOUS RESISTANCE DETACHMENTS. ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THIS MEETING WERE A PAKASTANI AIR FORCE COMNNDER, THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND PAK ARMY CORPS, AND THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR PAKISTAN FOR THE NORTHWEST BORDER PROVINCES.

28. ARMACOST ADVISED VORONTSOV NOT TO TRUST SUCH A REPORT; IT IS FULL OF MISPRESENTATIONS. RODMAN JOINED IN THAT THE PRESENCE OF US ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN WAS INCONCEIVABLE AND THAT SOMEONE WAS MISLEADING THE SOVIETS. TO VORONTSOV'S COMMENT THAT THE RESISTANCE NEEDED TO CHANGE ITS MENTALITY AND THINK POLITICALLY, RODMAN SAID THAT THE RESISTANCE IS TRYING TO DEVELOP GREATER UNITY. THE ELECTION OF A NEW RESISTANCE LEADER OR RAIS WAS A SIGN THAT THAT WAS HAPPENING AND SHOULD BE REGARDED AS POSITIVE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW.

29. ARMACOST NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT SETTING A DEADLINE FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL WOULD HELP. IT WOULD HAVE A TRANSFORMING EFFECT. THE ALLIANCE LEADERS HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO INTRODUCE INTO THEIR DELIBERATIONS DIVISIVE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR AND DEFINITIVE SOVIET SIGNAL THAT IT IS WITHDRAWING. A SOVIET DECISION ON THE TIMETABLE WOULD REFOCUS RESISTANCE ATTENTION ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

30. ARMACOST CONCLUDED THE AFGHAN DISCUSSION BY ASKING VORONTSOV WHAT HE INTENDED TO TELL CORDOVEZ IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS LIKE CORDOVEZ' IDEAS BUT THINK ANOTHER MEDIATOR WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. VORONTSOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WOULD BE TRICKY, BUT STATED THAT THE UN SHOULD NOT GET IN THE BUSINESS OF REARRANGING THE INTERNAL POLITICAL LIFE OF ANY COUNTRY. ARMACOST NOTED THAT PAKASTANI INTERLOCUTORS THINK THE CONVOCATION OF A LOYA JIRGA UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE KING WOULD BE THE KEY EVENT.

31. VORONTSOV SAID THE AFGHANS IN KABUL AGREED WITH THIS, THOUGH HE COULD NOT BE SURE WHAT THE "MAGNIFICENT SEVEN" IN PESHAWAR WOULD SAY ABOUT THIS. PETRONE UNQTE SHULTZ  
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