

# TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

OUTGOING

AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

P. 23 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Control: 1025A

Date: Nov 30, 1965  
12:30 PM

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Charge: Embassy

FILES  
COMM  
CHRON  
AMB  
MIN  
RF  
POL  
POL  
LCON  
CAO  
ATTACHES

ACTION TO:	SECSTATE WASHINGTON	1591
INFO :	AMCONSUL HONG KONG	201
	AMEMBASSY MOSCOW	33
	AMEMBASSY WARSAW	ONE

1. Polish First Secretary Andrzej Grawziuk told EmbOff he had talked to PKI Central Committee member at 8:00 A.M. on October 1. PKI source was elated, knowing that Sept 30 Movement then underway. PKI source told Grawziuk, "This is what we've been waiting for." He said not all of PKI Central Committee knew about plot, only "special group" headed by Aidit.

2. According this source, idea originated outside PKI (presumably Sukarno although this not stated) and Aidit presented proposal to group from Central Committee (presumably Politburo, possibly supplemented by other key CC members). PKI leaders agreed to participate on condition that PKI as

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organization would not be involved and that only objective was intra-government operation to seize limited group of top generals. Source claimed there was no intention to kill generals. PKI source added that Sukarno was supposed to come out with statement on October 1 alleging suppression of Generals' Council plot.

3. Gradziuk said he believes PKI had become so dependent on taking orders from Sukarno that it was subsequently paralyzed when Sukarno failed to act. On other hand, he thought Sukarno was gradually reasserting control and might still win out (This line may have been designed to solicit EmbOff's opinion, however).

4. Source thought Chinese saw present picture in black and white terms and really did not have clear idea of what happened or forces at work. He said Chicoms believe it is simple matter of reactionary Army on one side and temporarily defeated PKI on other with

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Sukarno no longer important factor. Chicom  
see no importance in cultivating middle forces. They  
feel Sukarno was untrustworthy ally who let PKI  
down (Although not explicitly stated, corollary  
of this analysis would be that Chinese felt PKI  
internal strategy wrong all along and are assuming I  
told you so attitude).

5. Gradziuk felt Soviets saw more complex  
situation but he was unwilling or unable to express  
himself so clearly on Soviet attitudes. He did  
say that Soviets were disturbed that Army targets  
extended beyond PKI itself to "other progressive  
groups," attitude implicitly shared by source.  
Gradziuk was particularly interested in soliciting  
EmbOff opinion on feasibility of forming new Communist  
Party. This question also posed by Soviet counselor  
in separate conversation with EmbOff and may indicate  
that it is at center of Soviet attention. In reply  
to question, Gradziuk said he did not think Soviets

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knew where Indo Army going politically and did not feel they were in position to talk seriously to Army on political matters at this time in view of confused situation.

6. In brief separate conversation, Soviet Political Counselor ~~EmbOff~~ said he could not understand why PKI did not act in face of repression by Army. "Why, why, why?" he repeated. EmbOff answered with Polish argument that PKI may be immobilized by long habit of obeying counselor Sukarno. Soviet ~~Officer~~ responded that PKI may think Sukarno is with them but it is obvious he is only trying to save himself and no longer cares what happens to PKI, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

7. Comment: It is possible that Polish EmbOff's story was doctored to protect PKI or to appear cooperative. Source is long-time acquaintance, however, and appears highly Western-oriented and sympathetic to progressive non-Communism. On other hand, he is

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believed to be intelligence officer and is  
undoubtedly a good one.

GP-4.

GREEN

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POL:EMasters

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11/30/65

*RJM*

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