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# TELEGRAM

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

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POL 15-1 SUKARNO

Control: DJAKARTA 3143

Date: Jan 9, 1967  
1725 cns

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1. In talk with Political Counselor January 7 Maj. Gen.

Sjarif Thajeb said Suharto is definitely committed to ousting

Sukarno but will not be pushed and insists on doing things his

own way. Since attempts to persuade Suharto to move ~~more~~ more

rapidly have failed, Sjarif and other "hawks" are attempting to

create situation which will force Suharto to act and thereby

precipitate final showdown. They believe this can be done by

March.

Next

2. ~~Next~~/major event, according to Sjarif, will be Sukarno's

report to MPES which other sources say now due tomorrow. Sjarif

said statement will criticize PKI role in Gestapu but will place

real blame on Nekolij and "its local Army friends" who "deceived

PKI" and induced it to act as it did. Statement will by implication

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also place blame for events of October 1, 1965, on Nasution.

Sjarif said statement will not mention CIA by name, but

"implication will be clear" that this is what is meant by  
use of term Nekolin<sup>m</sup>.

3. Sjarif said statement will please no one and will certainly not rpt not be acceptable to Army. It will in fact be useful to "hawks" to heighten anti-Sukarno feeling and pave way for two major actions planned during next several weeks. First effort will be coordinated move to mobilize public opinion against Sukarno. (This apparently already underway - Djakarta 3120.) Second will be expansion in membership of Parliament (DPR) in order to make this body, and also MPRS which includes all DPR members, more manageable.

3 4. Parliament will convene January 23, Sjarif said, and will serve as "prosecutor" in move against Sukarno. Sjarif indicated he himself would spearhead attack. After airing Sukarno's misdeeds, Parliament will call for MPRS session to deal coup de grace.

5. MPRS is expected to meet in late February or early March

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at which time it will "suspend Sukarno" pending a full investigation of his regime. Sjarif was vague on what would follow suspension decree but he and "hawks" apparently hope this action by MPRS will suffice and will either induce Sukarno to retire gracefully or precipitate military showdown/<sup>which</sup> ~~which~~ will force<sup>f</sup>fully remove him from office. Sjarif seemed to think latter was ~~max~~ more likely possibility and said bloodshed likely before problem solved. Sjarif, and also Abu Bakar Lubis in subsequent talk, said trip abroad by Sukarno "definitely out." Sukarno refuses to go voluntarily and Suharto and others prefer to deal with him within Indonesia rather than taking what they regard as undesirable step from standpoint of world public opinion of forcibly exiling president.

4 6. Timetable similar to that given by Sjarif Thajeb has been outlined to use<sup>4</sup> by other knowledgeable sources. There no question but that this/<sup>is</sup> what "hawks" hope to achieve but exact way scenario will unfold cannot be predicted at this time with any degree of certainty. Suharto is still calling shots and has not tipped his hand. Additional uncertainty is fact MPRS may prove difficult to control unless Suharto permits Army to exert

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real pressure on members.

7. Our guess is that Suharto definitely wants to remove or neutralize Sukarno but is committed to no firm timetable or exact method beyond fact he wants to stick to constitutional means and avoid bloodshed if possible. As a result he is resisting efforts to force him into what he regards as premature action but is taking no steps to prevent situation from ripening to point where more direct move against Sukarno may be feasible or in fact inevitable. When and if that happens Suharto will act as forcefully as he did in March 1966.

8. Following Lebaran holidays (Jan. 12 and 13) we will again be entering period of tension which likely to build for month or ~~more~~<sup>more</sup>. Net effect will probably be to reduce Sukarno's position further but there no certainty now that this tense period any more likely to result in Sukarno's final ouster than those which preceded it.

GP-3.

LYDMAN



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