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To : The Acting Secretary
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From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *4, 12, S/P* **FILE COPY**
Subject: The Special Committee: Can It Satisfy European Nuclear Aspirations?

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This paper analyzes why and to what extent the European members of NATO wish to participate actively in the nuclear defense of the Alliance; traces the development of the Special Committee, proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara, and its Nuclear Planning Working Group; and examines whether the Committee or any successor organization of similar scope can satisfy European desires as they exist today for an active role in nuclear affairs.

ABSTRACT

The Defense Ministers of the five countries represented on the Nuclear Planning Working Group of the Special Committee meet in Rome on September 23 and 24, 1966 to discuss whether a permanent organization should now be established within NATO for continuing consultation on nuclear policy and, if so, what form this organization should take. As the Working Group considers whether to "go permanent," this paper examines to what extent an organization such as the Committee can solve the "nuclear problem" of the Atlantic Alliance as it exists today.

This "problem" has its roots in the late 1950's and has gone through a number of phases since then. By the early 1960's there was a fairly widespread feeling in Europe that Alliance nuclear responsibilities should be modified in some way in order to give greater consideration to European security needs. This feeling resulted in part from a mixture of the

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"missile gap," the Berlin crisis and misunderstandings about the US policy of flexible response. As the events which gave rise to this feeling have passed by, however, no European member of NATO, other than Great Britain, France and Germany, has continued to express a serious desire to change the nuclear status quo. Although the others are interested in participating in changes that may be made to accomodate Germany, neither their desire for security nor their desire for status or prestige is strong enough to lead them to press actively for changes in existing nuclear relationships.

Since French and British desires to play a role in nuclear defense have been satisfied by the development of national nuclear forces, Germany is the only NATO country that has actively and consistently sought a wider role in nuclear defense. Germany's exposed position in Central Europe naturally makes security considerations of compelling importance for Bonn. In addition, Germany's desire for the status and prestige that would come from a nuclear role has been an important incentive, although the Germans have been restrained in voicing this desire.

German leaders have made clear that Germany has no intention of developing a national nuclear force. It is not very likely, in fact, that Germany would do so in foreseeable circumstances. Instead, Germany has sought an arrangement with its allies that would give it some voice in how US nuclear weapons would be used in Germany's defense in the event of war, and that would give Germany some kind of visible role in nuclear affairs. After MLF/ANF proposals were dropped from active consideration, the Germans continued to seek a "hardware solution" --- an arrangement which would have enabled them to participate in some system of joint ownership and possibly control of at least a small part of the nuclear force committed to the defense of Europe.

A review of the origins and development of the Special Committee shows that Germany has pressed the need for such a "hardware solution" with decreasing urgency since the spring of 1965. This trend is in part based on specific developments of the period, including suspension of MLF/ANF discussions, the formation of the Special Committee where Germany has been able to voice its concerns about nuclear policy, and a general preoccupation with the 1966 "NATO crisis" caused by France. Long-range trends also lie behind the decreasing emphasis by German leaders on the need for "hardware." The threat of war appears less imminent in Europe than in the early 1960's, and European governments are placing increased emphasis on "detente" rather than "defense" with regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. From the MLF experience, Germany knows that pressing for "hardware" now would not evoke enthusiasm from most of its European allies, and would in fact draw a vigorous negative reaction from France. British (and other European) interest in the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty has reinforced the UK's (and other countries') lack of enthusiasm for an MLF, or even for the UK's own ANF proposal. They believe that by granting some control to Germany over the use of nuclear weapons in a MLF/ANF arrangement, all chances for non-proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union might be destroyed.

