

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3287

PAGE 01 SEOUL 03150 01 OF 02 150738Z
ACTION SSO-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-00 EAP-00 TEDE-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /000W
-----630F07 150738Z /38

O 150724Z JUN 00
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9111
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 7199
SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/ISA/EA// IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5// IMMEDIATE
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//J-5// IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-5/PA// IMMEDIATE

APPEALS PANEL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
RELEASED 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D)

Classification Extended on : 02/15/2017 ~ Class:
CONFIDENTIAL ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~ Declassify on:
06-14-2025

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DEPT FOR U/S PICKERING, C - AMB. SHERMAN, NP - A/S EINHORN,
EAP - A/S ROTH, PDAS DEMING, AMB. KARTMAN, AND EAP/K

DEPT PLS PASS NSC FOR LIEBERTHAL

FROM AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: (AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION)
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03150 01 OF 02 150738Z
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MNUC, PINR, KS, KN
SUBJECT: INITIAL THOUGHTS ON NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT OUTCOME

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH. REASONS: 1.5
(B), (D).

1. (C) THE NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN SUMMIT WAS A MAJOR SUCCESS IN
ESTABLISHING AN UNPRECEDENTED DIRECT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE TOP LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AND IN
PERSONALLY COMMITTING BOTH OF THEM TO SEEK INTRA-KOREAN
RECONCILIATION. THIS AND A MORE ENCOURAGING REGIONAL
ENVIRONMENT ARE THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NORTH-
SOUTH DIALOGUE OF 1991-92, WHICH RESULTED IN MAJOR
AGREEMENTS BUT ULTIMATELY COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED.

2. (C) EVEN WITH THE DIRECT, PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE TWO
TOP OFFICIALS AND INTERNATIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT, THE ROAD TO
NORTH-SOUTH RECONCILIATION WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT.
INEVITABLY, POINTS WILL BE REACHED AT WHICH PROGRESS
STALLS. HOWEVER, FURTHER DRAMATIC EVENTS AND SUBSTANTIVE

PROGRESS APPEAR LIKELY IN THE COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS. THERE IS AMPLE ROOM FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO IDENTIFY AND IMPLEMENT IMPORTANT AREAS OF AGREEMENT, AND KIM JONG IL HAS NOW JOINED KIM DAE-JUNG IN DEMONSTRATING HIS COMMITMENT TO DO SO.

3. (S) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEADERS' INITIAL AGREEMENT WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR OF HOW FORTHCOMING NORTH KOREA WILL BE IN THE WAKE OF THE SUMMIT. THE TWO LEADERS HAVE AGREED TO HAVE THEIR OFFICIALS MEET VERY SOON TO TRANSLATE THEIR GENERAL AGREEMENT INTO PRACTICAL MEASURES.

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03150 01 OF 02 150738Z

ON FAMILY REUNIONS, THE NORTH HAS AGREED SO FAR ONLY TO MEETINGS OF SOME DIVIDED FAMILIES ON AUGUST 15, FAR SHORT OF SOUTH KOREANS' HOPES FOR UNIVERSAL AND SUSTAINED CONTACT BETWEEN DIVIDED FAMILIES, AT LEAST BY CORRESPONDENCE. THE NORTH KOREANS, FOR THEIR PART, WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY THE PACE OF SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE ASSISTANCE. BUT HERE, TOO, THE NORTH MUST PLAY ITS PART, FOR EXAMPLE, BY REASSURING SOUTH KOREAN INVESTORS THAT THEIR INVESTMENTS WILL NOT BE CONFISCATED, THAT PROFITS CAN BE REPATRIATED, AND THAT THERE WILL BE NO DOUBLE TAXATION.

4. (S) THE PERSONAL TRIUMPHS SCORED BY BOTH KIM DAE-JUNG AND KIM JONG IL AT THE SUMMIT WILL REINFORCE THEIR PERSONAL INCLINATION TO PURSUE ENGAGEMENT, AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO ENSURE THAT LOWER-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS WORK IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING MODE. KIM DAE-JUNG'S PERFORMANCE WAS VIRTUALLY FLAWLESS. HE MADE ELOQUENT APPEALS TO THE NORTH KOREANS BUT WITHOUT CONCEDED SOUTH KOREAN POSITIONS. THE SOUTH KOREAN OPPOSITION WILL CONTINUE TO CLOSELY MONITOR KDJ'S ENGAGEMENT POLICY, BUT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TRY TO SLOW IT DOWN MUCH AS LONG AS NORTH KOREA CONTINUES TO BE REASONABLY FORTHCOMING.