The present German Government is still committed to seeking a "hardware solution," and it will probably continue to advocate this policy, at least for the record. Apart from these political interests, however, there would seem to be less reason now for Germany to need "hardware" than there was in the early 1960's, and therefore less real pressure behind its quest for it. This does not mean that the security and prestige considerations which

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have led it to seek actively a wider role in nuclear affairs in the past have disappeared. To the extent that these considerations remain, however, the permanent successor to the Special Committee and its Nuclear Planning Working Group may well suffice to satisfy them, if it can proceed with the momentum which has been established by the Committee over the past sixteen months. Such a body should be able to give the Germans a sufficiently greater sense of participation in the formation and execution of alliance nuclear policy to satisfy their diminishing security concerns. Such a body would also be the only institutionalized "inner circle" in NATO, now that the Standing Group has been disbanded. German membership in it would seem to meet adequately Germany's aspirations for status and prestige.

I. EUROPEAN INTEREST IN CHANGING EXISTING NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS

There are two basic reasons why certain European members of NATO have been interested in obtaining for themselves some voice and role -- larger for some and smaller for others -- in the nuclear defense of Western Europe. The first reason, of course, is security. The second is status or prestige.

Security. Since the end of World War II the West Europeans have looked to the United States and its nuclear power for their defense against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. For a long period -- the years in which they were engaged in reconstructing their economies -- they were content to leave the full responsibility for the control and direction of their defense, both conventional and nuclear, in the hands of the American colossus.

As they found their new strength, their contribution on the conventional side increased (albeit insufficiently from the US viewpoint). At the same time, they became aware that perhaps they were entitled to some say in the control of the nuclear weapons which the US had allocated for the defense of Western Europe. The UK, with its national nuclear force and its special relationship with the US dating from the war, was not concerned to the same degree as others in this development. Nor was France, which, despite US discouragement, proceeded to develop a nuclear weapons system on its own and to establish for itself a more independent position than its European neighbors. Germany, however, bound by the constraints imposed by defeat, became the object of more and more concern in the nuclear context as it grew in economic power and subsequently in military strength after its admission into the Atlantic Alliance partnership. The division of Germany's territory and the obvious antipathy toward the Germans displayed by the Soviet Bloc made the matter of its security an even more sensitive issue for the FRG than it was for its Western European neighbors. Since the nuclear deterrent played the major role in Western Europe's defense, it was a logical development for West Europeans like the Germans who had no national nuclear arms to seek ways in which they might have greater influence over those who did, namely the United States.

Furthermore, despite repeated and explicit assurances from American officials, a degree of doubt persists in Europe whether the US would actually use its nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe in the event of war. Often these doubts are expressed in terms of some future US Government being less committed to the defense of Europe than its predecessors have been since World War II. Such doubts are inherent in the Atlantic nuclear relationship and they have been apparent at least since the beginning of the East-West "nuclear standoff" in the late 1950's. Europeans cannot help asking themselves whether an American President would invite retaliation against American cities by releasing his nuclear forces in response to a nuclear attack on Europe, or in response to a conventional attack in Europe which could not be stopped by conventional means.

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These doubts have been aggravated by American adoption of the strategy of flexible response. Many Europeans have an oversimplified confidence in the value of strategic nuclear weapons as an all-purpose deterrent. This confidence is in part a carryover from the 1950's when the US strategic force, in effect, served as such a deterrent for NATO. Preoccupation with the importance of strategic nuclear forces has meant that Europeans do not look on flexible response as the more complete deterrent it is intended to be, but instead fear that a greater reliance on conventional forces reflects an increased reluctance on the part of the United States to use nuclear weapons and results in a more open temptation to the Soviet Union to exploit this reluctance. These fears are reinforced in Europe by a general lack of enthusiasm for paying the cost of enlarged conventional armies. For these reasons, therefore, there has been a tendency in Western Europe not to be satisfied with leaving nuclear decision-making in the Alliance entirely up to the United States.

Status and Prestige. In addition to security considerations, a desire for status or prestige has motivated some NATO nations to want to play an active role in nuclear defense arrangements. Status and prestige would obviously follow from possession of a national nuclear force. To a considerable, if lesser, degree, they would also come from participation in a nuclear sharing arrangement or in a planning organization which had some real control over deployment, targeting and establishing the conditions for use of US nuclear forces that are committed to the defense of Europe.

It is difficult to sort out the degree to which a given European nation's nuclear aspirations are based on either security considerations or prestige, particularly since these aspirations fluctuate with shifts in the overall international situation. Most countries would tend to emphasize security considerations when discussing their aspirations, and this would probably be the basic motivation for smaller countries which cannot even hope for the prestige that would come from possessing a national nuclear force, but which nevertheless want maximum influence on the decision-making of the allies on whom they depend for their ultimate defense. The French, however, have been frank in citing prestige as one of their major reasons for developing the force de dissuasion, and the British, whether explicitly under the Conservatives or implicitly under Labor, also view the possession of their own nuclear force as a symbol of power and status.

Present Dimensions of NATO's "Nuclear Problem." The feeling which was fairly widespread in Europe in the early 1960's, that nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance should be modified in some way to give broader consideration to European security needs, has subsided. The developments which gave rise to this feeling -- the "missile gap" and tension over Berlin -- have passed by. With three exceptions (France, the UK and Germany) NATO countries in Europe have not recently expressed an urgent desire, for either security or prestige reasons, to have a voice in nuclear affairs.

Some degree of doubt about the willingness of the US to use its nuclear forces on Europe's behalf still persists in these countries, but it is not strong enough at present to lead them to press actively for changes in existing nuclear relationships. This is so because the threat of a Soviet attack now seems remote to most Europeans. Also, the desire for status or prestige in these countries is too modest to warrant the high cost or added responsibilities of developing a national nuclear force or even, as the history of the MLF/ANF project has shown, of insisting on a nuclear sharing arrangement. The Italians, it is true, have consistently wanted to participate in any organization that might be created to deal with nuclear affairs, but their express motivation has not been a genuinely felt need to play a greater role in nuclear matters, but, rather, a desire to assure Italy's membership in important NATO organizations. In addition, Italy and several smaller members of the Alliance have been interested in participating in any framework that might be devised to handle the very sensitive issue of German nuclear participation. None of these countries, however, is challenging the Alliance's nuclear status quo as such.

Since French and British desires to play a role in nuclear defense have been satisfied by the development of national nuclear forces, the Federal Republic of Germany is the only NATO country that has actively sought a wider role in nuclear defense. The FRG's exposed geographic position makes security considerations more compelling than they are for most of the other Allies. A collapse of the "forward defense" strategy would lead to the rapid occupation of German territory, and exchanges of tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe would undoubtedly have devastating effects on Germany. The West German Government therefore has a very real interest in the questions of when and where nuclear weapons would be used in the event of war. Under existing arrangements, however, it has very little to say about the matter.

In addition to these abiding security considerations, status and prestige have been important for German policy. The lack of a nuclear role clearly sets Germany apart from the other members of the Alliance's "big four" (the US, UK and France), even though German officials have been restrained in voicing their desire for the prestige that would come from some form of control over nuclear weapons.

German leaders have repeatedly made clear that Germany has no intention of developing a national nuclear force, and it is quite unlikely, in fact, that it would attempt to do so in foreseeable circumstances. If Germany went back on its formal undertaking not to manufacture nuclear weapons, a strong reaction would come not only from its Western European Union allies, but from the US and USSR as well. Germany's relationship to Western defense arrangements would be radically changed, and in the long run German security would be seriously weakened.

Instead of a national nuclear force, Germany wants some arrangement with its Allies which would give it a voice in how US strategic nuclear weapons would be used for Germany's defense in the event of war, and also some kind of visible role in nuclear affairs. A nuclear sharing arrangement such as the MLF was attractive to the Germans for these reasons. While the US would have retained its veto, Germany would have been able to play an active part in deciding where and when at least a small part of the Alliance's strategic force would be used in the event of hostilities. (Germany already plays a part in deciding where and when tactical nuclear weapons would be used because of the presence of such weapons on German territory under two-key control.) Whatever the details of the system devised, it would also have had the advantage for the Germans of providing a strong additional bond linking the United States to the Federal Republic.