5. (S) MEANWHILE, KIM JONG IL, AS HE JOKINGLY SAID ON CAMERA, HAS BEEN "LIBERATED" FROM HIS IMAGE AS A "RECLUSE." HIS RELAXED, COURTEOUS, AND HUMOROUS MANNER WAS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE USUAL CARICATURE OF HIM. THE VERY FAVORABLE SOUTH KOREAN AND WORLD REACTION TO HIS APPEARANCE -- HE WILL NOT HAVE MISSED IT BECAUSE HE PUBLICLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WATCHES SOUTH KOREAN TELEVISION -- WILL LIKELY ENCOURAGE HIM TO PURSUE FURTHER SUCH CONTACT WITH KDJ AND

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 03150 01 OF 02 150738Z

OTHER WORLD LEADERS. INDEED, HE HAS ALREADY AGREED WITH KDJ THAT HE WILL VISIT "SEOUL" AT AN "APPROPRIATE TIME."

6. (S) THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DEEPLY MOVED BY THIS UNPRECEDENTED MEETING, AND THEY NOW FEEL THEY HAVE REASON TO AT LEAST HOPE FOR SUSTAINED PROGRESS TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND, EVENTUALLY, UNIFICATION. MOST SOUTH KOREANS, HOWEVER, ARE QUITE REALISTIC, AND KNOW THAT THIS

IS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN MUCH USE OF THE WORD "UNIFICATION" IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUMMIT, THAT IS NEITHER KIM DAE-JUNG'S IMMEDIATE GOAL NOR THAT OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF SOUTH KOREANS. THUS, THE TWO LEADERS' AGREEMENT TO EXPLORE AREAS OF COMMONALITY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CONFEDERATION PROPOSALS HAS ATTRACTED RELATIVELY LITTLE MEDIA ATTENTION HERE.

7. (C) THE FIRST OF THE FIVE AREAS AGREED BY THE TWO LEADERS IS FOR AN "AUTONOMOUS" (OFTEN MISLEADINGLY

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 03150 02 OF 02 150738Z
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
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TRANSLATED IN THIS CONTEXT AS "INDEPENDENT") RESOLUTION OF THE PENINSULAR ISSUES. THIS IS A Milder VARIANT OF THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE "JULY 4 (1972) DECLARATION" BY THEN-PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE AND KIM IL SUNG, WHICH STATED THAT "UNIFICATION SHALL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH AUTONOMOUS EFFORTS

WITHOUT ... EXTERNAL ... INTERFERENCE." THE JULY 4
DECLARATION WAS EXPLICITLY CITED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN
APRIL OF AGREEMENT FOR A NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT.



1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

THE LANGUAGE DOES HAVE A CERTAIN RESONANCE WITH SOUTH
KOREANS AS WELL. AS A REFLECTION OF SOUTH KOREANS' NATURAL DESIRE TO BE THE
LEADING PLAYER IN DETERMINING "KOREA'S DESTINY."

1.4(D)
B1

8. (S) KIM DAE-JUNG PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ATTRIBUTES THE
SUCCESS TO DATE OF HIS ENGAGEMENT POLICY IN CONSIDERABLE
MEASURE TO U.S. SUPPORT, AND THE GENERAL SOUTH KOREAN
PERCEPTION IS THAT THE USG IS COOPERATING CLOSELY AND WELL
WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT ON NORTH KOREA. IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT THE USG POSITION CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF
COMPLETE SUPPORT, PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY, AND IN PRACTICE FOR
THE SUCCESS OF KDJ'S ENGAGEMENT POLICY. THIS IS BOTH FOR
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03150 02 OF 02 150738Z
THE SAKE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH KOREA AND FOR THE
SUCCESS OF KDJ'S POLICY, WHICH OFFERS THE BEST HOPE THAT
ISSUES OF PRIORITY CONCERN TO US WILL ALSO EVENTUALLY BE
SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED. THUS, OUR PLANNED ANNOUNCEMENT OF
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS-EASING STEPS AGAINST NORTH
KOREA HAS BEEN VERY FAVORABLY REPORTED HERE AS AN
INDICATION OF ACTIVE U.S. EFFORTS TO SUPPORT SOUTH KOREA'S
POLICY. WE CAN EXPECT THAT OUR ANNOUNCEMENT JUNE 15 OF
ANOTHER 50,000 TONS OF FOOD AID TO THE DPRK WILL BE
SIMILARLY VIEWED BY SOUTH KOREANS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE
ARE MANY IN THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESS CORPS WHO ARE
HYPERSENSITIVE ABOUT ANY "INDICATIONS" OF U.S. "ENVY" OR
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN APPROACH. WE WILL
THEREFORE NEED TO CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE IN ALL OUR
STATEMENTS THAT WE REGARD THE TWO KOREAS AS THE CENTRAL
PLAYERS ON THE PENINSULA AND THAT WE ARE MOST HOPEFUL FOR
THE SUCCESS OF THEIR DIALOGUE.

BOSWORTH

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