Although the MLF idea is no longer under active consideration, the Germans have continued to express interest in some sort of a "hardware solution" involving the joint ownership and control of at least a small part of the strategic weapons assigned to Europe's defense in order to assure German participation in the decision-making process for the use of these weapons. Concurrently with the successful development of the Special Committee, German pressure for a "hardware solution" -- while it has not disappeared -- has noticeably diminished.

II. THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

As an ad hoc organization designed to expose at least a few NATO countries to the realities of nuclear planning and to give them an opportunity to consult to an unprecedented degree with the US on nuclear matters, the Special Committee (or, more precisely, the Committee's Nuclear Planning Working Group, where the important discussions have taken place) has been a success.

The "Select Committee." Secretary McNamara proposed the formation of such a Committee on May 31, 1965 to a NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris. Advocating an improvement in NATO's "mechanisms for consultation, particularly with respect to nuclear policy," he suggested that a "Select Committee" of four or five Ministers of Defense should study possible ways "of improving and extending allied participation in planning for the use of nuclear forces," including US strategic forces. The Committee could also explore ways to improve communications arrangements in a crisis so that allied consultation on the use of nuclear forces would be assured.

The Select Committee proposal, which had not been described to other NATO Governments in advance, aroused immediate public and official interest. US officials stressed that its creation would be additional to any action on MLE/ANF which, at that time, was still under active negotiation. US officials said that the Select Committee should be viewed in the context of past efforts to increase opportunities for consultation within NATO on nuclear matters. These included the 1962 Athens Guidelines which clarified to some degree the circumstances in which consultations would be held within the Alliance on the use of nuclear weapons, and certain steps taken as a consequence of the Ottawa Ministerial Meeting in 1963. These included the internationalization of SHAPE's nuclear planning staff (which was previously staffed only by US and UK officers), the inclusion of non-US officers on SACEUR's liaison team at SAC in Omaha, and the appointment of a Belgian General as nuclear deputy to SACEUR. Past steps, however, had not led to the meaningful consultations which the Select Committee was intended to provide -- nor had they provided a "select" role for the Federal Republic, the nub of the Alliance's "nuclear problem."

France told NAC on July 7 that it saw "no usefulness" in the Select Committee proposal and would not participate, presumably because it viewed the Committee as another American effort to extend US influence in Europe. France has derided the importance of the Committee in public statements, but has not specifically attempted to prevent the other NATO members from organizing the Committee on an ad hoc basis within NATO's framework. With the exception of France, the reaction from NATO governments to Secretary McNamara's proposal was positive. On June 8 Chancellor Erhard told Secretary McNamara in Washington that he favored the idea. German officials indicated to our Embassy in Bonn, however, that they were concerned that the Select Committee would be viewed as a substitute for a multilateral nuclear force.

The Special Committee. In fact, overall interest in the proposal was so great that by fall the name of the proposed Committee had been changed from "Select" to "Special" because it had ten interested NATO members instead of the four or five originally envisaged. At that time, only Iceland, Norway, Luxembourg, France and Portugal were non-participants. In order to have meaningful consultation on the sensitive aspects of nuclear policy, however, it was essential that the discussions take place before a very limited number of participants from a small group of nations including the major allies. It was therefore decided to establish three working groups within the Special Committee framework, of which the most important was Working Group III on Nuclear Planning where discussion of nuclear policy would take place and where Germany would have an opportunity to participate. The two other working groups, of somewhat less significance, were Working Group I on Information and Data, which would define the kind of intelligence and other data required for governments to engage in meaningful consultations about the use of nuclear weapons, and Working Group II on Communications, which would determine whether improvements should be made in NATO communications facilities in order to provide for adequate and timely consultation about the use of nuclear weapons in an emergency. NATO's Secretary General would chair the Committee, which would not have the power to make decisions, but could make recommendations to the North Atlantic Council. The Committee was to be a temporary organization of indefinite duration.

The First Meeting. The Defense Ministers of the ten countries represented on the Committee met in Paris on November 27, 1965 to approve formally the structure of the Special Committee and the membership of the working groups. The US hoped to limit the Nuclear Planning Working Group to four countries (the US, UK, Germany and Italy), but the Defense Minister of the Netherlands was instructed to insist on the inclusion of a smaller country. The Ministers decided to avoid an almost impossible political problem by choosing the fifth country by lot, not exactly the solution (namely its own participation) that the Netherlands had in mind. The country chosen was Turkey.

In general, the membership of the working groups was distributed in a delicate balance designed to solve the requirements for meaningful consultation in the Nuclear Planning Working Group, and to assuage any hurt feelings on the part of other countries left out of the discussions on nuclear policy. The Committee consisted of the US, the UK, Germany, Italy, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey. The US and the UK were represented on all three working groups. Canada, whose desire to be represented on the Nuclear Planning Working Group was not satisfied, was allowed to participate in both of the other working groups. All the other members were represented on only one of the groups: Belgium and Greece on Working Group I (Information), Denmark and the Netherlands on Working Group II (Communications), and Germany, Italy and Turkey on Working Group III (Nuclear Planning).

At the November 27 meeting Secretary McNamara gave a detailed description of the existing nuclear capabilities of the Alliance. He described the nuclear

stockpiles in Europe, breaking them down by type, country of location and nationality of delivery forces. He also described the numbers and yields of weapons held by the US strategic force. To participants at the meeting, his presentation clearly indicated that the US was serious when it said that it wanted to consult more closely with its Allies on nuclear policy. It was followed by a presentation by the UK Defense Minister, who expressed the view that NATO had sufficient nuclear capabilities. The problem, he said, was how to establish political arrangements which would enable the Alliance to decide to release the weapons when necessary.

The German Defense Minister said that no country could depend entirely on the decision of others to ensure its own security. The Special Committee, he said, could not be a substitute for a collective nuclear force. These misgivings about the Committee (and concern over the heavy UK representation in the working groups) were repeated privately to American officials after the meeting. German officials expressed anxiety that the Special Committee would divert attention from the MLF.

The November 27 meeting established the Special Committee as a going concern. In the following months, Working Group I under UK chairmanship attempted to determine whether sufficient intelligence information and other data were available for governments to engage in timely and meaningful consultations about the possible use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. The Working Group concluded that while the information needed was generally available somewhere in NATO, it required improved handling. Specific recommendations were prepared for the consideration of NAC. Working Group II, under Dutch chairmanship, concluded that supplementary communications networks would be needed to assure timely consultations between NATO governments about the possible use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. The Working Group assessed various communications systems which might fulfill this need, and is preparing specific recommendations.

Working Group III. The most important discussions, of course, have taken place in the Nuclear Planning Working Group. While the representatives in other working groups have been specialists in the subject matter involved, Working Group III has met formally only at the ministerial level. Permanent Representatives to NAC have acted as the Ministers' deputies and have consulted at the working level between formal Working Group meetings.

Working Group III's first meeting in Washington on February 17-18, 1966, was devoted to a discussion of the strategic forces available for NATO's defense. In an agenda designed to emphasize the concerns of non-nuclear powers, the meeting opened with a period for questions. The non-nuclear members of NATO sought assurance: 1) that an attack against them would prompt a timely nuclear reaction; 2) that nuclear strikes would not be prematurely started, especially not from the territory of the particular NATO nation involved; and 3) that risks of nuclear devastation would as far as possible be equally shared by all members of the Alliance. The question period was followed by American briefings on how the US assesses the threat and then plans, procures, deploys and targets its strategic weapons.

This first meeting of Working Group III was by all estimates a success. The degree of interest was high, and the exchanges were frank and lively. US presentations were forthcoming and enough time was allotted for discussion. At the close of the first session, Secretary McNamara commented that he had learned more about the views and problems of his colleagues in the past three hours than he had in the past five years. The German Defense Minister repeated his view that the Special Committee approach would not, in itself, satisfy German interests, but he did not specifically stress German interest in a collective nuclear force in this connection. In their Agreed Minute the Ministers said that the meeting had showed that the general size of existing nuclear forces was adequate, but that there was a need for further consideration of increased participation by non-nuclear NATO nations in planning and consultation.

Working Group III met again in London on April 28-29, this time to discuss tactical nuclear warfare. SACEUR and SACLANT briefed the Defense Ministers in detail on the tactical nuclear weapons available to the Alliance, and a UK presentation described the lessons learned about the value of tactical nuclear weapons from British war games held in Germany in 1963 and 1965. Again the level of interest in the subject matter was high, and the open exchanges were spirited. The Agreed Minute noted that NATO's resources of tactical nuclear weapons appeared to be adequate but indicated that the Ministers found tactical nuclear weapons to have definite limitations. As the Minute explained, because of the dangers both of fallout in allied territory and of escalation, it was difficult to predict whether it would be to the net advantage of NATO to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in hostilities of a scale less than general war. The Minute also raised the question of replacing the Special Committee with a permanent organization in NATO which would make possible continuing participation in nuclear planning by non-nuclear nations. At the April meeting the German Defense Minister seemed relaxed about the "hardware" question, and he did not feel it necessary to make his usual declaration reserving the German position on this issue.

The July Meetings of The Committee and Working Group III. A meeting of the Special Committee as a whole was held on July 26 in order to give the Defense Ministers who were not in Working Group III a sense of participation in the discussions on nuclear matters. Norway and Portugal participated in this meeting as new members of the Committee. The chairmen of the three working groups gave reports, and many of the documents prepared for Working Group III meetings were circulated to all the Ministers.

On the afternoon of July 26 the Nuclear Planning Working Group met briefly to exchange views about a permanent organization to replace the Special Committee. The US had proposed the outlines of a new organization and had recommended beforehand that the Working Group approve its permanent establishment at the July 26 meeting. The German and British Governments, however, were reluctant to reach such a decision at that time. In view of the uncertainties resulting from the NATO crisis which France had provoked in March, the Ministers of both countries

said they were reluctant to run the risk of antagonizing France and some of the smaller Allies by undertaking to establish at that time a permanent restricted body within NATO which would be the locus of highly important and interesting discussions. On July 26, therefore, the Ministers merely agreed that specific proposals for a permanent organization should be considered by their deputies and then by a ministerial meeting of Working Group III to be held in Rome on September 23 and 24.

During the July meeting the British Defense Minister suggested that discussion of joint or collective nuclear sharing should be deleted from the mandate of the new nuclear planning group. It had been included in a draft Minute prepared by the US. He said that some members of the UK Government believed that the creation of a permanent nuclear planning group should be the occasion for formally abandoning discussions of collective nuclear "hardware." The German Defense Minister agreed to the deletion on the assurance that the record of the July meeting would show that the Ministers did not exclude "hardware" from subjects which could be discussed by the permanent group.

The British proposal to abandon formally further discussions of "hardware" when the Special Committee is put on a permanent basis is a reflection of Great Britain's active interest in a non-proliferation treaty, an interest that is echoed among many other members of the Alliance. Germany has modified its former strong resistance to a non-proliferation agreement, and would now apparently be willing to become a party to such a treaty as long as its minimum desires for security and status in nuclear affairs (which still may include some semblance of a "hardware" arrangement) are met in some appropriate way.

The Next Step. Since July the US proposals for a permanent organization have been discussed at length at the Permanent Representative level. By now there is general agreement with the US view that there should be a permanent body in the form of an open-ended committee called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), which would be a Committee of the North Atlantic Council composed of Defense Ministers of any interested countries. It would meet under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, presumably at the time of ministerial meetings of the NAC.

The kind of intimate discussions which to date have been held in Working Group II would be pursued in a subordinate Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) consisting of the Defense Ministers of five or six countries. The US, UK, FRG and Italy would be permanent members, and there would be one or two rotating members to be selected on an annual basis. NATO's Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, has expressed the view that he should also be chairman of the NPG so that proper coordination can take place between overall NATO planning and NATO nuclear planning. The US and the other members of Working Group II oppose Brosio's view, but they agree that the Secretary General should be present or represented at the group's meetings. The NPG would consider policies, plans and programs for the use of nuclear weapons; improvement in the machinery for consulting about the actual or potential use of nuclear weapons; and possible modernization of existing weapons systems and the development of new systems.

The Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Working Group will decide at Rome on September 23 and 24 whether to propose a permanent organization of this kind to the Special Committee as a whole. Some of the British and German reluctance to move ahead at this time has persisted. It is entirely possible, therefore, that some of the Ministers will prefer, for a variety of political reasons, to delay taking such a major decision on so vital an issue and will wish to refer the matter to the deputies for further consideration. If the Ministers do decide to go ahead, the Special Committee as a whole may agree to recommend the formation of the NDAC and NPG to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December. If approved, the new organizations could be in business by the beginning of 1967.

III. IS THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ENOUGH?

The expression of German misgivings is a recurrent theme in the story of the Special Committee. German officials have repeatedly said that consultation was not enough and that the Alliance needed an arrangement for joint ownership and control of nuclear weapons in which Germany could participate. As the record of Special Committee meetings shows, however, the urgency with which the German Government has called for a "hardware solution" in addition to the Special Committee has diminished noticeably since the Committee was formed.

There are several explanations for this trend. In part it reflects specific developments of the past several months. Since the end of 1965 the Allies have suspended the examination of specific proposals for joint ownership and control of nuclear policy. NATO has been preoccupied with many other problems which Germany would not wish to aggravate by pressing now for a nuclear sharing arrangement.

The decreasing emphasis on the need for a "hardware solution" also reflects longer-range general trends. There is less fear of war in Europe now than there was in the early 1960's when changes in the nuclear status quo were advocated with greater urgency. Europeans, including many Germans, are more interested in seeking areas of agreement with Eastern Europe, and the German Government is aware that if it pressed for a "hardware solution" now, the prospects for "detente" would be reduced. The story of the MLF showed that the other Allies would not be enthusiastic if Germany revived pressure for a nuclear sharing arrangement, and France, for its own reasons of status and prestige, would be vehemently opposed. This French reaction is apparently a factor of some importance for the Germans.

It is true that the present leaders of the German Government, including Erhard, Schroeder and von Hassel, are publicly committed to a "hardware solution," and they will probably continue to state this position, perhaps with modifications, even if only for the record. There is little reason to believe, however, that their political fortunes, whatever state they may be in, will be any more severely damaged by a failure at this late date to achieve a "hardware solution" than they were by their inability to reach agreement

with their Allies on a multilateral force in 1964 and 1965. In any case, Germany clearly has less reason now to press for "hardware" than it did when the Special Committee was formed, and barring a sharp increase in East-West tension in Europe, there is no reason to believe that this trend will be reversed in the foreseeable future.

This does not mean that all the security and prestige considerations which led Germany to seek a "hardware solution" have disappeared. To the extent that these considerations remain, however, continued participation in an organization such as the Special Committee should be able to satisfy them to a reasonable degree. In future discussions Germany and the other non-nuclear participants can acquire greater confidence that Europe will, in fact, be adequately defended by nuclear weapons in an emergency. If the new organization or the Alliance as a whole can devise procedures which will assure timely consultation in an emergency, Europeans could develop greater confidence that they will have a say about where and when nuclear weapons will be used so that their interests can be protected. The European participants would have the opportunity to become more aware of the real capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons, and could develop a greater appreciation for the considerations underlying US nuclear policy. The US, in turn, could have a greater appreciation for the specific concerns which Europeans have in the field of nuclear defense, and could learn better how these concerns might be satisfied.

Finally, active participation in deployment and targeting could provide the prestige of having an active role in the execution of nuclear policy. In particular, status could come to the Germans from participation as a permanent member in NATO's only important "inner circle," now that the Standing Group (of which Germany was not a member) has been abolished.

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